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## İÇİNDEKİLER

# 2022 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN FRANCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

## Olcay ÖZKAYA*, Zühal ÜNALP ÇEPEL**

## ABSTRACT

Assessments of the foreign policy of France after the April 2022 presidential election will guide the scholars on the future of the internal and external policies of France and the European Union (EU). Within this framework, the paper aims to identify the foreign policy approaches of the presidential candidates and the political parties they have represented in France. The paper adopts a diverse approach from traditional foreign policy approaches which take internal and external factors separately as units of analysis in foreign policy-making processes. Contrary to the traditional perspective, the authors focused on the interaction of internal and external factors, because it is argued in the paper that this interaction creates mutual impacts on agents and shapes foreign policy-making procedures. Methodologically the paper elaborates on the interaction through an analysis of the discourses of seven presidential candidates and the programs of the political parties they have represented. It is concluded in the paper that the interaction of the factors in French foreign policy has currently concentrated on the themes such as migration, security, economy, climate change, Islam, NATO membership, and the future of the EU. The article tries to contribute to the foreign policy analysis literature through a comprehensive analysis from a perspective of neoclassical realism on the combination of internal and external factors and to illuminate the probable reflections of the presidential election process in France.

***Keywords:*** Foreign Policy Analysis, France, Presidential Election, European Union, International Politics.
***JEL Classfication:*** F53, F59.

# 2022 FRANSA CUMHURBAŞKANLIĞI SEÇİMİ: DIŞ POLİTİKA ANALİZİ ÜZERİNE BİR DEĞERLENDİRME

## ÖZ

Nisan 2022 cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimi sonrasındaki Fransa dış politikasına ilişkin yapılacak değerlendirmeler, araştırmacılara Fransa ve Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) iç ve dış politikalarının geleceği konusunda yol gösterici nitelikte olacaktır. Bu çerçevede makalenin amacı, Fransa'da cumhurbaşkanlığı adayları ile adayların temsil ettiği siyasi partilerin dış politika yaklaşımlarının tespit edilmesidir. Makale, dış politika yapım süreçlerinde iç ve dış faktörleri ayrı analiz birimleri olarak ele alan geleneksel dış politika yaklaşımlarından farklı bir yaklaşım benimsemektedir. Geleneksel bakış açısının aksine, yazarlar iç ve dış faktörlerin etkileşimine odaklanmakta olup makalede bu etkileşimin aktörler üzerinde karşılıklı etkiler yarattığı ve dış politika yapım süreçlerini şekillendirdiği tartışılmaktadır. Metodolojik olarak makale, bu etkileşimi, yedi cumhurbaşkanı adayının söylemleri ve adayların temsil ettikleri siyasi partilerin programları üzerinden değerlendirmektedir. Makalede, Fransız dış politikasındaki iç ve dış faktörler arasındaki etkileşimin, hâlihazırda göç, güvenlik, ekonomi, iklim değişikliği, İslam, NATO üyeliği ve AB'nin geleceği temaları üzerinde yoğunlaştığı sonucuna varılmıştır. Bu çalışma, iç ve dış faktörlerin bileşimi üzerine neoklasik realizm perspektifinden kapsamlı bir analiz yaparak dış politika analizi literatürüne katkıda bulunmaya ve Fransa'daki cumhurbaşkanlığı seçim sürecinin olası yansımalarına ışık tutmaya çalışmaktadır.

***Anahtar Kelimeler:*** Dış Politika Analizi, Fransa, Cumhurbaşkanlığı Seçimi, Avrupa Birliği, Uluslararası Siyaset.
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## INTRODUCTION

The students of international relations have been currently witnessing the transformation of actors and factors within foreign policy analysis (FPA). The transformation stems from the nature of politics both in domestic and international realms. Until the end of the Cold War, scholars separated domestic policy and foreign policy strictly from each other, and they considered that these areas had unique characteristics. However, with the end of the Cold War, the lines between domestic and foreign policy areas are blurred. As expressed by Kaarbo et al., FPA connects the study of international relations with the study of domestic politics (Kaarbo, Lantis, & Beasley, 2013, s. 2). Thus, the approaches within the FPA have become inevitable in analyzing these blurred lines.

The FPA is based upon different factors which influence the foreign policies of states. Traditionally, these factors were grouped into two categories: external factors and internal factors. While the first category refers to the international environment as the source of foreign policies, the second category refers to the domestic area shaping the foreign policy of states. Kaarbo et al. define external factors as *"the organization of the international system, the characteristics of contemporary international relations and acts of other actors"*. On the other hand, they define internal factors as *"characteristics of the domestic political system and its ingredients; citizens and groups within the system, the government organizations, and individual leaders"* (Kaarbo et al., 2013, p. 7). The literature refers to the constructivist approach and different units of analysis such as the public, societal groups, bureaucratic organizations, leaders, and political psychology as internal factors, whereas, traditional viewpoints benefit from realism, liberalism, dependency theory, and world-systems theory to conceptualize and explain external factors.[1]

The literature centered on the divisions or one of these particular factors to identify foreign policies of states. However, neoclassical realist theory adopts a broad foreign policy perspective including both domestic and international factors. The realist school was composed of neorealism, structural realism, offensive realism, and defensive realism until the 1990s. Nevertheless, with the end of the Cold War, neoclassical realism as a more recent school has brought a new dimension to interpreting foreign policy. With this new trend, politics should be studied not only through the lens of systemic factors but also through internal factors such as leaders' choices and perceptions (Schweller, 2018, 28). According to neoclassical realism, external factors do not have direct effects since they are filtered by intervening variables, namely internal factors. To elaborate on the foreign policy of a state, one must observe *"the preferences and configurations of key domestic actors"* (Rose, 1998, 146-147). Since it is argued in the paper that the interaction creates mutual impacts on agents, this assumption can be tested by examining the discourses and promises of presidential candidates and their political parties in France. The paper is based upon

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[1] See. Kaarbo, J., Lantis, J. S., & Beasley, R. K. (2013). The Analysis of Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective. Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior. United States: Sage Publications.

the argument by Devlen and Özdamar (2009, 136) that the political leaders' perception of the systemic environment, their prioritization of *"political survival"* and *"large group identity"* are determining factors in foreign policy-making processes. From this point of view, it is aimed in the paper to answer the following questions: How do the presidential candidates in France interpret the foreign policy priorities of the state? What is the impact of ideology, political survival, and large group identity priorities of the leaders during the April 2022 presidential election?

To answer the questions above, the paper elaborates on the first ballot results and public opinion polls released by Politico[2]. The analysis covers both oral and written forms of different sources taken from the mainstream media, official websites of the political parties, and speeches given by the presidential candidates. From a neoclassical realist perspective, the paper highlights the interaction of factors in French foreign policy. Concerning the results of the latest polls, this paper handled seven candidates and parties or movements they belong to. Through the analysis, the paper aims to provide a broad understanding of the French foreign policy both for the present and the future, whilst shedding light on the foreign policy agenda of the EU as well. The first section informs briefly about the election process in France and its repercussions both in Europe and around the world. The second section elaborates on the presidential election from the perspective of FPA. The third and fourth sections inform and analyze the political parties/movements, leaders, and their foreign policy agendas during the election process. The final section provides prospects for the foreign policy agenda of France and the impact of the election on the EU and international politics.

## 2022 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN FRANCE AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS

According to the Constitution of France which was mainly designed by General Charles de Gaulle[3] in 1958, the president is the main figure in the democratic system in the country. In this semi-presidential system of France from 1958 to the present, namely the French Fifth Republic, the president appoints the prime minister as the head of the government and ministers. The government is accountable to French citizens, the National Assembly, and the Senate (Gouvernement, n.d.). Due to the president's position, the presidential election plays a crucial role for the French citizens.

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[2] This paper exploited POLITICO's polls on the presidential election in France. POLITICO is a global nonpartisan politics and policy news organization. See https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/france/, (Last Access: 09.04.2022).

[3] Charles de Gaulle was a General in the French army and he was the leader of the 'Free France' movement which was founded by him to fight against the German invasion of France during World War II. He has been named the founder of democratic France after the war. General de Gaulle had a conservative and nationalist foreign policy rooted in the developments during World War II. He supported the 'national independence' and 'free and sovereign Europe' policy in the region and he had negative attitudes toward the presence of the US and the UK in Europe. He has seen the US and the UK as 'Trojan horses' against the peace and stability in Europe. For those reasons, he opposed both the membership of the UK and the 'supranational' efforts in the European Community during the 1960s. Within this foreign policy approach, France, under the leadership of de Gaulle, withdrew from the military command of NATO, in 1966 and favored a rapprochement with the Soviet Union to build up a 'pan-European' system 'ranging from the Ural Mountains to the Atlantic Ocean'. Since then, 'Gaullist' foreign policy sentiments have had a considerable place in the foreign policy preferences of the politicians in France (Sander, 1995, p. 348-355).

The president with its highest authority is elected for five years with universal suffrage (Leterre, 2002). The results of elections, especially in states with major or middle power have a considerable impact on domestic, regional, and international politics. Regarded as a middle power democracy, France has been playing a central role in EU policies and a significant role in global politics (Kleinfeld et al, 2021). Considering the traditional foreign policy priorities of France, namely Europe, transatlantic relations, and Francophone Africa, the election for the presidency will have striking repercussions on both EU policy-making and international politics.

According to Article 7 of the French Constitution, if a candidate takes the absolute majority of the votes, then he or she becomes the president of France for five years. Otherwise, electorates vote for the second time but for the two candidates who take the majority of the votes on the first ballot (Leterre, 2002). The second round should be carried out two weeks later than the first round, and the candidates need just the majority of the votes to be elected in this round. Since Macron and Le Pen took 27.85% and 23.15% of the votes respectively in the election on 10 April 2022, they two passed to second-round elections on 24 April 2022. According to Article 6 of the Constitution, the same president can be elected by the citizens two times (1958, p.5). For that reason, Macron's candidacy has taken the attention of the French electorate, media, and foreign countries. In addition to Macron's candidacy, the election in April 2022 has various dimensions which need to be observed in detail.

This paper discusses the importance of the 2022 election within four main aspects: domestic politics, EU politics, relations with NATO, and international politics. The first and foremost aspect is the *domestic politics* of France which has been currently on the verge of various difficulties and changes. The major themes of the presidential election can be identified as migration, security, economy, climate change, Islam and Muslims, NATO, and the future of the EU. The second aspect of the election is on the *EU level*. The EU has been one of the main themes of the French presidential elections since the first years of European integration. While the election is a matter of domestic politics, it influences EU bodies and EU member states as well. As one of the six founding members of European integration, France has been shaping the core policies of the EU. As can be inferred from Macron's discourses, specific themes like *"security, defense, economy, sovereignty, migration, and leadership of the EU on global politics"* will dominate the EU in the long run (Çakır, 2021).

The third aspect of the presidential election revolves around *NATO* and its position in domestic and international politics. The historical roots of the significance of NATO in French foreign policy can be traced back to the establishment process of the Alliance after the Second World War, the French position against the American dominance over European security, the 1966 withdrawal decision of France from NATO's integrated military command under the administration of de Gaulle and its return to it in 2009. The position of France, as a NATO member, will determine the future of the organization. After the establishment of Australia, UK, and US alliance, namely AUKUS, a heated debate on the membership of France in NATO was restarted by the presidential candidates (Pollet, 2021). Therefore, the presidential election in

France touches upon the future of NATO and its power in a broad sense. The final aspect points out a more complicated and broad area: *international politics*. The changing characteristics of the balance of power and politics make French elections critical at regional and global levels. The stances of presidential candidates on international issues have an impact not only on the foreign policy of France but also on international politics.

In connection with the last aspect, a recent development has been highly affecting global politics and producing many repercussions on the French election. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 created a complex political environment in France. While the war has dominated the agenda, it has affected the discourses and campaigns of the candidates as well. In this respect, it is essential to consider the Ukraine war during the analysis within the context of assessing the impact on the election (Coffey, 2022; Quentin & Boiteau, 2022). By taking into consideration all these aspects and dynamics, it can be argued that the presidential election in France has the potential to open up 'Pandora's box' to assess regional and international politics in the short term. Moreover, it becomes necessary to analyze this presidential election from the perspective of the FPA to foresee the interaction of various factors.

## FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF NEOCLASSICAL REALISM

It is argued in the paper that the interaction of external and internal factors determines the foreign policy preferences of the agents and the structure. The idea behind this stems from the insufficiency of traditional literature on FPA that separates internal and external factors and focuses on just one aspect to make an analysis. Hence, traditional analyses do not explain foreign policy-making and the preferences of actors in a broad sense. Therefore, it can be stated that the separation of factors reduces international politics to a narrow area of research.

Hill (2003, p.28) defines foreign policy-making as a *"complex process of interaction between many actors, differentially embedded in a wide range of different structures".* Freire (2012, p.3) supports this argument and adds that the co-constitutive relations between agency and structure lead to the process of foreign policy-making. Since the 1990s, neoclassical realists have stressed the role of *"firstly statesmen, not the states"; "cognition, strategic culture, state-society relations, and domestic institutions"* in foreign policy-making (Zakaria, 1998, p. 42; Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 2009, p. 68). In a similar vein, Devlen and Özdamar (2019, p. 149) argue that the foreign policy of a state is influenced by the perceptions of domestic political leaders. If the leaders have *"conflictual or cooperative"* actions, if they maximize the large-group identity and prioritize political survival over everything, then the foreign policy-making procedures will be directly shaped by those mentioned. The paper follows this perspective in assessing French foreign policy through the interaction of various factors during the presidential election process.

FPA proposes that the leadership style, personalities, and beliefs of the leaders construct and shape the foreign policy of states. However, foreign policy-making

cannot be reduced to internal factors or actors such as the acts of presidents, prime ministers, or authoritarian leaders. It is argued in the paper that these actors play a significant role as components of the interaction between internal and external factors. It should be stressed that the discourses of French leaders and political parties or movements they act for during the presidential election campaigns unveil the interaction of factors in foreign policy.

## LEADERS, PARTIES, AND THEIR FOREIGN POLICY AGENDAS FOR THE PRESIDENCY

The spring of 2022 has a special meaning to French citizens due to the presidential election. Although the number of candidates reached 60, there were 12 candidates in the first round as stated by Laurent Fabius, Head of the Constitutional Council. Accordingly, 12 of the 60 candidates obtained the required 500 valid signatures from the elected officials in at least 30 different French departments (Fitzpatrick, 2022). One of these candidates has been Emmanuel Macron who officially announced his candidacy on 3 March 2022 (France 24, 2022). The remaining candidates have been; Marine Le Pen (Rassemblement National), Jean-Luc Mélenchon (La France Insoumise), Valérie Pécresse (Les Républicains), Eric Zemmour (Reconquest), Anne Hidalgo (Socialist Party), Yannick Jadot (Green Party), Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (Debout La France/Stand Up France), Fabien Roussel (Parti communiste français/Communist Party), Jean Lassale (Resist), Nathalie Arthaud (Lutte Ouvriere/ Workers' Struggle) and Philippe Poutou (Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste/ New Anticapitalist Party) (Tidey, 2021). The polls on the election focused on seven candidates who could have reached at least 4% of the total votes.[4] In that respect, this paper focuses on these seven candidates, their political parties or movements, foreign policy choices, and goals. The candidates are; Emmanuel Macron, Marine Le Pen, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Valérie Pécresse, Eric Zemmour, Anne Hidalgo, and Yannick Jadot. In the section below, the authors take a closer look at those candidates and their parties to examine the interaction between the factors and elaborate on their foreign policy agendas and motives from a neoclassical realist perspective.

### Emmanuel Macron- *La République en Marche (LRM) / The Republic on the Move*

As a former Minister of Economy, Industry, and Digital Affairs, Emmanuel Macron is the founder of the political party, *La République en Marche (LRM)* as well. The party was founded in 2016 as a political movement to combine leftist, rightist, and other groups into its structure (Macron, n.d.) Starting with the 2017 presidential election, the movement *En Marche* has pursued its political goals under the leadership of Macron. He ran for a second term after he completed his first term as the president of France (Tidey, 2021). Politico estimated that Macron could take 26% of the votes in

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[4]To narrow down the study, Politico's data on polls in France is studied.
See. https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/france/ (Last Access: 11.01.2022)

the first round of the election.[5] As expected, he obtained the highest number, 27.8% of the votes in the first round which gave him the right to run for the second round.[6]

During his term in the 2017-2022 presidency, Macron followed an active and passionate foreign policy both in Europe and around the world to strengthen his position in domestic politics as well. Macron aimed to empower the EU by protecting both "*the international liberal order and European civilization"*. He has underlined that this is the mission of France to maintain stability in the region as a reflection of the party's ideology. France has been following a consistent foreign policy approach to European security since the first years of the European integration.1950 Pleven Plan was proposed by France to establish the European Defense Community. Even though this initiative could not be put into practice, France aimed to integrate the six founding members' foreign and security policies through Fouchet Plan in 1962. In the 1990s, Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defense Policy have been the turning points for the EU in terms of deeper integration in the political sphere. In 1998, the then president of France, Jacques Chirac, and the then prime minister of the UK, Tony Blair, agreed on the Saint-Malo Declaration to lead an autonomous foreign and security policy in Europe through a 'rapid reaction force'. Those efforts finally worked and NATO members recognized the individual capacity of the EU in defense policy through the 2002 Berlin Plus agreements (Bindi, 2022, p. 37). By following the defense policy initiatives of de Gaulle and Chirac, the latest French president Macron proposed the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) pact to boost European defense cooperation in 2017, and aimed at a more autonomous EU in terms of security and defense (Staunton, 2021). After France took over the rotating EU presidency in January 2022, Macron made a speech in the European Parliament (EP) by highlighting the European collective security and the 'strategic autonomy' of the EU (France24, 2022). Strategic autonomy has been on the agenda of Macron since the 2010s to exist with a strong *"European sovereignty"* in the international arena (European Parliament, 2021). As neoclassical realism explains, Macron has followed *En Marche*'s policies which have been stated in the party program for his political survival and the continuity of the large-group identity.[7]

Macron announced the agenda of the EU as *"an independent, strong, sovereign and free EU"*. The foreign policy agenda of France has focused on migration, defense, hate speech in social media, and the economy as large group identity preferences. Macron has stressed building forces for the EU borders to control migration and EU Joint Armed Forces to strengthen the defense in the region. To compensate for budget deficits in the EU, he has supported the reform of the existing rules on economic integration (Marin Pool, 2021). Thus, he planned to succeed both in domestic and foreign policy by using the interplay between these areas.

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[5] To see the tables, charts, and methodology. See. https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/france/, (Last Access: 11.01.2022)

[6] For the results of the first round. See. https://www.gouvernement.fr/actualite/election-presidentielle-les-resultats-du-premier-tour (Last Access: 12.04.2022)

[7] See the details of the program at https://en-marche.fr/emmanuel-macron/le-programme/europe (Last Access: 11.01.2022)

As part of the EU policies on defense and security, 'Strategic Compass', was proposed in November 2021 by France to fortify self-sufficiency in European security. The goal of the Compass is to create *"autonomy on defense"* and decrease the dependency on the US and NATO. The EU aims to deploy 'rapid deployment troops', organize military drills, and facilitate partnerships among member states (Temizer, 2021). According to some analysts, Macron tries to fill the gap of leadership in the EU by taking major steps within the EU's foreign policy. On the issue of the full membership of Turkey to the EU, Macron has ensued disapproving stances of former French presidents. He thinks that Turkey does not share the EU's values and policies, consequently, he opposes full membership of Turkey (Euronews, 2022).

France has a considerable role in shaping the crises around the world. In Africa, France sought to *"project influence, build new alliances, repair old rifts and defuse the migration issue at home"* under the leadership of Macron (Chutel, 2021). Military operations have been launched by France in Mali to eliminate religious fundamentalism and terrorism in the country since 2013. In 2022, with a decision by the Macron administration, France announced withdrawal from Mali because of the disagreements with the junta regime. However, political leaders in the Sahel have announced that they need France in conflict resolution processes (France 24, 17 February 2022). On the other hand, Libya has been a significant North African country for France. NATO operations in Libya were held in 2011 with the support of France to change the regime in the country. The Macron administration has also strategic interests over Libya in the terms of energy sources, stability of the Mediterranean region, and migration control (Zahr, 2021). Accordingly, the operations in Libya have brought different results for France and the region than the Mali operations (Gros, 2014). These developments have also influenced domestic politics as a result of the interaction of domestic and foreign politics. The relations with the east and the AUKUS crisis[8] have been a watershed for the foreign policy preferences of France and Macron's position. It was previously seen as a *"treason to France"*, but currently it has been perceived as an instrument for the EU to have a key role in Asia as stated by Macron (Reuters, 2021). French opposition leaders share Macron's political stance on the AUKUS crisis and they reopen the debate on withdrawing from NATO after the row on submarines (Pollet, 2021).

The position of France in Russia and Ukraine has been particularly important for European security. The Macron administration supported NATO's position in the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Macron both wanted to communicate with Putin and strived to force Russia to refrain from a new clash. He aimed to improve relations with Russia the same as the other candidates. This had been one of the commonalities of leaders and political parties in France before the war in 2022 (Marlowe, 2022). However, during the

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[8] The AUKUS crisis stemmed from Australia's decision to cancel the 90 billion dollars contract with France for 12 submarines, which was negotiated between 2014 and 2016, and a new deal with the US, the UK, and Australia for building nuclear-powered submarines in September 2021. Although this new 'alliance' with Australia was named a huge success by the US and the UK against China's influence in the Indo-Pacific region, it annoyed France and caused a confidence crisis between these NATO allies (Scheffer & Quencez, 2021).

