Eurasian Research Journal

ERI
EURASIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE
AKHMET YASSAWI UNIVERSITY

Eurasian Research Journal is a refereed journal of international standards aiming to publish scientific articles in a wide range of fields including economics, finance, energy, international relations, security, transportation, politics and sociology in the Eurasian region that covers the territory from the Balkans to Mongolia with particular focus on Turkic – speaking countries. It is published quarterly in January, April, July and October. Contributions and articles submitted to Eurasian Research Journal are first evaluated by the Editorial Board with regard to their compliance with the publishing principles, and those found acceptable are forwarded to the referees well-known for their scholarship in the relevant field. The names of referees are kept confidential, and their reports are kept in record for a period of five years. The authors are responsible for opinions stated in the articles published in the journal.

Eurasian Research Journal

Indexed in

ASOS

Cosmos
Indexing

Eurasian Scientific
Journal Index

Index
Islamicus

Root
Indexing

Open Archive
Initiative Repository

International Scientific
Indexing

Scientific Indexing
Services

AKHMET YASSAWI UNIVERSITY

CONTENT

ARTICLES

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN, TURKISH AND KAZAKH EURASIANISM

Nurlan MUMINOV [1]

[1] Kazakh Ablai Khan University of International Relations and World Languages, 050004 Almaty, Kazakhstan
n.muminoff@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0001-7824-7044

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to provide a comprehensive comparative analysis of Eurasianism in Russia, Türkiye, and Kazakhstan. It delves into the historical, political, and economic aspects of each country's Eurasianist ideology, examining similarities and differences between them. Through this analysis, the paper seeks to gain a better understanding of the role that Eurasianism plays in each country's foreign policy and regional strategies. The paper also explores the impact of Eurasianism on the relationships between Russia, Türkiye, and Kazakhstan, as well as its implications for regional security and cooperation. The main argument of this paper is that while Russian, Turkish, and Kazakh Eurasianism share some commonalities in their emphasis on the importance of the Eurasian region and its unique cultural and historical identity, there are notable differences in the way that this identity is understood and articulated, as well as differences in geopolitical priorities and approaches to democracy and authoritarianism. It provides a valuable contribution to the scholarly debate on Eurasianism and serves as a useful resource for policymakers and analysts seeking to better understand the geopolitical landscape of the Eurasian region.

Keywords: Eurasianism, Russian Eurasianism, Turkish Eurasianism, Kazakh Eurasianism, Comparative Analysis.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been much scholarly analysis of the concept of Eurasianism and how it has manifested in various countries. Among the countries that have received significant attention in academic studies are Russia, Türkiye, and Kazakhstan (Fuller, 2022; Khalid, 2022; Tuysuzoglu, 2023; Vakhshiteh et al., 2022; Mangir, 2020). These three countries are particularly interesting for comparative analysis due to their shared historical and cultural ties as well as their distinct geopolitical contexts within the Eurasian region. The concept of Eurasianism has evolved differently in each of the three countries. In Russia, Eurasianism has been closely linked to the idea of a strong state and a centralized government. Russian Eurasianists have advocated for the creation of a new, non-Western civilization that would be led by Russia and would act as a counterbalance to the West. They believe that Russia's historical role as a bulwark against Western imperialism makes it uniquely qualified to lead the Eurasian region.

In Türkiye, Eurasianism has been closely linked to the idea of nationalism and a rejection of Western influence. Turkish Eurasianists believe that Türkiye has been too focused on its European aspirations and that it should instead look to its cultural and historical ties to Central Asia and the Middle East. They believe that Türkiye should play a leading role in the development of a new Eurasian civilization, but that this civilization should be based on shared cultural and historical values rather than a centralized government.

In Kazakhstan, Eurasianism has been more focused on promoting a sense of cultural and historical identity. Kazakh Eurasianists believe that Kazakhstan has a unique cultural heritage that is distinct from both Russia and the West. They believe that Kazakhstan should play a leading role in the development of a new Eurasian civilization, but that this civilization should be based on shared cultural values rather than a centralized government.

The objective of this study is to conduct a comprehensive comparative analysis of the Eurasianist ideology in Russia, Türkiye, and Kazakhstan. It explores the historical, political, and economic dimensions of the concept in each country and compares similarities and differences between them. By doing so, the research aims to enhance our understanding of the significance of Eurasianism in shaping the foreign policy and regional strategies of these countries. The research question guiding this study is: How do Russian, Turkish, and Kazakh Eurasianism compare in terms of their historical, political, and economic aspects, and how do they shape the domestic and foreign policies and regional strategies of each country? Through this analysis, the paper seeks to gain a better understanding of the role that Eurasianism plays in each country's domestic and foreign policies and its impact on regional security and cooperation.

The main argument of this paper is that while Russian, Turkish, and Kazakh Eurasianism share some similarities in their emphasis on the importance of the Eurasian region and its unique cultural and historical identity, there are notable differences in the way that this identity is understood and articulated, as well as differences in geopolitical priorities and approaches to domestic and foreign policies. Furthermore, the challenges and opportunities associated with the concept of Eurasianism reflect the competing interests and geopolitical

ambitions of the various countries in the region, as well as the potential for greater economic and political cooperation and integration.

Overall, this study seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of Eurasianism in the three countries, with the aim of contributing to the scholarly debate on the topic and serving as a valuable resource for policymakers and analysts seeking to better understand the geopolitical landscape of the Eurasian region.

METHODOLOGY

This paper uses a comparative analysis approach to examine the similarities and differences between Russian, Turkish, and Kazakh Eurasianism. The data for this analysis was collected from a variety of sources, including academic articles, books and policy papers. The data collected was analysed using a comparative analysis approach (Drobnič, 2014). This involved examining the similarities and differences between the three countries in their understanding and articulation of Eurasianism, as well as their geopolitical priorities and approaches to democracy and authoritarianism. The analysis also focused on the challenges and opportunities associated with the concept of Eurasianism and its implications for regional cooperation and integration.

The comparative analysis approach involved several steps:

Identification of key themes: The data was analysed for key themes related to Eurasianism, including cultural and historical identity, geopolitical ambitions, and economic cooperation.

Identification of similarities and differences: The data was then analysed for similarities and differences between the three countries in their understanding and articulation of Eurasianism, as well as their geopolitical priorities and approaches to democracy and authoritarianism.

Synthesis of findings: The findings were synthesized to develop a comprehensive understanding of the similarities and differences between Russian, Turkish, and Kazakh Eurasianism.

Interpretation of results: The findings were interpreted to develop insights into the challenges and opportunities associated with the concept of Eurasianism and its implications for regional cooperation and integration.

THE ROOTS AND EVOLUTION OF EURASIANISM

Eurasianism is a quasi-political and intellectual movement that emerged in the 1920s as a reaction to the Communist Revolution of 1917, the collapse of the Russian Empire, and the postwar crisis in Europe and was advanced by Russian intellectuals who had fled the country after the Communist Revolution of 1917 (Bassin et al., 2015; Meyer, 2009; Vinkovetsky, 2000). The movement posits that Russia does not belong in the 'European' or 'Asian' categories but instead to the geopolitical concept of Eurasia governed by the 'Russian world' (Shlapentokh, 1997). Eurasianists believe that Russian civilization forms a

unique entity defined by the historical, anthropological, linguistic, ethnographic, economic, and political interactions of the various genetically unrelated peoples who once constituted the Russian Empire. They developed a doctrine that seeks new sources of legitimacy for Russian imperial space and a new role for non-European peoples in the modern world (Tchantouridze and Schlacks, 2001).

The roots of Eurasianism can be traced back to the psychological and political roots of Eurasianist thought in German environmentalism and the disillusionment with the perceived rationalism and artifice of western culture, which turned from brooding to toxic with the advance of German aggression in World War I. M. I. Rostovtzeff's work on northern Black Sea archaeology in the intellectual and political context of pre-Revolutionary Russia offered possibilities for Russian self-identification and historiography, Eurasianist in particular (Meyer, 2009). Eurasianism was never attracted to violence and war as a way to regenerate humanity. However, through its evolution, Eurasianism has become closer and closer to the Soviet brand of Marxism, blending Marxism with nationalism, and becoming one of the precursors to the present-day ideology of post-Soviet Russia (Shlapentokh, 1997).

Eurasianism has expanded beyond Russia and has become a catch-all vision for the country (Mostafa, 2013). In Türkiye, non-Russian Eurasianism emerged in the 1930s as a response to the country's geopolitical position between Europe and Asia. Turkish Eurasianists, such as Ziya Gökalp and Nihal Atsız, argued that Türkiye was a 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis' that was distinct from both Europe and the Middle East. Turkish Eurasianists rejected the Westernization of Turkish society and advocated for a return to traditional Turkish values and culture (Akturk, 2015). The evolution of Eurasianism in post-Cold War Türkiye in the 1990s and 2000s has been the subject of various studies. The emergence and evolution of Eurasia as a geopolitical concept in Türkiye during this period has been analysed, with a focus on Turkish political, academic, and intellectual circles' redefinition of their geopolitical outlook towards Russia and the Turkic republics of Central Asia and Caucasus (Ersen, 2013). The development of relations with Russia and China in parallel with the tension in relations with Western actors has given rise to debates about a Eurasianist axis shift in Turkish foreign policy. The Eurasianist discourse has been kept at the forefront due to the fact that the links established with Russia and China do not depend on conditional cooperation and criticism from the West on the basis of authoritarianism (Tuysuzoglu, 2023).

In Kazakhstan, Eurasianism emerged in the post-Soviet era as a response to the country's geopolitical position between Russia and China. Kazakh Eurasianists, such as Olzhas Suleimenov argued that Kazakhstan was a unique blend of Turkic, Mongol, and Slavic cultures that should be preserved and promoted (Ram, 2001). Kazakh Eurasianists rejected both Westernization and Russification and advocated for a return to traditional Kazakh values and culture (Mostafa, 2013). The form of Eurasianism developed in Kazakhstan is different from other versions of Eurasianism, with Nazarbayev attaching a spatial dimension to his idea of Eurasia (Anceschi, 2020). Former President Nursultan Nazarbayev introduced and developed his own vision, policies, perceptions, and values of Eurasianism, which he saw as a way to promote Kazakhstan's interests in the region (Nyssanbayev and Dunaev, 2010).

While Russian, Turkish, and Kazakh Eurasianism share some commonalities, such as a rejection of Westernization and a belief in the importance of traditional culture, their historical and ideological roots differ significantly. These differences have important implications for the core tenets of Eurasianism in each country, as I will explore in the next section.

COMPARISON OF CORE TENETS OF RUSSIAN, TURKISH, AND KAZAKH EURASIANISM

Russian Eurasianism: Civilization and Geopolitics

The philosophy of Russian Eurasianism is a complex doctrine that emphasizes the uniqueness of Russia's civilization and its role as a bridge between Europe and Asia. The founding fathers of Russian Eurasianism argued that Russia was a distinct civilization that bridged Europe and Asia and that its destiny lay in forging closer ties with the peoples of the East. Russian Eurasianists rejected the Westernization of Russian society and advocated for a return to traditional Russian values and culture (Laruelle, 2008: 31-33). They emphasized the significance of the Eurasian landmass as the center of the world. As Russia is located at its heart, they argued that it has the inherent power and authority to control and assume a leading role in Eurasia. One of their key arguments was that Russia is not strictly European or Asian, but rather a unique Eurasian entity, and as such, it should strive to defend, maintain and advance its distinctive identity (Mostafa, 2013: 161).

One of the most prominent Eurasianist thinkers was Nikolai Trubetskoy, who argued that Russia was a distinct civilization with its own cultural and linguistic traditions. Trubetskoy argued that Russia was not part of Europe but was instead a Eurasian civilization that shared cultural and historical links with Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East (Smirnov, 2020).

Another important Eurasianist thinker was Lev Gumilev, who argued that Russia was a 'super-ethnos' that was distinct from other ethnic groups in the world. He believed that Russia had a special destiny and that it was the responsibility of the Russian people to fulfill this destiny (Shlapentokh, 2012). Unlike Trubetskoy, however, Gumilev was a Soviet historian, ethnologist, anthropologist, and translator who had a reputation for his highly unorthodox theories of ethnogenesis and historiosophy. He supported the national movements of Tatars, Kazakhs, and other Turkic peoples, and his theories have become the standard for a generation of hardliners in Russia who see in his books the template for a synthesis of nationalism and internationalism that could form the founding idea of a new Eurasia (Rossman, 2002). Gumilev's theories on passionarity and the role of the environment in shaping the development of cultures have been influential in the development of Russian nationalism (Clover, 2016).

Aleksandr Dugin, who is often credited with reviving and updating the ideology for the modern era, is another significant figure in the development of Eurasianist thought. Dugin's version of neo-Eurasianism represents a nostalgia for Russian strength and the belief that Eurasia should play a critical role at the center of a new multipolar world (Barbashin and Thoburn, 2014). At the heart of Dugin's neo-Eurasianism is the idea of the "Fourth Political Theory," which

posits a new paradigm beyond the three dominant political ideologies of the modern era: liberalism, communism, and fascism (Semonsen, 2023). Dugin's theory emphasizes the importance of traditionalism, communitarianism, and the rejection of individualism in favor of a collective ethos. He is an impressive aggregator of radical Right ideologies, bringing together doctrines from diverse origins such as völkisch occultism, Traditionalism, Conservative Revolution, European New Right, Eurasianism, and the like (Laruelle, 2019; Kalinin, 2019). Dugin conceives of Eurasia as being much larger than his predecessors ever did, stretching from the Great Wall of China in the east to the Atlantic Ocean in the west (Shekhovtsov, 2009).

While classical Eurasianism and neo-Eurasianism share a common emphasis on the distinctiveness of the Eurasian cultural and geopolitical space, they differ in their attitudes towards the West and the role of traditionalism in society. Both have been influential in shaping Russian nationalist thought and continue to be a source of debate and controversy in contemporary Russia.

Turkish Eurasianism: Ideology and Geopolitics

Turkish Eurasianism is a relative latecomer when compared with Russian Eurasianism, and it lacks the theoretical and ideological depth and sophistication one sees in its Russian counterpart (Kiniklioglu, 2022). The Eurasianist ideology in Türkiye can be identified as a Turkish version of Ba'athism, espousing an anti-Western approach in foreign policy and ultranationalist sentiment in domestic politics (Colakoglu, 2019). Turkish Eurasianism calls for a cultural, military, political, and commercial alliance with Türkiye's eastern neighbors, notably Russia, Iran, the Turkic countries of Central Asia, and even Pakistan, and India (Yanik, 2019).

One of the main proponents of Eurasianism in Türkiye was Ahmet Davutoglu, a former Foreign Minister, and Prime Minister. He has argued that Türkiye should pursue a "zero problems with neighbors" policy, which involves developing close relations with all its neighbors, including Russia and Iran (Davutoglu, 2001). This policy has been reflected in Türkiye's increasing cooperation with Russia, particularly in the areas of energy and defense (Ersen, 2022).

Another aspect of Eurasianism that has influenced Turkish foreign policy is the idea of a multipolar world order. Supporters of Eurasianism argue that the current world order, dominated by the United States and its allies, is unsustainable and that a more balanced distribution of power is necessary. Türkiye has sought to position itself as a regional power in the Middle East and has developed closer ties with countries such as Iran and Qatar, which share its opposition to US hegemony in the region (Tuysuzoglu, 2014).

However, it is important to note that while Eurasianism has had some influence on Turkish foreign policy, it is not the only factor shaping Türkiye's relations with other countries. Türkiye has historically had close ties with the West, particularly the United States and Europe, and these relationships continue to be important for the country's economic and strategic interests. Moreover, Türkiye's relations with Russia have been complicated by a number of factors, including the conflict in Syria and the situation in Ukraine (Cheterian, 2023).

Kazakh Eurasianism: History and Geopolitics

The type of Eurasianism that emerged in Kazakhstan is distinct from those that arose in Russia and Türkiye in terms of internal and external dynamics. For this reason, Kazakh Eurasianism served as an official channel in Kazakhstan's foreign policy, especially in the period of Nursultan Nazarbayev (Putz, 2020). Kazakh Eurasianism advocates for a unique identity and geopolitical orientation for Kazakhstan, rooted in its history, culture, and geography. Kazakhstan's Eurasian identity is a complex construct that is shaped by a combination of historical, cultural, and geopolitical factors (Laruelle, 2014). These factors have contributed to the development of a unique identity that draws on both European and Asian traditions and positions Kazakhstan as a bridge between East and West. This hybrid identity has significant implications for the country's foreign policy, enabling it to balance its relations with both Russia and the West and to play a constructive role in regional diplomacy and economic integration (Nyssanbayev and Dunaev, 2010).

The Soviet period was a critical period in shaping Kazakhstan's national identity. Scholars had argued that the Soviet legacy imposed a common Soviet identity on the country's diverse population, which helped to create a sense of national unity. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan had to redefine its national identity and create a new sense of belonging that would unite its diverse population (Ahmad et al., 2022). Kazakhstan's unique location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia has also played a significant role in shaping its identity. This hybrid identity has enabled Kazakhstan to navigate between competing cultural and political influences and position itself as a bridge between Europe and Asia (Anceschi, 2014).

Kazakh Eurasianism emphasizes the cultural and historical ties between Kazakhstan and other Eurasian nations, particularly Russia. Proponents of this movement view Kazakhstan as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and they seek to strengthen cultural and economic ties between Kazakhstan and its neighbors in the region (Nurgaliyeva, 2016). They believe that by promoting Eurasian integration, Kazakhstan can become a major player on the global stage. Kazakh Eurasianism stresses the importance of preserving and promoting the Kazakh language, culture, and traditions. This movement believes that Kazakhstan should celebrate its unique cultural heritage and resist the pressures of cultural homogenization that come with globalization. By preserving its cultural identity, Kazakhstan can assert its independence and promote greater understanding and cooperation between different nations and peoples (Kudaibergenova, 2016).

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF EURASIANIST THOUGHT

The comparative analysis of Russian, Turkish, and Kazakh Eurasianism has important implications for domestic and foreign policies in each country. The diverse conceptualizations of Eurasianism and the competing interests and ambitions of the various countries in the region have significant implications for regional cooperation and integration, as well as for relations with external actors.

Firstly, the analysis highlights the importance of understanding the different approaches to democracy and authoritarianism among the three countries. While all three countries prioritize state power and control, Russia and Kazakhstan have exhibited more authoritarian tendencies, while Türkiye has maintained a more democratic system of governance. This has implications for foreign policy in the region, as countries that prioritize democracy may be more likely to align with liberal democracies in the West, while those with authoritarian tendencies may be more aligned with other authoritarian regimes.

Secondly, the analysis underscores the importance of economic cooperation and integration in the region. All three countries recognize the potential economic benefits of greater regional cooperation and integration, particularly in the areas of energy, trade, and transport infrastructure. However, the differing geopolitical priorities of the countries may pose challenges to achieving greater economic integration. For example, Russia's efforts to establish the Eurasian Economic Union met resistance from other countries in the region, particularly Kazakhstan, which concerns Russian dominance. Similarly, Türkiye's focus on establishing closer economic ties with Europe may limit its willingness to engage in greater economic integration with other Eurasian countries.

Thirdly, the analysis highlights the potential for regional cooperation and integration to counterbalance the influence of external actors, particularly the United States and China. The Eurasian region is strategically important due to its location between Europe and Asia, and as a result, external actors have long sought to exert influence in the region. Russia, Türkiye, and Kazakhstan have all sought to balance the influence of external actors by promoting greater regional cooperation and integration. For example, Russia's Eurasian Economic Union is seen as a way to counterbalance the influence of the European Union (Vinokurov, 2014), while Türkiye's Eurasianist policies are seen as a way to counterbalance the influence of the United States and NATO (Goren, 2018).

Finally, the analysis has implications for the role of multilateral institutions in the Eurasian region. While all three countries have expressed support for greater regional cooperation and integration, they differ in their views on the role of multilateral institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Russia has been the most active in promoting the role of multilateral institutions, while Kazakhstan has been more cautious, and Türkiye has largely sought to engage in bilateral agreements (Balta, 2019). This has implications for the future of regional cooperation and integration, as countries may differ in their willingness to cede sovereignty to multilateral institutions.

Overall, the analysis of Russian, Turkish, and Kazakh Eurasianism has significant implications for foreign policy in the Eurasian region. Policymakers and analysts must take into account the diverse conceptualizations of Eurasianism and the competing interests and ambitions of the various countries in the region when developing policies that promote regional cooperation and integration. This may involve a greater focus on economic cooperation and integration, a more nuanced understanding of the different approaches to democracy and authoritarianism, and a recognition of the potential for regional cooperation and integration to counterbalance the influence of external actors.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the concept of Eurasianism has been prevalent in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Türkiye for several decades. While each country has its own unique interpretation of Eurasianism, they all share a common goal of establishing a distinct Eurasian identity separate from Western influence. Through comparative analysis methods, we can see how each country's historical experiences have shaped its understanding of Eurasianism. However, it remains to be seen whether the concept of Eurasianism will continue to be relevant in the 21st century, as globalization and the rise of China are changing the geopolitical landscape of Eurasia.

The literature review has demonstrated the historical and philosophical foundations of Eurasianism, tracing its evolution from a cultural and intellectual movement in the early 20th century to its contemporary geopolitical significance in the Eurasian region. The review has highlighted the importance of the concept of 'Eurasia' as a framework for understanding the geopolitical ambitions of Russia, Türkiye, and Kazakhstan, as well as the challenges and opportunities associated with the concept.

The article has explored the ways in which Russian, Turkish, and Kazakh Eurasianism differ in their conceptualization and implementation of Eurasianism. Specifically, it has examined the different approaches taken by these countries in relation to the role of the state, the place of democracy and authoritarianism, and their geopolitical priorities. The analysis has shown that while all three countries share a commitment to the idea of a unique Eurasian identity, they differ in their emphasis on state power, their approach to democracy and authoritarianism, and their geopolitical priorities.

REFERENCES

Ahmad, Vakhshiteh, Marina Vladimirovna Lapenko and Aisha Mukasheva (2022). Genezis yevraziyskoy idei i yevraziyskoy praktiki v Respublike Kazakhstan (The Genesis of the Eurasian Idea and Eurasian Practice in the Republic of Kazakhstan). Vestnik Rossiyskogo universiteta druzhby narodov, 22(1): 60-76.

Akturk, Sener (2015). The fourth style of politics: Eurasianism as a pro-Russian rethinking of Turkey's geopolitical identity. Turkish Studies, 16(1): 54-79.

Anceschi, Luca (2014). Regime-building, identity-making and foreign policy: neo-Eurasianist rhetoric in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Nationalities Papers, 42(5): 733-749. Doi: 10.1080/00905992.2014.928276.

Anceschi, Luca (2020). Analysing Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy: Regime Neo-Eurasianism in the Nazarbaev Era. Routledge.

Balta, Evren (2019). From geopolitical competition to strategic partnership: Turkey and Russia after the cold war. Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi, 16(63): 69-86.

Barbashin, Anton and Hannah Thoburn (2014). "Putin's Brain". Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-03-31/putins-brain. Accessed: 11.05.2023.

Bassin, Mark, Sergey Glebov and Marlene Laruelle (2015). Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism. University of Pittsburgh Press.

Cheterian, Vicken (2023). Friend and foe: Russia–Turkey relations before and after the war in Ukraine. Small Wars & Insurgencies: 1-24. Doi: 10.1080/09592318.2023.2185443.

Clover, Charles (2016). «Lev Gumilev: Passion, Putin and power». The Financial Times.

