

Uluslararası Politik Arařtırmalar Dergisi

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CONSTRAINTS

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FİLİSTİN VE İSRAİL

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The Rise of Turkey's Soft Power in Africa: Reasons, Dynamics, and Constraints

Abdurrahim SIRADAĞ¹

Abstract

Since 2005, with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) governments, the African continent has gained a great importance in Turkish Foreign Policy. Turkey's soft power policy is one of the most important tools in the development of multilateral relations with Africa. Turkey has been making significant cooperation with African countries in the fields of military and defense in recent years. For example, Turkey's largest overseas military base was opened in Somalia in 2017. However, Turkey's soft power prepares a very important strategic ground for deepening relations with the continent in the political, economic, social, and security fields. The ruling AK Party governments have moved Turkey's relations with Africa from an ideological dimension to a strategic one, revealing that the African continent has a strategic meaning for Turkey. The research argues that Turkey's soft power strategy toward Africa has been influenced by several factors and dynamics including historical, geographical, political, and economic. This study aims to contribute to the literature by analyzing Turkey's soft power policy in Africa in a conceptual framework and holistic approach.

Keywords: Turkey, Africa, Justice and Development Party (AK Party), Soft Power, Turkish Foreign Policy.

Türkiye'nin Afrika'da Yumuşak Gücünün Yükselişi: Sebepler, Dinamikler ve Engeller

Abdurrahim SIRADAĞ¹

Özet

2005 yılından itibaren Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Parti) hükümetleri ile birlikte Afrika kıtası Türk Dış Politikasında önem kazanmaya başlamıştır. Türkiye'nin yumuşak güç politikası, Afrika ile çok taraflı ilişkilerin geliştirilmesinde en önemli araçlardan biridir. Türkiye son yıllarda Afrika ülkeleriyle askeri ve savunma alanlarında önemli işbirlikleri yapmaktadır. Örneğin Türkiye'nin yurtdışındaki en büyük askeri üssü 2017 yılında Somali'de açıldı. Ancak Türkiye'nin yumuşak gücü, kıta ile siyasi, ekonomik, sosyal ve güvenlik alanlarında ilişkileri derinleştirmek için çok önemli bir stratejik zemin hazırlamaktadır. AK Parti hükümetleri Türkiye'nin Afrika ile ilişkilerini ideolojik bir boyuttan stratejik bir boyuta taşıyarak Afrika kıtasının Türkiye için stratejik bir anlamı olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Araştırma, Türkiye'nin Afrika'ya yönelik yumuşak güç stratejisinin tarihi, coğrafi, siyasi ve ekonomik dahil olmak üzere bir dizi faktör ve dinamikten etkilendiğini savunuyor. Bu çalışma, Türkiye'nin Afrika'daki yumuşak güç politikasını kavramsal bir çerçevede ve bütüncül bir yaklaşımla analiz ederek literatüre katkı sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Afrika, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Parti), Yumuşak Güç, Türk Dış Politikası.

INTRODUCTION

The African continent was mostly known in Turkey with negative concepts such as hunger, wars, and drought. However, despite the fact that the African continent has always had a very important strategic position in world politics, with its geopolitical position, the enormous wealth in the underground, and its dynamic population exceeding 1 billion, the African continent has not received enough attention in Turkey for a long time. After the 1974 Cyprus Intervention, Turkey started to take a series of important steps to diversify Turkish foreign policy and develop strategic relations with non-Western actors in order to reduce its dependence on the West. In this context, the African continent has become one of the important strategic areas of interest for Turkish foreign policy. In this regard, under the leadership of the then foreign minister Ahmet Gündüz Gökçün, the First African Plan was initiated, and a delegation of politicians and businessmen was sent to Africa in February 1979 to develop multifaceted relations with Africa. However, with the military coup of September 12, 1980, the First African Plan could not be implemented as a long-term strategic plan (İncesu, 2020). The Second Africa Action Plan was prepared in 1998 under the leadership of the then foreign minister İsmail Cem with the contributions of the Turkish civil society, Turkish businessmen, and Turkish diplomats to develop bilateral relations with the African countries but the second plan was also not implemented successfully by the Turkish coalition government of that time because of the political and economic crises in the country (Özkan, 2014: 25). With the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) declaring 2005 as the Year of Africa, news and developments regarding Africa began to be followed more closely by the Turkish media and Turkish academics. Until the 2010s, the Turkish media was transmitting news about Africa to the Turkish society, mostly from western news sources. Especially after 2010, when state news institutions such as Anadolu Agency (AA) and Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) started to open representative offices in different African countries, African news and developments have been transmitted to Turkish society more accurately and more objectively. Since 2005 Turkey has been actively engaging with Africa at the highest level and has been implementing the Africa Action Plan of 1998 effectively (Hazar, 2016: 10-11). An illustration of this change of implementation can be demonstrated by the fact that in 2009 Turkey only had 12 embassies across the African continent. Contrast that with the 43 Turkish embassies present in Africa in 2021 (T.C. Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹). Also, in 2008 only 10 African countries had diplomatic missions in Ankara. Today 37 African countries have diplomatic missions in the Turkish capital (T.C. Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹). With the increase in the number of Turkey's diplomatic missions in the continent, Turkey started to become a more visible actor in the continent, and as a result, Turkey started to develop multilateral relations with African countries more easily.

The ruling AK Party governments opened new offices for the undersecretary of foreign trade in 26 countries across the African continent to enhance her economic relations with African countries (T.C. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey¹). Furthermore, Turkey has expanded commercial and economic relations with the African countries by establishing Turkey-Africa Business Councils with more than 40 countries in Africa. As a result of intense political and economic relations with Africa, Turkey's trading relations with Africa have increased significantly from 5.4 billion dollars in 2003 to about 30 billion dollars in 2021 (T.C. Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹).

Moreover, Turkey organized Turkey-Africa Partnership Summits in Istanbul and in Malabo in 2008 and in 2014 respectively to institutionalize its multilateral relations with the continent (Sıradağ, 2020: 8-10). The third Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit was held on 16-18 December 2021 in Istanbul. Through these summits, Turkey aims to strengthen its multifaceted relations with the African countries and to become a permanent and visible actor in the continent. Importantly, the African Union (AU) accepted Turkey as a strategic partner of the continent in 2008. In this way, Turkey was recognized as an important strategic partner by the most important regional organization of the continent and started to establish strong relations with sub-regional African organizations.

It is important to highlight that Turkey has actively engaged in the re-building process of Somalia since the President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a historic visit to this country in 2011. The state and non-state actors have collectively built schools, hospitals, mosques, and roads (Sıradağ, 2016: 95-98). Humanitarian and development assistance provided by Turkey to Somalia has exceeded 1 billion dollars since 2011. Meanwhile, Turkey opened its largest Embassy Complex in Somalia in 2016 and its largest overseas military base in 2017 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey²). Turkey's active foreign

policy in Somalia has led to the emergence of Turkey as a significant political actor in Somalia as well as in the African continent.

There has been a growing literature on Turkey-Africa relations since 2005 after the ruling AK Party governments began to be actively involved in African politics. Turkey's interest in African politics has not only drawn the attention of Turkish academics and the Turkish media. It has also caught the attention of many international academicians, politicians, and the international media. However, there is still a lack of academic literature examining the specific aspects of Turkey-Africa relations. In this regard, not enough scholarship work has been done in the specific fields illuminating Turkey's soft power in Africa from a conceptual and theoretical perspective. In this sense, this research will aim to fill this significant gap in the academic literature. This study will seek to answer the following questions: What are the reasons and the dynamics behind Turkey's increasing soft power activities in Africa? To what extent Turkey has constructed its soft power policy in Africa?

Discussion on the Concept of Soft Power

When discussing the concept of soft power, the name Joseph Nye is usually mentioned as the most important originator of the concept of soft power in the 1990s. According to Nye (2004: 256), soft power is "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments". Nye underlines that there are three important instruments of soft power, namely, culture, ideology, and institutions. If a country can attract other countries with its culture and ideology, it will be accepted as a model country by the other countries and will be followed. Global actors will be more powerful and effective if they can spread their language, culture, and ideology in the world (Nye, 1990: 167-169).

Public diplomacy is a significant component of the concept of soft power. Public diplomacy is defined as a means to establish long-term relationships with other countries. Global actors aim to create a suitable environment to implement their foreign policy objectives with other strategically important countries through public diplomacy (Nye, 2004: 8). Hence, academic exchange programs with different countries, providing scholarships to foreign students, and organizing international seminars and conferences are crucial to consolidating a country's soft power. In addition, the global actors need to open their own cultural and educational centers in foreign countries and establish their radio stations and TV channels to spread their foreign policy objectives and values. Not only talking but also listening to the people directly is necessary to reinforce the concept. Besides this, working with NGOs and with companies is also necessary to increase a country's soft power (Nye, 2004: 13-24).

Sharing the same values with other countries is important for the execution of soft power policies successfully. It is critical to emphasize that soft power policies should avoid offending the religious and cultural values of the other countries (Nye, 2004: 10-15). Nye (2004: 13) states that Hollywood movies weaken the U.S.'s global image by offending the cultural and religious values of Muslims. The global role of the US has been brought into question in the eyes of the public in foreign countries in recent times. This is due to her focus being the use of hard power. For example, the use of military force of the U.S. to change the political systems in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2001 and 2003 respectively. This was followed by a public perception that it neglected to implement soft power policies to rebuild those countries after the occupations (Nye, 2004: 19).

Three concepts constitute soft power, namely benignity, brilliance, and beauty (Vuving, 2009: 8-11). Benignity refers to how a country develops its relations with another one. A benign country helps and protects another one without considering selfish interests. Such a country always respects different values and cultures, and it never threatens or forces other countries to get what it wants. Brilliance is the capability of the state to solve problems and make advances in science, technology, diplomacy, and the economy. Beauty denotes how a country can lead others to unite and work together. If a country can make successful and fair cooperation with other countries to pursue a common interest, it can be an influential power in world politics (Vuving, 2009).

The concept of soft power also includes some criticisms. The first criticism is that the resources of soft power are intangible. While a country's tanks and military aircraft are counted, soft power policies are uncountable. Therefore, it is difficult to measure the results of soft power policies (Yukaruc, 2017: 491-502). The second issue is that the soft power policies of global actors can sometimes damage the countries' global reputations. For instance, when Hollywood movies offend Muslims and undervalue Islam, the American government failed to control it (Nye, 2004: 13). For this reason, the question of how governments should assert control over the resources of soft power is not scrutinized thoroughly.

Furthermore, the question of how a country can make its policies more attractive remains ambiguous (Yukaruc, 2017: 499). It is hard to get a quick result from soft power policies because soft power policies take years. Importantly, the success of the soft power policies of a country depends on how foreign people internalize and respect soft power policies (Nye, 2004: 1).

In the light of the soft power concept debates, Turkey's lack of a history of exploitation in the African continent and its shared cultural and religious values with the African countries paved the way for Turkey to emerge as a strong soft power actor in the continent. At the same time, Turkey's active work through state and non-state actors in humanitarian and development aid projects in the continent and its direct contact with African people is one of the most important factors that increase Turkey's soft power on the African continent. Turkey does not use its political, economic, and military power as a pressure tool to strengthen its strategic relations with African countries. Turkey plays an important role in promoting Turkish culture in Africa through the activities of Yunus Emre Cultural Centers. The fact that news and developments related to Africa are featured more frequently in the Turkish media has also contributed significantly to the change in the perception of Africa in Turkey.

Change in Turkish Foreign Policy

The end of the Cold War era not only brought about significant changes in Turkish foreign policy but also influenced global politics profoundly. Turkey saw the end of the Cold War era as a strategic opportunity to reconstruct its traditional foreign policy and, therefore played a more proactive role in increasing her bilateral relations with the newly independent states in Central Asia and Caucasus. During the leadership of Turgut Özal (1983-1993) Turkey reinterpreted its historical and geographical identity from a more dynamic perspective. A policy shift was made, with the assessment that if Turkey was to develop a multilateral and multidimensional foreign policy it would have to increase bilateral relations with the former territories of the Ottoman State at the highest level (Jung, 2012: 33).

When the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power in 2001, Turkey entered a new political, economic, and social transformation. It began to realign Turkey's soft power policies taking into consideration the underlying Ottoman history in Africa. Specifically emphasizing Turkey's geographical position as among the most significant assets behind Turkey's soft power policy. According to the AK Party elite, Turkey has an Afro-Eurasian identity meaning that Turkey should develop its relations not only with Europe but also with Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (Davutoğlu, 2001: 65-74). The AK Party's geopolitical identity relies on Turkey's changing political, economic, and security interests and its socio-cultural dynamics. The new geopolitical identity of the ruling AK Party government has expanded her geographical vision from the West to the Middle East, the Balkans, Africa, Asia, and far beyond (Kalin, 2012: 12). Turkey's geographical and historical depths construct the new identity of Turkish foreign policy (Aras, 2009: 5).

Kalin (2011: 21) argues that Turkey has constructed a new conceptual framework for Turkish foreign policy during the AK Party government. Turkey's soft power policy has been based on its history, geographical depths, its democratic experience, and its vibrant civil society during the period of the ruling AK Party governments. Turkey's soft power capacity depends on how Turkey mobilizes its internal dynamics. Turkey failed in the past and made strategic mistakes such as military coups, the closures of the political parties, economic and political crises, and identity crises between secularism and Islam. These mistakes weakened the development of Turkey's soft power. Turkey has become a center of attraction with her economic and political performance with the AK Party governments in the neighboring countries and beyond (Kalin, 2011: 16-8).

Diversification in Turkish foreign policy (TFP) has become one of the most significant features of the AK Party governments (Öniş, 2011: 62). In this regard, Turkey has increased its strategic relations with Russia, Iran, China, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa at the highest level (Kalin, 2012: 11). Also, Turkey has become one of the largest economic powers within the EU and become the 16th largest economy in the world under the leadership of the AK Party government. Additionally, Turkey has been among one of the fast-growing countries in the world and has made significant progress in advancing its national defense industry during this period. (Haugom, 2019: 212).

The New Instruments of Turkey's Soft Power in Africa: The New Political Values

The ruling AK Party government has established new institutions and strengthened the existing institutions of the traditional Turkish foreign policy to revive its soft power in the world. In 2002 Turkey

only had 163 diplomatic missions in the world, this has increased to 239 today. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey1). The Office of Public Diplomacy (OPD) was among the most important institutions contributing to Turkey's soft power established under the Office of Prime Ministry in 2010. The OPC was re-named as the Directorate of Communications (DoC) in 2018 and set up under the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey. The main objectives of the DoC were to coordinate relations among public institutions, increase relations between state agencies and NGOs, and explain the changing role of Turkey in the world (Kalın, 2011: 11-12). Among the activities of the DoC, it has organized public policy panels, conferences, foreign policy workshops, youth programs, country meetings, international summits, journalist delegation programs, and cultural and promotional activities (Turan and Karafil, 2017: 25-9). The Directorate of Communications organized the "Turkey-Afrika Media Summit" in Istanbul on 25-26 May 2022. 80 press members from 45 African countries, African diplomats, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and academics attended this program. The aim of the summit is to increase cooperation between media representatives in Turkey and African countries and to strengthen Turkey's image in the African media (T.C. İletişim Başkanlığı). With this summit, Turkey aims to further reinforce its strategic presence in the continent through its soft power policy in African countries.

Religion, Culture, and Education

The ruling AK Party government took important steps at the institutional level to strengthen its relations with countries that have common social and cultural ties. In this sense, Türkiye Diyanet Foundation (TDV) is a religious organization aiming to increase historical, cultural, and religious ties with countries having a common historical and religious relationship. In this regard, the TDV has organized a wide range of social, cultural, and religious activities in Turkey and abroad. While it only operated in 30 countries before 2010, today it operates in more than 140 countries and runs 18 schools around the world. Moreover, it has built 294 water wells in 26 countries in Africa and runs four schools in Somalia including Somaliland (DiyanetHaber). TDV also provides scholarships for thousands of African students studying in Turkey under the International Imam Hatip High School Projects (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfi). Moreover, TDV organized the third Summit of African Muslim Religious Leaders, which was held in Istanbul in October 2019 (Directorate of Communications of Turkey, 2019). In addition, the TDV opened the largest mosque in Djibouti in November 2019 named Abdulhamid Han II Mosque (Anadolu Agency, 2019a).

Yunus Emre Institute (YEI) was set up in 2007 as an important pillar of cultural diplomacy to promote the Turkish language, history, and art abroad and to develop cultural relations with foreign countries. YEI has opened cultural centers in 58 countries with 8 being in African countries. YEI has plans to open new cultural centers in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique soon. The Turkish language has been taught as an elective course in three universities in Ethiopia since 2018 (TRT Haber, 2019). Since 2016, YEI has also been providing Turkish courses at Cheikh Anta Diop University in Senegal. Furthermore, YEI signed a protocol with the Department of Chief of Staff in 2018 to establish a Turkish Language Teaching Centre in the Senegalese Army (Yunus Emre Institute, 2020).

The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) is also one of the newly established organizations founded in 2010 as a new diaspora institution to develop relations with Turks living abroad. YTB conducted the African Media Representatives Training Program (AFMED) in 2019 with 20 African journalists attending the program from 20 African countries (Anadolu Agency, 2019b). YTB has also regularly organized graduation meetings with African students who studied in Turkey such as in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Nigeria, Kenya, Chad and Mauritania, Mali, Somalia, and Ghana.

Educational activities of Turkey in Africa promote Turkey's soft power significantly. Turkey's Scholarship Program established in 2012 has been one of the most significant international programs developed by YTB. Through this program, more than 100,000 foreign students have applied for studying at Turkish universities every year. As of 2019, 150,000 from 203 countries have been studying in different universities in Turkey. More than 15,000 African students have been studying in Turkey, with only 4,500 studying under the Turkey Scholarship Program. Most students from African countries come to study in Turkey from Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Kenya, Somalia, Malawi, Nigeria, and Cameroon (Yurtdışı Türkler Başkanlığı, 2020). Furthermore, 135 African academicians work at Turkish universities (Hürriyet, 2016).

The Turkish government established Türkiye Maarif Foundation in 2016 to take over the schools affiliated with the FETO abroad, open new schools where the Turkish population is high in foreign countries, and make Turkish schools a global brand (Usluer, 2016, 39-40). TMF operates in 66 countries with 323 schools that provide education to 36,282 students. Meanwhile, TMF took over 150 schools from the FETO in 30 African countries in which 15,747 African students were studying (Türkiye Maarif Vakfı). In conjunction with this, TMF has been lobbying internationally and contacting African governments, to take over all the schools affiliated with the FETO.

Media

In 2017 Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) began broadcasting in the Hausa language which is spoken by 45 million people in the West and Central African regions. Likewise, in 2020 TRT began broadcasting in the Swahili language which is spoken by 150 million people in Eastern and Southeastern Africa (DunyaBulteni, 2020). TRT World was founded in 2015 to broadcast internationally in the English language. It deals with the current developments on the African continent (TRT Haber, 2016). Turkey also has an international news agency known as the Anadolu Agency founded in 1920. Its scope and activities have been expanding during the AK Party governments and it opened its first office in Ethiopia in 2014. It has also opened its representatives in South Africa, Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, and Senegal (Anadolu Agency1).

Moreover, Natural TV was founded in Ankara in 2017 by a group of Turkish businessmen to air in Western Africa in 22 countries in English and French languages reaching over 5 million African people. It airs programs about Turkish culture, history, and art as well as the new developments in Turkey. Importantly, Turkish soap operas are being watched in more than 20 countries in Africa. Ethiopia, Tanzania, Ghana, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Cameroon, Madagascar, Mali, and Nigeria are among the countries where Turkish TV series are most-watched (The Guardian, 2019). The main purposes of such programs are to create a positive perception of Turkey in Africa, to eliminate the biases related to Africa in the mind of the Turkish people, and to increase bilateral relations with African countries in the long term.

Turkish Airlines

Turkish Airlines (THY) is one of the most prestigious institutions in Turkey increasing the country's image in the world. THY is an airline that flies to most countries in the world. In 2003 it flew to 103 destinations in 55 countries. Before the Covid-19 pandemic, it used to fly to 316 destinations in 125 countries. Since the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) governments implemented the Africa Action Plan in 2005, Africa has become a special destination for the THY which flies to most cities in the African continent. Before the Covid-19 pandemic, the THY used to fly to 58 destinations in 37 countries in Africa. Currently, it regularly increases the number of her flights with the lifting of the travel ban. THY both connects Turkey to the African continent directly as well as connecting the African continent to Turkey and different parts of the world (DailySabah, 2018a).

Before 2005, it was difficult to get a direct flight to African countries from Turkey, for Turkish citizens and businessmen. This was due to THY having limited access to countries in North Africa and just a few destinations in Sub-Saharan Africa. These problems have been eased through the new initiative of the THY in Africa, allowing Turkish businessmen to contact their partners in Africa directly and easily. For instance, Turkish businessmen have begun to undertake more contracting projects in Africa, facilitated by THY starting direct flights to different destinations on the continent. In 2002 the total amount of contracting projects undertaken by Turkish businessmen in Africa was 769 million dollars, today it has increased to 71 billion dollars (DailySabah, 2018b).

State and Non-state Organizations

Turkish foreign aid policies in Africa including humanitarian relief activities and development assistance are one of the most significant components of Turkey's soft power policy (Çevik, 2019: 61). The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) governments have increased the number of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) offices around the world. Between 1992 and 2002, TİKA had only 12 coordination offices in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, today it operates in 60 countries through 62 coordination offices. Since 2005 TİKA has been actively engaging with African countries. Today it has 22 coordination offices in different countries across the African continent (TİKA)

and implements hundreds of projects in various areas. Among its activities in Africa, it has opened more than 100 water wells across the continent and built modern hospitals in Mogadishu (Somalia), Nyala, and Darfur (Sudan) (Akıllı ve Celenk, 2019: 139-142).

Moreover, TİKA has restored more than 100 schools and has equipped them with basic resources. It has carried out agricultural development projects in 13 African countries to empower agricultural infrastructure and create jobs for Africans. Since 2011, it has also renovated 90 historical buildings in Algeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and South Africa. TİKA has built modern roads and buildings in Mogadishu. In September 2017, it has established Turkey's largest overseas military training complex in Mogadishu aiming to train the Somali National Army and the soldiers of other African countries (Sıradağ, 2018: 10). At the same time, Turkish NGOs have been carrying out a significant number of humanitarian and development aid projects across the continent. Turkish NGOs have begun to work together with state agencies to implement joint humanitarian aid projects in Africa (Donelli, 2019: 69). The IHH (Humanitarian Relief Foundation), Hudayi Foundation, Cansuyu Association, Deniz Feneri, Milli Gorus Foundation, and Doctors Worldwide Turkey are among the most active and well-known Turkish NGOs operating in Africa (Siradag, 2015: 11-15). According to the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report published in 2018, Turkey was ranked the number one country providing the largest amount of humanitarian assistance in the world in 2018. Turkey spent a total of 8.4 billion dollars on global humanitarian relief in 2018 and was therefore singled out as the most generous country in the world (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey3).

In addition, Turkey sent medical aid to 45 African countries during the Covid-19 pandemic process. Also, at the 3rd Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit, President Erdoğan stated that 15 million doses of vaccine will be supplied to African countries. The hospitals built by Turkey in Sudan, Niger, and Somalia offered free healthcare services to hundreds of Covid-19 patients during the pandemic. Only 6% of the African population has been vaccinated during the pandemic process (France24, 2021). Pandemic aid from Western countries to African countries also remained very limited. In this context, Turkey's pandemic aid to 45 African countries contributes to Turkey's image in the continent. It also strengthens Turkey's international image in the world. We can express the reasons why Turkey helped African countries during the pandemic process as follows. The first reason is the social and cultural identity of the ruling AK Party which sees helping African countries in the pandemic process as a social responsibility. The second reason is that Turkey's strong historical relations with Africa have been an important source of motivation for these aids. The third reason is that the ruling AK Party aims to further deepen and expand its strong political and economic relations with the continent. We can state that the aid provided by Turkey to African countries during the pandemic period will play an important role in strengthening bilateral relations in the medium and long term.

The Strengthened Institutions to Develop Economic Relations

One of the important dynamics of strengthening Turkey's soft power policy components in Africa is to boost Turkey's commercial and economic relations with the African countries. In this regard, The Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEİK) officially organizes the management of Turkey's foreign economic relations with the rest of the world. It has established 45 African Business Councils aiming to increase bilateral economic relations with African countries. Moreover, the Independent *Industrialists and Businessmen Association* (MÜSİAD) has been one of the most active private business associations that aims to enhance economic relations with African countries and has opened 30 branches across the continent (MÜSİAD, 2018).

Table 1. Turkey's Trade with North Africa (2000-2021) (Million \$)

Year	Export	Import	Total
2010	7.025,168	3.098,091	10.123,259
2011	6.700,805	3.342,055	10.042,860
2012	9.443,604	3.308,343	12.751,947
2013	10.930,556	3.630,876	14.561,432
2014	10.240,492	3.584,217	13.824,709
2015	8.918,833	3.173,401	12.092,234
2016	8.069,446	3.252,568	11.322,014
2017	7.918,462	4.203,460	12.121,922
2018	9.915,077	4.685,547	14.600,624
2019	10.828,878	4.009,992	14.838,870
2020	9.224,060	4.757,326	13.981,386
2021	13.339,835	5.417,618	18.757,453

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

According to Table 1, while Turkey's total trade with the North African region was 10 billion dollars in 2010, its total trade with the region in 2021 approached 19 billion dollars. According to the table above, it is seen that Turkey's total trade with the North African region has nearly doubled in 2021.

Table 2. Turkey's Trade with Sub-Saharan Africa (2000-2021) (Million \$)

Year	Export	Import	Total
2010	2.257,898	1.725,916	3.983,814
2011	3.633,016	3.424,658	7.057,674
2012	3.913,246	2.613,447	6.526,693
2013	4.405,698	2.559,946	6.965,644
2014	4.267,226	3.584,217	7.851,443
2015	4.212,322	2.151,915	6.364,237
2016	3.833,943	2.151,987	5.985,930
2017	4.318,839	2.978,629	7.297,629
2018	5.173,872	2.451,876	7.625,748
2019	5.794,323	1.810,756	7.605,079
2020	6.016,613	2.552,458	8.569,071
2021	7.873,284	2.814,891	10.688,175

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

According to Table 2, whilst Turkey's total trade with the Sub-Saharan Africa region was approximately 4 billion dollars in 2010, this figure exceeded 10 billion dollars in 2021. While Turkey's total trade with the African continent was 14 billion dollars in 2010, this figure reached roughly 30 billion dollars in 2021. According to table 2, Turkey's total trade with Sub-Saharan Africa has more than doubled in 2022. When Tables 1 and 2 are examined, we see that the Covid-19 pandemic period did not adversely affect Turkey's commercial relations with African countries, on the contrary, its commercial relations with the continent developed steadily. This situation shows that Turkey's state and non-state actors are in intense cooperation in order to develop commercial and economic relations with the African countries, especially during a difficult time like the Covid-19 pandemic process.

The Driving Forces Influencing Turkey's Soft Power in Africa

The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) governments have formed a new foreign policy identity based on history, geography, and national interests. According to this identity, Turkey has a unique geographical position in the world connecting Asia, Europa, and Africa. Given this fact, Turkey needs to diversify its strategic allies for the sake of its national interests. As a part of the new identity construction in Turkish foreign policy, Turkey has developed new strategies to carry out her soft power policies in Africa more effectively through Yunus Emre Cultural Centres, Maarif Schools, TİKA, Diyanet, THY, and the Turkish NGOs.

Turkey has a deep historical relationship with the African continent dating back to the 16th century. However, Turkey ignored developing its relations with the African countries due to its Western identity and the lack of strategic vision in traditional Turkish foreign policy. According to the new foreign policy identity, Turkey should strengthen its relations with the countries that had strong historical relationships in Africa. It is important to underline that Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country with 98 percent of its population. The ruling AK Party is also a political entity that has an Islamic identity. In this regard, providing humanitarian assistance to poor people in Africa is a significant responsibility of the believers in the religion of Islam. In addition, helping needy people without any religious and ethical discrimination has become a spiritual obligation for the ruling AK Party governments and the Turkish people. In this sense, Turkey has been among the significant actors in providing humanitarian and development assistance in Africa and in the world during the administration of the ruling AK party governments.

Turkey was a highly dependent actor on the Western world in the Cold War era. Reducing Turkey's over-dependence on the West has become a strategic priority through the strategic diversification of Turkish foreign policy. Transformation in Turkey in the fields of economics, politics, and society over the last two decades has become a critical driving force to increase multilateral relations with non-Western actors (Özkan, 2010: 104-105). Moreover, Turkey has become a more ambitious actor to advance economic and political relations beyond the region in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) after the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 because the conflicts and political crises in the MENA region have pushed Turkey to find the new economic and allies and markets for export of Turkish goods.

Today, the strategic importance of the African continent, which international actors see as an important competitive field, is increasing day by day in world politics. While China and Russia deepen their strategic relations in this continent, they also challenge the political and economic interests of the old traditional actors on the continent. In this context, the importance of the African continent in Turkish foreign policy is increasing day by day. Especially with the AK Party governments, the strategic meaning of the continent for Turkish foreign policy has been moved from an ideological basis to a strategic ground. In this sense, in the rapidly developing and changing world politics, Turkey has endeavored to become an important geopolitical actor on the African continent by using its soft power instruments in Africa.

Globalization has also created new political and economic opportunities for Turkey to get more actively engaged with the continent. As a part of the newly established foreign policy identity, state and non-state actors have actively collaborated to implement joint projects in Africa. Furthermore, Turkey has increased its bilateral relations with the African countries to close the FETO-affiliated schools and institutions seen as a security threat to Turkey. In the post-failed military coup in 2016, implementation and diversification of Turkish foreign policy have been imperative for Turkey to increase strategic relations with the continent and eliminate the FETO terrorist organization across the continent.

We can summarize the factors and dynamics behind Turkey's soft power policy toward Africa as follows: Firstly, AK Party governments have implemented a soft power policy in order to establish strong political and economic relations with Africa. Secondly, it has aimed to make Turkey a visible actor in African countries and to receive the political support of African countries at international platforms such as the UN. Thirdly, the ruling AK Party government has aimed to increase Turkey's geopolitical power in the world and its global prestige through its soft power instruments. Finally, the ruling party governments have intended to eliminate the institutions of the FETO terrorist organization that is still effective in Africa.

The Constraints of Turkey's Soft Power in Africa

Several significant factors damage Turkey's soft power policy in Africa. The first factor is domestic dynamics in Turkey. Turkey has faced different threats and challenges since 2011 including the failed military coup in 2016, the fluctuations in the Turkish Lira, and the Syrian conflict. Although Turkey has faced huge security threats since 2016, it has managed to maintain its strategic relations with Africa in a stable and strong manner. The role of the AK Party governments, which have been in power since 2002, in maintaining political and economic stability in Turkey plays a very important role in the strong progress of Turkey's relations with Africa. It is important to underline that maintaining political and economic stability in Turkey has been vital for implementing an effective soft power policy in Africa.

The second factor is regional dynamics. Political and economic instabilities in the region have a significant potential to affect Turkey's political and economic power in the region. For instance, Turkey's long-lasting fight against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Iraq and Syria has weakened Turkey's long-term soft power strategies in the world (Öner, 2013: 13). The terrorist organizations' activities against Turkey have forced the Turkish policymakers to invest more in Turkey's hard power capacity. The third factor is global threats and challenges. Global economic crises in the world such as the economic crisis of 2007, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war between Russia and Ukraine have had a negative impact on the economic development of many countries in the world. (Oğuzlu, 2007: 90-1).