2022 Russian invasion, Macron stood against Russia and pledged support for Ukraine. He stresses the EU autonomy as a long-term policy, particularly on security and the economy (Leali & Moens, 2022). During the first round of the elections, the situation in Ukraine made Macron more favorable as a result of 'the rally-round-the flag effect'. It makes people tend to rally around the incumbent leader and the government in times of war and crisis. For that reason, the current presidential election and the expectations of voters have been acutely influenced by external factors, namely Russia and the war in Ukraine (Caulcutt, 2022b; Coffey, 2022; Quentin & Boiteau, 2022).

## Valérie Pécresse- *Les Républicains / The Republicans*

Valerie Pécresse, the successor of Jacques Chirac and Nicholas Sarkozy in the party, *Les Républicains*, is a representative of a center-right liberal-conservative political party following the ideas of de Gaulle (Reuters, 2015). The mainstream media presented Pécresse as a strong contender for Macron. It was estimated that she would grab at least 8% of the votes in the first round (Sputnik, 2022). However, she was able to obtain 4,78% of the total votes and lost her chance to compete in the second round. She has been the governor of the Ile-De-France region of Paris and she served as a Minister for Higher Education and Budget (Tidey, 2021).

*Les Républicains* and Pécresse's view on foreign policy was explained within the party convention published on the official website, in September 2021.[9] Their foreign policy agenda focused on three major goals. The first goal was *"to reconquer the independence of Europeans"*. Pécresse believed that the EU needed various reforms in the sectors such as agriculture and industry (Les Republicains, 2021, pp. 10-16). Furthermore, in line with other candidates and political parties, the party planned to *"fight against uncontrolled immigration by setting up a European section of measures (in addition to measures at the national level)"*. Pécresse promised to restore the Schengen Agreement and migration policy of the EU and France. The main difference between Pécresse and Macron seems to be her promise to abandon the *"uncontrolled migration"* as a reflection of large-group identity. The promise included halving the number of residence permits for migrants, holding a referendum to change the laws, and introducing migration quotas first in France and later in the EU (Chrisafis, 2021; Les Republicains, 2021, p. 20). To support these steps, they also planned to reform foreign aid to African countries.

Pécresse, who cares about large group identity priorities, has similarities with the foreign policy approaches of Macron. She has pledged to *"restore France's pride and protect the French"* by making France *"more sovereign"* in the world as a second goal (Chrisafis, 2021; Euronews, 2021a). The party has been critical of *"any further enlargement of the European Union or the Schengen area and put a definitive end to accession negotiations with Turkey"* (Les Republicains, 2021, p. 29). Pécresse stated that it is possible to take back control over the European migration policy with the regeneration of bilateral relations with Turkey (Les Republicains, 2021, p. 46).

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[9] "Convention Europe et International". See https://republicains.fr/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/2021-09-24-lR-convention-europe.pdf , (Last Access: 12.01.2022)

Moreover, in line with the Paris Agreement on climate change, she targeted to increase carbon taxes and include nuclear energy in the green taxonomy (Les Republicains, 2021, p. 33; Tidey, 2021). The last goal has been to give France a truly international role and "*.. to face China, Russia, Turkey, and the US*" (Les Republicains, 2021, pp. 37-48). They see China as a big rival and threat to European values. To balance China's hegemony, they suggested a new approach to the Indo-Pacific region by supporting Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, and Australia both militarily and economically (Les Republicains, 2021, p. 42). While China has been maintained to be considered a rival and threat, Russia was considered a *"debatable"* actor. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has changed the approach. Currently, they have not pursued this positive attitude and have supported Ukraine in the war against Russia. According to Pécresse, *"the Russian president can no longer become an ally for France"*. She supports the sanctions against Russia and defines those *as "necessary"* for the security of Europe (Linfo.re, 2022).

  *Les Republicains* has challenging ideas on the relations with the US. They have aimed to maintain the 'Gaullist' and 'Chiraquian' tradition concerning their relations with the US as can be seen in the discourses within the party convention: *"Allied but not aligned"* as stated in the past by Former Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine. They opposed the economic superiority of the US companies. Pécresse stressed that France should not be *"dependent on the US"* (Les Republicains, 2021, p. 48). Their attitude toward the US is rooted in the historical goal of independence in foreign policy.

  Last but not least, Pécresse aimed to increase ties with French-speaking or *francophone* countries. The party delegates wished to strengthen the resources devoted to the Francophonie to make them a lever for economic, technical, and cultural cooperation with France (Les Republicains, 2021, p. 50). As a result, Pécresse and her party hoped to fortify the position of France around the world by increasing ties with different regional actors from Russia to African countries which could ultimately strengthen the position of Pecresse and the Republicans in domestic politics.

**Marine Le Pen- *Rassemblement National / National Rally***

  The leader of *Rassemblement National*, Marine Le Pen has had a long-lasting political career in France. As a far-right leader, she took over her father's seat at the party. Although she has followed radical sentiments on politics due to her father as a model of a political figure, she both has changed and has been changed within years. For instance, the party's name was changed from *National Front* to *National Rally* in 2018 to get more support from European citizens in the EP elections in 2019 (Deutsche Welle, 2018).

  In the 2017 presidential election, Le Pen lost the presidency against Macron in the second round. Much as she lost in the 2017 election and popularity in France, she persevered in her ambition to unseat Macron in the 2022 election (Tidey, 2021). Even though she has lost popularity in the previous election, Politico's polls on the presidential election refuted this opinion for 2022. It was estimated that she could grab at least 23% of the votes and they succeeded in their prediction. She obtained 23.1%

of the total votes and she has the right to run in the second round election against Macron on 24 April 2022.

The leading characteristic of the party is that it centers on the leader's authority and discriminates against democratic participation within the organization. Due to this structure, charismatic leadership and hierarchy play a central role in this political party (Akgül Durakçay, 2021, p. 252-253). Moreover, Le Pen's discourse on foreign policy predominantly determines the preferences of the party. Le Pen has had radical and critical sentiments in foreign policy for a long time. She sticks to some themes, namely security, migration, independent foreign policy, a strong military, and the economy as a reflection of the party's ideology and for her political survival (Tidey, 2021). In the 2017 party program, Le Pen wrote 144 articles to clarify her party's stance on domestic and foreign policies. While she softened some policies, she kept many of them. She has seen the EU as a bond with France and has opposed the EU for years. After Brexit, she named the pledge for exit from the EU as *"Frexit"* (Akgül Durakçay, 2021, p. 262). However, she has currently emphasized how to *"transform the EU"*, in line with far-right sentiments in European countries that can be assessed from a neoclassical realist point of view.

The party aims to direct EP and the EU towards a more conservative and nationalistic path. Le Pen's role is vital because she has been one of the strong candidates for presidential elections in 2022. She planned to expand her foreign policy preferences across the region by setting alliances in Europe. Initially, she planned to withdraw France from the Schengen Area and implement strict border controls. The party followed a campaign against the existing structure of the EU in the 2019 election. In this process, the party tried to influence Europeans to take their assistance for a *"new Europe"* (Akgül Durakçay, 2021, p. 264). Le Pen's opposition has not been indigenous to the EU. She opposes NATO membership and the role of the US in European security as well. As stated in the manifestation, France should *"leave the integrated military command of NATO so that France is not drawn into wars that are not hers"* (Le Pen, 2017, p. 19). Before the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Le Pen opposed the US position against Russia in the region and she pledged to improve relations with Russia. She believed that Russia had been a part of European culture and identity, but the US had not (Dagens Nyheter, 2016). Recently, she has turned against Russia and embraced Ukrainian refugees obviously for electoral reasons despite her strong ties with the Putin regime including financial support for her party. It should be noted that Le Pen has never condemned the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and improved ties with Putin's government. In recent, on the contrary, she has strongly condemned Russia due to the civilian casualty allegations in Ukraine. She has called these incidents war crimes and has demanded investigation (Caulcutt, 2022a; France 24, 2022b, p. 24).

**Eric Zemmour- *Reconquête / Reconquest***

Eric Zemmour, who moved from journalism to politics, has been the most controversial candidate for the 2022 presidential election. He has been one of the far-

right candidates and is considered a radical figure in politics. This has made Le Pen a moderate candidate in the election. Zemmour and Le Pen have followed different ways for their political survival to unseat Macron in the presidential election (Amiel, 2021). To follow his way, Zemmour set up his political party *Reconquête* in December 2021, instead of joining one of the right-wing parties. However, they have narrow policy agendas which focus on a few issues, particularly migration, Islam, gender, and Euroscepticism.[10] Zemmour's campaign has been considered a mixture of nostalgia and searing provocation replication of de Gaulle in some quarters (Ramdani, 2021).

Zemmour has been famed for his provocation on Islam, migration, and women. He stated that France has been losing its power from the perspectives of geopolitics and economics for the reasons of *"migration, Islamization, and feminization of the society"* (Tidey, 2021). In illustrating his theory of the 'great replacement' based on the allegation that the French-born population is being replaced by immigrants, he has used hate speech and has a discriminative approach against different segments of the society. It was estimated that he would get at least 9% of the votes in the election.[11] In the first round, he obtained 7.07% of the total votes, therefore he did not run in the second round. He had promises predominantly over domestic policy areas. However, one can infer their foreign policy preferences from the *"priorities"* of the party which were released on the official website.[12] He planned to implement his policies primarily in Europe and later in the whole world, by using domestic and foreign politics mutually to the benefit of their large group's identity as can be explained by neoclassical realism.

The texts within his website of Zemmour show that his ideas on foreign policy have been challenging in some respects. For example, he wanted to *"save"* France from decades of migration and liberalism. He thinks that these two phenomena have caused the decline of France in international politics. In his opinion, Europe has had a *"Christian heritage"* and "*without Christianity, the EU wouldn't be possible".* He argued that the *"Islamization of Europe reflects the clash of civilizations".* From his viewpoint, European countries must forbid the movement of Muslim migrants to *"protect Europe".* He has extended his ideas both for the region and around the globe by referring to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. He argued that European states must protect Armenia from regional *"threats", because,* Armenians reflect the Christian heritage in the region as well. Zemmour's foreign policy perception and choices signify his radical thoughts (Euronews, 2021b).

Zemmour's campaign consisted of five priorities, one of which reflected his main goal in foreign policy: *"independence".* He stressed that France should follow de Gaulle's approach to foreign policy. He rejected the judgments of supranational bodies by implying judicial bodies of the EU. He has also opposed the role of NATO by pledging to withdraw from it to follow an *"independent"* policy. Furthermore, he opposed the role of the US in Europe as well. He aimed to strengthen relations with Russia and loosen with the US respectively. To follow these goals, he stressed the role

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[10] Zemmour's program for the presidential election. See., https://programme.zemmour2022.fr/, (Last Access: 13.01.2022)
[11] See. https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/france/, (Last Access: 13.01.2022)
[12] For more details. See. https://www.zemmour2022.fr/priorites, (Last Access: 13.01.2022)

of military power and he planned to ramp up the armed forces of France (Pujol-Mazzini, 2021). At the beginning of the war in Ukraine in 2022, Zemmour supported building negotiations between the two parties and *the "neutralization"* of Ukraine on NATO membership. The civilian massacres in Ukraine made those views controversial. Henceforth Zemmour was also forced to change his position on Russia while in the past he used to declare he dreamed of becoming a Putin. Recently he has called Putin *"a dirty image of Russia"* (Franceinfo, 2022b, 2022c).

### Jean-Luc Mélenchon -*La France Insoumise / Rebellious France*

*La France Insoumise* is a left-wing populist party that was settled by Jean-Luc Mélenchon in 2016 as a democratic socialist party. Following the socialist ideas, Mélenchon was previously co-leader of the Socialist Party until 2008 (Mullen, 2018). To start changes in France, he started a movement called *La France Insoumise, which* means *'*rebellious France' or 'insubordinate France'. He first showed up in the 2017 presidential election as a candidate and took 19% of the votes in the first round. However, he lost against Macron and Le Pen in the second round. Politico estimated that Mélenchon's popularity decreased to 17% (Tidey, 2021). In the first round of the 2022 election, he obtained 21.95% of the total votes but he lost his chance to run for the second round.

Mélenchon's campaign in 2022 focused mainly on domestic politics and the EU. The party shares the idea of Le Pen and calls the EU a *"dead"* organization. They assert that *"the EU is not Europe. The current Union boils down to a single market where the people are subject to the dictatorship of banks and finance"*. Following this idea, Mélenchon and his party aimed to regenerate the current treaties of the EU (La France Insoumise, 2018). The party also supports a French referendum to see the supporters of Frexit (France 24, 2017). In addition to their socialist and ecologist views, the party keeps a Eurosceptic approach to EU affairs. Consequently, this approach indicates that Mélenchon, Le Pen, and Zemmour have been in agreement with each other on the functioning of the EU. As neoclassical realism argues, they elaborate on the EU issues from their parties' ideological points of view and by prioritizing their political survival.

The aforementioned leaders have also critical arguments on the role played by NATO and the US in European security. They oppose the hegemonic role of the US around the world. Mélenchon pledged to withdraw from NATO (Jouve, 2016). The party asserted that the United Nations (UN) is the only legitimate body for collective security. She aimed to *"organize a European conference on the internal and external borders of the EU, peace and collective security within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to promote peace and cross-border cooperation (Ireland, Cyprus, Hungary, Austria, Italy, Catalonia, Ukraine, Russia, etc)"* (La France Insoumise, 2018).

Mélenchon's party has been following socialist views on trade and economy. The party aims to withdraw from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank and aims to replace them with a *"Social Emergency Fund"* and a *"Social*

*Investment Bank"*. Moreover, Mélenchon pledged to empower the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) against G20, G7, IMF, and WTO. Since he objects to the dollar monopoly in the international system, he encourages the plan of China to propose a global currency (France 24, 2017). In terms of relations with Middle Eastern states, the party has discrete and critical ideas. It has pledged to end *"hypocritical alliances with Gulf petro-monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates"*. Mélenchon has supported Palestine's claims and two-state solutions in line with the UN resolutions. On the other hand, while he has criticized domestic politics in Russia due to the authoritarian regime, he has promoted some of Russia's interference in different regions like Syria (La France Insoumise, 2018). He had supported relations with Russia and had aimed to build dialogue on common security. However, in terms of war in Ukraine and Russian aggression, Mélenchon has reflected a clear attitude compatible with his stance. He names Putin as *"the only culprit"* and defines this war as *"Putin's crime against his country"*. He thought that it was not possible, thereafter, to *"pursue personal relations with a man like Mr. Poutine who has had personal responsibility for war crimes"*. Mélenchon wanted to prevent France from becoming a *"co-belligerent"* on Ukrainian soil. Moreover, he reaffirmed his goal for France to be a non-aligned country (Franceinfo, 2022a; Laurent, Oberdorff, & Peiron, 2022).

**Anne Hidalgo-*Parti Socialiste* / Socialist Party**

The latest mayor of Paris since 2014, Anne Hidalgo, has been the candidate of the Socialist Party for the 2022 presidential election. The Socialist Party or in French, "Parti Socialiste" is known as a central-left, social democratic, and pro-EU political party which has had deep roots in the political life of France for half a century (Tidey, 2021). Although they cannot gain the majority of the total votes for the presidency as estimated by Politico's polls, they pursued their goals for the 2022 presidential election under the leadership of Anne Hidalgo. It was estimated that Hidalgo would grab at least 4% of the total votes in the election.[13] However, she could only get 1.75% of the total votes in the first round and she did not run for the second round on April 24. While Hidalgo and Socialist Party mainly focus on domestic politics for this election and represent their arguments towards domestic policies, they explain their point of view for foreign policy mainly referring to the EU.

Hidalgo's program for election targets eight major topics and 70 articles within them. It includes work conditions in the country, ecology, democracy, education, social security, the rule of law, providing the means for economic recovery by ecology, foreign policy within the voice of France, and the strength of Europe (Hidalgo, n.d.). Among these major issues, the last section covers 13 articles that explain Hidalgo's and Socialist Party's perspectives on international politics. To begin with, it must be underlined that Hidalgo and her party are pro-European. Their foreign policy agenda has been based on the role and significance of the EU. They consider the EU as a guarantee of French sovereignty and power in world politics. The EU is defined in the party program with the following words:

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[13] See. https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/france/, (Last Access: 15.01.2022)

*"…powerful asset for controlling their security in the face of the major challenges facing all Europeans like climate change and the biodiversity crisis, health and food crises, the influence of multinationals and in particular digital giants, but also geopolitical challenges"* (Hidalgo, n.d.).

Moreover, they consider the US and China as rivals by calling them *"G2 states"*, and point out the brutalization of international politics by referring to Russia as a reflection of the party's ideology. Furthermore, the party is skeptical about these great powers. Hidalgo has underlined the importance of cooperation and alliances among the EU member states as an antidote to these powers. On the other hand, she has aimed to change the economic structure of the EU to improve social security and implement more ecological arrangements. She has supported reducing emissions by 55% until 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality until 2050. In line with these goals, she aimed to change tax policies within the EU to decrease income inequality (Hidalgo, n.d.).

As a controversial debate among the candidates, migration, and migrants play a very distinct role in the arguments. Hidalgo and Socialist Party evaluate this phenomenon mainly from a humanitarian perspective. They state that *"the EU must adopt a more humane, united and effective migration policy"*. They consider migrants as *"contributors to the construction and the history of their country"* (Hidalgo, n.d.). In addition, Hidalgo had a positive look to improve relations with Francophone countries to preserve and empower the position of the French language, which reflects the large-group identity priorities as well. She considered French as a cultural and political space for countries sharing universal values (Hidalgo, n.d.) Moreover, she promised to use diplomacy as a *"soft power"* tool to expand the consciousness of climate change around the world and to build a new international regime on environmental issues. Through these goals, Hidalgo has pledged a state with more social priorities and policies to promote democracy both in domestic and international politics. She has supported Ukraine and has shown solidarity with Ukraine against Russia in their war. She stated that *"It is a* sine qua non-condition *for this war to end.... It must be done now, otherwise it will drag on."* (Loaec, 2022).

## Yannick Jadot – *Europe Ecologie Les Verts* / Green Party

As a Member of the European Parliament (MEP), Yannick Jadot ran for Greens in France for the presidential election in April 2022. The Greens or Les Verts have positioned themselves in the center-left and have a green political ideology. By following this ideology, Jadot aimed to extend his party's policies nationwide by unseating Macron and grabbing the presidency. Jadot's and Green Party's programs for the election have focused on green politics in France, the EU, and world politics (Kayalı & Bermingham, 2021). According to Politico's opinion polls, Jadot would have got at least 5% of the total votes in the first round of the presidential election.[14] Following Politico's estimation, Jadot obtained 4.63% of the total votes in the first round. However, he had no opportunity to participate in the second round.

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[14] See. https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/france/ , (Last Access: 15.01.2021)

Green Party's program and project for the election consists of six main pillars. One of these pillars had been the motto of the party, *"building a world in peace"* (Europe Ecologie Les Verts, n.d.). They aimed to transform the state into an ecological state and make it possible to transform society as well. In line with this aim, they supported reinforcing the diplomatic capacity of the EU, increasing their power of action in favor of a renewed multilateralism, to protect fundamental rights and democracy as explained in the program. By supporting the role of the EU, Jadot and Greens manifested their positive attitude towards the supranational structure of the EU. However, they did not believe that the EU and its bodies have been adequate for these goals. Therefore, they aimed to transform the EU in the name of promoting ecology, social security, and democracy as well. Moreover, they clearly explained their stance on international conflicts. They supported the use of non-military instruments such as economic sanctions as means of international action. They supported the strengthening of the role of the EP in defining the EU's foreign policy. On the other hand, they aimed to support disarmament measures around the world, and abolish nuclear weapons under the aegis of the UN and with the support of European states (Europe Ecologie Les Verts, n.d.).

While Jadot pursued *"building a world in peace"*, he planned to follow a security policy that reminded the goals of Macron. He wanted to create a European operational military command for an autonomous Europe. As stated in the party program, he supported the strengthening of military cooperation at the EU level in strict compliance with international law and multilateralism. The party attributed this plan to two strategic goals: one is conflict resolution through security cooperation, and the second is preventing conflicts arising out of climate change. Furthermore, according to him, this approach will allow Europeans to weigh within the Atlantic framework and to make it more consistent with European interests. Related to this goal, he aimed to *"emancipate"* from the other great powers and balance the role of the US in Europe (Europe Ecologie Les Verts, n.d.). This attitude towards the US has been a reflection of the large-group identity priority of the party. Contrary to other candidates, Jadot pledged to reform the relations with Africa. As in the program, the party recognized the ecological responsibility contracted in the industrial era and during colonization. Withdrawal of the French army from Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, and ending the predation of the large industrial groups such as Total and Bolloré International where the French state has been present have been aimed (Europe Ecologie Les Verts, n.d.) On the war in Ukraine, Jadot has been following a certain policy against Russia by emphasizing the significance of peace with the following words: *"Peace is not about making big speeches; peace is about building the balance of power to put an end to these atrocities"*. In his view, the EU should have turned off the Russian gas and *"play collectively"* against Russia to balance the power in the region (Franceinfo, 2022e).

## ANALYSIS OF PARTIES, LEADERS, AND FOREIGN POLICY AGENDAS

The comprehensive analysis of seven candidates, their political parties, and foreign policy agendas for the 2022 presidential election sheds light on the interaction

between internal and external factors as it is argued in the Introduction part of the paper. It is worth highlighting that the categorization of different factors helps us to understand patterns of behavior in foreign policy-making. Although the categorization seems useful for special cases, it has been currently insufficient to understand and analyze rapidly transforming international politics.

