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MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ'NDEKİ SURİYELİ ÖĞRENCİLERİN PANDEMİ DÖNEMİNDE UYGULANAN HİBRİT EĞİTİMDE YAŞADIKLARI SORUNLAR VE ÇÖZÜM ÖNERİLERİ[*]

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Öz

Suriyeli sığınmacılar[1] konusu on yılı aşkın bir süredir Türkiye'nin en önemli gündem maddeleri arasında yer almaktadır. Türkiye'deki resmi sayıları 3,6 milyonu aşan Suriyeli zorunlu göçmenlerin büyük bir bölümünün çocuk ve gençlerden oluşması, özellikle eğitim alanında entegrasyonu önemli kılmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Covid-19 salgını döneminde yaygınlaşan hibrit (harmanlanmış) eğitim uygulaması sürecinde Marmara Üniversitesi'nde öğrenim gören Suriyeli öğrencilerin yaşadıkları sorunları tespit etmek ve çözüm önerileri geliştirmektir. Bu doğrultuda, Marmara Üniversitesi'nin farklı

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[1] Türkiye Cumhuriyeti devleti Suriyelileri "geçici koruma" statüsünde kabul etmektedir. Bunun nedeni ise Türkiye'nin coğrafi çekinceyle imzaladığı 1951 Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Statüsüne İlişkin Sözleşme ve 1967 New York Protokolü uyarınca sadece Avrupa'dan gelen sığınmacılara "mülteci" statüsü vermesidir. Her ne kadar Türkiye Cumhuriyeti devleti tarafından "geçici koruma statüsü" verilmiş olsa da Suriyeliler, Türkiye, Ürdün, Lübnan başta olmak üzere pek çok ülkeye sığınan zorunlu göçmenlerdir. Dolayısıyla bu çalışmada Suriyelilerden, "sığınmacılar" veya "zorunlu göçmenler" olarak bahsedilmektedir.

bölümlerinde öğrenim gören Suriyeli öğrencilerle anket ve derinlemesine görüşmelerin yapıldığı nicel bir araştırma gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu çalışmada değerlendirilen anket verileri, 2022 yılı içinde İstanbul'da Marmara Üniversitesi'nin de dahil olduğu beş kamu üniversitesinde eş zamanlı olarak gerçekleştirilen anket uygulamasına dayanmaktadır. Bu eş zamanlı anketten alınan Marmara Üniversitesi'ne ait veriler, daha kapsamlı bir değerlendirme yapabilmek için, yine aynı üniversitenin çeşitli bölümlerinde öğrenim gören ve ankete katılmış olanlar arasından seçilen öğrencilerle yüz yüze yapılan derinlemesine görüşmelerle de desteklenmiştir. Araştırma sonucunda, pandemi döneminde Suriyeli üniversite öğrencilerinin eğitim alanında yaşadıkları entegrasyon sorunlarının uzaktan eğitimle birlikte derinleştiği ortaya çıkmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *göçmen entegrasyonu, pandemi, hibrit eğitim, Marmara Üniversitesi, Suriyeli öğrenciler.*

PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED BY SYRIAN STUDENTS AT MARMARA UNIVERSITY IN HYBRID EDUCATION DURING PANDEMIC PERIOD AND PROPOSALS FOR SOLUTIONS

Abstract

Syrian asylum-seekers have been an important issue on Turkey's agenda for more than a decade. The fact that most of the Syrian forced migrants – whose number surpassed 3,6 million in Turkey – are composed of children and youngsters, renders educational integration more important. The present study is based on a research carried out by quantitative method. The aim is to specify the problems faced by the Syrian students at Marmara University in the process of hybrid education during the Covid-19 pandemic and to propose solutions. To this end, survey and in-depth interviews were carried out with the Syrian students in different departments at Marmara University. The survey data assessed in this study for Marmara University is based on a survey carried out in 2022 simultaneously in five public universities in İstanbul. The survey data for the Marmara University is supported by face-to-face in-depth interviews with the selected Syrian students for a more comprehensive assessment. Research results reveal that the online education during the pandemic has deepened the educational integration problems encountered by the Syrian university students.

Keywords: *migrant integration, pandemic, hybrid education, Marmara University, Syrian students.*

Giriş

2011 yılından beri devam eden Suriyelilerin zorunlu göçü Türk kamuoyunda pek çok yönüyle tartışılan meselelerden biridir. Yıllar içinde zorunlu göçle gelen Suriyeli sayısının giderek artması sonucunda Türkiye bugün resmi olarak 3,6 milyonu aşkın kişiye ev sahipliği yapar konuma gelmiştir (Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı – GİB[2], 2022). Suriye'de savaşın tam anlamıyla bitmesine ilişkin belirsizliğin sürmesi ve Türkiye'de kalış süresinin uzamasıyla birlikte Suriyeli zorunlu göçmenlerin ülkelerine geri dönüş eğilimleri de gittikçe azalmaktadır. Bu gerçek, Suriyelilerin entegrasyonunu daha da öne çıkarmaktadır.

Entegrasyonun her alanı önemli olmakla birlikte eğitim ayrı bir önem taşımaktadır, zira Türkiye'deki Suriyeli nüfusun büyük bir bölümü 18 yaş altı ile 19-24 yaş grubundaki bireylerden oluşmaktadır (GİB, 2022). Bu grubun içinde de yaklaşık yarım milyon Suriyeli 19-24 yaş grubundadır. Bu sayı potansiyel üniversite öğrencisi sayısını göstermesi açısından önem taşımaktadır. Ayrıca Yükseköğretim Kurulu'nun verilerinden de görüldüğü gibi, 2013-2014 eğitim-öğretim yılından itibaren üniversitelerdeki yabancı uyruklu öğrenciler arasında Suriyelilerin sayısı her geçen yıl artmıştır (Yükseköğretim Kurumu – YÖK[3], 2022). Bu gerçek de Suriyeli gençlerin eğitim alanındaki entegrasyonunun önemini gözler önüne sermektedir.

Göçmen entegrasyonu göçün halihazırda kolay olmayan bir parçasıyken salgın, doğal afet vb. olumsuz gelişmeler onu iyice zorlaştırmaktadır. Covid-19 küresel salgını bu duruma verilecek bir örnektir. Bu salgın göçmenlerin entegrasyonunu hemen her alanda olumsuz etkilemiştir. Yüksek öğrenimi de kapsayan eğitim de bu alanlardan biridir. Bu bağlamda salgının Türkiye'de yaşayan Suriyeli üniversite öğrencileri üzerindeki etkileri, onların eğitim alanındaki entegrasyonları ve yüksek öğrenim deneyimleri açısından araştırmayı gerektirmektedir.