The security problems and conflicts that emerged in the Middle East after 2011 have revealed the fact that Turkey must remain a stronger actor in the fields of defense and military in its region and in the world. After 2016, Turkey seems to play a more active role in the field of defense both in its region and in the African continent. For example, the opening of Turkey's largest military base abroad in Somalia in 2017 is one of the important examples showing the change in Turkey's foreign policy after 2016. At the same time, Turkey has made bilateral agreements with more than 20 African countries in the fields of defense and military. However, since 2016, Turkey continues to strengthen its soft power policy in the African continent, especially through its institutions such as Maarif Schools, TİKA, Yunus Emre Cultural Centers, and Turkish NGOs. The new regional and global dynamics that emerged after 2011 revealed that Turkey needs to establish a fine balance between its military power and soft power. In this context, although Turkey has increased its investments in the military and defense field after 2016, it has also continued to strengthen its soft power policy elements in a strategic way.

Understanding the African social, economic, and political dynamics and values is vital to developing effective soft power policies toward Africa. Turkey ought to establish a more effective system of coordination between the state and non-state institutions in Africa. The state and non-state institutions should not duplicate each other's activities on the continent. Furthermore, there are many universities and research centers in Turkey which have opened "Centers for African Studies", but there is a lack of experts on Africa to run these centers accurately. Turkey needs to send more Turkish students to African universities at the graduate level. African politics and Turkey-Africa relations courses should be taught in the departments of politics and international relations.

For the institutionalization of Turkey's relations with Africa, academic relations between Turkish universities and African universities should be strengthened. Turkish universities should send their doctoral students to African countries for research purposes will contribute to further strengthening the relations between Turkey and Africa academically. Supporting undergraduate students studying in Turkish universities who are interested in African politics, history, and art is also of great importance for the future of relations. It is not possible to progress Turkey's African policy only with political dynamics. In this sense, it is very important for the future of relations that institutions such as YÖK, TÜBİTAK, and universities should provide financial support to researchers studying on Africa. In addition, African Research Centers opened in universities in Turkey should be established for scientific aims rather than political purposes and should continue their work in this direction.

CONCLUSION

Turkish foreign policy has undergone a significant transformation under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government. The ruling AK Party governments have developed a new foreign policy identity based on Turkey's geographical, historical, socio-religious dynamics and strategic interests. Turkey has been a more visible and active player in African politics through its active soft power policies over the last decade. Importantly, Turkey has implemented the Africa Action Plan of 1998 to actively engage with the continent. In this regard, Turkey has cooperated with NGOs, businesses, religious associations, universities, and research centers to build up its soft power capacity. Turkey's soft power policies do not conflict with Africa's social and cultural values, and it does not aim to change the foreign policy preferences of the African countries. It is important to highlight that Turkey's growing soft power in Africa is more likely to open new strategic spaces for Turkey to develop its political and economic relations with African countries in the coming years. Humanitarian and development assistance has been one of the most important components of Turkey's new soft power policy in Africa. This research argues that Turkey's domestic dynamics have been playing a major role

in constructing effective and successful soft power in Africa. Political and economic stability is a key precondition for improving Turkey's long-term soft power policy toward Africa.

The AK Party governments have actively implemented the Africa Action Plan of 1998 since 2005, revealing that Africa is one of the most important strategic areas of Turkish foreign policy. Keeping Turkey's relations with Africa at the highest level is one of Turkey's historical and strategic responsibilities. With the establishment of the Republic, Turkish policymakers determined foreign policy approaches according to their ideological tendencies and they considered Turkey's strategic interests at the lowest level. With the end of the Cold War period, an intense debate started in Turkish politics, media, and academia on Turkey's new role in the changing world order. Having undergone a major strategic transformation with Turgut Özal, Turkey took important steps to implement this strategic transformation in a more systematic way during the AK Party period. In this context, it is possible to say that Turkey's African approach has shifted from an ideological approach to a strategic one. Finally, keeping Turkey's relations with Africa strong at all times is not only important for its national interests and historical responsibilities but also a necessity for Turkey to remain a strong actor in its region and world politics.

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Körfez Ülkeleri ve Filistin: Güçlü Tarihsel Bağlar Temelinde Körfez Siyaseti

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Özet

Basra Körfezi'nin Arap yakasında yer alan, Körfez İşbirliği Konseyi (KİK) üyesi ülkeleri ile Filistin arasında güçlü tarihsel bağlar bulunmaktadır. Bu tarihsel bağlar Filistin meselesi kadar eskidir. İki taraf arasındaki ilişkiler 19. yüzyıl sonları itibari ile başlayan sistematik Yahudi göçleri sonucu ortaya çıkan Filistin meselesinin 1930'larda işgale dönüşmesine kadar gitmektedir. Bu süreçte başlayan karşılıklı ilişkiler sonucu Körfez toplumları ve Filistinliler arasında önemli tarihsel bağlar gelişmiştir. Bunun sonucu olarak Filistin meselesi Körfez ülkelerinde bir kimlik meselesi olmuş ve dış politikalarında temel parametre teşkil etmiştir. Filistinliler, Filistin davası ve Körfez ülkeleri arasındaki güçlü tarihsel bağlar literatüre yansımada için yeteri kadar bilinmemektedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı literatürdeki bu boşluğu doldurmak üzere katkıda bulunmaktır. Bu çalışma Filistin ve Körfez arasındaki tarihsel bağların Körfez siyasetinde nasıl etkili olduğu sorusunu cevaplamaktadır. Bu çalışmanın ana iddiası Filistin meselesinin Ortadoğu genelinde ve Körfez özelinde bölgesel siyasetin şekillenmesinde tarihsel olarak belirleyici bir rol oynamakta olmasıdır. Tarihsel süreçte İsrail'in kurulmasına olan dönem, Arap-İsrail Savaşları dönemi, Barış dönemi ve içinde bulunduğumuz İbrahim Anlaşmaları ile başlayan İsrail'le normalleşme dönemi konjonktürü çerçevesinde Filistin meselesi başat faktör olarak bölgesel dinamikleri belirlemiştir. 1973 Petrol Ambargosu bu noktada en çarpıcı örnek teşkil etmiş ve Körfez siyasetinde bölgesel ve küresel sonuçları olan tarihsel bir dönüm noktası olmuşken 2020'de bazı Körfez ülkelerinin İsrail'le normalleşme anlaşması yapmaları Körfez siyasetinde yeni bir dönüm noktası olmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Filistin, Basra Körfezi Ülkeleri, İsrail, Arap-İsrail Savaşları, Arap Milliyetçiliği.

Gulf States and Palestine: Strong Historical Ties Determining Gulf Politics

Esra ÇAVUŞOĞLU¹

Abstract

There are strong historical ties between Palestine and the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) residing on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf. These historical ties are as old as the Palestine issue, and the relations between the two sides go back to the turn of the Palestinian issue, which emerged as a result of the systematic Jewish immigration that started at the end of the 19th century, to an occupation in the 1930s. As a result of the mutual relations that started in this process, important historical ties have developed between the Gulf societies and the Palestinians. As a result, the Palestine issue has become an identity issue in the Gulf countries and has been the main parameter in their foreign policies. Since the strong historical ties between the Palestinians, the Palestinian cause, and the Gulf countries are not reflected in the literature, they are not known enough. The main aim of this article is to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. This study answers the question of how the historical ties between Palestine and the Gulf have been influential in Gulf politics. The main claim of this study is that the Palestinian issue has historically played a determinant role in the shaping of regional politics in the Middle East and the Gulf in particular. In the historical process, the period leading to the establishment of Israel, the Arab-Israeli Wars, the Peace period, and the current period of normalization with Israel, which started with the Abraham Agreements, determined the regional dynamics as the dominant factor in the Palestinian issue. While the 1973 Oil Embargo was the most striking example at this point and became a historical turning point with regional and global consequences in Gulf politics, the normalization agreement of some Gulf countries with Israel in 2020 became a new turning point in the Gulf politics.

Keywords: Palestine, Persian Gulf Countries, Israel, Arab-Israeli Wars, Arab Nationalism.

GİRİŞ

Arap Körfez ülkelerinin devletleşme süreçlerine paralel olarak gelişmiş olan Filistin meselesi tarihsel süreç boyunca Basra Körfezi ülkelerinin dış politika gündemlerinin öncelikli meselesi olmuştur. 20. yüzyıl başlarında Filistin'e Yahudi göçlerinin yoğunlaşması ile başlayan İsrail işgali sonucu ortaya çıkan ve gelişen Filistin meselesi tüm İslam dünyasında olduğu gibi Körfez toplumunda da ciddi bir hassasiyete sebep olmuş ve bu doğrultuda Körfez ülkeleri ile Filistinliler arasında önemli bağlar oluşmuştur. Tarihsel süreç içinde Körfez'in Arap yakası ile Filistin toplumu arasında gelişen bağlar doğrultusunda Filistin davası Körfez ülkelerinde bir kimlik meselesine dönüşmüştür. Filistin'e Yahudi göçleri ile başlayan işgalin boyutları İsrail'in kurulmasının akabinde başlayan Arap-İsrail savaşları ile ve sonrasında "barış süreci" çerçevesinde genişleyerek derinlik kazanmıştır. Buna paralel olarak, Filistin davası ulusal ve bölgesel düzeylerde Körfez siyasetindeki öncelikli yerini koruyarak önemini artırmaya devam etmiştir.

Ortadoğu genelinde ve Körfez özelinde Filistin meselesinin bir kimlik meselesi olmasının öncelikli boyutu İslam'ın ilk kiblesi olan Mescid-i Aksa'yı bünyesinde barındıran, Müslümanların kutsal şehri Kudüs faktörü temelinde şekillenen dini boyutudur. Tüm İslam dünyasında olduğu gibi Körfez kamuoyu için vazgeçilmez bir öneme sahip olan Kudüs'ün İsrail işgali altında olması meselenin kimlik düzeyinde algılanmasında en temel faktör olmaktadır. Filistin meselesinin Körfez ülkelerinin kimlik inşa süreçlerinde önemli bir yer almasının diğer boyutu ise Arap Milliyetçiliğine dayanmaktadır. İslam coğrafyasının kalbindeki Filistin'in Yahudi toplumu ve devleti tarafından işgal edilmesi ve bu işgal sonucunda Filistinlilerin yerlerinden edilmesi tüm Arap dünyasında olduğu gibi Körfez toplumlarında büyük bir infiale yol açmıştır. Arap-İsrail savaşları ekseninde başlayan yeni süreçte ise, meselenin dini boyutuna Arap milliyetçiliği boyutu eklenmiş ve mesele bir Arap meselesi olarak Körfez halklarının öncelikli bir kimlik sorunu haline gelmiştir. Filistin meselesinin bu iki temele dayalı olarak bir kimlik meselesi olarak gelişmesinde, toprakları işgal edilen Filistinlilerin Ortadoğu'da göç ettikleri ülkelerin başında Körfez ülkelerinin gelmesi önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Bu süreçte petrol ekonomisine geçen ve önemli bir ekonomik dönüşüm sürecine girmiş olan Körfez ülkelerinin Filistin halkına kucak açarak onlara yer ve istihdam imkanları sunmaları ile iki toplum arasında önemli tarihsel bağların temelleri atılmıştır.

Tarihsel Filistin-Körfez bağlarının bir diğer önemli boyutunu ise Filistin davasının kurumsallaşmasında ve gelişmesinde Körfez ülkelerinin sağladığı önemli destekler oluşturmuştur. Filistin meselesinin başlangıcından bugüne Körfez ülkeleri Filistin direnişinin ve özgürlük mücadelesine yönelik çalışmaların örgütlenmesinde ve kurumsallaşarak temsil edilmesinde, başta bu çalışmalara ev sahipliği yapan Kuveyt olmak üzere, sahip oldukları petrol kaynaklarına dayalı ekonomik güçleri ile ciddi düzeyde finansman desteği sağlamışlardır ki buda iki toplum arasındaki bağları güçlendiren önemli bir unsur olmuştur. Bununla birlikte, Filistin meselesi Arap-İsrail savaşları (1948-1973) dönemi ve sonrası süreçte derinleşen ve genişleyen İsrail işgali doğrultusunda bir uluslararası sorun haline dönüşmesi çerçevesinde Körfez ülkelerinin siyasi gündeminde öncelikli mesele olarak yerini korumaya devam etmiş ve Körfez ülkeleri Suudi Arabistan liderliğinde uluslararası diplomasi alanında meselenin başat savunucuları olmuşlardır. 1973'te Suud kralı Faysal bin Abdulaziz liderliğinde Körfez ülkelerinin uyguladığı petrol ambargosu, Körfez ülkelerinin Filistin meselesi konusundaki hassasiyetlerinin uluslararası siyasi ve ekonomik dengeleri değiştirecek düzeyde bir etkiye sahip olduğunu gösteren tarihi bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Ortadoğu ile özleşmiş ve Ortadoğu siyasetinin merkezini teşkil eden Filistin meselesi¹ Körfez aktörlerinin uluslararası ilişkilerinde, günümüze kadar sürekliliğini koruyan bir tarihsellik içinde dönemsel gelişmelere ve ülkelerin dış politika yaklaşımlarına göre değişebilen düzeylerde daima belirleyici bir dinamik teşkil etmiştir. Bu sebeple, Körfez siyaseti bölgesel ve ulusal düzeylerde Filistin meselesinin dinamiği çerçevesinde ele alınmadan doğru bir şekilde değerlendirilmiş olmayacaktır.

¹ Ortadoğu'nun en temel meselesi olan Filistin meselesi Ortadoğu Sorunu olarak tanımlanmaktadır ve tarihsel gelişimi içinde çeşitli boyutları ile başlı başına önemli bir araştırma alanı olduğu için bu çalışma kapsamında ele alınmamaktadır. Konuyla ilgili detaylı bilgi için bkz, Rashid Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance 1917-2017*, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2020. Ilan Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine One Land Two Peoples*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Alfred M. Lilienthal, *The Zionist Connection What Price Peace*, New York: Dodd Mead & Company, 1978.

Filistinliler ve Filistin davası ile Körfez ülkeleri arasındaki güçlü ve derin tarihsel bağlar gerek Körfez çalışmaları alanında gerekse Filistin-İsrail sorunu alanında literatürde çok az yer bulabildiği için iyi bilinmeyen bir konu olarak kalmıştır. Bu açığı kapatma düşüncesi ile literatüre çok önemli bir katkıda bulunan Filistin asıllı Rosemarie Said Zahlan'ın Filistin ve Körfez Ülkeleri, *Palestine and the Gulf States*, adlı çalışması iki tarafın tarihsel süreç içindeki yakın ilişkilerini ve Körfez ülkelerinin Filistin davasına verdiği desteği gün yüzüne çıkaran başat eser olmuştur.² Körfez ülkeleri ve toplumlarının Filistin'e olan bağlılığı ve tarihsel ilişkileri hegemonik güçler tarafından Körfez ülkeleriyle olan ittifaklarında önemli bir problem kaynağı olarak görüldüğü için uluslararası literatürdeki hakim yaklaşımlar tarafından göz ardı edilmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, konuyla ilgili çalışmalar Türkçe literatüre yansımamış ve konuyla ilgili önemli veriler Körfez çalışmaları kapsamında yapılan analizlerde yer almamıştır. Bu makale literatürdeki mevcut boşluğun doldurulmasına katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Günümüz Ortadoğu siyasetinin merkezinde yer alan Filistin meselesi Körfez ülkelerinin dış politikalarında edindiği ağırlık ve önem nispetinde bölgesel gelişmeleri etkilemektedir. Arap Baharı sonrası süreçte bazı Körfez ülkelerinin İsrail'le olan yakınlaşmaları doğrultusunda Filistin meselesi konusundaki tarihi yaklaşımlarını değiştirmeleri sonucu 2021'de İbrahim Anlaşmaları ile İsrail'le normalleşme sürecinin başlatılması da bunun önemli bir göstergesidir.

Tarihsel Körfez-Filistin Bağları ve Suudi Liderliği

Filistin ve Körfez arasındaki en erken bağların oluşması Filistin meselesini doğuran gelişmelerin başlangıcına kadar gitmektedir. İsrail'in kurulmasından çok önce başlatılan Filistin'e sistematik Yahudi göçleri Filistin'de demografik dengelerin ve toplumsal ve ekonomik düzenin değişmesine ve bozulmasına yol açan yeni bir süreci başlatmıştır. 1882'de başlayan ilk Yahudi göçü dalgası (*aliyah*) ile 30 bin Yahudi Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinden gelerek Filistin'e yerleşmiş ve 1930'larda gerçekleşen 5. Aliyah ile bu sayı 200 bine ulaşmıştır (Cleveland, 2008: 282). Filistin'de Yahudi toplumunun hızla büyümesiyle birlikte, Yahudi toplumun örgütlenmesi ve Filistinliler üzerinde oluşturdukları sistematik baskı ve şiddet eylemleri Filistin toplumunda büyük bir patlamaya sebep olmuştur. Yahudilerin Filistin'de yerleşmeleri Filistinlilerin topraklarından ve evlerinden çıkarılmaları yoluyla gerçekleştirildiği için büyük bir Filistinli sürgünü ile sonuçlanmıştır. Yüzlerce Filistinli aile ev ve topraklarını ya satmak zorunda kalmış ya da zorla yerlerinden çıkarılmıştır. Bu gelişmeler Filistin toplumunun direnişine sebep olmuş ve yerli halk ile işgalciler ve İngiliz idaresi arasında 1930'lu yıllarda yoğunlaşan çatışmalar sonucu derinleşen Filistinlilerin mağduriyeti tüm Arap dünyasında yankı bularak önemli bir tepkiye yol açmıştır (Zahlan, 2009: 4-6).

Bu dönemde özellikle Körfez'in Arap yakasının tek bağımsız ve egemen devleti olan ve 1932 yılında krallık olan Suudi Arabistan'ın kurucusu Kral Abdülaziz bin El-Suud, Filistin işgaline karşı büyük bir duyarlılık göstermiş siyasi düzeyde meseleye dahil olarak Filistin'de işgalin durdurulması için İngiliz yönetimi ile yazışmalar ve görüşmeler yapmıştır. İngiltere'nin müttefiki olmasına rağmen Kral Abdülaziz İngiliz Siyonist politikalarına karşı olmuş ve bölgesel bir lider olarak İngiltere tarafından muhatap otorite kabul edilmesi ile İngiltere üzerinde Filistin hakları konusunda önemli bir baskı oluşturmuştur. Filistinli liderlerin yardım ve destek istemek üzere sürekli müracat ettikleri Arap dünyasının en güçlü lideri konumunda olan Kral Abdülaziz, İngiliz Hükümetinin uygulamaya koymak istediği Balfour Deklarasyonu'na karşı çıkan ilk Arap lider olmuştur (Al-Kahtani, 2004: 136).

1936-39 yıllarında Filistin toplumunun lideri Hacı Emin Hüseyini öncülüğünde artan Yahudi göçlerine ve yerleşimci Yahudilere Filistin topraklarının satılmasına göz yuman İngiliz yönetimine karşı Filistinliler grev gerçekleştirmiştir. Bu zorlu süreçte Filistinlilerin içinde bulunduğu ekonomik sıkıntıya destek olmak üzere henüz petrol dönemine geçmemiş olan fakir Körfez halkları Filistin'e destek kampanyası başlatmış ve böylece Filistinliler ile Körfez halkı arasındaki ilk tarihsel bağlar bu şekilde

² Rosemarie Said Zahlan (1937-2008), Oryantalizm eserinin yazarı Filistinli akademisyen Edward Said'in kız kardeşidir. Körfez çalışmaları alanında çok önemli derinlikli çalışmaları mevcut olup özellikle Filistin davasına olan bağlılığı ekseninde Körfez ve Filistin arasındaki yakın ilişkilerin ortaya konmasını kendisine bir misyon edinmiştir. Filistin davasını etkin bir şekilde destekleyen bir akademisyen olarak Filistinliler adına Körfez yönetimine ve toplumlarına olan vefa borcunu bu çalışması ile ödeyerek hakikatin bilinmesi kaygısını taşımıştır. Rosemarie Said Zahlan, *Palestine and the Gulf States, The Presence at the Table*, New York: Routledge, 2009. Ayrıca, Filistin meselesi üzerindeki akademik çalışmalarda çok önemli payı olan Rashid Khalidi'nin Körfez krizinin Filistin ve Körfez ilişkilerini nasıl etkilediğini anlatan makalesi² ve Jawad El-Hamad'ın tez çalışması² bu konu üzerine yapılmış bir elin beş parmağını bulmayan çalışmalardır.

kurulmuştur (Zahlan, 2009: 15-18). O dönemde İngiliz yönetiminin tecrit politikası sonucu dış dünya ile bağlantıları son derece zayıf olan Körfez toplumlarının haber alma imkanları Irak'tan Kuveyt'e ulaşabilen sınırlı sayıda Mısır ve Irak menşeli yayın ve 1934'te Arapça yayına başlayan İtalyan radyosunun sadece elektriğin bulunduğu Kuveyt ve Bahreyn'de dinlenebilmesi ile sınırlıydı (Zahlan, 2009: 15-16). Bu şartlar altında Filistin'deki gelişmelerden haberdar olan Körfez Arapları, Filistinlilerin maruz kaldıkları duruma karşı olan duyarlılıkları ve alakaları doğrultusunda Filistinlilere ve Filistin davasına karşı büyük bir sempati geliştirmişlerdir.

Bunun ilk somut örneği 1936'da Kuveyt'te önde gelen tüccar aileleri temsil eden yedi kişilik bir öncü ekibin Filistin'e destek komitesi kurması olmuştur. Bu komitenin düzenlediği Filistin'e destek mitingine yüz elliden fazla Kuveytli katılmış ve miting sonunda başta kadınların kişisel değerli eşyalarını bağışlaması ile fakir Kuveyt halkı için o gün önemli bir paraya tekabül eden 730 otuz Sterlin tutarında bir meblağ Filistinliler için toplanmıştır (Zahlan, 2009: 17). Körfez Şeyhlerini dış ilişkiler kurmaktan men eden İngiliz yönetiminin baskısı altında Filistinlilerin yardım talebini reddetmek zorunda kalan Kuveyt Emiri, bu toplumsal girişime karşı koyamamış fakat sorumluluk almamak için o tarihte av seyahatine çıkmıştır. Bu gelişme, Kuveyt'in iç siyasetinde siyasi kültürün diğer Körfez emirliklerinden daha farklı bir şekilde katılımcılık doğrultusunda gelişmesinde dönüm noktası olmuştur. Filistin meselesi konusunda ticari elitin emir üzerinde talep ve baskı oluşturması, 1938'de tüccarlar ve Emir arasında vergilendirme konusunda anlaşmazlık çıkması sonucu ilk meclisin kurulması ile sonuçlanan bir süreci başlatmıştır (Yom, 2020: 580).

Sonraki yıllarda Suud Kralı Abdülaziz Amerika ile ilişkilerinde de Filistin konusundaki diplomatik mücadelesini sürdürmüş ve 1945'te Başkan Franklin D. Roosevelt'le yaptığı görüşmede Filistin konusundaki tavizsiz yaklaşımı ile başkan üzerinde konu ile ilgili önemli bir etki oluşturmuştur. Bunun sonucu olarak Başkan Roosevelt Kral Abdulaziz'e Yahudilere olduğu gibi Araplara danışmadan Filistin konusunda karar almayacağı sözünü vermiş ve Amerikan hükümetinin Araplara karşı düşmanlık oluşturacak hiçbir eylemi gerçekleştirmeyeceğinin garantisini vermiştir (Zahlan, 2009:24-25). 1947'de BM'nin Filistin'in Taksimi Planını açıklamasına kadar olan süreçte Kral Abdülaziz İngiltere ve ABD'yi defalarca uyararak bu taksimin büyük bir savaşa yol açacağını öngörmüş ve karara şiddetle karşı çıkmıştır (Al-Kahtani, 2004: 138).

Arap-İsrail Savaşları ve Körfez

15 Mayıs 1948'de İsrail devletinin kuruluşunun ilanından birkaç saat sonra Mısır, Suriye, Ürdün ve Irak güçlerinin İsrail'e açmış olduğu birinci Arap-İsrail savaşı ile başlayan ve 1973 Yom Kippur, dördüncü Arap-İsrail Savaşı ile son bulan dönem Filistin meselesinin tarihsel sürecinde ve Ortadoğu siyasi tarihinde Arap-İsrail savaşları dönemi olarak yer almıştır. 1948'de İngiltere'nin Filistin'deki manda yönetimini sona erdirmesi üzerine Filistin'de İsrail devletinin kurulmasını kabullenmeyen Arap devletlerinin İsrail'e açtıkları savaşta yenilgiye uğramaları Arap dünyasında *nakba* yani felaket olarak adlandırılmıştır. Suudi Arabistan ve İngiliz hamiliği altındaki Körfez şeyhlikleri askeri anlamda savaşta yer almamış olmalarına rağmen bu gelişmeyi büyük bir hayal kırıklığı ve tepki ile karşılamışlardır. Arap-İsrail savaşları ekseninde Filistin meselesi, o dönemde Arap dünyasında güçlenen Arap milliyetçiliğinin temel siyasi meselesi ve motivasyonu haline gelmiştir. İkinci Arap-İsrail savaşı olan 1956 Süveyş Krizinin ABD'nin müdahalesi sonucu Mısır lideri Cemal Abdünnasır'ın zaferi ile sonuçlanması Nasır'ı tüm Arap dünyasında bir kahraman yapmakla kalmamış aynı zamanda Nasır'ın Filistinlilerin kurtarıcısı olarak görülmesine sebep olmuştur (Kamrava, 2005: 95-96). Böylece ortaya çıkan Nasırizm fenomeni Arap milliyetçiliğine ivme kazandırmış ve Arap dünyasında Filistin meselesi ve Arap Milliyetçiliği birbirinden ayrılmaz hale gelmiştir.

Arap Milliyetçiliğini başat tehdit olarak gören İngiliz yönetiminin baskısı altındaki Körfez Şeyhlikleri Pan-Arabizmin yarattığı heyecanı ortaya koyamazken Suud kralı Abdülaziz Nasır'ı desteklemiş ve Mısır'da yapılan Pan-Arabist neşriyatın ve Arapların Sesi (*voice of the Arabs*) radyosunun finansörü olmuştur (Zahlan, 2009: 28). 1953'te hayatını kaybeden Kral Abdülaziz'in cenazesine Nasır katılmış ve yeni kral döneminde de Nasır-Suud ittifakı devam etmiştir. Suud-Nasır ittifakının öncelikli ortak politikası Filistin meselesi olmuştur. 1956'da İngiliz-Fransız-İsrail güçlerinin Mısır'a saldırmasıyla Suud kralı Mısır'a 10 milyon \$ tutarında destekte bulunmuş ve Fransa ve İngiltere'ye petrol ihracını durdurmuştur (Zahlan, 2009: 31). Diğer taraftan Katar Emirliğinde Mısır'a yapılan saldırılara karşı halk dükkanları kapatarak grev uygulamış ve protesto için toplanarak tepki göstermiştir (Zahlan, 2009: 30). 1967 6 Gün Savaşı'nda Mısır liderliğinde İsrail'e saldıran Arap ordularının yenilgiye uğraması Nasır ve

Mısır için büyük bir utanç kaynağı olmuş ve Nasırizmin sonunu getirmiş olsa da Nasır'ın 1970'te ölümü ile yerine geçen Mısır lideri Enver Sedat'ın Mısır'ın iade-i itibarı için dördüncü Arap-İsrail Savaşı olan 1973 Savaşına girişmesine zemin hazırlamıştır.

1967 savaşında Arap güçlerinin (Mısır, Suriye, Lübnan, Ürdün, Irak) yenilgisi Filistin meselesinde çok yıkıcı sonuçları olan yeni bir dönemin başlangıcı olmuştur. Savaştan Araplara karşı büyük bir üstünlük kazanarak zaferle çıkan İsrail, Filistin toprakları üzerinde yayılmacılığını genişleterek askeri işgal başlatmıştır. İşgal ettiği topraklara Kudüs, Golan tepeleri ve Sina'yı ekleyen İsrail savaş sonrasında Filistin'de yerleşim birimleri inşası projesini başlatmış ve buna paralel olarak Filistin halkı üzerinde ağır bir baskı ve kontrol mekanizması oluşturmuştur. Bu gelişmeler, özellikle Doğu Kudüs'ün İsrail'in eline geçmesi Körfez'in Arap yakasında büyük bir infiale sebep olmuştur. En büyük ve somut tepki Körfez'in lider ülkesi Suudi Arabistan'ın 1964'te tahta geçen kralı Faysal bin Abdülaziz El-Suud'dan gelmiştir. Babası kral Abdülaziz gibi Filistin meselesine son derece duyarlı olan ve İslami dayanışma konusuna verdiği önemle tanınan Faysal Doğu Kudüs'ün İsrail tarafından işgalinden dolayı büyük bir üzüntü içine girmiştir. Bu sebeple siyasi idaresini kullanarak Kudüs'ün işgaline göz yuman Amerikan yönetimine karşı petrol ambargosu başlatmıştır (Zahlan, 2009: 36-37). Birkaç hafta süren ambargo sonuçsuz kalmış olmasına rağmen o dönemde Suud Kralının Filistin ve Kudüs meselesi sebebiyle petrol kozunu kullanarak Amerikan yönetimine direk yaptırım uygulama girişimini ortaya koyması açısından oldukça anlamlıdır. Savaşın akabinde Hartum'da toplanan Arap Ligi Zirvesinde yapılan yardım kampanyasında Suudi Arabistan 50 milyon Dolarlık yardım yaparken, Kuveyt yıllık 55 milyon Dolar bağış yapmıştır ki bu rakam İngiltere'nin dayatmış olduğu Sterlin anlaşması kapsamında devalüasyon sebebi ile yıl içinde 75 milyon Sterlin tutarında para kaybetmiş olan Kuveyt için büyük bir miktara tekabül etmiştir (Zahlan, 2009: 39-40).

Diğer taraftan Suudiler ve diğer Körfez toplumları konuya ciddi bir duyarlılık sergileyerek Filistin ve savaşta yenilen Arap ülkelerine destek ve İsrail'i protesto eylemleri gerçekleştirmiştir. Kuveyt yönetimi savaşın başlamasıyla sıkı yönetim ilan etmiş ve yıl sonuna kadar yürürlükte tutmuştur. 1961 yılında bağımsızlığını kazanan Kuveyt'te Arap Milliyetçiliği geniş bir etki alanı oluşturmuş ve toplumsal düzeyde 1967 savaşına karşı büyük bir duygusal reaksiyon ortaya çıkmıştır. İsrail ve destekçisi ABD'ye duyulan öfke sadece Kuveyt halkı tarafından değil Kuveyt hükümeti tarafından da ortaya konmuştur. Kuveyt hükümeti savaşta Mısır cephesine bir tabur birliği göndererek küçüğe olsa askeri destekte sağlamaya çalışmıştır (Terrill, 2007: 24).

1967'de İngiliz idaresi altında bulunan Katar, o günkü adı ile Anlaşma Devletleri (*Trucial States*) olan BAE ve Bahreyn'de 1967 yenilgisi halkların yoğun üzüntü ve tepkilerine neden olmuş fakat İngiliz otoritesine bağlı olan yönetimlerin tepkileri sınırlı kalmıştır. Buna rağmen, Katar hükümeti Haziran-Eylül 1967'de İngiltere ve ABD'ye petrol ambargosu uygulamayı başarmış ve halkın yoğun sokak protestolarının yer aldığı Anlaşma Devletlerinde Abu Dabi şeyhi Zayed bin El-Nahyan Ürdün'e 1.3 milyon Sterlin tutarında para göndermiştir (Zahlan, 2009:42-46). Bağımsızlığının akabinde BAE lideri Şeyh Zayed 1971 yılında Ahbar El-Yom gazetesinde yaptığı açıklamada İsrail'in yayılma politikasının ve Siyonizm'in ırkçı planlarının direk olarak Arap ülkelerini, kaynakları zengin olanları hedef aldığını, ve her bir Arap ülkesinin İsrail düşmanı ile olan savaşta kendi sorumluluk ve rolünü üstlenmediği sürece Siyonizm'in tehlikesinden güvende olamayacağını ifade ederek açık bir şekilde İsrail ve Siyonizm'e karşı mücadeledeki duruşunu ortaya koymuştur (Ulrichsen, 2016: 3).