In the case of the 2022 election in France, the paper points out this argument through the analysis of the discourses of candidates and political party programs. Their agendas for foreign policy indicate that external and internal factors interact with each other. The foreign policy preferences of leaders as presidential candidates illuminate, on the one hand, the characteristics of contemporary international relations and acts of other states as external factors; on the other hand, characteristics of the domestic political system and its components such as citizens, groups, the government organizations and individual leaders as internal factors. These two dimensions shape each other through a complex process that can be studied from a neoclassical realist perspective.

The role of external factors in the presidential election can be found in the viewpoints of candidates and their parties over the international system. Regardless of the right-wing or left-wing views, the majority of the candidates and their parties have predominantly realist points of view. They indicate this in their policy preferences as explained in the previous section. Candidates regard the international system as an area of competition, conflict, and distrust. To manage these difficulties, leaders like Macron and Jadot suggest creating an army with the EU whilst leaders like Zemmour and Le Pen prefer to boost the military power of France, especially after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. As the neoclassical realist approach assumes, the external factors bring long-term foreign policy approaches. French attempts to establish an EU army since the 1950 Pleven Plan indicates the realist background in foreign policy-making tradition. On the other hand, some of the leaders have critical standpoints toward the international liberal order. For instance, Zemmour and Mélenchon oppose the existing liberal economic system and consider it a threat to France.

The aforementioned candidates keep different perceptions of the international system and the actors such as NATO, Russia, and China. Pursuing a separate attitude, Zemmour, Mélenchon and Le Pen oppose the role of NATO and the US in the region. They regard the US as a rival and perceive NATO as an obstacle to stability in the region. Before the war in Ukraine, these actors aimed to improve their bilateral relations with Russia, while others like Hidalgo opposed this. The foreign policy agendas of a few of these candidates also follow realist and liberal approaches on considerable issues. For example, their support for European integration indicates this perspective. Jadot, Hidalgo, Macron, Pécresse keep these ideals contrary to other leaders. They aim to strengthen the EU and EU bodies to promote security and prosperity in the region.

While the impact of the systemic factors, external actors, and geopolitics are regarded outside the control of policy-makers, it is a fact that these are reinterpreted by

groups and individuals within states (Kaarbo et al., 2013, p. 7). These are leaders, the public, societal groups, and government organizations. Therefore, foreign policy-making is not a one-sided and linear process, rather it is a process of interaction of all these factors as we witness in the discourses of candidates for the presidential election in France. To clarify this point, one can observe the positions of candidates and their parties on a certain number of international developments. The discourse of 'migration crisis' has been an apparent case to observe how the migration influx has been perceived by the political society and how it has been currently used as a populism tool not only in France but also in a large number of countries, especially the developed ones. The Turkey case analyzed by Kaya (2020) indicates that domestic and international factors have been influential in Turkey's migration policy and Turkey-EU relations under the Justice and Development Party government. In the same manner, French leaders' discourses are influenced by this external development. The presidential candidates have differentiated perceptions on the issue of migration. From a neoclassical realist perspective, these perceptions have arisen from the group-level identity formation processes and for the political survival of party leaders which can ensure their footing in politics. While the majority of the candidates such as Macron, Zemmour, Le Pen, and Pécresse consider migration as a threat to their country, others such as Hidalgo and Jadot refute this idea. It is clear that the approaches of Socialist and Green party leaders on migration have been based upon their ideologies. However, Macron, Zemmour, Le Pen, and Pecresse have maintained populist and xenophobic approaches to migrants to influence the votes of party bases. On the other hand, Hidalgo and Jadot prioritize environmental and social issues in their foreign policy agendas. The reflections of these foreign policy preferences influence both domestic and international politics, because, this is a mutual process among various factors. In sum, the interaction among factors determines the actions from the perspective of FPA. The international system together with the leaders and their perceptions has currently played a great role in the foreign policy-making processes of France. Therefore, both the external and internal factors construct the building blocks of the next five years' foreign policy agenda in France.

## CONCLUSION

Intending to focus on the mutual interaction between internal and external factors, this article examined the April 2022 presidential election in France through the analysis of the discourses of seven candidates and their party programs. While their policy agendas include both domestic and foreign policies, the scope of this paper is limited to their foreign policy preferences and programs for the election. By bringing into discussion the traditional categorization of different factors for FPA, this paper tried to put a new and inclusive approach in the area of research. The authors argued that interaction between internal and external factors creates mutual impacts on agents and this can be observed in the presidential election process in France. Analysis of the discourses of candidates and their party programs clarifies various interwoven policies influenced by internal and external factors.

While one categorization within the traditional FPA attributes these candidates' foreign policy preferences to the structure of the international system, the other categorization attributes these preferences to the sources internal to states. However, these factors are two sides of a coin and they shape each other through interaction. The election process in France represents this idea via candidates and their political parties. As stressed above, various themes and issues dominate the agendas of the candidates in international politics. Although their ideologies and opinions are different, these themes are predominantly common among them. They are shaping and being shaped by these themes. Thus, they determine internal and external factors and are determined by internal and external factors. This mutual and complex process among them represents the main feature of the presidential election in France. Whilst this article analyzes the election process in France from an FPA perspective, the results of the election will shape these prospects in the long run. The re-election of President Macron with 58.2% of the votes in the second round will be confirming France's firm stand within the EU and enhance its cooperation with NATO with regard to the Ukraine war.

As a crucial historical turning point, the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, less than forty days before the presidential election, has influenced the discourses of the candidates and the voters' choices. Ties of candidates like Le Pen, Zemmour, and Melenchon with Russia and Putin and their position towards the war, have affected the first round of the election on 10 April. While Zemmour's ambiguous attitude decreased his votes, Le Pen's and Mélenchon's stance in favor of Ukraine slightly increased their votes in the first round. The war in Ukraine has shown that France as a middle power will maintain its historic security-oriented policy goals in its foreign policy and within the EU. However, the discourses of the presidential candidates over migration, Islam, and European integration can be read as the signals of the policy fields which can be manipulated dramatically through the internal factors.

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## SOSYAL MEDYANIN İŞE ALIM SÜREÇLERİ ÜZERİNE ETKİSİ: FACEBOOK, LINKEDIN VE TWITTER KAPSAMINDA BİR DEĞERLENDİRME

**Zeynep Ceren NURATA\***

### ÖZET

Günümüzde gelişen teknoloji ile birlikte insan kaynakları (İK) uygulamalarında da değişimler yaşanmaktadır. İşe alım süreçlerinde geleneksel İK yöntemleri terk edilmeye başlanmış, şirketler tarafından potansiyel adaylara, sosyal medya aracılığıyla ulaşılmaya başlanmıştır. Bu şekilde şirketler daha az maliyetle daha kısa sürede personel istihdam etme olanağına sahip olmuşlardır. Sosyal medyanın ilgi çekmesinde sosyal ağların önemi büyüktür. Günümüzde hem işverenler hem de çalışanlar sosyal ağlar vasıtasıyla karşılıklı etkileşimde bulunmaktadır ve sosyal ağların İK süreçlerine sağladığı katkı giderek artmaktadır. Özellikle sosyal medyanın, İK uygulamalarından işe alım süreçlerine etkisi incelenmeye değer bir konu olarak ortaya çıkmakta ve literatürde bu konuda giderek daha fazla çalışma ortaya konmaktadır. Bu çalışma ile sosyal medya sitelerinden Facebook, LinkedIn ve Twitter ele alınarak işe alım süreçleri yönünden getirdiği kolaylıklar ve bu kolaylıklar karşısında taşıdığı bazı sorunlar tartışılmaya çalışılacaktır. Dolayısıyla en yaygın kullanım ağına sahip üç farklı sosyal medya sitesinin İK işe alım sürecine etkisi; şirketler, İK uzmanları, işgörenler ve potansiyel adaylar perspektifinden incelenerek konunun çok amaçlı ele alınması ve bu suretle alan yazınına katkı sağlanması amaçlanmaktadır. Araştırma hem sosyal ağ hem de İK literatürünün genişletilmesi açısından katkı sağlamaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Sosyal Medya, İşe Alım, Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter.
**JEL Sınıflandırması:** M10, M12, M54, J53.

## EFFECTS OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON RECRUITMENT PROCESSES: A REVIEW ON FACEBOOK, LINKEDIN, AND TWITTER

### ABSTRACT

Today, with the developing technology, changes are taking place in human resources (HR) practices. Traditional HR methods have been abandoned in recruitment processes, and companies have begun to reach potential candidates through social media. In this way, companies have had the opportunity to employ personnel in a shorter time with less cost. Social networks play an important role in attracting attention to social media. Today, employers and employees interact with each other through social networks. The contribution of social networks to HR processes is increasing. In particular, the effect of social media on recruitment processes emerges as a subject worth examining, and more studies are being put forward in the literature on this subject. In this study, the conveniences of Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter, which are three popular and common social media sites in terms of recruitment processes, together with the problems they have in the face of these conveniences, will be discussed. Therefore, it is aimed to examine the effect of three different social media sites with the most widespread usage network on the HR recruitment processes, from the perspective of companies, HR professionals, employees, and potential candidates, and thus contribute to the literature. The research contributes to the expansion of both social networking and HR literature.

**Keywords:** Social Media, Recruitment, Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter.
**JEL Classification:** M10, M12, M54, J53.

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**Sosyal Medyanın İşe Alım Süreçleri Üzerine Etkisi: Facebook, LinkedIn ve Twitter Kapsamında Bir Değerlendirme**

## GİRİŞ

Teknolojik değişim ve rekabetin gelişimi şirketler için insan kaynakları (İK) uygulamalarını giderek daha önemli hale getirmektedir. Personelin seçimi, yerleştirilmesi, eğitimi, yükseltilmesi, yetenek yönetimi, şirketlerin insan kaynaklarına yönelik stratejilerinin belirlenmesi konusundaki anlayışlar geçmişten günümüze evrilerek gelmiştir. Personel yönetimi sürecinden, onun bir uzantısı ancak daha geniş ve kapsamlı bir boyutu olarak İK uygulamalarına geçilmiş (Deringöl, 2010, s. 1), insan kaynaklarına yönelik plan, politika ve stratejiler üst yönetimin ana görevlerinden biri haline gelmiştir (Mucuk, 2016, s. 317).

Klasik yönetim anlayışından günümüze insanın verimliliğinin artışında yalnızca maddi ödüllerin ya da dış denetimin etkili olamayacağı, insanın motive edilerek verimliliğinin artacağına yönelik görüşler yönetim literatüründe yerini almıştır (Yüksel, 2000, s. 13-15). Bu nedenle örgütler için bu kadar önemli olan insan faktörünün özenli seçiminin örgütlerin verimliliği ve rekabet avantajı kazanması açısından ne denli önem arzettiği daha net anlaşılmıştır.

Bu öneme istinaden artık daha yetenekli bir işgücünün şirkete kazandırılması insan kaynakları yönetiminin (İKY) başlıca hedeflerinden biri haline gelmiştir. Dolayısıyla İK uzmanları ya da yöneticiler, iş ilanlarını daha görünür kılmak adına sosyal paylaşım sitelerinden yararlanmaya başlamışlardır. Bu şekilde hem yetenekli adaylara ulaşmak hem de adaylara yönelik bir özgeçmiş taraması yapabilmek mümkün olmaktadır. Bugün pek çok şirket, sosyal paylaşım sitelerinden LinkedIn'i profesyonel iş arayışlarında kullanmaktadır. LinkedIn, dünya çapında farklı sektörlerden milyonlarca profesyonelin buluşma noktasıdır. Bu platform üzerinden İK uzmanları ya da yöneticiler, uygun pozisyonlar için iş adaylarını tespit etmekte, profesyonellerin özgeçmişlerini taramakta, profesyoneller de açık olan pozisyonların takibini yapabilmektedir. Daha çok sosyal paylaşım sitesi olan Facebook da bugün işverenlerin hem iş adaylarını hem de şirket çalışanlarını izledikleri bir alana dönüşmektedir (Delaney, 2013, p. 86-102).

Bir diğer sosyal paylaşım sitesi olan Twitter; işverenlerin, iş adayları ve çalışanlarının profil ve paylaşımlarına erişerek kişilere ait karakter analizi yapabilmesine imkân tanıyan bir platform mahiyetindedir. Son yıllarda özellikle profesyonellerin sıklıkla kullandığı bir web sitesi olan Twitter, kullanıcıların yapmış olduğu paylaşımlar vasıtasıyla işverenler açısından şirketlerine uyum sağlayıp sağlayamayacaklarının bir anlamda kontrolünün yapıldığı bir alana dönüşmektedir. Bu anlamda sosyal paylaşım siteleri işverenlere sunduğu muazzam veri ile hem iş tanımı kapsamında en doğru personeli seçme hem de o kişinin gerçekten şirket ve pozisyon için uygun olup olmadığını anlama avantajını sunmaktadır (Rosen, Solomon, McLarty, Esken & Taylor, 2014, p. 256-272).

Öte yandan, sosyal medyada yer alan bilgilerin doğruluğuna ilişkin tereddütler kadar işverenlerin bu sitelere erişim sağlayarak çalışanlarını ya da iş adaylarını görüntülüyor olabilmesinin, özel alanın ihlali anlamında yarattığı rahatsızlık dile getirilmektedir. Kimse özelinin, görmesini istemediği kişiler tarafından görüntülenmesini

istemez. Bu sadece çalışanların özelinin görülmesi anlamında değil aynı zamanda işverenlerin de özelinin korunması gerektiği anlamındadır (Delaney, 2013, p. 86-102).

Bu çalışmada, sosyal medyanın insan kaynakları seçimi ve işe alım sürecine etkilerinin Facebook, LinkedIn ve Twitter bağlamında ele alınması amaçlanmaktadır. Çalışma üç bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölümde "sosyal medya ve Internet" başlığı altında Internet, sosyal medya ve sosyal paylaşım ağlarının tanımına yer verilmektedir. İkinci bölüm "sosyal medyanın işe alım sürecine etkisi" başlığını taşımaktadır. Sosyal medyanın, İK uygulamalarından personel seçimi ve işe alım süreci üzerine etkisi ele alındıktan sonra üçüncü bölümde dünya genelinde en yaygın kullanım ağına sahip olan üç sosyal paylaşım sitesi Facebook, LinkedIn ve Twitter'ın kullanımı incelenmekte ve bu ağlarla ilgili gündeme gelen gizlilik, güvenlik, etik konuları ve hukuki sorunlar tartışılmaktadır. Çalışma genel değerlendirme kısmı ile sona ermektedir.

## SOSYAL MEDYA VE INTERNET

Internet; insanlar arasındaki iletişim ve bilgi alışverişinin gerçekleşmesini sağlayan ortak iletişim alt yapısı olarak ifade edilebilir. Bu ortak iletişim altyapısı, sayıları milyonlarla ifade edilebilen bilgisayarın birbirine bağlanması ile oluşmaktadır (Güler, Meral, Köse, Teyin, Senol ve Kocak, 2015, s. 1828). ABD Savunma Departmanı tarafından ARPAnet ağının kurulması ile 1969 yılında ilk çalışmaları başlayan haberleşme sisteminin (Türkiye'de Internet, http://www.internetarsivi.metu.edu.tr/tarihce.php) tüm dünyada yaygın olarak kullanılır hale gelmesi 1995 yılını bulmuştur. Ülkemizde ilk kullanımı ise 1992 yılında gerçekleşmiştir. 1999 yılında Internet altyapısı oluşturulmuş ve 2000'li yılların başında bu alt yapı üzerinden birçok kuruluş internet erişimine kavuşmuştur (Internet, Dünyada ortaya çıkışı, Türkiye'de ilk kullanımı, http://tarihinizinde.com/internet-dunyada-ortaya-cikisi-turkiyede-ilk-kullanimi/).

Internetle birlikte gelen bilgiyi gönderme ve alma özelliği iş yapma ve yaşam şeklimizi değiştiren bir iletişim devrimi gerçekleştirmiştir (Neumann, O'Murchu, Breslin, Decker, Hogan & MacDonaill, 2005, p. 472). Internetin önemli bir kitle iletişim aracı olduğuna ilişkin Morgan Stanley tarafından yapılan bir araştırma sonucuna göre (Meeker & Pearson, 1997); 50 milyon kullanıcıya ulaşma süresinin radyoda 38 yıl, televizyonda 13 yıl, internette 5 yıl olması, internetin hedef kitleye ulaşmadaki hızını göstermesi açısından önemlidir (Vural ve Bat, 2010, s. 3351).

Internet teknolojisi ile birlikte artan sosyal etkileşim, sosyal medya olgusunu yaratmıştır. Sosyal medya; "kullanıcılara enformasyon, düşünce, ilgi ve bilgi paylaşım imkânı tanıyarak karşılıklı etkileşim yaratan çevrimiçi araçlar ve web siteleri için ortak kullanılan bir terimdir." (Sayımer'den aktaran İşler, Çiftçi ve Yarangümelioğlu, 2013, s. 179). Sosyal medya, kullanıcıların bir profil yaratarak, kendileri ile ilgili bilgileri, haberleri paylaştıkları ve diğer kullanıcıların paylaşımlarını izleyebildikleri sanal ortamlardır (Erhan, 2017, s. 60, 61).

Sosyal medya, kişilerin zaman ve mekân sınırlaması olmadan (mobil tabanlı), paylaşımda bulundukları bir iletişim şeklidir (Vural ve Bat, 2010, s. 3351).

**Sosyal Medyanın İşe Alım Süreçleri Üzerine Etkisi: Facebook, LinkedIn ve Twitter Kapsamında Bir Değerlendirme**

Lariscy, Avery, Sweetser & Howes (2009, p. 314), sosyal medyayı, sürekli bir değişim içinde, dünya çapında anlık ağ bağlantılı iletişime olanak sağlayan ve çoğunlukla bloglara ve çevrimiçi sosyal paylaşım sitelerine atıfta bulunan bir kavram olarak tanımlamaktadır.

Sosyal medyanın geleneksel medyadan farkı bilgiye daha hızlı ulaşabilme fırsatı vermesi ve daha geniş bir özgürlük alanı tanımasıdır. Geleneksel medya, bireylerin karşılıklı etkileşim halinde olamadığı, sınırlı bir iletişim türüdür (Erhan, 2017, s. 60). Sosyal medyanın karşılıklı etkileşime olanak tanıması, sıfır ya da çok az bir maliyetle iletişim imkânı sunması, güncellenebilir olması, kolay ve hızlı geri dönüşüme imkân tanıması ve sınırsız bilgiye ulaşabilme olanağı sağlaması gibi olumlu özellikleri söz konusudur. Geleneksel medyada paylaşım için eğitim ve uzmanlaşmış yetenekler gerekirken sosyal medya için bu geçerli değildir, sosyal medyada herkes üretim ve paylaşımda bulunabilir. Geleneksel medya üzerinden iletilen bir paylaşım, yaratıldıktan sonra değiştirilemez, bununla birlikte sosyal medya yeniden düzenlemeyle anında değiştirilebilme özelliğine sahiptir (Vural ve Bat, 2010, s. 3352, 3372).

Sosyal medyanın ilgi çekmesinde sosyal ağların da önemi büyüktür. İnsanları sanal ortama çeken ve burada uzun süreler geçirmesini sağlayan sosyal ağlar, farklı kullanım alanları ve farklı içeriklere sahiptirler (Vural ve Bat, 2010, s. 3355). Aynı zamanda bu sosyal ağların kullanılma sıklığı da farklılaşmakta ve her geçen gün artmaktadır. Günümüzde saniyede atılan tweet sayısı 10.161 iken, Instagram'a yüklenen fotoğraf sayısı 1.186 adet, Google'da yapılan arama sayısı 105.335 adet, Youtube'da izlenen video sayısı 97.336, e-mail gönderimi ise 3.181.216 adete ulaşmaktadır. Bu, saniye başına internet trafiğinin 161.121 GB'ı bulması anlamına gelmektedir (Internet live stats, http://www.internetlivestats.com/one-second/)[1]. İnsanlık tarihinin başlangıcından 2003 yılına kadar kayıt altına alınmış toplam veri 5 milyar GB iken bu rakam, 2011 yılında her iki günde bir, 2013 yılında ise her 10 dakika bir üretilmeye başlanmıştır[2]. Günümüz istatistikleri dikkate alındığında bu sürenin daha kısalmış olduğu tahmin edilmektedir (Çekin, 2018, s. 1).