Bu gerçekten hareketle, Suriyeli üniversite öğrencilerinin Covid-19 küresel salgını döneminde yaygınlaşan hibrit eğitim uygulamasında karşılaştıkları sorunları tespit etmek ve bu sorunlara çözümler geliştirmek amacıyla İstanbul'da 200 ve üzeri Suriyeli öğrencinin kayıtlı olduğu beş kamu üniversitesinde eş zamanlı olarak bir anket uygulanmıştır. Bu üniversiteler, İstanbul Üniversitesi, İstanbul Üniversitesi-Cerrahpaşa, Marmara Üniversitesi, Sağlık Bilimleri Üniversitesi ve Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi'dir. Söz konusu anketten alınan Marmara Üniversitesi'ne ait veriler, yine bu üniversite genelindeki farklı bölümlerden seçilen Suriyeli öğrencilerle yüz yüze yapılan derinlemesine görüşmelerin sonuçlarıyla birlikte değerlendirilmiştir. Dolayısıyla Marmara Üniversitesi özelinde yapılan bu çalışma, anket ve onun

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[2] Buradan sonra referanslarda "GİB" olarak kullanılmıştır.
[3] Buradan sonra referanslarda "YÖK" olarak kullanılmıştır.

sonuçlarını destekleme amacıyla gerçekleştirilen derinlemesine görüşmelere dayanmaktadır.

Bu çalışmada, Suriyeli öğrencilerin eğitim alanında yaşadıkları entegrasyon sorunlarının uzaktan eğitimle birlikte derinleştiği ileri sürülmektedir. Suriyeli üniversite öğrencilerinin entegrasyonunun uzaktan eğitim uygulamasından nasıl etkilendiğini ve öğrencilerin hangi sorunlarla karşılaştıklarını Marmara Üniversitesi örneğinde inceleyen bu çalışma üç bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölüm göçmenlerin eğitim alanında entegrasyonu kapsamında Suriyeli üniversite öğrencileriyle ilgili literatüre yer vermektedir. İkinci bölümde çalışmanın yöntemine ilişkin bilgi verilmektedir. Üçüncü bölümde anket ve derinlemesine görüşmelerden elde edilen bulgular yer almaktadır. Son olarak araştırmadan elde edilen bu bulgular değerlendirilerek Marmara Üniversitesi'nde öğrenim gören Suriyeli öğrencilerin karşılaştıkları sorunlara çözüm önerileri sunulmaktadır.

Eğitim Alanında Göçmen Entegrasyonu ve Türkiye'deki Suriyeli Üniversite Öğrencileri Üzerine Çalışmalar

Göçün küresel düzeyde artmasıyla birlikte göçle ilgili pek çok kavram tartışılır hale gelmiştir. Bu kavramlardan bazıları, dinsel, kültürel, etnik, sosyal açıdan farklı olan grupların ortak bir şekilde "en az sorunla" nasıl beraber yaşayabilecekleri ve göçün yol açtığı bu toplumsal çeşitliliğin "toplumsal kazanca" dönüştürülebilmesiyle ilgili kavramlardır (Erdoğan, 2020).

Göç bir süreç olarak kabul edilirse entegrasyon, hiç kuşkusuz bu sürecin önemli bir parçasıdır ve farklı pek çok alana sahiptir Göç çalışmalarına katkı yapan sosyal bilimciler arasında entegrasyonun alanlarına ilişkin görüş farklılıkları olmakla birlikte bazılarının öne çıktığı görülmektedir. Bunlar, sosyo-ekonomik, sosyo-kültürel (kültürel) veya kültürel/dini, hukuki/siyasal alanlardır (Entzinger ve Biezeveld, 2003; Penninx, 2005). Göçmen entegrasyonu üzerine yapılan çalışmalarda entegrasyonun sağlanmasıyla ilgili çeşitli ölçülebilir şartlar ve göstergelere yer verilmektedir. Ölçülebilir şartlar istihdam piyasasına giriş, eğitim ve sağlığa erişim gibi şartlardır ve bu şartlar aslında entegrasyonun göstergeleri olarak kabul edilmektedir (Topçu ve Büyükbeşe, 2020). Entzinger ve Biezeveld (2003), sosyo-ekonomik alanda başarılı bir entegrasyon göstergesinin göçmenlerin iş piyasasına katılımları ve bunu harekete geçiren veya engelleyen eğitim ve dil becerileri gibi etkenlerle bağlantılı olduğunu vurgulamaktadırlar. Dolayısıyla hem yeni gelen hem de ikinci nesil göçmenlerin eğitim alanındaki kazanımlarını gözlemlemek büyük önem taşımaktadır (Entzinger ve Biezeveld, 2003). Ager ve Strang (2008) çalışmalarında, göçmen entegrasyonunun göstergeleri arasında a) işaretleyici ve araçlar olarak iş, barınma, eğitim ve sağlık; b) sosyal bağlantılar olarak sosyal köprüler, sosyal bağlar ve bağlantılar; c) kolaylaştırıcılar olarak dil ve kültür

bilgisi, güven ve istikrar ve d) temel göstergeler olarak da haklar ve vatandaşlığı saymaktadırlar. Entegrasyon göstergelerinin ortaya konulduğu bir başka çalışma ise Castles, Korac, Vasta ve Vertovec'e (2002) aittir. Bu çalışmada entegrasyonun yönleri örgün eğitim, mesleki eğitim (training) ve istihdama ilişkin entegrasyon, sosyal entegrasyon, sağlık, hukuki entegrasyon, siyasal entegrasyon ve toplam entegrasyondur. Her bir yön ayrı göstergelere sahiptir. Örneğin, akademik ve mesleki eğitim ile istihdama ilişkin entegrasyon göstergeleri arasında göçmenlerin mesleki eğitim ve yüksek akademik eğitime erişim ve eğitimleri tamamlama istatistikleri, yaptıkları iş başvurusu sayıları, çağrıldıkları iş mülakatı ve aldıkları iş teklifi sayısı, göçmenler arasındaki işsizlik oranları, istihdamın mesleki ve sektörel dağılımı ve göçmenlerin iktisadi göstergelerinin toplumun geri kalan kısmıyla karşılaştırılması yer almaktadır.