Diğer taraftan Umman'da durum diğer Körfez ülkelerinden daha farklı bir gelişme göstermiştir. Filistin meselesine olan düşük ilgisi ve İngiliz ve Amerikan yönetimlerine olan bağlılığı ile tanınan Umman Sultanı Said bin Teymur'un halk protestolarının ortaya çıkmasına izin vermeyen yaklaşımı Umman'da hiçbir tepkinin görülmemesinde önemli bir rol oynamıştır. 1970 yılında babasından tahtı devralan sonraki Sultan Kâbus bin Said'in aynı politika ve yaklaşımı sürdürmesi ile Umman'ın Körfez ve Arap dünyası içindeki bu konuyla alakalı farklılığı tarihsel bir mahiyet kazanmıştır. İsrail düşmanlığının bir dış politika normu haline geldiği Körfez ülkelerinde Umman İsrail'le geliştirdiği yakın ilişkilerle önemli bir istisna arz etmiştir (Zahlan, 2009: 43-44).

Kuveyt'in İstisnailiği Çerçevesinde Kuveyt-Filistin Dayanışması

Kuveyt tarihsel olarak, Suud liderliği hariç tutulduğunda, Filistin meselesine en bağlı Körfez ülkesi olmuştur ve bugün bu yaklaşımını en tavizsiz bir şekilde sürdüren Körfez ülkesidir. Kuveyt'in Filistin'e yönelik politikasındaki değişmezliğin temelinde Kuveyt'in Körfez'in Arap yakasındaki siyasi istisnailiği faktörü yatmaktadır ki Kuveyt'in siyasi istisnailiğini doğuran değişimler Filistin meselesine

bağlı olarak gelişmiştir (Zahlan, 1998, 36-39). Kuveyt'te diğer Arap Körfez ülkelerinden farklı olarak, muhalefetin aktif olduğu işlevsel bir meclis sistemi kurulmuş ve bu kapsamda siyasi katılım ve çoğulculuğun hâkim olduğu bir monarşik rejim varlığını sürdürmektedir. Bu sistemde, tüccar kesimi gibi toplumsal kesimler meclisteki aktif siyasetleri doğrultusunda monarşi rejimini elinde tutan El-Sabah ailesi üzerinde bir denetim ve kontrol mekanizması oluşturmaktadır. Kuveyt toplumunda önemli bir temsil kapasitesine sahip olan tüccar sınıfının yönetim üzerinde bir baskı oluşturması sonucu gelişen parlamenter sistem çerçevesinde, Kuveyt siyasi sisteminde monarşinin korunması ile birlikte tarihsel süreç boyunca çoğulculuk, katılımcılık ve hoşgörü kültürü hâkim olmuştur ve bu yönüyle Kuveyt siyasi sistemi diğer Körfez monarşilerinden ayrıştırılarak 'hayırsever otoriteryanizm' (*benevolent authoritarianism*) olarak tanımlanmaktadır (Yom, 2020: 579-582). Bu siyasi yapının oluşumu ve gelişiminde Filistin meselesi başat rol oynamıştır. 1936-39 Filistin direnişine karşı yoğun bir duyarlılık ve destek gösteren Kuveyt toplumunu temsil eden tüccarların Filistin'e destek talepleri doğrultusunda emirlik üzerinde baskı kurması sonucu ortaya çıkan muhalefet, meclisin kurulmasını sağlamıştır (Zahlan, 2009:36-53). Kuveyt'in 1961'de bağımsız olmasından sonra emir ve toplum arasında sağlanan anlaşma sonucunda Kuveyt siyaseti liberal bir anayasa, seçimle oluşan bir meclis ve temel bireysel hakların korunması unsurları kurumsallaşmıştır. Kuveyt yönetici ailesi El-Sabah iktidarını bu toplumla yaptığı uzlaşma yolu ile sürdürmüştür (Herb, 2016: 7-16).

Kuveyt'in istisnailiği çerçevesinde gelişen bir diğer tarihsel Kuveyt-Filistin bağı ise Kuveyt'in diğer Körfez ülkeleri içinde en çok Filistinli göçmeni bünyesinde barındırması ve bunun sonucu olarak Filistin davasının liderliğinin ve örgütlenmesinin Kuveyt'te kurulmuş ve gelişmiş olmasıdır. Kuveyt, Filistinli göçmenlere yurt ve istihdam imkânı sağlamakla kalmayarak Filistin davasına ev sahipliği yapmış ve Kuveyt basını Filistin davasının önde gelen sesi olmuştur. Kuveyt'in devletleşme ve petrol ekonomisine geçiş süreçlerinde önemli bir rol oynayan bu bağlar tarihsel ve toplumsal düzeyde, tabandan tavana doğru gelişmiş ve günümüz Kuveyt siyasetinin temel dinamiklerini teşkil etmiştir.

Kuveyt'te Filistinliler ve Filistin Kurtuluş Örgütü (FKÖ)'nün Kuruluşu

Arap-İsrail Savaşları boyunca işgalin derinleşmesiyle kitlesel Filistinli göç dalgalarının önemli bir kısmı Körfez ülkelerine yönelmiş ve özellikle diğer Körfez ülkelerinden daha önce petrol ekonomisine geçen ve bağımsızlığını diğer Körfez ülkelerinden on yıl önce kazanmış olarak zenginleşen ve kurumsallaşan Kuveyt'te Filistinli göçmenler için önemli istihdam alanları açılmıştır (Zahlan, 1998: 45-49). Her bir Arap-İsrail savaşında sayısı önemli oranda yükselen Filistinli göçleri sonucunda Kuveyt'te önemli bir ağırlığa sahip Filistinli toplumu gelişmiştir ki buda ve Kuveyt ve Filistin arasındaki tarihsel bağların önemli bir ayağını oluşturmuştur. Bu göçler özellikle üç ana dönemde yoğunlaşmıştır ki bunlar 1948 Savaşı, 1967 Savaşı ve 1975 Lübnan iç savaşı sonucu yoğunlaşan göç evreleridir (Lesch, 1991: 42-43). Vatanlarını terk etmek zorunda kalan ve her bir evrede sayıları artan Filistinliler Lübnan, Ürdün, Suriye ve Körfez ülkelerine göç etmişlerdir. Bu dönemler Körfez ülkelerinin petrol ekonomisine geçiş ve aynı zamanda devletleşme süreçlerinde oldukları bir döneme tekabül etmiştir. Körfez ülkeleri Filistinlilere yurt ve istihdam imkânı sunarken, Filistinlilerin devletleşme ve sosyo-ekonomik gelişme süreçlerinde olan Körfez ülkelerinin öğretmen, memur ve işçi ihtiyacını karşılamada çok önemli katkıları olmuştur (Zahlan, 2009: 4-5, Khalidi, 1991:19-20).

Körfez'de en fazla Filistinli göçmene ev sahipliği yapan Kuveyt (Khalidi, 2009: 20), Filistinlilere ve Filistin davasına en büyük desteği veren Körfez ülkesi olmuştur (Zahlan, 2009: 39-42). 1948 Savaşı sonucunda Filistinliler sürgünü yaşarken Kuveyt'te petrolün keşfi ile yeni bir dönem başlamıştır. Körfezin Arap yakasında ilk petrol 1931'de Bahreyn'de bulunmuşken Kuveyt'te petrol ilk olarak 1938'de bulunmuş ve petrol ihracatı 2. Dünya Savaşından sonra başlamış olmasına rağmen Kuveyt'in devasa petrol rezervleri çok kısa bir süre içinde Kuveyt'e büyük bir zenginlik sağlamıştır. Ayrıca, Kuveyt İngiliz hamiliğinde bulunan diğer Körfez ülkelerinden (Bahreyn, Katar ve Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri) on yıl önce 1961'de bağımsız olmuş ve bu sebeple devletleşme ve kurumsal gelişme sürecini erken başlatmıştır. Kuveyt'in bürokratik yapısının oluşmasında ve vasıflı iş gücü ve uzman kadro açığını doldurmada Filistinliler önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Özellikle eğitimin kurumsallaşmasında etkin bir şekilde Filistinliler yer almış ve 1966'da Kuveyt'teki öğretmenlerin yüzde 49'unu Filistinli öğretmenler teşkil etmiştir (Lesch, 1991:43). 1957'de Kuveyt'te Filistinlilerin nüfusu toplam nüfusun yüzde 7,3'ünü bulurken, 1965'te yüzde 16'ya yükselmiştir. 1967 Savaşının Batı Şeria ve Gazze'nin işgali ile büyük bir yıkımla sonuçlanarak Filistin göçünü tırmandırması ile Kuveyt'te 1965'te 77 bin civarındaki Filistin nüfusu 1970'te 147 bine ve 1975'te 204 bine yükselmiş ve 1990'da Irak'ın Kuveyt'i

işgalinden önce Kuveyt'in yerli nüfusu 600 bin iken Filistinlilerin sayısı 400 bini bulmuştu (Lesch, 1991: 42-43). Özellikle Kuveyt'te ve diğer Körfez ülkelerinde müteahhit, bankacı, danışman gibi işlerde çalışan çok sayıda Filistinli çok iyi paralar kazanarak zenginleşmişler ve Filistin davasının önemli finansörleri haline gelmişlerdir (Zahlan, 2009: 12-13). Bu gelişme Kuveyt ve Filistinliler arasındaki karşılıklı olarak gelişen tarihsel bağların güçlenmesi ve farklı bir boyut kazanmasında oldukça etkili olmuştur. Filistin meselesi Arap, Kuveyt ve Filistin milliyetçiliklerinin güçlenmesinde en merkezi mesele ve ortak dava haline gelmiş ve bunun yansımaları Kuveyt'te yaşayan Filistinli şair Kemal Nasır'ın dizelerinde ortaya çıkmıştır (Zahlan, 2009: 47).

Filistin'in kurtuluş ve özgürlük mücadelesinin temsilinde ana aktör olarak önemli bir rol oynayan FKÖ'nün kurulmasının temellerinin Kuveyt'te atılmış olması Filistin ve Körfez arasındaki güçlü tarihsel bağların önemli bir boyutu olmuştur. Yukarıda belirtildiği gibi 1936-39 Filistin ayaklanması ile Kuveyt toplumunda öncelikli olarak başlayan ve diğer Körfez ülkelerine sirayet Filistin meselesi konusundaki duyarlılık, Filistinlilere karşı duyulan sempati ve İsrail ve destekçileri olan İngiliz ve Amerikan yönetimlerine duyulan öfke bir toplumsal mesele haline gelmiş ve Kuveyt'te parlamenter meclis ve siyasi katılım kültürünün oluşmasında önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Bu süreç içinde Kuveyt toplumunda sayıları artan Filistinliler, Filistin davasının kurumsallaşmasında öncü rol oynamış ve bu durum Kuveyt ve Filistin bağlarını güçlendiren önemli bir faktör olmuştur. Bunun en önemli adımı, Kuveyt'e göç etmiş ve orda çalışmakta olan Filistin lideri Yaser Arafat ve arkadaşlarının 1957'de El-Fetih örgütünü Kuveyt'te kurmaları olmuştur. Filistin'in kurtuluş mücadelesinin yürütülmesi ve Filistinlileri temsil etmek üzere kurulan bu yapı zaman içinde Kuveyt hükümetinin ve toplumunun destekleri ile hızla gelişerek 1964'te Kahire'de kurulan FKÖ şemsiyesi altında en büyük örgütü oluşturmuştur. 1969'da El-Fetih lideri Arafat FKÖ'nün yürütme kurulu başkanı olmuş ve FKÖ'nün BM, Arap Birliği, İslam Konferansı Örgütü gibi uluslararası kuruluşlarda tanınması ve Filistinleri temsil hakkını kazanmasında önemli rol oynamıştır.

Filistin meselesinin siyaseten kurumsallaşmasının Kuveyt'te başlaması ve gelişmesinde dikkati çeken önemli bir faktör Kuveyt Emirinin kardeşi Şeyh Fahd Ahmet'in El-Fetih üyesi olmasıdır ki Filistin davasının Kuveyt yönetici ailesi içinde etkili olduğunu ve onlar tarafından desteklendiğini göstermesi açısından önemlidir. 1967 Savaşında Kuveyt ordusu içinde yer almış olan Fahd Ahmet, El-Fetih merkezinin Ürdün'den sonra taşındığı Lübnan'a giderek yerleşmiş ve 1971'de tutuklanarak Kuveyt'e geri gönderilmiş, 1990'da Irak'ın Kuveyt'i işgali sırasında vurularak kraliyet şehidi olmuştur (Azouray & Beaugrand, 2015).

Diğer taraftan, Kuveyt'te Filistin toplumunun genişlemesi ve güçlenmesi İngiltere tarafından istenmeyen bir gelişme olarak görülmüş ve Kuveyt'teki Filistinliler İngiliz çıkarları için önemli bir tehdit olarak tanımlanmıştır. İngiltere'nin Kuveyt Büyükelçisi A.T. Lamb Londra'ya Kuveyt'teki Filistinliler hakkında bir rapor göndererek İngiliz hükümetini uyarmıştır. 2 Haziran 1976 tarihli "Varlık mı yoksa Yük mü? Kuveyt'te Filistinliler" adlı raporunda büyükelçi Kuveyt'te %38'e ulaşan Filistin nüfusunun Kuveyt siyasetini etkileme potansiyeli ile Kuveyt devletini ele geçirme tehlikesi ve özellikle Filistinlilerin ödedikleri vergilerin FKÖ'ye tahsis edilmesi yolu ile büyüyen FKÖ tehdidi üzerinde durmuş ve bu gelişmelerin İngiliz çıkarları için ciddi bir tehdit teşkil ettiğini anlatmıştır (FCO/2685, 1976). Benzer bir yaklaşım İngiliz basınında da gündem oluşturarak Kuveyt'teki Filistinliler aleyhinde haber yapılmıştır. Daily Express gazetesinin 19 Ağustos 1976'da "*Petrol Krallığına İsyen Tehdidi*" başlıklı haberinde "*Moskova Kuveyt İşgalinin Arkasında*" altbaşlığı ile Filistinli extremistlerin İngiltere'nin Kuveyt'teki çok önemli petrol çıkarları için büyük bir tehdit oluşturduğu iddia edilmiştir (FCO/2685, 1976). Haber, İngiltere'nin 1917 Balfour Deklarasyonu ile önünü açmış olduğu İsrail işgali sonucu yerlerinden olan Filistinlilerin, İngilizler tarafından Kuveyt'te "işgalci" olarak görülmelerini göstermesi açısından çarpıcıdır. İngiliz yönetimi kendi emperyalist politikalarının sonucu olarak Filistinlilerin yaşamakta olduğu dramın sonlandırılması için hiçbir adım atmazken, Kuveyt'e ve diğer Körfez ülkelerine sığınmış ve o ülkelerde önemli bir istihdam açığını kapatmış olan Filistinlileri bir tehdit olarak görmüştür.

Kuveyt Basınının Etkisi

Kuveyt'in Filistin meselesine verdiği destekte Kuveyt basını etkin bir rol oynamıştır. Kuveyt hükümeti siyaseten açıkça İsrail karşıtı bir söylem kullanmamış olsa da Kuveyt'te diğer Körfez ülkelerinden farklı olarak mevcut olan nispi basın özgürlüğü, Kuveyt basınının Filistin davasının ve İsrail'e ve İsrail yanlısı Anglo-Amerikan politikalarına yönelik eleştiri ve tepkilerin güçlü bir sesi haline gelmesine imkân

tanımıştır. Kuveyt'te özgür ve etkin basın mevcudiyeti faktörü, Kuveyt'in yukarıda bahsedilen geleneksel çoğulculuk ve hoşgörü kültürünün etkin bir muhalefetin aktif rol oynadığı bir parlamento varlığı ile kurumsallaşmış olmasının önemli bir sonucu olmakla birlikte, söz konusu siyasi yapıyı destekleyici bir faktör olmuştur. Kuveyt'teki diğer Körfez ülkelerinde mevcut olmayan bu siyasi yapı ve nispeten özgür Kuveyt basını karşılıklı olarak birbirini desteklemiştir (Yom, 2020: 580-81). Kuveyt basını Arap dünyasında Filistin meselesinin önemli bir sesi olmuştur.

Arapça yayınların dışında Kuveyt'te İngilizce yayın yapan *Kuwait Times* gazetesi Filistin haklarının savunuculuğu ve İsrail işgali ve Amerikan ve İngiliz politikalarının karşıtlığı misyonunu yüklenerek bu alanda ses getiren cesur bir habercilik sergilemiştir. İngiliz Dışişleri Bakanı Lord Balniel'in petrol krizini müteakip gerçekleştirdiği Körfez turunda Kuveyt'i ziyareti sırasında, 22.01.1974 tarihli *Kuwait Times* gazetesinin "İngiliz Zayıflığı" başlıklı haberinde Filistin meselesine yönelik İngiliz politikası yoğun ve sert bir şekilde eleştirilmiştir. İngiltere'nin İsrail'e silah satışına devam ettiğini vurgulayan haberde, İsrail'in yaratılmasında asıl sorumlu ülke olan İngiltere'nin Balfour deklarasyonu ile sebep olduğu bu durumdan dolayı son yirmi yılda hiçbir üzüntü ve pişmanlık belirtmemiş olması ve zaten yetersiz olan 1967 BM 242 kararını dahi takip etmediği, "terörizm" iddiasıyla İsrail'i desteklediği ve manipülasyonları ile Arap karşıtı ve İsrail yanlısı yanlış bir algıyı kamuoyunda oluşturduğu ve buna karşılık İngiltere'nin Kuveyt'teki büyük petrol çıkarlarının bulunduğu yorumları yapılmıştır (*Kuwait Times*, 1974).

Diğer Körfez ülkelerinden on yıl önce 1961'de bağımsızlığını alan Kuveyt'in İngiltere ile kolonyal bağlar temelinde süren yakın ilişkilerine rağmen Kuveyt basınının İngiltere'nin Filistin-İsrail meselesinde ki tarihsel sorumluluğu ve taraflı politikaları üzerinde açık bir şekilde eleştirmekten çekinmemesi Kuveyt'te basın özgürlüğünün etkinliğini ve Kuveyt basını ve kamuoyunun Filistin meselesine olan duyarlılığını göstermesi bakımından önemlidir. Ayrıca, Kuveyt kamuoyunun Kuveyt'in petrol gücü ve İngiltere'nin Kuveyt petrolüne olan bağımlılığı konusunda farkındalık kazanmış olduğunun göstergesidir. Kuveyt'teki basın toplantısı sırasında Kuveyt basını Bakan Balniel'i yoğun bir sorgulama altına alarak eleştiri bombardımanına tutmuştur. Balniel'in sıkıştırıldığı toplantıda sorulan sorular arasında, İngiltere'nin İsrail'e silah ambargosunu kaldırması, İngiliz Yahudilerinin 1973 savaşında İsrail'e destek için 50 milyon Sterlin tutarında para toplanması ve Filistinlilerin geri dönüş hakları gibi sorular yer almış ve *Kuwait Times*, 'Balniel'in İnkarı' başlıklı haberinde bakanın bütün bu iddiaları inkar ederek uçağa yetişme gerekçesi ile acele ile ayrıldığını yazmıştır (*Kuwait Times*, 1974). Bu gezi dönüşünde Bakan Balniel, bakanlıklara göndermiş olduğu brifing yazısında Kuveyt gezisine dair, Kuveyt'le ilgili hayal kırıklığını anlatan izlenimlerini paylaşmıştır. Aşağı Körfez ülkelerinde görüşmeler çok iyi geçerken Kuveyt'te çok daha soğuk bir havada ve Kuveyt Emiri ile görüşmenin gülünç bir şekilde yüzeysel geçtiğinden bahsetmiş ve Irak işgaline karşı İngiltere'nin Kuveyt'e verdiği destek karşılığında Kuveyttilerin hiçbir sıcak ve minnet belirten bir yaklaşımla göstermediğinden yakınan İngiliz Bakanın bu açıklamaları Kuveyt'in istisnailiğinin dış ilişkilerine yansımalarını ortaya koymaktadır.

1981 yılında Başbakan Margaret Thatcher'ın yapmış olduğu Körfez ziyaretinde yine Kuveyt basını Filistin-İsrail meselesine yönelik taraflı politikaları konusunda eleştirel sorularla başbakanı sıkıştırmış ve açık bir dille İngiltere hükümetini suçlamıştır. Kuveyt ziyareti ile alakalı yazdığı telgrafta Dış İşleri Bakanı Lord Carrington, Kuveyt basınının, Thatcher'ı basın toplantısında kendisine yöneltilen sorulara karşı verdiği cevaplarda Filistinlilere yönelik ithamlarında İsrail liderlerinin dilini kullanmakla ve FKÖ'yü terörizmle yaftalayarak tüm Arap dünyasına meydan okumakla suçladığını aktarmıştır (PREM 19-535, 1981). Thatcher'ın İsrail yanlısı tutum ve söylemleri Arap dünyasında büyük bir eleştiriye sebep olmuştur. Ziyaretin ardından Kuveyt'te bulunan FKÖ'nün resmi sözcüsü Abu Maizar'ın yaptığı açıklamada, İngiltere'nin Filistin'de Siyonist projeyi başlatan politikasının hiç değişmediği, FKÖ'nün verdiği meşru mücadeleyi terörizmle yaftaladığı ve bu iki yüzlü ve şantajcı politikasına devam etmekle Ortadoğu'da barış ve güvenliği tehdit etmekte olduğu ifadelerinin yer aldığı eleştirileri Kuveyt basınının etkisiyle Arap dünyasında önemli yankılar bulmuştur (PREM 19-535, 1981).

Kral Faysal ve 1973 Petrol Ambargosu

Dördüncü Arap-İsrail savaşı olan 1973 Yom Kippur Savaşında (Ekim Savaşı ve Ramazan Savaşı olarak da bilinir) Suud Kralı Faysal liderliğinde Umman hariç olmak üzere Körfez ülkelerinin küresel petrol krizine neden olan petrol ambargosu gerçekleştirmeleri Körfez ve Filistin arasındaki tarihsel bağları

siyasi arenada en üst düzeyde ortaya koyan önemli bir dönüm noktası olmuştur.³ Savaş sırasında ABD hükümetinin İsrail'e vermiş olduğu açık destek sonucu dengelerin İsrail lehine dönmesi Arap dünyasında büyük tepkiye neden olmuş ve Suudi Arabistan liderliğinde Körfez ülkelerinin ellerindeki petrol kozunu siyasi bir güce dönüştürecek düzeyde bir inisiyatif olarak petrol ambargosu uygulamaları ile büyük bir etki alanı oluşturmalarıyla sonuçlanmıştır. Körfez ülkelerinin uyguladığı petrol ambargosu ile petrol üretiminin kısıtlanması ve petrol fiyatlarının hızla yükselmesi sonucu küresel düzeyde bir petrol krizi yaşanmıştır.⁴ Körfez siyasetinin şekillenmesinde önemli bir milat teşkil eden 1973 petrol ambargosunun temelinde yatan yegâne faktör yukarıda tarihsel süreç çerçevesinde ortaya koyulan Körfez ve Filistin arasındaki güçlü tarihsel bağlardır. Filistin meselesinin gelişmesinde sürecin başından beri büyüyen İsrail işgaline paralel olarak Filistinlilerin mağduriyetinin boyutlarının büyümesi Körfez halkının ve liderlerinin konuyla ilgili hassasiyetlerinin ve İsrail karşıtlığıyla birlikte İsrail'e arka çıkan ABD ve müttefiklerine duyulan tepkinin artmasına sebep olmuştur.

Petrol ambargosunun başlatılmasını müteakip aralık ayında Suudi Dışişleri Bakanı, İngiliz Büyükelçisine S. Arabistan'la tam bir dostluk ilişkisi kurabilmenin üç koşulu olduğunu ve bunların İsrail'in saldırganlığının kınanması, BM 242 Kararının tanınması⁵ ve Filistin'in self-determinasyon hakkının tanındığına dair bir anlaşma yapılması olduğunu belirtmiştir (Zahlan, 2009: 58). Yom Kippur savaşındaki gelişmeler doğrultusunda siyasi arenada gerçekleştirilen bu somut ve önemli girişimde Suud Kralı Faysal'ın meseleye olan kişisel yakınlığı ve duyarlılığı ile birlikte etkin liderlik kapasitesi başat rol oynamıştır. Kral Faysal, Filistinlilerin hakları konusunda ABD ve İngiltere ile diplomatik mücadele yürüterek konu ile ilgili Arap ülkelerinin siyasi düzeyde liderliğini yürütmüş olan Kral Abdulaziz gibi, krallığı elinde bulundurduğu 1964-75 yılları arasında ABD liderleri ile Filistin meselesi üzerinde etkin diplomatik ilişkiler kurmuş ve bu konu ile ilgili olarak ABD yönetimi Faysal'ı bölgesel otorite olarak kabul ederek muhatap almış ve müzakerelerde bulunmuştur.

Kral Faysal, krallığının çok daha öncesinde Siyonizm karşıtı yaklaşımı ile Filistin davasına destek verme misyonunu üstlenmiş ve bu konuda siyasi düzeyde çalışmalara başlamıştır. 1957'de Velihaht Prens Faysal Filistin-İsrail meselesi ile ilgili görüşme yapmak üzere ABD Başkanı Eisenhower'ı ziyaret etmiş ve başkana İsrail'in Arap dünyası için en büyük tehdit olduğunu vurgulamıştır (Zahlan, 2009: 34). Önceki bölümde değinildiği gibi Faysal, 1967 yenilgisinden sonra ABD yönetimi üzerinde konu ile ilgili baskı oluşturmak üzere ABD'ye petrol akışını birkaç hafta süre ile durdurma girişiminde bulunmuştur. Savaştan sonra Hartum'da düzenlenen Arap Zirvesi'nde İsrail'le asla barış yapılmayacağı ve müzakere yapılmayacağı, İsrail'in tanınmayacağı ve Filistinlilerin kendi topraklarındaki haklarından vazgeçilmeyeceği temel prensiplerini deklare eden kararın alınmasında Faysal öncü rol oynamıştır (Dawisha, 1983: 676). Zirvenin ardından Faysal, ABD Başkanı Lyndon B. Johnson'a yazdığı 6 Eylül 1967 tarihli mektupta zirvede alınan kararları deklare etmiş ve İsrail saldırganlığı karşısında verilen desteğin kesilmesi gerektiğini ve BM'nin İsrail işgalini durdurması gerektiğini belirtmiştir (Office of Historian). Kuveyt Emiri, ülkesinde bulunan FKÖ ofisini Filistin Büyükelçiliği olarak kabul etmiş, ayrıca 1974'te Lahor'da düzenlenen İslam Konferansına katılırken FKÖ lideri Arafat'ı bir devlet

³ Yom Kippur Savaşı sırasında, Körfez ülkeleri öncülüğünde, Petrol İhraç Eden Arap Ülkeleri Birliği (OAPEC) üyelerinin 17 Ekim 1973'te Kuveyt'te toplanarak İsrail'in ele geçirdiği topraklardan çekilmesi ve Filistin meşru haklarının güvenceye alınmasına kadar petrol üretiminde aylık %5 oranında azaltma ve ham petrol fiyatını %70 oranında yükseltme ve savaşta İsrail'e destek veren ABD ve Hollanda'ya petrol ihracının durdurulması kararını açıkladılar Mart 1974'e kadar ambargoyu sürdürdüler. Ambargoya Arap olmayan ülkeler, başta İran olmak üzere, Venezuela, Endonezya ve Nijerya'da destek vermiştir. Bkz. Issawi, C. (1978), "The 1973 Oil Crisis and After," *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics*, Vol.1, No.2, Winter-79, 3-26.

⁴ Ekim 1973'te 3 \$ olan petrol varil fiyatları Ocak 1974'te 11,65 \$'a yükselmiştir. Petrol fiyatlarının yükselişi devam ederek 1985 yılında 29\$'a ulaşmıştır. Petrol krizi küresel düzeyde enerji güvenliği sorununa sebep olurken aynı zamanda küresel ekonomiyi etkileyen büyük bir şok yaratmıştır. Bkz, Özev, M.H. (2010), "Petrol Sermayesi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler: 1973 Sonrası Körfez Ülkeleri Örneği," Doktora Tezi, İstanbul Üniversitesi. Salih Öztürk, Selin Saygın, (2017), "1973 Krizinin Ekonomiye Etkileri ve Stagflasyon Olgusu," *Balkan Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, cilt 6, sayı 12.

⁵ Bm 242 kararı, 1967 Savaşında İsrail'in Sina Yarımadası, Gazze, Batı Şeria ve Golan tepelerini işgal etmesi sonucu BMGK tarafından oybirliği ile alınan ve İsrail'in işgal ettiği topraklardan çekilmesini öngören karardır. İsrail tarafından uygulanmayan karar 1973 Yom Kippur Savaşından sonra alınan BM 338 Kararı ile teyid edilmiştir. Bkz, United Nations Security Council, Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, <https://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7d35e1f729df491c85256ee700686136> (Erişim Tarihi: 31.12.2021)

başkanı gibi bizzat yanında konumlandırarak Filistin lideri olarak selamlanmasını sağlamıştır (Zahlan, 2009: 64).

Diğer taraftan, Soğuk Savaş bağlamında batı müttefikleri olan Suudi Arabistan ve diğer Körfez ülkeleri yönetimlerinin Mısır lideri Nasır gibi sosyalist devrimci Arap liderleri tarafından “siyonist müttefikler,” “batı emperyalizminin uşakları” gibi yaftalarla Filistinlilere ihanetle suçlanmışlar ve bu liderler bu şekilde siyasi meşruiyet kazanmaya çabasına girmişlerdir (Dawisha, 1983: 675). Nitekim, kuruluşundan beri gücünü önce İngiltere daha sonra Amerika ile gerçekleştirdiği ittifakla güçlendiren Suudi Arabistan her zaman batı ittifakının bölgesel bir gücü konumunda olmuştur. Bununla birlikte, ABD ile ittifakı çerçevesinde Kral Faysal, babası Abdülaziz’in benimsediği yaklaşımı sürdürerek, bir taraftan ABD ile ittifakını sürdürürken diğer taraftan bu ittifak çerçevesinde ABD liderleri ile olan temaslarında öncelikli mesele olarak Filistin konusunu gündemde tutmuş ve Filistin haklarının korunması ve İsrail işgalinin durdurulması için baskı oluşturmaya çalışmıştır. Nihayetinde, 1973’te İsrail’i destekleyen ABD ve Hollanda’ya uyguladığı petrol ambargosundaki öncülüğü ile bu politikasının en somut örneğini ortaya koyarak petrol kozunu bir yaptırım aracına dönüştürmeyi başarmıştır.