Colakoglu, Selcuk (2019). The rise of Eurasianism in Turkish foreign policy: Can Turkey change its pro-Western orientation? Middle East Institute: Washington.

Davutoglu, Ahmet (2001). Stratejik Derinlik. Istanbul: Kure Yayinlari.

Drobnič, Sonja (2014). «Comparative analysis». In Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research, edited by Alex C. Michalos, 1125-1127. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.

Ersen, Emre (2013). «The evolution of 'Eurasia' as a geopolitical concept in Post–Cold war Turkey». Geopolitics, 18(1): 24-44. Doi: 10.1080/14650045.2012.665106.

Ersen, Emre (2022). Turkey and the Eurasian integration: Ideology or pragmatism? Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, 22(1): 111-125.

Fuller, Steve (2022). Eurasianism as the deep history of Russia's discontent. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 54(7): 863-866. Doi: 10.1080/00131857.2022.2054330.

Goren, Nilsu (2018). The NATO/US-Turkey-Russia strategic triangle: challenges ahead.

Kalinin, Kirill (2019). Neo-Eurasianism and the Russian elite: The irrelevance of Aleksandr Dugin's geopolitics. Post-Soviet Affairs, 35(5-6): 461-470.

Khalid, Amna (2022). «Russia's foothold in Asia: Understanding Eurasianism in Russian post-Soviet discourse». MJIR| Malaysian Journal of International Relations, 10(1): 1-21.

Kiniklioglu, Suat (2022). Eurasianism in Turkey. SWP Research Paper. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik-SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. Doi: 10.18449/2022RP07.

Kudaibergenova, Diana T. (2016). «Eurasian Economic Union integration in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. European Politics and Society, 17(1): 97-112.

Laruelle, Marlene (2019). Alexander Dugin and Eurasianism. In Mark Sedgwick (Ed.), Key Thinkers of the Radical Right: Behind the New Threat to Liberal Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.

Laruelle, Marlene (2008). Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire An Ideology of Empire. Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, DC The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Laruelle, Marlene (2014). The three discursive paradigms of state identity in Kazakhstan. Nationalism and identity construction in Central Asia: Dimensions, dynamics, and directions: 1-20.

Mangir, Demet Sefika (2020). Cografi ve Jeopolitik Eksende Neo-Avrasyacılık (Neo-Eurasianism on the Axis of Geography and Geopolitics). Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, No.43: 193-208.

Meyer, Caspar (2009). Rostovtzeff and the classical origins of Eurasianism. Anabases: Traditions et réceptions de l'Antiquité, No.9: 185-197.

Mostafa, Golam (2013). The concept of 'Eurasia': Kazakhstan's Eurasian policy and its implications. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 4(2): 160-170. Doi: 10.1016/j.euras.2013.03.006.

Nurgaliyeva, Lyailya (2016). Kazakhstan's economic soft balancing policy vis-à-vis Russia: From the Eurasian Union to the economic cooperation with Turkey. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 7(1): 92-105.

Nyssanbayev, Abdimalik and Vladimir Dunaev (2010). Evraziyskaya Doctrina Nursultana Nazarbaeva (Eurasian Doctrine of the Nursultan Nazarbayev). Almaty: Institute of Philosophy and Political Studies at the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Putz, Catherine (2020). Luca Anceschi on Kazakhstan's 'Neo-Eurasianism'. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/luca-anceschi-on-kazakhstans-neo-eurasianism. Accessed: 12.02.2023.

Ram, Harsha (2001). Imagining Eurasia: The poetics and ideology of Olzhas Suleimenov's AZ i IA. Slavic Review, 60(2): 289-311.

Rossman, Vadim (2002). Lev Gumilev, Eurasianism and Khazaria. East European Jewish Affairs, 32(1): 30-51. Doi: 10.1080/13501670208577962.

Shekhovtsov, Aton (2009). Aleksandr Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism: The new right à la Russe 1. Religion Compass, 3(4): 697-716.

Semonsen, Robert (2023). Did Aleksandr Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism Inspire Russia's War in Ukraine?, The European Conservative. Retrieved from https://europeanconservative.com/articles/commentary/did-dugins-neo-eurasianism-inspire-russias-war-in-ukraine/. Accessed: 11.05. 2023.

Shlapentokh, Dmitry (2012). Lev Gumilev: The ideologist of the Soviet Empire. History of European Ideas, 38(3): 483-492. Doi: 10.1080/01916599.2012.681525.

Shlapentokh, Dmitry V. (1997). Eurasianism: Past and Present. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 30(2): 129-151.

Smirnov, Andrey V. (2020). Classical Eurasianism as a post-Revolutionary Philosophy. Russian Studies in Philosophy, 58(6): 522-534. Doi: 10.1080/10611967.2020.1868263.

Tchantouridze, Lasha and Charles Schlacks (2001). «Eurasianism: In Search of Russia's Political Identity: A Review Essay.» Review of Exodus to the East: Forebodings and Events: An Affirmation of the Eurasians, Pëtr Savitskii, Ilya Vinkovetsky, Catherine Boyle, Kenneth Brostrom, Charles Schlacks Jr., Nicholas V. Riasanovsky. Perspectives (16): 69-80.

Tuysuzoglu, Gokturk (2014). Strategic depth: A neo-Ottomanist interpretation of Turkish Eurasianism. Mediterranean Quarterly, 25(2): 85-104.

Tuysuzoglu, Gokturk (2023). The Eurasianist transformation of Turkish foreign policy after the coup attempt: An evaluation in the context of the SCO. Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 17(1): 83-105.

Vakhshiteh, Ahmad, Marina V. Lapenko and Aisha Mukasheva (2022). Genesis of the Eurasian idea and Eurasian practice in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, 22(1): 60-76.

Vinkovetsky, Ilya (2000). Classical Eurasianism and its legacy. Canadian-American Slavic Studies, 34(2): 125-139.

Vinokurov, Evgeny (2014). Mega deal between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia in Global Affairs, No. 4: 1-7.

Yanik, Lerna K. (2019). Debating Eurasia political travels of a geographical concept in Turkey. Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations, 16(63): 33-50.

JAPAN'S VALUE-BASED RELATIONSHIP IN ACTION: THE CASE OF CENTRAL ASIA

Albina MURATBEKOVA [1]

[1] Khoja Akhmet Yassawi International Turkish-Kazakh University, 050004 Almaty, Kazakhstan
albina.muratbek@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0001-5908-6564

ABSTRACT

In light of continuing geopolitical and geoeconomic transformations in Eurasia, regional and international players are revising their foreign policies toward Central Asia. Japan, which has been developing stable and value-oriented cooperation with the region, has also been affected by the current transformations that impact the relationship with Central Asia. The paper attempts to reintroduce Japan's vision of Central Asia by unpacking Japan's larger matrix of foreign policy and scrutinising its humanitarian and development assistance efforts in Central Asia. The paper first focuses on the retrospective developments of Japan's engagement with the region. Then it discloses the economic underpinnings of cooperation. Further, discuss development assistance mechanisms in Central Asia. In conclusion, the paper summarises Japan's engagement with Central Asia in connection to previous and ongoing political and economic developments in the region. By doing so, another perspective on Japan-Central Asia affairs will be provided that enables scientific discussions on Japan's transforming foreign policy.

Keywords: Japan, Central Asia, Value-based diplomacy, Development assistance, Central Asian foreign policy.

INTRODUCTION

In light of continuing geopolitical and geoeconomic transformations in Eurasia, regional and international players are revising their foreign policies toward Central Asia. By following multivector policies, Central Asian states are adapting to ongoing processes and diversifying their external partnership priorities. Japan, which has been developing stable and value-oriented cooperation with the region, has also been affected by the current transformations that impact the relationship with Central Asia. The paper attempts to reintroduce Japan's vision of Central Asia by unpacking Japan's larger matrix of foreign policy and scrutinising its humanitarian and development assistance efforts in Central Asia.

Japan is an active and strategic partner in the region. It contributes to the prosperity of the region through its development assistance schemes, potential for investment, and support for the socio-economic development of the region. Known for modest but significant collaboration with Central Asian nations, Japan adheres to its "mission-oriented" policy towards Central Asia, which is bolstered by Japan's desire to create a stable international order (Insebayeva, 2019). It demonstrates itself as a peaceful economic power (Len et al., 2008), which, in comparison with other countries, does not have an image of Japanese imperialism or neo-colonialism in the Central Asian countries (Dadabaev, 2016). Its policy in the region is based on value-based diplomacy, which is motivated by factors other than geopolitical rivalries. Since its relative economic decline in comparison to the dynamic 1970s and 1980s, Japan has found attractive the concept of smart power, which combines the values and cultural tools of soft power diplomacy with hard power interests such as security that are instrumentalized in foreign policy with Central Asia (Fukushima, 2018). It came from Nye's (2004) concept of smart power, which is "an ability to blend hard power and soft power resources into effective strategies depending on the circumstances". Japan's strategy in the region is also featured as being stimulated by primarily normative (Barber, 2018) or economic interests (Mangi, 2011).

Japan had provided significant assistance in developing infrastructure projects in the Central Asian states long before the Chinese initiative. Japan's infrastructure projects are of high importance for bilateral and intra-regional cooperation (Murashkin, 2018; Takeshi, 2007). Being among the top donors in the world and the Central Asia region, Japan supports the social and economic development of the Central Asian states through its ODA mechanisms. The Central Asian states' abundant energy and raw material resources determined their high potential for cooperation.

It was among the first to institutionalise negotiations by establishing the "Central Asia plus Japan" dialogue in 2004. The creation of dialogue was expected as a new stage of Japan's engagement with the region, which today becomes an essential complement to the Japanese strategy in the region, compensating for the limits of bilateral interaction (Dissyukov, 2019).

However, numerous studies agree that the Central Asian region is on the periphery of Japan's foreign policy strategy when compared to other regions (Murashkin, 2019; Dadabaev, 2013; Len et al., 2008; Rakhimov, 2014). The foreign policy toward the region is described as "on and off" (Kawato, 2008) or "colorless" (Iwashita, 2008; Murashkin, 2018). The lack of a coherent vision towards Central Asia is also seen in Japan's establishment, which categorises the region differently: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers the region to

be in Europe; the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) puts the region in Asia; and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry views in the same category as Russia (Murashkin, 2019). The modest promotion of Japanese initiatives in the region and the insufficient media coverage in Japan also impact public knowledge of bilateral and multilateral programmes.

The paper aims to examine the applicability of both positive and pessimistic approaches to Japan's Central Asian policy. Given the ongoing transformations in Eurasian affairs, the paper also attempts to gauge the implications of such transformations for Japan's Central Asia policy. By doing so, another perspective on Japan-Central Asia affairs will be provided that enables scientific discussions on Japan's transforming foreign policy. The paper utilises comparative analysis and content analysis to test it, adhering to constructivist methodology while employing government reports and documents as well as expert materials. The paper first focuses on the retrospective developments of Japan's engagement with the region. Then it discloses the economic underpinnings of cooperation. Further, discuss development assistance mechanisms in Central Asia. In conclusion, the paper summarises Japan's engagement with Central Asia in connection to previous and ongoing political and economic developments in the region.

EVOLUTION OF JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

In retrospect, the Central Asian region was considered as a "backward" of the Soviet Union. Interest in the area was initially welcomed with only a modicum of enthusiasm. Japan itself was struggling to define the boundaries of Asia after the end of the Cold War, and during the early 1990s, the Japanese government was conceptualising its strategy to incorporate the newly independent Central Asian states into its larger foreign policy matrix. As a result, Japan's presence in the region remained elusive despite its significant financial support.

By the mid-1990s, Japanese authorities reassessed the emerging importance of the Central Asian region in the context of the rise of China and the need to develop relations with Russia (Len, 2008). In 1997, the Japanese government reconsidered the role of Eurasia when Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro introduced the concept of Eurasian diplomacy. His vision for the first time mentioned the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus as part of the Silk Road region, while he was pioneering in using the Silk Road roots as a layer for connectivity. The Eurasian diplomacy aimed to foster a relationship based on political and economic cooperation, cooperation in peacebuilding through non-proliferation, and democratisation of society (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 1997). Acknowledging the potential of the Silk Road networks, Japan announced a new approach that aims to assist the Silk Road countries in developing intra-regional integration in the areas of communication, transportation, and energy networks.

Following PM Hashimoto's speech, in the summer of 1997, the first high-level delegation of the Japanese Diet visited Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, which later became known as the "Obuchi Mission." The mission with 61 members, after travelling to Russia, headed to the Central Asian states, where they met with the academic and business communities in order to

develop and enhance cooperation. As a result of the visit, the Obuchi mission developed a report, most of the recommendations of which were realised later (Takeshi, 2007). Further, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi launched the Silk Road Action Plan in 1998, which became the first attempt to conceptualise Japan's policy in the Central Asian region. In line with these developments, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) launched the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC) that became the first regional connectivity programme predating the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.

Besides, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) opened offices in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000, respectively. These developments led Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan to become Japan's top donors of official development aid (Kawato, 2008). Yet due to the brief tenures of the Hashimoto (1996–1998), Obuchi (1998–2000), and Yoshiro (2000–2001) governments, the direction of Japanese foreign policy toward Central Asia remained ambiguous (Dadabaev, 2013).

The early 2000s brought new developments to the region. The creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) stimulated Japanese officials to think about joining the organisation since it served as a platform for dialogue with Russia and China. Both neighbours revised their strategy in the region and started active involvement through various bilateral arrangements in the fields of economics, trade, energy, and natural resources. In addition, the observers – Iran, India, Pakistan, and Mongolia - and the establishment of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group all spoke about the potential of the SCO as a new non-liberal regional bloc in Eurasia. At the same time, the post-9/11 world boosted the significance of security, and the issue of Afghanistan became a decisive factor in dealing with the Central Asian region. Japan acknowledged that the stability and security of Eurasia depend on the stability of the Central Asian region and Afghanistan. With Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's active stance in "sharing the burden" with the US in anti-terrorist activities, Japan's approach to the region was followed by a revision of strategic interests in the Central Asian region (Murashkin, 2019).

As a result, during August 2004, Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi visited four Central Asian states, where she was promoting Japan's new approach towards the region and initiating the "Central Asia plus Japan" dialogue, the inaugural foreign ministers meeting in which she participated. In essence, the "Central Asia plus Japan" dialogue aimed to work in five directions: policy dialogue, intra-regional cooperation, business promotion, intellectual dialogue, and people-to-people contacts (Takeshi, 2008). The foreign ministerial meeting is the highest level within the dialogue, and even though it has no set schedule, past meetings show a biannual frequency of gatherings. In addition to the Foreign Ministers Meetings, there are Senior Officials Meetings that are instrumental in the preparation of the Foreign Ministers' Meeting and their "follow-ups." The dialogue remains a central platform for interaction with the Central Asian states.

In line with the activation of Japan's policy in Central Asia, in August 2006, PM Koizumi made his maiden visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the first prime minister to do so. During the visit, he outlined Japan's interests in the energy sector while promoting the strengthening of bilateral relations and regional cooperation.

Further, PM Shinzo Abe, during his first term (2006–2007), together with Foreign Minister Aso Taro, launched a new initiative, "The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity," which covered the Eurasian continent. The concept was projected as a new pillar of Japan's foreign policy that attempts to broaden the diplomatic reach of Japan, while it was also interpreted as a response to the growing aspirations of China and Russia. Central Asia, meanwhile, was emphasised in line with its resource value and was called one of the important regions (MOFA, 2007). Nonetheless, the Arc moved into the background soon but showed the extending horizons of Japan's foreign strategy, while its established interests in the Central Asian region were strengthened further. Overall, since six prime ministers held the position for a short time between 2005 and 2012, the implementation of policies was again slowed down (Barber, 2018). Meanwhile, strategy toward the Central Asian region remained focused on resource diplomacy and deepening business interaction.

With the beginning of the second term of PM Shinzo Abe in 2012, along with implementing Abenomics – the economic policies for reviving the Japanese economy and promoting Japanese exports worldwide – Abe's administration continued to enlarge political and economic ties with Central Asian states. In October 2015, PM Abe made a historical tour to all Central Asian states, the first stay in the region since PM Koizumi's visit in 2006, while being the first head of the Japanese government to visit Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. As it is seen from the signed contracts, energy was the primary focus of the visit. Besides, for the Japanese high-tech companies, the rare earth metals are essential for supply; therefore, accompanied by businessmen, Abe's tour was intended to deepen Japan's resource diplomacy in the Central Asian region. The visit affirmed that the Central Asian region is among the important destinations for resource procurement and infrastructure exports. Shinzo Abe demonstrated pragmatism and mercantilism during the trip to the region in comparison to the previous value-oriented diplomacy. Moreover, Abe's visit to Central Asia was a logical continuation of Tokyo's active diplomacy because, during 2012–2015, Japanese officials visited the region with a high frequency in comparison to the previous decade (Murashkin, 2018).

The post-Abe period has not brought significant changes to Japan's bonds in Central Asia. If PM Abe's seven-year tenure allowed him to enhance Japan-Central Asia ties, one year under PM Yoshihide Suga's leadership and more than a year under PM Fumio Kishida's leadership coincided with larger geopolitical changes in Eurasia, and as a result, Japan's involvement with Central Asia did not lead to significant progress. It is assumed that despite the strong institutionalisation of power in Japan, personal factors still matter with regard to regional cooperation (Carnegie Moscow Center, 2022). If the Central Asian leaders are known for their attempts to keep the leadership as long as possible, thus ensuring the continuity of their aspirations, Japan's frequent changes of leadership at some point impact the development of its external priorities.

With the escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, some have linked Japan's strategy in Central Asia to the Russian invasion and its consequences. Prime Minister Kishida advocates a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" and highlights Japan's support for the G7 and the collective denunciations of the West (FULCRUM, 2023). However, despite the high degree of integration of Russia's

influence in Central Asia, it is wrong to assume that the states of Central Asia as sovereign entities are considered only through the Russian axis. Similarly, others connect Japan's efforts in the region with the comprehensive penetration of China in Central Asia, which does not require drawing parallels with Japan's strategy in Central Asia.

It is also redundant to claim that without a special document on Central Asia, relations with that region have elusive potential. It is assumed that this is a quality of Japan's "otherness," which, in contrast to other regional players, means that it is not necessary to identify the modalities of cooperation in an established way. By following its humanitarian and assistance-based relationship, Japan follows its own path with the region, gradually deepening existing ties with Central Asia and not comparing its efforts with those of other regional players.

Institutionally, Japan-Central Asia cooperation is continuing within the framed "Central Asia plus Japan" dialogue format at the level of foreign ministers. The past 9th Foreign Ministers' Meeting of the "Central Asia plus Japan" Dialogue in December 2022, had discussed relations amid changing international circumstances and issues related to risks of instability. Participating foreign ministers reiterated their interest in enhancing cooperation, while issues related to the capacity of human resources for the economic development of Central Asia, cooperation in the field of decarbonization, and diversification of transportation routes through the "Trans-Caspian International Transport Route" were on the agenda (MOFA, 2022).

JAPAN'S ECONOMIC TIES WITH CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

As for bilateral ties, Japan has been intensifying its economic and business ties with the Central Asian states. Among the major bilateral agreements are the conventions for the avoidance of double taxation signed with Kazakhstan (2008) and Uzbekistan (2019); for the promotion and protection of investment with Uzbekistan (2008) and Kazakhstan (2014); and for cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy with Kazakhstan (2010) (MOFA, 2020). During the visit of PM Abe to the Central Asian states in 2015, agreements for cooperation in economy, science, and water security were signed with Tajikistan; for cooperation in financial intelligence, countering money laundering and terror financing, and infrastructure were agreed with Kyrgyzstan; and agreements on infrastructure development and natural gas plant projects were signed with Turkmenistan (SEnECA, 2018).

Japan was pioneering in promoting the development of infrastructure projects. From the early 1990s, Japanese investments and loans funded transport and communication infrastructure projects all over the region. To name but a few, Japanese money was involved in the construction of the Irtysh River bridge in eastern Kazakhstan (1995); railway modernization projects in Kazakhstan (1995), Turkmenistan (2007), and Uzbekistan (2007); road rehabilitation projects in Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek-Osh road) and Tajikistan (Kurgan Tuybe-Dusti road); reconstruction and modernization of the airports in Astana (1998) and Bishkek (1996); as well as airports in Samarkand, Bukhara, and Urgench cities in Uzbekistan (Rakhimov, 2014). As a result, Japan made significant efforts to

support the region's transportation infrastructure, develop intra-state and inter-state communication, and diversify the Northwest bound towards East and West. By encouraging regional connectivity and infrastructure development projects, including through the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Japan has been supporting the stability and sustainable development of the countries in the region, while at the same time supporting the nation-building process of the newly independent states.

Projects within the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program, which was established in 1997 by the Japan-led ADB in order to promote development through cooperation, also significantly supported regional development and connectivity. Between 2001 and 2019, CAREC contributed $38.6 billion in investments to establish multimodal transportation networks, increase energy trade and security, facilitate the free movement of people and freight, and lay the groundwork for economic corridor development (CAREC, 2020).

Japan, which is highly dependent on oil-producing countries, also intends to maintain its energy security through the promotion of strategic energy policy in the Central Asian region. Japan contributed to the energy-related projects in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. It was also emphasised during Shinzo Abe's travel to Central Asia in 2015. In particular, the trip was marked with significant agreements worth $27 billion, out of which $18 billion were allocated to Turkmenistan in mostly oil and gas-related infrastructure, $8.5 billion for oil and gas infrastructure in Uzbekistan, $1.1 billion were distributed in agriculture, machine-building, and automotive infrastructure in Kazakhstan, $120 million was allocated for airport and motorway infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan, and $7.5 million was allocated for water and social issues in Tajikistan (Murashkin, 2019). Hence, if initially Japan was interested in supporting the infrastructure development of the region, during the last decade it shifted toward cooperation in the energy and natural resources sectors in the oil-rich countries and support for social development in the others. At the same time, Japan's activities in the Central Asian region were not principally motivated by the need for fuel resources (Barber, 2018). At present, Japan is working with Kyrgyzstan on the implementation of the construction project of a hydropower plant in Karakul, with Uzbekistan on the implementation of international industrial standards, and with humanitarian and social projects in all Central Asian states (Kadyrova, 2022).

Peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy and the development of uranium mining gain particular interest in Japan as well. Specifically, Kazakhstan, with its rich uranium ore deposits, had developed extended partnerships with Japanese companies. Major Japanese energy companies have signed agreements with the Kazakhstani national atomic company Kazatomprom for the development of uranium resources and the extraction of rare earth metals (Barber, 2018). Based on these contracts, it is projected that Kazakhstan would provide up to 25% of the Japanese demand for uranium within the next decade (Dadabaev, 2018).

The share that Central Asian countries have in the total trade statistics of Japan does not even exceed 0.1%. The level of bilateral trade with Kazakhstan—Japan's largest trade partner in the region—remains ten times lower in comparison to China and Russia's interaction in the energy sector (Insebayeva, 2019). Given

that Japan, as the third-largest economy in the world, is number 4 in total exports and number 5 in total imports, the potential of bilateral economic engagement is being realised very modestly (OEC, 2022). The major items imported from the Central Asian states include energy resources and raw materials, while their exports include mostly machinery and vehicles, electronics, and other highly valued electronic materials.

Figure 1. *Japan's trade statistics with the Central Asian states*

Source: Statistics Bureau Japan (n.d.)