Temel ve zorunlu eğitimin yanı sıra yüksek öğrenimi de içeren eğitim, göçmen entegrasyonunda önemli bir yere sahiptir, zira sosyo-ekonomik alan başta olmak üzere pek çok entegrasyon alanını doğrudan etkilemektedir. Örneğin, eğitim ve mesleki eğitim düzeyi yüksek, birkaç dili konuşabilen, ülkeye katkıda bulunabilecek göçmenlerin bulundukları ülkelerin toplumlarınca kabul edilmeleri göreceli olarak kolaylaşmaktadır (Karasu ve Koçal, 2021). Entegrasyon toplumsal kaynaşmayı içerdiğinden ötürü eğitim, entegrasyonun sosyal, kültürel, siyasal, hukuki ve istihdamla ilgili boyutlarını doğrudan etkilemektedir (Yaralı Akkaya, Azimli Çilingir ve Tuğ Levent, 2018).

Bugün itibariyle barındırdığı 3,6 milyon üzerinde Suriyeli zorunlu göçmenin ülkelerine geri dönme eğilimlerinin giderek azalması sonucunda Türkiye, son yıllarda göçmen entegrasyonun en fazla tartışıldığı ülkelerden biri haline gelmiştir (Erdoğan, 2020). Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı'nın yayınladığı demografik verilere göre, Suriyelilerin çoğunluğu 18 yaş altı ile 19-24 yaş grubundaki bireylerden oluşmaktadır (GİB, 2022). Bu grup içerisinde 9 yaşından küçük çocukların toplam sayısı bir milyonu aşarken, potansiyel üniversite öğrencisi sayısını gösteren 19-24 yaş aralığındaki Suriyeliler ise yaklaşık 464 bindir (GİB, 2022). Ayrıca YÖK'ün verilerine göre, 2013-14 eğitim öğretim yılında 1,785 Suriyeli öğrenci varken bu sayı 2020-21 eğitim öğretim yılında 47,482'ye çıkmıştır (YÖK, 2022).

Suriyeli çocuk ve gençlerin Türkiye'deki toplam Suriyeli nüfus içindeki oranları incelendiğinde, en fazla sayıda yabancı uyruklu öğrencinin Suriyeli olması eğitim alanında entegrasyonlarını önemli kılmaktadır. Mülteci gençlerin entegrasyonu ve Kanada'daki Suriyeli mültecilerle ilgili çalışmalarıyla tanınan Wilkinson (2002), çatışma nedeniyle ülkelerini terk etmek mecburiyetinde olan çocuk ve ergenlerin eğitim alanındaki performanslarının entegrasyonun gerçekleşme ve yerleştikleri topluma uzun dönemli uyum sağlama düzeyini göstermesi bakımından eğitimin giderek daha fazla önem kazandığını vurgulamaktadır.

Türkiye'deki Suriyeli üniversite öğrencilerinin entegrasyonlarına ilişkin literatür incelendiğinde, bu konuda çok sayıda çalışmaya rastlanmaktadır. Bunlar nicel, nitel ve karma yöntemle yapılmış araştırmalar olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır.

Konuyla ilgili nicel çalışmalar arasında yer alan Altunbaş'ın (2020) araştırmasında, Suriyeli üniversite öğrencilerinin akademik ve idari personelle iletişim, ötekileştirilme, kültürel farklılıklar, dil sorunları, psikolojik ve sosyal yalnızlık gibi konularda memnuniyetsizlik yaşadıkları sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Sağır ve Aydın'ın (2020) çalışmasında, Suriyeli öğrencilerin uyum konusunda sorulan sorulara verdikleri cevaplardan kendilerini arada kalmış hissettikleri anlaşılmaktadır. Türkiye'deki eğitim seviyesi ile ilgili olarak ise kendi ülkelerininkinden daha iyi olduğu yönünde net bir görüşleri mevcuttur. Öğrencilerin önemli bir çoğunluğu eğitimleri bittikten sonra da Türkiye'de kalacaklarını ifade etmiştir. Suriyeli öğrencilerin yaşadıkları en büyük problem dil konusu ve bunun getirdiği iletişim problemleridir. Erdoğan, Erdoğan ve Yavcan (2017) tarafından hazırlanan "Elite Dialogue" başlıklı raporda, Suriyeli üniversite öğrencileri ve akademisyenlerden oluşan elit grupların Türkiye'de kalmaları için özel teşvik politikaları izlenmesi gerekliliği sonucuna varılmıştır. Diğer bir çalışma olan Erdoğan ve Erdoğan'nın (2018) tarihli çalışmasında, Suriyeli öğrencilerin savaş nedeniyle travma ve derin psikolojik sorunlar yaşadıkları, üniversiteye kayıt yaptıranların oranının düşük olduğu, sosyal açıdan yerel halkla bütünleşmedikleri ve geleceğe yönelik beklentilerinin belirsiz olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır.

Nitel çalışmalardan Hohberger'in (2018) araştırmasında, merkezi bir öğrenci alım sisteminin getirilmesi, Türkçe kurslarında akademik Türkçe'nin de okutulması, mevzuat ile ilgili bir kitapçığın hazırlanması ve işgücü piyasasındaki imkanlarla ilgili bilgi aktarılmasının gerekli olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. Cin ve Doğan'ın (2021) çalışmasında, öğrencilerin en çok önemsedikleri değerlerin, eğitim almak, ev sahibi ülkenin bir parçası olmak, başarmak ve daha özgür ve cinsiyet eşitliğine dayanan bir hayat sürmek olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Çopur ve Demirel'in (2017) çalışmasının bulguları arasında yaşanan ekonomik zorlukların eğitimde kesinti veya tamamen eğitimden vazgeçmeye sebep olduğu; eğitim sürecinde dil engelinin ciddi problem yarattığı; eğitimin devamında rehberlik hizmeti/oryantasyon alamamalarının sorunlara neden olduğu; ve topluma uyum problemlerinin sıkıntılara yol açtığı yer almaktadır. Sezgin ve Yolcu'nun (2016) çalışmasındaki bulgular şöyledir: öğrenciler okul zamanı çalışamamaktadır, okulda yarı-zamanlı çalışma imkanları bulunmamaktadır ve sadece erkek öğrenciler yaz mevsiminde çalışabilmektedir, öğrencilerin barınma biçimi onların sosyal uyumlarını etkilemektedir, öğrenciler dersleri anlama, derslerde not tutma, arkadaşlar ve yerel halk ile iletişimde sorunlar yaşamaktadır ve dil konusunda