Uluslararası literatürde Körfez ülkelerinin petrolü bir silah olarak kullanmaları olarak tanımlanan bu tarihi adım İsrail’in ilerleyişini durduramamış olsa da siyasi dengeleri değiştirmiştir. Bunun en çarpıcı örneği, petrol krizinden en fazla etkilenmiş olan Avrupa ülkelerinin, Körfez ülkelerinin Filistin meselesi konusundaki hassasiyetlerinin ve kararlılıklarının ne kadar hayati boyutlarda olduğunu idrak etmeleri üzerine, konuya yönelik yaklaşımlarını değiştirmek zorunda kalmaları olmuştur. Avrupa Topluluğu (AT) üyesi 9 Avrupa ülkesi savaşın başlamasından bir hafta sonra bir ortak bildiri yayımlayarak ateşkesin sağlanıp, BM 242 Kararı çerçevesinde bir an önce anlaşma sağlanarak düşmanlığın sona erdirilmesi çağrısında bulunmuştur (Zahlan, 2009: 61).

Körfez ülkelerinin petrol silahını tekrar kullanmalarını önlemek üzere, 9 Avrupa ülkesi petrol krizinin patlak vermesiyle Filistin-İsrail meselesi konusunda Arap ülkelerinin hassasiyetlerini paylaştıklarını göstermek amacıyla Arap dünyası ile ilişkilerini güçlendirmek üzere Avrupa-Arap Diyalogu (*The Euro-Arab Dialog*, EAD) başlatmışlardır. Mart 1974’te yürürlüğe koyulan ve ekonomik iş birliğinin çerçevesini belirlediği diyalog 1980’li yıllara kadar sürdürülmüştür (Zakariah, 2013: 95-115). Bu girişimle Avrupa devletleri İsrail yanlısı Amerikan politikalarından kendilerini ayırdıklarını ortaya koyma motivasyonu ile hareket etmiş ve buna karşılık ABD’nin tepkisi ve girişimi engellemek üzere uyguladığı baskılarla karşılaşmışlardır. Ambargo sonrası süreçte Avrupa ülkeleri ve Amerikan politikaları arasında Arap-İsrail meselesine yönelik farklılaşma doğrultusunda iki farklı yaklaşım ortaya çıkmış ve iki taraf arasındaki ilişkileri etkilemiştir (Zahlan, 2009: 62).

Körfez ülkelerindeki hayati ekonomik ve enerji çıkarlarını korumak üzere İngiltere bu girişime katılmak zorunda kalmış fakat buna rağmen İsrail yanlısı politikalarından vazgeçmemiştir (Çavuşoğlu, 2018, 13-14). 1981 yılında Thatcher hükümetinin Dış İşleri Sekreteri Lord Carrington, İngiltere’nin Filistin konusunda tutarlı ve samimi bir yaklaşım ortaya koyması gerektiği politika yaklaşımı doğrultusunda Avrupa Topluluğu’nun 9 üye ülkesi ile birlikte Venedik Deklarasyonunun ilan edilmesine öncülük etmiştir (Çavuşoğlu, 2018, 19-20). İngiltere özellikle Carrington’un somut girişimleri sonucu, göstermelikte olsa Arap-İsrail meselesine yönelik olarak ABD ile değil Avrupa ile birlikte hareket ettiği imajını oluşturma stratejisinin meyvelerini 1985 yılında Suudi Arabistan’la yapmış olduğu *Al Yamamah* adlı büyük silah satışı anlaşması ile toplamıştır. On yılın en büyük anlaşması olan bu anlaşma 2 milyar Sterlin tutarında silah satışı ile İngiliz silah sanayisine ve ekonomisine büyük bir servet kazandırmıştır. Bu anlaşmanın önemi Suudi Arabistan’ın başat güvenlik tedarikçisi olan Amerika’nın İsrail yanlısı politikalarından dolayı bu büyük silah satışını İngiltere’ye kaptırmış olmasında yatmaktadır. 1988’de İngiltere ile anlaşmayı yenileyen Suudi Arabistan, Filistin meselesi konusundaki kararlılığını bir kez daha müttefikleri Amerika’ya göstermiştir.

Körfez ülkelerinin 1973 petrol krizi ile sonuçlanan petrol ambargosu Körfez siyasetinde bölgesel ve küresel düzeylerde çok önemli sonuçları olan bir milat olmuştur. Bölgesel düzeydeki en önemli sonuçlarından biri, 1973 savaşında Mısır’ın uğradığı hezimet ve ardından 1978’de Camp David Anlaşması ile İsrail’le barış yapması sebebiyle Arap Liginden çıkarılması sonucu itibarını kaybeden lider ülke Mısır’ın yerine Suudi Arabistan’ın geçerek Arap dünyasının başat gücü haline gelmesi olmuştur. Böylece Ortadoğu siyasetinin merkezi Körfez’e kaymış ve Körfez ülkeleri etkin aktörler haline gelmiştir. Körfez ülkelerinin Ortadoğu siyasetindeki ağırlığının artmasında 1973 petrol ambargosunda ortaya koydukları siyasi irade ile birlikte petrol krizi sonrasında petrol gelirlerinin muazzam bir düzeye artması ile büyüyen ekonomik güçleri temel rol oynamıştır. Petrol fiyatlarının

petrol krizini takip eden on yıl içinde yükselmeye devam etmesi sonucu Körfez ülkelerinin petrol gelirleri 1975-76 yıllarında 5-10 katı düzeylerde artmış ve uluslararası finans güçleri haline gelmişlerdir. Bu doğrultuda Körfez ülkeleri dış yatırım fonları ile uluslararası büyük şirketlerin ortakları haline gelmişlerdir. Diğer taraftan Körfez ülkeleri diğer Ortadoğu ülkelerinin kalkınma ve altyapı projelerinin başat destekçileri olmuş ve bu şekilde Ortadoğu ülkeleri üzerindeki etki alanlarını artırarak Ortadoğu siyasetinde etkin aktörler olmuşlardır.

1973 petrol krizinin sonucu olarak başta Avrupa ülkeleri olmak üzere Japonya gibi sanayileşmiş küresel güçlerin Körfez ve Ortadoğu petrolüne olan bağımlılıkları temelinde enerji güvenliği meselesi ve petrol-politik, petrol diplomasisi gibi kavramları uluslararası ilişkilerde önemli parametreler haline gelmiştir. Körfez sermayesinin küresel ticarete yükselen bir değer olması Körfez'in özellikle silah sektöründe pazar değerinin yükselmesi ile sonuçlanmıştır. Silah sanayisi güçlü olan ABD, İngiltere, Fransa gibi ülkeler için Körfez öncelikli pazar hedefi haline gelmiş Körfez ülkelerinin başat güvenlik ve savunma tedarikçileri olan bu ülkelerin silah satışları hızla yükselmiştir (Muttam, 1984). Bu çerçevede, silahlanma yarışına giren Körfez ülkeleri içinde buldukları güvenlik ikilemi kısılcacında büyük güçlerin Körfez'de oluşturdukları güvenlik mimarisinin başat aktörleri olmuşlardır.

Petrol ambargosu sonrası gelişmeler Körfez-Filistin bağlarının daha da güçlendiği yeni bir aşamaya geçilmesini sağlamıştır. Özellikle Körfez ülkelerinin petrol sermayelerindeki muazzam artış bu ülkelerin kalkınmalarını hızlandırmış ve uluslararası şirketler için cazibe noktası haline gelmelerine sebep olmuştur. Bunun sonucu olarak Körfez ülkelerine olan Filistinli göçü artmış diğer taraftan Körfez ülkelerindeki mevcut Filistinlilerin de gelirlerinin yükselmesi ile Filistin'e gönderilen paralarda önemli artışlar olmuştur. Filistinli göçmenlerin Körfez ülkelerinde kazandıkları paralardan Filistin'de bulunan yakınlarına göndermeleri Filistinlilerin ekonomisine de katkıda bulunmuş ve hastane, okul, üniversitelerin vs. yapılması veya iyileştirilmesi yoluyla Filistinlilerin refahını yükseltmiştir. Körfez'den gönderilen paralar sadece Filistin'e değil Lübnan, Suriye ve Ürdün gibi büyük Filistin diasporalarının Filistinli mülteci kamplarının yer aldığı ülkelere de giderek Filistinlilerin hayatına dokunmuştur. Ayrıca, petrol sermayeleri artan Körfez ülkelerinin kalkınma fonlarına ayırdıkları payın bu dönem itibari ile önemli bir yükseliş göstermesinde Filistin'in önemli bir payı olmuştur. Başta Kuveyt olmak üzere Körfez ülkelerinin FKÖ'ye yaptıkları finansal ve siyasi desteğin artması ile Körfez'in Filistin davasının başat destekçisi haline gelmesi Körfez-Filistin bağlarını güçlendirmiştir. Diğer taraftan, Umman Filistin meselesine olan mesafesi ve İsrail'le yakınlığı konusundaki farklı yaklaşımını Sultan Kâbus idaresinde bu dönemde de devam ettirmiş ve 1973 petrol ambargosuna dahil olmadığı gibi diğer Körfez ülkelerinin kati bir ortak politikası olan İsrail karşıtı bir politika benimsememiş ve zaman zaman İsrail'le örtülü ilişkiler geliştirmiştir (Jones, Guzansky, 2019: 49-56). Umman, Mısır'ın 1977'de İsrail'le anlaşmasını alkışlayan tek Körfez ülkesi olarak Körfez ülkeleri tarafından dışlanmış (Kechichian, 1995), ayrıca Filistin 1. İntifadası sırasında Filistin tarafında yer almaktan kaçınmıştır (Stollman, 2004: 193).

Barış Süreci ve Körfez Ülkeleri

1975 yılında Kral Faysal'ın yeğeni tarafından öldürülmesi Körfez-Filistin bağlarında olduğu kadar Filistin meselesinde de önemli bir kırılma noktası olmuştur. Kral Faysal'ın şaibeli bir cinayete kurban gitmesi ile ABD Dış İşleri Bakanı Henry Kissinger tarafından etkisi artan İsrail yanlısı ABD politikalarının uygulanmasının önünde potansiyel bir sorun teşkil eden bir siyasi lider ortadan kaldırılmıştır. Bu noktada, Filistin meselesinin batı müttefikleri olarak siyasi arenadaki en güçlü savunucusu ve destekçisi olan Suudi Arabistan, Faysal'ın gösterdiği kararlılık ve sıkı duruşu gösterebilecek yeni bir liderin yoksunluğu içinde yeni bir sürece girmiştir. Bu süreçte, Ortadoğu dengelerinin değişmesi ile Filistin meselesi savaş sürecinden barış sürecine geçiş yaşamıştır. Mısır lideri Enver Sedat'ın 1973 yenilgisinden sonra İsrail ile anlaşma yoluna girmesi ve Kissinger'ın stratejisi doğrultusunda adım adım yürütülen görüşmeler sonunda (Zahlan, 2009: 65-66) Amerikan başkanı Jimmy Carter öncülüğünde 1978'de Mısır ve İsrail arasında Camp David anlaşmasının imzalanması ile Arap-İsrail Savaşlarının öncü gücü olan Mısır'ın Arap dünyasında İsrail'i tanıyarak meşruiyetini ilan eden ilk ülke olması şok etkisi yaratmıştır. Mısır'ın Arap dünyasından büyük tepki alması ve Arap Birliği'nden çıkarılması sonucu Suudi Arabistan bölgesel liderliğini güçlendirirken barış sürecine doğru giden Filistin meselesinin siyasi arenada ki sözcüsü olmaya devam etmiştir.

1979 İran İslam devrimi Körfez siyasetinin dinamiklerini ve güç dengelerini değiştiren bir dönüm noktası olduğu kadar Filistin-Körfez bağları noktasında da önemli bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Rejimin değişmesi ile bölgede ki en güçlü destekçisini ve uyguladığı çifte sütun *twin pillars* (Sick, 2018),

politikasının iki ayağından birini kaybeden ABD bundan sonraki süreçte Suudi Arabistan ile olan ittifakını güçlendirerek, güvenlik işbirliği düzeyini ileri boyutlara taşımıştır. Filistin meselesi bağlamında ise en önemlisi, anti-Siyonist bir ideoloji benimseyen yeni İran rejiminin İsrail karşıtı ve Filistin davasının destekçisi olan yeni dış politikası ile Körfez siyasetinde Filistin meselesi ağırlığını artırmıştır. İslam Cumhuriyetini ziyaret eden ilk yabancı lider Yaser Arafat olmuş ve FKÖ'nün İran'da temsilcilik açması Humeyni yönetimi tarafından kabul edilmiştir (Bahgat, 2006: 42). Ancak 1980'de, devrimin ilk yılında, Irak lideri Saddam Hüseyin'in İran'a savaş açmasıyla başlayan ve 8 yıl süren İran-İrak Savaşı'nın İran İslam Cumhuriyeti'ni siyasi ve ekonomik anlamda önemli bir ablukaya alması ve bunu savaş sonrasında ABD'nin ambargo ve yaptırımlarının takip etmesi İran'ın Filistin meselesi üzerindeki etkisini sınırlamıştır.

80'li yıllar, Filistinliler ve Filistin davası açısından olumsuz seyreden gelişmelerin 1987 yılında gerçekleşecek olan 1. Filistin İntifadasına adım adım yaklaşır bir zemin hazırladığı ve Arap Birliği gündeminde Filistin meselesinin ikincil bir duruma düştüğü bir dönem olmuştur. 1982'de İsrail Lübnan'ı işgali ardından Beyrut'ta bulunan Sabra ve Şatilla Filistin mülteci kamplarında büyük bir katliam gerçekleştirmiştir. İsrail Savunma Bakanı Ariel Şaron yönetiminde yapılan katliam sonucunda çocuk, yaşlı ve kadınların da dahil olduğu üç binden fazla Filistinli katledilmiştir. Bunu takiben FKÖ merkezini Lübnan'dan, kurtarmak istediği topraklardan 3.200 km uzaklıktaki Tunus'a taşımak zorunda kalmıştır ki bu da FKÖ için Arap ülkelerinin baskıları altına gireceği yeni bir döneme geçmesi anlamına gelmiştir (Pappe, 2004: 219-220).

1982'de Suudi Arabistan Kralı Fahd bir barış planı hazırlamış ve bu plan Eylül 1982'de yapılan Fez Arap Zirvesi'ne dahil edilmiştir. Bu çerçevede, FKÖ'nün Filistinlilerin tek meşru temsilcisi olduğu ve BM tarafından Filistin devletinin garanti altına alınması gerektiği vurgulanmıştır (Kostiner, 2009: 419-422). Kral Fahd'ın planı istenen etkiyi oluşturamamış, Ekim 1985'te İsrail'in Tunus'daki FKÖ genel merkezini bombalayarak 70 insanı öldürmesi, 1986'da Ürdün hükümetinin FKÖ ofisini kapatıp bir El-Fetih liderini sınır dışı etmesi ve 1987'de ABD'nin Washington'da bulunan Filistin Bilgi Ofisini kapatması (Zahlan, 2009: 79). Filistin mücadelesinin uluslararası alanda temsiliyetinin ve meşruiyetinin engellenmesine yönelik girişimler olmuştur. Aralık 1987'de Gazze'de bir İsrail kamyon şoförünün 4 Filistinliyi öldürmesi ile tetiklenen gelişmeler sonucunda başlayan 1. İntifada Batı Şeria ve Gazze'yi kapsayan büyük bir toplumsal direniş hareketi olmuştur (Pappe, 2004: 230-240). 6 yıl süren intifada hareketi Oslo barış anlaşmasının imzalanması ile sonuçlanan görüşmelerin başlamasına sebep olmuş ve Filistin meselesi bu tarih itibarı ile "barış" süreci olarak tanımlanabilecek olan yeni bir evreye geçmiştir. Barış dönemi ile birlikte bir önceki devreye göre konu üzerindeki etkinlikleri zayıflamış olsa da Filistin meselesinin siyasi arenadaki başat destekçileri yine Körfez ülkeleri olmaya devam etmiştir. İsrail'i tanımayı hiçbir zaman kabul etmemiş olan Körfez ülkeleri Filistin meselesinde bir sonuca varabilmek kaygısı ile İsrail ile masaya oturmak zorunda kalacakları bir sürece girmişler ve bu süreçte de Filistin meselesi Körfez ülkelerinin dış politika ajandalarının öncelikli konusu olmaya devam etmiştir.

1990'da Saddam Hüseyin'in Kuveyt'i işgali Filistin-Körfez ilişkilerinde bir kırılma noktası teşkil etmiştir. Saddam'ın Kuveyt'i ilhak etmesine karşılık ABD liderliğinde batı koalisyonunun Irak'a savaş açması Arap dünyasında bir bölünme ve kutuplaşmaya sebep olmuştur. Körfez güvenliğine büyük bir darbe vuran saldırgan Irak'a karşı birleşen KİK ülkelerine karşı, Yemen, Ürdün, Sudan, Libya gibi ülkeler Amerikan'ın bölgeye müdahalesine karşı Irak'ı desteklemişlerdir. İran'la giriştiği savaştan büyük kayıplarla çıkan Saddam, Irak'ın tarih boyunca üzerinde hak iddia ettiği Kuveyt'i işgal ederek siyasi ve ekonomik kazanç elde etmek hedefine ulaşmak için anti-emperyalist ve anti-Siyonist söylemler üzerinden işgaline meşruiyet kazandırmak istemiştir. Irak tarafındaki Arap ülkelerinin argümanı ABD'nin İsrail'in Lübnan'ı işgalinde müdahale etmemesine karşılık Irak'a müdahale etmesi olmuştur. Saddam, savaş sırasında İsrail başkenti Tel Aviv'i hedef göstererek ateş açmış ve kendisine verilen Kuveyt'ten çekilmesi ultimatoma karşı İsrail'in işgal ettiği topraklardan çekilmesi şartını ileri sürmüştür (Kamrava, 2005: 190).

Saddam'ın Kuveyt'i işgalini İsrail'in Filistin'deki işgali ile ilişkilendirerek meşrulaştırma gayreti, Filistin meselesini istismar ederek Arap dünyasında itibar kazanmaya çalışması FKÖ'nün Irak yanlısı bir pozisyon almasına sebep olmuştur. 2 Ağustos 1990'da Saddam'ın Kuveyt'i işgalinin ardından 10 Ağustos'ta toplanan Arap Zirvesi'nde Irak'ın Kuveyt'i işgalinin kınayan ve Körfez ülkelerinin egemenlik haklarını savunan karara FKÖ ret oyu vererek bu pozisyonunu açıkça ortaya koymuştur. FKÖ'nün bu yaklaşımı büyük bir hayal kırıklığı yaşayan Körfez ülkeleri tarafından ihanet olarak algılanmıştır ki bu tutumu FKÖ'nün Kuveyt gibi Filistin davasına ev sahipliği yapmış bir ülkenin

işgalini desteklemesi olarak yorumlanmıştır (Zahlan, 2009: 92). Khalidi (1991) ise işin iç yüzünün aslında böyle olmadığını, Arap Zirvesinde yapılan oylamada FKÖ'nün ret oyu vermediğini fakat çekimser kaldığını çünkü Irak'ın Kuveyt'i işgaline tamamen karşı olup diğer taraftan bölgede Amerikan varlığının güçlenmesini daha büyük bir tehlike olarak gördüğünü anlatmaktadır. Aynı şekilde Zahlan (2009), FKÖ'nün aslında tarafsız bir politika izlediğini açıklamaktadır. Buna rağmen, FKÖ lideri Arafat'ın Saddam ile kucaklaşmasını gösteren fotoğrafın TV kanallarında gösterilmesi onun "Kuveyt'e ihanet" imajının Körfez ülkeleri kamuoyunda pekişmesine neden olmuştur.

Körfez-Filistin bağlarında önemli bir kırılma noktası teşkil eden bu gelişmeler, FKÖ'nün marjinalleştirilerek Körfez ülkelerinin desteğinden mahrum bırakılması ve Körfez ülkelerinde yaşayan Filistinlilerin bundan büyük ölçüde etkilenmesi ile sonuçlanmıştır. Başta Kuveyt olmak üzere Körfez ülkeleri FKÖ'ye olan kırgınlıklarını Filistinli göçmenlere yansıtmış ve çok sayıda Filistinli Kuveyt'i terk etmek zorunda kalmıştır. Bu durum, Filistinlilerin ciddi bir mağduriyete ve ekonomik yıkıma uğramaları ve Filistin davasının en önemli finans kaynaklarının kesilmesi ile sonuçlanmıştır (Khalidi, 1991:19-20, Zahlan, 2009: 93-94). Bu durum, İntifada süreci içinde bulunan Filistin topraklarında şartların Filistinliler aleyhine gelişmesinde etkili olmuş, İsrail Filistinliler üzerindeki zulmünü artırmış ve söz konusu gelişmelerle aynı zamanda gelişen barış sürecine önemli ölçüde yansımıştır.

1991 yılında yapılan Madrid Barış Konferansı ile İsrail ve Filistin delegasyonları arasında barış görüşmeleri başlamıştır. Görüşmelere bir KİK temsilcisinin gözlemci olarak davet edilmesi üzerine Suudi Amerikan büyükelçisi Prens Bandar bin Sultan konferansa bizzat katılmıştır (Zahlan, 2009: 96). Başta Arap dünyasında olmak üzere uluslararası arenada desteği önemli ölçüde kaybeden FKÖ, İsrail ve Amerikan projeksiyonu olan 1993 Oslo Barış anlaşmasını imzalamak zorunda kalmıştır. Görüşmelerde ağırlığını koruyan Suudi Arabistan, BM 242 ve 252 kararları doğrultusunda İsrail'in Kudüs'te demografik dengeleri bozmaya yönelik girişimlerinin durdurulması için uyarılarda bulunmuştur. Nihayetinde barışın tesis edilemediği ve aslında halen devam etmekte olan bu süreç boyunca S. Arabistan ABD ile güçlenen güvenlik ittifakına rağmen Filistin meselesinde bölgesel koordinatör pozisyonunu korumaya devam etmiştir (Kostiner, 2009: 417-422). ABD'nin bölgedeki en büyük müttefiki olmasına rağmen Suudi Arabistan, ısrarla vurgulamakta olduğu Ortadoğu'daki istikrarsızlığın temel nedeninin İsrail'in işgali olduğu iddiası ile ABD politikaları ile ters düşmüş, İsrail'e karşı Arap boykotuna destek vermiş ve Filistin davasını finansal ve diplomatik olarak desteklemeye devam etmiştir (Bahgat, 2006: 115-116).

Oslo şartlarının İsrail tarafından uygulanmaması, bilakis Oslo sonrası süreçte İsrail işgalinin Yahudi yerleşimleri yoluyla Filistinliler aleyhine derinleşerek artması Eylül 2000'de 2. İntifadanın patlak vermesi ile sonuçlanmıştır (Fahredden ve Çalışkan, 2010). İntifadanın ilk yılında İsrail şiddetinin boyutlarının artması ile kanlı bir sürece dönüşmesi sonucu Suud Kralı Abdullah, 2002 Arap Barış Planı olarak bilinen barış girişiminin öncülüğünü yapmıştır. Kral Abdullah Suud liderleri ile hazırladığı bu planda diğer Arap ülkelerinin de dahil olduğu, ABD Başkanı Bush'un, Avrupa'nın ve BM'nin desteklediği bir mutabakat sağlamayı başarmıştır. Abdullah bu plan çerçevesinde Irak ve Kuveyt gibi düşman tarafları bir araya getirerek Filistin meselesinde Arap birliğini tesis etmiş ve plan 2002 Beyrut Arap Zirvesi kararı ile açıklanmıştır (Kostiner, 2009: 422-25). Bu plan BM 242 ve 338 kararlarının uygulanmasını, İsrail'in Suriye ve Lübnan dahil olmak üzere 1967'de işgal ettiği topraklardan çekilmesi ile birlikte BM 194 kararının öngördüğü Filistinli mültecilerin geri dönüş haklarının teminat altına alınmasını deklare etmiş ve buna mukabil İsrail ile ilişkilerin normalleşebileceğini ilan etmiştir (Kostiner, 2009: 423-24).

Kral Abdullah liderliğinde ortaya konulan barış planı İsrail tarafından kabul görmediği gibi İsrail'in Filistin'deki şiddetini artırmasına ve 2. İntifadanın yeni bir sürece geçmesine sebep olmuştur (Bahgat, 2006: 135-36). Planın ilan edildiği günden sonraki gün İsrail Batı Şeria'da, 500'den fazla Filistinlinin katledildiği yeni bir saldırı harekâtı başlatmıştır (Ahmed, 2002). Barış Planı 2007 Riyad Arap Birliği Zirvesi'nde yeniden tam olarak deklare edilmiş fakat İsrail tarafından kabul edilmediği için sonuçsuz kalmıştır. Bu süreç içinde Irak'ın Kuveyt'i işgali sonrasında kırılma yaşayan Kuveyt-Filistin bağları 2000'ler itibari ile yeniden onarılmış ve ilişkiler kaldığı yerden devam etmiştir. 2004'te Filistin Yönetimi Enformasyon bakanlığından bir delegasyon Kuveyt'e 1990'daki kırılmadan sonraki ilk Filistin üst düzey ziyaretini gerçekleştirmiş ve aynı yıl Arafat'ın ölümünü müteakiben Filistin lideri Mahmut Abbas Kuveyt'i ziyaret ederek, Arafat'ın Saddam'ı desteklemesinden dolayı özürlerini ifade etmiştir (Bahgat, 2006: 141). Bu dönemde bir LNG devi olarak büyük bir finans gücü haline gelen Katar, Filistin'e önemli kalkınma yardımları ve yatırımlar yapmaya devam etmiş, diğer taraftan 2006

seçimlerini kazanan Hamas'ın başat finansal ve siyasi destekçisi olmuştur. BAE lideri Şeyh Zayed de Filistin meselesine olan bağlılığını sürdürmüş ve Filistin toplumunun en büyük finans destekçilerinden biri olmuştur.

İsrail'le Normalleşme

Körfez siyasetinde Arap Baharı sonrası süreçte yaşanan gelişmeler tarihte en ileri düzeyde Körfez-İsrail yakınlaşmasının gerçekleştiği ve buna paralel olarak Körfez-ABD ittifakının maksimum düzeye ulaştığı bir dönem olmuştur. Bu yeni dönemde BAE ve Suudi Arabistan veliaht prensleri olan yeni nesil Körfez liderlerinin İsrail'le yakınlaşması sürecine girmeleri sonucu İsrail'le normalleşme anlaşmalarının temelleri atılmıştır. Suudi Arabistan, her ne kadar barış süreci içinde Filistin haklarının kazanılması yolunda İsrail'le Filistin arasında bir barış anlaşması yapılmasına olumlu bakmış ve bu doğrultuda iki barış planı teklifi sunmuş olsa da hiçbir zaman İsrail karşıtı politikasından vazgeçmemiştir. Bahgat'ın (2006) ifade ettiği gibi Suudilerin ülkelerini İslam'ın ve Arap dünyasının koruyucusu olarak görmeleri anlayışı temelinde bir konsensüs geliştirmiş olmalarından dolayı Suudi Arabistan Körfez ülkeleri arasında İsrail'i tanıması ve ilişkilerini normalleştirilmesi en son beklenebilecek bir ülke olmuştur. Bu geleneksel ve kurumsallaşmış Suudi siyasetine rağmen Arap baharı sonrası süreçte Suudi Arabistan liderlik değişimine bağlı olarak İsrail'le ortak bölgesel çıkarlar geliştirilmesi temelinde tarihinde ilk olarak İsrail'le yakınlaşmıştır. 2017'de veliaht prens ilan edilen, Suud Kralı Selman bin Abdulaziz'in oğlu Muhammed bin Selman (MbS), BAE veliaht prensi Muhammed bin Zayed (MbZ) ile olan yakınlığı ve bu ikilinin dönemin ABD Başkanı Donald Trump'ın Ortadoğu danışmanı olan damadı Jared Kushner ile yakınlaşmaları sonucu Körfezin lider ülkesi S. Arabistan'ın bölgesel politikalarındaki en radikal ve köklü değişim Filistin meselesinde görülmüştür (Çavuşoğlu, 2022, 92-103).

Babası Kral Selman'ın ilerlemiş yaşı ve sağlık sorunları nedeni ile ülkenin de facto yönetimini ele alan prens MbS, Kushner tarafından Filistin hakları aleyhine hazırlanmış olan ve "Yüzyılın Barış Planı" olarak tanımlanan sözde barış planının destekçisi olmuş ve Filistinlilerin planı kabul etmesi için baskı oluşturmaya çalışmıştır. ABD'nin Kudüs'ü İsrail'in başkenti olarak tanıması ve büyükelçiliğini Kudüs'e taşımasıyla başlayıp 2020'de yapılan İbrahim Anlaşması ile tamamlanan bu süreçte MbS İsrail politikaları ile tam bir uyum içinde bir dış politika yaklaşımı sürdürmüştür. Geleneksel Suud politikalarını sarsacak düzeydeki bu yeni politikaları kabul ettirebilmek için MbS, genç ve tecrübesiz bir prens olarak, yüzlerce tecrübeli ve etkin prensin mevcut olduğu Suud ailesi üzerinde hakimiyet ve otorite kurmak ve bu otorite ile kendisine engel olma potansiyeli taşıyan rakiplerini elimine etme ihtiyacı duymuştur. Bu doğrultuda MbS, "yolsuzlukla mücadele" gerekçesi ile devletin ağır yapı taşları olan çok sayıda devlet adamını tutuklatma operasyonu başlatarak rakiplerini Riyad'da bulunan bir beş yıldızlı otelde göz altında tutmuş ve işkence ile sindirmeye çalışmıştır (Ortahamamcılar, 2018). MbS'nin rakiplerini elimine etme operasyonunun tamamlanması ile Suudi Arabistan'ın Filistin meselesine yönelik Suud politikalarındaki radikal değişimlerin önündeki potansiyel engellerin kaldırılması sağlanmıştır.

Nihayet, Ağustos 2020'de duyurulan İbrahim Anlaşmalarının ilkinin 15 Eylül 2020'de Beyaz Saray'da BAE ile İsrail arasında imzalanmasıyla BAE İsrail'i resmen tanıyarak diplomatik ilişkilerini başlatmıştır. Körfez özelinde ve Ortadoğu genelinde son derece tarihsel bir dönüm noktası olan İbrahim Anlaşmaları ile Arap dünyası yeni bir döneme girmiştir. İsrail'in İslam coğrafyasının kalbinde kuruluşundan beri Arap ülkeleri İsrail'i kabul etmemiş ve Arap-İsrail Savaşları on yıllarca devam etmiştir. Yukarıda bahsedildiği gibi, Camp David Anlaşması ile İsrail'i ilk tanıyan Mısır lideri Enver Sedat büyük tepki almış ve ülkesi Arap Birliği'nden çıkarılmıştır. 15 yıl sonra Ürdün 1994'te İsrail'le Vadi Arabe Anlaşmasını yaparak İsrail'le normalleşen ikinci Arap ülkesi olmuştur. Barış süreci döneminde barış müzakerelerine katılmak üzere İsrail'i de facto tanımak durumunda kalmış olan Arap Körfez ülkeleri, İsrail vizesini içeren pasaport sahiplerine giriş izni vermeyecek kadar katı bir yaklaşım benimsemişlerdir. Bu sebeple bu kırmızı çizginin aşılması İsrail açısından çok önemli gelişme anlamına gelmektedir. BAE'nin başlattığı bu trendi Suudi Arabistan takip etmemiş fakat Suudi nüfuzunun güçlü olduğu Bahreyn bir ay sonra İsrail'le normalleşen ikinci Körfez ülkesi olmuştur. Her ne kadar dönemin ABD Başkanı Trump tarafından Körfez'in diğer devletlerinin de anlaşma yapması için baskı oluşturmak istendiyse de Körfezde üçüncü bir devlet anlaşmaya yanaşmamıştır. Normalleşme anlaşması için oluşturulan baskıların etkili olduğu ülkeler arasında Sudan ve Fas yer almaktadır. Bu iki ülke üzerinde İsrail'le normalleşmeleri için kullanılan baskı unsurları olan petro-dolar endeksli rüşvetlerle birlikte siyasi rüşvetler oldukça etkili olmuştur (Çavuşoğlu, 2022: 102). Körfez'in lider ülkesi Suudi Arabistan

bu süreçte İsrail’le normalleşme anlaşması yapmamış olmasına rağmen Filistin pahasına İsrail çıkarlarına destek vermiş ve BAE’nin İbrahim Anlaşması ile İsrail’le normalleşmeyi başlatmasının önünü örtülü onaylama yoluyla açmıştır. Suudi hükümetinin henüz İsrail’le normale anlaşması yapmamış olmasının temelinde toplum desteğinin alınmamış olması sebebiyle temkinli hareket etme stratejisi ve Biden iktidarı ile değişen dengeler sonucu ABD baskısının ortadan kalkması faktörünün birlikte etkili olması yatmaktadır. 2020 seçimleriyle gelen Demokrat Parti lideri Başkan Biden hükümeti İsrail eksenli ABD politikalarını değiştirmemiş olmakla birlikte, bölgesel politikalarda belli konularda yumuşama gösterme eğiliminde olmuştur.