Japan intends to strengthen economic ties with Central Asian countries. In 2019, the foreign ministers of Japan and Central Asia held bilateral negotiations with the aim of signing bilateral investment agreements with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan that would create more favourable conditions for Japanese investors, which had already been implemented with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. In 2022, Tokyo held Central Asia Investment Forum 2022, organized by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

Nevertheless, the participation of Japanese businesses in the Central Asian states remains largely government driven. The Japanese companies in the region are operating through their representative offices and not as full-scale branches, which is explained by a relatively modest amount of business volume (Murashkin, 2019). For the Central Asian states as well, the involvement of Japanese companies is still low in comparison to other countries. Hence, there is still a huge potential for expanding economic ties.

JAPAN'S DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE SCHEMES IN THE REGION

As one of the top providers of development aid, Japan employs official development assistance (ODA) as a significant tool for interaction with developing nations. Being an economic superpower and member of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and its DAC (Development Assistance Committee), Japan has dedicated 0.34% of its GNI to ODA activities, which is the third largest in relation to ODA/GNI share among the DAC member states in 2021 (OECD, 2022). Japan's primary mission in providing developmental assistance is based on the strategy of providing a financial stimulus and a development model by being self-sustaining and without the need for external assistance (Dadabaev, 2016). It also sets itself apart from Western approaches to assistance by emphasising its value-oriented vision.

Structurally, Japan provides ODA through bilateral and multilateral frameworks. The bilateral mechanism of assistance is maintained through JICA (the Japan

International Cooperation Agency), one of the largest aid agencies in the world. JICA provides assistance through technical cooperation, finance and investment cooperation, and grants. It has over 96 offices around the world and 15 domestic offices that coordinate the whole process (JICA, 2022).

For Central Asia, JICA provides primarily three categories of assistance: yen-based loans and grants, no-interest grant-in-aid, and technical assistance. The yen-based loans are aimed at supporting the socio-economic development of the receiving country by financially supporting infrastructure and transport projects such as airports, electricity-generating stations, water infrastructure, and education projects. No-interest grants are intended for the least developed countries in order to provide for basic needs and eradicate poverty. Technical assistance is projected to be shared with Japanese expertise by sending various specialists to recipient countries, where Japanese specialists share their experience and train local specialists (Dadabaev, 2016).

The priority of providing assistance to Central Asia has been changing. In the early 1990s, the Japanese government suggested that a comparatively small amount of assistance might be efficient for smaller countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, therefore, initially, the majority of financial support was addressed to these two states. However, as time went on, weak administration and a lack of capacity to effectively distribute loans led to problems with implementation. As a result, Japan re-adjusted its ODA focus towards Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Dadabaev, 2018). However, Kazakhstan had switched its preferences to direct investments rather than government loans and later transformed from a recipient to a donor status. As a result, Uzbekistan ended up being the largest recipient of Japanese aid. At present, Uzbekistan remains among the top recipients of Japanese financial support and concessional loans, followed by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, while oil-rich Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are working on attracting Japanese investments. Figure 2 shows the amount of ODA provided by Japan; it should be reminded that the total amount is still relatively small in comparison to the rest of the world.

Figure 2. *Total value of JICA programs in Central Asia.*

Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency (n.d.)

* Unit: millions of yen

Table 1. *Total value of JICA programs*

Country/Year	2017	2018	2019	2020
Kazakhstan	111*	61	113	86
Kyrgyzstan	2,901	3,007	2,042	1,522
Tajikistan	3,199	1,248	2,927	2,542
Turkmenistan	183	105	72	37
Uzbekistan	10,534	43,270	27,470	15,729

Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency (n.d.)

* Unit: millions of yen

JICA's activities in Central Asia are related to enhancing regional connectivity and industrial diversification. At present, it focuses on four main areas of cooperation: 1) governance strengthening, including legal system development; 2) industrial diversification, including the promotion of small and medium enterprises; 3) infrastructure development, including the construction of airports and power plants; and 4) human resources development (JICA, 2022).

By implementing its assistance schemes, Japan intends to contribute to the sustainable socio-economic growth of Central Asian states. Specifically, in Kyrgyzstan, JICA prioritises two directions: maintenance of transport infrastructure and reduction of regional disparities, as well as reconstruction of social infrastructure. In Tajikistan, JICA implements its assistance in three priority areas, such as the improvement of the economic and industrial sectors, the provision of basic social services, and the promotion of social stability. In Uzbekistan, JICA focuses its efforts on three fronts: economic infrastructure, vitalization of the private sector, and agricultural reform and rural development (JICA, 2022).

Besides supporting the socio-economic well-being of Central Asia through JICA, Japan is joining the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) initiatives, which in December 2022 launched a new joint initiative worth US $4.1 million to promote resilient communities in all Central Asian countries. Within the initiative, it is expected to boost social cohesion and empower youth in all Central Asian states (Kadyrova, 2022).

Japan also strengthens its people-to-people contracts through advancing capacity-building mechanisms. Since the Japanese view that "nation-building is human resource capacity-building," capacity-building and empowering human capital are seen as the main pillars of Japan's support (Murashkin & Varpahovskis, 2022). The Japan Center for Human Development, along with the Japan Human Resource Development Scholarship programs, are important tools for the implementation of that purpose.

The Japan Centers for Human Development, projected to be a hub of capacity-building development in transition economies, were also opened in the Central Asian states. In particular, based on the bilateral intergovernmental agreements

on technical cooperation, under the JICA, the Kyrgyz Republic-Japan Center was established in 1995; the Uzbekistan-Japan Center for Human Development was created in 2000; and the Kazakhstan-Japan Center for Human Development was opened in 2002.

The centres aimed to support the socio-economic development of Central Asian states by developing the capacity needed for transitioning to a market economy and promoting a market economy. Along with learning the Japanese language, the centres provided courses in career planning, training the business community, and sharing Japanese managerial expertise. It encourages building a bridge between Japan and Central Asian states through various target groups, which becomes a platform for sharing the Japanese vision of life. The centres support local entrepreneurs with Japanese expertise, such as by practising Kaizen philosophy, visiting Japanese companies as part of the "Practical Business Course in Japan," supporting women entrepreneurs and agricultural businesses, etc. Japanese centres also have Japanese art courses, including Japanese manga (comics) and anime (animation) courses that are popular cultural cards among youth. Japanese centers' activities support in advancing human capacity and promote intra-regional cooperation in the region.

The Project for Human Resource Development Scholarship by Japanese Grant Aid (JDS) is another initiative of Japan to empower the youth through providing scholarships for master's and doctoral programmes. In Kyrgyzstan, the project started in 2006 and has so far provided 270 scholarships. In Tajikistan, where it has operated since 2008, the project has supported 106 fellows for their graduate studies, while the fellowships in Uzbekistan, which were launched in 1999, have been obtained by 391 graduate students (JICE, 2023).

The Japanese government also provides mobility programmes for Central Asian universities that allow students to travel to Japan both for study and business purposes, as well as full grants within its international scholarships. Central Asian universities increased their collaboration with Japanese universities and established connections with Japanese programmes. Overall interest in Japan among youth is growing, while the popularity of popular manga and anime encourages youth to become acquainted with Japan and its heritage.

CONCLUSION

Japan has a positive image in the Central Asian states. Dadabaev (2016) suggests that "Asian [cultural] roots and Western norms determine the duality of the national identity of Japan, which in turn shapes "ambiguously" defined interests in the region." The duality of the Japanese approach, combined with the closeness of Japanese tradition and culture, makes Japan a close friend of Central Asians. Tokyo's support of essential infrastructure and transport objects, along with comprehensive support of socio-economic development, served as the foundation of a relationship with the region. Moreover, regardless of the different geopolitical scenarios of the Eurasian players, Japan is always active in cooperation with regional states.

The Japanese strategy may appear modest in comparison to other countries' massive and well-presented initiatives; however, Japan has been developing its own path of engagement with the region based on providing assistance and

technological investment, in turn benefiting from Central Asia's energy-rich markets. Tokyo's support for the necessary infrastructure and transportation facilities, along with comprehensive support for socio-economic development, is the core of relations with the region. Through the construction of high-quality infrastructure projects and the development of regional cooperation, Japan has expanded the possibilities of intra-regional cooperation.

Nevertheless, with additional efforts, Japan's engagement with the Central Asian region might be expanded to a new level. More attention might be needed to enhance people-to-people contacts. Given that the Japanese provide a positive example of nurturing management leaders and demonstrating an exemplary corporate culture, the extension of capacity building projects and programmes might lead to increasing business ties between partners. The Japan Centers of Human Resources could be a good platform, but in comparison to the present agenda of the centers, more attention might be given to the real sectors of the economy through the real engagement of business partners on both sides, including private and governmental.

Furthermore, given the region's small number of Japanese courses in comparison to other languages, more support for opening mass courses for learning the Japanese language may increase interest in and awareness of Japan.

An important tool of Japan's soft power, its global cultural influence through authentic products such as postmodern music, animation, films, fashion, or brands like Hello Kitty, Sony, Nintendo, and others, can widen Japan's presence in the region by stimulating interest in Japan's cultural products (Douglas, 2009).

Because of the lack of knowledge of Japanese business culture and language, Central Asian alumni of Japanese universities could also help connect business and entrepreneurial people on both sides. In addition, their knowledge of the Japanese market might expand exports of products from the Central Asian region. Despite the current efforts of Japanese programmes, the number of students is relatively small, with the majority remaining in academia rather than entering the business world.

Engagement of the private sector in developing businesses with Japan is also impeded by long and expensive logistics for transporting goods from Japan to Central Asia. Due to the high costs of logistics, in addition to the high prices of Japanese goods, purchasing Japanese goods is not widespread in the region. In comparison, South Korea, which also lacks direct connections with the region, is very popular in terms of purchasing cosmetics, foods, materials, clothing, and so on. Japanese products, although interesting, are limited due to the difficulties of ordering them from Japan, as it takes around 2–3 months for delivery. As a result, in order to expand contacts between medium and small businesses, it is necessary to reconsider the options for sustainable and efficient transportation. Long distances and high customs costs lead to inappropriate prices that make Japanese products affordable for a very limited group of the population.

Japan's engagement with the Central Asian region is among the prospective areas of development. Japan and Central Asia are interested in deepening bilateral and multilateral contacts, whereas infrastructure development and socioeconomic well-being are at the core of the partnership.

REFERENCES

Barber, B. Bryan (2018). "Far, yet so near: Normativity in Japan's diplomacy with the Central Asian republics", Asian Affairs: An American Review, 45(1): 18-39. Doi: 10.1080/00927678.2017.1412677.

CAREC Program (2022). Retrieved from https://www.carecprogram.org/?page_id=31. Accessed: 01.11.2022.

Carnegie Moscow Center (2022). "Japan in Central Asia: Declining Partner or Key Player?" February 24, 2022. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Transcript_24.02.2024.pdf. Accessed: 04.11.2022.

Dadabaev, Timur (2011). The evolution of Japanese diplomacy towards Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In OSCE yearbook 2011: Yearbook on the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (pp. 441-458). Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG. Doi: 10.5771/9783845238234-441.

Dadabaev, Timur (2013), "Japan's search for its Central Asian policy. Between idealism and pragmatism". Asian Survey, 53(3): 506-553. Doi: 10.1525/as.2013.53.3.506.

Dadabaev, Timur (2016). "Japan's ODA assistance scheme and Central Asian engagement: Determinants, trends, expectations". Journal of Eurasian Studies, 7(1): 24-38. Doi: 10.1016/j.euras.2015.10.002.

Dadabaev, Timur (2018). "Japanese and Chinese infrastructure development strategies in Central Asia". Japanese Journal of Political Science, 19(3): 542-561. Doi: 10.1017/S1468109918000178.

Dissyukov, Almas (2019). Central Asia and Japan: 15 years of multilateral cooperation. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/central-asia-and-japan-15-years-of-multilateral-cooperation/?fbclid=IwAR3Nfwm1a51O_LSoKT0mtANwPS6I-GE0UFKy9SLAKGJooOGL2CG8Dk05G8Y. Accessed: 01.11.2022.

Fukushima, Glen S. (2018). Japan's "Soft Power". Japan Foreign Trade Council. Retrieved from https://www.jftc.jp/monthly/archives/001/201802/9480ee77341ac62987618120e86cd807.pdf. Accessed: 13.11.2022.

FULCRUM (2023). Japan's foreign policy direction under Kishida. Retrieved from https://fulcrum.sg/japans-foreign-policy-direction-under-kishida/. Accessed: 04.02.2023.

Insebayeva, Sabina (2019). "Japan's Central Asia policy revisited: National identity, interests, and foreign policy discourses." Nationalities Papers, 47(5): 853–867.

Iwashita, Akihiro (2008). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Japan: Moving together to reshape the Eurasian Community. The Brookings Institution, 2008.

JICA (2022). Annual Report 2022. Retrieved from https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/annual/2022/index.html. Accessed: 04.02.2023.

JICA (n.d.). Japan International Cooperation Agency. Retrieved from https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/annual/index.html. Accessed: 04.02.2023.

JICA (2023). The project for human resource development scholarship by Japanese grant aid". Retrieved from https://jds-scholarship.org/. Accessed: 22.01.2023.

Kadyrova, Elvira (2022). "Japan and Central Asia: dynamics of the current partnership". Retrieved from https://www.newscentralasia.net/2022/12/21/japan-and-central-asia-dynamics-of-the-current-partnership/. Accessed: 04.02.2023.

Kawato, Akio (2008). "What is Japan up to in Central Asia?" In "Japan's Silk Road Diplomacy. Paving the Road Ahead". Ed. by Christopher Len, Uyama Tomohiko and Hirose Tetsuya. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2008, pp.15–30.

Len, Christopher, Uyama, Tomohiko, & Hirose, Tetsuya (Eds.) (2008). Japan's Silk Road Diplomacy: Paving the Road Ahead. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program.

Mangi, Lutfullah (2011). "The political and economic strategy of Japan towards Central Asia". Social Research Center Publications, 2011. pp. 1–9.

McGray, Douglas (2009). Japan's gross national cool. Foreign policy. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/11/japans-gross-national-cool/. Accessed: 21.11.2022.

MOFA (2007). "On the "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity". An Address by H.E. Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Founding of the Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.", International House of Japan, March 12, 2007.

MOFA (2020). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved from https://www.mofa.go.jp/. Accessed: 14.02.2023.

MOFA (2022). "The 9th Foreign Ministers' Meeting of the "Central Asia plus Japan" Dialogue". Retrieved from https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_003197.html. Accessed: 04.02.2023.

Murashkin, Nikolay (2018). "Not-So-New Silk Roads: Japan's foreign policies on Asian connectivity infrastructure under the radar", Australian Journal of International Affairs, 72(5): 455-472. Doi: 10.1080/10357718.2018.1510896

Murashkin, Nikolay (2019). "Japan and Central Asia: Do diplomacy and business go hand-in-hand?", Études de l'Ifri, Ifri, April 2019.

Murashkin, Nikolay and Eriks Varpahovskis (2022). "The Role of Development Models in Japan's and Korea's Relations with Central Asia: Discourses and Practices." Journal of Eurasian Studies, 13(2): 180–199.

Nye, Joseph S. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Public Affairs.

OECD (2022). ODA Levels in 2021 – Preliminary data. Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/ODA-2021-summary.pdf. Accessed: 04.11.2022.

Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet (1997). Address by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to the Japan Association of Corporate Executives. 24 July 1997. Retrieved from https://japan.kantei.go.jp/0731douyukai.html. Accessed: 14.10.2022.

Rakhimov, Mirzokhid (2014). "Central Asia and Japan: Bilateral and multilateral relations", Journal of Eurasian Studies, 5(1): 77–87.

SEnECA (2018). Political and security relations – Mapping Central Asia's relations with other Asian states. Policy Paper D2.1. No. 2. Edited by Anna Gussarova and Māris Andžāns,

Takeshi, Yuasa (2007). "Japan's multilateral approach toward Central Asia", in Akihiro Iwashita, Ed., Eager Eyes Fixed on Slavic Eurasia: Volume 1, Russia and Its Neighbors in Crisis, 21st Century COE Program Slavic Eurasian Studies, No. 16-1, Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, June 2007, pp. 75-77.

Takeshi, Yuasa (2008). "Consolidating "Value-Oriented Diplomacy" towards Eurasia? The "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" and Beyond", In "Japan's Silk Road Diplomacy. Paving the Road Ahead". Ed. by Christopher Len, Uyama Tomohiko, Hirose Tetsuya. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2008.

UKRAINE 'IN BETWEEN':
THE ROAD TO WAR AND KYIV'S REACTION TO THE RUSSIAN AND EUROPEAN INITIATIVES IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE

Giulia AZZARONE [1] & Valdir DA SILVA BEZERRA [2]
[1] College of Europe, 8000 Bruges, Belgium
giulia.azzarone95@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0002-3325-925X
[2] Saint Petersburg State University, 199034 Saint Petersburg, Russia
sb1.valdir@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0001-6488-478X

ABSTRACT

The regional integration initiatives undertaken by the Russian Federation and the European Union (EU) in the post-Soviet space since the 1990s and the Ukrainian response to such initiatives constitute one of the main factors (and yet not sufficiently explored) behind the geopolitical tension involving the current war in Ukraine. This research shows how Kyiv's reaction towards the aspirations of both Russia and the European Union in the post-Soviet space spurred an acute competition between Moscow and the West, which set the scene for the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Keywords: Ukraine, Russia, European Union, Eurasian Economic Union, Integration, Geopolitical conflict.

INTRODUCTION

After the end of the Cold War, academic and political debates on the post-Soviet space revolved around not only post-Communist economic transition, but also around the European Union's (EU) and Russia's policies of institutionalization and integration in the region during the 1990s. These projects bore the same overall objective of exerting an influence over their neighbourhood to guarantee their own security and political objectives. In Averre's words: "Moscow's aim is similar to that of Brussels - to shape its external environment by establishing stable and friendly States on its periphery as a prerequisite for security" (Averre, 2009: 1696). However, the remarkable difference between the EU's and the Russian approach to their neighbourhood lies in the means employed to achieve their political aims. If, on the one hand, Russian-led initiatives such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) symbolized attempts to reinforce Moscow's influence in its neighbourhood, EU's policies towards the post-Soviet space, notably the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Eastern Partnership (EaP), adopted an approach based on the attractiveness of the EU project for countries in its vicinity. While the EU, on the one hand, represents "an economic entity tasked with managing functional integration […] Russia is a nation-State wielding the whole array of coercive and co-optative tools, much like other sovereign actors" (Bechev, 2015: 341).

Nevertheless, both the EU and Russia "are still in a state of profound mutual ambiguity" (Emerson, 2005: 1), not exactly knowing how to properly coexist within the 'same European home', and how to conciliate their interests in the post-Soviet space. On this note, Ukraine is one of the countries that better represented the clash between the Russian and the EU projects in the post-Soviet area, due to its (geo)strategic importance for both actors. Especially in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, Europe witnessed a "shift from uncomfortable coexistence to competition between the EU and Russia in their common neighbourhood" (Bechev, 2015: 340), amplifying the political tensions in the post-Soviet space.

Ukraine is the country that better represents the clash between the pre-war Russian and the EU political approaches to the post-Soviet area, due to its (geo) strategic importance for both actors. Especially in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, Europe witnessed a "shift from uncomfortable coexistence to competition between the EU and Russia in their common neighbourhood" (Bechev, 2015: 340), amplifying the political tensions in the post-Soviet space. Furthermore, Kyiv provides the most evident instance of the difference in means used by Russia and the EU in the implementation of their strategies toward their neighbourhood. On the one hand, the EU instruments of attractiveness based on economic incentives strongly motivated Ukraine to participate in the EU's projects in the neighbourhood. But, most importantly, the Ukrainian aspiration to become someday a member of the EU motivated Kyiv to be an active partner in the EU policies towards its Eastern neighbourhood. Indeed, in Ukraine's view, stronger relations with the EU and coveted membership would have been a crucial security guarantee for Ukraine against Russian geopolitical ambitions in the region.

While the European Union's increased presence in the post-Soviet space exacerbated Russia's concerns over a possible encroachment in the area perceived by Moscow as its sphere of influence, for the EU itself Russia represented an

inherently geopolitical actor, willing to assert its Great Power domination in the region (Ademmer et al., 2016; Browning, 2017). At the same time, much like Russia, the EU is also "impregnated with geopolitical visions aimed at ordering and organizing the space beyond its borders" (Browning, 2017: 106), whose instruments are composed of economic incentives and the attractiveness of its values (or 'Soft Power').

In this paper, we analyse pre-war European and Russian approaches towards the post-Soviet space and Ukraine's response to such initiatives during the 1990s and 2000s. The aim is to reach an understanding of how Kyiv reacted to Moscow's and EU's influence within the region and how did the past competition between these parties over their common neighbourhood prepare the ground for the present situation in Ukraine. To do that, we scrutinize the main political initiatives undertaken by Russia and the EU in terms of their regional projects and the engagement – or lack thereof – of Ukraine vis-à-vis such projects.

We found best suited to focus our attention on the political relations between Ukraine, the EU, and Russia since the 1990s, describing the gradual implementation of EU's framework policies (such as the ENP/EaP) and the Post-Soviet regional cooperation initiatives patronized by Russia (the Commonwealth of Independent States, CSTO and EEU), while evaluating Kyiv's political response. In Ukraine, both the EU's attempt at getting closer to post-Soviet countries as well as Russia's Great Power game and efforts to consolidate a sphere of influence in the region can be observed. Structurally, our first section will be dedicated to Russia's model political moves in the post-Soviet space, whereas the second one will concentrate on the EU's initiatives towards Eastern Europe. Both sections will present Ukraine's response vis-à-vis both players, exploring the political dynamics involving Kyiv, Moscow and the European Union.

RUSSIAN-LED INITIATIVES OF INTEGRATION IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE

Ukraine's Importance to Russia

After the fall of the USSR, not only the post-Soviet space was left on the periphery of global regionalization, but Russia "went through a period of revolutionary turmoil, characterized by chaotic and haphazard decision-making" (Trenin and Lo, 2005: 4), which hindered the country's ability to exercise any role of regional leadership. Moreover, the loss of its "buffer zone" as the Eastern European States after the Soviet dissolution in 1991 cut down Russia's area of influence and, in the eyes of Moscow, left the country more vulnerable in both military and political terms. As a legacy from its period of post-Soviet weakness, authorities in Moscow had the perception that the West (including Europe), 'took advantage' of the country's debilitated economic and political state – especially during the 1990s - to undermine Russia's national security (Averre, 2009) and one of the key elements to understand this situation is Moscow's political relationship with Ukraine.

Ukraine's importance for Russia can hardly be underestimated. In short, "their shared history and the long Russian domination over parts of the Ukrainian territory left very strong cultural, ethnic, economic and political ties" (Adam, 2011: 56; our translation) between these two countries. The very formation

of the Old Russian State during the 9th century resulted from the historical development of Eastern Slavic tribes, whose first political associations were centred around Kyiv (today's capital of Ukraine), constituting what became later known as the Kievan Rus; it was by that time "that an ancient Russian nationality was formed with a single language, a single culture, common State borders and history, representing the cradle of three future Slavic peoples - Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians" (Pushkin Institute, n.d., our translation).

Both Russia and Ukraine are also considered part of an 'Orthodox civilization', sharing similar cultural values, religion, and traditions, differentiating them from other civilizations (Huntington, 1996), such as the Western one. On this note, in the year of 988 AD, by the will of Prince Vladimir I (r. 980–1015), the principality of Rus adopted Christianity as its official religion, by means of a "mass baptism" in Kyiv; not long afterward, the newly adopted Christianity would expand rapidly within Slavic lands (although not without resistance), with the so-called "Baptism of Rus" becoming one of the most influential events in the history and spiritual life of the Slavic peoples, and one the most important dates for Russians and Ukrainians alike (Bezerra, 2019). Up to this day, for example, the sign of the principality of Vladimir I (or Volodymyr the Great for Ukrainians) is the main element of the State Emblem of Ukraine (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996, Article 20).