ise asıl sorun okumaya ilişkindir. Gültekin vd.'nin (2019) çalışmasında şu bulgular öne çıkmaktadır: dil konusu Suriyeli öğrencilerin yaşadığı en büyük problem olup, iletişim konusunda da Suriyeli ve Türk öğrencilerin arkadaşlıklarının selamlaşma ve sosyal medyadan takiple sınırlı kalmaktadır. Suriyeli öğrencilerin akademik başarıları ile ilgili olarak karşılarına çıkan engeller arasında, ekonomik problemler, dil ve ayrımcı davranışlar öne çıkmaktadır. Ayrıca hizmetler, bilgiye erişim ve haklarını öğrenmek konusunda sorunlar yaşamaktadırlar. Türk öğrencilerin, Suriyeli öğrencilerle tanışmadan önce Suriyeliler hakkında doğru olmayan bilgilere medyadan ulaşmaları da olumsuz bir algının oluşmasına neden olmaktadır. Kaya'nın (2021) çalışmasında, düşük akademik performans, akran desteği gibi önemli sosyal bağların eksikliği ve ayrımcılığın Suriyeli öğrencilerde yalnızlık, değersizlik, öfke, geçmişe özlem ve düşük benlik saygısına neden olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. Attar ve Küçükşen (2019) tarafından yapılmış çalışmada, Türkler ve Suriyeli öğrencilerin birbirlerinden uzak durduğu, Türkçe problemini aşmaları durumunda komünikasyonun artacağı ve özellikle üniversiteye giriş koşullarıyla ilgili Türk toplumundaki önyargıların mevcut olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Akbaşlı ve Mavi'nin (2021) araştırmasının sonucunda kimlik ve vatandaşlık krizi, savaş ve göçten kaynaklanan psikolojik problemler ve Avrupa'ya göç etme isteği ön plana çıkmıştır. Şahin ve Çelik'in (2020) çalışmasında şu tespitler yapılmaktadır: öğrencilerin Türkçe ve Yabancı Dil Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi'nde (TÖMER) gördükleri 1 senelik Türkçe eğitimin akademik süreçler için yeterli değildir. Bunun yanı sıra oryantasyon eksikliği ve idari personelin sadece Türkçe biliyor olması sorun yaratmaktadır. Akademik kadronun Suriyeli öğrencilerle olan ilişkilerinde önyargılı olanlar kadar pozitif ilişki kuranlar da bulunmaktadır. Suriyeli öğrenciler, olumlu davranmayan Türk öğrenciler yerine diğer yabancı öğrencilerle sosyal ilişkileri tercih etmektedirler. Taşar'ın (2019) çalışmasında, ölçme ve değerlendirme aşamasında soruların anlaşılmadığı, cevaplar için yeterli zamanın verilmediği, çevrimiçi eğitimin zor olduğu ve hazırlanacak ödevler için bilgisayar temininde sorun yaşandığı tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca öğrenciler yurtlardaki çalışma ortamı ve burs bulma konusunda sıkıntı yaşamışlardır.

Karma yöntemin kullanıldığı araştırmalardan Yaralı Akkaya vd.'nin (2018) çalışmasında, Suriyeli öğrencilerin yarıdan fazlası TÖMER'de alınan Türkçe hazırlık eğitiminin içerik, kapsam ve süresini yeterli bulmadığı ve öğrencilerin yarıdan fazlasının sınavlarda test yapılmasını istedikleri tespit edilmiştir. Harunoğulları vd.'nin (2019) araştırmasının sonuçları şöyledir: Suriyeli öğrenciler en fazla dil ve maddi imkanlar açısından sıkıntı çekmektedir, çoğunluğu ailesiyle birlikte kalabalık ortamlarda yaşamaktadır, yarıdan fazlası burs/kredi alamamaktadır ve yine yarıdan fazlası eğitimlerini tamamlayınca ülkesine geri dönmek istemektedir. Ayrıca öğrenciler kültürel uyum ve çevreye uyum konularında problem yaşamamaktadırlar. Son olarak, Kaya ve Şahin'in

(2021) araştırmasında, bazı konularda uyum sağlanmış olmakla birlikte ekonomik sorunlar, lisan problemi, barınma ve yetersiz ev koşulları, ulaşım, dışlanma ve ayrımcılık, sosyalleşme sürecine düşük katılım, istihdam ile ilgili gelecek kaygısı, kültürel gettolaşma gibi konularda problemlerin sürdüğü tespit edilmiştir.

Suriyeli üniversite öğrencileriyle ilgili yukarıda adı geçen çalışmalardan farklı olarak bu çalışma ise doğrudan Marmara Üniversitesi örneğinden hareketle, Suriyeli öğrencilerin uzaktan eğitime ilişkin görüşlerini öğrenmeyi amaçlamakta ve onların Türk üniversitelerindeki eğitime uyumlarını kolaylaştırma ve başarı düzeylerini artırmaya yönelik önerilerde bulunmaktadır. Suriyeli öğrencilerin önemli bir kısmının Türkiye'de kalma olasılığı göz önüne alındığında, onların eğitim düzeylerinin yükseltilmesi ve meslek sahibi olmaları Türk toplumuyla uyum içinde yaşamaları açısından da önemlidir.

Yöntem

Bu çalışma, Covid-19 pandemisi döneminde yaygınlaşan hibrit eğitim uygulamasının Marmara Üniversitesi'nde öğrenim gören Suriyeli öğrencilerin entegrasyonları açısından ortaya çıkardığı sorunları saptamayı ve bu sorunlara yönelik çözüm önerileri geliştirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma, amacı açısından açıklayıcı, kullandığı yöntem açısından ise nicel bir araştırmaya dayanmaktadır. Nicel araştırma kapsamında gerçekleştirilen anketten elde edilen verileri desteklemek amacıyla yine ankete katılanlar arasından seçilen Suriyeli öğrencilerle yüz yüze derinlemesine görüşmeler yapılmıştır.

Araştırmanın evrenini Türkiye'deki üniversitelerde okuyan Suriye uyruklu öğrenciler oluştururken, örneklem Marmara Üniversitesi'nde öğrenim gören Suriyeli öğrencilerdir. Araştırmanın deseni, tarama (survey) modelidir. Yaşamın farklı alanlarında kişilerin belirli konulardaki tutum, inanç, görüş, davranış ve beklentilerini anketler kullanılarak tespit etmeyi amaçlayan tarama modeli, geniş bir evrenin birtakım özelliklerini tanımlamak için uygundur, zira, araştırmacılara esneklik sağlamaktadır ve katılımcıların görüş ve tutumları standart bir ölçek veya aynı sorular ile tespit edildiğinden daha nesnel sonuçlara ulaşmayı olanaklı kılmaktadır (Gürbüz ve Şahin, 2017).