Sosyal ağlar, bir bireysel profil oluşturularak diğer bağlantılarla etkileşimde bulunulmasını ve bu şekilde sistem içindeki tanıdıkların bağlantılarını da görüntülemeyi olanaklı kılan web tabanlı servisler olarak tanımlanabilir (Boyd & Ellison, 2008, p. 211). Bunlar, kullanıcıların, bağlantıları hakkında detaylı bilgi edinmesini, bunu başkaları ile paylaşmasını ve bu şekilde online ilişkilerin oluşturulmasını sağlayan platformlardır (Yokoyama, 2016, p. 3). Söz konusu siteler on milyonlarca Internet kullanıcısı tarafından ilgi görmekte ve değerleri her geçen gün bu taleple orantılı artmaktadır. Sosyal ağlar giderek hayatımızın daha önemli bir parçası haline gelmektedir. Mesleki ve sosyal yaşamlarımız, zaman ve mekân sınırı olmaksızın sosyal ağlar aracılığıyla giderek daha fazla raporlanır, araştırılır, paylaşılır ve öğrenilir hale gelmektedir (Eijkman, 2008, p. 93). Ancak bu durum, sosyal ağlarda mahremiyet konusunu gündeme getirmektedir. Örneğin Facebook'ta kişiler ten rengine ya da ırkına göre farklı

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[1]Söz konusu veriler 27.08.2022 tarihi itibariyle belirlenen verilerdir.
[2]Bilginin yer aldığı videoya ulaşmak için: Kirk Borne, Big Data, Small World: Kirk Borne at TEDxGeorgeMasonU, https://bigdata-madesimple.com/big-data-small-world-kirk-borne-at-ted/.

reklamlar görmekte; Google, kişi profiline göre farklı sonuçlar sunmaktadır ve Twitter'ın bir aplikasyonu olarak yapay zekâ sohbet robotu Tay, uygulamaya geçtikten 16 saat sonra ırkçı ve cinsiyetçi söylemleri nedeniyle Microsoft tarafından sonlandırılmak durumunda kalmıştır[3]. Çevrimiçi dünyadaki kişisel verilerin kullanılarak işlenmesi (Çekin, 2018, s. 2-3) mahremiyet sorunlarını ve hak ihlallerini gündeme getirmektedir. Yine de tüm bunlara rağmen, sosyal ağların kullanılma düzeyi ya da bu ağlara olan ilgi azalmamaktadır (Vural ve Bat, 2010, s. 3357).

Sosyal paylaşım sitelerinde mahremiyet konusu çoğunlukla net olarak tanımlanmış bir olgu değildir. Sosyal medya üzerinden gerçekleşen tüm ilişkiler, etkileşimler kayıt altına alınmaktadır ve sosyal veri madenciliği için söz konusu kayıtlar muhafaza edilmektedir. Sosyal medya siteleri için mahremiyetin söz konusu olabilmesi için bu sitelerin açık politikalar ve veri koruma mekanizmaları sağlaması önemlidir (Dwyer, Hiltz & Passerini, 2007).

## SOSYAL MEDYANIN İŞE ALIM SÜRECİNE ETKİSİ

İK seçimi, işletmedeki uygun kadrolara/görevlere iç ve dış kaynaklardan başvuran adaylar arasından işin gereklerine en uygun olan kişi ya da kişilerin seçimidir. İnsan kaynağını bulma ve seçmede, *"örgüt içi ve dışı referanslar, iş ilanları, testler, mülakat ve başvuru formlarındaki bilgilerin analizi"* yoğun olarak kullanılan yöntemlerdir. Türkiye'de Internet de örgütlerin işe alımda yaygın olarak kullanmaya başladığı araçlardan biri haline gelmiştir (Polat, 2017, s. 229-230). Şirket dışı sosyal paylaşım siteleri, İK seçim sürecini desteklemek amacıyla ayrıca kullanılmaktadır (Yokoyama, 2016, p. 4).

Sosyal medya üzerinden görüntüleme, potansiyel işverenlerin, adayla yaptığı görüşmeden ya da adayın iş başvuru formundan elde edemeyeceği türde 'hazine değerinde' bir bilginin şirketlere teminine imkân tanır (Saylin & Horrocks, 2013). Çoğu kez bu bilgi bir adayı elemek amacıyla kullanılmasına rağmen günümüzde her zamankinden daha fazla işe alımı destekler mahiyettedir. Örgütler için işe alım maliyetlerini minimumda tutmak önemli olduğundan, doğru adayların ilk seferde işe alınması azami önemdedir (Rosen et al., 2014, p. 256-272).

Sosyal medya, şirketlere ve dolayısıyla İK uzmanlarına geleneksel işe alım metotlarının ötesinde fırsatlar sunar. Bir iş ilanı ile ilgili 'tweet' atılması, İK uygulamaları açısından işe alım sürecini hem daha ilginç hem de daha etkin hale getirebilir. Bugün 'head-hunting', sayısız LinkedIn profili sayesinde kolaylaşabilmekte ya da bir çalışanın içinde bulunduğu şirkette çalışmanın nasıl bir şey olduğuna bloğunda yer vermesi örgüt imajını etkilemektedir. Dolayısıyla şirket iş ilanlarına daha fazla kişinin başvurması mümkün olmaktadır. Sosyal medya üzerinden paylaşılan bilginin yarattığı etki, güçlü bir şirket imajı oluşturarak hem mevcut çalışanları örgüte daha fazla bağlamak hem de

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[3]Detay bilgi için bknz: The Guardian, Microsoft 'deeply sorry' for racist and sexist tweets by AI chatbot, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/26/microsoft-deeply-sorry-for-offensive-tweets-by-ai-chatbot.

potansiyel iş adaylarını kendine çekmek isteyen örgütlerin birincil önceliği olmaya başlamıştır (Parry & Solidoro, 2013, p. 128). Aşağıdaki tabloda, işe alım sürecinde sosyal medya kullanımı ile geleneksel yöntemlerin farkı ortaya konmaktadır.

**Tablo 1: Sosyal Medya İşe Alım Uygulamalarının Geleneksel Yöntemlerle Farkı**

|  | Geleneksel Yöntemler | Sosyal Ağ Siteleri Kullanımı |
|---|---|---|
| Etkileşimin Doğası | İki taraflı iletişim (adaylar özgeçmişlerini gönderirken, işletmeler de karar alımı sürecinde geri bildirim sağlarlar.) | Tek taraflı iletişim (adaylar işletmelere karar vermeleri için ipucu niteliğinde çeşitli sinyaller gönderirler). |
| Yetenek Havuzu | Coğrafi açıdan sınırlandırılmış bir yetenek havuzu söz konusudur. | Sosyal medya, örgütlerin dağınık bir yetenek havuzundan işe alım yapabilmelerine olanak sağlar. |
| Ağ Oluşturma | İşverenler, iş adaylarının uygunluğu için referans isteme yoluna başvururlar. | İşverenler, iş arayanlar hakkında davranışsal ve ayırt edici bilgileri öğrenmek amacıyla sosyal medyadan faydalanırlar. |

**Kaynak:** Wade, 2015, p. 4.

Şirkete başvuran adayların geçmişine ilişkin araştırma sosyal medya aracılığı ile yürütülebilir. En iyilerin firmada istihdam edilmesine olanak sağlar zira sosyal medya aracılığıyla daha geniş bir aday havuzuna erişim ve pasif adaylarla da etkileşim söz konusu olabilmektedir (Nagendra, 2014, p. 197-207). Geleneksel olarak işe alım süreçleri işverenler tarafından daha çok gazetelere ilan vermek şeklinde iken son on yılda online ilan vermeye doğru bir değişim gerçekleşmiştir. Internetin yaygın kullanımı bugün işe alım sürecini yeniden şekillendirmiştir. İşverenler ya da İK uzmanları tarafından bu süreci sosyal medya aracılığı ile yürütmek çok daha kolay hale gelmiştir (Dinesh, 2015, p. 283-285). Sosyal medya araçlarını kullanan işletmeler bu araçlarda işletme ile ilgili güncel verileri paylaşabilmekte, potansiyel adayların, resim, görüntü ve bireysel paylaşımları İK uzmanlarınca değerlendirilebildiği gibi işletmedeki pozisyonlarla ilgili detaylı bilgilendirme gibi çok geniş bir bilginin de adayların erişimine açık olması söz konusudur. Bu bilgi çeşitliliği geleneksel işe alım araçlarında bulunmamaktadır (Yılmaz, 2016, s. 49).

Bununla birlikte, çalışan paylaşımları, özellikle İK uzmanlarının ve işverenlerin dikkat etmesi gereken bir konu haline gelmektedir. Sosyal medya aracılığıyla yetenekleri şirkete çekmek kadar şirketle ilgili izlenimlerin ve şirket imajının yönetilmesi konusuna da yeterli kaynağın tahsis edilmesi önem arz eder (Holland & Jeske, 2017, p. 293).

Nasıl ki işverenler sosyal medya paylaşımlarından yola çıkarak adaylar hakkında değerlendirme yapabiliyorsa, adaylar da şirketlerin repütasyonlarını değerlendirmede sosyal ağları kullanmaktadırlar (Adecco, 2015, p. 4). Sosyal medya, farklı etkileşim biçimlerine olanak sağlayan benzersiz bir ortamdır. Bu alanda yapılan çalışmalar, sosyal medyada yer alan şirket hakkındaki bilgilerin, potansiyel başvuru sahiplerinin

algılarını etkileyebileceğini göstermektedir. Örneğin, sosyal medyada şirketle ilgili bilgileri gördüğünü bildiren kişilerin, o şirkete ilişkin daha olumlu bir kurumsal itibar algısına sahip olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Aynı şekilde bir kurum hakkında sosyal medyada algılanan mevcut bilgilerin, kurumsal imaj algıları ile pozitif yönde ilişkili olduğu ve bunun da işveren çekiciliği ile pozitif ilişkili olduğu, Carpentier, Hoye & Weijters'in (2019) bir Belçika üniversitesi işletme bölümü son sınıfında okuyan 165 yüksek lisans öğrencisi üzerinde yaptıkları araştırma ile ortaya konmuştur. Ayrıca, Carpentier, Hoye, Stockman & Van Theemsche (2017, p. 11), bir kuruluşun Facebook sayfasının işveren imajı ve kurumsal çekicilik üzerinde olumlu bir etkisi olduğunu belirtmiştir. Bu nedenle, şimdiye kadar yapılan araştırmalar, sosyal medyada şirket bilgilerine ulaşmanın kurumsal itibarı, kurumsal imajı, işveren imajını ve kurumsal çekiciliği olumlu yönde etkileyebileceğini göstermektedir (Carpentier et al., 2019, p. 6).

Bununla birlikte, günümüzde sosyal medyanın artan kullanımı, repütasyon yönetimi ve markalaşma çabaları konusunda şirketler açısından yeni zorlukları gündeme getirmektedir. Sosyal medyaya yansıyan çalışan yorumları, potansiyel adayların gözünde şirketin nasıl değerlendirildiği konusunu etkilemektedir. Artık çalışanlar da sosyal medya üzerinden yapmış oldukları paylaşımlarla şirketlerin güvenilirliğini ve itibarını etkilemektedirler. Sonuç olarak, kasıtlı ya da kasıtsız, bilerek ya da bilmeyerek, çalışanlar 'marka elçileri' ve 'işveren vekilleri' gibi hareket etmektedirler. Bu aslında çalışanların elinde bir güçmüş gibi görünmesine karşın bunun disiplin cezaları ve işten çıkarmaya kadar gidecek sonuçları da göz önünde bulundurulmalıdır (Holland & Jeske, 2017, p. 293-297).

Örgütlerin işe alım süreçlerinde sosyal medya üzerinden görüntüleme yaptığı, özgeçmiş aramaları için LinkedIn'e, adayın daha çok kişisel özelliklerine yönelik bir fikir edinmek amacıyla da Facebook ve Twitter'a baktıkları ifade edilmektedir (Rosen et al., 2014, p. 256-272). Ancak işverenlerin yarıdan fazlasının, iş başvurusunu, kişinin sosyal medya hesabını görüntüledikten sonra reddettikleri görülmüştür (Delaney, 2013, p. 91). Adayları reddetmenin temel sebepleri, adayın provokatif ve uygunsuz fotoğraf ya da bilgi paylaşımı, alkol ve uyuşturucu kullanımına ilişkin içerik, önceki işvereni kötüleyen paylaşımları, ayrımcı yorumları, nitelikleri konusunda yalan söylemesi ve önceki işyeri ya da işverene ait gizli bilgileri paylaşması olarak ifade edilmektedir. Sosyal medya üzerinden adayın işe alınmasındaki temel sebepler ise olumlu kişilik özellikleri, örgüte uyum, adayın işin ihtiyaçlarına uygun bir profil çizmesi ve sosyal paylaşım sitesinde adayın ödül ve başarılarının görülebilir olması şeklinde belirtilmektedir (Kluemper, Mitra & Wang, 2016, p. 162).

## FACEBOOK, LINKEDIN VE TWITTER: KULLANIMLARININ SAĞLADIĞI AVANTAJLAR VE GÜNDEME GETİRDİĞİ SORUNLAR

2004 yılında sadece Harvard öğrencilerinin kullanımına açık bir platform olarak yaratılan Facebook, 26 Eylül 2006'da 13 yaş üstü tüm kullanıcılara açılmıştır. Ekim 2012'de Facebook'un aylık aktif kullanıcı sayısı 1 milyara ulaşmıştır. Sitenin, ilk yaratıldığı günden bugüne tasarımında da pek çok değişiklik yapılmıştır. Değişmeyen tek şey, her kullanıcının sitede bir *'profil'*inin olmasıdır. Kişi profilinde cinsiyeti, adı, mail

adresi ve fotoğrafı dahil olmak üzere kendi ile ilgili pek çok bilgiye yer verebilmektedir. Ayrıca yaşı, dini ve politik görüşleri, sevdiği kitaplar, dinlediği müzik, sevdiği spor ve diğer faaliyetler de yer alabilmektedir. Bunları kimlerle paylaşacağına kullanıcının kendisi karar verir (Delaney, 2013, p. 88). Profesyoneller için online sosyal ağ olan LinkedIn, 2002 yılında Reid Hoffman tarafından yaratılmıştır. Profesyonel bir ağ olarak tasarlanan LinkedIn, üyelerini, eğitim, beceriler, iş tecrübeleri ve bunların güncellenmesi gibi profesyonel yaşama dair bilgilerini paylaşmaya davet eder (Stelmaszak, 2014, p. 11). Kullanıcıların profil yaratmasına, diğer profesyoneller ile bağlantı kurmasına, grup oluşturmasına ya da var olan gruplara katılmasına izin verir. Bunların dışında şirketler için düşündükleri pozisyonlara uygun adayların belirlenmesi, çalışanlar için de iş arama ve bulma gibi İKY kapsamında kullanılabilecek önemli özelliklere sahiptir. Ayrıca özel mesajlaşma, şirketleri takip etme ile birlikte başarılar, uzmanlıklar ve iletişim bilgilerinin profiller üzerinden yayınlanmasına olanak sağlama gibi sunduğu faydalar mevcuttur (Kuduğ, 2011, s. 28). Fortune 500 şirketlerinden yöneticiler dahil olmak üzere dünya çapında 850 milyondan fazla üyesiyle LinkedIn, dünyanın en büyük profesyonel ağı konumundadır (LinkedIn.com).

Üç büyük ABD sosyal medya sitesi arasında yer alan Twitter, aylık yaklaşık 340 milyon kullanıcıya sahiptir (Digital 2020). Yapılan araştırmalar, Twitter'ın işverenlerin görüntüledikleri başlıca sosyal medya sitelerinden biri olduğunu göstermiştir. Şirketler, kişinin yaratıcılığı, potansiyel iletişim becerileri, profesyonel özelliklerinin analizi ve örgüte uyumlu olup olmadığının anlaşılması açısından Twitter'ı kullanmayı tercih etmektedirler (Rosen et al., 2014, p. 256-272).

Sosyal medya üzerine yapılan çalışmalar, sosyal paylaşım sitelerinin işe alım yapan örgütlere, adayların kişiliklerine bakış olanağı sunduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Bu da adayların gelecekteki iş performansları konusunda işverenlere önemli ipuçları sunmaktadır. Kişiliğin sosyal medya kullanımı ile olan ilişkisi üzerine Quercia ve arkadaşları (2011, p. 181) tarafından yapılan araştırmanın sonuçları, kişilik ve işe alınabilirliği değerlendirmede Twitter kullanıcılarının profillerinin kullanımı konusunda değerli bilgiler elde edilmesini sağlamıştır. Karakter analizi bağlamında, dışa dönük (extroversion) bir bireyin Twitter'da daha fazla takipçisinin olduğu; uzlaşmacı (agreeable) bir karakterin diğerleri ile pozitif etkileşim içinde olduğu; özdisiplin sahibi (conscientious) kişilerin, çok sayıda faaliyetin içinde olduğu; deneyime açık kişilik yapısında olanların (open to experience) kişiselleştirilmiş bir arka plan, ilginç bir başlık ve profil fotoğrafına sahip olduğu; duygusal dengesizlik ya da nevrotiklik (neuroticism) durumunda kişinin sık sık kötü bir ruh hali ve genel olarak hayata karşı negatif duygular ile ilgili konuştuğu belirtilmektedir. İşverenler, iş performansıyla olumlu ilişkilendirilebilecek kişilik özelliklerine sahip adayları belirleme ve işe alma konusunda isteklidirler (Rosen et al., 2014, p. 256-272).

Quercia ve arkadaşlarının (2011, p. 180) çalışmasına benzer şekilde, Gosling ve arkadaşlarının (2011) Texas Üniversitesinde 133 katılımcıyla gerçekleştirmiş oldukları çalışmada, katılımcıların Facebook sayfalarında paylaştıkları bilgiler ve kullanım sıklıkları ile beş temel kişilik özelliği arasında anlamlı ilişkiler ve farklılıklar tespit etmişlerdir. Hughes ve arkadaşları (2012), Avrupalı, Kuzey Amerikalı, Asyalı Facebook ve Twitter kullanıcıları arasından 300 kişilik örneklem grubuyla gerçekleştirmiş oldukları

çalışmada sosyal ağ tercihini Facebook'tan yana kullanan katılımcıların Dışadönüklük ve Duygusal Denge faktörü itibariyle anlamlı olarak daha yüksek skorlara sahip olduğunu ortaya koymuşlardır. Adalı ve Golbeck (2012), 71 kullanıcının Twitter ve Facebook profilini inceledikleri çalışmalarında, bireylerin profil bilgilerinden yola çıkarak kişilik özelliklerini tahmin etmenin mümkün olduğunu ortaya koymuşlardır. Ortigosa ve arkadaşları (2013) da benzer şekilde Facebook profilindeki bilgilerinden yola çıkarak kişilik özelliklerini büyük oranda tahmin etmenin mümkün olduğunu belirlemişlerdir (Dal ve Dal, 2014, s. 149). Oktay, Fırat & Ertem (2014, s. 10) çalışmasında, Amerikan twitter kullanıcılarının sadece ilk isimlerine bakarak yaş ve etnik bilgilerinin hesaplamasını yapmışlardır. Li & Cardie (2014, p. 643) kişilerin Twitter paylaşımlarından yola çıkarak yaşam geçmişinin ortaya konulabileceğini ve tweet analizi ile önemli kişisel yaşam olaylarının kronolojik listesinin çıkarılabileceğini ortaya koymuşlardır.

Facebook, LinkedIn ve Twitter'ın işletmeler açısından işe alım süreçlerindeki kullanımına yönelik sağladığı faydalar konusunda ülkemizdeki çalışmalara bakacak olursak; Yılmaz (2016, p. 48,49), perakende sektöründe faaliyet gösteren işletmelerin sosyal medya uygulamalarının işe alım sürecindeki rolü ve etkisi üzerine yaptığı araştırmada, işletmelerin daha geniş aday havuzuna ulaşabilmek için sosyal medya sitelerinde hesapları olduğu ve bu hesapların genellikle LinkedIn ve Facebook hesapları olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Özellikle, LinkedIn'in işe alım süreçlerinde işletmeler tarafından öncelikle tercih edildiği gözlenmiştir. Bozkurt ve Triki (2016, s. 89-107), sosyal medyanın İK açısından önemini, işe alım kararlarına ve süreçlerine etkilerini araştırmıştır. Araştırma kapsamında sosyal medyanın İK yöneticilerinin iş gören adaylarını değerlendirmede ve bazı pozisyonlar için ideal profilller oluşturmada belli bir norm oluşturma gücüne sahip olduğu ortaya konmuştur. Sosyal medya paylaşımlarının, İK yöneticileri tarafından iş adaylarının işe alım mülakatlarında belirtmedikleri ve psikolojik testler yapılmadan da bilinmesi zor olan, bireylere ait kişilik özelliklerinin ve psikolojik yapılarının ortaya konması için kullanıldığı görülmüştür. Bakırtaş ve Sekendür Turgu (2021, s. 807) LinkedIn'e karşı işgörenlerin algısını belirlemek üzere yaptıkları çalışmada LinkedIn'in diğer sosyal ağlarla karşılaştırıldığında daha geniş kitlelere daha hızlı ulaşma olanağı sağlaması ve daha fazla bilgiye ulaşmayı mümkün kılması nedeniyle daha fazla tercih edildiğini saptamışlardır.

Dolayısıyla işe alım yapan örgütler Twitter, Facebook ve LinkedIn'de yer alan paylaşımları kullanarak potansiyel adayları inceleme fırsatı elde etmektedirler. Aynı zamanda potansiyel adaylar da bu siteler üzerinden yapmış oldukları paylaşımlarla kendilerini işveren firmalara daha cazip gösterebilmektedirler (Rosen et al., 2014, p. 256-272).

İK uzmanları, günümüz şartlarında yeni mezun genç yetenekleri şirkete çekmekte bazı zorluklarla karşı karşıya kalabilmektedir. Bu yeni kuşak, üniversite kariyer günleri, kariyer fuarları ya da üniversite kariyer merkezlerine ilgi duymamaktadır. İş arayışlarını Internet üzerinden yapan bu üniversite mezunu gençlere ulaşmak ve ilgilerini çekmek için etkin bir sosyal medya işe alım stratejisinin geliştirilmesi gereklidir. Şirketler, mümkün olduğu kadar çok öğrenciyi Facebook üzerindeki şirkete ait fan sayfasına

çekmeye çalışmaktadırlar. Facebook fan sayfasından işverenin kariyer sayfasına doğru zamanla oluşacak yoğunluk, işverenin Facebook'taki işe alım çabalarının istenilen sonuçları yarattığı anlamına gelecektir (Wazed & Ng, 2015, p. 137-140).