Körfezin veliaht prensleri MbS ve MbZ ikilisinin ABD ve İsrail’le geliştirdikleri ittifak doğrultusunda geliştirdikleri güç konsolidasyonuna dayalı olarak yürüttükleri yeni bölgesel siyasi dizayn kapsamında Filistin aleyhine atılan bu önemli adımlar Suudi elitleri ve Suud toplumu tarafından kabul görmediği gibi aynı zamanda diğer Körfez toplumları tarafından da kabul görmemiştir (Çavuşoğlu, 2022: 101-103). Her iki liderliğin ulusal ve bölgesel düzeylerde yürüttükleri statüko savaşı çerçevesinde tırmandırılan otoriterizm ile, toplumsal, ideolojik ve siyasi düzeylerde karşılığı olmayan bu yaklaşım medya, sosyal medya, lobicilik vb. çeşitli araçların kullanılması yoluyla empoze edilmiştir.

Kuveyt, tarihsel istisnailiği doğrultusunda, anlaşmanın kendisine empoze edilmesine yönelik en sert tepkiyi veren ülke olmuştur. Kuveyt Bakanlar Kurulu derhal bir bildiri yayınlayarak Kuveyt’in Filistinlilerin yanında olduğunu belirten ifadeleriyle tarafını netleştirmiştir. 41 Sivil Toplum Kuruluşunun birleşerek hükümetten İsrail’le normalleşmenin kanunla suç kapsamına alınması talebine karşı Kuveyt Meclisi İsrail’le normalleşmenin yasaklanması kanun teklifi önergesi vermiştir (Çavuşoğlu, 2020: 259-260). Katar, normalleşmeye karşı kesin bir açıklama yapmazken Filistin haklarının altını çizerek Filistin davasına rağmen tavır almayacağını göstermiştir. Umman hükümeti yaptığı açıklama ile anlaşmayı desteklediğini belirterek İsrail’le normalleşmeye yönelik açık bir kapı bırakmış ve meseleye yönelik tarihsel yaklaşımını sürdürdüğünü ortaya koymuştur.

SONUÇ

Ortadoğu’nun en merkezi meselesi olan Filistin meselesi, tarih boyunca Körfez toplumlarının Filistin meselesine olan duyarlılıkları doğrultusunda Filistinlilerle kurulan tarihsel bağlar temelinde Körfez ülkelerinde bir kimlik meselesi olmuş ve dış politikalarında öncelikli meselesi olarak yerini korumuştur. Körfez ülkeleri Suud yönetimi liderliğinde Filistin meselesinin Ortadoğu’da hissedilmeye başlandığı 1930’lar itibarıyla konuya gösterdikleri duyarlılık ve Filistin halkına verdikleri moral ve finans desteği ile Filistin toplumu ile güçlü bağlar kurmuşlardır. Bu güçlü bağlar temelinde Filistin meselesi Körfez ülkelerinin dış politikalarının kırmızı çizgisi haline gelmiş ve özellikle Suud Krallarının ABD liderleri ile konuyla ilgili önemli bir diplomasi mücadelesi vermeleri sonucu ABD politikaları üzerinde etki alanı oluşturmayı başarmışlardır. Bunun en önemli örneklerini Suudi Arabistan’ın kurucusu olarak bilinen Kral Abdulaziz ve Kral Faysal vermiştir. Kral Faysal’ın 1973’te OPEC ülkeleri ile birlikte Araplara karşı İsrail’i destekleyen ABD’ye karşı petrol ambargosu uygulaması meselenin Körfez ülkeleri için nasıl bir öneme sahip olduğunu ve Suudi liderliğinin bu konudaki kararlılığını güçlü bir siyasi iradeye dönüştürdüğünü ortaya koymuştur. Nitekim, 1975’te Kral Faysal’ın bir suikaste kurban gitmesi siyasi arenada Filistin meselesinin en büyük destekçisinin kaybı ile sonuçlanmıştır. Faysal’ın katledilmesiyle Filistin davası önemli bir lideri kaybetmiş olsa da Arap-İsrail Savaşlarının sona ermesinden sonra Suud yönetimi Filistin davasının büyük bir finansal destekçisi ve aynı zamanda masa üzerindeki en güçlü destekçisi olmaya barış sürecinde de devam etmiştir. 2002’de Suud Kralı Abdullah’ın Arap Barış Planı girişiminde bulunması çözüm noktasında sonuçsuz kalmış olsa da Suudi-Amerikan ittifakının derinleştiği bir bağlamda Filistin meselesinin Suud yönetiminin ajandasında önemli bir yer tutmaya devam ettiğini ve ABD ile diplomatik çabaların sürdürüldüğünü göstermesi açısından önemlidir. Bu çerçevede Filistin meselesi tarihsel süreç boyunca ABD liderliğindeki batı güçlerinin Körfez ülkeleri ile sürdürdükleri ittifakın önündeki en büyük handikap olarak kalmaya devam etmiştir. Bu önemli handikabın aşılması, Körfez ülkelerinin İsrail’le yakınlaşması sonucu Körfez ülkeleri tarafından başlatılan İbrahim Anlaşmaları ile İsrail’le normalleşme gibi tarihi bir hedefin gerçekleştirildiği bir dönemde önemli ölçüde gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Eylül 2020’de BAE ile İsrail arasında İbrahim Anlaşması imzalanarak ilişkiler normalleştirilmiş ve böylece İsrail için çok önemli uzun vadeli hedeflerin gerçekleştirilmesinde önemli adımlar atılmıştır. İsrail’in 1948’de bir işgal devleti olarak kurulmasını müteakip İsrail’e savaş açan Arap devletleri İsrail’i hiçbir zaman tanımamış ve gayri meşru bir devlet olarak kabul etmişlerdir. Bu durum Arap-İsrail

savaşlarının sona ermesinden sonrada devam etmiş ve hatta Camp David Anlaşması ile İsrail'i tanıyıp anlaşma yapan Enver Sedat liderliğindeki Mısır Arap dünyasından dışlanmış ve Arap Birliği'nden çıkarılmıştır. Dolayısıyla İsrail'in reddi genel olarak Arap dünyasında olduğu gibi özellikle Körfez siyasetinde modern tarih boyunca başat kırmızı çizgi olmuştur. Umman ve Fas hariç tutulduğunda, Arap dünyasında ve özellikle 1973 sonrasında ekonomi-politik düzeyde merkezi bir önem kazanan Körfez siyasetinde İsrail karşıtlığının bir norm haline gelmesi İsrail için ciddi bir handicap oluşturmuş ve İsrail güvenliğini çevreleyen bir tehdit teşkil etmiştir. Kuruluşundan beri bu sarmaldan çıkmak isteyen İsrail, ABD'nin Ortadoğu politikalarının şekillenmesi üzerine oluşturmuş olduğu etki alanı çerçevesinde Arap ülkeleri ile normalleşme konusunun ABD gündeminde öncelikli olarak yer almasını sağlamıştır. ABD, Körfez monarşileri ile olan güvenlik ittifakı çerçevesinde onlar üzerinde İsrail'le normalleşme sürecini başlatmaları konusunda önemli bir baskı oluşturmuştur. Bu baskılar karşısında Körfez ülkeleri Filistin'le aralarındaki tarihsel ve kültürel bağlar doğrultusunda uzun bir dönem İsrail karşıtlığından taviz vermemişlerdir.

Körfez ülkelerinin Suudi Arabistan liderliğinde Filistin davasının başat destekçileri olmalarına ve bu doğrultuda İsrail karşıtlığını bir kimlik meselesi olarak dış politikalarının öncelikli alanı olarak konumlandırmalarına rağmen Arap dünyasında 2020'de başlatılan İsrail'in tanınması ve diplomatik ilişkilerin başlatılması bazı Körfez ülkeleri öncülüğünde gerçekleştirilmiş olması, Filistin meselesinde Körfez liderliğinin anahtar rolünü ortaya koymaktadır. Tarihsel güçlü Filistin-Körfez bağlarına rağmen, Suudi ve BAE veliaht prenslerinin ABD ve İsrail'le olan ilişkileri ve ittifakları doğrultusunda Suudi Arabistan gibi tarihsel olarak Filistinlilerin arkasında durmuş olan bölgesel bir gücün Veliaht Prens MbS liderliğinde pasifize edilmesi ile Suudi Arabistan liderliğinde Körfez engelinin ortadan kaldırılması gerçekleştirilmiştir. Suud hükümeti İsrail'le henüz anlaşma yapmamış olmasına rağmen BAE'nin başlattığı ve Körfez'de Bahreyn'in takip ettiği İbrahim Anlaşmalarını örtülü olarak desteklemiştir. Bu süreçte MbS, Suudi Arabistan tarihinde ilk olarak Filistinliler aleyhine tavır sergileyen lider olmuştur. Ancak burada altı çizilmesi gereken nokta, MbS'nin bu yaklaşımını Suud devletinin yönetici elitine rağmen sürdürmekte olduğudur. MbS'nin yaklaşımı bu konuda geleneksel yaklaşımı sürdürmekte olan Suud devletine yakın olan elit sınıfın ve Suud toplumunun görüşlerini yansıtmamaktadır. Fakat MbS'nin oluşturduğu otoriteriyizm mevcut politikanın eleştirilmesinin ve muhalefetin önünü kesmiştir.

Buna rağmen, Körfez siyasetinin temel dinamiklerinden biri olan Filistin meselesinin Körfez ülkelerinin dahil oldukları ittifaklarda hegemonya aleyhine bir handicap oluşturma potansiyeli başta tarihsel bir istisnailiğe sahip olan Kuveyt ve Katar gibi aktörlerin kararlı yaklaşımları ile devam edecektir. Kuveyt siyasi istisnailiği çerçevesinde tarihsel olarak diğer Körfez ülkelerinde mevcut olmayan katılımcı ve çoğulcu bir siyasi yapıya sahip bir monarşi olmasında temel rol oynamış olan Filistin davasından taviz vermeme kararlılığını net bir şekilde ortaya koymaktadır. Katar da Filistin sorunu çözülmedikçe anlaşmaya yaklaşmayacağı mesajını vermekte ve Filistin pahasına İsrail'le anlaşma yapmayacağına yönelik politikasını çeşitli platformlarda teyit etmektedir. Bütün bu gelişmeler Suudi-BAE yeni nesil liderliğinin politikalarına rağmen tarihsel Körfez-Filistin bağlarının Körfez'de toplumsal ve normatif düzeyde etkisini ve gücünü korumaya devam ettiğini ve İslami bağlar temelinde Filistin meselesinin bir kimlik unsuru olmaya devam edeceğini göstermektedir.

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Islamic Education and the Development of Madrasah Schools in the Philippines

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Abstract

This study aims to explore Islamic education in the Philippines, from the history, developments and its current situations. This paper focuses on Islamic education in the Philippines, with its management and curriculum. Content analysis was used as a study approach in this article by the researcher. Document analysis were collected and analyzed from related studies such as articles, journals and published research. Based on these studies, the current situation has been evaluated. The findings of the research will be related to the discussions about the role of Islamic education in formation and preservation of Muslim identity in Christian-majority countries. The findings will also inform ongoing madrasa educational development and reform, their status in the Philippines, and their curriculum. According to the findings, as with other Muslim minority communities exposed to Western colonial rule, the Islamic education were exposed in political maneuvering by a series of colonial and postcolonial nations. Islamic education in Philippines has been a story about struggle against colonial and post-colonial attempts to incorporate Muslims into a western idea of modernity. Understanding the significance and importance of Islamic education in Philippines is a necessary component of delivering a holistic and integrated system of education that Muslims in the Philippines require in order to effectively perform the duty that Islam has assigned to them.

Keywords: Religious Education, Islamic Education, Philippines, Muslim Filipino, Bangsamoro

Filipinler’de İslami Eğitim ve Medrese Okullarının Gelişimi

Amina H. SAMID¹

Özet

Bu çalışma, Filipinler'deki İslami eğitimin tarihini, gelişmelerini ve mevcut durumunu incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Filipinler'de İslami eğitimin yönetimi ve müfredatı bu çalışmanın odak noktasıdır. Bu çalışmada araştırmacı tarafından bir yaklaşım olarak içerik analizi kullanılmıştır. Belge-Doküman analizi, makaleler, dergiler ve yayınlanmış araştırmalar gibi ilgili çalışmalardan toplanmış ve analiz edilmiştir (referans alınarak derlenmiştir.). Bu çalışmalardan (referanslardan) yola çıkılarak mevcut durum değerlendirilmiştir. Araştırmanın bulguları, Hristiyan çoğunluklu ülkelerde Müslüman kimliğinin oluşumunda ve korunmasında İslami eğitimin rolüne ilişkin tartışmalarla ilişkilendirilecektir. Bulgular ayrıca Filipinler'deki devam eden medrese eğitiminin gelişimi, reformu ve eğitim içeriği hakkında bilgi verecektir. Bulgulara göre, Batı sömürge yönetimine maruz kalan diğer Müslüman azınlık topluluklarında olduğu gibi, İslami eğitim, bir dizi sömürge ve sömürge sonrası ulus tarafından siyasi manevralara maruz kalmıştır. Filipinler'de İslami eğitim, Müslümanları batı zihniyetine entegre etmeye yönelik sömürgeci ve sömürge sonrası girişimlere karşı direnişin bir anlatısı olmuştur. Filipinler'de İslami eğitimin önemini anlamak, Filipinler'deki Müslümanların dini mesuliyetlerini etkin bir şekilde yerine getirmek için ihtiyaç duydukları bütünsel ve entegre bir eğitim sistemi sunmanın gerekli bir bileşendir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Din Eğitimi, İslami Eğitim, Filipinler, Müslüman Filipinli, Bangsamoro

INTRODUCTION

Islamic education is important for Muslims overall, but it is especially vital for Muslims who live as a minority in non-Muslim majority countries. Islamic education in these non-Muslim majority settings not only provides Muslims with the valuable information about their religion, but it also helps forming and maintaining their Muslim identity. The Islamic education can help Muslim people in non-Muslim nation survive in a society that is both materially and spiritually just, tranquil, successful, and peaceful. Everyone has the right to pursue knowledge and scientific investigation, regardless of background, gender identity, creed, or religion. It fosters growth in the areas of science, religion, creativity, intellect and language, and it combines all of these qualities into a comprehensive educational system that strives for excellence and goodness. The ultimate objective is to achieve total devotion to God as the Creator at the level of the individual, the community, and humanity as a whole. As the Philippines is predominantly Catholic Christian country, it is generally considered that one of the government's primary concerns right now is to satisfy the crucial needs of Muslim Filipinos for Islamic education that accurately reflects their ambitions, cultures, identities, and interests in the Muslim Filipino community. The article discussed Islamic education in the Philippines where Muslims live as a minority. In the Philippines there are four different kinds of madaris (plural for madrasah) education. These include traditional madaris, integrated madaris, tahdiriyyah, and Arabic Language and Islamic Values Education (ALIVE). Nevertheless, in addition to the four Islamic education institutions already mentioned, there are other types of institutions that provide Islamic education, such as Toril, a boarding school that focuses on memorizing, reciting, and understanding the Qur'an. There are also several universities-in the Philippines that-offers higher education-in Islamic studies degrees under social sciences department.

The ALIVE (Arabic Language and Islamic Values Education) is a program overseen by Department of Education and is created for Filipino Muslim students, it is implemented in Integrated madaris and all public schools in the entire Philippines, with at least fifteen Muslim students in one classroom. This initiative serves as a manual for organizing, instructing, and evaluating Islamic Studies in public primary schools and private Madaris (Solaiman S, 2017: 39). Arabic languages are taught three times a week for 40 minutes, while Islamic Values Education is taught twice a week for 40 minutes. Which means, Arabic language and Islamic values is given 3 hours and 20 minutes per week¹. In contrast, to the RBEC (Refined Basic Education Curriculum) subjects², such as Mathematics, English, and Science, require 50 minutes of class time every day. Because these areas are discussed in greater depth than those covered in the ALIVE program. The Tahdiriyyah is a preschool program, overseen by BARMM government which serves Moro children from aged 5 and younger, it concentrates on the traditional madaris and Integrated madaris in particular to the Bangsamoro region.

The scope of the article is the history and the contemporary situation of Islamic education in the Philippines. The focuses will be in Islamic education in traditional madaris and the integrated madaris education institutions in the Philippines. The traditional madaris are those that are not governed or overseen by the government; integrated madaris are those that have a government permit. The findings will be relevant for the discussions on madrasah education as well as the role of Islamic education in forming and maintaining Muslim identity in non-Muslim settings.

In this research, the term "Traditional Madrasah" is referring to a particular kind of unsupervised madrasah by the government, however, permitted to fend for itself. It is usually established by private persons or groups to offer Islamic instruction to the youth of the Muslim community. They adhere to a variety of standards for the implementation of the pedagogy, curriculum and assessment. These different standards are frequently connected to where the madrasah teachers have completed their undergraduate Islamic religious education. Furthermore, traditional madrasah is also operated differently throughout Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, although there are some commonalities in terms of teacher qualifications and curriculum content. The focuses of this institution are more on spiritual aspects. "Integrated Madaris" here is refers to Islamic schools that accredited and recognized by Department of Education in the Philippines. Since it is governed by the government, it gives its graduates a lot of opportunities.

¹ Policy Guidelines on Madrasah Education in the K to 12 Basic Education Program - TeacherPH

² [Grade 1 to 10 Subjects | Department of Education \(deped.gov.ph\)](https://www.deped.gov.ph/grade-1-to-10-subjects/)

This topic was chosen primarily, because in the debate about how to strengthen and advance Islamic education for the current Bangsamoro administration, this research with its two distinct concentrations—traditional madaris and integrated madaris—is a very timely topic in examining widely factors. It is important to put an extra effort to understand the differences between the traditional madaris and integrated madaris systems. This research, therefore, explains the reasons behind this two institutions difference, in terms of curricula, system, and state, and why the traditional still remain traditional. Many Muslim parents still hope that their children will receive an Islamic education that is representative of their culture and customs, along with the skills that will guarantee that Islamic teachings and identity are upheld and strengthened.

This is a qualitative, literature-based study. Official documents and various publication are gathered and content-analyzed to present history and contemporary Islamic education in the Philippines. After this introduction, the article briefly presents the history of Islam in the Philippines, followed by the history of Islamic education. Then Islamic education in the contemporary Philippines explored: traditional madaris (plural of madrasah), which are private Islamic schools that operate outside the Philippine educational system; integrated madaris, which are also private Islamic schools but accredited by the government. The importance of Islamic education to Muslims in the Philippines and current problems are also discussed.

Islam in the Philippines

The advent of Islam in the Philippines can be traced back to the 14th century, when Arab traders passing through Indonesia and Malaysia traded with the locals. Sulu was the Philippines trading hub, connecting Indonesia, China and Malaysia at that time. It was reported that the people of the Philippines welcomed Islam and it became the majority religion in the Philippines until the invasion of the Spanish colonialists in 1521 AD (Skowronek, 1998:47). Currently, Philippines is predominantly Catholic country because of four centuries occupation, colonization and Christianization of Spaniards (Gutiérrez, 2007:709; see also Bonifacio, 2018:41; Pangalangan, 2010:539) According to the latest census of Philippines Statistics Authority (PSA), Muslims in the Philippines nowadays is account for about 5% of the total population (census of the Philippine, 2021)³, which shows that policies of the colonialists led to a dramatic shift in the country's religious composition.

The Muslims of the Philippines has been known as Moros or Bangsamoro (literally, “Moro Nation” (Setiawan, 2020:3). The Moro struggle began with the Spanish occupation, which lasted from 1565 to 1898 (Banlaoi, 2009:168-171), and was followed by the American occupation. As a result of the Peace Treaty signed by Spain and the United States (USA) in 1898, the whole of the Philippines came under American administration and continued until 1946, when the independence of the Philippines was gained (Gowing, 2021:48-55). The American rule aimed to integrate the Moro Muslims and their lands into a single Philippine statehood, although the Americans recognized that the Moro people were culturally and religiously different from the Catholic Christian majority of the Philippines (Buendia, 2006:1-2).

According to some historians, this policy of integration amounted to illegal annexation of the Moros and their territories (Lingga, 2004:7-8). The Moros, on the other hand, have gradually accepted this situation, welcoming indigenous people and Christian settlers from northern territories to Moro lands in the southern part of the Philippines. The main problem after the independence, however, has been the government and administrative policy, which has resulted in Moros being marginalized. When the Jabidah massacre occurred on March 18, 1968, it was a crucial flashpoint that inflamed the Moro struggle against the Philippine government (Curaming, 2017:78-87).

From the 1970s onwards, the Moro people's demand for self-determination has increased, as they experienced othering and marginalization. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was founded in 1972 by Moro revolutionary politician Nur Misuari, with the goal of achieving full independence for the Moros. Salamat Hashim, a former vice chairman of the MNLF, created the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1977. The MILF, too, aimed at achieving full independence through armed revolution, but with an Islamic approach and the creation of an Islamic society, as opposed to the MNLF's secular orientation (Kapahi & Tañada, 2018:3-7).


³ Philippine Statistics Authority | Republic of the Philippines (psa.gov.ph)

After the years of conflict and peace talks, on July 26, 2018, “the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao” (also known as the Bangsamoro Organic Law) was enacted by the President Duterte’s administration with the MILF to establish the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM)⁴.

As mentioned above, the term “Bangsamoro” means “Moro Nation” which refers to all of Mindanao's Filipino Muslim ethnolinguistic communities. The Bangsamoro people or the Moros are divided into thirteen ethnolinguistic groups, which means that they have a wide range of cultural and linguistic backgrounds, but because of the shared history which is marked by the resistance towards foreign colonial powers, and then the Philippine governments, they created a collective identity distinct from the Filipinos (Kapahi & Tañada, 2018:1-2) and they have a strong Islamic identity.

The Image 1 shows the area under the BARMM region. According to the 2020 Census, the population of the BARMM is about 5 million. Given that the population of the Philippines is about 110 million, the population of the BARMM account for less than 5% of the population⁵, but this does not include the Moros living outside the BARMM and “the Balik Islam”. The Moros have traditionally lived in Mindanao Island and adjacent islands. Currently, the BARMM includes only some parts of Mindanao Island: Lanao Del Sur, Maguindanao, and Cotabato City, plus the adjacent islands of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi (Sakili, 2012:7-8).

Image 1. The Map of the Philippines and BARMM location



Source: [Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao • BARMM Official Website](https://www.barmm.gov.ph/)

In the Philippines, there are Muslims who do not live in Bangsamoro region, or they are not part of the Moro people. Moreover, this is also a trend known as the “Balik Islam”, which is a loose agglomeration of former Christians in the Philippines who think that the Philippines was a Muslim country prior to Western colonization and that all Filipinos must “revert” to their native faith (Borer et al., 2009:191-192). The Balik-Islam (Return to Islam) reverts have no historical or ethnic connections to the Bangsamoro, and they are a distinct group of Muslims (Acac, 2020: 4). It is reported that there are about 200,000 Muslim converts (Adiong, 2008: 3).

History of Islamic Education in the Philippines

In the late 13th or early 14th century, Islamic education emerged in the southern Philippines along with Islam, through Arab missionaries. It extended to Mindanao's southern islands and the Sulu Archipelago over the next two centuries (Guleng et al., 2017:2). Prior to the colonial period, the madrasah system is locally known as “Pandita”. From that time until now, volunteerism has been the basis of these madrasah system (Abu Bakar, 2011:76). The Pandita schools were mostly institutionalized in Mindanao and Sulu. “Pandita”, is Sanskrit term meaning “learned man” and similar to Arabic “alim”, a term applied to those who had distinguished themselves by attaining greater knowledge of Islam, regardless of social background (Milligan, 2017:781). The teachers at these schools are referred to by a various name,

⁴ <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2018/07jul/20180727-RA-11054-RRD.pdf>

⁵ <https://psa.gov.ph/population-and-housing/node/166426>

including pandita, guro, khatib,-imam, or-Bilal (Institute of Autonomy and Governance: 34). But according to Lantong (2018) the usual term used to refer to teachers of this type of school was “guru” a Sanskrit word, which means “teacher”.

In Pandita school, learning started in small tutorial sessions held at the mosque or at the Pandita's place (Milligan, 2017:781-795). Students lived with or visited the teacher on a regular basis, with the assistance of more wealthy Moro families who wished their children to be taught about Islamic beliefs. It taught students passages from the Qur'an, Arabic writing, and a little arithmetic (Lantong, 2018:68) . When Americans invaded the Philippines in 1898, they disbanded the Pandita system and replaced it with a western secular school. They offered a curriculum that was designed to colonize, westernize, and secularize Muslims (Lantong, 2018:68). It encompassed the teaching of democratic values, the training of functioning citizens, and the people's rights and obligations. The medium of instruction was English. The Americans compelled every child under the age of seven to enroll in school and provided them with free school supplies (Lantong, 2018:63). These policies have been maintained by the Philippine governments (Milligan, 2008: 369-370). This partly led to a rift in Muslim population between those who have received Western education and those who have received traditional education, as in other Muslim societies. Besides this, a new type of modern Muslim educational institution, namely madrasa emerged among the Moro Muslims in the Philippines during the American rule. The madrasa schools provided not only religious education but also various science and social subjects to their students, and they were mainly opened and financially supported by the wealthy Muslim people and Islamic associations. After independence, the number of madrasa schools with the levels of primary, secondary and higher education increased gradually in the Philippines by attracting some foreign Muslim teachers coming from various Muslim countries (Göksoy, 1996: 87-88)

In the early 1950s, an Indian Muslim scholar, Maulana Abdul Aleem Siddique Al-Qaderi, made a visit to Manila. Among the impacts of this visit was the Islamic reawakening of some prominent Muslim families and leaders. Some of the economically well-off Muslim families revived the Pandita system of education, it was then transformed into a madrasah, a community-based operated Islamic school, with a concentration on the Islam, Qur'an, and moral instruction. To run this madrasah, the managements invited foreign Muslim scholars as teachers and professors (Lantong, 2018:68-69). From that onwards, there had been the establishment of several major madaris in the Philippines.

Islamic Education in Contemporary Philippines

There have always been Islamic education in the Philippines, since the late 13th and early 14th century (Guleng et al., 2017:2). However, the educational quality in Islamic education institutions has been parochial and relatively weak (Lantong, 2018:68), due to colonialism and the policies of the Philippine governments. Nevertheless, in recent decades, there have been attempts to remedy the situation. In fact, Islamic education has also been one of the important topics discussed in the peace talks between Moros and the Philippine governments. Currently, both the Constitution and the Bangsamoro Organic Law have articles which allow and regulate Islamic education in the Philippines.

The 1987 Constitution reads that:

“The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development” (Article no. 2, section 22)

“The state shall encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as self-learning, independent, and out-of-school study programs particularly those that respond to community needs” (Article no. 14, section 2 (4))

“Further, the State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions and institutions. It shall consider their rights in the formulation of national plans and policies” (Article no. 14 section 17).

All these articles guarantee, among others, Islamic education, at least in theory. Yet the Constitution also states that “no public money or property shall be appropriate, indirectly or directly, by means of support in any sect or church” (Article 6, section 29 (2)), declaring the separation of church and government. The implication of this article is that government funds cannot be used for religious purposes of any kind, whether Islamic or other religions. Given such a context of government financial assistance, the madrasahs need to be self-reliant (Abu Bakar, 2011:80), and it resulted to thinning development of Islamic education in the Philippines.

However, given the aim of the Department of Education's school administrators to provide quality basic education that is equitably accessible to everyone and to create the foundation for life-long learning and service to the public good (Madjid, 2022:194-198) and with the aim of government to prioritize education, among other things, in order to create nationalism and patriotism, the Department of Education administrators work together with the national government in designing and implementing educational reform initiatives for Muslim pupils, through integrating the madrasa education system, and incorporating Arabic Language and Islamic Values (ALIVE) course subjects into numerous public schools around the country since 2002 (Guleng et al., 2017:2-3). Through these programs, the government recognizes the rights of Muslim Filipino children to legally receive Islamic education in government schools, in line with the national aims of providing quality education to every citizen of the Philippines. Yet, there are still madaris which are not part of this integration, which will be discussed below.

Traditional Madrassah Education

In the Philippines, traditional madrasah is administered and run by a family or organization, unlike Department of Education certified schools. A family, individual, community or organization can own and run a traditional madrasah. According to recent research, almost 60% of traditional madaris are owned by individuals and families, the rest is owned by organizations or belong to the community (Institute of Autonomy and Governance: 56). However, the establishment of these madaris have not been for profit, education has usually been provided free of charge as a sort of community service.

According to Abdulkarim & Suud (2020), the number of madaris in the country has been estimated to be in the thousands. Prior to the creation of BARMM, research shows that, a total of 1,850 madaris in ARMM areas account for a total of 83%, while non-ARMM areas account for 17%. Maguindanao has the most, with 643 madaris 34.8%, followed by Lanao del Sur with 444 madaris 24%. Basilan has 112 madaris 11%, and Sulu has 138 madaris 11%, respectively 7.5% from small barangays in the region (Institute of Autonomy and Governance: 107).

Usually, the madaris takes up 2.5 hectares of donated land and builds one of 2-15 classroom-with enough facilities to conduct instruction and learning. Learning environments are provided through traditional instructional methods, and madaris do not spend much in new educational technology that support enhanced learning, mostly due to the lack of funding (Cagape, 2008:10).

Most of the Islamic teachers on these madaris are graduated abroad. Saudi Arabia has a graduation rate of 43.3% (Institute of Autonomy and Governance: 115). These are the common Islamic teachers who teach in traditional madaris. Their credentials from abroad are not credited by the Department of Education in the Philippines. Because these madaris do not follow the Department of Education's official curriculum, and are not integrated madaris.

The main reason why most of the students in traditional madaris continued their study abroad, there is no available madrasah in the Philippines that provide Islamic degree programs in higher level aside from those given by the University of the Philippines, Mindanao State Universities and other State Universities such as Cotabato State University. All these baccalaureate and graduate degrees necessitate qualifications that can only be achieved through education that supervised by the government, as a result, high school graduates of the traditional madaris frequently enroll at foreign Islamic universities for higher studies.

Due to disparities in the educational backgrounds of the founders and advisers, differences in teachers training orientation, lack of communication among madrasah, dialogue between different ethnolinguistic groups, and government neutrality, curricula differed. The curricula focused heavily on Arabic languages and Islamic Sciences, and lacked areas or subjects such as Filipino, technical and vocational training, therefore they used Arabic as a medium of instructions.