Araştırmada, pandemide yaygınlaşan hibrit eğitim uygulamasının Suriyeli üniversite öğrencilerinin Türkiye'ye uyumunu nasıl etkilediğini, ne tür sorunlarla karşılaştıklarını ve bu sorunların çözümüne ilişkin beklentilerinin neler olduğunu tespit etmek ve detaylı bir biçimde kavramak için veri toplama araçları olarak anket ve derinlemesine görüşme kullanılmaktadır. Türkçe ve Arapça olmak üzere iki dilde hazırlanan ankette ölçeklendirme ifadeleri yer almaktadır ve ölçüm aracı olarak kişilerin tutum ve eğilimlerini ölçmekte

kullanılan Likert ölçeği seçilmiştir.[4] Likert ölçeği, her birinin karşısında "kesinlikle katılmıyorum"dan başlayıp "kesinlikle katılıyorum"a kadar uzanan derecelendirme seçeneklerinden oluşmaktadır. Bu araştırmada, en fazla tercih edilen beşli derecelendirme ölçeği kullanılmıştır. Araştırmada uygulanan anketin soruları "demografik bilgiler", "sosyo-ekonomik profil" ve "küresel salgın döneminde yüksek öğrenimde uzaktan eğitim" başlıkları altında toplanmıştır. Derinlemesine görüşme sorularının başlıkları ise "demografik bilgiler", "sosyo-ekonomik profil", "pandemi döneminde uzaktan eğitim", "gelecek planları"dır.

Araştırma kapsamında yukarıda belirtilen beş kamu üniversitesinde, Covid-19 salgını nedeniyle Türk üniversitelerinin tümünde uygulanan uzaktan eğitim sürecinin sonuna doğru, 27 Ocak ve -25 Şubat 2022 tarihleri arasında eş zamanlı olarak anket yapılmıştır. Bu üniversiteler arasında Marmara Üniversitesi'nin yer almasının nedenlerinin başında beş dilde eğitim vermesi ve bütün dünyadan öğrenci çeken uluslararası bir üniversite niteliğine sahip olma özelliği gelmektedir. Lime-survey programı üzerinden uygulanan bu ankete Marmara Üniversitesi'nde 2021-2022 döneminde kayıtlı 251 Suriyeli öğrenciden 77'si (% 30,67) katılmıştır. Anket bulgularını daha somut ve kapsamlı şekilde değerlendirebilmek amacıyla farklı bölümlerde okuyan ve daha önce ankete katılmış olanlar arasından rastgele seçilmiş 6 Suriyeli öğrenci ile de Mayıs 2022'de yüz yüze derinlemesine görüşmeler yapılmıştır. Bu görüşmelerin az sayıda olması ise Suriyeli öğrencilerin yüz yüze görüşme yapmaktan çekinmeleriyle ilişkilidir. Gizlilik ilkesi gereği, araştırma kapsamında görüşme yapılan Suriyeli öğrenciler S1, S2, … S6 şeklinde belirtilmiştir.

Araştırma Bulguları: Anket ve Derinlemesine Görüşmelerin Değerlendirilmesi

Konusunu Covid-19 pandemisiyle beraber yaygınlaşan hibrit eğitim uygulamasının Marmara Üniversitesi'nde öğrenim gören Suriyeli öğrencilerin entegrasyonları üzerindeki etkisinin oluşturduğu çalışmanın verileri, yukarıda ayrıntıları verilen 77 Suriyeli öğrencinin katıldığı anketten ve bu ankete katılmış olanlar arasından rastgele seçilmiş 6 Suriyeli öğrenciyle yapılan derinlemesine görüşmelerden elde edilmiştir. Bu bölümde söz konusu anketin ve derinlemesine görüşmelerin değerlendirilmesi yapılmaktadır.

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[4] Likert ölçeği, "… ölçülmeye çalışılan özelliğe ilişkin birbirine benzeyen, ancak aralarında çeşitli farklılıklar içeren yargılar"dan oluşmaktadır (İslamoğlu ve Alnıaçık, 2016: 175).

I. Demografik Bilgiler

Cinsiyet

CİNSİYET	TOPLAM SAYI	YÜZDELİK
ERKEK	55	% 71,43
KADIN	22	% 28,57

2022 yılında Marmara Üniversitesi'nde yükseköğrenim gören toplam 251 Suriyeli öğrenciden 77'si ankete katılmış olup, bunların 55'i (% 71,43) erkek ve 22'si (% 28,57) kadındır. Buna göre ankete katılanların yaklaşık dörtte üçünün erkek öğrencilerden oluştuğu görülmektedir. Marmara Üniversitesi'ndeki Suriyeli kadın ve erkek öğrenciler arasındaki sayısal farklılık, YÖK verileriyle de örtüşmektedir. YÖK'ün 2020-2021 verilerine göre Suriyeli erkek öğrenci sayısı 29,400, kadın öğrenci sayısı ise 18,082'dir (YÖK, 2022). Yine YÖK'ün verilerine göre Türk üniversitelerinde 2021-22 akademik yılında toplam kayıtlı 8,296,959 öğrencinin 4,172,147'si erkek, 4,124,812'si ise kadındır (YÖK, 2022).

Yaş

YAŞ	TOPLAM SAYI	YÜZDELİK
19-21	21	% 27,27
22-24	18	% 23,38
25-27	10	% 12,99
28-30	28	% 36,36

Dört yaş grubu için hazırlanan ankete 19-21 yaş grubundan 21 (% 27,27), 22-24 yaş grubundan 18 (% 23,38), 25-27 yaş grubundan 10 (% 12,99), ve 28-30 yaş grubundan 28 (% 36,36) Suriyeli öğrenci katılmıştır.

Sınıf

SINIF	TOPLAM SAYI	YÜZDELİK
1. Sınıf	10	% 12,99
2. Sınıf	12	% 15,58
3. Sınıf	10	% 12,99
4. Sınıf ve Üstü	9	% 11,69
Lisansüstü	36	% 46,75

Ankete katılanların 10'u (% 12,99) 1. Sınıf, 12'si (% 15,58) 2.sınıf, 10'u (% 12,99) 3.sınıf, 9'u (% 11.69) 4.sınıf ve üstünde okuyan (Tıp ve benzeri fakültelerde) Suriyeli öğrencilerden oluşmaktadır. Dikkat çeken bir durum ise ankete katılanlardan 36 öğrencinin (% 46,75) lisansüstü programlarda öğrenim görmekte olmalarıdır.