İşverenler, özellikle kişisel bilgilerle ilgileniyor görünmektedir. Nitekim kullanıcılar bilgilerini gizli tutmak niyetinde olsalar bile, işverenler, iş arayanları görüşmeler sırasında sosyal medya şifrelerine erişmelerine izin vermeye zorlayacak kadar ileri gidebilmektedirler (Van Dijck, 2013, p. 212). Bazı işverenlerin bu bilgiyi vermeyi reddeden kişileri işe almaktan vazgeçebildiği ya da mevcut çalışanları içinden bu bilgileri vermeyi reddedenleri cezalandırabildiği ya da konuyu işten çıkarmaya kadar götürebildiği dile getirilmektedir. Bu yolla, işverenler sosyal medya siteleri üzerinden yalnız iş başvurusu yapanları değil aynı zamanda kendi personelinin konuşma ve faaliyetlerini de izleme imkanına sahip olmaktadır. Bunun sonucunda şirket müşterileri ya da kendi yöneticisi hakkında olumsuz bir yorumda bulunmuş çalışanın, paylaşımları nedeniyle işini kaybetmesi olasılık dahilindedir (Delaney, 2013, p. 87).

Teknolojideki hızlı gelişmelerle birlikte artan sosyal medya kullanımı sonucunda çalışanların sosyal medya üzerinden işverene yönelik itibar sarsıcı açıklamaları sıklıkla gündeme gelmektedir. Çalışanlar, sosyal medya aracılığıyla mevcut işlerine yönelik ya da işveren örgüte yönelik şikayetlerini dile getirebilmektedirler. Mahkeme kararları incelendiğinde, çalışanın işverene ya da başka bir çalışana yönelik sarf ettiği küçük düşürücü, şeref ve namusa dokunacak sözlerinin, iş sözleşmesinin işveren tarafından haklı sebeple feshine yol açtığı görülmektedir (Yıldız ve Öztürk, 2020, s. 555-572).

Sosyal medyanın istihdam kararlarında belirleyici bir faktör olarak artan kullanımı, davalara ve bazı durumlarda yasal düzenlemelere neden olmaktadır. Hukuki ortam; sosyal medya gönderilerinin kanıta dayalı olarak kabul edilebilirliği, olası adayları taramak için hem genel hem de şifre korumalı sosyal medya geçmişlerinin kullanılması, Twitter ve Facebook gibi sosyal medya gönderileri için çalışanların işine son verilmesi vb. çeşitli sorunlarla çevrelenmiş durumdadır. Çalışanların sosyal medya kullanımıyla tetiklenen işten çıkarmalardaki artış, bu tür işten çıkarmaları tanımlamak için kullanılan yeni bir terimi doğurmuştur: Facebook paylaşımı sebebiyle işten çıkarma (Facebook Fired) (Mcgarvey Hidy & McDonald, 2013, p. 69-71).

Yıldız ve Öztürk (2020) çalışanların sosyal medya paylaşımlarını, mahremiyet ve işten çıkarma kapsamında ele almışlardır. Araştırma bulguları kapsamında, çalışanların mahremiyet kaygısı taşımaksızın sosyal medya üzerinden yaptıkları paylaşımların işten çıkarılma sebebi olduğu görülmüştür. Sosyal medyanın sadece işe alımda değil işten çıkarmada da işverenler için bir değerlendirme kriterine dönüştüğünü ortaya koyan bulgular Tablo 2'de incelenebilir.

## Tablo 2: Örnek Olay Analizine İlişkin Bulgular

| Yıl/karar numarası | Örnek olay | Mahremiyete yönelik tehditler | | Hukuki sonucu |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **Tema** | **Kodlar** | |
| Yargıtay 7. Hukuk Dairesi 2016/11591 | Çalışanın, iş arkadaşlarıyla mesai saatleri içerisinde, hasta yataklarının üzerine çıkıp kurumu ve mesleğini küçük düşürecek şekilde fotoğraf çektirmesi, daha sonra bu fotoğrafı sosyal medya hesabından bir grup aracılığıyla, kurum isim ve logosunu açıkça beyan ederek, *"hasta gelmesin diye dua ederken, …Hastanesi"* başlığıyla Facebook adlı sosyal paylaşım sitesinde yayınlaması | İfşa | Açıkça beyan Fotoğraf çektirmesi Facebook Mesai saatleri Sosyal medya | İşverenin geçerli sebebe dayanarak işçinin iş sözleşmesini feshetmesi/işyerindeki çalışma disiplinini ve iş akışını etkileyecek nitelikte olup artık davalı işverenden davacı ile çalışmasının beklenememesi |
| 2017/14208 | İşçinin kendisine ait Twitter hesabından başka çalışanlara hakaret ve sataşma niteliğinde birden fazla paylaşımda bulunduğu, örneğin, *"…Arkadaşlar patroncu bir İK personeli olacaksanız yapmayın o mesleği, çıldırtmayın insanı…"* şeklinde paylaşımlar yapması | Gözetim | Birden fazla paylaşım Hakaret ve sataşma Twitter | İşverenin haklı sebebe dayanarak iş sözleşmesini feshetmesi/işyerindeki başka bir işyeri çalışanına hakaret ve sataşma |
| 2018/13723 | İşçinin müşteri temsilcisi/sosyal medya uzmanı olarak görev yaparken yazılı savunmasında da kabul ettiği üzere, işe giriş esnasında imzaladığı iş sözleşmesi için Facebook hesabında kurumsal müşteri olan …'nin adını vererek *"Bugün yaptığım iş sözleşmesinde 46 sayfa okudum ve imzaladım. Artık köle olmaya hazırım."* şeklinde paylaşımda bulunması | Gözetim | Facebook Köle Paylaşım Adını vererek | İşverenin geçerli sebebe dayanarak iş sözleşmesini feshetmesi/işçinin sosyal medya paylaşımı sonrasında davacıyla aynı projede çalışmaya devam etmek istememesi |

**Kaynak:** Yıldız ve Öztürk, 2020, s. 563.

LinkedIn ve Facebook gibi platformlar, bir çalışanın sosyal davranışını izlemek ve profesyonel değerini değerlendirmek üzere işverenler tarafından bir disiplin stratejisi olarak kullanılmaktadır ki çalışanlar çoğu zaman bunun farkında değillerdir ancak bir kez farkına vardıklarında da bundan hoşlanmayacaklarını iddia etmek yanlış olmayacaktır (Van Dijck, 2013, p. 212).

İşverenler bu uygulamayı, 'ayrık otlarını temizlemek', 'çürük elmaları dışarıda bırakmak' olarak adlandırmakta ve şirket kültürüne uygun adaylar seçmek amacıyla bu yolu izledikleri argümanını ileri sürmektedirler. Yasaların uygulanmasına çalışan kurumlar, iş adayları ve çalışanlarını sosyal medya üzerinden görüntüleme konusuna sıcak baktıklarını, büyük bankalar ve menkul kıymet firmaları gibi finansal kuruluşlar ise şeffaflık ve içeriden bilgi sızdırmanın önüne geçmek için çalışanlarının Facebook hesaplarını talep etmekte sakınca görmediklerini ifade edebilmektedirler. Ancak kişiler işverenlere online bilgilerini sorgulamaksızın bu kadar rahatlıkla verebilirler mi ya da vermeyi isterler mi, bu tartışmalı bir konu olarak öne çıkmaktadır (Delaney, 2013, p. 91-94).

Facebook'un kurucusu Mark Zuckerberg, çevrimiçi sosyal paylaşımın artması sonucu artık insanların mahremiyet beklentisine sahip olmamaları gerektiğini belirterek şu ifadeleri kullanmıştır: *"…bunların yeni toplumsal normlar olacağına karar verdik ve bu doğrultuda ilerliyoruz."* Sonuç: Facebook kullanıcılarının şu anda sitenin gizlilik konusundaki uygulamalarına karşı çıkma olasılığının çok az olmasıdır (Quercia et al., 2011, p. 184).

Hem paylaşılan bilgilerin içeriği hem de tasarlanma amacına bağlı olarak LinkedIn, güvenlik ve bilgi şeffaflığı gibi konularda diğer online sosyal ağlar kadar yakından incelenmemiştir. Üyeleri tarafından da kabul gördüğü üzere LinkedIn'de paylaşılan bilgiler görünürdür ve amacı potansiyel bağlantılar ve iş fırsatlarını çekmektir. LinkedIn'in kişisel gizlilik konularına yaklaşımına ilişkin, kullanıcılar arasında huzursuzluğa neden olan, LinkedIn kurucusunun bir toplantıda dile getirdiği *"gizlilik yaşlı insanlar içindir"* sözüyle güvenlik konusunda yaratmış olduğu endişedir. LinkedIn, yüzlerce hatta binlerce birinci derece bağlantıya erişim ve ekleme izni verir, bu da eşi benzeri görülmemiş büyüklükte ikinci ve üçüncü derece bağlantılar anlamına gelir. Ortalama bir kullanıcının LinkedIn'de 427 bağlantısı olduğu düşünüldüğünde, bu 5.576.901+ ikinci ve üçüncü derece bağlantı anlamına gelmektedir. Linkedin'de 2.539 bağlantınız bulunuyorsa bu, 13.731.237+ üyenin ağa dahil olması anlamına gelir. Bunun anlamı aslında bu kadar çok insanın bilgilerinin görünür olması ya da irtibat kurulabilir olması demektir (Stelmaszak, 2014, p. 11-17).

Facebook fotoğraflar ve videolar olmak üzere yüklenecek data miktarı konusunda kullanıcılarına neredeyse sınırsız bir imkân sunmaktadır. Nisan 2012'de Facebook, yazılım şirketi Instagram'ı satın alarak kullanıcılarına Internet'e resim yükleme olanağı sunmuştur. Facebook'un büyüme hızı ABD'de yavaşlamasına rağmen diğer ülkelerde muazzam bir büyüme hızına sahiptir. Tüm bu gelişmeler, artık birbirimize daha fazla bağlandığımızı ve laptop, hızlı Internet, akıllı telefonlar ve Facebook gibi iletişim teknolojilerinin bu süreci kolaylaştırdığını göstermektedir. Sonuç olarak, teknoloji, Internet, online iletişim, Facebook ve tabi diğer sosyal ağlar, mevcut hayatlarımızın bir

parçası konumundadır ve gelecekteki hayatlarımızın da bir parçası olacaktır (Delaney, 2013, p. 86-102).

Türkiye'deki 8.4 milyon LinkedIn kullanıcısı (Digital 2020, https://wearesocial.com/digital-2020) ve 37 milyon Facebook kullanıcısı (Yılmaz, 2020, https://www.webtekno.com/turkiye-instagram-twitter-facebook-kullanici-sayisi-h86431.html) göz önüne alındığında, söz konusu veri tabanının şirketlere sağladığı avantaj ortadadır. Böylelikle nitelikli işgücü daha kolay tespit edilebilir hale gelmektedir (Öz, Keklik ve Kılıç, 2015, s. 593). Zira bir şirketin böyle bir aday havuzuna hatta bunun bir kısmına dahi sahip olması çok uzun yıllarını alacaktır ve bu bilgiyi güncel tutabilmesi neredeyse imkânsızdır. Ağın içinde bilgilerin görünürlüğü yüksektir ancak bunun bazı istisnaları söz konusudur. Örneğin LinkedIn, potansiyel olarak riskli olabilecek bilgilerin (doğum tarihi gibi) ikinci ve üçüncü derece bağlantılar tarafından görülmesini otomatik olarak bloke etmektedir. Bir sosyal ağın kullanıcıları, profillerini aslında kimin görüntülediği konusunda bilgi ve kontrollerinin söz konusu olmadığının farkına vardıkça ("profilini kim görüntüledi" kısmında şirketler kendilerini anonim yapabilmektedir) bilgi mahremiyetine yönelik bakış açıları ve algıları da değişmeye başlamaktadır (Stelmaszak, 2014, p. 15,16).

Günümüz İK uygulamalarına bakıldığında, bir adayın dijital ayak izlerini araştırmak ve takip etmek artık çok kolaylaşmıştır. Personel seçimi ve işe alım bağlamında yeni teknolojiler, işverenlere adaylar hakkında enformel kaynaklardan bilgi toplama konusunda fırsatlar sunmaktadır. Burada ortaya çıkan sorun, online kaynakların etik kullanımının sağlanması ile ilgilidir. Siber sorgulama ya da adayı görüntülemenin arkasındaki temel güdü, maliyetleri azaltma isteğidir. Ancak burada, 'veri madenciliği' ve 'elektronik gözetleme' adına sosyal medyanın bir araca dönüşmesi tehlikesi bulunmaktadır. Sosyal medya üzerinden elde edilen bilgilerin her zaman güvenilir olamayacağı göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, sosyal medyanın doğru insanın işe alınmasını kolaylaştırdığı ve bunun arka planındaki maliyetleri ortadan kaldırdığı yönündeki yaklaşımlar, ortaya çıkan endişeleri ne azaltır ne de meşrulaştırır. Dahası bu tarz uygulamalar, İK profesyonellerince etik olanla etik olmayan izleme ve bilgi toplama arasındaki çizginin aşılması anlamına gelebilecektir (Holland & Jeske, 2017, p. 294-295).

İş arayışında olan kişilerin aleni olarak yaptıkları paylaşımlar konusunda özellikle dikkatli olmaları çok önemlidir. Basit bir şekilde bir işveren sizin isminizi bir arama motoruna (örneğin Google) girdiğinde birkaç tık sonrasında sizin yaşınız, dininiz, politik görüşleriniz, cinsel eğilimleriniz, aynen yaptığınız alıntılar, en sevdiğiniz müzik grubu gibi sayısız bilgilere ulaşabilir. Bunların içinde sizi utandıran üniversite yıllarından bir fotoğraf olabileceği gibi siyasi gündemle ilgili düşünceleriniz ya da düşünmeden yapmış olduğunuz ayrımcı yorumlar da olabilir, bunları okuyabilir ve sizin hakkınızda hoş olmayan bir izlenime kapılabilirler (Delaney, 2013, p. 98). Dolayısıyla sosyal ağlar vasıtasıyla bir veri paylaşıldığında bu veriye kimin denk geleceği sorunu vardır ve bu üzerinde giderek daha fazla düşünmeye değer bir konu halini almaktadır (Quercia et al., 2011, p. 184).

## GENEL DEĞERLENDİRME

İKY fonksiyonlarından biri de insan kaynağı bulma ve seçme sürecidir. İnsan kaynakları yönetiminin diğer süreçlerinin etkili bir biçimde yerine getirilmesine katkıda bulunması sebebiyle bu İKY fonksiyonu örgütler için ayrı bir önem taşır (Yılmaz, 2016, s. 36). Pozisyonun ihtiyaçlarına ve şirketin kültürüne uygun bir adayın seçimi hem şirketin rekabet avantajı açısından hem de işgörenin mutluluğu ve dolayısıyla etkinliği açısından önemlidir. Bu nedenle örgüt için doğru insanın bulunması, İK süreçlerinde doğru yöntemlerin kullanılmasını gerektirmektedir (Öz vd., 2015, s. 592).

Örgütler doğru işe doğru adayı bulabilmek için gazete ilanları, üniversite kariyer fuarları, personel avcılığı, istihdam ajansları ve çalışan tavsiyeleri gibi farklı işe alım uygulamaları kullanmaktadır (Lebekwe ve Güran, 2018, s. 90). Günümüzde kullanılan bu yöntemlere karşın aday bulma, aday araştırmasını kolaylaştırma, potansiyel adaylarla iletişim sağlama, aday havuzu oluşturma, iş ilanları yayınlama, işveren marka reklamı yapma, iş teklifi yapma gibi sağladığı sayısız fayda ile sosyal medya kullanımı en fazla tercih edilen seçenek olmaya başlamıştır (Öz vd., 2015, s. 592).

Sosyal medya araçları olarak sosyal ağlar, işverenlerin en yetenekli personeli kendi şirketine çekmesini mümkün kıldığı kadar iş adaylarının da kendilerini işverenlere ve İK uzmanlarına tanıtmasını mümkün kılmaktadır. Sosyal paylaşım siteleri ile potansiyel adaylar artık şirketler için daha göz önünde, daha görünür hale gelmektedir. Günümüzde iletişim teknolojisindeki gelişmeler doğrultusunda örgütler, İK fonksiyonlarını yerine getirmek için her zamankinden daha fazla sosyal medyadan ve popüler sosyal ağlardan faydalanmaktadır. Bu konuda üç temel sosyal paylaşım ağı akla gelmektedir. Facebook, LinkedIn ve Twitter. Her üç ağ da dünyada en sıklıkla kullanılan ve nitelikli işgücüne erişim anlamında şirketlere muazzam veri seti sunan platformlardır (Saylin & Horrocks, 2013).

Şirketler sadece iş adaylarına ulaşmak anlamında bu ağlardan faydalanmamakta, aynı zamanda çalışanlarının neler yaptığı, nelerden hoşlandığı vb. paylaşımlarına erişerek onları daha yakından tanıma imkânı da elde etmektedirler. Ancak bugün şirketlerin iş adayları ve çalışanlarından sosyal ağlarına ait kullanıcı adı ve şifrelerini talep ederek onların sosyal medya üzerindeki paylaşımlarına erişmek adına sergiledikleri çabalar, o kadar da masum görünmemektedir. İşverenlerin ya da İK uzmanlarının bu şekildeki tutumunun, özel alanın sınırlarını aşmak olduğu şeklindeki yorumlara karşılık şirketler, gizli bilgilerin, ticari sırların ve şirket repütasyonunun korunması adına bu yöntemlere başvurmanın haklılığını savunmaktadırlar (Delaney, 2013, p. 86-102).

Bununla birlikte, işverenlerin başvuru sahiplerine yaptıkları abartılı ya da yanlış vaatler, eğer başvuru sahipleri bunları online duyururlarsa, şirketler açısından olumsuz sonuçlar yaratmaktadır. Gerçekçi olmayan ve çalışanlar nezdinde karşılık bulamayan beklentiler örgüt içinde bir tür çatışmaya yol açmaktadır. Bu sebepten, çalışanlar görüşlerini örgüt içinde dile getirebilecekleri gibi sosyal platformlar üzerinden de dile getirebilmektedirler. Bilgi çağında işverenlerin marka ve imajlarını yönetebilmeleri için

çalışanlarının beklentilerini yönetebilmeleri de gereklidir (Holland & Jeske, 2017, p. 300).

İşletmeler eğer sürdürülebilir, olumlu, güçlü bir imaj yaratmak, var olanı sürdürmek ya da geliştirmek istiyorlarsa sosyal ağ sitelerinde mutlaka gerçekçi bilgiler paylaşmalıdırlar. İşverenler, iş gücü piyasasındaki her bireyin işletmelerini gelecekteki istihdam olanakları açısından değerlendirebileceği olasılığını göz önünde bulundurmalıdırlar (Denizli, 2020, s. 171).

Elektronik işe alımın daha da popüler hale gelmesi ve insan kaynaklarının dijitalleşmesi İK uzmanları için pek çok cephede potansiyel çatışmaların varlığının sinyalini vermektedir: elektronik izlemeyi mümkün kılan teknolojiler yalnızca kişisel yaşama el uzatılması anlamına gelmemekte aynı zamanda 'akıllı' teknolojiler kişisel verilere sızma ve veri madenciliğinin artması anlamına da gelmektedir. Bu şekilde toplanan yüksek miktardaki veri, başvuru kayıtlarına izinsiz erişim, verinin izinsiz ifşası ve veri güvenliğinin tehlikeye atılması gibi endişeleri arttırmaktadır. Hızla gelişen elektronik iletişim ve buna paralel sosyal medyanın hızlı değişimi ve beraberinde getirdiği beklenmedik zorluklara karşın düzenleyici mevzuat bir adım geriden gelmektedir (Holland & Jeske, 2017, p. 287-309).

ABD'de işverenlerin çalışanlarına, sosyal medya yoluyla ayrımcılık yapmasını önlemek adına 'Sosyal Ağlar Online Koruma Yasası *(Social Network Online Protection Act)*' adı altında federal yasalar gündeme gelmektedir (Delaney, 2013, p. 95). Social Network Online Protection Act (SNOPA), Facebook, MySpace ve Twitter gibi web sitelerinin yanı sıra e-posta ve diğer herhangi bir kişisel kullanıcı tarafından oluşturulan içerikler için geçerli bir uygulama mahiyetindedir. Mevzuat, "mevcut veya potansiyel işverenlerin veya eğitim kurumlarının çevrimiçi içeriğe bir kullanıcı adı, şifre veya başka bir erişim talep etmesini veya bu tür bilgileri gönüllü olarak vermeyi reddettikleri için bireyleri disipline etme, ayrımcılık yapma veya bireyleri istihdam etmeme veya onları cezalandırma" gibi uygulamalardan menetmeyi amaçlamaktadır. SNOPA'nın herhangi bir hükmünü ihlal eden işverenler, 10.000 $'ı geçmemek üzere bir para cezasına çarptırılabilmektedir[4]. Ülkemizde ise internet teknolojilerinin barındırdığı riskler karşısında 6698 sayılı Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Kanunu ile 2016 yılında önemli bir düzenleme yapılmıştır (Çekin, 2018, s. 3).