Apart from religious similarities, Ukraine and Russia for centuries shared important political ties as well. During the 18-19th centuries, parts of the current Ukrainian territory (especially the central and eastern parts) were controlled by the Russian Empire, while during the 20th century, shortly after the 1917 Russian Revolution, Ukraine, under the rulership of the Bolsheviks, became a socialist soviet republic, included later in the USSR. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine and all the former Soviet republics declared their independence with the next decade being marked by attempts to foster a particular Ukrainian identity, this time detached from the Russian one.

Moscow's Approach Towards the Post-Soviet Space and Ukraine's (Dis) Interest

During the 1990s, a multilateral forum for political concertation between the former Soviet republics was established to regulate future relations of the post-Soviet nations, namely the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Founded on December 25, 1991, the CIS was comprised of the following signatories: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Based on promises of cooperation and partnership, the CIS would prove inefficient in terms of consolidating stronger institutional ties within the post-Soviet space, which was not a priority in Russia's foreign and economic policies. According to analysts "it is not much of an overstatement to say that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is little but an institutionalized gathering of the sovereign post-Soviet presidents" (Trenin and Lo, 2005: 9), while Moscow's relationship with the newly independent States in its neighbourhood became marked by a "regression of the empire" (Freire, 2008).

Since its inception, the CIS didn't exert any significant impact on the most important political decisions taken by its members (Weitz, 2014), and no general leadership was exercised by Russia in terms of implementing a serious integrative

project for the region (Dugin, 2016). Ukraine, for its part, saw the organization not as a platform for multilateral concertation, but as the 'definitive instrument of the end of the USSR' (Adam, 2011), an institutional representation of the country's independence from Moscow. In that regard, it is telling to observe that on the CIS official website, there is no single quotation from Ukrainian leaders about the importance of this political forum for the country.

At the beginning of the new century, however, to develop further cooperation in the military-political sphere with neighbouring countries of the post-Soviet space, Russia launched the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), considered by Moscow as an important factor "to maintain stability and ensure security in the CIS area" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2008) and a key element "of the modern security system in the post-Soviet space" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016). The organization, while focused on the fight against international terrorism, extremism and separatism, was joined by Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (the latter three countries are located in Central Asia). The absence of Ukraine in the CSTO, in turn, switched the geographical focus on Central Asia, whereas historically it is Russia's western borders that represent a focal point of Moscow's security concerns due to negative perceptions about NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] military encroachment.

NATO is seen by Moscow as dominated by American strategic interests, with its post-Cold War expansion perceived by Putin as an 'unwelcomed militarization' of Russia's western borders (Oldberg, 2010; Freire, 2008). While Realists have considered NATO as "essentially an American tool for managing power in the face of Soviet threat" (Mearsheimer, 1995: 14), its expansion after the end of the Cold War - when the Soviet threat no longer existed - could only be explained, in Russia's view, as directed against itself. According to the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2016, for example, Moscow sees the US (together with its Western allies) once again conducting a policy of containment to weaken Russia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016).

This interpretation held by Russian leaders (and by Vladimir Putin in particular) about NATO´s expansion during the late 1990s and early 2000s, as well as the installation of anti-ballistic missiles in countries such as Poland and Romania, objectively nurtured Russia's concerns about the advances of the Atlantic Alliance. By 2008 Russia openly expressed its discontent towards NATO's further expansion to the East and "notably to the plans of admitting Ukraine and Georgia to the membership in the alliance […] bringing NATO military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2008). In effect,

> The admittance of Ukraine […] into NATO was considered by the Russian leadership to be a logical limit, a kind of "red line" in the realm of NATO expansion […] the possibility of admitting two neighbouring countries [Ukraine and Georgia] to the inimical military bloc looked like it could be a crushing blow to Russian strategic interests (Tsvetkov, 2017; our emphasis).

It is important to note that Russian President Vladimir Putin believes that Russia must have a sphere of influence in its neighbourhood, particularly among the former Soviet republics, due to its Great Power status and security needs. In that sense, Russia usually did not treat post-Soviet states (such as Georgia and Ukraine) as truly sovereign, once the Kremlin leadership believes it has the

right to set conditions on their policy choices, ensuring that these States do not take actions that undermine Russian interests. The blatant evidence of Moscow's opposition to the influence of Western organizations in its neighbourhood came with the Russian military intervention in Georgia in 2008, following Tbilisi's attempt to re-establish control over the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Justified by authorities in Moscow (and especially by Dmitry Medvedev, President at that time) as an intervention intended to defend the civil populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the brief Russia-Georgia war of 2008 demonstrated Moscow's will of using its military power to curb NATO's advance towards its southern borders, while improving its military position and regional pre-eminence in the post-Soviet space (Oldberg, 2010; Mazat and Serrano, 2012). Similar aspects of that justification and geopolitical goals were also levelled by Russian authorities in the moments before the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2022.

In 2010, by its turn, much due to Russia's political pressure and frequent altercations with its Ukrainian counterparts, Ukraine's president Viktor Yanukovych (who governed the country between 2010 and 2014) cancelled Kyiv's aspirations of joining NATO. In that year, the Parliament of Ukraine (Верхо́вна Ра́да) decided to withdraw the country's application for NATO membership (sent some years prior), a decision motivated by the desire to keep stable relations with Russia and by the realization that a Ukrainian candidacy to the Atlantic Alliance was - by that time – still premature (Mazat and Serrano, 2012).

In 2011, Moscow formed the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) alongside Belarus and Kazakhstan "to make the best use of mutually beneficial economic ties in the CIS space" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2013), while aiming to stimulate: 1) free flow of goods, capital, services and labor 2) equal access to transport and energy infrastructure and 3) common rules of customs and tariff regulation among its participants. The EEU, under the leadership of Moscow, "actively sought to attract new members, or at least to dissuade potential members from pursuing closer economic integration with the EU" (Ademmer et al., 2016: 2). For some analysts, the establishment of the EEU was an attempt by Moscow to control the post-Soviet space, creating a transnational entity that could potentially become a stronger global Eurasian actor (Cohen, 2013). Dugin (2016), for instance, asserts that behind the regional economic integration lies a greater geopolitical goal, to create a supranational Eurasian space based on civilizational ties, like the European Union.

When initial conversations were held back in 2003 on the establishment of a legal framework for a future Common [Eurasian] Economic Space between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, Ukraine was actively involved in the process; by that time, around 17.3% of Ukraine's exports were directed to Russia, while imports from Russia accounted for 32.9% of the country's total (Observatory of Economic Complexity, n/d). Russia then represented the single most important trade partner of Ukraine, a situation that was used by Moscow to keep Kyiv under its sphere of influence (Ademmer et al., 2016). However, on April 2011 the President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso mentioned during a visit to Kyiv that Ukraine could not simultaneously join the Russian-led EEU and expect its acceptance into a Free Trade Zone (FTZ) with the European Union (Deutsche Welle, 2011).

In fact, by 2010 a law passed by the Ukrainian parliament affirmed Kyiv's commitment to ensure its integration into the European political, economic and legal space to attain [a possible] membership in the EU (Law of Ukraine on the Foundations of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 2010) thus benefitting from an economic cooperation with the bloc. With the EEU, Ukraine signed only a memorandum for 'intensified cooperation' (TASS, 2013), while not excluding a potential admittance into the Customs Union that already existed between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. However, that policy of balancing between the EU and Russia "resulted in a political crisis and a split in the Ukrainian society" (Lagutina and Vasilyeva, 2017), consisting of those who favoured a definitive approximation with the EU versus those who favoured stable and closer relations with Russia.

The Aftermath of 2014's Turmoil and Russia-Ukraine Relations

At the beginning of 2014, in response to President Viktor Yanukovych's suspension of Ukraine's association agreement (AA) with the EU, Ukrainians in favor of an approximation with Europe started to protest on the streets, claiming a change in the government in Kyiv. The social discontent behind the so-called 'Revolution of Dignity' also originated from the deep inefficiency of Ukraine's institutions, discriminations along a West-East divide and, most of all, the incapacity of the central government to implement reforms in a context of economic crisis. During that time Russia "used diplomatic persuasion to try to convince Kyiv not to align with the West" (Mazarr et al., 2018: 16), although without achieving its desired results. Years prior, the increasingly pro-EU discourse among Ukrainian circles caused "a rhetorical backlash by Russia framed as resistance to Western meddling in its privileged sphere of cultural influence" (Bechev, 2015: 345). Some even contend that for President Vladimir Putin "all nominally independent border land States […] including Ukraine, [are used] as weapons in the hands of Western powers intent on wielding them against Russia" (Kotkin, 2016: 4). For most Russian politicians,

> There were no doubts that as a result of the pro-Western revolution in Ukraine, the country would renew its efforts toward attainting membership in NATO, and in this new situation Russia would have no chance to slow the process down with negotiations (Tsvetkov, 2017; our emphasis).

To complicate things further, in March 2014 Russia annexed Crimea and started to support separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine, putting Moscow at odds with authorities in Kyiv and the EU. By that time, Russia invoked historical narratives to justify its ownership over Crimea. Historically, the Crimean Peninsula became part of the Russian Empire in 1783, during the reign of Empress Catherine II "The Great" (1762-1796), after a military victory over the Ottoman Turks who held control of the region. In 1954, however, USSR's Secretary-General Nikita Kruschev ceded Crimea to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Be it as it may, since the end of the USSR in 1991, Moscow interpreted the Ukrainian sovereignty in Crimea "as the most humiliating loss of all the territories left outside of Russia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union" (Lukyanov, 2016: 35). Therefore, Crimea's annexation by Russia meant the 'correction of that historical injustice' (ibid.)

According to opinion polls, between 2014 and 2015 more than 80% of Russians were in favor of Crimea's accession to Russia, and more than 70% believed that

the event indicated the country's return to its 'traditional role of Great Power' (Levada Analytical Centre, 2016: 270-273) in world politics. The EU, by its turn, declared it wouldn't recognize "Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea nor accept the destabilization of eastern Ukraine" mentioning that "peace and stability in Europe are no longer a given [due to] Russia's violation of international law" (ibidem). Within that context, Moscow was perceived as a "political rival to Brussels and consequently as the main stumbling block to any EU–Russia cooperation" (Averre, 2009: 1708; Bechev, 2015).

For Europeans, what the 2014 crisis seemed to demonstrate was that "Russia has proven not only capable but also willing to use military force [...] to maintain its primacy in the post-Soviet space" (Bechev, 2015: 341). In Ukraine, on the other hand, many started to feel as if their country was once more slipping behind a new kind of 'iron curtain', with Moscow's actions provoking "even deeper hostility toward Russia not only among Ukraine's elites but also among its broader population" (Trenin, 2016: 26). In 2015 for instance, in a discourse before the UN, Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko (who governed the country from 2014 to 2019) exposed his personal views about the situation involving Crimea, mentioning,

> My country has become the object of external aggression. This time the aggressor is Russia - our neighbouring country, a former strategic partner [...] All this is happening against the background of treacherous rhetoric about fraternal peoples, common history, related languages and a "destined" common future. We are dealing with a desire to return to imperial times with spheres of influence, representing a desperate attempt to assert itself at the expense of others.

Not only Poroshenko, but other Ukrainian politicians started to label Russia as an 'aggressor country' and as an 'occupying power', which violated Ukraine's sovereignty by disobeying international law. The post-revolution government in Kyiv was thus became characterized by its sympathy for the West and its anti-Russian rhetoric. According to the Kremlin, the events of 2014 in Ukraine consisted of a full-fledged coup d'état to topple a pro-Russian leader, a coup that was supported and welcomed by the West. Notwithstanding, in 2019 an amendment to the preamble of the Ukrainian Constitution affirmed "the European identity of the Ukrainian people and the irreversibility of the European and Euro-Atlantic course of Ukraine" (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996, preamble; our translation), while a different addition to the Constitution established that the president should work for the "implementation of the strategic course of the State towards the acquisition of full membership [...] in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization" (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996, Article 102; our translation).

THE EU'S MODEL OF INTEGRATION IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE

EU's Importance to Ukraine and Kyiv's Long-Term Aspirations

At the root of the relations between Ukraine and the EU lies the ontological question about the nature of Europe and what could and could not be considered as 'Europe'. Ukraine has long aspired to join the European Union. Under Leonid Kuchma's administration during the 1990s, a vast program of reforms

was adopted in Ukraine to strengthen ties with the West and the EU (Kubicek, 2005), while at the same time keeping stable relations with Russia. The rhetoric adopted by Kuchma stressed how Ukraine should endeavour to create a link with the EU from a cultural as well as from an institutional point of view.

At that time, the legal framework for EU-Ukraine relations was based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1994, representing the first agreement of this kind between the EU and one of its neighbours in the East. However, even after numerous political contacts, parliamentary exchanges and meetings at ministerial levels, in practice the PCA signed in 1994 had mainly an economic character; on the one hand, the EU lamented the slow pace of Ukraine's implementation of legal provisions, whereas Ukraine was dissatisfied with the restrictions imposed by the European bloc on its exports of steel and textile (Kubicek, 2005). Already in 1996, Kuchma announced that one of the main priorities of Ukraine's foreign policy was to obtain EU membership.

The presidential decree "Strategy of Ukraine's Integration in the European Union" issued in 1998 and others that followed further emphasized the so-called 'European choice' of Ukraine, based on the consideration that the EU membership could provide Ukraine not only political but also economic development while securing Kyiv against the 'Russian menace' (Kubicek, 2005). For its part, the EU was aware of the importance of showing engagement with Kyiv, considering that instabilities in Ukraine could have negative effects on the entirety of the bloc. However, Ukraine was excluded from the group of countries to join the EU during its first 'big' enlargement in 2004, when the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia achieved EU membership. Nevertheless, when the Orange Revolution happened in Ukraine in 2004, the EU's interest in Kyiv grew stronger, culminating in Ukraine's inclusion in the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership (EaP).

EU's Approach towards its Eastern Neighbourhood and Ukraine's Participation

Following its 'big' enlargement in 2004, suddenly the European Union was surrounded by a 'new' neighbourhood of States, which required the elaboration of new policies to deal with Europe's neighbours under a single political framework, represented by the European Neighbourhood Policy (European Commission, 2004). The ENP encompassed 10 southern neighbours (Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Palestine, Israel and Syria) and 6 Newly Independent States (NIS), namely: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and had the purpose of stabilizing - politically as well as economically – Europe's neighbourhood, protecting the EU from potential instabilities at its borders.

One year prior, according to the Commission of the European Communities (2003: 6) the ENP was intended to "avoid […] new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union". To that end, and to foster democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights in Eastern Europe, the EU's strategy consisted in offering participation in the bloc's market to those partners that successfully implemented reforms in accordance with the EU's Acquis Communautaire (a whole set of duties and

rights deriving from the European Union's law). Nevertheless, since the ENP covered only those countries that were excluded from any perspective of EU membership, its efforts to incentivize States to align with EU's legislations showed little results (Delcour, 2011).

The first element put into practice to achieve the objectives of the ENP was the elaboration of Action Plans (AP), which established the political and economic reforms required for each partner country to strengthen their cooperation with the EU (European External Action Service, 2016). At the same time, the EU recognized the 'conspicuous divergences' of the partner countries and consequently the necessity to adopt a tailored approach to each of them. The AP signed between Ukraine and the EU in 2005, for instance, had the following requirements: compliance with electoral standards established by the OSCE both in parliamentary and presidential elections, approximation of the country's legislation with that of the EU, implementation of independence for the judiciary branch and the development of better administrative capacities.

Partner countries were incentivized to proactively set goals and implement the reforms agreed upon with the EU. When it comes to the EU's relations with Ukraine, more specifically, "the European Commission proposed to move beyond mere cooperation to a significant degree of economic integration in return for concrete progress in terms of legal approximation" (Loo et al., 2014: 4). In fact, the ENP promoted "a comprehensive and ambitious agenda for domestic political, economic and institutional reform [in Ukraine] converging towards what is seen to be an 'EU model'" (Bechev and Nicolaïdis, 2010: 478). However,

> Being included in a single policy framework together with countries that had no accession perspective [to the EU] was considered by Ukraine as a way to discard its European aspirations. As Ukraine considered its position within the ENP to be quite specific, it met any EU attempt to develop multilateral instruments with reluctance (Delcour, 2011: 76).

Under the auspices of President Viktor Yushchenko, who assumed power after the 'Orange Revolution', Ukraine's integration with the EU and NATO became once again a guideline for Kyiv's foreign policy (Sasse, 2008). In 2006, the European Union stepped up its commitment to achieve economic integration with countries outside the block through its "Global Europe Strategy" and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs). Notably, Ukraine was the first ENP country to open negotiations for an Association Agreement already in 2007, whereas negotiations for a DCFTA between Kyiv and the EU were launched one year later.

In 2009, the ENP was further complemented by the Eastern Partnership, including once again: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus and aimed to foster multilateral cooperation between the EU and countries in the eastern region of Europe. However, the EaP still did not address Kyiv's ambitions to join the EU. The ENP and EaP were both reviewed twice, in 2011 (after the Arab Spring) and in 2015, as a result of the Ukrainian crisis. The latter, particularly, had an important impact not only on future EU policies towards the post-Soviet space but also on Kyiv's foreign policy orientation towards Europe and NATO.

The Aftermath of 2014's Political Turmoil and EU-Ukraine Relations

The basis upon which the Association Agreement (AA) between Ukraine and the European Union was created involved Kyiv's aspiration to be considered not only 'as a mere neighbour's to Europe, but 'as part of Europe' itself. Although it did not openly mention any EU membership perspective for Kyiv at that time, the document nevertheless did not exclude such a development in the long term either. However, on the eve of the EaP Vilnius Summit in 2013, Ukraine announced that it would not sign the AA with the EU, so as not to upset its economic as well as political relations with Moscow. That decision sowed discontent among the Ukrainian population, initiating what became later known as the 'Euro-Maidan revolution'.

The acting Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych was forced to flee the country and in June 2014 the temporary Ukrainian president appointed by the parliament, Oleksandr Turchynov, proceeded to finally ratify – through a 'fast-track' procedure - the whole content of the Agreement, which was signed later the same year. Nevertheless, even after Kyiv's approval, some EU members were still not favourable to the signature of the AA with Ukraine (the Netherlands for example), so the document entered into force only in 2017. The most contested points of the AA concerned EU membership perspectives for Ukraine, as well as the free movement of labour and access to EU funding programs.

For the European Commission, the Agreement was "the main tool for bringing Ukraine and the EU closer together […] [promoting] deeper political ties, stronger economic links and the respect for common values" (European Commission, n.d.). In practical terms, Kyiv benefited from the implementation of the economic measures included in the Agreement with the EU, above all in terms of the abolition of tariffs on many agricultural and industrial products exported from Ukraine to the bloc. As a result, in 2017 the European Union accounted for approximately 40% of Ukraine's total exports; later on, in 2019 Ukraine's exports to the EU amounted to €19.1 billion, representing a 48,5% increase in comparison to 2016, whereas the number of Ukrainian companies with access to the European went from 11.700 in 2015 to more than 14.500 in 2019 (European Commission, n.d.).

However, despite improvements in bilateral economic relations, Ukraine still faced difficulties in terms of aligning its legislation with EU's regulations and standards (above all in the judicial sector) (Romanyshyn, 2019), with a possible future accession to the EU and NATO being complicated by the annexation of Crimea by Russia and by political and military disputes over territories in Donetsk and Luhansk in the eastern parts of the country. At the same, this understanding of Ukraine as 'EU's neighbour', rather than the 'centre of its world', of an adjacent element to a 'wider' Europe, places Kyiv not quite on the same 'footing' with other members of the bloc.

> At the heart of the EU's relationship with surrounding countries lies a fundamental asymmetry of power which in turn feeds the EU-centric nature of the enterprise […] even […] the more inclusive notion of 'neighbourhood' – still reflects the centrality of the EU [...] an exercise of a central power 'managing' its periphery (Bechev and Nicolaïdis, 2010: 479).

Thus, Ukraine's position vis-a-vis the expanding normative and value-driven initiatives undertaken by the EU on the one hand and Russia's security-motivated institution building on the other put Kyiv at a crossroads, whilst the country was seen by both the EU and Russia as an important element for their strategies in the post-Soviet area.

CONCLUSION

Years before the Ukrainian political crisis of 2014, European powers could hardly accept the continued existence of old-fashioned spheres of influence in the continent. On this note, the EU saw negatively any Russian attempt to increase its political hold within the post-Soviet space and especially towards Ukraine in particular. On the other hand, the process of EU enlargement during the 2000s was seen by Moscow as a challenge to its regional leadership, thus fomenting new divisions in Europe along the East/West cleavage. With NATO's post-Cold War expansion and the EU's addition of former Soviet satellites, a new cycle of mistrust took place between Moscow and European leaders, a situation that became even more acute after 2014 and in light of the events that led to the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022.

In fact, since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 Moscow feared the EU's gradual approximation with Ukraine. On the other hand, due to the size of its population, territory and geostrategic location, neither Russia nor the EU could refrain from engaging Ukraine politically to advance their interests. Russian-led initiatives, however, did not particularly attract the political elites in Kyiv whereas since the 1990s Ukraine seemed to gravitate more towards the 'European project'. Nevertheless, during the 2000s Kyiv still managed to not alienate Russia completely, as demonstrated by Ukraine's renunciation of its bid to join NATO in 2010.

Moscow's incorporation of Crimea in 2014 further antagonized the political elites in Kyiv, consolidating Ukraine's foreign policy orientation towards the EU and the affirmation of the country's 'European choice', jeopardizing its relations with Russia. Although being internally split between a pro-European and a pro-Russian side, especially in Eastern parts of the country, forecasts for the future normalization of political relations between Kyiv and Moscow are now extremely uncertain. In terms of Ukraine's future in Europe, it remains to be seen whether Kyiv will be able to regain control over its Eastern parts to renew its aspiration for candidacy to the European Union and maybe possibly even NATO. The fact is that: by being geographically positioned among two influential and powerful neighbours, Ukraine suffered the effects of both the EU's 'unwillingness' to accept the country as 'more than a neighbour' and Russia's 'willingness' to keep it under its sphere of influence.

The road to war in Ukraine, therefore, was marked by the perception of Russian authorities that Kyiv should not move on its own towards Europe and especially towards NATO, while Brussels - up until the outbreak of the conflict - was hesitant to take concrete steps to attend Ukraine's long-held aspirations to be accepted in the European block.

REFERENCES

Adam, Gabriel Pessin (2011). A Rússia e os Países da Comunidade dos Estados Independentes no Início do Século XXI. In Alves, A. org. Uma Longa Transição: Vinte Anos de Transformações na Rússia: 39-80. Brasília: IPEA.

Ademmer, Esther, Laure Delcour and Kataryna Wolczuk (2016). Beyond geopolitics: exploring the impact of the EU and Russia in the "contested neighbourhood". Eurasian Geography and Economics, 57(1): pp. 1-18.

Averre, Derek (2009). Competing Rationalities: Russia, the EU and the 'Shared Neighbourhood'. Europe-Asia Studies, 6(10): pp. 1689-1713.

Bechev, Dimitar (2015). Understanding the contest between the EU and Russia in their shared neighbourhood. Problems of Post-Communism, 62(6): pp. 340-349.