Türkiye'ye Gelinen Yıl

TÜRKİYE'YE GELİNEN YIL	TOPLAM SAYI	YÜZDELİK
2011-2013	15	% 19,48
2014-2016	34	% 44,16
2017-2019	25	% 32,47
2020 ve sonrası	3	% 3,90

Ankete katılan öğrencilerden 15'inin (% 19,48) Suriye'de iç savaşın başladığı 2011 - 2013 yılları arasında Türkiye'ye gelen ilk göçmen grubunda yer aldığı görülmektedir. Öğrencilerden 34'ü (% 44,16) ise 2014-2016 döneminde Türkiye'ye göç etmiştir. Bunun temel nedeni Türk Hükümetinin uyguladığı "açık kapı" politikası sonucu Suriye'den Türkiye'ye göçün giderek hızlanmasıdır (Pirinçci, 2018). Buna paralel olarak, aynı dönemde Türkiye üzerinden Avrupa'ya doğru yönelen düzensiz göçmen sayısında da artış olmuştur. Avrupa Birliği (AB) sınır koruma ajansı Frontex verilerinin gösterdiği üzere, 2015 yılında AB ülkelerine giden yaklaşık 1,5 milyon mültecinin 1 milyona yakını, Türkiye'nin üzerinde bulunduğu Doğu Akdeniz rotasını kullanmıştır (Arısan Eralp, 2016).

Yaşanılan Şehir

YAŞANILAN ŞEHİR	TOPLAM SAYI	YÜZDELİK
İstanbul	66	% 85,71
İstanbul Dışı	11	% 14,29

Ankete katılanların 66'sının (% 85,71) İstanbul'da, geriye kalan 11'inin ise (% 14,29) İstanbul dışında yaşadığı görülmektedir. Bu öğrencilerin sosyal, ekonomik ve kültürel faktörler dolayısıyla İstanbul'u tercih etmiş olmaları kuvvetle muhtemeldir. Geriye kalan % 14,29'luk kesimin ise İstanbul dışında yaşamakla birlikte 2020 sonrası pandemi döneminde uygulanan hibrit eğitim sayesinde Marmara Üniversitesi'nde yüksek öğrenimlerini sürdürebildiği görülmektedir.

Yabancı Dil

YABANCI DİLLER	TOPLAM SAYI	YÜZDELİK
İNGİLİZCE	52	% 67,53
DİĞER	12	% 15,58
HİÇ	13	% 16,88

Ankete katılanların büyük çoğunluğunu oluşturan 52 öğrenci (% 67,53) Türkçe dışında bildikleri yabancı dilin İngilizce olduğunu belirtmiştir. Bilinen yabancı diller arasında İngilizcenin yanı sıra Fransızca da sorulmuştur, zira Suriye 1946'ya kadar Fransız sömürgesi olduğu için Fransızcanın da popüler bir dil olabileceği düşünülmüştür. Ancak Marmara Üniversitesi özelinde Fransızca bilen öğrenci sayısı 0'dır. Öte yandan, katılımcıların 12'si (% 15,58) diğer yabancı dilleri bildiklerini ifade ederken, geriye kalan 13 öğrencinin ise (% 16,88) hiçbir yabancı dil bilmediği anlaşılmaktadır.

II. Sosyo-Ekonomik Profil

Yaşanılan Mekân

YAŞANILAN MEKÂN	TOPLAM SAYI	YÜZDELİK
TEK	10	% 12,99
AİLE	51	% 66,23
AKRABA	2	% 2,60
ARKADAŞ	12	% 15,58
ÖZEL YURT	2	% 2,60

Ankete katılanların yaklaşık üçte ikisinin (% 66,23) aileleriyle birlikte yaşadığı görülmektedir. Geriye kalanlardan 10'u (% 12,99) tek başına, 12'si (% 15,58) arkadaşlarıyla birlikte, 2'si (% 2,60) akraba yanında, 2'si ise (% 2,60) özel yurtta kalmaktadır.

Hanedeki Kişi Sayısı

HANEDEKİ KİŞİ SAYISI	TOPLAM SAYI	YÜZDELİK
1-3	38	% 49,35
4-5	30	% 38,96
6-7	7	% 9,09
8 ve üzeri	2	% 2,60

Ankete katılanların yaklaşık yarısının (% 49,35) 1-3 kişilik, yarısından fazlasının ise (% 50,65) 4 ve daha fazla kişinin yaşadığı hanelerde ikamet ettiği görülmektedir. Bu veriler ışığında Suriyelilerin genel olarak İstanbul'un bazı semtlerinde yoğunlaştığı ve elverişsiz koşullarda yaşadıkları dikkate alınacak olursa, ankete katılan öğrencilerin de ikamet ettikleri hanelerde -özellikle pandemi döneminde - zor koşullarda hem ders çalışmak hem de çevrim içi dersleri takip etmek durumunda kaldıkları görülmektedir.

Çalışma Durumu

ÇALIŞIYOR MUSUNUZ?	TOPLAM SAYI	YÜZDELİK
ÇALIŞIYOR	22	% 28,57
ÇALIŞMIYOR	28	% 36,36
İŞ ARIYOR	11	% 14,29
YARI ZAMANLI	16	% 20,78

Ankete katılan Suriyeli öğrencilerin yarıya yakınının (% 49,35) eğitimlerinin yanı sıra tam zamanlı veya yarı zamanlı çalıştığı anlaşılmaktadır. Ayrıca 11 öğrencinin de (% 14,29) iş aradığı görülmektedir. Ankete katılanların yaklaşık üçte biri ise (% 36,36) çalışmadığını beyan etmiştir.

Burs/Kredi

BURS/KREDİ ALIYOR MUSUNUZ?

%1,30 %6,49

%19,48

%72,73

■ BAŞVURDUM ■ BAŞVURMADIM ■ EVET ■ HAYIR

BURS/KREDİ ALIYOR MUSUNUZ?	TOPLAM SAYI	YÜZDELİK
BAŞVURDUM	1	% 1,30
BAŞVURMADIM	5	% 6,49
EVET	15	% 19,48
HAYIR	56	% 72,73

Ankete katılan öğrencilerin 56'sı (% 72,73) burs / kredi almadığını beyan etmiştir. Buna karşılık 15'i ise (% 19,48) burs / kredi aldığını belirtmiştir. Geriye kalanlardan 5'inin herhangi bir kredi / burs için başvurmadığı, sadece 1'nin ise burs / kredi başvurusunda bulunduğu görülmektedir.