Unlike regular school managed by the government, these madaris generally run two days a week, Friday-Saturday or Saturday-Sunday are the most common school days. Since the vast majority of students enrolled in madrasah also attend in government schools, which have classes on weekdays, such as Monday to Friday. As a result, children are totally occupied with schooling every day of the week and have little leisure time, but at the same time it allows them to acquire their religion as well as necessary skills for their social life.

They offer a sequential learning and hierarchically structured instruction that is like formal schooling offered by the government. It takes 16 years to complete the education, with 4-4-4-4 educational system

consists of four (4) years of Ibtidai (elementary), four (4) years of Mutawassit (intermediate), four (4) years of Thanawi (high school), and four (4) years of Kulliyah (college) (Cagape, 2008:7). It functions similarly to a regular school, with pupils progressing from madrasah ibtida'i (primary school) to madrasah kulliyah (higher level).

However, there is no set of curricula, as they are not under the control of the Department of Education. These madaris have adopted curricula from Arab countries. It's worth mentioning that the madrasah's curriculum generally mirrors that of the country from where its teachers graduated. The majority of the madaris that use international models have professors who are Saudi Arabian graduates. Given this situation, students who studied in Saudi Arabia were able to obtain textbooks and teaching materials while studying abroad, which they then used when they returned to their madrasah in the Philippines or formed their own madrasah (Institute of Autonomy and Governance: 60).

In Table 1 below, the offered subjects of most traditional madaris in the Philippines, which is based on Arab countries curricula, is shown. Children are expected to master the fundamentals of each subject areas beginning in elementary school, and then progressing to the intermediate level, which students are expected to be able to investigate, learn how to perform what they have learned, and practice, the high school is the advanced level, also can be called preparation for higher level.

Kulliyah (College level) usually offers four degrees programs: Tarbiyyah (education), Shariah (Islamic law), Da'wah (Islamic propagation), and Usuluddin (Fundamentals of religion), by following the model of the highest-level religious education in Middle Eastern Arab countries. Among these degrees that offered, 56.4% of madaris offered Tarbiyyah as major, followed by Shari'ah with 43.6%, Da'wah that has 38.5%, and Usuluddin with 12.8% (Institute of Autonomy and Governance: 58). The concentration of these offered courses included all of the subjects taught at the college level.

Table 1. Traditional Madrasah Curriculum

ELEMENTARY/ 1-4th grade	INTERMEDIATE/ 5-8th grade	HIGH SCHOOL/ 9-12th grade	COLLEGE/ 13-16th grade
1. Fiqh 2. Tawhid 3. Hisab 4. Qawa'id 5. Qira'a 6. Sirah 7. Hifdul Qur'an 8. Tafsir 9. Hadith 10. Sharf 11. Mutaala'a 12. Imla	1. Fiqh 2. Tawhid 3. Hisab 4. Qawa'id 5. Qira'a 6. Sirah 7. Hifdul Qur'an 8. Tafsir 9. Hadith 10. Mutaala'a 11. Imla 12. Tarih 13. Nu-shuws	1. Usulul Fiqh 2. Tawhid 3. Hisab 4. Qawa'id 5. Qira'a 6. Sirah 7. Hifdul Qur'an 8. Tafsir 9. Hadith 10. Mutaala'a 11. Imla 12. Tarih 13. Farai'd 14. Insa'a 15. Ulumul Qur'an 16. Mustalahul Hadith 17. Balagha	1. Fiqh 2. Usulul Fiqh 3. Mustahul Hadith 4. Ulumul Qur'an 5. Usulul-Tafsir 6. Tafsir 7. Sirah 8. Fara'id 9. Tariq Al-Tahre 10. Aqeedah 11. Qawa'idul Lughah 12. Tarbiyah

Source: Mahad Al-Islami Shar'i, Cotabato City Philippines

Integrated Madrasah Education

Aside from the traditional madrasah offering Islamic education, there is also another type of madrasah in the Philippines, that are accredited and recognized by Department of Education in the Philippines. These are called "Integrated Madaris" which are private and Islamic schools that have received government accreditation.

Integration of madrasah schools into the government educational system has actually been started since 1980's and it became a government policy from those years onwards. In 1982, the government took various decisions to integrate the madrasahs into the official education system with the aim to improve and develop the social and educational status of disadvantageous Moro Muslims. As a result of the joint efforts of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports with the Ministry of Muslim Affairs, those

madrasahs that fulfilled certain conditions and offered science and cultural courses in addition to their religious courses in their curriculums were officially recognized by the government and they even received financial support from the state (Göksoy, 1996: 88)

The integrated madaris system was officially established in 2005, when the Philippine government gave sanctioned the accreditation, integration and development of madrasah as a learning institution, with unified curriculum. Letter of Instruction (LOI, No. 1221) in 2005 is the Philippine government's first law aiming at gradually integrating madaris into the national educational system. This Letter is based on Article 15, Section 8 (1) of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, which states that the government must maintain an appropriate, complete and integrated system of education (Abdulkarim & Suud, 2020:8-16).

The Letter stipulates that the madrasah should maintain its Islamic identity and Arabic language, as well as Islam as a religion in its curriculum that adheres to national educational system. It recognizes the integration and accreditation of madaris into the Philippine education system. Because this madaris is run by the government, classes are held on a regular basis, Monday through Friday, just like they do in public schools. Furthermore, the government has also prescribed the curriculum that implemented in this madaris.

The DepEd order no. 51, s. 2004 known as the "Standard Curriculum for Elementary Public Schools and Private Madaris" has been amended by the DepEd order no. 40, s. 2011 with two approaches, the Refined Elementary Madrasah Curriculum (REMC) for public schools and the Refined Standard Madrasa Curriculum (RSMC) for all integrated madaris in the Philippines.

In Table 2 the Refined Standard Madrasa Curriculum used in all integrated madaris in the Philippines for Elementary, along with the K to 12 programs⁶, with precise time allotment. Moreover, for high school and senior high school, is the same applied curriculum from RSMC comprising K to 12 subjects, intended for high school and senior high school.

Table 2. Refined Standard Madrasah Curriculum (RSMC) for Integrated Madaris

Learning Areas	Grade1	Grade2	Grade3	Grade4	Grade5	Grade6	Frequency
Mother Tongue	50mnts.	50mnts.	50mnts.				Daily
English		90mnts.	90mnts.	60mnts.	60mnts.	60mnts.	Daily
Filipino	70mnts.	70mnts.	70mnts.	60mnts.	60mnts.	60mnts.	Daily
Science			40mnts.	60mnts.	60mnts.	60mnts.	Daily
Mathematics	70mnts.	70mnts.	70mnts.	60mnts.	60mnts.	60mnts.	Daily
Araling Panlipunan	40mnts.	40mnts.	40mnts.	40mnts.	40mnts.	40mnts.	Daily
MAPEH	40mnts.	40mnts.	40mnts.	40mnts.	40mnts.	40mnts.	Daily
Character Education	30mnts.	30mnts.	30mnts.	20mnts.	20mnts.	20mnts.	Daily
Arabic Language	40mnts.	40mnts.	40 mnts	40 mnts	40mnts.	40mnts.	Daily
Qur'an	30mnts.	30mnts.	30mnts.	30mnts.	30mnts.	30mnts.	Daily
Sirah & Hadith	40mnts.	40mnts.	40mnts.	40mnts.	40mnts.	40mnts.	3x a week
Aqidah & Fiqh	40mnts.	40mnts.	40mnts.	40mnts.	40mnts.	40mnts.	2x a week

Source: Standard Curriculum for Elementary Public Schools and Private Madaris | Refined Elementary Madrasah Curriculum (REMC) - Schools / Universities 1160 (affordablecebu.com)

The madaris integration has benefited the Muslim community since it molds young Muslims to become more educated, they can readily find work in the labor market, participate actively in educational decisions, and, most importantly, their contributions are acknowledged. It helps Muslim student transition smoothly from private Madrasahs to public schools. In appropriate circumstances, it brings together Muslims students long-standing educational marginalization. The program meets the needs of graduates in terms of technical readiness and professionalism. It also incorporates ideals that reflect

⁶ [DO_s2019_021.pdf \(deped.gov.ph\)](#)

country cultures, traditions and conventions. On the other hand, they are pursuing their social well-being, while also preserving their identity as Moro with rich in inherent and dynamic cultural heritage. However, it appears that, numerous madaris in entire Philippines are still not integrated. Despite the fact that the Department of Education does not recognize or accredit these madaris, the majority of them seek official accreditation. In Cagape (2008) study, 71% of the madaris in the Philippines have stated that they want to be integrated.

While there are some traditional madaris, on the other hand, wish to remain traditional, because of lack open communication, the traditional madaris administrator are unwilling to accept the government's push to integrate Islamic education through the Department of Education. Because many madaris are experiencing increased discomfort and unease-among Islamic teachers, their skill is not being properly recognized by the government. A Muslim teacher who received Islamic education abroad-is not guaranteed to be properly acknowledged by the Department of Education or the Commission on Higher Education, restricting their knowledge and power inside the madaris (Cagape, 2008:7-8).

Furthermore, some are opposed to the integration, because they believe that there is a diversion towards Christianization due to the term equivalent of assimilation, a subtle type of de-Islamization of the millennial population of Muslim Filipinos. It is influenced by the views and interpretations of the Philippine government, that national culture is defined by the Moro elders as Christian culture, and integration implies assimilation of Muslims into Christian society.

However, it is believed that integrated Islamic schools are thought to unquestionably increase the government's desire to adequately address the educational needs of its citizens, whether Christians or Muslims, but the vague area that causes disagreement among madaris operators is that rejecting-government recognition, standards, and monitoring, will not be able to integrate their schooling and students who graduate from their institutions cannot avail the education offered in public schools and in higher level of education in universities.

Results and Discussion

In this part, it will discuss some of the issues and difficulties that Muslim Filipinos have faced in implementing Islamic education in the Philippines, and its current stand in Muslim Filipinos. Among the listed Islamic institutions, the Traditional madaris, Integrated madaris, the traditional madaris are the most plagued by issues and problems.

When it comes to the graduates of traditional madaris, they also have the lowest employment opportunities. As according to the recent research⁷, possible employment of graduates in madrasah is the lowest. They are not able to apply in any government institutions due to their lack of social skills and learning. Therefore, most of the madrasah graduates locally, went to Cotabato City, Marawi City, and Baguio City for further studies. They have chosen these places because they had higher education institutions that offer specialized programs, such as the Al-Ma'rif Institute in Baguio City, Jami'at al-Waqf in Marawi City and Jami'at Cotabato in Cotabato City. Almost all traditional madaris graduates end up in traditional madaris as well, as being Islamic teachers.

However, the new Bangsamoro government has proposed program in improving the Islamic education system in Philippines, specifically in Bangsamoro territories. Under Section 104 of the Bangsamoro Education Code (BEC), the Ministry of Basic, Higher and Technical Education (MBHTE) establishes and administers special qualifying tests for stable appointment to Mudarris (Islamic teachers) positions in the ministry through the Director-General Madaris Education (DGME). In coordination with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) for BARMM, the MBHTE will grant special licenses to those who pass the exam, with the caveat that the accorded eligibility will only qualify the appointee for permanent appointment to Mudarris (Islamic teacher) and will not be regarded a substitute for second level eligibility unless authorized by the national Civil Service Commission (CSC) office.

The specific qualifying tests known as Qualifying Exam in Arabic Language and Islamic Studies (QEALIS) may waived for graduates with Latin honors in Arabic, traditional Madrasah graduates and Islamic studies from a recognized university or institution of higher learning. Mudarris (Muslim teacher) is not a profession regulated by the Philippines Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), and it is not covered by Republic Act No. 1080, which declares bar and board exams to be civil service exams. The Bangsamoro Organic Law mandates the construction of Mudarris (Muslim teacher) qualification

⁷ Research on traditional madaris in armm and adjacent regions n.d

criteria, and the MBHTE is in charge of establishing the standard, which must be accepted by the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

Upon having passed the Qualifying Exam in Arabic Language and Islamic Studies (QEALIS), aspiring Asatidz enroll in Language Enhancement and Pedagogy (LEaP), a training designed to help madrasah teachers improve their English skills and gain a better understanding of assessment, teaching and lesson planning (Sali & Marasigan 2020:204-205). Graduates of traditional madaris will be able to teach in any public school run by the Philippine government as ISAL (Islamic Studies and Arabic Language) teachers, if they will pass the exam.

Aside from the reality that policy initiatives for traditional madaris are limited, the provided policies are still infants (Cagape, 2008:1-3), and their effective implementation has faced additional challenges beyond the conventional obstacles of poverty and poor funding. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, there has been a shift in attitudes, the traditional madrasah's independence in the Philippines has been called into question due to official ideas that the madrasah and extremism are linked, connecting to Muslim secessionist movement in Mindanao known as the Abu Sayyaf extremist group, this has become a national security risk in the eyes of Philippines government (Abu Bakar, 2011:79).

This has sparked a variety of reactions in the Philippines. On suspicion or used for terrorist activity, traditional madaris have been raided. The multiplicity of Philippine society presents a challenge to national unity, and driving reason resulted in thinning replies to Muslim Filipinos long quest for educational justice. But the Abu Sayyaf group's kidnapping activities were rejected by Moro's, believing that this was not Islamic teaching.

In the context of Philippine madaris integration to public education, it is extremely relevant, given the numerous assessments that have to go through, such as School site preparation, curriculum review and evaluation, beginning to boost enrolment, and training for Islamic teachers, will provide the administration with an opportunity to assess the consequences of extremism suspicions.

Another aspect, in most cases, curriculum that has been applied in this traditional madaris are based on the country that a teacher graduated, which is most of them are graduates from various Arab countries, putting the context of Islamic interpretations is in risk of being exaggerated. Their courses could promote either moderate or radical interpretations of what is considered Islamic in both practice and context.

Regardless of this risk, the Muslim Filipinos still have faith that the madrasah is an important tool in the process of Islamization in the Philippines, in which madrasah is a Muslim school that educates-Islamic knowledge. It is revered as a symbolic of Islam as well as a place of learning. It is thought to be an ideal location for learning Arabic and Islamic religious beliefs

Up to this point, the traditional madrasah has served as educator of Muslim Filipino youth as well as a source of religious beliefs and Islamic practices. The education delivered by traditional madaris has a high level of satisfaction among the parents of pupils who study there. When compared to kids in public schools, madrasah students had excellent behavior and attitudes. A student in a traditional madaris grows increasingly acquainted with the centuries-old Islamic ideas and traditions. They are more conscious of performing their faith in the community, which promotes religious tolerance among individuals of all faiths and advocates for moderate Islam.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, as most experts have remarked, Islamic education in the Philippines is a story of struggle for the majority of Muslim Filipinos, from the time of colonialism to the current Philippine administration. It has remained insular, weak, and traditional to this day. It is luck of the government's assistance in order to flourish and mature, which is exactly what Muslim Filipinos require. Currently, most of Islamic education schools known as traditional madrasah system, is operated through volunteerism. It is run by a family, group or organization who has decided to give back to the community by providing this service for free. It is a self-contained system that cannot be able to formally register with the Department of Education. As a result, there's no such thing as a standardized or uniform curricula available. Despite these defects or weaknesses, the madrasah system slowly functioned and continues to operate, demonstrating the Muslim community's great desire for their children to get Islamic education.

So far, these Islamic institutions has played a role to serve as Islamic educator of young Filipino Muslims, as well as a source of religious practices and Islamic beliefs, despite the fact that it operates

slowly. It is hoped that Islamic education will result in a cultural paradigm that will transform Muslim societies in accordance with Islamic tradition, as well as give non-Muslims the impression that Islam is a religion of peace and a wholistic approach that encompasses positive development and social change. As a sort of recommendation, as is now done in several cities and municipalities in the Philippines (for instance, the Davao City Madrasah Comprehensive Development and Promotion Program), traditional madaris which does not want to be integrated should get some assistance from local government. That they can be used to cover the cost of personnel services, such as honoraria/allowances, fixed salaries for teachers and staff, maintenance expenses, other operating costs, capital costs, and professional development for madrasah employees and teachers.

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Analysis of Consumer Society in Turkey Through Banking Products and Advertisements: 2000 – 2013 Years

Edanur GÜREL¹

Abstract

This research is based on qualitative content analysis method of banking press and tv commercials between 2000-2013 years. In this research, the experienced change of society with capitalization process of Turkey and the reflections of banking products/services and ads at this change were discussed. During the discussion of these reflections, new middle class and consumer society were used as basic terms. Since the common characteristic of developed capitalist countries is having comprehensive and powerful middle class. In Turkey, although the term of middle classes emerged after 1980's, their real sense of presence has just begun to legitimize after 2000's especially with AKP administrations. Therefore, the selection of this date range and these terms is important. The aim of this study is to analyze this process through the advertisements of Garanti Bank and Türkiye Finans banks.

Keywords: Banking Advertisements, Consumer Society, Neo Middle Class, Islamic Bourgeoisie, AKP Government, Baudrillard, Garanti Bank, Türkiye Finans

Bankacılık Ürün ve Reklamları Üzerinden Türkiye’de Tüketim Toplumu Analizi: 2000 – 2013 Yılları

Edanur GÜREL¹

Özet

Nitel içerik analizi yöntemi kullanılarak 2000-2013 yılları arasındaki bankacılık basın ve televizyon reklamları incelemesine dayalı yürütülen bu çalışmada, Türkiye’nin kapitalistleşme süreciyle birlikte toplumun geçirdiği değişimler ve bu değişimde bankacılık ürün/hizmetleri ve reklamlarının yansımaları tartışılmıştır. Çalışmanın ana literatüründe yeni orta sınıf ve tüketim toplumu kavramları üzerinden gidilmiştir. Çünkü gelişmiş kapitalist ülkelerin ortak özelliği geniş ve güçlü bir orta sınıfa sahip olmalarıdır. Türkiye de, gelişmekte ve kapitalistleşmesini meşrulaştırmaya çalışan bir ülkedir. Özellikle 80’lerden sonra orta sınıf kavramı gün yüzüne çıkmış olsa da, 2000’li yıllardan sonra AK Parti hükümetleriyle varlığını gerçek anlamda meşrulaştırmaya yeni yeni başlamıştır. Bu nedenle bu çalışmada bu tarih aralığının ve bu kavramların seçilmesi ayrı önem taşımaktadır. Bu çalışmada amaç, Garanti Bankası ve Türkiye Finans bankalarının reklamları üzerinden bu süreci analiz etmektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Banka Reklamları, Tüketim Toplumu, Yeni Orta Sınıf, İslami Burjuvazi, AK Parti İktidarı, Baudrillard, Garanti Bankası, Türkiye Finans

INTRODUCTION

For centuries, capitalism is a system that has been aiming to make more profit and to increase its capital continuously. In time, this system transformed itself in parallel with the changing production conditions with the development of science and technology from industrial capitalism to financial capitalism. During this transformation, the resources it feeds on have also changed, and in a way, its main raw material has become human and culture. However, this change did not cause a deterioration in the capital-consumption relationship, which is the basis of capitalism, on the contrary, it strengthened it. This empowerment has led to the formation of a consumer society, especially through advertisements. Turkey has started to transition to economic liberalization, especially with the January 24 decisions. This has accelerated the capitalization process. However, Turkey started to experience the real changes in both economic and social areas after the 2000s. The difference between these changes and movements from previous periods is that they are a change from the bottom up. The aim of this study is to analyze how bank advertisements contributed to this mobility in the light of this information.

For this purpose, Garanti Bank and Türkiye Finans advertisements broadcasted in the press and on television between 2000-2013 were analyzed using the content analysis method. While reaching the conclusion in the research, the development process of capitalism in the world and in Turkey was mentioned, especially the concepts of consumer society and the new middle class in Turkey were emphasized. The most important reasons for choosing these banks as the sampling are that Garanti Bank is the bank that advertises the most and offers leading products/services in the sector. Türkiye Finans, on the other hand, carries out a banking activity preferred by the neoconservative middle class in Turkey. In addition, Türkiye Finans was the bank that gave the most advertisements among such banks at that time. These cases also helped to examine both more products/services and more types of advertisements. The interpretation of the study on only two banks and the fact that it deals with a certain period limits the generalization of the analysis.

The Concept of Consumption

The prosperity of societies and the development of consumption supply together, the rise of commodity fetishism as an ideology of daily life, that is, the fact that consumption has become an object of worship or desire brings us face to face with the reality of a consumption society (Aytaç, 2006: 27). Featherstone (1996: 49) explains the consuming term based on the meaning of the word. He states that this term mostly means "destroying", "spending", "wasting", "ending" and similar connotations are valid for the consumption term.

Consumption is a term that can be explained both economically and sociologically. According to Yavuz Odabaşı (2006: 4), who explains the term economically, consumption means "acquiring and owning a product or service produced within the scope of satisfying a certain need". Douglas and Isherwood (1999: 8), who examine consumption sociologically, explained this concept as "an integral part of the same social system that explains the work motive, which is part of the social need to establish relationships with other people and to have mediating materials for this relationship".

According to Bocock (2009: 42), it is not possible to define the concept of consumption separately from theories in a social structure. The meaning of this concept can vary according to different theoretical views, as well as depending on the historical period analyzed in a single view. Therefore, in order to understand the role that consumption plays in capitalism; it is necessary to place the concept of consumption within a broader social theoretical framework derived from the analysis of its forms in the early stages of capitalism.

As Bocock argues, it is necessary to examine the history of consumption and the history of capitalism together. Thinking of capital and consumption phenomena as independent concepts, which constantly give birth to each other, is like breaking the human body apart.

In pre-capitalist societies, people could not invest their money and use it as capital in business, unlike now. Because they did not have the money to save in this way. Few people had money, and it was only the church and the nobility. But they were not actively using their money as capital. The money (gold, silver) in their hands was stagnant and unproductive (Huberman, 2013: 39).

Towards the end of the Middle Ages, the spread of trade over large areas had advanced considerably. One of the most important effects of commercial growth has been the growth of cities. The first urbanization was seen in Italy and the Netherlands, where the expansion of trade created new jobs and

cities became a source of attraction (Pirenne, 2011: 100-101). By the 16th century, the accumulation of capital had reached a certain point. As a result of the opening of Bohemia-Hungary gold and silver mines, the operation of American silver deposits and the large commercial activities carried out in connection with them, the Trade Age began (Sombart, 2013: 28).

As a result of all these developments, the first sixty years of the 18th century led to a consumption revolution, as people became aware of the kinds of goods, they could decorate their homes and bodies with, and their purchasing power increased. The increasing interest of the urban middle classes as well as the aristocrats in this type of consumer goods led to the growth of the market, and the last three decades of the 18th century saw the emergence of a larger scale of industrial production, such as the increase in cotton production in Lancashire (Bocock; 2009: 24). While Porter (1990) talks about the characteristics of British society in the 18th century, he argues that the development of consumption provided the foundations of large-scale industrial production that began and developed later in this century and 19th century capitalism in England.

In addition to all these developments, there have been great developments in the banking sector as well. The banking system, which was seriously implemented with the appreciation of money, revealed the capital market required by industrialization. Thus, the commercial bourgeoisie turned into the industrial bourgeoisie (Ateş, 2009: 199). These developments have also led to the formation of a consumer society over time. However, before explaining the consumer society, it is useful to explain the developments in banking activities and financial capitalism.

The Rise of Financial Capitalism and the Changing World Economy

Banking and banking activities, which have existed as a necessity in parallel with the development of trade and industry in the historical process, are among the most important institutions of financial capitalism today.

The most obvious economic activities of banks are to act as intermediaries between real or legal persons who have money. In other words, banks are businesses where there is a mutual money supply and demand (Aydoğdu, 2010: 10). Banks also contribute to the development of national and international trade by providing registered money flow to the economy. Central banks of countries direct their economies with their monetary policies (Bakkal & Aksüt, 2011: 14) With these activities, banks are one of the institutions that make the biggest contribution to the capitalist economic system.

In the second half of the 19th century, the world economy entered the stage of financial capitalism, and the economic power passed into the hands of large investment banks. Société Générale de Crédit Mobilier, which was founded by the French government in 1852 and was the first bank with a joint stock company structure in France, is a clear indicator of the move towards financial capitalism. Because the purpose of establishment of this bank was to provide long-term financing necessary for railways and heavy industry (Allen, 2003: 26). Crédit Mobilier has set an example for the commercial banks of Central Europe that finance large-scale business ventures by combining deposit banking and stock market investing. This close relationship between banks and industry laid the foundations for financial capitalism, and it started to rise especially in Germany at the end of the 19th century (Allen, 2003: 27). In the period following the 1929 crisis, in the face of serious depression and unemployment in developed countries, it led to the emergence of a demand-oriented Keynesian approach, instead of the classical economic understanding that was believed to be valid until that time (Duman, 2011: 22). According to Keynes, there are five variables that determine the level of economic activity. These variables specified in the functioning of the economic system; national income, employment, consumption, investment, and interest rates (Çapraz, 2001: 20).

The policies proposed by the Keynesian approach, which emerged with the loss of the effectiveness of the classical economic understanding after the 1929 Crisis, caused a rapid increase in national income and employment in developed countries during the 1940s and 1950s (Duman, 2011: 25). In this period, it was deemed necessary for entrepreneurs and marketers to expand consumption, increase, and sustain production. Advertising, which has continued in this regard since the 1920s, has become an active sector in the marketing of products and the spread of consumption (Kaya, 2010: 148).

Between 1950-1970 years, the decrease in demand, which caused the crisis in the 1930s, was overcome with policies increasing total demand; mass production is balanced by the promotion of mass consumption. In this period, which coincided with Fordism, "consumption culture and the social reproduction function of advertising" was the promotion of mass consumption. The relative prosperity

in the society brought the pursuit of happiness by the masses and advertisements basically promised happiness (Dağtaş, 2009: 19-20).

Especially after the last quarter of the 20th century, depending on the acceleration of globalization, banking transactions crossed national borders and gained an international character. In this case, banks are of great importance for the global economy as well as national economies (Bakkal & Aksüt, 2011: 17) Marx's proposition that "capital has no homeland" is a proposition that includes the view that the most obvious form of capital is finance capital. Today, when we look at the concept called globalization, it is seen that the most important aspect is capital movements and the increase in their speed. What determines this environment is speculative capital movements rather than goods movements arising from production and trade (Buğra, 2001: 47). In other words, as Braudel mentioned, capitalism is in one of the periods when it is the most itself. In this period, financial capitalism determines the world economy rather than real capital.

Characteristics of the Consumer Society

Looking at the background of the transformation of industrial production towards mass production, it is understood that the first major economic crisis (the crisis of control of production and consumption processes) experienced by capitalism on a world scale completely changed the balance. The purpose of mass production has been how to sell what is produced. Thus, when, how and by whom the production is carried out, as well as when, how and by whom the products will be purchased has started to gain importance. (Tellan, 2009: 26-27).

In the Fordist era of mass production and mass consumption, new consumer groups emerged. In these groups, which started to make a choice in the products they bought, the perception of brand image began to settle thanks to the advertisements. The change of the target audience to the working class was a significant change compared to the 1920s and 1930s, when consumers were mostly from the middle class, and it was also reflected in the advertisements of the goods produced in this period (Bocock, 2009: 31-32).

According to Baudrillard (1988: 96), the rationalization process of the forces involved in production in the 19th century reached its peak in consumption in the 20th century. The way of creating new wealth brought with it its own understandings. With the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the 2000s, old ideologies began to disappear from the scene, and the way of thinking and worldview of the new era changed (Aksoy, 2014: 157). Baudrillard claims the emergence of a postmodern society based on the concept of simulation for this period and mentions the existence of a radical break between modern society and postmodern society, such as between traditional society and modern society. Cevizci describes the concept of simulation mentioned by Baudrillard in his work titled Simulations written in 1983 as follows (Cevizci, 2010: 1282):

It is a concept developed to show that today's postmodern world is a virtual reality in which symbols and images replace the real and concrete, rather than a real society. Baudrillard states that we buy and sell images with symbols rather than goods and services and try to provide psychological satisfaction of needs and desires rather than meeting real material needs and gives today's fashion and clothing industry to better express his thought or basic argument. The need for people to dress neatly and cleanly for changing weather conditions has been replaced by the desire for high-status designer labels.

Baudrillard has also shaped consumption as "a system of signs regulated by codes and rules". Explaining this consumption system shaped by Baudrillard through advertisements, Aydoğan (2004: 228-229) mentions that advertisements literally take on the function of "driving force" in the spread of such a consumption culture. In addition to this expression, she mentions that with the increase in the number and variety of mass industry products, the advertising industry and mass media have started to produce consumers who are ready to buy every new product and brand. Dağtaş (2009: 19-20), on the other hand, says that consumption culture and advertising serve to ensure social reproduction in the capitalist system. Advertising, on the one hand, not only provides the economic reproduction of capitalism by encouraging the purchase of a certain product or service, but also undertakes a socialization task that serves the social reproduction of capitalism with the content they use. "The general goal of socialization through consumption culture and advertising is; It is the construction of hedonistic and selfish individuality. This goal has existed since the beginning of capitalism when traditional society began to disintegrate."

At the end of the twentieth century, people work in developed societies not only to survive, but also to consume. Even if not all the advertised goods can be bought by everyone, they serve as the purpose of the working people's work. The important thing is that consumption has become a surreal and symbolic form, belonging to another universe, and the idea of purchasing has become a motive as much as the act of buying (Baudrillard, 1988).

Development of Consumer Society in Turkey

The transition from traditional societies to capitalist society by experiencing a radical break has changed all production and consumption habits. Capitalist entrepreneurs, who are constantly striving to gain more capital and profit, have commodified everything, thus making everything consumable. Especially after the Industrial Revolution, capitalist movements in European countries and the USA have become unstoppable, and these movements have led to financial crises affecting the whole world, as well as causing vitality in the economy. When we look at Turkey, in fact, although modernization efforts have been started since the First Constitutional period (1876 Constitution) in the Ottoman Empire, the capitalization movements, the change in production and consumption habits developed differently from Europe and the USA.

Advertising in the Ottoman Empire could not grow and become a sector because it needed an advanced production and economic system. In that period, even the newspapers, which were the only advertising medium, were established by foreign entrepreneurs, the economy did not have the necessary vision for the development of advertising, and the development of advertising in the Ottoman Empire ceased to be a concept of need (Yavuz, 2013: 229).

The founding period of the Republic corresponds to the period of great depression in the world economy. Because of the world economic crisis and the country's recovery policies, the use of domestic goods has been tried to be encouraged. For this reason, in the founding years of the Republic, advertising campaigns were organized for savings and giving priority to domestic goods. With the alphabet revolution, literacy campaigns were started, so the number of people who read and write increased compared to the past, and this was reflected in the reading rate of the newspapers (Yavuz, 2013: 229).

The Republic was founded upon the end of an economically collapsed structure. Opportunities for the development of consumption were still limited at that time. The new administration, which wants to develop its economy with state enterprises, has made it necessary to support private enterprises by the state and to produce in a protective and closed economic structure.

Ahmad (1999) states that the development of consumption in Turkey coincided with the years of change in Turkish political life in the 1950s and 1960s. The Republic of Turkey, which took over the collapsed economy of the Ottoman Empire, could not provide the development of consumption mechanisms due to its inability to have sufficient production opportunities. According to Orçan (2008: 157), the formation of the economic and cultural infrastructure necessary for the consumption culture to penetrate the society coincides with the period 1950-1980 in Turkey.