Bechev, Dimitar and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (2010). From policy to polity: Can the EU's special relations with its 'Neighbourhood' be Decentered? JCMS, 48(3): pp. 475–500.

Bezerra, Valdir Da Silva (2019). De volta para o passado: a aproximação de Putin com a Igreja Ortodoxa russa e a retomada da religião como fator de identidade regional. Intellector, Ano XV | Volume XVI | Nº 31| Janeiro/Junho 2019 | Rio de Janeiro, pp. 48-58.

Browning, Christopher S. (2018). Geostrategies, geopolitics and ontological security in the Eastern neighbourhood: The European Union and the 'new Cold War'. Political Geography, No. 62: pp. 106-115.

Cohen, Ariel (2013). Russia's Eurasian Union could endanger the neighbourhood and U.S. interests. The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved from http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/06/russias-eurasian-union-could-endanger-the-neighborhood-and-us-interests. Accessed: 26.05.2022.

Constitution of Ukraine (1996). Retrieved from https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80#Text. Accessed: 10.08.2022.

Delcour, Laure (2011). Shaping the Post-Soviet Space? EU Policies and Approaches to Region-Building. London: Ashgate.

Deutsche Welle (2011). Ukraine refused to join the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Retrieved from https://p.dw.com/p/112Uz. Accessed: 26.05.2022.

Dugin, Alexandr (2016). Geopolítica da Rússia Contemporânea. Lisboa: Instituto de Altos Estudos em Geopolítica E Estudos Auxiliares.

Emerson, Michael (2005). EU-Russia: Four Common Spaces and the Proliferation of the Fuzzy. Centre for European Policy Studies: CEPS Policy Brief, pp. 1-4.

European Commission (2004). European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities.

European Commission (n.d.). Countries and Regions: Ukraine. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/ukraine.

Accessed: 26.06.2022.

European External Action Service (2016). European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Brussels. Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp/330/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp_en. Accessed: 16.05.2022.

Freire, Maria Raquel (2008). As Eleições Presidenciais Na Rússia: Continuidade Na Mudança. Portugal: Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Retrieved from https://estudogeral.sib.uc.pt/jspui/bitstream/10316/9605/1/MRFreire_OccasionalPaper32_IPRI_2008.pdf. Accessed: 08.10.2022.

Huntington, Samuel (1996). O Choque de Civilizações: E a Recomposição da Ordem Mundial. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Objetiva.

Kotkin, Stephen (2016). Russia's perpetual geopolitics: Putin returns to the historical pattern. Foreign Affairs, United States, 95(3): pp. 2-9.

Kubicek, Paul (2005). The European Union and democratization in Ukraine. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, No. 38: pp. 269-292.

Lagutina, Maria and Natalya Vasilyeva (2017). Eurasian Economic Union in the Russian Foreign Policy. In Tsvetkova, N. Ed. Russia and the World: Understanding International Relations: pp. 309-326. Lexington Books.

Law of Ukraine on the Foundations of Domestic and Foreign Policy (2010). Contents. https://kodeksy.com.ua/ka/o_printsipah_vnutrennej_i_vneshnej_politiki.htm. Accessed: 13.12.2021.

Levada Analytical Centre (2016). Russian Public Opinion 2013-2015. Retrieved from http://www.levada.ru/cp/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/2013-2015-Eng1.pdf. Accessed: 15.04.2022.

Loo, Guillaume, Peter Van Elsuwege and Roman Petrov (2014). The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Assessment of an Innovative Legal Instrument. SSRN Electronic Journal.

Lukyanov, Fyodor (2016). Putin's foreign policy: The quest to restore Russia's rightful place. Foreign Affairs, United States, 95(3): pp. 30-37.

Mazarr, Michael. J et al. (2018). Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives. RAND Corporation: Research Report, RR-2726-AF: pp. 1-46.

Mazat, Numa and Franklin Serrano (2012). A Geopolítica Da Federação Russa em Relação aos Estados Unidos e à Europa: Vulnerabilidade, Cooperação e Conflito. In Alves, A. org. Rússia no Século XXI: O Renascimento de uma Potência?: 9-50 Brasília: IPEA.

Mearsheimer, John (1995). The false promise of international institutions. International Security, 19(3): pp. 5-49.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2008). The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Retrieved from http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116. Accessed: 18.09.2021.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2013). The Foreign

Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Retrieved from https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186. Accessed: 18.09.2021.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2016). Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Retrieved from http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248. Accessed: 15.03.2022.

Observatory of Economic Complexity (n.d.) [OEC]. Ukraine. Retrieved from https://oec.world/en/profile/country/ukr. Accessed: 15.04.2022.

Oldberg, Ingmar (2010). Russia´s Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. Swedish Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publications/russias-great-power-strategy-under-putin-and-medvedev-min.pdf. Accessed: 15.02.2022.

Poroshenko, Petro (2022). Petro Poroshenko's Loud Speech at the UN General Assembly. Full text. Retrieved from https://ua.112.ua/statji/huchnyi-vystup-petra-poroshenka-na-henasamblei-oon-povnyi-tekst-261590.html. Accessed: 03.07.2022.

Pushkin Institute (n.d.). The formation of the Old Russian state (Russia in IX-XII centuries). Retrieved from https://pushkininstitute.ru/learn/practices/2027#1. Accessed: 04.02.2022.

Romanyshyn, Yuliana (2019). Partenariato Orientale A Rischio Stallo. Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso. Retrieved from https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Azerbaijan/Partenariato-orientale-a-rischio-stallo-193406. Accessed: 15.03.2022.

Sasse, Gwendolyn (2008). The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality revisited for the EU's eastern neighbours. Europe-Asia Studies, 60(2): pp. 295-316.

TASS (2013). Customs Union and Common Economic Space. Retrieved from https://tass.ru/spravochnaya-informaciya/671096. Accessed: 03.06.2022.

Trenin, Dmitry (2016). The revival of the Russian military: How Moscow reloaded. Foreign Affairs, United States, 95(3): pp. 23-29.

Trenin, Dmitry and Lo Bobo (2005). The Landscape of Russian Foreign Policy Decision-Making. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 4-27.

Tsvetkov, Ivan (2017). US-Russian Relations. In Tsvetkova, N. Ed. Russia and the World: Understanding International Relations, pp. 377-398. Lexington Books.

Weitz, Richard (2014). The Customs Union and Eurasian Union: A Primer. In Cornell, S; Starr, F. S. org. Putin's Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents, pp. 29-39. Singapore: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute e Silk Road Studies Program.

Eurasian
Research
Journal
Spring 2023
Vol. 5, No. 2.

CONTEMPORARY POLITICS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: HISTORICAL DETERMINANTS AND POLITICAL EXPERIENCES

Elvis FEJZIĆ [1]
[1] University of Sarajevo, 71000 Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
elvis.fejzic@fpn.unsa.ba

ORCID: 0000-0002-1638-8607

ABSTRACT

The original foundations of democratic politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina were developed during the period of Austro-Hungarian occupation, and political pluralism was institutionalized in an incomplete form in 1910. The monarchical regime in the first Yugoslav state did not stimulate political development in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because fictitious political pluralism was introduced in political practice. It was not possible to achieve enviable political development not even in a second Yugoslav state, because it was built on the principles of socialist monism. The independent and sovereign existence of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is limited by ethnocracy and imposed stabilocracy. First, this article will investigate to what extent the post-socialist development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which takes place in the stages after the multi-party elections in 1990, is determined by earlier political experiences, and above all by the original concept of incomplete democratic politics founded during the Austro-Hungarian occupation government.

Keywords: State, Politics, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Political Culture, Political Pluralism, Democracy, Ideology.

INTRODUCTION

Modern democratic politics was developed and conceived under the influence of Enlightenment ideas, which openly advocated political emancipation, the rule of the people, and the republican form of government. Bosnian experience of modern politics is connected with the last decade of the nineteenth and the first decade of the twentieth century as at the time Bosnia and Herzegovina – being under Austro-Hungarian colonial rule – had faced for the first time ever, an ordeal of practically enforcing and developing itself in accordance with liberal and capitalistic ideas that were meant to transform the essence of its then economic and political system that was based on feudal and theocratic foundations. The emergence of political pluralism, parliamentarianism, and an introduction of an elective system gave a crucial tone and a dimension to contemporary Bosnian Herzegovinian politics, which had already experimented with some forms of democratic politics at the beginning of the past century. Thematic research of this article belongs to the field of political science the history of political thought, and it concentrates on the complicated development of modern politics and statehood in Bosnia and Herzegovina. An institutional research approach was applied in this article, considering that special focus is placed on the development of political institutions, pluralism, and generally democratic forms of politics. When it comes to research methods, considering that this topic belongs to the history of political thought and that it reflects on contemporary political development, it is a necessity to use the historical and comparative method, but especially the method of content analysis, so the article prefers a qualitative approach in political science. Taking into account the contemporary political context in post-socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina, problems, challenges, and threats faced by ineffective state power, it is necessary to investigate whether the complicated constitutional-political development, especially in the post-Dayton period, was determined and conditioned by earlier political experiences. At the same time, special emphasis in the research will be placed on the political connections of the first experience of democratic politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from the time of the Austro-Hungarian occupation government, and then the post-socialist concept of democratic politics, given that both political models were determined by the will of the ethnocracy and the stabilizing role of external political factors, which so far has not been adequately and scientifically researched at all.

Therefore, it should be emphasized that the modern character of Bosnian politics possesses not only its post-socialist experience but also its former political experiences. Furthermore, the contemporary Bosnian Herzegovinian experience of politics and political culture has its oldest and authentic foundations in the tradition and statehood of medieval Bosnia and the epoch of Ottoman reign over Bosnia, which had an imperial governance character. Namely, during the Middle Ages Bosnia enjoyed a free and sovereign state existence, with established governmental state institutions, like all other medieval feudal states at the time. Its existence as a free state owing to its being a medieval European state, ended with the Ottoman conquest of its territory. After that, the Ottomans performed radical changes concerning the social structure in its westernmost province (Trencsényi et al., 2016). However, Bosnia was never the Dark Vilayet – neither during the Ottoman reign in the region nor during the succeeding political epochs – a view also shared by the opponents of the Bosnian state and legal

development and Bosniak ethnic identity – rather it was represented as a cradle of libertarian and critical thought that did not conform to exorbitant cosmetic compromises with colonial and authoritarian governments.

The original Bosnian identity preserved its authenticity from immediate Ottoman cultural influences – they refined it and gave it a distinct tone but did not transform its essence – that is why the process of Ottomanization of Bosnian society, as active as it was, eventually did not work. The awareness of the territorial compactness of Bosnian territory and the common Illyrian-Slavic origin of Bosniak nationality that during the Ottoman reign had only been heterogeneous on a confessional basis (that comprised of Islamic, Catholic and Orthodox Bosniaks), has never vanished or been erased. Bosniaks of different religions cherished the spirit of convergent politics. Historical records and works of educated Bosniaks from this period of Bosnian history, witness the convergent, tolerant and brotherly relationships between Bosniak members of three religions and is made evident by the reactions and rebellions of educated Bosniak Muslim intellectuals against the Ottoman regime in cases when it performed unfair acts towards the non-Muslim Bosniak population. The Bosniak population was ethnically homogeneous up until the 1860s, when with the assistance of conservative policies coming from Serbia and Croatia, the struggle for religious rights of Bosnian Catholics and Bosnian Orthodox grew into a struggle for their ethnic rights, after which they began declaring themselves as Croats and Serbs. After that, the ethnic structure of the population in Bosnia was heterogeneous, comprising Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. This kind of ethnic structure of the Bosnian population – alongside with slight and mild modifications – has remained to today, keeping in mind that in the following decades, the original Bosnian identity sometimes faced various political bans regarding its expression. In the epoch of a sovereign Bosnian state existence, we may say that three constitutive Bosnian nationalities enjoy their ethnic rights mostly uninterrupted.

The processes of ethnicization in Bosnia had already been completed by 1878 – by which religious differences of the Bosniak population decanted into ethnic differences through a period of new political circumstances – after which Austro-Hungary completed its occupation, and with the decision of the Berlin Congress its historical name was altered as well. The name `Bosnia and Herzegovina´ has been in official use ever since. Bosnia and Herzegovina did not lose its territorial compactness, nor the critical spirit of its intellectual elite – who have always been guardians of Bosnian heritage, not even in the Austro-Hungarian period of rule. After establishing King Alexander's dictatorship in first Yugoslavia, the historical territorial integrity was violated for a short period. Ultimately however, by the decisions of ZAVNOBIH (The State Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and AVNOJ (The Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia) during the Second World War, Bosnia and Herzegovina managed to restore the centurial statehood that enabled it to continue its sovereign existence in second Yugoslavia, and after that as an independent state in the era of global politics.

THE EMERGENCE OF PARLIAMENTARIANISM AND POLITICAL PLURALISM: AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN POLITICAL EXPERIENCE

After the setting up of the Austro-Hungarian form of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina, liberal political and economic ideas started to be used and applied in its political practice. Fortifying political pluralism – made possible by the introduction of the Bosnian Assembly and the election procedure – in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1910 represented a true step forward toward the sphere of modern politics (Zgodić, 2003: 97). The established political parties – apart from the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which did not have its representative body within the Bosnian Assembly – were based on an ethnic principle that had respect for religious affiliation (Fejzić, 2012: 206). Bosniak Muslims at that time were predominately engaged in the Muslim National Organization as well as in the Muslim Progressive Party. Concurrently Bosnian Serbs generally supported the political actions of the Serbian National Organization, and at a much lesser rate The Serbian National Independent Party. Bosnian Croats were oriented to the Croatian National Community – which had greater support from citizens – and to the Croatian Catholic Association, which promoted the ideas of catholic clericalism and Christian democracy.

The breakthrough of capitalistic ideas into Bosnian space hastened the process of accepting socialist ideas and practices which were trying to humanize the work sphere and liberate it from capitalistic rigidity and inclemency. Bosnian Herzegovinian social democrats of the period offered original and functional solutions within the political, social, and national existence milieu, especially within a sphere with a preference for democratic governance, free elections, public voting rights, woman's rights activism, promotion of secular education, and a struggle for equality among all Yugoslav nation – primarily Bosniak Muslims whose ethnic indigenous status was denied by the official governmental regime (Fejzić, 2015). Settling the agrarian issue and eliminating agrarian relations within the economic sphere, which represented a feudal system relapse, mostly drew the attention of Bosnian political elites from within, and the Austro-Hungarian rule during the post-annexation phase in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Regarding the resolution of the issue, Bosnian Herzegovinian political representatives at the time failed to reach a consensus since they diverged in their proposals of ideas. In that sense, Serbian and Croatian parties, together with the civic-oriented social-democratic political elite, hoped for a radical solution of the Agrarian Question, whilst political Bosniak Muslim representation advocated the politics of the status quo within the sphere of agrarian relations. The settlement of the Agrarian Question – in its distinct way – also complicated the politics of transformable ethnic pacting in the Bosnian Assembly because the conditions for permanent political alliances and negotiations were not provided.

During the Habsburg rule, Bosnia and Herzegovina began a vigorous process of secularization of politics, society, and education. As a result of the activities of educated intellectuals, ideology developed as a science of political ideas (Okey, 2001). So gradually Bosnia and Herzegovina's discourse had established a socialist, conservative, liberal, clerical, pan-Islamist, nationalist, and communist political thought. Under Habsburg rule Bosnia and Herzegovina had begun developing modern political institutions; it introduced the system of separation of powers, organized and conducted the first elections, adopted a capitalist

economy, established unions, created the first political parties, anticipated political pluralism, and brought changes in agricultural policy to end feudal system. In that political epoch, new scientific disciplines such as geopolitics, psychology, philosophy, and biopolitics had been developed. That political epoch had created minimal conditions for the birth of democracy in a multi-verse political milieu in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the times of Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the preconditions for a more dynamic development of social sciences, as well as for progressive reforms in the spheres of society, politics, and economics were created. With the acceptance of the Western European ideological worldview, a process of transformation of traditional and parochial Bosnian-Herzegovinian political culture within the political milieu began. After that, Bosnia-Herzegovina's politics gradually distanced itself from its traditional meaning and developed as a modern activity that claims to be based on conditioned and incomplete political pluralism and democratic forms of politics. However, in this period of political history, the political culture still had a very pronounced parochial character. The process of emancipation, liberalization, and democratization of society and the state in Bosnia and Herzegovina still persists and has no contours of authentic liberal-democratic politics.

INTERWAR POLITICAL CULTURE: THE CAMOUFLAGED ABSOLUTISTIC MONARCHISM IN ACTION

Bosnian Herzegovinian nationalities and their political leaderships had already predominantly supported, during the First World War – when discussions on creating the first joint state of Southern Slavs the course of negotiations leading to the creation of the state of the Balkan Slavs. Nevertheless, at the time there was also an opposing political stream that wanted to see Bosnia as an autonomous state, or rather, as a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, although they did not possess a strong political influence. After the end of the First World War, Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the union of the newly formed states of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. The state in question was soon after renamed into a new state formation: The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. In the newly established state of a monarchic type, a new statute was enacted – known as The Vidovdan Constitution – which was meant to regulate its political structure in accordance with the foundations of national Unitarianism and state-centrism. The Yugoslav national identity had been formed as a supra-identity for all of the South Slavic nationalities that supported the process of creation and entered the first Yugoslavian cluster. It should be particularly emphasized that the Yugoslav Muslim Organization – a political party founded in Bosnia and Herzegovina – succeeded in adding a specific amendment complement to the highest-ranked legal act of the newly founded state. As a result, article number 135 was appended to the Constitution (Imamović, 2003: 294). It guaranteed to preserve the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its historical borders in case of regional restructuring of the state territory.

The constitutional and political normative mentioned earlier were violated following the introduction of the Dictatorship in January 1929, more precisely, `The Law on the name and division of the Kingdom into administrative areas´,

by which the state was renamed, The Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The former internal political structure was now redefined and divided. With that act, the historical territorial continuity and the state-territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been broken for the first time. Afterward, the King destroyed the new Constitution and thus completely established his absolutistic rule. Another attempt to decant the state territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely the Cvetković-Maček Agreement, occurred at the end of the 1930s. This political agreement should have resolved the Croatian question in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia – the Croats asked for alteration of the state according to the federalist principles – and predicted the establishment of the Banovina of Croatia. The agreement was settled at the expense of Bosnia and Herzegovina because the Banovina of Croatia was supposed to also extend its territory to a part of Bosnian historical territory. After that, the dissatisfaction with the official governmental regime became more and more evident. This resulted in the emergence of augmented demands – by different social-political actors – for the autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina – young and progressive intellectual elites had the most specific demands – since it was the only certain way to preserve Bosnian Herzegovinian statehood and territorial integrity (Fejzić, 2015: 168). In the Yugoslav interwar political epoch, political pluralism had an ethnic-religious character and low democratic potential. An incidentally small number of political representations and parties had a civilian, working-class, or rather, trans-ethnic and trans-religious character. In this period of political history, Bosnian Herzegovinian political culture stagnated and still possessed a parochial character because, at that time, the monarchic governmental regime limited the process of political socialization and civilian participation.

SOCIALIST AND POST-SOCIALIST EXPERIENCE OF POLITICS

The system of political rule in the socialist political epoch was characterized by political monism. There was no system of liberal-democratic rule, political pluralism, or free elections, but also any preconditions for competition between different political elites. Nevertheless, in this period of Bosnian political history – under the influence of socialist self-government – a regime of economic democracy was developed in the spheres of work and earnings that had the markings of participative or, better said, direct democracy (Zgodić, 2000: 404). Therefore, even if the ex-Yugoslav political regime had the markings of political monism, there is a collaboration in the work sphere between actors of the capital – the state represents them because of the structure of owners' relations – and the union organizations as the representatives of the work sphere. This governmental regime was based on the politics of the worker's socialist self-governance. The former regime of socialist government was not established on a democratic dogma, but it did not prevent the practice of some reduced forms of democratic rule within the sphere of economic relations and direct political participation.

Direct civilian participation – and this should be particularly emphasized – that was approved by the communist regime – especially through the system of workers and social self-governance – often had fictitious political participation characteristics, and this was in political practice its greatest flaw and constraint. Thus, for instance, the fictitious political participation in Yugoslav political practice involved these forms of political civilian engagement: strikes, student

demonstrations, referendums concerning self-distribution, public discussions on law and changes, worker's and youth organizations' activism that was the communist party's extended arm, and finally, the united syndicate council. The communist ideologists had prognosticated that, in fact, the state would gradually perish away under the influence of the workers and social self-governance, but that process did not progress in accordance with the normative anticipations. In this governmental regime, this kind of political communication was, by rule, controlled by the political government. Therefore, the free fluctuation of political ideas never existed, which prompted this governmental regime to disassociate from liberal political aims. Therefore, the values of this political worldview were not in accordance with the fundamental values of liberal democracy. The then socialist political paradigm proffered the radical secular political pattern, within which the religious communities' activism was openly demonized. Socialist politics also proved to be inefficient within the sphere of national politics (Filandra, 2012: 453). The political culture in this political epoch had a minimalistic character and the traits of a servile culture in which free civic activity is minimized, marginalized, and reduced.

The political thought and practice in the post-socialist period in Bosnia and Herzegovina were marked by the re-introduction of the pluralist party system. The nationalistic parties in the first post-socialist multiparty elections received the biggest number of votes, and thus the political scene of Bosnia and Herzegovina was once again divided on an ethnoreligious basis after more than fifty years. After the successful referendum on independence, Bosnia and Herzegovina received official ordain and international recognition, but that was not sufficient to prevent the war against the state and the internal armed conflicts (Fejzić, 2021: 256). The democratic life was suspended, and the state of emergency was characterized by crude conflicts until the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. With this agreement which ended the war, and its Annex IV respectively, the new foundations of Bosnia and Herzegovina were established. In expert literature, Bosnia and Herzegovina is often branded as the post-Dayton state formation. In its post-Dayton political epoch, Bosnia and Herzegovina is consisting of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republic of Srpska entities, along with Brčko District, which makes its political structure deeply complex. Besides, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina entity is radically decentralized and consists of ten cantons. The post-Dayton intrastate structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not rational, natural, and functional, which reflects on the state's efficiency in creating and enforcing internal and international politics.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a state in which some forms of consociational democracy are constantly being imposed and experimented with. Hence, during political implementations nondemocratic practices like dislocating a political process outside the governmental institutions are often preferred. The central political question in Bosnia and Herzegovina – better call it an existential one – is still the question concerning the state organization and its eventual reconstructions on some other bases. The existing state structure is non-functional, and unnatural, and is not founded on historical Bosnian regions, or rational economic presuppositions. That is why the reform of the current state establishment is necessary and has no alternative to it. The National Question and the question of economic recovery and prosperity are not the focus of Bosnian

politics, but rather find themselves as being in the shadow of possible models for reorganizing the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Post-Dayton political pluralism is ethnically polarized, and the democratic governmental regime – because of the usage of consociational arrangements – has an ethnocratic character (Pejanović, 2015: 121). The political culture of this political epoch still does not carry the mark of civilian culture, primarily because the ethnocratic governmental system creates a subjected mentality in its civilians.