III. Küresel Salgın Döneminde Yükseköğrenimde Uzaktan Eğitim

Çalışmanın bu kısmında, Marmara Üniversitesi'nde öğrenim gören Suriyelilerin Covid-19 pandemisinde yükseköğrenimde uzaktan eğitime ilişkin görüşlerine yer verilmektedir. Bu kapsamda Suriyeli öğrencilerin Likert ölçeğine göre oluşturulmuş ifadelere katılım dereceleri ile derinlemesine görüşmelerde dile getirdikleri hususlar birlikte değerlendirilmektedir.

İfade 1. Uzaktan Eğitim için gereken teknolojik ve internet olanaklarına sahibim.

	1	2	3	4	5	EN YÜKSEK CEVAP
İfade 1 (%)	55,84	29,87	7,79	2,60	3,90	KESİNLİKLE KATILIYORUM

Bu ifade için katılımcıların çok büyük bir bölümü (% 85,71) "kesinlikle katılıyorum / katılıyorum" diyerek uzaktan eğitim için gerekli teknolojik ve internet olanaklarına sahip olduklarını bildirmiştir. Katılımcıların dörtte üçünden fazlasının bilgisayar / internet olanaklarına sahip olmaları nedeniyle özellikle pandemi dönemindeki zorunlu hibrit eğitim uygulamasına kolay adapte oldukları söylenebilir.

Bu ifadeye katılım derecesinden hareketle Suriyeli öğrencilerin pandemi döneminde genel olarak çevrim içi eğitime adaptasyonda zorlukla karşılaşmadıkları ileri sürülebilir. Bu adaptasyonda her ne kadar sıkıntı çekilmemiş ise de derinlemesine görüşme yapılan Suriyeli öğrenciler ikamet ettikleri İstanbul semtlerinde teknolojik alt yapıdan kaynaklanan internet bağlantısındaki kopukluklar nedeniyle derslerin tamamını çevrim içi izleyemediklerini beyan etmişlerdir. Bu konuda öğrencilerden biri görüşlerini şu şekilde ifade etmiştir:

> "Online derslerde odaklanma problemi yaşadığım için bazı derslerden kaldım. UES'in (Uzaktan Eğitim Sistemi-Perculus) ses ve görüntü kalitesinin düşük olması beni etkiledi. Sınavlarda herhangi bir sorun yaşamadım." (S4)

İfade 2. Yaşadığım ortam uzaktan eğitim için uygun değildir.

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**EN YÜKSEK CEVAP**
İfade 2 (%)	**2,60**	**12,99**	**14,29**	**41,56**	**28,57**	**KATILMIYORUM**

Ankete katılanların büyük bir bölümü (% 70,13) yaşadıkları ortamın uzaktan eğitim için uygun olduğunu ifade etmiştir. Diğer yandan, derinlemesine görüşmelerde bir öğrenci şunları söylemiştir:

> "İnternet var ama altyapıda problem varmış Samatya'da. Bu yüzden (internet için) odadan odaya taşınıyorum. Gerçekten çok zor orada oturmak." (S3)

İfade 3. Uzaktan eğitim dil yetersizliğim nedeniyle dersleri anlama konusundaki problemimi artırdı.

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**EN YÜKSEK CEVAP**
İfade 3 (%)	**16,88**	**16,88**	**18,18**	**27,27**	**20,78**	**KATILMIYORUM**

Ankete katılan öğrencilerin yarısına yakını (% 48,05) bu ifadeye katılmamaktadır. Buna karşılık öğrencilerin % 33,76'sı bu görüşe katılırken, % 18,18'i ise çekimser kalmıştır.

Diğer yandan derinlemesine görüşmelerde konuyla ilgili olarak öğrencilerin bazılarının dersi kayıtlardan tekrar izleme imkanları olduğuna dair izlenim edinilse de, Türkçe ya da İngilizce dil bilgisi yeterli olmadığı için dersleri anlama ve özellikle not tutma konusunda sorun yaşadığını ifade edenler olmuştur. Öğrencilerden biri görüşlerini şu sözlerle dile getirmiştir:

"Öğretim elemanları ders boyunca çok hızlı konuştuğu için Türkçe not tutmak konusunda zorluk çekiyorum ve bundan dolayı Türkçe anlayabildiklerimi Arapça not tutmak zorunda kalıyorum ve bu nedenle çok fazla vakit harcıyorum" (S3).

İfade 4. Pandemi dönemiyle birlikte çevrim içi Türkçe dil kursuna duyduğum ihtiyaç arttı.

	1	2	3	4	5	EN YÜKSEK CEVAP
İfade 4 (%)	16,88	18,18	16,88	22,08	25,97	KESİNLİKLE KATILMIYORUM

Ankete katılan öğrencilerin yarısına yakını (% 48,05) bu ifade için "katılmıyorum / kesinlikle katılmıyorum" demiştir. Buna karşılık öğrencilerin % 34,36'sı "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" derken, % 16,88'i ise "kararsız" olduklarını bildirmiştir.

Derinlemesine görüşmelerde ise öğrencilerden biri pandemi döneminde hibrit eğitimde yaşadığı dil sıkıntılarını şu şekilde ifade etmiştir:

"Türkçem sadece konuşmak ve tanışmak için yeterli. Dersi anlamak akademik anlamda çok zor. Türk arkadaşlarım derslerde zorlanınca 'sen zorlanıyorsun ben nasıl zorlanmayayım' diyorum. Her dersi çeviriyorum, ezberliyorum sonra tekrar çeviriyorum. Akademik dil kursuna ihtiyaç duyuyorum." (S5)

Bir diğer Suriyeli öğrenci şunları söylemiştir:

"Evet. Biz TÖMER'de öğreniyoruz ama aslında yeterli değil. Çünkü sadece dil algılanıyor. Akademik Türkçe ve konuşma dili çok farklı." (S2)

İfade 5. Türkçe dışında bildiğim yabancı dil o dilde verilen dersi takip etmem için yeterlidir.

	1	2	3	4	5	EN YÜKSEK CEVAP
İfade 5 (%)	32,47	19,48	23,38	16,88	7,79	KESİNLİKLE KATILIYORUM

Ankete katılan öğrencilerin yarısından fazlası (% 51,95) bu ifade için "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" derken, öğrencilerin % 24,67'si "katılmıyorum / kesinlikle katılmıyorum" şeklinde görüş bildirmiştir. Dikkat çeken bir husus ise öğrencilerin % 23,38'inin bu ifade ile ilgili çekimser kalmalarıdır.