Ancak burada bir tartışma konusu da kuşkusuz sosyal medya platformlarını kullanan başvuru sahiplerinin gerçekten mahremiyet iddiasında bulunmaya hakları olup olmadığıdır. Zira kişilerin, bilgilerini sosyal ağ sitelerine gönderdiğinde gizlilik haklarını kaybettiğine dair görüşler olduğundan bahsedilmektedir ki bu durum, ülkemiz için de geçerli gözükmektedir (Kroeze, 2015, p. 4). Türkiye'de 2016 yılında çıkarılan 6698 sayılı Kişisel Verilerin Korunması Kanunu'na göre kişisel verilerin, *"ilgili kişinin kendisi tarafından alenileştirilmiş olması"* halinde, açık rıza aranmaksızın işlenmesi mümkün görülmüştür. Sözlük anlamı itibarıyla "açık, ortada, meydanda" anlamlarına gelen aleni sözcüğünün anlamı uyarınca sosyal ağ sitelerinde paylaşılan bilgilerin de "açık, ortada, meydanda" olması dolayısıyla alenileştiği sonucu çıkmaktadır. Bu sebeple, adayların

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[4]ESR, Social Networking Online Protection Act would Prevent Employers and Schools from Requiring Usernames and Passwords; https://www.esrcheck.com/2013/03/20/social-networking-online-protection-act-would-prevent-employers-and-schools-from-requiring-usernames-and-passwords/

sosyal ağ siteleri üzerinde yer alan her türlü bilgilerinin, işe alım sürecinde, kişinin rızası aranmaksızın işlenmesi mümkün görünmektedir (Denizli, 2019, s. 295). Bu yönüyle konu daha ileri araştırma ve tartışmalara açıktır.

Günümüzde bu işlemlerin hukuki boyutu ile birlikte etik boyutu da sorgulanmakta ve bu konuda yasal düzenlemeler kadar kullanıcıların da kendilerini korumaya yönelik tedbirler alması önerilmektedir. Örgütlerin gelişen ve dinamik bir ortamda giderek daha fazla değişkene odaklanmasıyla birlikte, neyin iş için gerekli olduğuna karar vermeleri ve sonuçta, ne çeşit bir sosyal medya faaliyetinin/bilgisinin iş için gerekli olduğu konusundaki çizgiyi çekmeleri giderek güçleşmektedir. Dolayısıyla İK profesyonellerinin, bilgi ve teknolojinin gelişimi ile oluşan bu yeni sınırları yönetebilmesi için etkin bir yasal ve etik çerçevenin gerekliliği vurgulanmalıdır. Pek çok örgüt sosyal medya kullanımına ilişkin belirli etik davranış kuralları ve/veya etik talimatlar belirlemiştir. Bu yönergelerin işe alım süreçlerini de kapsayacak şekilde genişletilmesi önemlidir. Örgüt içi açık yönetmeliklerin söz konusu olması durumunda İK uzmanları ve yöneticilerin etkin, savunulabilir ve geçerli kararlar alma konusunda daha başarılı olacaklarını söylemek mümkündür (Holland & Jeske, 2017, p. 287-309).

Her ne kadar örgüt tarafından alınacak etik tedbirler ve yaptırımlar önem arz etmekteyse de burada örgüt içindeki her bir bireyin sahip olduğu etik ideolojinin önemine de vurgu yapmak gerekmektedir. Zira çalışanların sahip olduğu etik ideoloji, örgüt tarafından belirlenmiş ahlaki kural ve yaptırımların göz önünde bulundurulması ya da göz ardı edilmesi noktasında önemlidir. Örgüt içindeki kültür, çalışanların tutum ve davranışlarına ne kadar yön veriyorsa, çalışanların sahip oldukları ahlak felsefesi ya da etik ideolojileri de çalışma hayatını ve örgütün etik iklimini etkilemektedir. Yöneticilerin karar alım süreçlerinde çalışanların bireysel etik ideolojilerini de dikkate alması hususunu bir tavsiye niteliğinde ortaya koyabiliriz.

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# GLOBAL AND LOCAL BRANDS: DISTINGUISHING PERCEPTIONS FROM ORIGIN*

## PEREN ÖZTURAN**

## ABSTRACT

This study aims to (1) disentangle the relationship between brand origin (global vs. local) and brand perceptions (perceived brand globalness, PBG vs. local iconness, LI), and (2) investigate how consumer ethnocentrism moderates these model pathways. We utilize a multi-method approach in two complementary studies, a survey (N=253) and an experiment (N=148). We find that brand origin (global vs. local) and perceptions (PBG vs. LI) are distinct constructs that need to be accounted for separately in brand evaluation models. We show that the routes to purchase intentions (PIs) differ across global and local origin brands. PBG has a positive relationship with perceived brand quality and prestige but only for global origin brands. In contrast, for local origin brands, LI plays a crucial role via positive relationships to perceived brand quality and prestige. Consumers prefer brands to stay true to their brand origin. Ethnocentrism dampens both the PBG-PI and LI-PI relations only for global origin brands. Neither PBG nor LI seems to trigger PIs for ethnocentric consumers for global origin brands. We show that the routes to PIs differ across global and local origin brands. Brand managers should stay true to the origins of their brands (global/local) in building their brands' globalness/localness perceptions since consumers prefer a fit between origin and perceptions.

*Keywords:* Brand origin, perceived brand globalness, local iconness, ethnocentrism.
*JEL Classification:* M31.

# KÜRESEL VE YEREL MARKALAR: KÖKEN VE ALGI AYRIMI

## ÖZ

Bu çalışma, (1) marka kökeni (küresel ve yerel) ile marka algıları (marka küreselliği, MK ve yerel ikonluk, Yİ) arasındaki ilişkileri ve (2) bu yapısal ilişkiler üzerinde tüketici etnosentrizminin rolünü araştırmaktadır. Ampirik olarak birbirini tamamlayıcı iki metot, bir anket (N=253) ve bir deney (N=148) kullanılmaktadır. Marka değerlendirme modellerinde marka kökeni (küresel ve yerel) ile marka algıları (MK ve Yİ) ayrı ayrı hesaba alınması gereken farklı kavramlardır. Tüketicilerin satın alma niyetlerini (SAN) artırmada küresel ve yerel kökenli markalar arasında farklılıklar bulunmaktadır. MK'nin marka kalitesi ve prestiji ile pozitif bir ilişkisi vardır, ancak bu sadece küresel kökenli markalar için geçerlidir. Buna karşılık, yerel kökenli markalar için Yİ, marka kalitesi ve prestiji ile pozitif ilişkisi sebebiyle önemli bir rol oynar. Tüketiciler, marka kökenlerine sadık kalan markaları tercih etmektedir. Ayrıca, etnosentrizm, hem MK-SAN hem de Yİ-SAN ilişkilerini yalnızca küresel kökenli markalar açısından zayıflatıcı etkiye sahiptir. Etnosentrik tüketicilerin küresel kökenli markalar açısından SAN'larını tetiklemekte ne MK, ne de Yİ etkin bir rol oynar. Çalışmamız SAN'a giden yolların küresel ve yerel kökenli markalar arasında farklılık gösterdiğine işaret ediyor. Tüketicilerin köken ile algılar arasında uyumu tercih etmesi nedeniyle, yöneticilere markalarının küresellik/yerellik algılarını oluştururken marka kökenine (küresel/yerel) sadık kalmalarını öneriyoruz.

*Anahtar kelimeler:* Marka kökeni, algılanan marka küreselliği, yerel ikonluk, etnosentrizm.
*JEL Sınıflandırması:* M31.

## INTRODUCTION

The branding literature underlines the benefits of global brands and assumes that consumers generally prefer them over local ones (e.g., Steenkamp et al., 2003). However, emerging market firms enter international markets heavily with their own, newly developed brands such as Huawei and Haier from China and Wipro from India. As well, they acquire global brands such as IBM's PC division by Lenovo or Godiva chocolates by Ülker. Thereby, the international competitive landscape has increased in variety with respect to the origin of global brands. This increased variety in global brand origin would not be of interest if consumers did not care about brand origin in their global brand evaluations. Because sourcing and production have spilled over national borders, it has in general become difficult to correctly identify brand origin (Balabanis & Diamantopoulos, 2008; Samiee et al., 2005). Furthermore, to disguise their origin, brands acquire other brands and use foreign sounding brand names (Gurhan-Canli et al., 2018). Nonetheless, perceived origin of a brand is still considered an important attribute (e.g., Magnusson et al., 2011; Samiee, 2011). Given this background, we lack a clear understanding of how brand origin adds to consumer evaluations above and beyond brand perceptions.

The extant literature defines perceived brand globalness (PBG) as a brand's *perceived* multimarket reach. The brand origin concept, on the other hand, captures the country with which consumers relate the brand with (Balabanis & Diamantopoulos, 2008; Samiee, 2011; Usunier, 2011). While consumers find it hard to correctly identify brands' origin (Mandler et al., 2017), they do have a perception of at the minimum whether brands are of domestic or foreign origin (Riefler, 2012). This implicit categorization of brands over their (perceived) origin influence their evaluations (e.g., Balabanis & Diamantopoulos, 2011; Mandler et al., 2021). For example, Winit, Gregory, Cleveland, and Verlegh (2014) distinguish distribution globalness from ownership globalness and show that each has different effects. Consumers may prefer a locally owned global brand over a globally owned one depending on their level of ethnocentrism or home country bias. Similarly, Riefler (2012) distinguishes between domestic and foreign origin global brands to find significant differences in brand evaluations driven by globalization attitudes and global consumption orientation.

The difference between global and local origin is expected to become even more relevant in Western countries that have entered a "post-globalization" phase (Gardels, 2008), characterized by shifts in public opinion against globalization processes (Ghemawat,

2017). Global brands as symbols and tools of globalization are expected to get their share of negative sentiments in this shifting environment, particularly by ethnocentric consumers who generally prefer local origin brands (Balabanis & Diamantopoulos, 2004). Global marketing managers should care about and respond to the local marketplace, positioning their brands as a local player, or even as a symbol of the local culture when necessary (Alden et al., 1999; Özsomer, 2012). Indeed, consumer responses to globalization and global brands have proven to be much more complex than initially assumed (Strizhakova et al., 2012; van Ittersum & Wong, 2010).

Inspired by the changing landscape and recent research, this paper aims to address the research gap in international marketing literature on global brand origins and perceptions. This we do this in two steps. First, we disentangle the relationship between brand origin (global vs. local) and perceptions (perceived brand globalness, PBG vs. local iconness, LI) (e.g., Batra et al., 2000; Özsomer & Altaras, 2008; Özsomer, 2012; Riefler, 2012; Steenkamp et al., 2003). Secondly, we investigate how consumer ethnocentrism moderates this model pathways. We focus on ethnocentrism because it is a particularly relevant consumer dispositional factor strongly predicting local origin brand purchasing behavior, especially when these brands are also globally available and desired (e.g., Winit et al., 2014). While reaching these goals, we theoretically compare and contrast Consumer Culture Theory (CCT) and Signaling Theory (ST) and empirically utilize a multi-method approach in two complementary studies (a survey and an experiment). Thence, we like to answer the recent call to address some of the inconsistencies and omissions of previous work on global branding (Liu et al., 2021) and advance our branding knowledge.

With survey data, we first show that brand origin (global vs. local) and brand perceptions of globalness and local iconness are distinct constructs that need to be accounted for separately in brand evaluation models. We also find that the routes to purchase intentions (PIs) differ across global and local origin brands. PBG is positively related to perceived brand quality and prestige but only for global origin brands. In contrast, for local origin brands, local iconness plays a crucial role via positive relationships to perceived brand quality and prestige. Interestingly, while the total effect of local iconness on purchase intentions are significant for local origin brands, a similar effect is not observed for global origin brands. Thus, it is tough for a global origin brand to start the local iconness path going, implying that consumers prefer global

brands to stay true to their brand origin. When considered against the previous work in the domain (e.g., Ozsomer 2012; Steenkamp et al., 2003), these insights are new.

Furthermore, global origin brands need to be cognizant of ethnocentric consumers. Our results show that consumer ethnocentrism dampens both the PBG-PI and Local iconness - PI relations only for global origin brands. Neither PBG nor Local iconness seems to trigger PIs for ethnocentric consumers for global origin brands.

Results from the experiment complement our survey findings and are especially relevant for re-positioning brands with established origin and image/symbolism perceptions. If brand managers would like to update a brand's positioning along global image and symbolism, they need either a previously recognizable global image and symbolism perceptions or a global origin. Thus, the fit between previous origin and image perceptions are critical. For local iconness, what matters is that the brand is perceived of local origin, especially when there are ethnocentric consumers in that market.

Theoretically, we build a bridge between the Consumer Culture Theory (CCT) and Signaling Theory perspectives to global branding by clarifying whether the *consumer culture-based perceptions* or *information-based signals* explain more of consumers' brand evaluations and purchase intentions. We also explore their complementary effects.

## THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES

### Consumer Culture and Signaling Theories

International marketing scholars have used mainly two theoretical perspectives when investigating consumer attitudes and preferences of global and local brands: consumer culture theory (CCT, Arnould & Thomson, 2005) and signaling theory (Erdem & Swait, 1998; 2004). CCT enables researchers to address the cultural meanings, sociohistoric influences, and experiential indicators over the choice of global vs. local offerings (e.g., Alden et al., 1999; Batra et al., 2000). Consumer Culture Theorists also highlight how global brands enable participation in an imagined global world (Holt et al., 2004). They hold a capacity to serve as a legitimacy tool, a license while becoming cosmopolitan (Strizhakova et al., 2008; 2012). These researchers define perceived brand globalness (PBG) as a brand's *perceived* international and utilize

subjective consumer-level data for its measurement (e.g., Steenkamp et al., 2003). A brand's globalness operates as a halo effect, influencing usually in a positive way the evaluation of other, more objective product attributes like quality or prestige (Holt et al., 2004). Perceived brand globalness increases willingness to pay (Davvetas et al., 2015).

The prominent approach in the domain is that to curate globalness perceptions, the brand should be positioned in more than a couple of countries and recognized as worldwide in these markets (Steenkamp 2019). This can happen in following ways: first via segmentation-targeting-positioning efforts that connote a global, multicultural lifestyle and secondly via Public Relations efforts, advertising, and word of mouth, especially using names, influencers.

Signaling theory, on the other hand, drives from information economics and argues in case of a market with no perfect and symmetric information, actors employ information regarding the uncertain characteristics to convey their brands' positions to consumers (Erdem & Swait, 1998). Signaling theorists use global origin, captured via worldwide availability and recognition as a positive market signal that carries information on the brand's capacity and motivation to fulfil on its potentials (Erdem & Swait, 2004; Erdem et al., 2002; Özsomer & Altaras, 2008). A brand's globalness implies worldwide success and, therefore, serves as a hallmark of endorsement for any audience. Objective measures such as actual multimarket reach and ratio of sales from abroad are generally used to capture the signaling function of global brands. Objective measures are used mainly by practitioners and by brand ranking frameworks such as those developed by ACNielsen and BusinessWeek (Chu & Keh, 2006).

Local brands, on the other hand, hint a closer tie and a richer commitment to consumers' niche wishes, a sensitivity to the local market peculiarities, culture, and preferences (Dimofte et al., 2008; Kapferer, 2005; Özsomer, 2012; Steenkamp & de Jong, 2010). Appendix A compares the current research with exemplary international marketing literature regarding key concepts and measurements.

By examining the relative effectiveness of global vs. local cultural positioning, consumer culture theorists assume that the actual origin of a brand is *less* relevant for consumers compared to their perceptions of globalness or localness whilst they form their purchase intentions and brand choices (e.g., Alden et al., 1999; Batra et al., 2000). If a brand communicates its globalness (availability and acceptance in world markets) in a specific market, even though it may actually be a local origin brand, it may still be perceived as high on

globalness by consumers in that particular market. Indeed, brands of local origin engage in market availability abroad in an effort to boost local perceptions of quality and prestige (Özsomer, 2012).

In contrast, a brand may engage in activities and communication that increases its representativeness and symbolism of the local culture, even though it may have a global origin. Thence, it may be associated with localness in consumers' minds and hearts. Such a brand would have a local consumer culture positioning according to Steenkamp (2019). For example, Coca Cola is successfully positioned as the drink to be enjoyed with family in the holy month of Ramadan (Bilgin & Wührer, 2014) and has become an indispensable stable of Ramadan dinner tables in Turkey for several decades. The brand not only eliminated seasonality, which was a problem with declining sales in the winter, but Ramadan became a month of increased sales. In this reasoning, the origin of the brand (global or local) does not matter or matters less, while the cultural positioning global vs. local is what matters or matters more (Liu et al., 2021). This leads to the following proposition:

> *Proposition 1a:* Perceived brand globalness is positively associated with purchase intentions irrespective of brand's global origin.
>
> *Proposition 1b:* Perceived local iconness is positively associated with purchase intentions irrespective of brand's local origin.

We first test the validity of this proposition and then extend it by arguing that the benefits of global (local) brand perceptions (i.e., PBG vs, Local Iconness) may actually depend on brand origin (global vs. local). That is, building on the inconsistencies and omissions of the previous literature (Liu et al., 2021), we investigate if and how the proposed relationships change when we consider a brand with a global versus a local origin.

Previous work has suggested that consumers may prefer brands that have a *fit* between their natural origin and nurtured perceptions (Riefler, 2012). Riefler (2012) shows that globalness perceptions enhance evaluations of domestic origin global brands if consumers have a positive attitude to globalization while foreign origin global brands suffer if consumers oppose globalization. Local brands often share a long history and heritage with their home markets, some even becoming representations of the local culture (Steenkamp

et al., 2003). That said, in our context, local iconness could be a defensive strategy for local brands while perceived globalness could be a proactive strategy for global brands (Özsomer, 2012) as these two groups of brands compete with each other for consumer's minds, hearts, and wallets. Therefore, brand perceptions may not be two ends of a continuum yet indicate positionings with a potential to exist together. This is a viable strategic option for brand managers who face fragmented segments (e.g., ethnocentric customers) when pursing a multi-market strategy. Given the emotional value attached to localness and functional value attached to globalness (c.f., Zarantonello et al., 2013), the local iconness - prestige relationship may be higher (lower) while globalness - quality relationship may be lower (higher) for brands with a local (global) origin. Consequently, we suggest that the effectiveness of the routes to create brand preference and purchase intentions may differ depending on brand origin. For global origin brands, perceived globalness may enhance purchase intentions more while for local origin brands, local iconness could be the key.

> *Hypothesis 1:* The positive association between local iconness (PBG) and purchase intentions is stronger for local (global) origin brands.
> *Hypothesis 2:* For a local (global) origin brand, local iconness (PBG) enhances purchase intentions via prestige (quality).

The difference between brand origins is particularly relevant when bearing in mind home country predispositions (Alden et al., 2006; Balabanis & Diamantopoulos, 2004; Dimofte et al., 2008; Verlegh, 2007). That is, "cultural associations are an important source of brand equity, provided that the cultural positioning is aligned with consumers' cultural attitudes" (Steenkamp 2019 p.13). Ethnocentric consumers, those who find it morally wrong to purchase foreign branded products and services, may buy the brands with global origin less, no matter how high they rate these offerings on globalness. Conversely, such consumers may prefer the local origin brands more, no matter the high efforts of the global origin brands to build local symbols/image. In fact, these efforts may be perceived with skepticism and labeled as not sincere (Winit et al., 2014). When consumers have feelings of unease or lack of fluency in judgements, this may lead to negative brand evaluations (Torelli et al., 2012). We, therefore, expect the well-established consumer ethnocentrism's negative moderation effect on the perceived globalness – purchase

intention relation to be higher for global origin brands while its positive moderation effect on the local iconness – purchase intention relation to be higher for local origin brands. Overall, these predictions suggest that the way consumer brand perceptions (PBG and local iconness) affect preferences may vary with brand origin and consumer ethnocentrism. Our conceptual framework capturing these nuances is depicted in Figure 1.

*Hypothesis 3:* Brand origin attenuates consumer ethnocentrism's weakening effect on purchase intentions relationships, in that: for a local origin brand, consumer ethnocentrism's weakening effect is less, while for a global origin brand, consumer ethnocentrism's weakening effect is more.



**Figure 1: Conceptual Model**

## METHODOLOGY

To follow a multi-method approach in our empirical research, we conducted a survey and an experiment. With the survey, data was collected from the Netherlands during a period of two weeks in May 2014. The Netherlands is a mature market in the "post-globalization" phase that has achieved high global integration through foreign trade and internationally oriented citizens

(Nijssen & Douglas, 2004). In line with the matched samples technique, the survey was conducted in shopping malls and open markets catering to middle-income clientele who are generally reasonably familiar with global and local brands (e.g., Özsomer, 2012). Six Master students (who we refer as the project team) conducted the survey under the supervision of the author. As a token of appreciation, a small gift, a bar of chocolate, was given to respondents. Overall, a total number of 256 respondents participated in the study. Three surveys were excluded due to the respondent age below 18, leaving us with 253 completed surveys. The resulting sample compromised of 73% respondents in the 18- to 45-year age range, 49% males, an average daily television watching of 1.9 hours, and 38% with a university degree or higher.