A discourse on the character of the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the European Union (EU) and other Euro-Atlantic organizations has prompted great polemics and perplexities in the local intellectual, political, and economic circles. To eliminate and unmask certain obscurities, it is necessary to thoughtfully analyse and scan the Bosnian-Herzegovinian political stage, then the institutional-political foundation of the EU, and finally the mass installation and negative implications of the `new forms of Eurocentrism´ in states which have recently joined the EU. It is especially important to explore to which measure a non-critical and conformist Europocentric discourse is present in Bosnian-Herzegovinian society, along with the question if it has already produced any kind of damage to Bosnian political culture. This conformist political approach needs to be prevented and has all its potential risks uncovered on time. However, Euroscepticism is not the political solution to be preferred because that kind of irreconcilable relation towards the EU would not bring anything lucrative to Bosnia and Herzegovina (Laughland, 2005: 204). It is rather better to choose the path between Eurocentrism and Euroscepticism that would guarantee the successful integration of the state but also preserve its authentic culture and political tradition. The EU as a supranational creation should not be sacralized at all because it certainly does not represent an ideal economic-political community in which all problems vanish. Therefore, Bosnia and Herzegovina need a conscious and sober integration – free from any misconceptions, unrealistic projections, and sacral expectations – into the biggest association of European peoples, and this path has no other acceptable alternatives.

While analysing the post-Dayton political discourse, it is plausible to conclude that the only acceptable political idea is the one that claims that we should not understand our advantages as our handicaps! That is the first step. Post-Dayton Bosnian daily life is marked by political obstructions and ethnonational verbal confrontations that trouble the process of making political decisions, and this is also directly reflected in the process of developing a stable state. Besides the undertakings in creating conditions for the Bosnia and Herzegovina integration process into the EU, simultaneous and permanent work on raising the awareness of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian people, of their common homeland, of their belonging to Bosnia and Herzegovina, while at the same time trying to find the `point of understanding´ for all Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizens, that will create conditions for their political dialogue and interethnic convergence.

Reconstruction of the state organization and constitutional reforms are fundamental conditions for future progress and democratic state consolidation. Most critically-emancipatory-oriented thinkers consider this problem the greatest impediment to any further progress and integration (Zgodić, 2006). Inter-Bosnian political disagreements should be absolved before joining the European Union – any other different outcome may have negative repercussions on the

state – to accept and overcome all political novelties brought about by European integration. Better said, it is necessary to actualize the discourse on Bosniakhood and Bosnianhood but also to work on developing the awareness of the historic inter-confessional convergence that has adorned Bosnia from ancient times to this day. It is necessary to refresh the memory of Bosnian political history and its values. Political consensus attainment in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina is made impossible due to the accumulated hatred and the constructed ignorance about us – for which mainly extremists of right-wing and expansionistic policies are guilty. Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose citizens do not possess a sufficiently developed sense about themselves, their collectiveness, and what they are historically – and this is an indicator of low political culture – cannot be a serious candidate for entering the EU. The subjected existence of citizens is not what our country needs in the Euro-Atlantic political epoch, but rather a self-conscious citizenry acting as a generator of democratic consolidation and economic prosperity. With these citizenry attributions and virtues, the fate and the perspective of our state are not at all questionable and uncertain.

However, the post-Dayton political existence of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is conditioned by various political threats and challenges that limit its possibilities and intentions in the field of practical politics. These limiting political processes and finalized solutions are often imposed on political distance. Their effects can be found exclusively in the sphere of internal politics, and that creates the impression that they have an intra-Bosnian character (Bieber, 2006). The apostrophized consequences are, as a rule, the result of global interdependence and transnational polycentrism in the sphere of political decision-making that, for example, has permanently changed and transformed the political process in democratic countries. However, this trend does not have the same intensity in all countries – it is usually conditioned by the possession of different forms of power - and is particularly expressed in political communities that have limited institutional capacity and transitional state creations. In this regard, it is possible to assume that globalization policy largely makes a model, defines, and directs Bosnia and Herzegovina's development and political capabilities – as new, post-socialist, and transitional democracies – while minimizing the democratic capacity of its political institutions. In other words, the effects of globalization that can be found in the political milieu and social sphere of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian state give its political person a completely different form, role, and meaning. In fact, there are more indicators that unambiguously indicate that are endangered the political stability and economic sustainability in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina.

CONCLUSION

A relic of traditional collectivism can still be detected and identified in Bosnia-Herzegovina's politics - in the post-Dayton political era it is particularly expressed in the depersonalizing linkage of individuals to ethnic and religious identity, whereas in times of socialist politics, for instance, individuals found refuge in a class identity whose homogeneity was preserved by the Communist Party. This has been a major obstacle to the emergence of participative political culture and the development of true democracy based on the system of civic representation. The development of social and political thought in Bosnia and Herzegovina had

been permanently marked by a longstanding colonial subordination of the state and the various forms of authoritarian collectivism within a political practice. Therefore, it is quite evident that dysfunctional politics and government in post-socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina were established and developed under the influence of early, complicated, and illiberal political experiences, which had a pronounced collectivist character, which is at the same time an answer to the research question.

The dominant determinants of the contemporary political epoch are – besides globalization and the neoliberal worldview – supranational policies and Euro-Atlantic integrations. Bosnia and Herzegovina have already been overtaken by waves of globalization, neo-liberalization, and Euro-Atlantic integrations. It is not erroneous to say that its future and existence are bound to the EU, but it should not put itself in a subjected position towards the EU in an idolatrous, inferior, and conformist way. Therefore, politics that follow the principles of partnership, equality, and respect should be preferred and advocated. However, one of the key problems is that the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina lack a developed awareness of belonging to the state, without which it is impossible to attain the self-respect that is a fundamental part of every developed political culture. Consequently, during a phase of democratic transition and consolidation – in which Bosnia and Herzegovina still is – it is important to eliminate any misconceptions, unrealistic expectations, prejudices, and stereotypes regarding the essence and functions of the EU as a supranational creation and build a basic consensus on a functional state that will reflect the wishes and interests of all its citizens.

REFERENCES

Baár, Monika (2010). Historians and Nationalism: East-Central Europe in the Nineteenth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Beck, Ulrich and Edgar Grande (2006). Kozmopolitska Europa: društvo i politika u drugoj moderni (Cosmopolitan Europe). Trans. Tamara Marčetić. Zagreb: Školska knjiga.

Bieber, Florian (2006). Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Fejzić, Elvis (2015). Bosanskohercegovačka socijaldemokratija: geneza, politička dogmatika i perspektiva (Bosnian-Herzegovinian Social Democracy: Genesis, Political Dogmatics and Perspective), in: Emina Abrahamsdotter and Besima Borić, eds. Razgovor o ljevici: identitet, kriza i izazovi u Bosni i Hercegovini danas (Talking about the left-wing: Identity, Crisis and Challenges in Bosnia and Herzegovina Today). Sarajevo: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, pp. 156-180.

Fejzić, Elvis (2012). "Political thought in Bosnia and Herzegovina during Austro-Hungarian rule, 1878-1918". East Central Europe, 39(2-3): 204-236.

Fejzić, Elvis (2021). Populizam i nacionalizam u postdejtonskoj Bosni i Hercegovini: Desnica, ljevica i zloupotrebe volje naroda (Populism and nationalism in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina: Right-wing, Left-wing and Abuse of the will of the people), in: Velimir Veselinović, ed. Populistički duhovi vremena i izazovi demokraciji: studije o populizmima (Populist Spirits of the Time and Challenges to Democracy: Studies on Populisms). Zagreb: Despot infinitus, pp. 250-269.

Filandra, Šaćir (2012). Bošnjaci nakon socijalizma: o bošnjačkom identitetu u postjugoslavenskom dobu (Bosniaks After Socialism: On Bosniak Identity in the Post-Yugoslav era). Sarajevo; Zagreb: BZK Preporod; Synopsis.

Filandra, Šaćir (1998). Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću (Bosniak Politics in the XX. Century). Sarajevo: Sejtarija.

Imamović, Mustafa (2003). Historija države i prava Bosne i Hercegovine: 3. dopunjeno i redigirano izdanje (History of the State and Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 3rd supplemented and edited edition). Sarajevo: Magistrat.

Laughland, John (2005). Zatrovani izvor: nedemokratski korijeni europske ideje (Tainted Source: Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea). Trans. Snježana Kereković. Zagreb: Slovo M.

Okey, Robin (2007). Taming Balkan Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Okey, Robin (2001). The Habsburg Monarchy: From Enlightenment to Eclipse. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pejanović, Mirko (2015). Država Bosna i Hercegovina i demokratija (The

state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and democracy). Sarajevo: University Press; Magistrat izdanja.

Trencsényi, Balázs et al. (2016). A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe: Volume I: Negotiating Modernity in the `Long Nineteenth Century´. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zgodić, Esad (2003). Bosanska politička misao: austrougarsko doba (Bosnian Political Thought: the Austro-Hungarian era). Sarajevo: DES.

Zgodić, Esad (2000). Titova nacionalna politika: temeljni pojmovi, načela i vrijednosti (Tito's national policy: basic concepts, principles and values). Sarajevo: Kantonalni odbor SDP BiH.

Zgodić, Esad (2006). Vladavina konsenzusom (Governing by Consensus). Sarajevo: BZK Preporod.

THE POLITICAL VISION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF TURKIC STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE TURKIC WORLD VISION 2040

Firat YALDIZ [1]
[1] Kastamonu University, 37150 Kastamonu, Türkiye
firatyaldiz@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0001-5152-2050

ABSTRACT

After 1991, the phenomenon of the Turkic world turned from an ideological dream to a political reality, with the independent Turkic states becoming equal and sovereign subjects in the international system and international politics. In this process, many cooperation organizations (TURKSOY, TURKPA, TWESCO, etc.) were established among the Turkic states. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), established in 2009 as the umbrella organization of the Turkic world cooperation organizations, became even stronger with the membership of Uzbekistan in 2019. The 2021 Istanbul Summit and 2022 Samarkand Summit of the OTS are extremely important for the future of cooperation in the Turkic world. In this study, the political vision for the OTS and the Turkic World Vision - 2040 will be analyzed.

INTRODUCTION

The Turkic states became independent after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, which marked the beginning of an important and new era for the Turkic world. In this new period, many regional cooperation institutions have been established, especially under the leadership of Türkiye. First and foremost, the International Turkic Cultural Organization (TURKSOY), the International Turkic Academy, the Turkic world Parliamentary Assembly (Turk-Pa), the Turkish Culture and Heritage Foundation, the Turkish Investment Fund and the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) has formed the institutional infrastructure of regional cooperation. Among these (Turkic world) cooperation organizations that emerged in fields such as culture, science, art, diplomacy, and common heritage, OTS comes to the fore both in terms of its institutional structure and is an umbrella organization, as well as in terms of political representation and cooperation in the context of the Turkic states (Kocaman, 2021).

The institutional cooperation efforts and political vision of OTS, directly and indirectly, affect the cooperation organizations of the Turkic world. In this study, the Organization of Turkic states, which is the umbrella organization of the Turkic world cooperation institutions, and the Turkic World Vision – 2040 will be emphasized. Therefore, the cooperation endeavors in the Turkic world and Turkic world cooperation organizations will be examined in line with the new institutionalism theory through which Turkic World Vision - 2040 will be analyzed.

The new institutionalism theory has been included in the discipline of international relations, especially in the context of the formation and development of the institutional structure of the European Union (EU). The discussions about the position of institutions in foreign policy and their role in international relations have become increasingly important in the international relations discipline and literature. In this context, the EU, which is a strong and important example of the institutionalization of the European region and its states in the international system, has entered the research area of new institutionalism (Mercan, 2011: 75-76) and has become a unique area where the assumptions of institutionalism theory are tested with its formal and informal institutions (Açıkmese, 2004: 21). The new institutionalism, which is based on a theoretical ground that has been increasingly examined in the discipline of international relations with the EU process, has become a theory in which the word 'institution' has expanded not only as an organization but also to include norms, principles, and values established at the EU level.

Thus, three main new institutionalist approaches called neo-institutionalism and criticizing the formal view of the classical institutionalist approach, began to be used as a unit of analysis and conceptual framework in international relations. Accordingly, the first new institutionalist analysis, supported by rational choice theory, assumes that individuals (or states at the international level) who act in their own interests and aim to provide maximum benefit are central actors in the political process and that institutions emerge as a result of interdependence and strategic interaction. Rational choice institutionalists in international relations have been particularly influenced by developments in the new institutional economy (Schneider and Ershova, 2018). Second, historical institutionalism represents a cultural approach. Rather than being the result of

strategic calculations about it, institutions provide moral or cognitive patterns for interpretation and action. The distinguishing feature of historical institutionalism is that it allows for historical possibilities, emphasizes dependent options, and thus focuses on the continuity of institutions. Historical institutionalism does not ignore the impact of the historical roots of existing international organizations on international relations (Suddaby et al., 2014: 100-123). Finally, normative institutionalism directs the influence of international relations from rationality and efficiency of the role of norms and values. The primary focus of normative institutionalism is on the ways in which institutions constrain individual choice. While normative institutionalism considers an institutional change in the context of learning, it also reminds us that existing institutions tend to structure the field of vision of individuals contemplating change. Many international norms that set the standards for the appropriate behavior of states are based on local norms and internationalized through the efforts of different entrepreneurs, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and transnational advocacy networks. The interplay between national and international norms also functions differently, as states "socialize to accept new norms, values, and perceptions of their interests". There are three areas of international relations research in which these various types of institutionalism and the questions outlined are answered. The first is the domain of the state sovereignty. The sovereignty of the state can be understood broadly as a fundamental institution that drives international relations. This understanding may seem like accepting the basic arguments and terms of realism, but institutionalists do not conceive of sovereignty as a given structure but as a social construction. The second area is the area of international regimes. International regimes shift their focus to institutions based on international values and facilitating interstate cooperation and coordination. Third, it is the global and/or regional institutions that provide the unification of these areas. The European Union, which is a regional regime in which state sovereignty is relatively transferred and abandoned, can be shown as an exemplary institutional structure in terms of the combination of the first two areas. In recent years, the EU has emerged as an institution that has been examined especially with its institutional analysis dimension (Schimmelfennig and Thomas, 2011: 177-191). In this context, if we need to examine the institutional developments that shape the Turkic world according to the new institutionalism theory, it can be said that the Turkic states are in partnership as equal sovereign states and the Turkic world is symbolized with the active participation of the Heads of State of the Turkic states in harmony with the state sovereignty. Secondly, the partnership and cooperation of Turkic states is evolving towards a regional cooperation area that is compatible with international politics and based on international values. Thirdly, the institutional structures that provide the combination of the first two areas gain importance. It is important that the Turkic world cooperation institutions were established after 1991; among these institutions, OTS stands out as an umbrella organization. Turkic World Vision - 2040, which reveals the common vision of Turkic world cooperation institutions by OTS, is of great importance in this respect (Yaldiz and Yaldiz, 2020: 75-97).

THE COOPERATION IN THE TURKIC WORLD

After the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan declared their

independence and Türkiye was the first state to recognize the independence of these new Turkic states. Thousands of years of the historical, social, and cultural partnerships between these states and societies formed the basis of relations after 1991 (Yaldiz and Ozen, 2021). After 1991, "the Summits of the Heads of Turkic Speaking States" became the political starting point of the cooperation in the Turkic world.

During his visit to the newly independent Turkic states in 1992, Süleyman Demirel, then the Prime Minister of Türkiye, started to organize these summits. The first summit was held in Ankara on October 30, 1992, attended by the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, and the President of the Republic of Türkiye Turgut Ozal and Prime Minister Demirel and ended with the signing of the Ankara Declaration. It is an important point to emphasize that Türkiye has an active role in the cooperation institutions of the Turkic world. According to Balcer (2012), cooperation between Turkic states has started to institutionalize mostly with the initiative of Türkiye. Köstem also states that Türkiye's Eurasian policy after the USSR was influenced by the idea of the Turkic world and was quickly internalized by various political actors in Türkiye and moreover, although the geopolitical importance of the region for Türkiye has decreased, the idea of the Turkic world has gained a "taken for granted" status in Türkiye's foreign policy interests and practices (Köstem, 2017: 722). The participants of the Summits of the Heads of Turkic Speaking States aimed to strengthen relations and develop cooperation on the basis of the independence, sovereignty, respect for territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs. At another summit held in Bishkek in August 1995, the need to preserve the great cultural and historical heritage of the Turkic people was repeated and all parties expressed their readiness to cooperate and develop relations. The 6th Summit, which was held in Astana in 1998, has been followed by many summits until today, and in this process, many cooperation organizations have been established with the political will and approval of the Heads of State.

The International Organization of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY) was established in 1993, in Ankara – Türkiye. The founding agreement signed by the Ministers of Culture of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Türkiye. Later on, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and the autonomous republics of the Russian Federation (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Altai, Sakha, Tyva, and Khakassia) as well as the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia (Moldova) joined TURKSOY as member states with an observer status (TURKSOY, 2023). The activities and efforts of TURKSOY are determined by the Permanent Council and are implemented by the TURKSOY Secretariat. The first concrete step of the institutionalization efforts towards the Turkic world was taken with the establishment of TURKSOY. It is particularly important that an institution was established on the common denominator of Turkic culture in 1993, right after the Turkic states gained their independence. The Cultural Capitals of the Turkic world endeavor (Yaldiz, 2020), is the most important and most valuable work of TURKSOY. This process started with the declaration of Astana (Kazakhstan) as the Cultural Capital of the Turkic world in 2012, followed by Eskişehir (Türkiye) in 2013, Kazan (Tatarstan) in 2014, Merv (Turkmenistan) in 2015, Sheki (Azerbaijan) in 2016, Turkistan (Kazakhstan) in 2017, Kastamonu (Türkiye) in 2018, Osh (Kyrgyzstan) in 2019, Khiva (Uzbekistan) in 2020, Bursa (Türkiye) in 2022 and Shusha (Azerbaijan) in 2023.

The Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States (TURKPA) was established on 21 November 2008 with the Agreement signed by the Presidents of the Parliaments of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Türkiye; its Secretariat is in Baku - Azerbaijan (TURKPA, 2023). TURKPA was established to increase cooperation between the parliaments of Turkic states and to strengthen parliamentary diplomacy.

The Turkic world Educational and Scientific Cooperation Organization (TWESCO) was established on May 25, 2010 under Kazakhstan's Ministry of Education and Science. Upon the proposal of Nursultan Nazarbayev, then the President of Kazakhstan, at the OTS meeting held in 2009 to establish an international scientific center tasked with conducting research on the Turkic world and gained international organization status on August 28, 2014 (TWESCO, 2023).

The International Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation (ITCHF) was established at the OTS meeting held in Kyrgyzstan – Bishkek in 2012. ITCHF carries out its activities in Azerbaijan – Baku with the aim of "preserving, researching, and supporting Turkish culture and heritage through the activities, projects, and programs it supports and finances" (ITCHF, 2023).

The Turkic Investment Fund (TIF) was established at the 9th OTS Summit on November 11, 2022 held in Samarkand – Uzbekistan. The TIF is the first and main joint financial institution established by the Turkic states, which aims to mobilize the economic potential, to strengthen the trade and economic cooperation and to implement joint projects between the member states of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS, 2022).

As explained above, from the establishment of TURKSOY in 1993 and the Turkic Investment Fund in 2022, many organizations were created to provide and develop cooperation between the Turkic states in different fields. The last meeting of the Coordination Committee of Organizations of the Turkic Cooperation, which was established to ensure coordination between these institutions (OTS, TURKSOY, TURKPA, TWESCO, ITCHF), was held on January 20, 2023, in Istanbul.

THE ORGANIZATION OF TURKIC STATES

The Organization of Turkic States is the most important organization of the Turkic world. The Summits of the Heads of Turkic Speaking States are the basis of the OTS, which has the role of an umbrella organization to which other Turkic world organizations are affiliated/related with. The OTS was established with the Nakhchivan Agreement on October 3, 2009. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Türkiye are the members; Hungary (2018), Turkmenistan (2021), and TRNC (2022) are the observer members of the OTS. The Council of Heads of State, the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Council of Elders, the Senior Officials Committee, and The Secretariat are the principal organs of the OTS (OTS, 2021).

In this context, the situation of Uzbekistan, which became a member of OTS in 2019, 10 years after OTS was established (in 2009), has a special importance. It

is vital for the OTS that Uzbekistan participates in the Turkic world cooperation, albeit belatedly, politically, and institutionally. In addition, Uzbekistan's point of view to make structural reforms during the 2023 chairmanship term of the OTS, is valuable in terms of the effectiveness and efficiency of the cooperation of the Turkic world and the Turkic states, as well as the institutional structure and functioning of the organization [2].

The main purposes and tasks of the OTS set out in Article 2 of the Nakhchivan Agreement are as follows (OTS, 2020):

- strengthening mutual confidence, friendship and good-neighborliness among the Parties;

- maintaining peace, strengthening security and confidence in the region and in the world as a whole;

- search for common positions on foreign policy issues of mutual interest, including those in the framework of international organizations and at international forums;

- coordination of actions to combat international terrorism and separatism, extremism, trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, as well as the assistance to international policy on control over illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances;

- promotion of effective regional and bilateral cooperation in political, trade and economic, law enforcement, environmental, cultural, scientific-technical, military, technical, educational, energy, transportation, credit and finance areas and other areas of common interest;

- creation of favorable conditions for trade and investment, further simplification of Customs and transit procedures aiming at facilitation of movement of goods, capital, services and technologies, and simplification of financial and banking operations;

- aiming for comprehensive and balanced economic growth, social and cultural development in the region through joint actions on the basis of equal partnership in order to steadily increase and improve the living conditions of the peoples of the Parties;

- discussing questions of ensuring the rule of law and good governance and guaranteeing human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with generally recognized principles and norms of international law;

- expansion of interaction in the field of science and technology, education, health, culture, sports and tourism;

- encouragement of interaction of the mass media and communication of the Parties in promoting, popularizing and disseminating the great cultural and historical heritage of the Turkic peoples;

- discussing questions of exchange of legal information for the development of interaction and mutual legal assistance, and cooperation in various spheres of law.

---

[2] The speech of Uzbekistan President Mirziyoyev who is the chairman of OTS 2023, at the 2022 Samarkand Summit of the OTS with the participation of the Heads of State has been the initiator of this process. The political analysis of Mirziyoyev's speech reveals important clues for the progress of the cooperation process in the Turkic world and make analyzes and predictions about the future of the OTS and the Turkic world. The content of the speech of Mirziyoyev is excluded from the scope of this study, as it could be a subject of another study.

The conceptual, historical, political, and legal foundations of the Turkic cooperation organizations constitute an important infrastructure in terms of the content of the concept of the Turkic world and contribute to the construction of the national and international dimensions of the Turkic identity. The OTS's web page includes nineteen topics under the title of the Areas of Cooperation:

Table 1. *Areas of Cooperation of the OTS*

№	Area of Cooperation
1.	Political Cooperation
2.	Economic Cooperation
3.	Customs Cooperation
4.	Transport Cooperation
5.	Tourism Cooperation
6.	Education Cooperation
7.	Information and Media Cooperation
8.	Youth and Sports Cooperation
9.	Diaspora Cooperation
10.	Cooperation in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)
11.	Energy Cooperation
12.	Health Cooperation
13.	Migration Cooperation
14.	Agricultural Cooperation
15.	Cooperation on Justice
16.	Cooperation on Humanitarian Issues and Development
17.	Cooperation in the Field of Human Resources
18.	Cooperation among Muslim Religious Institutions
19.	Cooperation with International Organizations

As can be seen in the aforementioned table, OTS has comprehensively structured the areas of cooperation between the Turkic states and embodied the objectives of cooperation in a total of nineteen titles. The structuring of these cooperation areas in very different and diverse fields such as trade, tourism, migration, diaspora, health, agriculture, by going beyond political and economic cooperation, is of great importance for the future of the Turkic world and the institutional value of OTS.