Turkey started to experience a social and cultural structure brought about by a new economy in the 1980s. With the decisions taken in the economy on January 24, 1980, the Turkish economy underwent a liberal transformation. After 1980, when the protectionist and import substitution economic policies were replaced by free competition, imports were liberalized first, and then, with the liberalization of imports at the end of 1983, the Turkish market was opened to foreign products, thus Turkish goods began to compete with foreign products (Yavuz, 2013: 235). With the Özal government giving priority to economic laws, progress was also made in communication, urban investments, and energy production. Despite many criticisms, the right of title deed to the owners of slums and making those who migrated from the village to the city as property owners increased the number of the middle class and the incomes of the municipalities (Karpat, 2015: 220).

Advertising has also gained importance since the 1980s. The liberalization trends seen in the country's economy have started to increase the power of the private sector and the competition between companies, which has a positive effect on advertising investments. The visual effects used together with the color television broadcasting since 1983 and the developing technology made the advertisements attract attention and be watched (Çetinkaya, 1992: 42). After the 1990s, private televisions started broadcasting, ending the TRT monopoly, foreign investors starting to come to the country with the effect of globalization, so the number of foreign brands gradually increased in the country, and the increase in

investments and competition in the media field were the developments that directly affected the advertising World (Taşyürek, 2010: 11-12).

Çetinkaya (1992: 51) is of the opinion that especially since the 1980s, the idea of transforming Turkish society into a consumer society and bringing Turkish people into the consumption economy was decided by the political authority. According to him, “it is not possible to talk about the function of advertising alone to transform a society into a consumer society. However, from the moment the process of transforming society begins, advertising can undertake a number of functions to accelerate this process.” Bali (2001: 58) also supports Çetinkaya's ideas, according to him, with the economic measures implemented after September 12, it was aimed to create a willing audience for consumption from ordinary people, even if their income is not sufficient, to increase consumption. Yavuz (2013: 236), on the other hand, agrees with the idea that although the foundations of a consumption society in Turkey were laid by the political authorities, the main tool is the media by ensuring that it is included in daily life. According to him, whether through advertisements or other programs, the Turkish people had to change the way they considered saving and using domestic goods as a virtue after 1980.

When the 20th century was left behind and the 21st century was entered, Turkey faced the most important economic crisis in the history of the Republic in 2001 (Kayra, 2015: 218). The liquidity crunch in banks in November 2000 turned into a severe crisis in February 2001. In the hope of finding a solution to the crisis, Kemal Derviş, one of the Vice Presidents of the World Bank at the time, was invited to Turkey by the Prime Minister of the time, Ecevit, and entered the cabinet as the Minister of State in charge of the economy on 3 March (Karpat, 2015: 241). Kemal Derviş, who was still trying to manage the economy under the influence of the crisis in 2002, stated that it would be appropriate to set an early election date in this period, and the TBMM (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) moved the early general election to 3 November 2002. Only the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) and CHP (Republican People's Party) were able to pass the threshold. First, the 58th Government was established under the presidency of Abdullah Gül; After the YSK's (High Election Board) cancellation of the Siirt elections, thanks to the constitutional amendment that paved the way for Erdoğan to become a deputy and therefore the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the new prime minister of the 59th government in February 2003 (Karpat, 2015: 244).

The general elections held in 2002 were one of the important elections that marked the beginning of a new era in Turkish politics. After the elections, the financial sector, which was badly injured in the 2001 crisis, was repaired, the central bank was made independent, debt management was no longer a problem, and fiscal discipline was ensured. In the background of the improvement policies implemented by the AK Party in this period, Derviş's Transition to a Strong Economy Program; in other words, these policies consist entirely of neoliberal economic policies. The AK Party continued to implement these policies on its own initiative, under the control of the IMF until May 2008 (Yıldırım, 2011: 123-124). The AK Party paid particular attention to speeding up the EU process to reduce these suspicions and strengthen its legitimacy. Thus, membership negotiations began in 2005. In this period, when the work for the European Union continued, some of the doubts about the Party were gradually dispelled with the steps taken towards democratization (Demirel, 2014: 7).

In this period, when we look at the social transformation dynamics that made the AK Party government possible; Since the 1980s, Turkish society has been enriching, urbanizing, and the level of education has been increasing, although the quality of education has not changed much. Ethnic and religious beliefs-based identities (Demirel, 2014: 7) have found ways to express themselves, and the increase in production and welfare has led to progress in becoming an open society, despite the continuing deterioration in income distribution.

Changing Capital and Class Balances: The Islamic Bourgeoisie and the New Middle Class

An important aspect of Turkey's economic and social transformation is the emergence of a “new middle class,” which first appeared during the 1980s and has been rapidly growing and evolving since 2000s. The new middle classes, in this transformation process, became the symbol of change and became one of the most important elements that make up today's Turkey (Keyman, 2012: 23).

The new middle classes (upper-middle classes) in social sciences in Turkey also form the basis for discussions of new wealth. The new middle classes that emerged after the 1980s in Turkey; The wage earners, whose living conditions have improved and who are among the upper income groups, are specialists and managers employed in the finance and service sectors and in positions related to the

external links of the economy, especially with the adaptation process to the international economy (Dağtaş, 2009: 33-35). According to Öncü (1999: 123), these groups are the new middle classes not only because of their unique position in the employment market, but also because they are ideal consumers who function to ensure the adoption of the codes of behavior of the global consumer culture of the new era in society, or because they are presented as such. The new middle classes can play an important role in the strengthening of a political actor as well as their economic and cultural activities (Keyman, 2012: 25). The new middle classes, especially in the 2000s, have been one of the main actors of Turkey's political, economic, and cultural transformation, and their position has shown a growing trend. In this period, the choice to be made by the new middle classes, who were in a dilemma between conservatism and democratization, has largely determined the future of Turkey (Keyman, 2012: 27).

The bourgeoisie in Turkey was designed as a group created by the state and would benefit the state's interests (İnsel, 2012: 15). For this reason, one of the most important factors leading to Turkey's social change is the transformation of the capital structure. The effect of the spread of wealth from big cities to Anatolia in this regard is great. Turkey, which started its industrialization and thus its capitalization late, created a bourgeois class by the state in order to close the gap, accelerate its industrialization and revive its economy. This situation does not occur as a natural consequence of the capitalization process. Due to the excessive state interventions in the economic policies implemented from the first periods of the Republic to the 1980s and the depressed atmosphere created by the wars and crises in the world, the Turkish economy could not fully enter the process of capitalization. However, with the support of liberal policies implemented after the 1980s, a bourgeois class independent of the state began to emerge. After the 2000s, this new bourgeoisie, which was influential in the formation of the AK Party, became stronger with the AK Party's coming to power and the implementation of neoliberal policies. Thus, Turkey has taken an important step in the process of capitalization and serious differences have been observed in consumption habits.

Analysis of Banking Products and Advertisements 2000 – 2013 Years: Garanti Bank and Türkiye Finans

In all these capitalization processes in the world and in Turkey, the main institutions providing capital flows in the changes in production and consumption habits have been banks. The changing economic policies in Turkey have led to the development of banking products/services, and this situation is also reflected in its advertisements.

Bank advertisements, which encouraged saving in the early years of the Republic, have begun to change this attitude with liberal policies. Thus, it has tended to encourage more people to spend and benefit from banking products/services. They aimed to achieve this with advertisements in which the smiling, sincere, polite, and unlimited service bank employees are highlighted. The developing financing tool for the widespread segment of the society has been bank loans and credit cards. The rapid increase in the number of debit and credit card uses, especially in the 2000s, has supported the transformation of individuals into consumers from the early youth (Tellan, 2008: 12).

In this study, Garanti Bank and Türkiye Finans advertisements were analyzed by qualitative content analysis method. The images and texts used in the advertisements, which were categorized over the concepts of consumption and the new middle class, were interpreted.

We are consuming, we are happy!

Different symbols and images have been used according to age periods in the method of addressing individuals who have been transformed into consumers by owning bank cards and credit cards since the first youth and even childhood. Symbols, images, and signs that young people and children value have become a source for advertisements. This situation coincides with Baudrillard's concept of "simulations" and the view of Lefebvre and other postmodern thinkers that "consumption is made through images, symbols and signs", which also supports this concept. Garanti Bank's products such as "Bonus Kontör", "MiniBank", and "Extra Genç" (Extra Young) are examples of youth and childhood credit and debit cards.¹

Garanti Bank's launch of "Let's buy, let's buy! what do we buy for free?" in 2000 and the Bonus Card advertisement presented to the consumers with the Bonusgiller family are examples of one of the most

¹ For the image look, 2003, Kristal Elma Archive, <http://www.kristalelma.org.tr>, access: April 2014

important steps in the formation of the consumer society, which led to the increase in the use of credit cards in Turkey. In the advertisement, the motto of the consumer society "consume more to earn" is placed in the minds of the consumer society, in which a family profile is drawn that unconsciously shop in order to accumulate more "bonuses" beyond their needs and reach psychological satisfaction by being happy with these consumption actions. Considering the communication language used by Bonus Card in the following years, it is seen that it follows a similar policy. It encourages people to consume more by organizing more "win bonus" campaigns, especially on days that are important for the society.²

The middle class is changing, discourses are changing

Announcing its merger with the Ottoman bank after the 2001 crisis, Garanti Bank used the symbols of the "Republic" and "Ottoman" traditions in the commercial it prepared. Describing itself as a secular and modern Republican bank, Garanti Bank has declared itself the most powerful bank in Turkey by merging with a more traditional power. After the publication of this advertisement, the overlap between the traditional and the modern, or the secular and the conservative, has been an issue in Turkey's agenda, both in terms of capital and social events, as mentioned in the previous sections. This situation has been one of the effective factors in making changes in products/services and advertisements.

The emergence of the new middle class and the Islamic bourgeoisie led to the development of different financial structures. "Participation Banking", also known as "Islamic Banking" in the international arena, was born in Turkey as a result of the social demands of the 1980s and the economic conditions of the period. Participation Banking in Turkey started for the first time in 1985 with the financial liberalization policy of Prime Minister Turgut Özal, within the framework of a special legal regulation for Arab investors (Şen, 2011: 79-80). With the making of new regulations, the name of these institutions was changed to participation banks in 2005. In addition, with the additional regulations introduced in 2006, participation banks have been brought to a position in accordance with the regulations, laws and principles to which traditional banks are subject (Uslucan, 2013: 15).

In the advertisement of the merger of Anadolu Finans and Family Finans capitals at the foundation of Türkiye Finans, which made a rapid entry into the banking sector with the regulations in 2005, a different discourse was used than Garanti Bank. "The best is to be united, to share, to multiply by sharing. The best is to grow as one, to become one and walk the same path. Anadolu Finans and Family Finans merged for this. Türkiye Finans is waiting for you to share this joy." in the advertisement, the words of which are included, emotional and Turkish cultural themes are handled that will attract the attention of the more "conservative" and "traditional" groups of the society, which are the target audience of Türkiye Finans.

The banking sector in Turkey is one of the sectors that makes the best use of cultural language, values, and emotional themes in its advertisements. They convey their messages by touching the most sensitive points of the society in order to make the products/services they offer such as personal loans and deposit accounts a necessity and necessity. In the deposit advertisement of Türkiye Finans, published in 2008, a father figure rejoicing at the birth of his son and announcing it to his colleagues, and a figure among the public reminding him of the realities of life, the lifetime expenses of having a child and the hardships that these expenses will cause. The father, who wants not to experience all these financial difficulties in the future, finds the solution for both his and his child's future by opening a deposit account in Türkiye Finans. Similarly, in the personal loan advertisement of Garanti Bank published in 2012, the profile of an officer who makes marriage plans but cannot realize this plan due to financial difficulties is drawn. However, he solves this problem with the "support loan" he received from Garanti Bank.

As a result of increasing competition, changing market conditions, and developing technology have left the place of advertisements with friendly personnel, trying to strengthen the image of the bank, to new bank advertisements promoting technological superiorities and fast and high-quality services. This situation also necessitated banks to develop new products/services constantly, and the need to introduce and display these developed products/services to consumers has led to advertisements gaining importance. Thus, the market has revived, and each new product/service developed has created an image

² For the images look, 14 Aralık 2011, Milliyet, <http://narajans.net>, access: December 2013

that facilitates people's work and provides practical solutions, resulting in a result that seems to benefit the consumer.³⁴

Garanti Bank and Türkiye Finans not only increase customer satisfaction with the products/services offered by their customers according to their usage purposes and tastes, but also increase the loyalty of people to themselves. This is a cycle that the consumer society and today's capitalism are trying to create. In the presentation of these products/services, the cultural and religious values of the target group are also kept in the foreground, and the overlap of traditional and modern areas is much better noticed. In a way, it can be said that Baudrillard's concept of "transparency" is also observed in banking products/services and advertisements.

The cooperation between Garanti Bank, which represents the Republican elite and secularism, and Türkiye Finans, which represents tradition and conservatism, on the individual pension system and credit card infrastructure shows that they leave their cultural identities in the background and act by considering their economic interests because of the necessity of being a bourgeois. This situation proves that the balance of the capital class in Turkey has changed and that the general structure of the society is in a process of serious change. Türkiye Finans' use of Garanti Bank's Bonus Card infrastructure in credit cards and its cooperation with Garanti Bank in the private pension system are examples of this transformation of capital.

To make a general assessment, the economic crises in Turkey in the early 2000s and the economic packages prepared in the light of the implemented neoliberal policies caused both the birth of the new rich to change the existing capital balance and the peak of the consumption culture in the society. In this period, the credit cards offered by the banks to the market and the products/services that followed with the competition brought by technological developments have been major factors that helped the formation of a consumption society in Turkey. Advertisements play an important role in reaching and directing these products/services to consumers.

The service of consumer culture and advertising to capitalism's social reproduction is based on distributing individual identities and offering rich lifestyles. The new middle classes that emerged with the consumption culture in Turkey; It lives this culture both in an exhibitionist way and spreads it through its cultural industries. It provides the social reproduction of today's financial capitalism, which is based on the service, finance and information sectors.

It is observed that the social, cultural, economic, technological developments and changes experienced in advertisements especially after 2000 in Turkey are also reflected in the content and forms of advertisements. The symbols and images used in advertisements, which are the mirror of society, reflect the lifestyle of that society when they are facts associated with real life. While this situation previously caused the banks to create the perception that no one can enter on the society and leave the image of a place of fear, today, with the reproduction of capitalism and the consumption culture descending into the depths of the society, banks have created an image that they provide services in a comfortable, friendly, and practical environment. Parallel to this re-image of the banks, the changing products/services have become appealing to all segments of the society, which has led to the reproduction of capitalism and the spread of consumption culture. Capitalism is a system that legitimizes its existence by penetrating all the capillaries of society.

As can be seen in the examples of Garanti Bank and Türkiye Finans, banks aim to connect them to themselves by using content that appeals to every segment of society separately in their advertisements. Thus, it makes individuals or groups feel special. The banks, which use these tactics mostly for credit card advantages and loan options, have made the society dependent beyond being tied to them. More consumption was encouraged in the content used in advertisements, more spending was encouraged during these periods by using the cultural values of the society such as marriage, birth, and holidays, and it was made compulsory to take loans from banks by taking advantage of the conveniences offered for the comfort of individuals who are in trouble with the expenditures made. This situation has caused Turkey to enter into a period of vicious circle dependent on banks, together with financial capitalism.

³ For the image look, 1 Haziran 2013, Milliyet, <http://narajans.net>, access: December 2013

⁴ For the image look, 30 Nisan 2013, Posta, <http://narajans.net>, access: December 2013

CONCLUSION

According to historical capitalism, the consumption and commodification of labor has led to the economic strengthening and development of the West since the first years of industrialization. Economic developments have brought along technological and scientific developments. The depletion of resources based on industrial production over time has led to the search for new resources and exploitation with the help of developing technology opportunities. These searches have also led to wars and serious economic depressions that will affect the whole world. In all these periods of crisis and war experienced for centuries, capitalism has renewed itself in western countries and strengthened itself by taking advantage of technological developments. In addition, with the changing production processes, it has opened new resource areas for the market by fusing cultural elements into industrial production. Thus, capitalism, which has taken its current form, has revealed a new consumption slavery, although it seems to be a structure that thinks about people and cultural elements.

Baudrillard, one of the thinkers who called the age of today's capitalism as the postmodern age, stated that the differentiation of production forms was caused by the developing information technologies and communication becoming a social production by determining the information industries. This situation also caused us to enter an era of simulation. In the era of simulations, everything purchased was aimed at satisfying the psychological satisfaction of desires, thanks to the symbols used, rather than the function of meeting material needs.

The change in production styles has also led to the development of the advertising industry. Every new production realized has instilled the consumption ambition, and due to advertisements, consumers have tended to work much harder in order to always reach more. By promoting the consumption of products or services, advertisements serve both the economic reproduction of capitalism and the social reproduction of capitalism with the contents they use and serve as a socialization function.

When we look at the development of capitalism and consumption in Turkey, it is not possible to see that there are radical breaks like in the West. The state structure of the Ottoman Empire was not a suitable structure for the disintegration experienced in the formation of capitalism to occur here as well. Although there were some developments in the last period of the Ottoman Empire, it had the opportunity to enter the process of capitalization and modernization only after the proclamation of the Republic. In the single-party period until the 1950s, the private sector made important developments in the country with more nationalistic policies, but the state intervention continues to have an effect. In 1950, with the Democratic Party administration, liberal policies supporting private entrepreneurs became evident in the country's economy, while the consumer culture began to show its effect. As a result, Turkey has started to move away from the mixed economy and state management system that has prevailed until now. Supporting private entrepreneurs and liberal policies a serious threshold has been crossed with the Özal government after 1980, and in this period, the society has begun to carry the characteristics of a consumer society. In addition, new classes have emerged in the social structure.

In the 2000s, with the AK Party government, we entered a period in which all this capitalization process, the reproduction of the consumer society and class movements began to settle into place. Starting from the Özal Era, capital began to undergo a transformation. Turkey, which does not have a bourgeois class as in the developed capitalist countries, has just started to form its own bourgeois class without the help of the state in this period. In previous periods, capital started to gain power slowly, but the central authority was so strong that they had a hard time proving their age. In addition, international competition was very strong and deep-rooted, and they were in the throes of fighting it. While these pains continued, the capital in Turkey preferred to be fed from the foreign capital over time, although it was fed by the state power. Although the Özal era paved the way for this, the real opportunities were provided by the neoliberal and open-minded policies offered by the AK Party governments. Thus, in the years following the 2000s, Turkish capital has become an aggressive capital that can create a market of its own and enter into international competition. However, the main importance of this period is that the transformed capital was an important factor in the coming to power of a political party by supporting it. In this period, while the capital was undergoing a transformation, at the same time, new classes emerged within the society that experienced class changes. This new class, which did not need the support of the state, weakened the view that the religious life model and the modern lifestyle could not be compatible with each other. This new class, which has become more and more evident thanks to its wealth and power, has been instrumental in important changes not only in the political and economic field, but also in cultural accumulation.

The representatives of the new middle class have started to express their own cultures in subjects such as culture, art and education, which have adopted the modern lifestyle until now and are monopolized by the urban and secular segments. The most important features of these layers, which are called the new middle class and Islamic bourgeois, and which play a major role in the transformation of Turkish society, are that when the economic power comes into their hands, they begin to resemble other bourgeois elites created by the state. They go to similar schools and apply the same consumption rules with slightly more Islamic motifs. While capital is undergoing a transformation in Turkey, society must be transformed into a consumer society due to the nature of capitalism. Within the framework of this view, a society that is crazy about ostentatious and consumption has been formed in Turkey, and the society has become, in a sense, addicted to consumption. Opportunities that drive the masses to consumption have been presented in almost all sectors. Individuals are encouraged to consume through advertisements and a social structure has been created in which those who do not consume, or buy are excluded.

In this situation, the importance of bank advertisements is greater. Because today's capitalism is a system that runs on financial capitalism and the effects of this are felt especially after the 2000s in Turkey. Even though they sometimes experience violent conflicts with the real sector, they contribute to the reproduction of the capitalist society by cooperating with the banking sector. Sometimes it even becomes the main actor. People who are somehow encouraged to consume more need more money or unreal supporters such as credit cards and installment advantages in order to carry out this action. In this case, banks cause people to borrow more by encouraging consumption with the most innocent, most cultural, most emotional, most entertaining, most eye-catching content they use in their advertisements. At the same time, it causes them to borrow again by taking the most advantageous, harmless loans from them in order to close these debts.

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Vietnam's Policy over South China Sea: Potential for Conflict Escalation?

Mustafa TÜTER¹

Abstract

The South China Sea dispute is a major foreign policy issue for Vietnam with regard to its security and economic interests as well as its relations with other regional and major powers. Vietnam's policy over the SCS creates significant implications for regional stability as Vietnam engages with China and the US. In recent years, it tends to move towards diversification of its diplomatic and military options with other non-claimant states such as Japan, India and Russia. These diversification attempts are also strongly associated with energy security matters. This article argues that potential risk for conflict escalation in the SCS is growing not only because of China's growing influence in the region but also because of its increasing energy security concerns. In this regard, Vietnam's concerns over security interests, but particularly energy security concerns, set limits for Vietnam-China cooperation. Thus, the newly adopted energy policy orientation presents potential risks for the future relations between the two countries. It is suggested that there is an urgent need to take certain actions to prevent potential conflict escalation in the SCS in the coming years.

Keywords: Vietnam, South China Sea, China, the United States, policy diversification, energy security, conflict escalation

Vietnam'ın Güney Çin Denizi Politikası: Çatışma Tırmanma Potansiyeli

Mustafa TÜTER¹

Özet

Güney Çin Denizi, Vietnam'ın güvenlik ve ekonomik çıkarları ile bölgesel ve büyük güçlerle ilişkileri açısından en önemli dış politika sorunudur. Çin ve ABD ile geliştirdiği ilişkilere bağlı olarak şekillenen Güney Çin Denizi politikası bölgesel istikrar üzerinde önemli etkiler doğurmaktadır. Son yıllarda Vietnam'ın bu politikası Güney Çin Denizi'nde hak iddiasında bulunmayan Japonya, Hindistan ve Rusya gibi devletlerle diplomatik ve askeri tercihlerinin çeşitlendirilmesi istikametinde ilerlemektedir. Bu politika çeşitlendirme çabaları aynı zamanda enerji güvenliği meseleleriyle yakından ilişkilidir. Bu makale çatışma tırmanmasına yönelik potansiyel riskin sadece Çin'in bölgede artan etkinliği sebebiyle değil aynı zamanda Vietnam'ın artan enerji güvenliği kaygıları nedeniyle büyüdüğünü iddia etmektedir. Vietnam'ın güvenlik çıkarlarına dönük kaygıları, ama özellikle enerji güvenliği kaygıları, Vietnam-Çin işbirliğini sınırlandırmaktadır. Dolayısıyla Vietnam'ın son yıllarda izlediği enerji politikaları yönelimi iki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerin geleceği açısından ciddi potansiyel risk oluşturmaktadır. Bu bağlamda önümüzdeki yıllarda Güney Çin Denizi'nde ortaya çıkması muhtemel çatışma tırmanmasını önlemek için acilen gerekli adımların atılması önerilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Vietnam, Güney Çin Denizi, Çin, ABD, politika çeşitlendirilmesi, enerji güvenliği, çatışma tırmanması

INTRODUCTION

After China adopted a new maritime policy towards the South China Sea, the tensions among claimant states have arisen seriously. While China has become more assertive in claiming its own sovereignty rights, the provocations of non-claimant states have been heavily involved in the dispute and the suspicions of claimant states have also been increased. Vietnam, like Philippines, confronts on the front line of maritime disputes with China. Although Vietnam had chosen to navigate policy disagreements in the last decades, the risk of potential conflict grows as the disputes continue to intensify. Since Vietnam is a major claimant state in the South China Sea, its views and actions can produce significant impact on escalating tensions. As a matter of fact, Hanoi commemorated anniversary of a battle against the Chinese navy this year on March 14 (Hanoi Times March 14, 2022). It marks a new stand for further development since the Prime Minister, Pham Minh Chinh, officially attended the ceremony for the first time in history. The shifting attitude indicates that Vietnam government intends to give a clear signal about its maritime sovereignty and security concerns.

Philippine's submission to the Arbitration Court in 2013 marked an important turning point in terms of internationalization of the SCS maritime disputes. This event led the issue to be grown and transformed into geopolitical competition between great powers and other regional states (Yılmaz and Liu, 2019). With the invitation to external powers to the issue and the Court's final decision in favoring Philippines, China's official policy of "dual-track thinking" became jeopardized. In dual-track-thinking, China aims to manage the maritime disputes by taking the question of sovereignty in bilateral negotiations and resolving the non-sovereign disputes through regional multilateral diplomacy (Zhou, 2016: 878). So, Beijing agrees to advocate the ASEAN's role in building consensus on the SCS code of conduct among claimant states. However, the Arbitration process also made ASEAN to be divided internally mainly because of the involvement of external powers.

It is important to recognize that China and Vietnam have experienced several violent conflicts since the beginning of the Cold War. Their sovereignty disputes over the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands and the related disputes over demarcation of their respective exclusive economic zones (EEZ) have not been resolved peacefully yet. The China-Vietnam conflict over the SCS does not only create military tensions and potential for armed conflict but it also reduces the improvement of political and economic cooperation between the two powers. While China has become confident to manage Vietnamese challenges with its growing political and economic influence, Vietnam attempts to navigate its economic and security interests by applying smaller power approach in its relations with great powers (Path, 2018). Although the expectations for Vietnamese long-term accommodation of Chinese security interests have been widely examined in the existing literature in recent years, exploring the increasing potential conflict escalation over the SCS based on newly emerging energy security concerns are neglected. Therefore, this article aims to explain why Vietnam take a position between cooperation and struggle over the SCS by addressing the likelihood of increasing potential risk for conflict escalation between Vietnam and China in the coming years. Vietnam's increasing concerns for energy security and its new policy orientations tend to reduce Vietnam-China cooperation and presents potential for conflict escalation.

Within this general analytical framework, this article first analyzes Vietnam's engagement with China in recent years. Second, it addresses Vietnam's enhanced security ties with the US especially after the implementation of US' FOIP strategy has become more visible. Third, it also examines Vietnam's efforts to diversify its diplomatic and military policies by establishing new ties with other major powers. Fourth, Vietnam's increasing security concerns are evaluated through its recent energy policy priorities and orientations. And finally, this article makes some suggestions for preventing potential conflict escalation between Vietnam and China in the SCS.

Vietnam's Strategic Policy over South China Sea

Theoretically, ASEAN individual states' strategic responses with respect to great powers are characterized by "hedging". The main purpose of hedging strategy is to preserve national autonomy and avoid policy dependency on any external power. For instance, Kuik defines hedging as "insurance-seeking behavior under high-stakes and uncertain situations" and puts emphasis on deliberately contradictory policies vis-a-vis competing powers (Kuik, 2016). On the other hand, Goh describes hedging as more of "an unconscious, reactive and default option" given the inability of ASEAN states to make concerted strategic decisions (Goh, 2016). As far as it is concerned, Vietnam's hedging behavior

can be understood more specifically as “balanced hedging”, which means maintaining defence ties with the US while keeping deeper economic and diplomatic ties with China (Shambaugh, 2018: 102). So, this type of hedging always implies projecting balancing measures and relative equanimity. Womack’s asymmetry theoretical framework for analyzing Vietnam’s relations with China suggests a different perspective which emphasizes the disparity of national capabilities and their impacts on the differences in risk perception, attention and interactive behavior between a larger state and a smaller state (Womack, 2006). What is important here is to recognize that China and Vietnam have always had an asymmetrical relationship, but it does not mean that China was able to dictate what it wants from Vietnam.

Vietnam’s SCS strategy driven by hedging logic in its relations with China can be formulated as “cooperating and struggling” behavior (Tran and Sato, 2018; Do, 2017). As it is understood, this strategy involves contradictory logic to manage the SCS dispute. While it refers “cooperation” with China and other claimant states as much as possible with an aim to reduce tensions, Vietnam also “struggles” with them in order to preserve its core interests (Thayer, 2016).¹ However, Vietnam’s strategic approach is combined with improved balancing measures particularly against China since 2010. These balancing measures include internal and external elements such as increasing its military and maritime law enforcement capabilities, fortifying its outposts in the Spratlys, preparing battles with China and strengthening strategic ties with the US and other major powers.

Moreover, Vietnam also puts a great deal of diplomatic effort to use ASEAN mechanisms in order to achieve better results for the peaceful resolution of maritime dispute. After Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995, the mechanisms of ASEAN became the central part of its SCS strategy for dealing with maritime disputes. ASEAN as a multilateral institution provides Vietnam to keep the SCS dispute on the organization’s agenda and an opportunity to internationalize the issue. For instance, the ASEAN’s Leaders’ Vision Statement issued on 26 June 2020 by the 36th ASEAN Summit was shaped in accordance with Vietnam’s expectations. The Vision statement strongly addresses the importance of maintaining maritime security and promoting peace, stability, safety and freedom of navigation and overflight above the South China Sea, as well as upholding international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS, in the South China Sea (ASEAN, 2020).

In the past, Vietnam and the Philippines played key roles in drafting the 2002 Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. However, the Declaration is not sufficient itself because it is a non-binding document. For that reason, Vietnam contributed to formulate a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea with an aim of helping management of disputes. Vietnam is especially concerned with a code to be “substantive and effective, in accordance with international law, especially 1982 UNCLOS” (Tra November 22, 2018). When the discussions were made during the meetings on a Single Draft Negotiating Text in 2018, Vietnam has demonstrated its willingness for a long list of demands, which means to apply the future code to the whole South China Sea and make it a legally binding document. In addition to that Hanoi has insisted on effective enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms, including legal arbitration. It has concretely proposed 27 additional points referring to different dimensions of managing the South China Sea dispute (Thayer, August 3, 2018).

By the end of 2020, however, the negotiations between ASEAN and China has interrupted mainly because of the significant differences between Vietnam and China. Vietnam has taken a position not to rush the negotiation in a way that sacrifices the code’s substance and effectiveness. In the negotiations, Beijing favours having veto power on joint military exercises with external powers and preventing companies from outside the region from resource exploitation. While Vietnam asks the code to apply extensively including the maritime issues in the Paracels, China prefers to limit the geographic scope to the Spratlys. Vietnam also demands to create a monitoring commission with respect to its implementation (Hoang, September 28, 2020).

Vietnam is one of the claimant states which shows a strong reaction against China’s nine-dash line claims in the South China Sea. Vietnam’s territorial dispute with China is related to the two archipelagos of Paracels and Spratlys. It claims historical rights for having control over those territories for centuries. Vietnam’s claims are reflected in the two white papers on SCS which were published in 1975 and 1988 (Anh, 2016: 374). Later on Vietnam continues to articulate its claims over sovereignty rights with other diplomatic notes and letters on the UN platform. For example, in 2016, Hanoi stated that it “has ample

¹ This strategic principle first appeared in the Communist Party official documents in 1994, but it is still articulated by policymakers in Vietnam.

legal basis and historical evidence to affirm its indisputable sovereignty over Hoang Sa (Paracel) Archipelago and Truong Sa (Spratly) Archipelago” (UN Document, June 13, 2016). So, Vietnam’s diplomatic perspective on the SCS is mainly based on proclaiming that China has no historical right on territorial sovereignty over the islands.

Vietnam’s policy over the SCS is built upon three pillars. First, Vietnam advocates its sovereignty claims and rights to EEZ and continental shelf over Paracels and Spratlys by proving sufficient historical evidence and legal foundation (Vietnam Ministry of Defence, 2019: 31). Second, it stands in a position being against use of force and supports the idea of peaceful resolution to the dispute in accordance with international law, especially UNCLOS. Third, in order to reach such a solution, Vietnam is ready to work with other parties to manage the dispute and protect regional stability. Vietnam’s SCS policy is consistent with its overall defence policy, which posits “three nos” principle: no military alliances, no foreign bases on Vietnam’s territory and no relationship with one country to be used against a third country. Furthermore, Vietnam adds the fourth principle in its 2019 defence White paper. It underlines the significance of not using force or threat in international relations (Vietnam Ministry of Defence, 2019: 12).