**Table 1: Profile of Respondents**

|  | *Percentage* (N = 253) |
|---|---|
| Age: |  |
| 18-25 | 30 |
| 26-35 | 23 |
| 36-45 | 20 |
| 46-55 | 15 |
| 56 and above | 12 |
|  |  |
| Gender: |  |
| Female | 51 |
| Male | 49 |
|  |  |
| Average daily television watching: |  |
| < 1 hour | 13 |
| >= 1 and < 2 hours | 24 |
| >= 2 and < 3 hours | 31 |
| >= 3 and < 4 hours | 15 |
| >= 4 hours | 9 |
| Information not available | 8 |
|  |  |
| Education: |  |
| High School | 24 |
| Vocational Education | 39 |
| University | 21 |
| Master | 14 |
| PhD | 2 |
| Others | 1 |
|  |  |
| Monthly income: |  |
| €1500 or less | 28 |
| €1501- €2500 | 35 |
| €2501- €3500 | 15 |
| More than €3500 | 18 |
| Information not available | 4 |

Product categories and brands were selected according to previous work examining the interplay between local and global brands (i.e., Özsomer, 2012). Brands were identified in two steps. In the first step, the project team evaluated the ACNielsen rankings to select the global origin brands in the Dutch market. The best-known global origin brands in the Dutch market were first chosen and then matched with their best-known local-origin counterparts using Euromonitor market share of brands in the Dutch market. In the second step, following previous work (i.e., Özsomer, 2012), a preliminary survey was conducted to establish consumer perceptions of the selected 21 brands from 9 product categories. An online survey using Qualtrics was preferred instead of a focus group to save time and increase reach. The preliminary survey was sent out to 210 participants from the family and friend circles of the research team, out of which 120 responded. The respondents were mostly young (i.e., 88% in the age group of 21 and 40 years), educated (50% holding a Master's degree), and represented both genders (51% female). The high/low involvement scale for product categories and perceived globalness and local iconness for brands were used to identify six categories (i.e., beer, coffee, jeans, laundry detergent, mobile service provider, and yoghurt) and a global - local brand pair for each category (i.e., Grolsch - Corona, Douwe Egberts - Nepresso, G-star - Levi's, Witte Reus - Ariel, KPN - Vodafone, and Campina - Danone) to be used in the actual survey. Many of what we identified as local origin brands (i.e., originating in the Netherlands) were actually perceived as high in perceived brand globalness. The relationship between brand origin and perceived brand globalness (and local iconness) is indeed the issue we would like to address, providing ecological validity for our selection of country with such success stories of local origin brands.

The original English questionnaire was translated into Dutch and the Dutch version was translated back into English by the researcher. To decrease order-effects, two versions of the survey for each product category were randomly distributed: one starting with questions pertaining to the local brand (N=128) and the other to the global brand (N=125). To reach residents with an international background, the survey was also administered in English, N = 77. The language and order of the survey did not have an impact on focal variables, $p > .10$, except for brand purchase likelihood ($M_{Dutch}$= 4.36, $M_{English}$=4.90, $F(1,504)$=12.12, $p < .001$). The respondents completed the survey in 20 minutes, on average.

We employed the same measurement items as Steenkamp et al. (2003) for our constructs (see Appendix B for exact items). For the seven multi-item constructs (only prestige was a single item construct), we standardized their items before conducting confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in MPlus (Muthén & Muthén, 2017) and used 5,000 bootstrap samples in our examination. The item "purchasing foreign-made products is un-Dutch" and the reversed item "not all knowledgeable about this brand" were dropped because of their low contribution to the consumer ethnocentrism and brand familiarity measures, respectively. Factor loadings were all higher than .50 ($p < .001$).

The measurement model's fit is high, ($\chi^2$ (131) = 232.6 ($p < .001$), RMSEA = .04 [90% C.I. = .03 - .05], CFI = .98, SRMR = .03). The seven multi-item constructs had convergent validity, with average variance extracted (AVE) higher than .50 and composite reliability (CR) larger than .70. The AVEs and CRs were higher ($p < .001$) than these benchmark levels. All constructs expressed discriminant validity, which was checked by comparing the AVE of each construct against its squared-correlation with another. Jointly, the results support the good psychometrics properties for the latent constructs. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics about the measures.

**Table 2. Descriptive Information about the Measures**

| Construct | Scale | M | SD | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Brand Purchase Likelihood | 7-point | 4.522 | 1.631 | .934 | | | | | | | |
| 2. Perceived Brand Globalness | 7-point | 4.579 | 1.735 | .063 | .842 | | | | | | |
| 3. Perceived Brand Quality | 7-point | 5.006 | 1.048 | .412 | .207 | .746 | | | | | |
| 4. Local Iconness | 7-point | 3.593 | 1.652 | .042 | -.633 | -.036 | .892 | | | | |
| 5. Perceived Brand Prestige | 7-point | 4.443 | 1.365 | .130 | .165 | .231 | .041 | 1.000 | | | |
| 6. Brand Familiarity | 7-point | 5.603 | 1.322 | .265 | .134 | .340 | .089 | .153 | .788 | | |
| 7. Country of Origin | 7-point | 5.453 | .789 | .154 | -.048 | .144 | .039 | .047 | .162 | .806 | |
| 8. Consumer Ethnocentrism | 7-point | 2.169 | .986 | .056 | -.040 | -.009 | .097 | .097 | -.057 | -.010 | .799 |
| AVE | | | | .873 | .709 | .557 | .796 | | .621 | .649 | .639 |
| CR | | | | .932 | .880 | .715 | .921 | | .765 | .881 | .840 |

*Note*: Correlations larger than .09 and smaller than -.09 are significant at $p < .05$ (N = 506). Diagonal elements are the square roots of average variance extracted (AVE).

## Survey Results

We first aimed to seek the validity of the proposition offered by research embracing CCT theory: Perceived brand globalness (local iconness) is positively related to purchase likelihood

irrespective of brand global (local) origin. We compared fit indices of two structural equation models (SEMs) of a pooled approach and a multi-group analysis. By pooling all sampled brands into one model, the first SEM treats all global/local origin brands the same, assuming brand origin does not matter. The pooled approach builds on the model by Steenkamp et al. (2003). The alternative approach we propose acknowledges brand origins and distinguishes between global/local origins by testing them separately in a multi-group SEM. The multi-group SEM also tests our hypothesis H1, H2, and H3 and allows us to account for consumer ethnocentrism's moderation effects. Given that ethnocentrism is measured by a scale and in light of concerns with dichotomizing a continuous variable when not conceptually relevant, we used latent factor interactions (Klein & Moosbrugger, 2000) for testing the consumer ethnocentrism moderations. To assess latent factor interactions in a multi-group set-up, mixture model analysis with known class membership (class 1 = local and class 2 = global) was employed (Muthén & Muthén, 2017).

Loglikelihood difference tests were used to test the SEM models' fit. The first SEM has 86 free parameters, with a loglikelihood value of -11695.2, and a scaling correction factor of 1.442. The second SEM has 112 free parameters, a loglikelihood value of -11866.6, and a scaling correction factor of 1.362. Results from both models were obtained with the MLR estimator. Following the steps needed to compute a chi-square difference test based on these figures (Muthén & Muthén, 2017), we find that the multi-group SEM improves the model fit when compared to the first utilizing pooled data, $\Delta\chi2$ ($\Delta df$), $p$-value = 311.9 (26), $p < .001$. Thus, Proposition 1 is not validated, providing support for our more fine-tuned approach integrating global/local brand origin. Distinguishing between the global vs. local origins of brands shed more light on the phenomenon under study than the dominating view that does not consider the origin of global/local brands.

Having found support for a nuanced approach that accounts for global vs. local brand origin together with perceptions of globalness and localness, we turned to testing our hypotheses. Our hypotheses suggest different routes to purchase intentions for brands with global versus local origins. Before reporting the results, it is worth noting that the main effects model with parameters set free across the brand groups did not have a better fit compared to the one where parameters were constrained to be equal, ($\Delta\chi2$ (15)= 17.1, $p = .311$). However, including consumer ethnocentrism interactions significantly improved the model fit when

compared to both the constrained main effects model (Δχ2 (19)= 31.3, *p* = .038), and the free main effects model (Δχ2 (4)= 21.2, *p* < .001). This suggests that consumer ethnocentrism brings the effect of global/local brand origin to life. The multi-group SEM approach we endorse is worthwhile when consumer ethnocentrism is accounted for in the model. This approach incorporates a mixture model with free parameters across two groups (global vs. local origin brands) and latent factor interactions (Table 3) and the mediation analyses incorporating these effects are reported in Table 4.

### Table 3: The Role of Origin

| | *Local Brands* | | | *Global Brands* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | b | S.E. | *p*-value | b | S.E. | *p*-value |
| Perceived Brand Quality | | | | | | |
| Brand Familiarity | .315 | .112 | .005 | .259 | .099 | .009 |
| Country-of-origin | .096 | .065 | .143 | .073 | .081 | .368 |
| Perceived Brand Globalness | .207 | .117 | .078 | .428 | .168 | .011 |
| Local Iconness | .285 | .141 | .043 | .054 | .134 | .685 |
| | | | | | | |
| Perceived Brand Prestige | | | | | | |
| Brand Familiarity | .079 | .100 | .432 | .088 | .101 | .384 |
| Country-of-origin | .052 | .071 | .463 | .003 | .084 | .972 |
| Perceived Brand Globalness | .404 | .122 | .001 | .444 | .188 | .018 |
| Local Iconness | .477 | .139 | .001 | .289 | .170 | .090 |
| | | | | | | |
| Brand Purchase Likelihood | | | | | | |
| Brand Familiarity | .098 | .111 | .377 | .171 | .108 | .115 |
| Country-of-origin | .113 | .073 | .120 | -.045 | .069 | .516 |
| Perceived Brand Globalness | -.028 | .117 | .810 | -.199 | .233 | .395 |
| Local Iconness | .166 | .119 | .164 | -.088 | .175 | .613 |
| Perceived Brand Quality | .632 | .106 | <.001 | .561 | .136 | <.001 |
| Perceived Brand Prestige | -.109 | .063 | .084 | .068 | .063 | .286 |
| Consumer Ethnocentrism (CET) | .040 | .239 | .867 | .114 | .092 | .216 |
| CET x Perceived Brand Globalness | .044 | .098 | .650 | -.598 | .193 | .002 |
| CET x Local Iconness | .081 | .126 | .519 | -.610 | .185 | .001 |
| Number of free parameters | 112 | | | | | |
| Loglikelihood value | -11866.6 | | | | | |
| Scaling correction factor | 1.362 | | | | | |
| △χ2 (△df), *p*-value [a] | 21.2 (4), *p* < .001 | | | | | |

*Note: Unstandardized solution; p-values are two-tailed.* [a]: The main effects model with free parameters across the two groups had 108 free parameters, loglikelihood value of -11873.0, and a scaling correcting factor of 1.390.

**Table 4: The Direct, Indirect, And Total Effects on Brand Purchase Likelihood: A Multi-Group Analysis with Brand Origin**

| | Local Brands | | | | | | Global Brands | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Perceived Brand Globalness | | | Local Iconness | | | Perceived Brand Globalness | | | Local Iconness | | |
| | b | S.E. | p-value | b | S.E. | p-value | b | S.E. | p-value | b | S.E. | p-value |
| Direct effect | -.028 | .117 | .810 | .166 | .119 | .164 | -.199 | .233 | .395 | -.088 | .175 | .613 |
| Direct effect moderated by Consumer Ethnocentrism | -.001 | .007 | .850 | .013 | .024 | .580 | .119 | .128 | .353 | .054 | .103 | .601 |
| Total direct effect | -.029 | .123 | .812 | .179 | .133 | .179 | -.080 | .115 | .490 | -.034 | .074 | .643 |
| Indirect effect via Perceived Brand Quality | .131 | .073 | .075 | .180 | .088 | .041 | .240 | .124 | .053 | .030 | .077 | .695 |
| Indirect effect via Perceived Brand Prestige | -.044 | .028 | .116 | -.052 | .034 | .123 | .030 | .031 | .327 | .020 | .020 | .331 |
| Total indirect effect | .087 | .071 | .220 | .128 | .088 | .145 | .270 | .131 | .039 | .050 | .082 | .541 |
| Total effect | .057 | .122 | .638 | .307 | .146 | .035 | .190 | .142 | .180 | .015 | .096 | .873 |

*Note*: Unstandardized solution; *p*-values are two-tailed. Since this model incorporated latent factor interactions, bootstrapping and Confidence Interval estimations were not possible to conduct.

The routes to purchase intentions differ across global and local origin brands, supporting H1. Table 3 shows that, in line with CCT theory (Steenkamp et al., 2003), for global origin brands, PBG has a positive relationship with perceived brand quality (b = .428, *p* = .011) and perceived brand prestige (b = .444, *p* = .018). But, this holds true only for global origin brands. In contrast, for local origin brands, local iconness plays a crucial role. That is, the local iconness of the local origin brand has a positive relationship with its perceived brand quality (b = .285, *p* = .043) and perceived brand prestige (b = .477, *p* = .001). The other relationships, PBG for local origin brands or local iconness for global origin brands were insignificant, *p* > .10. Table 4 shows that the total effect of local iconness on purchase intentions holds true for local origin brands (b = .307, *p* = .035), while a similar effect is not observed for brands with global origin, *p* > .10. In contrast, PBG has a significant indirect effect on purchase intentions for global origin brands (b = .270, *p* = .039), while its total effect is not significant for both global and local origin brands with, *p* > .10, confirming H1 predictions. These results suggest that there are different routes to purchase intentions depending on the global versus local origin of the brand. While

local origin brands boost purchase intentions with local iconness, global origin brands benefit from perceived globalness but to a lesser extent, supporting Özsomer (2012)'s local iconness results.

When we look at the results per mediator, the picture becomes clearer. Perceived brand quality has a significant relationship with purchase intentions for both local and global origin brands (respectively, b = .632 and b = .561, for both *p* < .001) while prestige plays an insignificant role, *p* > .05 (see Table 3). Consequently, for local origin brands, the indirect impact of local iconness on purchase likelihood via perceived quality is the most important path (b = .180, *p* =.041) while for global brands, the indirect impact of PBG on purchase likelihood via perceived quality is the most important (b = .240, *p* =.053, see Table 4). This partially confirms H2 in that when we account for brand global/local origin, the mediation effect of prestige is surpassed in importance by to the role of quality.

*Consumer ethnocentrism as moderator.* The consumer ethnocentrism moderation is impactful only for the purchase likelihood of *global origin brands* supporting H3 (Table 3). The effect of PBG and local iconness on purchase likelihood gets significantly weaker with higher consumer ethnocentrism, (b = -.598, *p* = .002; b = -.610, *p* = .001, respectively) for global origin brands. Contrast this with the insignificant moderation effects for local origin brands. To better understand these moderation effects, we compared the impact of consumer ethnocentrism on brand purchase likelihood at low and high levels of PBG and local iconness (Cohen et al., 2003). As depicted in Figure 2a and 2b, respectively, for global origin brands, perceived brand globalness has an insignificant effect on purchase likelihood when consumer ethnocentrism is low ($b_{LOW}$ = .195, *p* = .482) but has a significant negative effect as consumer ethnocentrism gets higher ($b_{HIGH}$ = -.542, *p* = .004). Similarly, local iconness has an insignificant effect on purchase likelihood when consumer ethnocentrism is low ($b_{LOW}$ = .309, *p* = .166) but has a negative significant effect, as consumer ethnocentrism gets higher ($b_{HIGH}$ = -.469, *p* = .005). Together, these results indicate that consumer ethnocentrism negatively moderates the perceived globalness – purchase intention as well as the local iconness – purchase intention relationships. Yet these hold true, only for *global origin brands*, and not for local origin brands. Ethnocentric customers are more sensitive when approaching brands with a global origin, while having more stable preferences for local origin brands. We revisit these findings and provide some recommendations in the Discussion section.

A. PERCEIVED GLOBALNESS          B. LOCAL ICONNESS



*Notes:* CET = Consumer Ethnocentrism. Interaction effects were not significant for local brands (*p* > .10), hence are not depicted here.

**Figure 2: Consumer Ethnocentrism (CET) Moderates the Focal Relationships for Global Brands**

*Survey study summary.* Overall, we can conclude that when brand global vs. local origin is accounted for, consumers attach different values to brands with perceived brand globalness versus local iconness perceptions. Specifically, a local brand's iconness connotes better quality which in turn makes consumers prefer the local origin brand more while perceived globalness and quality perceptions are the main route for global origin brand purchase likelihood. This finding is new and consistent with ideas proposed by earlier work that accounts for brand origin misclassifications (e.g., Winit et al., 2014).

The survey study helps us understand that brand perceptions (PBG and local iconness) are related to consumer brand evaluations and purchase likelihood, depending on brand global/local origin. This nuance is not addressed sufficiently in the global branding research (Liu et al., 2021). Specifically, the focal relationships between brand perceptions and quality, prestige, and purchase intentions not only depend on consumer characteristics such as

consumer ethnocentrism but also on brand characteristics such as brand global or local origin. This is a valuable extension of previous work.

What can marketers do when they want to create new perceived brand globalness and local iconness perceptions for a brand with a specific brand origin and an existing brand perception? This is an important question given the increase in acquisitions by emerging market multinationals (EMNCs) of global origin brands (e.g., Chattopadhyay et al., 2012) with firmly established brand schemas in consumer's mind. In the introduction, we had mentioned Lenovo's acquisition of IBM's PC unit, or Ülker's acquisition of Godiva chocolates as examples of such acquisitions of established brands by EMNCs. What happens when a global brand is acquired by a local origin brand that signals connections to local culture and symbolism such as Tata's acquisition of Jaguar and Land Rover and Haier's acquisition of GE Appliances, or Geely's acquisition of Volvo Cars in 2010. How should brand managers design the communication and advertising to re-position the Lenovo or the GE brand if necessary? Should Lenovo build local iconness and GE build perceived globalness? In these examples, over time a misalignment between the actual brand origin and its perceived positioning (PBG vs. local iconness) can occur as more consumers learn the new origin of the brand. Then, it may be possible to see some negative misclassification effects. To probe this possibility further, we run our second study.

**Experimental Study**

Having established that brand global/local origin matters with a survey-based study, the second study aims to provide guidance to managers who face an inexorable misalignment between brand origin and perceptions. We manipulate rather than measure brand origin and perceptions by making use of a fictitious brand. We distinguished four conditions for this brand: (1) brand has a global origin and is perceived as a global brand, (2) brand has a global origin and is perceived as a local brand, (3) brand has a local origin and is perceived as a local brand, and (4) brand has a local origin and is perceived as a global brand. We will explore if new perceptions of brand globalness and local iconness are differentially influenced by the origin and the existing perceptions or is it simply a story of fit such that perceived globalness and local iconness are higher when the brand origin (global vs. local) fits existing perceptions (conditions 1 and 3, respectively) compared to no-fit conditions (conditions 2 and 4). The measurement

items used in the experimental manipulations build on previous work (i.e., for brand origin: Zhang & Khare, 2009 and for brand perceptions: Alden et al., 1999) and the same with the survey.

*Experimental study method.* In a 2 (origin: local vs. global) by 2 (perceptions: local vs. global) experimental between-subjects design 148 students were recruited from a behavioral lab at a Dutch University in exchange for course credit ($M_{age}$ = 19.97, $SD_{age}$ = 1.88, 27% female). The data collection took a week during late January-early February of 2017. Every participant was allocated to an experimental condition in a randomized fashion.

All respondents were requested to read the information about a jeans brand called SyPHer imagining it to be highly relevant for them. They were given some brief information (brand origin manipulation) and an advertisement (brand perception manipulation) about SyPHer. We manipulated brand origin by providing the following information: for the local brand origin condition, "SyPHer is produced and marketed **in the Netherlands, for Dutch consumers**. It is a local brand that is available on the Dutch market only." and, for the global brand origin condition: "SyPHer is produced and marketed **internationally, for global consumers**. It is a global brand that is available across the world." After reading this information, respondents were asked to examine the brand's new advertisement, which was to be placed in magazines and online. The local versus global perceptions were manipulated such that for the local iconness (perceived globalness) condition, respondents saw an ad stating, "SyPHer represents what the Netherlands (world) is all about. For me, SyPHer is **a symbol** of the country (world) we live in. (see Appendix C for the exact image and wording). This is a frequently used priming procedure in the international marketing research domain where consumers are requested to examine an advertisement that is systematically varied across conditions (e.g., Diamantopoulos et al., 2017).

After the manipulations, respondents indicated the brand's perceived globalness and local iconness by means of the same items as in the survey study (i.e., Steenkamp et al., 2003). We later asked the manipulation checks and some demographic questions such as age and gender.[1]

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[1] We also collected data for other constructs used in the survey such as purchase intentions, quality, prestige, and consumer ethnocentrism. For brevity, we do not report these results here. We can do so upon request.

*Manipulation checks.* Post-hoc manipulation checks demonstrated that our manipulations effectively primed brand origin and perceptions. For each manipulation, we asked one manipulation check question. For the brand origin question, respondents indicated their perceptions of SyPHer's origin, where 1= owned by a Dutch company (local), 7=owned by an international company (global). Self-reported origin was significantly higher for the global origin condition ($M_{globalO}$ = 4.92) than for the local origin brand ($M_{localO}$ = 3.04; $F(1,146)$=40.6, $p < .001$), suggesting that the manipulation worked. For the brand perception question, respondents indicated their perceptions of SyPHer's advertisement, where 1=about the Netherlands 7=about the world. Self-reported perception was significantly higher for the global perception ($M_{globalP}$ = 6.09) than for the local perception condition ($M_{localP}$ = 2.62; $F(1,146)$=332.9, $p < .001$).

*Experimental study results.* We followed the same procedures as those used in the survey to check the convergent and discriminant validity of our multi-item constructs. After seeing all perform well, we averaged the items to calculate factor scores for path analyses. As a preliminary check, we tested for the mean differences using an ANOVA. We found that perceived globalness and local iconness showed significant differences between the four conditions, $F(3,144)$=29.3, $p < .001$ and $F(3,144)$=4.5, $p = .005$ (see Figure 3 for actual means) providing confidence for our experimental design and manipulations.