It is an important shortcoming that OTS does not include cooperation on democracy, rule of law, freedoms and human rights within these comprehensive cooperation areas. However, it is of great importance for the global prestige of the Turkic world in the 21st century that the Turkic world has become a geographical and political region where democracy and democratic values are cared for on a constitutional ground that is compatible with international law and international human rights law, especially where fundamental rights and freedoms are secured and guaranteed. (This missing topic has been poorly and inadequately addressed in the Political and Security Cooperation section in Turkic World Vision – 2040).

As a matter of fact, the comprehensive cooperation areas specified by OTS have been emphasized in detail in the Turkic World Vision – 2040, under the auspices of the Turkic Heads of State, with the phrase "We, the Heads of State of the Organization of Turkic States". Turkic World Vision – 2040, the focus of this article, which is under the auspices of Turkic Heads of State with this clear expression, will be examined in detail below.

TURKIC WORLD VISION – 2040

The 8th Summit of the Organization of Turkic States (in which the name of the Turkic Speaking States Cooperation Council was changed to the Organization of Turkic States), convened in Istanbul on 12 November 2021 with the theme of Green Technologies and Smart Cities in the Digital Age. According to Beylur (2021), "one of the most important results of the Summit that should be emphasized is undoubtedly the Turkic World Vision - 2040 adopted by the member states." The long (seventeen pages in total) and detailed Turkic World

Table 2. *Areas of Cooperation of the 2040 Turkic World Vision*

Political and Security Cooperation	Political Cooperation
	Security Cooperation
Economic and Sectoral Cooperation	Economic Cooperation
	Transport and Customs
	Information and Communication Technologies
	Energy
	Tourism
	Health
	Environment
	Agriculture
People-to-People Cooperation	Culture
	Education and Science
	Youth and Sports
	Diaspora
	Information and Media
	Civil Society Organizations
Cooperation with External Parties	International Organizations
	Humanitarian and Development Cooperation

Vision – 2040 (OTS, 2023), which was accepted at this summit (2021 Istanbul Summit), contains very important statements regarding the goals of the Turkic world for the next 20 years. The Turkic World Vision – 2040, based on four pillars and the eighteen areas of cooperation listed under these pillars provide the most comprehensive strategic approach that has been put forward since the Turkic states gained their independence in 1991.

THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY COOPERATION

The Political and Security Cooperation pillar consists of the Political Cooperation and Security Cooperation sections. In the section on the Political Cooperation, there is a special emphasis on strengthening global and regional cooperation of common interest among OTS member states and increasing synergies between national institutions and other stakeholders. Also included in this column are cooperation on strengthening the rule of law, judicial systems, legal infrastructure, and institutional capacities in OTS member States. In this context, it is aimed to ensure effective cooperation and coordination between other Turkic cooperation institutions (TURKSOY, Turkic Academy, Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation, and TURKPA) in order to advance cooperation in cultural, academic, and parliamentary spheres. In addition, it was also stated that increased cooperation with other regional (European) and global (UN) organizations and carrying out tangible joint projects.

In the Security Cooperation section, building a network for cooperation and information sharing among the Member States' law enforcement authorities to combat the threats of radicalization, violent extremism, Islamophobia, xenophobia and terrorism, transnational organized crime, including the illegal

drug trade, irregular migration, human trafficking, illicit arms trade, organ trafficking, economic, financial and cybercrimes, and to ensure border security are highlighted. Another detail that should be mentioned in this context is that the military-technical cooperation between the Turkic states has become one of the important developing cooperation areas before the Turkic World Vision - 2040, especially in the post-1991 period (Kocatepe, 2022).

The fact that these cooperation areas have been put under the title of Political and Security Cooperation reveals that political cooperation is not based on human rights and freedoms, but security-centered. However, the separation of these two fields (political cooperation and security cooperation) and the establishment of political cooperation based on democracy, rule of law, fundamental rights, and freedoms are important for the Turkic world to become a regional and global actor in the next two decades and beyond.

THE ECONOMIC AND SECTORAL COOPERATION

The Economic and Sectoral Cooperation pillar consists of eight sections: (i) Economic Cooperation, (ii) Transport and Customs, (iii) Information and Communication Technologies, (iv) Energy, (v) Tourism, (vi) Health, (vii) Environment, and (viii) Agriculture.

The Economic Coopertation covers many subjects such as working towards achievement of free movement of commodities, capital, services, technologies and people among the OTS Member States; providing exchange of experience and best practices in national economic development policies; developing financial and investment instruments for supporting private sector, fostering economic growth and socio-economic development, developing programs supportive to diaspora members, who are willing to start a business in their countries of origin, etc.

The Transport and Customs, mentions simplifying customs and transit procedures of the OTS Member States for border crossing; increasing investments for ensuring intra-regional connectivity with well-developed and interconnected hard and soft transport infrastructure projects among the OTS Member States; harmonizing transport policies and freight-related technical standards for the Trans-Caspian International East-West Middle Corridor; carrying out close cooperation to ensure effective implementation of international conventions in the field of transport by the OTS Member States and emphasizes promoting Zangazur Corridor at various international economic platforms by OTS Member States.

The Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) gives place to harmonize policies and regulations in the field of ICT by increasing cooperation among the regulators, public and private operators, and other relevant stakeholders of the OTS Member States; to develop e-government and e-services joint programs and projects with priority given to trade, transport, health and education; to increase partnerships on ICT services and infrastructure development, including broadcast services, mobile, satellite technologies, fiber optics, and develop joint ICT potential of the OTS Member States by creating a regional technological ecosystem through establishing joint cooperation

platforms and networks; to bring together leading research and development centers such as techno and IT parks to share experience and knowledge in digital matters, to enhance collaboration in cybersecurity to respond to regional security challenges by establishing a common platform in close cooperation with international cybersecurity centers; to achieve digital connectivity and communication through the effective use of space technologies in all spheres of social-economic life, and harmonize national space policies and establish result-oriented cooperation among the OTS Member States through joint programs and projects, including knowledge, experience and know-how sharing, capacity building programs; to establish cooperation mechanism among the OTS Member States with the aim to use common space-infrastructures, innovative space technology tools and share space-based data for resource management, disaster risk reduction and sustainable development; to encourage scientific cooperation in the area of space studies as well as joint research and study among the relevant authorities of the OTS Member States, including universities and space centers.

The Energy includes building strategic partnership among the OTS Member States in the field of energy through coordination of policies, promotion of energy trade, investments, joining the production of energy products, research and technological cooperation to provide secure, sustainable, competitive and affordable energy to the OTS Member States; developing strategic energy infrastructure projects in the region such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, Southern Gas Corridor and its components TANAP and TAP, to meet the demand of the OTS Member States, to provide them with alternative routes, as well as to contribute to European and global energy security; ensuring collaboration among the OTS Member States for energy diversification and clean/green energy, particularly in the field of renewable energy such as solar, bioenergy, wind, nuclear through joint investments, knowledge, experience and know-how exchanges; ensuring close cooperation between governments and private sectors for conducting research and innovation in order to reduce cost and increase the use of contemporary energy technologies, in particular those related to the energy efficiency and energy storage, and to establish joint production and distribution of petrochemical products; ensuring universal access to affordable clean/green energy carriers and end-use services for households and communities living in urban and rural areas; institutionalizing energy cooperation among the OTS Member States through the establishment of integrated Turkic Energy Market; establishing close cooperation with international organizations including but not limited to International Energy Agency (IEA), International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and Energy Charter.

The Tourism gives place to reveal the ancient and contemporary cultural heritage of the region through various innovative tourism programs and projects; to develop and promote various types of tourism packages, cultural routes and tours in the field of eco-tourism, culinary tourism, adventure tourism, health tourism, spiritual/sacred tourism; to establish a network of cooperation among the relevant public and private authorities of the OTS Member States in order to attract investment, organize capacity-building programs, harmonize policies and regulations, as well as achieve common standards in the tourism sector; to establish an alliance of prominent touristic cities of the Turkic world to enhance the cooperation and ensure experience sharing among each other; to develop necessary policies, regulations, and incentives for making prices affordable for tourists visiting the OTS Member States, to enhance visa facilitation for

tourism purposes for the citizens of selected third parties to be implemented in accordance with national legislation of the OTS Member States and developing a common position to this end.

The Health mentions to strengthen human resources and institutional capacities in the health sector through the exchange of knowledge and best practices, joint capacity building and training programs and mobility of health professionals; to work on the harmonization of national policies and legislations for better development of healthcare infrastructure, communications and health information systems among the OTS Member States; to encourage joint investments, public-private partnership models and innovative financing for upgrading and modernizing healthcare industry, infrastructure and services in the OTS Member States; to build capacities and resilience of the national health systems to ensure emergency preparedness for prevention, detection and response to transnational health threats, including pandemics and other infectious diseases; to boost joint scientific cooperation, research and development programs among health institutions and universities to develop prevention, diagnosis, treatment methods, vaccines and other medications for existing and future challenges; to facilitate trade in medical goods, equipment and services in the region and beyond.

The Environment covers to give priority to environmental protection in the national and joint policies of the OTS Member States and take necessary measures to increase societal awareness on this global challenge; to take joint action to prevent and respond to natural and manmade disasters and to mitigate their effects and contribute to recovery through establishment of the OTS Civil Protection Mechanism; to preserve biodiversity by preventing uncontrolled pollution from the energy sector, household heating, industrial complexes, road traffic, incineration of waste and other toxic materials; to accelerate the use of green digital technologies for the benefit of the environment, and support the deployment of green digital solutions that accelerate the low-emitting energy networks, enable precision farming, decrease pollution, combat biodiversity loss, and optimize resource efficiency; to use the power of data in tackling societal, climate and environment-related challenges as well as contributing to healthier, more prosperous and more sustainable societies; to encourage urban development based on high-tech infrastructure and widespread access to smart technology while implementing urban policies that reduce resource and energy consumption, minimizes pollution and emissions and help cities become greener, inclusive, safe and resilient; to use instruments of green financing, transfer of green technologies in the implementation of the climate agenda of the OTS Member States; to develop a wide international exchange and a variety of the best technologies in the field of low carbon development, in particular in industry, agriculture, energy, transport, and renewable energy sources.

The Agriculture emphasizes mobilizing public and private institutions, academics, civil society organizations, research institutions, and farmer associations to achieve sustainable agricultural development; to develop organic farming as an agricultural method to produce food using natural substances and processes with a limited environmental impact, and maintain a strict control and enforcement system; to harmonize sustainable rural development programs and policies, promote modern practices and innovative technologies and encourage

productive linkages in the agricultural sector by establishing partnerships between agro-clusters, farmers, and agro-businesses; to establish effective collaboration with relevant international organizations such as FAO, IFAD, IOFS, and UNDP.

THE PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE COOPERATION

The People-to-People Cooperation pillar consists of six sections: (i) Culture, (ii) Education and Science, (iii) Youth and Sports, (iv) Diaspora, (v) Information and Media, (vi) Civil Society Organizations.

The Culture gives place to develop joint social, cultural and educational activities by the relevant institutions of the OTS Member States to further discover the commonalities and enrich the sense of togetherness among the Turkic societies; to prepare a common list of the cultural heritage of the Turkic world, preserve this cultural heritage and take joint action for repatriating the cultural heritage of the Turkic world to their country of origin; to ensure strong coordination and cooperation among the relevant institutions of the OTS Member States and the Turkic Cooperation Organizations for submitting nominations to the Representative List of Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity of UNESCO; to promote common Turkic heritage of the greatest scientists, poets, thinkers and artist, and nurture the OTS Member States' traditions, customs, folklore, and role of Turkic world on intercultural dialogue; to organize annual joint film festivals, music and art events as well as other similar cultural activities for bringing our peoples together.

The Education and Science mentions to harmonize the curriculum and credit system for better cooperation in the field of higher education among the OTS Member States, and encourage collaboration in diploma recognition and academic qualifications in the OTS Member States; to contribute to further development of education systems in the OTS Member States in accordance with international standards, introducing innovative methods of learning, critical thinking and practical use of technology; to intensify scientific and analytical researches on the common Turkic history, culture, language, literature and geography, and support elective courses on the subject matters in the school curricula in the OTS Member States; to make the Turkic Higher Education Space fully operational through Orkhun Process Exchange Program and render Turkic Universities Union (TURKUNIB) the leading cooperation mechanism; to enable the mobility of students, researchers, and academics through joint policies, and instruments including twinning programs, and organize competitions in different branches of science; to prepare educative videos on common Turkic history, geography, literature, values, culture and tradition, with creative and modern techniques to elicit greater interest from young students; to develop scientific publication data accessible for academics, researchers and students, and create a common international index for the scientific journals of the OTS Member States; to share their best experiences on entrepreneurship and vocational education and explore opportunities on the realization of joint projects on increasing skills and knowledge in this direction; to support the implementation of joint fundamental, practical, innovative and startup projects; to develop common innovative ecosystem, support the transfer of technology among the OTS Member States and encourage the commercialization of scientific results; to promote effective

intellectual property protection in accordance with international instruments; to create joint online open-access encyclopedia of the Turkic world; to accelerate the cooperation among think tanks and establish the Turkic world Think Tanks Network.

The Youth and Sports gives place to carry on projects tailored to empower the youth of the OTS Member States, to enhance cooperation and coordination among them, and to upgrade their skills such as entrepreneurship; to initiate various tournaments, championships, and activities in the different fields of sports to benefit the unifying power of sport for further convergence of the societies of the Turkic world; to institutionalize and operationalize the existing Youth Platform as an umbrella bringing together the Youth NGO's and ensure the sustainability of the youth and sports initiatives such as Turkic Universiade, Young Leaders Forum, Young Entrepreneurs Forum as well as youth camps and festivals; to build linkage of platforms for youth and ethno-sports of the OTS Member States with relevant regional and international initiatives customized to these fields; to institutionalize the organization of World Nomad Games initiated and founded by the Kyrgyz Republic and transform it into a world brand with an aim to present the ancient cultural heritage of the Turkic peoples to the whole world.

The Diaspora emphasizes developing a strategic framework for diaspora engagement and investment in the countries of origin; mobilizing academic diaspora to support the higher education and scientific institutions in the Turkic world and strengthening the linkages among diaspora academicians across the world; to ensure active involvement of the Turkic Diaspora communities in the relevant projects and programs of the Organization of Turkic States.

The Information and Media includes to benefit from the emerging and developing media for increasing awareness of the shared values, traditions, history and solidarity among citizens of Member States to showcase the advantages of Turkic cooperation and to encourage citizens towards closer interaction with sister societies and others; to strengthen cooperation among the public and private media institutions of the OTS Member States; to build new media partnerships, enhance mobility of media professionals, and foster an environment conducive to media innovation and quality journalism; to establish a hub of broadcasters, media production companies, content creators, start-ups to R&D institutes and production companies across the Turkic world for collaboration, innovation policy and network building to create a greater impact; to encourage the production of movies, series, documentaries, cartoons, and audio materials reflecting commonalities, collective history and shared values of the OTS Member States.

The Cooperation with Civil Society Organizations emphasizes enabling environment for networking and joint work of civil society organizations (NGOs) from the OTS Member States with the aim of strengthening dialogue among them, and ensuring their active engagement in the socio-economic and political development of their respective countries; to involve civil societies in the activities of the OTS and the other Turkic Cooperation Organizations such as TURKPA, TURKSOY, Turkic Academy, and Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation to promote common values, foster dialogue and understanding and to boost people-to-people contacts within the region.

THE COOPERATION WITH EXTERNAL PARTIES

The Cooperation with External Parties pillar consists of two sections: (i) Cooperation with International Organizations, (ii) Humanitarian and Development Cooperation.

The Cooperation with International Organizations gives place to enhance cooperation with international and regional organizations, as well as third countries with a view to developing project-based and sectoral partnerships for common benefit and increase visibility and influence of the OTS as a reliable international actor; to strengthen institutional relations with UN and its bodies, Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), and establish new partnership relations with relevant regional institutions including the European Union (EU), Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), and Visegràd Group; to conduct joint projects with UN specialized agencies and in partnership with other relevant stakeholders for implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the Member States and across the globe; to ensure close coordination and joint actions to safeguard common interests of the OTS Member States in the framework of other international organizations.

The Humanitarian and Development Cooperation mentions to build relations with donor community to address the development needs of the Member States; to take joint action to channel official development assistance and lines of development credits of the OTS Member States for poverty eradication in the developing countries; to initiate a regular dialogue with the donor community and provide a regional perspective in donor assistance, thus align as much as possible the donor interventions with the needs and priorities identified within Vision 2040; to increase solidarity with the Global South and contribute to the South-South and triangular cooperation for the well-being of the countries and people of the South, their national and collective self-reliance and the attainment of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; to carry out joint projects to link countries that have development needs with those Member States that have solutions, while enabling sharing of technical or economic knowledge and necessary skills.

ANALYZES OF TURKIC WORLD VISION – 2040

The Turkic World Vision – 2040 has a detailed framework and future vision as described above. The analysis of this comprehensive content of Turkic World Vision – 2040 is of particular importance for the future of the Turkic world.

First of all, it is seen that the Turkic World Vision – 2040 has been designed in accordance with the international system and international norms. In this context, the world order and international organizations, especially the UN (and the UN Treaty), and the emphasis on international peace and security, one of the basic concepts of international norms, and references to international law are extremely valuable. The reference by the Heads of States of OTS to

the concepts of international law, international peace, security, and welfare in the introduction to the Turkic World Vision – 2040 is an important emphasis reflecting this perspective. Likewise, the use of the concept of universal values in this section is an indication that the Turkic world has a political vision parallel to the international community and aims to be an active actor in the international system. It is stated that the Turkic World Vision – 2040 is determined through the commonality of the language, culture, and history of the Turkic peoples, and it is explained that the values of the Turkic people are in harmony with the universal values.

The Turkic World Vision – 2040 assigns a special role and task to the OTS and aims to strengthen both the member states nationally and the Turkic world as a whole, through four basic principles. In this context, these four basic principles (i) the political and security cooperation, (ii) economic and sectoral cooperation, (iii) people-to-people cooperation, (iv) cooperation with external parties are detailed in separate sections and sub-titles.

The Political and Security Cooperation section emphasizes the rule of law, and cooperation with other international organizations such as the EU, the UN, etc. In this context, the emphasis on cooperation in the fight against global crimes that threaten international peace and security, such as terrorism, drugs, human trafficking, weapons smuggling, and cybercrime, declares that the Turkic world will not be allowed to return to the field of action of international crimes and criminal organizations, in the next two decades. Baranyi (2022: 121-136) points out the unique position of Hungary, the member of the EU and the observer of the OTS: "In spite of their geographical distance, there are many issues of common interest among Hungary and different groupings of the OTS members. Since Hungary is a member of the EU and takes part in its decision-making processes, it could use its leverage to shape the EU agenda in a direction beneficial to a better understanding of the Turkic nations. In fact, there are a set of issues that could be addressed to the benefit of the OTS, the EU and Hungary, most prominently in the fields of security, migration, and energy."

The Economic and Sectoral Cooperation section is important in terms of associating the historical, cultural and, social ties of the Turkic world with real politics and setting a concrete target on joint economic benefits. Supporting the existing partnerships of the Turkic states and the Turkic world with economic goals and projects will strengthen the cooperation, and the Turkic world will be an important regional/global actor with economic confidence. This economic vision, which was not at a sufficient level since 1991, has a vital importance in terms of political cooperation in the Turkic world. The Economic and Sectoral Cooperation pillar, going beyond being a superficial discourse in the Turkic World Vision – 2040, includes eight sections consisting of (i) economic cooperation, (ii) transport and customs, (iii) information and communication technologies, (iv) energy, (v) tourism, (vi) health, (vii) environment, and (viii) agriculture have been transformed into concrete cooperation targets.

The People-to-People Cooperation shows that the importance of civil society and the individuals, which is getting globally important and effective actors in the 21st century, has been recognized by the OTS. It is important that in addition to the NGOs (as associations, unions, foundations, etc.), the media organizations and diaspora societies are especially emphasized in the People-to-

People Cooperation section which consists of six sub-sections: (i) Culture, (ii) Education and Science, (iii) Youth and Sports, (iv) Diaspora, (v) Information and Media, (vi) Civil Society Organizations. The creation and/or strengthening of a human-centered social structure in the Turkic world in accordance with global trends is one of the most important and unique features of the Turkic World Vision – 2040.

The cooperation with external parties section shows that the Turkic world will cooperate with global actors and support the international community on humanitarian and development cooperation. It is extremely valuable to articulate cooperation with regional and global institutions such as the UN, EU, OIC, OSCE, ECO, and CICA, which are not only geographically wide but also diverse in their fields of activity.

Lastly, the most important shortcoming in the Turkic World Vision – 2040 is that both very little space and superficial discourses is given to issues such as democracy, human rights, fundamental rights and freedoms, women's rights, environmental rights, etc. It is expected that the Turkic world would also be assertive in these areas and that these claims would go beyond abstract and be detailed with concrete vision and projects. It is of vital importance to detect this important deficiency of the Turkic World Vision – 2040 and to make the Turkic world a regional and global actor that respects human rights and is above the global democratic standards.

In the context of the Turkic World Vision – 2040, Musabay Baki (2022: 48) draws attention to the historical roots of cooperation in the Turkic world and says:

The aim of building resilient societies and institutions must always be kept top of mind in the OTS, whatever cooperation area is at the stake. To this end, principles such as accountability, preparedness, readiness to adapt and responsibility should continue to be the anchors of Turkic cooperation. These solid principles have long resonated throughout the Turkic world. They appear in Kutadgu Bilig (Blessed Knowledge), written centuries ago in the Karakhanids age by Yusuf Has Hacib, a Turkic philosopher and writer from Balasagun. As a timeless work of Turkic literature dating back to the 11th century, this book and the values it ensconces will keep on inspiring the visionary and resilient aspects of Turkic cooperation.

CONCLUSION

After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, five Turkic states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) gained their independence. In addition to these new states, together with the Republic of Türkiye, which was founded in 1923, and the TRNC, which declared its independence in 1983 (but unfortunately is not recognized by any state other than the Republic of Türkiye) the idea of the Turkic world, which has a large geography and a large population, has started to be discussed. These discussions gained a concrete institutional structure with the establishment of the OTS by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Türkiye in 2009 with the Nakhchivan Agreement. With the membership of Uzbekistan in 2019, the name change to

the Organization of Turkic States in 2021, and the participation of Hungary (2018), Turkmenistan (2021), and TRNC (2022) as observer members, the institutional structure of the Organization of Turkic States has completed its deficiencies and has become a more assertive actor in international politics. With the strengthening of the institutional structure, the political cooperation and future vision of the OTS have become even more important and this gap has been filled with the 2040 Turkic World Vision.

The Turkic World Vision – 2040, announced by the Heads of State of the Organization of Turkic States in order to guide the next phase of the Organization of Turkic States' priorities, evolution, and direction in the next two decades, puts the cooperation between the member states of OTS on a solid political ground. In this context, the foundations of cooperation are laid in four main titles: (i) political and security cooperation, (ii) economic and sectoral cooperation, (iii) people-to-people cooperation, (iv) cooperation with external parties, and in eighteen sub-titles, cooperation is detailed. Yesevi (2022: 21) states that "Turkic World Vision – 2040 was prepared in detail and with great care; nonetheless, it has generated questions as to how all these aims will be accomplished."

In this study, the cooperation institutions of the Turkic world have been examined and the institutional structuring process of the Organization of Turkic States has been elaborated in detail. In this context, the unique role of the Organization of Turkic States in ensuring cooperation in the Turkic world has been emphasized and its institutional expansion and political deepening since its establishment has been examined in detail. The Turkic World Vision – 2040 has been comprehensively analyzed in direct proportion to its importance for the future of the Turkic world. It is aimed that this study – with the aforementioned theoretical and practical background – will be a source for future studies on the change and institutionalization of the Turkic world, the OTS, and the Turkic World Vision – 2040.