Vietnam’s strategic interests are concentrated on three main issues in the SCS, namely territories, fisheries, and oil and gas. Defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity is not only the most important goal of Vietnam’s SCS strategy, but it also essential for maintaining political stability and legitimacy of the Communist Party of Vietnam. Essentially, Vietnam’s SCS policy still prioritize to preserve status quo while preventing China or other claimants from occupying new territories. In achieving this primary goal, Vietnam remains to be committed to peaceful resolution of the dispute by an attempt to mobilize international support. However, as an important new policy tool, the Party’s Central Committee attempted to combine its substantive policy goal with sustainable development goal of Vietnam’s maritime economy in October 2018. It puts an aim of making Vietnam a “strong maritime country” by 2030 (Vietnamplus, October 22, 2018). The second aspect of Vietnam’s SCS policy is concerned with energy policy. Vietnam’s approach to resource exploitation is changing due to the vital demands of economic development and China’s pressures over its own oil and gas operations in the SCS. The new policy considerations on energy issues are becoming influential to take important steps in changing overall SCS policy.

Vietnam’s Engagement with China

China’s growing confidence on claiming its sovereignty rights in the South China Sea can be observed by looking at the recent maritime institutional reforms. The Chinese public discourse regarding South China Sea has also become intense and assertive. The domestic discourse largely shaped by the Chinese leadership reflects strong support for China’s foreign policy actions in the South China Sea. And its increasing assertiveness was indicated by certain developments such as its official statement of “nine-dash line” claims under the UN in 2009; its establishment of Sansha City and blockade of Scarborough Shoal in 2012; its efforts to construct seven artificial islands in the Spratlys since 2013; its repeated interference in Vietnam’s offshore oil and gas activities in 2011, 2017 and 2019 and its planting of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig in Vietnam’s claimed EEZ in 2014 (International Crisis Group Report, November 29, 2021).

China’s policy on the South China Sea is mainly based on its long-term policy objective which aims to build a strong maritime power in response to the US presence in the region. The main aspects of this policy are characterized by creating effective control over maritime space, implementing assertive maritime diplomacy and establishing powerful maritime economy (Ross, 2020: 5). In this regard, China’s policy on South China Sea cannot be separated from its grand economic policy of the Maritime Silk Road of 21st Century. It is highly crucial for China to secure sea lines of communication in order to sustain the future development of BRI.

Vietnam is still seeking to preserve its balanced approach towards China in both economic and security terms. It can be suggested that Vietnam continues to adopt hedging strategy between China and the US. The primary goal of Vietnam foreign policy is to achieve peace and security in order to facilitate economic development. Due to having long decades of devastating wars, Vietnam is especially concerned with another armed conflict that prevents its modernization. Although it is determined to secure its core interests, Vietnam is careful to avoid escalations that may lead to the use of force. What is important for Vietnam in its relations with China is to pursue economic development goal as a first

priority as China has become its largest trading partner. The economic exchange between the two countries has certainly helped to increase information exchanges, building trust and containment of incidents, however, it may not be sufficient for Hanoi to prevent Beijing from acting assertively in the SCS. Since 2003, the two countries have made cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin to create for joint coast guard patrols, oil and gas development and fisheries management. The most important factor to ease tensions and defuse upcoming crises emerges to be the communication channel between the two countries' communist parties.

Vietnam and China established a "comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership" in May 2018. In political terms, Vietnam was able to receive an opportunity for greater network of engagement mechanisms with China under this framework. In military domain, there are some notable channels of conduct like combined naval patrols and port calls, combined patrols along the land border, training programs for officers and scientific military institutions. Between 2003 and 2016, Vietnam and China conducted 60 military cooperation activities, which makes Hanoi the sixth most frequent military diplomacy partner of Beijing in the world and the second one in Southeast Asia after Thailand (Allen and Saunders, 2017: 45).

Vietnam and China regularly conduct high-level negotiations with deputy foreign ministers on territorial issues. According to the ICG, three working groups under this mechanism focus on matters related to the SCS (International Crisis Group, December 7, 2021). Although the substantive issues are remained unresolved, the countries maintain regular dialogues to build trust through these mechanisms. These bilateral negotiations have generated some effective results on delimiting the land and maritime borders in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1999 and 2000. Both countries made a deal to establish a shared hydrocarbon exploration and development zone in the Gulf of Tonkin in 2004, but there is still no improvement on commercial exploitation of resources. In this area the Chinese and Vietnamese national oil companies were engaged in joint development activities. However, it is suggested that the potential domestic political uneasiness has made such an effort "practically impossible" (Treglode, 2016: 39-40). The major obstacle in managing maritime boundary issues is concentrated on outside the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin. As Vietnam refrains to accommodate China's demand to exclude the Paracels from its own agenda, the negotiations are remained in deadlock (Hai, 2021: 8).

Enhanced Vietnam-US Security Ties

Vietnam tends to resort increasing balancing measures with respect to its security interests in the SCS. By reinforcing its military and maritime law enforcement capabilities, it aims to build up "credible deterrence capabilities" (Grossman, 2018). Some security partners, especially the US and Japan, have helped Vietnam to increase its maritime capacity in developing law enforcement capabilities. For example, the US has transferred to Vietnam two decommissioned US Coast Guard Hamilton-class cutters and 24 Metal Shark patrol boats. Additionally, Vietnam signed an agreement with the Japan International Cooperation Agency for receiving a loan to build six patrol vessels (Reuters, July 28, 2020). Although those efforts cannot be regarded as large-scale militarization activities, in 2016, Vietnam decided to deploy five Spratly features Israel-made EXTRA rocket artillery systems which provide additional capability for Vietnam against China's nearby artificial islands (Reuters August 10, 2016).

The most direct US involvement to the SCS dispute was made by Hillary Clinton at 2010 Hanoi ASEAN Summit when she addressed to the SCS as the US national interest (Landler, 2010). The US rebalancing strategy in the Obama era increased commitments to the region and led to changing perceptions of both sides and escalated tensions. In Trump era, however, the trade war policy was followed by adopting particular regional policy of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) to intensify great power competition between the US and China. In this new strategic framework, the Trump administration obviously demonstrated its intention to incorporate Vietnam into the new extended security partnerships, like the Quad, against China. Furthermore, it is important to notice that the Trump administration deliberately produced uncertainty for East Asian geopolitics and took economic security as a first priority. After the improvement of bilateral security relations during Trump era, the new Biden administration has already given positive earlier signs for the following years. It is clear that the Biden administration plans to carry the Trump's legacy of great power competition with China, which also includes to increase support to Indo-Pacific strategy. More importantly, the Biden administration has paid a special attention to name

Vietnam as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific in its National Security Strategic Guidance (White House, March 2021) .

Vietnam and the US already established a comprehensive partnership in 2013 and the considerations for upgrading into strategic level are taken place. In practical terms, the US security support to Vietnam can be regarded as “highly strategic” and its willingness to incorporate Vietnam into Washington’s FOIP strategy has been partially endorsed by Vietnam. It is important to notice that the term “Indo-Pacific” is used by Vietnam in the 2019 defence White paper (Grossman August 5, 2020). Specifically with regard to the US policy towards the SCS, the two countries have convergent interests in opposition to the growing influence of China in the region. After the US removal of arm embargo on Vietnam in 2016, the security ties between Vietnam and the US has been strengthened. Emerging new opportunities for bilateral cooperation include Vietnam’s possible participation in the US-led regional security arrangements and what the US expects from Vietnam is to allow to use its military facilities. Vietnam’s participation to the US-led military exercise for the first time in 2018 presents a symbolic importance for further security cooperation. However, Hanoi’s major concerns for improving economic development and its strategic priority for balanced approach towards China make it unlikely to permit the US military forces getting fully access to Vietnam’s facilities.

Diversification of Vietnam’s Diplomatic and Military Policies

On the other hand, the recent tendency towards diversification of diplomatic and military policies of Vietnam has been remarkable. The attempts for improving relations with other non-claimant actors such as Japan, India and Russia refers to the conditional change for its strategic approach towards the South China Sea dispute in the future.

Vietnam and Japan reached an agreement to extend their strategic partnership into Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia in 2014 (Japan Ministry of Defence, March 18, 2014). The bilateral ties based on both economic links and maritime security interests in the SCS serve as a foundation for further improvement for cooperation. The China-Japan strategic competition over infrastructure development also provides ASEAN individual states, including Vietnam, to gain additional benefits (Tüter, 2019). Most recently, Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide made a visit to Vietnam in October 2020 and the two sides reached an agreement for further defence and security cooperation. Vietnam and Japan also agreed on making defense equipment and technology transfer (Associated Press October 19, 2020). In this visit, Suga made a statement on Vietnam’s role in FOIP strategy as “valuable partner” and Vietnam’s possible participation in “Quad plus” arrangement (The Times of India, March 21, 2020).² On the other hand, Vietnam are still cautious about China’s reactions if it engages into those security frameworks so that it is reasonable to expect its “unofficial joining” and “selected participation” (Hiep October 29, 2020). However, Vietnam’s high security priority for the SCS indicates a potential strategic change if it considers China’s pressures can no longer be endurable.

When it comes to Vietnam-India relations, both countries established their strategic partnership in 2007 based on defence cooperation. They have incentives to improve defence cooperation in the following years especially by increasing ties in defense industry and technology (The Hindu, July 1, 2021). Even though the negotiations on India’s sale of BrahMos antiship cruise missiles to Vietnam has not been completed since 2014, within the framework of Prime Minister Modi’s “Act East” policy the two countries share strategic interests in dealing with counter measures against China’s growing influence. In December 2020, Hanoi and Delhi agreed upon to create a joint statement for enhanced military-to-military exchanges, training and capacity-building programmes (India Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 21, 2020). It can be expected that India will continue to seek improved strategic cooperation with Vietnam to realize its Act East policy, but the major concerns are likely to be concentrated on more regional security issues rather than the SCS crisis as similarly observed in other non-claimant actors’ limited involvement to the issue.

Vietnam’s ties with Russia are also getting closer. Vietnam has a long history of cooperation with Russia, starting from the Cold War to the present. Russia was the first country that Vietnam established a strategic partnership in 2001 and it was upgraded into a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2012. Interestingly, Hanoi allowed Russian warships preferential access to Cam Ranh Bay military base by signing an agreement with Moscow in 2014 (Yen, 2020: 6). Although Russia’s involvement into the

² Vietnam has already joined in some activities of the Quad-plus framework.

SCS is minimal, Vietnam considers its relations with Russia as a strategic asset. But the most important element in Vietnam-Russia strategic cooperation appears in defence cooperation. Moscow is the Hanoi's biggest arms supplier, accounting approximately 74 percent of its total imports (SIPRI, 2020). So, Russian weapons systems are essential for Vietnam in upgrading its military modernization and improving its deterrence capabilities in the SCS.

Vietnam's Increasing Energy Security Concerns

The oil and gas industry has been a central place in Vietnam's economic development in the last decades. However, declining oil production and decreasing oil prices have made Vietnam government wary about both domestic consumption and foreign export in the last few years. More recently, the energy problem has been complicated by China's interference in Vietnam's rigs and survey ships in the SCS (South China Morning Post July 12, 2019). PetroVietnam, Vietnam's national oil company, declared that the South China Sea situation still presented a high political risk and oil and gas exploration activities of the Group were affected by those unpredictable developments (PetroVietnam, January 2020). For example, Chinese oil companies forced PetroVietnam to cancel production-sharing contracts with Spanish energy company Repsol for blocks 135-136 and 07/03 in June 2020. One month later, the company also rejected a drilling contract with Noble Corporation at nearby block 06-01. China has also involved to stop operations of international oil companies in Vietnam. As China insists on conducting all economic activity in the SCS, including oil and gas exploration, by littoral states themselves, Vietnam feels more uneasiness to cope with the negotiations on the Code of Conduct. China's this demand from Vietnam turns into difficult and costly to manage, not only because it lacks sufficient capital and technology but also because its national autonomy is under constrained (Reuters, May 17, 2018). Therefore, Vietnam is quite anxious about its weakening strategic position vis-a-vis China.

As a result of these developments, Vietnam has decided to become more active in energy exploration in the SCS, especially collaborating with Japan, India and Russia. For example, Vietnam and India have agreed to expand and promote oil exploration and exploitation in October 2011. Hanoi preferred to engage the Indian oil company ONGC Videsh Limited, which is India's largest public-sector company, for getting help with oil and gas exploration in the SCS. Beijing demonstrated strong objection to this collaboration mainly because ONGC as a state-owned company operates for not only commercial interests but also strategic interests (VnExpress, October 24, 2019). In addition to that Japan demonstrated its interest on oil fields in Vietnamese coast. Japan's interest in the SCS can also be understood from its energy vulnerability, which means that 90% of Japan's oil imports are shipped through the SCS.

Moreover, Russia's role in the energy nexus of SCS reflects conditional engagement from the outside of the region. Vietnam pays considerable attention to Russia as an important oil and gas partner. On the other hand, Russian companies want to take an advantage of accessing Vietnam market and improve their operations in the country. It can be suggested that the SCS is not a Russian core interest, but Vietnam is more likely to be open to consider Russian option especially after the SCS resource disputes are managed peacefully.

This newly adopted energy oriented policy presents potential risks for the future relations between Vietnam and China. China will likely to sustain its interference on Vietnam's oil and gas activities in the SCS, which creates tensions difficult to avoid in the future. As it was experienced in 2014 Haiyang Sjiyou 981 incident, there is an increasing possibility to expect that Vietnam may choose to confront China again. In 2019, China sent government ships to the Japanese oil rig and its ships harassed Vietnamese fishing boats by challenging Vietnamese claims in the disputed EEZ. The concerns over energy security and resource development in the SCS demonstrate the main limitation to China-Vietnam cooperation. As Richardson suggests, the contestation over energy and resource control outweighs the considerations of territory for some ASEAN countries, including Vietnam (Richardson, 2008). The energy potential of the SCS increases their incentives for jointly developing energy resources with multinational oil companies.

As Robert S. Ross argues, "the maritime sovereignty dispute is not the cause of heightened Sino-Vietnamese conflict. Rather, heightened Sino-Vietnamese conflict over security interests has caused increased tension over the sovereignty and EEZ disputes". He also adds that "only when Vietnam cooperated with the US did China escalate the conflict" (Ross, 2020: 627). Thus, if Vietnam's energy

security concerns are supported by the US in the near future, there is no doubt that this heightened conflict over security interests would stimulate conflict escalation between Vietnam and China.

Preventing Potential Conflict Escalation

By looking at the US reconcentration on Southeast Asia with its new policy tools of FOIP and Quad frameworks, the South China Sea has become the focus of attention with regard to the implications of increasing US-China strategic competition. For other regional claimant states, recent new developments create both opportunities and challenges. Economically, they receive alternative options to gain better advantages, however, they face possible risks in security domain. Most of the regional states would choose to act towards cooperation and reducing tensions under the uncertainty of great power competition. But some of them may choose to move towards taking risks for favourable outcomes. In considering China's position, Beijing has an interest in maintaining stability for minimizing outside intervention to the SCS issue. The rational stabilizer role is also consistent with the need to secure China's future development of BRI given the fact that the stable SCS is crucial. However, nothing can be achieved without well-defined diplomatic actions. There are some initial steps to be taken in order to prevent future potential escalating tensions in the SCS.

First, Vietnam and China should increase their efforts to negotiate on delimitation of the waters outside the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin. The two countries delimited their sea boundary in the Gulf, however, bilateral negotiations on the outside waters were disseminated. The main disagreement is concentrated on the Paracels. While China claims it as its own EEZ, Vietnam disagrees and demands to negotiate its status. Both parties need to build trust and establish new mechanisms for further cooperation on maritime security and promoting peace in the SCS. As an initial step, it is relatively easier to begin with a focus on the issues of fisheries and scientific research regarding to maritime environment protection.

Second, Vietnam should move towards other regional claimant states, like Indonesia and Philippines, to negotiate their differences. It is practical and promising to narrow the scope of the complicated disputes in the SCS. This approach will contribute to achieve final resolution in the long term. In this regard, the role of ASEAN presents a potential impact on the establishment of cooperative mechanisms for regional countries. The negotiations on the Code of Conduct should be completed as soon as possible in order to avoid possible future conflict escalation in the SCS.

Third, Vietnam should seek and contribute to establishing energy security cooperation mechanisms in order to deal with urgent need to avoid resource based confrontation. Energy security as a shared concern and a strong rationale for cooperation should be considered an opportunity instead of challenge. The essential diplomatic effort should focus on multilateral energy security cooperation by moving beyond the bilateral maritime disputes. The SCS does not only contain rich maritime oil and gas resources but the strategic location it presents makes sea line of communications crucial for international trade and energy. It connects Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. Without facing the challenging strategic planning issues with regard to the SCS energy routes, it is difficult to reach maritime demarcation agreements or compromises in the SCS. The urgent need for the whole region is to increase investment and technology for regional energy cooperation. From security point of view, improving mechanisms for joint development of resources in the SCS would help to create new norms for subsequent territorial settlements.

CONCLUSION

Vietnam's policy on the SCS is critical as it stands as one of the main parties to the issue. Its foreign policy actions potentially generate considerable impact on the regional security and stability. Vietnam still pursues a cautious and balanced approach towards the SCS, which can be described as a hedging strategy. While sustaining economic and political engagement with China, Vietnam also aims to ease its security concerns by putting balancing options open. As a middle power in the region, the economic development remains to be the first priority and maintaining stable regional environment is favourable for Vietnam. In this context, Vietnam are getting closer to the United States in forming security arrangements and seeks to internationalize the SCS issue. However, what is missing in Vietnam's policy over the SCS is to combine different options for organizing its strategic interests in order to get strategic leverage and ultimately attain desired outcomes.

For responding to this need of making more coherent strategic policy, the recent tendency towards diversification of diplomatic and military policies of Vietnam has been remarkable. The attempts for

improving relations with other non-claimant actors such as Japan, India and Russia presents conditional change for its strategic approach towards the South China Sea dispute in the future. Vietnam are still cautious about China's reactions if it engages into those security frameworks so that it is reasonable to expect its "unofficial joining" and "selected participation" (Hiep October 29, 2020). However, Vietnam's high security priority for the SCS indicates a potential strategic change if it considers China's pressures can no longer be endurable. On the other hand, China's overall energy security diplomacy has become a source of conflict that Vietnam seeks different options to ensure its own particular interests. In this regard, Vietnam's policy over SCS is more likely to be shifted mainly because of its energy concerns.

While comprehensive dispute resolution in the SCS remains to be long-term objective, it is possible to prevent likely tensions upcoming in the following years. Vietnam can actively involve to facilitate negotiations with China on delimiting the border outside the Gulf of Tonkin and bring its maritime claims into conformity with other regional claimant states under the platform of ASEAN. In this regard, it is crucially important to proceed the negotiations for the establishment of the Code of Conduct. For energy security cooperation, both Vietnam and China need to recognize their own preferences and seek convergent interests to realize their own particular energy policies. This need is more likely to be urgent in the coming years ahead and if the increasing risk cannot be managed, it is possible to expect escalating tensions between the two countries.

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Barış Esen, Bölünmüşlük Gölgesinde Çatışma Çözümü Asimetrik Güç Filistin ve İsrail. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1. Baskı (2019), ss. 254.

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Birçok uzman, Ortadoğu'daki sorunların kaynağı olarak Filistin sorununu işaret etmektedir. Zaman içerisinde büyük güçlerin İsrail'e verdiği destek nedeniyle Filistin ile İsrail arasında bir güç asimetrisi oluşmuştur. Güç asimetrisini tetikleyen unsurlardan biri de Filistin'deki bölünmüşlüktür. *Bölünmüşlük Gölgesinde Çatışma Çözümü Asimetrik Güç ve İsrail* başlıklı kitap, Filistin ve İsrail taraflarının müzakere masasına oturmalarına rağmen kalıcı bir barışın sağlanamamasında asimetrik gücün etkili olduğunu ve bu asimetrik gücün nasıl dengelenmesi gerektiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu doğrultuda öncelikle Filistin'de bir birliğin sağlanması gerektiğini öne sürmektedir. Kitap, Filistin ile İsrail arasındaki sorunları asimetrik güç ve bölünmüşlük kavramlarıyla ele alması bakımından farklılık oluşturmaktadır. Esen, bu kitapla birlikte "Filistin-İsrail Sorunu nasıl çözüm bulacak?" ve "Filistin içerisindeki barış nasıl sağlanabilir?" sorularına yanıt aramaktadır. Barış Esen'in doktora tezinden yola çıkarak kaleme aldığı bu kitap giriş ve sonuç haricinde 4 bölümden oluşmaktadır. Filistin'deki bölünmüşlüğün asimetrik güç bağlamında müzakereyi nasıl etkilediği, asimetrik güç içerisinde tarafların ne zaman müzakereye yöneleceği, Filistin'deki bölünmüşlük halini derinleştiren unsurlar, bu bölünmüşlüğün sona ermesi için gösterilen çabalar ve Filistin ile İsrail arasındaki güç asimetrisinin tarihsel süreçte nasıl değiştiği ele alınmaktadır.

"Güç Kavramı ve Gücü Oluşturan Unsurlar" başlıklı birinci bölümde realist bakış açısıyla gücün tanımı yapılmış ve bir devletin kendi güvenliğini sağlamak için kendi gücünü maksimize etmesi gerektiği belirtilmiştir. Bu bölümde uluslararası güç dengesini Soğuk Savaş ve uluslararası örgütler üzerinden anlatan yazar, Filistin'de bir devlet yapısı olmaması nedeniyle devletler arası güç sistemi üzerinden Filistin ile İsrail arasındaki güç dengesini ortaya koymaya çalışmıştır. Güç dengesini anlatmak için tarihsel süreçten örnekler veren yazar, bu dengenin sağlanabilmesi için güçlü olan tarafın ağırlığı azaltılırken güçsüz olan tarafın gücünün artırılması gerekliliğine vurgu yapmıştır. Yazara göre bu denge, uluslararası sistemde devletlerin hayatta kalmasına yardımcı olacaktır. Bunlara ek olarak, Filistin ile İsrail arasındaki mücadeleyi tanımlamak için kullandığı *güç asimetrisi* kavramı ele alınmıştır. Güç asimetrisi, taraflar arasındaki güç farkı ve yoğun bir dengesizlik zamanında ortaya çıkmakta ve zayıf olan taraf aradaki güç farkını minimal seviyeye indirmek için terörizm gibi stratejik araçlar kullanabilmektedir. Bölümün son kısmında ise güç asimetrisiyle müzakere süreci ele alınmış, bu kapsamda müzakere aşamasına geçişin taraflar arasındaki asimetrisinin azalmaya başladığı anda ortaya çıktığını belirtilmiştir.

"Uluslararası İlişkilerde Çatışma Çözümü" başlıklı ikinci bölümde öncelikle William Zartman'ın çatışma çözümü kavramına ve söz konusu psikolojik faktörlerin neler olduğuna değinilmiştir. Bu yaklaşım, uzun süre çatışan tarafların bir arabulucuyla anlaşmaya yanaştığını göstermektedir. Bu anlaşmanın ortaya çıkabilmesi için taraflar birbirlerine güvenmese de arabulucuya güvenmeleri gerekmektedir. Arabulucu pozisyonundaki tarafın aradaki iletişimi kolaylaştırabilecek, ikna kabiliyeti yüksek, tarafları ortak çıkarılara yönelebilecek, gerektiğinde güç kullanabilecek ve yapıcı rol oynayabilecek olması gerekmektedir. Yazarın bu bölümde ele aldığı Dean Pruitt ise Zartman'ın olgunlaşma teorisini ileriye götürmüş ve hangi faktörlerin tarafları müzakere masasına oturmaya ikna

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edebileceğine değinmiştir. Bu minvalde, öncelikle değinilen husus motivasyon olmuştur. Tarafları müzakere masasına oturmaya ikna edecek motivasyon kaynakları ise tarafların çatışmanın maliyetini fark etmesi sağlamak ve tarafların çatışmayı kazanamayacağı düşüncesi olmuştur. Bölümde son olarak Pruit'in hazır olma kavramı ele alınmıştır. Buna göre iki tarafında müzakereye hazır olmasının anlaşma sağlanma ihtimalini arttırdığını belirtir. Bir tarafın anlaşmaya daha çok istekli görünmesinin o tarafın daha zayıf görünmesini sağlayacağını ve müzakerelerde güç asimetrisini doğurabileceğine değinilmiştir. "Filistin'de Bölünmüşlük" başlıklı üçüncü bölümde, Birinci İntifada ile 2006 Filistin seçimleri arasındaki dönemde Hamas ve El Fetih gruplarının yapıları, ideolojileri ve Filistin meselesine bakışları değerlendirilmiştir. İdeolojik olarak milliyetçi ve sosyalist görüşlerin ağır bastığı El Fetih ile İslamcı ideolojiye bağlı Hamas arasındaki bölünme, bölgedeki gelişmeler dolayısıyla daha da derinleşme ihtimali bulunmaktadır. Bunun en spesifik örnekleri Körfez Krizi ile Oslo görüşmeleri olmuştur. İki taraf arasındaki bu bölünme, hem coğrafi hem de ekonomik olarak Filistin toplumunu derinden sarsmaktadır. Bu ise Hamas'ın etkin olduğu Gazze Şeridi'nin El Fetih'in hakim olduğu Batı Şeria'dan sosyo-ekonomik olarak geri kalmasına yol açmıştır. Oslo görüşmelerinde Hamas'ın süreç karşıtı bir rol oynaması, İsrail ve uluslararası kamuoyu tarafından dışlanması bu duruma neden olan en önemli faktörlerdir. Ayrıca, İsrail'in Gazze'ye yaptığı operasyonlar, Hamas liderlerine gerçekleştirdiği suikastlar ve barış sürecinde El Fetih'e yapılan yardımlar bölünmeyi derinleştirmiştir. 2006 seçimlerinden sonra Hamas ile El Fetih arasındaki bölünmenin iyice belirginleşti hatta bu bölünmenin taraflar arasında silahlı çatışmaya dönüştüğü görülmektedir. Son olarak iki taraf arasındaki bölünmeyi sonlandırmak için bölgesel ve küresel olarak yürütülen arabuluculuk girişimlerine değinilmiştir. Bu doğrultuda en ciddi teşebbüsün Suudi Arabistan'ın çabalarıyla 2007 yılında Mekke'de iki tarafın bir araya geldiği ve bir ulusal birlik hükümetinin kurulmasının kararlaştırıldığı anlaşma olduğu görülmektedir.

"Çatışma Çözümü Çerçevesinde Filistin-İsrail Meselesi" başlıklı son bölümde ise çatışmanın çözülmesinde uygun zaman ve motivasyon kaynakları, adil bir barış süreci için gereklilikler, Filistin ile İsrail arasındaki güç asimetrisi, Oslo'dan İkinci İntifada'ya kadar olan süreç ve taraflar arasındaki arabulucuların oynadığı roller ele alınmıştır. Bu kapsamda, yazar ilk kısımda çatışmanın çözülmesi kapsamındaki adımların geçerli bir zemine dayanmadığını belirtmektedir. Nitekim İsrail'in Yahudi yerleşimlerini genişletmesi, Filistinli aktörler arasındaki bölünmeyi derinleştirecek hamleler yapması, barış sürecinde iki taraf arasındaki güç asimetrisini dengelemesi beklenen arabulucu pozisyonundaki ABD'nin bu asimetriyi daha da dengesizleştirmesi çözüm adımlarının makul bir zemine oturmasını engellemiştir. Diğer taraftan Filistin kanadındaki bölünmüşlük hali barışı daha kırılgan hale getirmiştir. Dolayısıyla yazar, barış için uygun zaman olarak İsrail'in Filistinli tarafları bölünmeye sevk etmediği, Filistin'de ise Hamas ile El Fetih liderlerinin yüzleşmesinin gerçekleşmesini işaret etmiştir. Bölüm kapsamında ayrıca Filistin ile İsrail arasındaki güç asimetrisinin tarihsel olarak dönüşümü ele alınmıştır: 1880'li yıllarda taraflar arasında güç dengesi söz konusuysen bu tarihten itibaren kademeli olarak güç asimetrisinin İsrail lehine değiştiği ancak Birinci İntifada ile Filistinlilerin gösterdiği direnişle birlikte bu asimetrinin bir nebze de olsa azaldığı hatta bu süreçte Filistin'in direnişi uluslararası kamuoyu tarafından destek gördüğü belirtilmiştir. Ayrıca, tarihsel süreçte güç asimetrisinin İsrail lehine gelişmesinde Balfour Deklarasyonu ve Nazi Almanyası'nda gerçekleşen Yahudi soykırımı önemli bir faktör olarak görülmüştür. Yine negatif ve pozitif barış kavramına da değinen yazar, Filistin ile İsrail arasındaki barış sürecini bazı sorunlar giderilse de taraflar arasındaki gerilimlerin devam ettiği "negatif barış" terimi ile ifade etmiştir. Bu bölümde son olarak iki taraf arasındaki çatışmanın çözümü konusunda ABD'nin rolü ele alınmış, ABD'yi bu süreçte tarafsız bir rol oynamamasından dolayı arabuluculuk vazifesini layıkıyla yerine getiremediğinden bahsedilmiştir.

Sonuç olarak yazar bu kitapta, Filistin-İsrail arasındaki güç dengesini bozan unsurların başında Filistin'deki bölünmüşlüğü görmüştür. Ancak, yapısı itibarıyla bakıldığında Filistin'deki bölünmüşlük halinin sona ermesinin güç dengesini sağlayabileceğini söylemek zordur. Nitekim, güç asimetrisinin dengelenmesinde siyasi, askeri, ekonomi, sosyal ve uluslararası faktörlerin yeterince ele alınmadığı görülmekte olup, bu da kitabın argümanını zayıflatmaktadır. Zira, Filistinli grupların birleşmesinin de mevcut konumu itibarıyla güç asimetrisini dengelemeye yetmeyeceğini göstermektedir. Öyle ki Birinci İntifada ile birlikte Filistin'de bölünmüşlük halinin ön plana çıkmaya başladığı ancak Filistin ile İsrail arasındaki güç dengesinin Filistin topraklarında İngiliz manda yönetiminin gelmesiyle birlikte bozulduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Bu bağlamda, yazarın güç asimetrisini ele alırken dengelyi bozan unsurların başında İsrail'e gelen uluslararası desteklere daha kapsamlı bir şekilde değinmesi kitabın

argümanını desteklemesi bakımından önemlidir. Gerek Batılı kaynaklardan gerekse yerel birçok kaynaktan yararlanılarak hazırlanan bu kitap, Filistin ile İsrail arasındaki çatışmanın çözümü ve taraflar arasında güç asimetrisini oluşturan etkenleri açıklaması bakımından önemlidir. Ali Öner'in *Çatışmalar ve Görüşmeler Sarmalında Filistin İsrail Çatışması* Tuğçe Ersoy Ceylan'ın *İsrail'de Çatışan Kimlikler Filistinliler ve Yahudiler* gibi Filistin ile İsrail arasındaki sorunları ele alan birçok kapsamlı çalışma söz konusu olsa da, asimetrik güç kavramı çerçevesinde bu sorunun değerlendirilmesi bağlamında konuyu ele alan başka bir çalışmanın bulunmaması kitabın literatürde önemli bir yer edinmesinde etkili olmaktadır. Yazarın doktora tezinden yola çıkarak yayınladığı bu eser Filistin-İsrail çatışmasını asimetrik güç kavramlarıyla ele alması bakımından özgünlüğünü korumaktadır.