**Figure 3: Experimental Results of Brand Origin Interaction with Brand Perception**

Before running the path models, we transformed the dummy codes into effect codes to ease coefficient interpretation (following Cohen et al., 2003 and earlier work e.g., Harmeling et al., 2015; Schrift & Amar, 2015) i.e., -0.5 for global brand origin / global brand perception and +0.5 for local brand origin / local iconness variables and then calculated an interaction variable. The path analyses results show that for perceived brand globalness, both brand origin and brand perceptions mattered. That is, local brand origin created lower perceived globalness compared to global brand origin (b= -1.780, $p < .001$). In addition, local perception created lower perceived globalness compared to global perceptions (b = -.776, $p < .001$). Regarding local iconness, however, only brand perceptions mattered (right hand side of Figure 3). That is, local brand perceptions created higher local iconness compared to global brand perceptions (b= .792, $p < .001$) while brand origin seemed not to drive new localness perceptions, $p > .10$. Furthermore, with respect to the fit idea, we find that it does not hold. Specifically, the interaction between brand origin and brand perceptions impacted neither the globalness nor the iconness perceptions, $p > .10$. To summarize, we found that if marketers would like to re-position a brand along perceived globalness, they should see if it originally has a global origin or holds existing global perceptions. However, if they would like to position it along local iconness, they should only do so if it is perceived as a local origin brand in the market. A brand with a global origin cannot achieve local iconness according to these experimental results, not to mention it would lose returns especially among ethnocentric consumers as suggested by our survey results.

## DISCUSSION

This study revisits previous research on global branding (e.g., Steenkamp et al., 2003) and investigates the benefits of disentangling the well-established effects of perceived brand globalness versus local iconness perceptions for brands with global or local origin. The results of the survey conducted in the Netherlands indicate that the routes to purchase intentions are indeed asymmetric for global versus local origin brands. Specifically, perceived globalness helps boost purchase intentions of global origin brands while local iconness enhances purchase intentions for local origin brands. For both, however, the effects are only attainable if the quality perceptions are primarily established. This is an important finding since Steenkamp et al. (2003)

did not observe a positive relation between local iconness and perceived quality while Özsomer (2012) found a positive relation only in the culturally grounded food categories. The importance of quality perceptions for local iconness is in line with Winit et al.'s (2014) finding for Thai Airlines. Meanwhile, there is room to find ways to persuade highly ethnocentric consumers. The findings show that neither perceived brand globalness nor local iconness can reverse this type of consumers' aversion to global brands. Hence, what global brand managers should do with regard to ethnocentric customers depends on how large the ethnocentric consumer segment is in the market of interest. How does the anti-globalization sentiments reflected in and fueled by Br(exit), the Trump administration's anti-globalization moves and similar sentiments affect the number of ethnocentric consumers? If these segments reach a size difficult to ignore for global origin brands, they may have to acquire local icon brands to complement their brand portfolios.

Building on these findings, we also examine in an experiment what happens if a re-positioning strategy is intended. We suggest that for globalness, what marketers need is either prior globalness perceptions or a global origin while for local iconness, what matters is that the brand is perceived as local in the given market, especially when ethnocentric consumers are targeted. This seems in line with anecdotal evidence as well as prior empirical findings. For example, Cola Turka, a local, soft drink brand, was launched in 2003 by Ülker, a large food and beverage manufacturer in Turkey. With Coca-Cola the market leader, followed by Pepsi, Cola Turka needed a unique differentiation point whilst facing the global brands. The ad agency curated a launch campaign that played on the Turkish pride and featured Chevy Chase. Later on, the company has always built its localness perceptions in line with its local origin (Britt, 2003). Ülker in the recent decade turned out to be an emerging giant and even acquiring global brands like Godiva chocolates. Yet for such brands, it followed a light-touch acquisition strategy and has continued to build on their globalness perceptions, given the global brand origins as well as their already established global brand schema (Chattopadhyay et al., 2012). Overall, the two studies support such practical examples and provide practitioners evidence on how actual brand origin plays a role in addition to prior global/local perceptions when making new positioning decisions.

Torelli and colleagues' findings (2012) in the context of global brands inform our findings. Torelli et al. (2012) find that associations that contradict the existing brand concepts may make consumers experience a sense of confusion, which in turn leads to negative brand associations.

They find that brand concepts that fit (vs. misfit) with each other are as a result more (less) positively perceived by consumers when a certain brand concept already exists. In our context, perceived brand globalness and local iconness are brand concepts. When local iconness is added to a global origin brand, consumers may experience a sense of unease or disfluency dampening brand evaluations and purchase intentions.

Extending the findings of earlier work mostly emphasizing the perceptions and related positioning efforts of brands (e.g., Steenkamp 2019), our conceptualization and empirical approach shows that origin and the related impressions towards the brands are important for consumers. These findings address gaps in global branding literature (Liu et al., 2021) in two folds. First, we theoretically clarify inconsistencies of perceived globalness and local iconness definitions. Second, we include experimental data using fictitious brands, which is empirically not much preferred by prior work, mostly employing surveys and real brands. These insights are essential for marketing practitioners in that both global and local brand managers need to re-position their brands if the origin changes with growth or acquisition and in contexts with heterogeneous consumer ethnocentrism. The different routes to purchase intentions for global and local origin brands revealed in this study tilt the balance towards staying true to the "nature" of global vs. local brands both in terms of origin as well as perceptions. While new positions can be nurtured, there seems to be path dependence in terms of where the brands start. A brand's globalization trajectory is usually part of its growth story while its genetics stay the same (Sharp, 2010). Both managers and researchers could benefit from matching conceptual and empirical choices with the delicate processes that consumers' hearts and minds go through and thereby keeping global - local brand origin and ethnocentrism as important variables in their models. The key takeaways align well with recent work on omni-brand orientation (Schmidt-Devlin et al. 2022) and are underlined further since the meta-analysis that shows consumer ethnocentrism is at varying degrees is dependent on cultural factors, yet overall universal (Balabanis & Siamagka, 2022).

## LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

We hope our research stimulates future studies where the multi-faceted interplay between brand origin and perceptions are investigated in the context of rising anti-globalization trends particularly in post-industrialized markets and the growth of ethnocentric consumer segments. It

would be interesting to examine if brands that behave in ways that are congruent (incongruent) to their origin (i.e., local origin brands building on their local iconness and global origin brands building on PBG), translate into willingness to pay. While for local brands, this may translate into favorable brand evaluations (attitude, preference, consideration), global brands may still warrant higher margins in the marketplace. Winit et al. (2014) find heterogeneous effects across categories on purchase intentions in Thailand. This is an interesting area worthy of exploring further.

Future research could also use longitudinal or time-series data to track how the brand origin and global/local perception interaction evolves with actual changes in brand positioning (not hypothetical as we tested in the experiment). Given the initial support we find for path dependence and staying true to the genetics of the brand (Sharp, 2010) such longitudinal analyses could answer questions such as: How long does a brand need to shed its brand origin effect in a specific market (think of the Coca Cola example in Turkey provided earlier before).

Since consumers in emerging and high-income markets are expected to react differently to global origin and global brand perceptions (e.g., Burgess & Steenkamp, 2006; Batra et al., 2000; Özsomer, 2012), a multi-country study could be employed to investigate how results differ in these contexts (e.g., Eng et al.,2016). We hope our study contributes to the insightful and interesting research stream on global and local branding as their paths cross in many markets, contexts, and hearts.

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**APPENDIX A. COMPARING THE CURRENT RESEARCH WITH HIGHLY RELEVANT PAPERS ON GLOBAL BRANDING**

| Article | Key Constructs | Definitions | Operationalization / Methodological outcome | Substantive outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Steenkamp et al., (2003) | Perceived globalness-localness | the perceived multimarket reach of a brand and is based upon consumer perceptions. | Survey based, using subjective consumer-level data e.g., brands selected from focus groups, where two brands in each category represent the global and local ends of the perceived globalness continuum. | Perceived globalness is positively related to quality and prestige and through them to purchase likelihood (PL) while local iconness has only a direct impact on PL. Brands can be simultaneously global and local. |
| Özsomer (2012) | Actual global-local origin and perceived globalness-localness | widespread regional/ global awareness, availability, acceptance, and demand | Survey based, using objective measures e.g., ACNielsen rankings help identify best-known global (local) brands and focus groups are used to check local brands have high local iconness and global counterparts high perceived globalness | Perceived brand globalness is positively related to local iconness in an emerging market, but the relationship is negative in advanced markets. Local brand's globalness and global brand's local iconness has differential effects. |
| Holt et al., (2004) | Actual global-local origin | wide availability and recognition as the key features of global brands | Survey based, using brands selected by objective measures i.e., from Interbrand Global Scorecard | Consumers choose global brands due to quality signal, global myth, and social responsibility. |
| Winit et al. (2014) | Brand ownership (local versus foreign owned) versus perceived globalness | brand globalness is a continuum, based on the relative geographical scope of the brand while brand ownership is what underlies the global / local distinction i.e., perceived origin of the brand. | Experiment based, using manipulations that include brand information on geographical availability and promotions for brand globalness and information on headquarters location, nationality of majority of shareholders, and nationality of board / executives for brand ownership. | Consumers who perceive a brand as being global (non-global) associate the brand with higher (lower) quality and intended to purchase it more (less), regardless the perceived ownership of the brand (consistent with Steenkamp et al. 2003). Brands can be simultaneously global and local. |
| **The current research** | Actual global-local origin and perceived globalness - local iconness | wide availability and recognition. | Survey and experiment based, using objective measures: ACNielsen rankings and Euromonitor market share for actual brand origin and manipulating promotions for perceived brand globalness / local iconness. | Actual brand origin matters: The fit between the perceived globalness (local iconness) and global/local origin are associated with higher purchase intentions. |

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## APPENDIX B. MEASURES

| Constructs | Items |
|---|---|
| Perceived Brand Globalness (AVE = .71, Steenkamp et al., 2003) | Answer the questions below considering brand X in the Y category<br>1. To me, this is a global brand - To me, this is a local brand<br>2. I DON'T think consumers overseas buy this brand - I DO think consumers overseas buy this brand<br>3. This brand is sold only in the Netherlands - This brand is sold all over the world |
| Local Iconness (AVE = .80, Steenkamp et al., 2003) | 1. I associate this brand with things that are Dutch - I DO NOT associate this brand with things that are Dutch<br>2. To me, this brand represents what the Netherlands are all about - To me, this brand does NOT represent what the Netherlands are all about<br>3. To me, this brand is a very good symbol of the Netherlands - To me, this brand is not a very good symbol of the Netherlands |
| Perceived Brand Quality (AVE = .56, Keller & Aaker, 1992) | 1. This brand is very low on overall quality - This brand is very high on overall quality.<br>2. This is a brand of inferior quality - This is a brand of superior quality. |
| Perceived Brand Prestige (Han & Terpstra, 1988) | • This is a prestigious brand - This is not a prestigious brand |
| Brand Purchase Likelihood (AVE = .87, Dodds et al., 1991) | 1. I would not buy it - I would certainly buy it<br>2. I am not at all likely to buy it - I am very likely to buy it. |
| Brand Familiarity (AVE = .62, Steenkamp et al., 2003) | 1. This brand is very familiar to me -This brand is unfamiliar to me<br>2. Everybody here has heard of this brand - Almost nobody here has heard of this brand<br>3. I am not all knowledgeable about this brand-I am very knowledgeable about this brand |
| Consumer Ethnocentrism (AVE = .64, Shimp & Sharma, 1987) | Please indicate your own personal preference or feeling about each item by drawing a circle around the number that is closest to your personal feeling. There is no right or wrong answer.<br>1. Purchasing foreign-made products is un-Dutch.<br>2. It is not right to purchase foreign products.<br>3. A real Dutch person should always buy products made in the Netherlands.<br>4. Dutch should not buy foreign products, because this hurts Dutch business and causes unemployment. |
| Country-of-origin (AVE = .65, Jaffe & Nebenzahl, 1984) | Products/brands made in the Netherlands are:<br>1. Overall quality: Poor - Excellent<br>2. Design and style: Poor - Excellent<br>3. Level of technology: Poor – Excellent<br>4. Value for money: Poor - Excellent |

*Note:* Brand-related and country-of-origin items were scored on seven-point bipolar scales with the end poles given above. Consumer Ethnocentrism items were scored on seven-point scales with 1=strongly disagree and 7=strongly agree as anchors.

# APPENDIX C. EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS OF LOCAL VERSUS GLOBAL PERCEPTIONS

| *Condition: Local Perceptions* | *Condition: Global Perceptions* |
| --- | --- |

SyPHer represents what the Netherlands is all about. For me, SyPHer is **<u>a symbol</u>** of the country we live in.

SyPHer represents what the world is all about. For me, SyPHer is **<u>a symbol</u>** of the world we live in.

# YAZARLARA DUYURU

## DERGİ HAKKINDA

İşletme Fakültesi Dergisi yılda iki kez yayımlanan hakemli bir dergidir. Dergide işletme, iktisat, siyaset bilimi, uluslararası ilişkiler ile turizm işletmeciliği alanlarında, farklı metodolojik ve kuramsal bakış açıları sunan bilimsel nitelikte özgün çalışmalar yayımlanmaktadır. Derginin yayın dili Türkçe ve İngilizcedir. Dergiye gönderilen çalışmaların başka bir yerde yayımlanmamış veya yayımlanmak üzere değerlendirmeye alınmamış olması zorunludur.

## DEĞERLENDİRME SÜRECİ

Dergiye gönderilen çalışmaların öncelikle Dergi Editörlüğü tarafından yayın ilkelerine uygunluğu değerlendirilir. Bu aşamada ayrıca dergiye gönderilen bütün çalışmalar bir intihal tespit programında orijinalite yönünden kontrol edilir. Bu aşamaya ilişkin değerlendirme sonuçları yazarlara çalışmanın dergi editörlüğünün eline geçmesini izleyen 15 gün içerisinde bildirilir. Hakem incelemesine değer bulunan çalışma ilgili alanda uzmanlaşmış en az iki hakeme gönderilir. Bu süreçte hakem ve yazar kimlikleri gizli tutulur. Dergi editörlüğü hakemlerden gelen bilgiler doğrultusunda son değerlendirmeyi yapar ve hakem raporlarını yazarlara en geç 15 gün içerisinde gönderir. Son değerlendirme aşamasında düzeltme isteminde bulunan çalışmalar için değerlendirme süreci yeniden başlar. Çalışmaların yayımlanması, hakem değerlendirme sonuçları ve dergi editörlüğünün görüşleri doğrultusunda gerçekleşir. Değerlendirme süreci için hedeflenen toplam süre 75 gündür.

## YAZIM KURALLARI

Aşağıda yer alan biçimsel özellikleri taşımayan çalışmalar, değerlendirme sürecine alınmaz. Derginin son sayısının referans amaçlı incelenmesi önerilmektedir.

### Genel Sayfa Düzeni

Dergiye gönderilecek çalışmanın tüm metninde, 1,15 satır aralığı, Arial 11 punto fontu (A4 kağıdına) kullanılmalı, 4 cm üstten, 3 cm alttan, 3 cm sağdan, 3 cm soldan boşluk bırakılmalı; kapak sayfası, şekiller, tablolar, kaynakça, notlar, ekler ve özet kısımları dahil olmak üzere metin toplam 25 sayfayı geçmemelidir. Sayfa sınırını aşan çalışmalar değerlendirmeye alınmayacaktır. Çalışmada üst ve alt-bilgi için 1,5 cm mesafe bırakılmalı ve Arial 9 punto fontu kullanılmalıdır.

### Kapak Sayfası

Yazar/yazarların adı, soyadı, kurumu, ORCID bilgisi, adresi, telefon numarası ve e-posta bilgileri kapak sayfasında yer almalıdır. Yazar/yazarlar, kapak sayfası dışında, ana metin içerisinde herhangi bir yere yazar kimliğini ortaya çıkarabilecek ifadeler yazmamalıdır.

**Öz (Abstract) Sayfası**

Kapak sayfasını Öz sayfası izlemelidir. Bu sayfada çalışmanın başlığı ve özeti, çalışmanın yazıldığı dil önce olmak üzere hem Türkçe hem de İngilizce olarak yer almalıdır. Öz çalışmanın amaç, kapsam, yöntem ile sonuç ve bulguların açık bir özeti olmalı ve 150-250 sözcüğü geçmemelidir (tek satır aralıklı). Her bir Öz'ün altına çalışmanın içeriğine uygun 5 adet anahtar kelimeler her iki dilde eklenmelidir. Çalışma konusuna uygun Jel Kodları eklenmelidir. Link için tıklayınız: https://www.aeaweb.org/econlit/jelCodes.php

**Ana Metin**

Çalışmanın ana metni Öz sayfasını izleyen sayfadan başlamalıdır. Öz sayfasından başlamak üzere sağ alt köşeye gelecek biçimde sayfa numarası konulmalıdır. Paragraf başlıkları 1 cm içeriden başlamalı, paragraflar arasında boşluk bırakılmamalıdır.

Ana başlıkların tamamı büyük harflerle satır ortasına koyu fontla yazılmalıdır. İkinci düzey başlıklar sözcüklerin ilk harfleri büyük, sola hizalı ve koyu fontla yazılmalıdır. Üçüncü düzey başlıklar 1 cm içeriden başlamalı, sözcüklerin ilk harfleri büyük olmalı ve koyu fontla yazılmamalıdır. Ana başlıklardan önce ve sonra 12 nk aralık bırakılmalıdır. İkinci düzey başlıklardan önce 12, sonra 6 nk aralık bırakılmalıdır. Üçüncü düzey başlıklardan önce ve sonra ise 6 nk aralık bırakılmalıdır.

**Tablo ve Şekiller**

Her tablo başlığı tablonun üstünde; her şekil başlığı şeklin altında sola yaslı yalnızca ilk harfleri büyük olacak şekilde, tablo/şekil numarası ve başlığı verilerek koyu fontla yazılmalıdır (Örneğin; Tablo 1: Örneklemin Özellikleri). Renklendirme için yalnızca siyah ve grinin tonları kullanılmalıdır. Tablo/şekil büyüklüğü 1 sayfayı ve yukarıda belirtilen sayfa ölçülerini aşmamalıdır. Tablo/şekil içerisinde 8-10 punto kullanılabilir. Yatay tablola eklenecek ise dergi yayın formatına uygun şekilde konulmalıdır.

Tablo/şekil altlarında yer alan açıklamalar için 8 punto, normal düz yazı karakteri kullanılmalıdır. Tablo/şekil altında yer alan dipnotlar küçük harflerle üst simge (a,b,c,d…) başlıkları kullanılarak verilmelidir. İstatistiksel anlamlılık düzeyleri (*) işaretinin üst simge kullanımıyla belirtilmelidir (p<0.05 için *, p<0.01 için ** ve p<0.001 için ***). Alıntılanan tablo/şekil için sayfa numarası da dahil metin-içi atıf verilmelidir. Metin içinde sunulan tablo, formül veya şekiller resim olmamalıdır.

**Atıf ve Kaynakça**

Dergide APA-5 kapsamında metin-içi atıf yöntemi kullanılmaktadır. Dipnot veya sonnot yöntemleri kullanılmamalıdır. Sadece metinde açıklayıcı bilgiye ihtiyaç duyulursa dipnot kullanılabilir. Bu şekilde kullanılan dipnotlar 9 punto ile yazılmalıdır.

Metin-içi atıf ve kaynakça gösterimi için tıklayınız: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1w5zEQEHNDCbHk8GtMLVy_f9ybMO7WfCl/view

Uygun formatı taşımayan çalışmalar değerlendirme sürecine alınmaz.

Doğrudan alıntılanma aşağıdaki biçimde sunulmalıdır. Maksimum 3 satır, italik, Arial 10 font, 1 cm sağ / sol girintili.

Ön değerlendirme aşamasında Dergi Yayın Kurulu tarafından düzeltme talep edilmesi durumunda yazarların 1 ay içerisinde ilgili düzeltmeleri yapması gerekmektedir. İlgili düzeltmeler yapılmadığı takdirde RET kararı verilir.

### Yasal/Özel İzin Belgeleri

Anket, mülakat, odak grup çalışması, gözlem, deney, görüşme teknikleri kullanılarak katılımcılardan veri toplanmasını gerektiren nitel ya da nicel yaklaşımlarla yürütülen her türlü araştırmalar için Etik Kurulu Kararının makaleyle beraber sisteme yüklenmesi gerekmektedir. Ayrıca makale içerisinde Etik Kurulu Kararı bilgisine yer verilmesi (iznin hangi kurumdan, hangi tarihte ve hangi karar veya sayı numarası ile alındığı açıkça sunulmalıdır) zorunludur. Son olarak olgu sunumlarında "Aydınlatılmış Onam Formu"nun alınması; başkalarına ait ölçek, anket, fotoğrafların kullanımı için sahiplerinden izin alınması ve yine makalede belirtilmesi gerekmektedir.

### İntihal Raporu

Dergiye ilk gönderim aşamasında makale ile birlikte intihal raporunun sisteme eklenmesi gerekmektedir.

Yayın hakları saklıdır. Dergide yayımlanan çalışmaların bütünü veya bir kısmı, yayımlayan kuruluşun ve yazar/yazarların yazılı izni alınmaksızın, elektronik, mekanik, fotokopi, kayıtlama veya benzeri bir araçla herhangi bir şekilde basılamaz, çoğaltılamaz, fotokopi veya teksir edilemez, özetlenemez ve yayımlanamaz.

İşletme Fakültesi Dergi Editörlüğü, yayın formatına uygun hazırlanmayan çalışmaları hakem değerlendirmesine göndermeksizin yayımlamama hakkını saklı tutar.

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