REFERENCES

Açikmese, Akgul S. (2004). "Uluslararası iliskiler teorileri isiginda Avrupa butunlesmesi". Uluslararası İlişkiler, 1(1): 1-32.

Balcer, Adam (2012). "Between energy and soft pan-Turkism: Turkey and the Turkic Republics". Turkish Policy Quarterly, 11(2): 151-162.

Beylur, Suat (2021). "A New Turning Point in the Integration of the Turkic World: Turkic World Vision-2040", Weekly e-Bulletin No. 331, Eurasian Research Institute. Retrieved from https://www.eurasian-research.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Weekly-e-bulletin-29.11.2021-05.12.2021-No-331.pdf. Accessed: 12.05.2023.

Baranyi, Tamás P. (2022). "Hungary's role in the Organization of Turkic States as an observer state: Limitations and opportunities". Perceptions, 27(1): 121-136.

Kocaman, Omer (2021). "Cok tarafli is birligi'nin karsilastigi zorluklar ve bolgesel uluslararasi kuruluslarin artan onemi: Turk Konseyi ornegi". Bağımsızlıklarının 30. Yılında Türk Cumhuriyetleri-Bölgesel Politika. Ankara: Nobel Yay.

Kocatepe, Omer Faruk (2022). Turk Devletleri Teskilati: Politik ve Askeri is Birligi. Ankara: Nobel Yay.

Köstem, Seckin (2017). "When Can Idea Entrepreneurs Influence Foreign Policy? Explaining the Rise of the "Turkic World" in Turkish Foreign Policy". Foreign Policy Analysis, 13: 722–740.

Mercan, Sezgin S. (2011). "Siyasal butunlesme kuramlari isiginda AB genislemesi". Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi, 10 (1): 67-83.

Musabay Baki, Pelin (2022). "Turkic World Vision–2040: A step forward for the resilience of Turkic cooperation". Perceptions, 27(1): 26-52.

Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States (2023). "About TURKPA". Retrieved from https://turk-pa.org/en. Accessed: 02.04.2023.

Schimmelfennig, Frank and Daniel C. Thomas (2011). "Normative institutionalism and EU foreign policy in comparative perspective". International Politics, 46(4):177-191.

Schneider Gerald and Anastasia Ershova (2018). Rational Choice Institutionalism and European Integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Suddaby, Roy, William M. Foster and Albert J. Mills (2014). History and Institutions. Organizations in Time: History, Theory, Methods (Ed. M. Bucheli ve D.Wadhwani). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The International Organization of Turkic Culture (2023). "History". Retrieved from https://www.turksoy.org/en-US. Accessed: 02.04.2023.

The International Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation (2023). "The International Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation (ITCHF)". Retrieved

from https://itchf.org/en/. Accessed: 02.04.2023.

The Organization of Turkic States (2020). "Nakhchivan Agreement". Retrieved from https://turkicstates.org/assets/dokuman/Nahngilizce1.pdf. Accessed: 02.04.2023.

The Organization of Turkic States (2021). "Organization". Retrieved from https://www.turkicstates.org/en. Accessed: 02.04.2023.

The Organization of Turkic States (2022). "Baghdad Amreyev is appointed as the President of the Turkic Investment Fund by the Leaders of OTS". Retrieved from https://turkicstates.org/en/haberler/baghdad-amreyev-is-appointed-as-the-president-of-the-turkic-investment-fund-by-the-leaders-of-ots_2682. Accessed: 02.04.2023.

The Organization of Turkic States (2023). "The Turkic World Vision - 2040". Retrieved from https://turkicstates.org/assets/pdf/haberler/turkic-world-vision-2040-2396-97.pdf. Accessed: 02.04.2023.

Yaldiz, Firat and Ayse Colpan Yaldiz (2020). "Turk kamu yonetiminde yeni kurumlar ve dis Politika: Türkiye-Kirgizistan iliskilerinde yeni kurumsalcilik (New institutions and foreign policy in Turkish public administration: New institutionalism in Turkey-Kyrgyzstan relations)". Amme İdaresi Dergisi, 53(2): 75-97.

Yaldiz, Firat and Cinar Ozen (2021). "Türkiye – Turk cumhuriyetleri ilişkileri (1991-2021) (Türkiye – Turkic republics relations (1991-2021))". Bağımsızlıklarının 30. Yılında Türk Cumhuriyetleri-Küresel Politika. Ankara: Nobel Yay. 15-38.

Yaldiz, Firat (2020). Türk Dünyası Kültür Başkentleri. (Ed.) Ankara: Nobel Yay.

Yesevi, Cagla Gul (2022). "Examining the organization of Turkic States: A teacher and norm-creator". Perceptions, 27(1): 2-25.

BOOK REVIEW

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP TODAY

Zhandos KUDAIBERGENOV [1, 2]

[1] K.Zhubanov Aktobe Regional University

[2] Khoja Akhmet Yassawi International Turkish-Kazakh University, 050004 Almaty, Kazakhstan

e-mail: jandos.kudai@ayu.edu.kz

ORCID: 0000-0002-7927-8747

Niklaus Steiner. International Migration and Citizenship Today (Second Edition). London and New York, Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group, 2023, pp. 208.

"International Migration and Citizenship Today" is a thought-provoking and timely book that provides a comprehensive overview of the complex and multi-faceted issues surrounding international migration and citizenship in the modern world. Drawing on his extensive expertise in migration studies, Steiner provides a nuanced and insightful analysis of the social, political, economic, and legal complexities of migration and citizenship, offering readers a deep understanding of the challenges and debates in this field.

The introduction part focuses on the nature and goals of this book, by covering issues of unique juxtaposition in modern times, liberal democracies, types of migrants, and moral obligations toward migrants and hosts. Also, this chapter makes an accent on two central questions such as criteria of admission of migrants who want to come into liberal democratic countries and criteria of ensuring that admitted migrants become part of their society. The author shares his experiences and assumptions about how liberal democracies are responding and should respond to international migrants.

The second part is devoted to immigrants, by focusing on how liberal democracies admit certain kinds of immigrants, how these countries try to deter other kinds of immigrants from entering and settling, and the impact immigrants have on receiving countries. The first two chapters of this part explore some of the choices democracies face as they try to eliminate unauthorized immigration and the challenges these choices pose for both the receiving country and the immigrants. This last chapter discusses the economic, political, cultural, and demographic impact that immigrants have on the liberal democracies that receive them. Also, it asks to what extent, if any, liberal democracies should consider the impact their admission policies have on immigrants' home countries.

The third part analyzes the modern efforts to protect refugees by granting them asylum, beginning with the establishment of various international laws and refugee organizations. It is paid attention to people who have been forced to flee but who fall outside of the commonly accepted definition of a refugee. The author made it clear that despite the significant differences between immigrants and refugees, there are also significant overlaps between them, and much of the controversy today, revolves around the perceived overlaps and differences between these two types of international migrants.

The fourth part examines citizenship, nationalism, and national identity, and the process of granting citizenship, which is known as naturalization. Here the author argues that acceptance of people as society members happens not only due to liberal democracy admitting someone as a citizen.

The final part of the book summarizes the contemporary challenges such as how liberal democracies with significant migrant populations must live up to their commitment to their three most important values: creating a strong sense of national identity and loyalty, equal treatment of all citizens, and respect for the rights of minority groups in society.

One of the strengths of this book is its rigorous and up-to-date examination of the key concepts and theories related to migration and citizenship. Steiner skillfully navigates through the complexities of the topic, exploring the historical evolution of migration patterns, the factors driving migration, and the impact of migration on both sending and receiving countries. He also delves into the diverse legal frameworks and policy approaches towards migration and citizenship, including issues such as human rights, asylum, refugees, and the role of states and international organizations in shaping migration policies. The book also sheds light on the social and cultural aspects of migration, including the dynamics of migrant communities, transnationalism, and the experiences of migrants in host societies.

What makes "International Migration and Citizenship Today" particularly compelling is its critical perspective. The author does not shy away from addressing the contested nature of migration and citizenship, and they provide nuanced analyses of the power dynamics, inequalities, and injustices that shape migration processes and outcomes. Steiner highlights the role of structural factors such as globalization, inequality, and discrimination in shaping migration patterns, as well as the ways in which migration policies and practices can reproduce or challenge social hierarchies and exclusionary practices. The author also draws attention to the agency and resilience of migrants, as well as the contributions they make to their host societies.

Furthermore, the book is well-organized and accessible, making complex concepts and debates understandable to readers with various levels of familiarity with the topic. Steiner draws on examples and case studies from diverse regions of the world, providing a comprehensive overview of international migration and citizenship beyond a narrow regional or national focus. He examines the historical, political, and economic contexts of migration in different regions, shedding light on the similarities and differences in migration patterns and policies across countries and continents. This global approach enhances readers' understanding of the complexities and nuances of international migration and citizenship in different contexts.

However, the book has some criticizing moments as while the book addresses important social, political, economic, and legal aspects of migration and citizenship, it may not thoroughly explore intersectional issues, such as the intersection of gender, race, and class in the migration process. This can be seen as a limitation in fully capturing the complexity and diversity of migrant experiences. Also despite its global perspective, the book does not cover all regions of the world in equal depth, potentially resulting in a skewed or incomplete analysis of international migration and citizenship. Certain regions and countries are not adequately represented in the book, which could limit some readers' understanding of the global dynamics of migration. As the book acknowledges the agency and contributions of migrants, it could benefit from including the voices of migrants themselves, to provide a more comprehensive and nuanced analysis of the topic.

In conclusion, the book "International Migration and Citizenship Today" is a valuable contribution to the field of migration studies. It offers a comprehensive and critical analysis of the social, political, economic, and legal dimensions of international migration and citizenship, providing readers with a deeper understanding of the complexities and challenges of this global phenomenon. This book is highly recommended for scholars, students, policymakers, and anyone interested in gaining a deeper understanding of the contemporary challenges and debates surrounding migration and citizenship in today's world.

Eurasian Research Journal
© Eurasian Research Institute

Editorial Principles

Eurasian Research Journal focuses on the history and current political, social and economic affairs of the countries of the Eurasian space. The journal also explores the economic, political and social transformation of the countries of Central Asia and the Turkic world.

Eurasian Research Journal publishes original research articles, review articles and book reviews.

An article to be published in *Eurasian Research Journal* should not have been previously published or accepted for publication elsewhere. Papers presented at a conference or symposium may be accepted for publication if this is clearly indicated.

Eurasian Research Journal is published quarterly. Each issue is forwarded to subscribers, libraries and international indexing institutions within one month after its publication.

Review of Articles
Articles submitted to *Eurasian Research Journal* are first reviewed by the Editorial Board in terms of the journal's editorial principles. Those found unsuitable are returned to their authors for revision. Academic objectivity and scientific quality are considered of paramount importance. Submissions found suitable are referred to two referees working in relevant fields. The names of the referees are kept confidential and referee reports are archived for five years. If one of the referee reports is positive and the other negative, the article may be forwarded to a third referee for further assessment or alternatively, the Editorial Board may make a final decision based on the nature of the two reports. The authors are responsible for revising their articles in line with the criticism and suggestions made by the referees and the Editorial Board. If they disagree with any issues, they may make an objection by providing clearly-stated reasons. Submissions which are not accepted for publication are not returned to their authors.

The royalty rights of the articles accepted for publication are considered transferred to Eurasian Research Institute of Akhmet Yassawi University. Authors have full responsibility for the views expressed in their articles and for their stylistic preferences. Quotations from other articles and duplication of photographs are permitted as long as they are fully referenced and cited.

Language of Publication
The language of the journal is English.

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMITTING RESEARCH ARTICLES

Please follow the steps listed below in order to register in the system:

1. Click the "Manuscript Handling System". Select "New User" and register in the system by filling in your title, name, surname and other information.

2. Log into the system by entering your user name and password. Then click

"Edit" under "My Profile". On the page that appears fill in your personal information, and area of research (for associate professorship or tenure). Do not forget to click "Save" for each section.

3. If you would like to serve as a reviewer for our journal, click "Yes" for the relevant question found at the bottom of the screen. Then "Save" your answer.

4. In case of a mulfunction of the system or you simply cannot submit the article through the system for any reason, you can send your article directly to erj@eurasian-research.org after making it comply with the style guidelines below.

Please follow the steps listed below to submit an article:

1. Log into the system by entering your user name and password. Then click "Author" on the upper menu.

2. Click "New Submission".

3. Fill in all the required information concerning your submission and then upload the word file of your article to the system. **Make sure** that the word file you upload **does not** include an author name.

4. Once you make sure that all the required areas have been filled in, click "Send".

5. After submitting your article, make sure you see this statement on the screen: "Your data have been successfully entered."

6. Check to see if your article has been submitted from "My Submissions".

NOTES:

1. You will receive automatically generated emails when your article has been received and at every stage of the evaluation process.

2. Enter the information on your area of research even if you are not an Associate Professor or have not received tenure. It is essential that you fill in this information since articles are assigned to reviewers by using this information.

3. Please email info@eurasian-research.org regarding any queries regarding the system.

Publication fees

There are no submission fees, publication fees or page charges for this journal.

Style Guidelines

The following rules should be observed while preparing an article for submission to *Eurasıan Research Journal*:

1. Title of the article: The title should suit the content and express it in the best way, and should be written in **bold** letters. The title should consist of no more than 10-12 words.

2. Name(s) and address(es) of the author(s): The name(s) and surname(s) of the author(s) should be written in **bold** characters, and addresses should be in normal font and italicized; the institution(s) the author(s) is/are affiliated with, their contact and e-mail addresses should also be specified.

3. Abstract: The article should include an abstract in English at the beginning. The abstract should explain the topic clearly and concisely in a minimum of 75 and a maximum of 150 words. The abstract should not include references to

sources, figures and charts. Keywords of 5 to 8 words should be placed at the end of the abstract. There should be a single space between the body of the abstract and the keywords. The keywords should be comprehensive and suitable to the content of the article. The English and Russian versions of the title, abstract and keywords should be placed at the end of the article. In case the Russian abstract is not submitted, it will be added later by the journal.

4. Body Text: The body of the article should be typed on A4 (29/7x21cm) paper on MS Word in Size 12 Times New Roman or a similar font using 1,5 line spacing. Margins of 2,5 cm should be left on all sides and the pages should be numbered. Articles should not exceed 8.000 words excluding the abstract and bibliography. Passages that need to be emphasized in the text should not be bold but italicized. Double emphases like using both italics and quotation marks should be avoided.

5. Section Titles: The article may contain main and sub-titles to enable a smoother flow of information. The main titles (main sections, bibliography and appedices) should be fully capitalized while the sub-titles should have only their first letters capitalized and should be written in bold characters.

6. Tables and Figures: Tables should have numbers and captions. In tables vertical lines should not be used. Horizontal lines should be used only to separate the subtitles within the table. The table number should be written at the top, fully aligned to the left, and should not be in italics. The caption should be written in italics, and the first letter of each word in the caption should be capitalized. Tables should be placed where they are most appropriate in the text. Figures should be prepared in line with black-and-white printing. The numbers and captions of the figures should be centered right below the figures. The figure numbers should be written in italics followed by a full-stop. The caption should immediately follow the number. The caption should not be written in italics, and the first letter of each word should be capitalized. Below is an example table.

Table 1. *Information Concerning Publications in Eurasian Research Journal*

| Publication type	Number of publication	Number of pages			Number of references		
		N	X	SS	N	X	SS
Article	96	2,042	21.3	7.5	2,646	27.6	15.8
Book review	4	30	7.5	4.4	31	7.8	8.3
Total	100	2,072	20.7	7.9	2,677	26.8	16.1

Source: Statistical Country Profiles

7. Pictures: Pictures should be attached to the articles scanned in high-resolution print quality. The same rules for figures and tables apply in naming pictures.

The number of pages for figures, tables and pictures should not exceed 10 pages (one-third of the article). Authors having the necessary technical equipment and software may themselves insert their figures, drawings and pictures into the text provided these are ready for printing.

Below is an example of a picture.

Picture 1. *Ancient Rune script*

Source: en.wiktionary.org

8. Quotations and Citations: Direct quotations should be placed in quotation marks. Quotations shorter than 2.5 lines should be placed within the flowing text. If the quotation is longer that 2.5 lines, it should be turned into a block quote with a 1.5 cm indentation on the right and left, and the font size should be 1 point smaller. Footnotes and endnotes should be avoided as much as possible. They should only be used for essential explanations and should be numbered automatically.

Citations within the text should be given in parentheses as follows:

(Koprulu 1944: 15)

When sources with several authors are cited, the surname of the first author is given and 'et. al' is added.

(Gokay et al. 2002: 18)

If the text already includes the name of the author, only the date should be given:

In this respect, Tanpinar (1976: 131) says …

In sources and manuscripts with no publication date, only the surname of the author should be written; in encyclopedias and other sources without authors, only the name of the source should be written.

While quoting from a quotation, the original source should also be specified:

Koprulu (1926, qtd. in Celik 1998).

Personal interviews should be cited within the text by giving the surnames and dates; they should also be cited in the bibliography. Internet references should always include date of access and be cited in the bibliography.

www.turkedebiyatiisimlersozlugu.com [Accessed: 15.12.2014]

9. Transliteration of Ukrainian to English

Transliteration from the Ukrainian to the Latin alphabet should follow the system officially approved by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers in 2010 (https://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/ungegn/docs/26th-gegn-docs/WP/WP21_ Roma_system_Ukraine%20_engl._.pdf). When transliterating place names, Ukrainian names are preferred to Russian equivalents: for example, Mykolaiv rather than Nikolaev, Kyiv rather than Kiev. However, for historical references to Ukrainian cities, it may be appropriate to use Russian names if they were in wide use at the time.

Please, use UK English in your manuscript.

10. References: References should be placed at the end of the text, the surnames of authors in alphabetical order. The work cited should be entered with the surname of the author placed at the beginning:

Example:

Isen, Mustafa (2010). *Tezkireden Biyografiye*. Istanbul: Kapi Yay.

Koprulu, Mehmet Fuat (1961). *Azeri Edebiyatinin Tekamulu*. Istanbul: MEB Yay.

If a source has two authors, the surname of the first author should be placed first; it is not functional to place the surname of the other authors first in alphabetical order.

Example:

Taner, Refika and Asim Bezirci (1981). *Edebiyatimizda Secme Hikayeler*. Basvuru Kitaplari. Istanbul: Gozlem Yay.

If a source has more than three authors, the surname and name of the first author should be written, and the other authors should be indicated by et.al.

Example:

Akyuz, Kenan et al. (1958). *Fuzuli Turkce Divan*. Ankara: Is Bankasi Yay.

The titles of books and journals should be italicized; article titles and book chapters should be placed in quotation marks. Page numbers need not be indicated for books. Shorter works like journals, encyclopedia entries and book chapters, however, require the indication of page numbers.

Example:

Berk, Ilhan (1997). *Poetika*. Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yay.

Demir, Nurettin (2012). "Turkcede Evidensiyel". *Eurasıan Research Journal*, *Turk Dunyasi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 62(2): 97-117. doi: https://doi.org/10.53277/2519-2442-2021.2-01.

Translator's, compiler's and editor's names (if there are any) should follow the author and title of the work:

Example:

Shaw, Stanford (1982). *Osmanli Imparatorlugu*. Trans. Mehmet Harmanci. Istanbul: Sermet Matb.

If several references by the same author need to be cited, then the name and surname of the author need not be repeated for subsequent entries following the first entry. A long dash may be used instead. Several references by the same author should be listed according to the alphabetical order of work titles.

Example:

Develi, Hayati (2002). *Evliya Celebi Seyahatnamesine Gore 17. Yuzyil Osmanli Turkcesinde Ses Benzesmesi ve Uyumlar*. Ankara: TDK Yay.

_____ (2003). *XVIII. Yuzyil İstanbul Hayatina Dair Risale-i Garibe*. Istanbul: Kitabevi.

If **more than one work by the same author of the same date** need to be cited, they should be indicated by (a, b).

Example:

Develi, Hayati (2002a). *Evliya Celebi Seyahatnamesine Gore 17. Yuzyil Osmanli Turkcesinde Ses Benzesmesi ve Uyumlar.* Ankara: TDK Yay.

Develi, Hayati (2002b). *XVIII. Yuzyil Istanbul Hayatina Dair Risale-i Garibe.* Istanbul: Kitabevi

For **encylopedia entries**, if the author of the encylopedia entry is known, the author's surname and name are written first. These are followed by the date of the entry, the title of the entry in quotation marks, the full name of the encyclopedia, its volume number, place of publication, publisher and page numbers:

Example:

Ipekten, Haluk (1991). "Azmi-zâde Mustafa Haleti". *İslam Ansiklopedisi.* C. 4. Istanbul: Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi Yay. 348-349.

For **theses and dissertations**, the following order should be followed: surname and name of the author, date, full title of thesis in italics, thesis type, city where the university is located, and the name of the university:

Example:

Karakaya, Burcu (2012). *Garibi'nin Yusuf u Zuleyha'si: Inceleme-Tenkitli Metin-Dizin*. Master's Thesis. Kirsehir: Ahi Evran Universitesi.

Handwritten manuscripts should be cited in the following way: Author. Title of Work. Library. Collection. Catalogue number. sheet.

Example:

Asım. *Zeyl-i Zubdetu'l-Es'ar*. Millet Kutuphanesi. A. Emiri Efendi. No. 1326. vr. 45a.

To cite **a study found on the Internet**, the following order should be followed: Author surname, Author name. "Title of message". Internet address. (Date of Access)

Example:

Turkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankasi. "Gecinme Endeksi (Ucretliler)" Elektronik Veri Dagitim Sistemi. http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr/ (Accessed: 04.02.2009).

An article accepted for publication but not yet published can be cited in the following way:

Example:

Atilim, Murat ve Ekin Tokat (2008). "Forecasting Oil Price Movements with Crack Spread Futures". *Energy Economics*. In print (doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2008.07.008).

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMITTING BOOK REVIEWS

Apart from Academic Articles, the Eurasian Research Journal (ERJ) publishes Book Reviews. Usually, there are two Book Reviews published in each issue of the journal. The following rules should be observed while preparing a Book Review for submission to the ERJ:

1. The topic of the book should match with the scope of the ERJ.

2. Only reviews on recently published books are accepted. The book that is to to reviewed must be published within less than a year before the intended date of the publication of ERJ.

3. A Book Review should contain a concise description, critical view, and/or evaluation of the meaning and significance of a book. A normal Book Review should contain approximately 800-1000 words.

4. Name(s) and address(es) of the author(s): The name(s) and surname(s) of the author(s) should be written in bold characters, and addresses should be in normal font and italicized; the institution(s) the author(s) is/are affiliated with, their contact and e-mail addresses should also be specified.

5. The text of a Book Review should be typed on A4 (29/7x21cm) paper on MS Word in Size 12 Times New Roman or a similar font using 1.5 line spacing. Margins of 2.5 cm should be left on all sides and the pages should be numbered.

6. Tables and Figures should not be used in a Book Review.

7. All Author(s) should refrain from using contractions, first or second person viewpoints, incomplete sentences, ambiguous terminology, and slang, informal style as well as wordy phrases.

8. Author(s) are recommended to proofread and copyedit their Book Review prior to submitting.

Book Reviews should be submitted using the Manuscript Handling System option at http://erj.eurasian-research.org/yonetim/login/index.php