Derinlemesine görüşmelerde ise Suriyeli öğrencilerin bir bölümünün Türkiye'ye gelmeden önce temel İngilizce dil bilgisine sahip olduğu izlenimi elde edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla Türkçeyi de ilk kez Türkiye'ye geldikten sonra öğrenmeye başladıkları için İngilizce dil bilgilerinin daha iyi olduğu söylenebilir.

Bu konuda Suriyeli öğrencilerden birinin ifadesi şöyledir:

"(Suriye'de) ilkokuldan liseye kadar neredeyse tüm eğitimimi İngilizce ağırlıklı olarak aldım. Yani eğitimimin büyük çoğunluğu İngilizcedir." (S1)

İfade 6. Hocalar Suriyeli öğrencileri de gözeterek çevrim içi dersleri daha anlaşılır bir dille anlatıyorlar.

	1	2	3	4	5	EN YÜKSEK CEVAP
İfade 6 (%)	**14,29**	**24,68**	**18,18**	**19,48**	**23,38**	**KATILIYORUM**

Ankete katılan öğrencilerin % 38,97'si bu ifade için "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" derken, öğrencilerin % 42,86'sı ise "katılmıyorum / kesinlikle katılmıyorum" şeklinde görüş bildirmiştir. Katılımcıların % 18,18'nin ise çekimser kaldığı görülmektedir.

Derinlemesine görüşmelerde de Suriyeli öğrencilerin, öğretim elemanlarının çevrim içi dersleri daha anlaşılır biçimde anlatmalarını talep ettikleri görülmektedir. Suriyeli öğrencilerden biri bu konuda şunları söylemiştir:

"Hocalar çok hızlı konuşuyor. Derslerde konuşulan dil akademik dilden ziyade günlük dile yakın… Bazen yapılan espirileri ve günlük konuşmaları anlamıyorum. Ya daha sade bir dil tercih edilmeli ya da sadece akademik bir dille konuşulmalı." (S2)

Bir diğer Suriyeli öğrenci ise şu ifadeyi kullanmıştır:

"Hocalar hızlı konuşuyor rap gibi." (S3)

İngilizcesi ders izlemeye yeterli olduğu halde dersleri izlemekte sorun yaşayan bir Suriyeli öğrenci ise kendisini şöyle ifade etmiştir:

"Aslında ben burada uzaktan eğitimi yüz yüze eğitime tercih ederim. Çünkü uzaktan eğitim aldığınızda bunlar kaydediliyor ve üniversite

bünyesindeki herhangi biri (idareci, akademisyen, öğrenci) bunlara erişebiliyor ve dersin nasıl gittiğini görebiliyor… Fakat okula geldiğimizde bazı profesörlerimiz dersler İngilizce olmasına rağmen asla İngilizce konuşmuyordu. Slaytları dahi İngilizce idi fakat Türkçe konuşuyorlardı ve Türkçe açıklıyorlardı… İngilizce işlenmesi planlanmış bir dersin Türkçe ilerlemesi uluslararası öğrencilerin öğretimine yönelik bir dil bariyeri yaratıyor. Bu yaklaşım sınıf ortamında yabancılaştırılmış öğrencilerin varlığına da ciddi katkıda bulunuyor." (S1)

İfade 7. Pandemi döneminde derslerle ilgili olarak Türk öğrencilerden yardım alabiliyorum.

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**EN YÜKSEK CEVAP**
İfade 7 (%)	**6,49**	**33,77**	**24,68**	**19,48**	**15,58**	**KATILIYORUM**

Ankete katılan öğrencilerin % 40,26'sı bu ifade için "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" derken, öğrencilerin % 35,06'sı ise "katılmıyorum / kesinlikle katılmıyorum" demiştir. Dikkat çeken bir husus da "kararsızım" diyenlerin oranının ankete katılan tüm öğrencilerin dörtte birine (% 24,68) yakın olmasıdır.

Derinlemesine görüşmelerde Suriyeli öğrenciler Türk öğrencilerle ilişkileri konusunda yukarıdaki oranlarla paralellik gösterecek şekilde görüş belirtmişlerdir. Örneğin bir Suriyeli öğrencinin bu konudaki düşünceleri şöyledir:

"Bazı Türk arkadaşlarım var. Çok iyiler. İstediğim notları benimle paylaşıp yardım ediyorlar. Bazıları yardım etmek istemiyorlar, not paylaşmıyorlar." (S5)

İfade 8. Pandemi döneminde uzaktan eğitim derslerinde rahatça soru sorabiliyorum.

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**EN YÜKSEK CEVAP**
İfade 8 (%)	**18,18**	**33,77**	**24,68**	**16,88**	**6,49**	**KATILIYORUM**

Ankete katılanların yarısından fazlası (% 51,95) bu ifade için "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" derken, % 23,37'si ise "katılmıyorum / kesinlikle katılmıyorum" şeklinde görüş bildirmiştir. Katılımcıların % 24,68'i ise "kararsız" olduklarını ifade etmişlerdir.

Ancak derinlemesine görüşmelerde öğrencilerin dil (İngilizce / Türkçe) bilgileri seviyesi nedeniyle derslerde soru soramadıkları anlaşılmaktadır. Bir Suriyeli öğrencinin bu konudaki görüşü şöyledir:

> "Hocalarımla iletişimim yok. Söz verdiğinde cevap veriyorum, vermiyorsa konuşmuyorum." (S5)

İfade 9. Uzaktan eğitim sürecinde kayıt edilen dersleri tekrar ederek derslerdeki eksikliklerimi kapatabiliyorum.

	1	2	3	4	5	EN YÜKSEK CEVAP
İfade 9 (%)	41,56	40,26	3,90	10,39	3,90	KESİNLİKLE KATILIYORUM

Ankete katılanların dörtte üçünden fazlası (% 81,82) bu ifade için "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" demiştir.

Derinlemesine görüşmelerde de Suriyeli öğrencilerin büyük bir bölümünün bu ifadeyle ilgili görüşü olumludur. Bunlardan birinin sözleri şöyledir:

> "Evet, kaydedilen dersleri çocuklarım yattığında tekrar izliyordum. Anlamadığım bir şey olduğunda videoyu tekrarlayabiliyordum, sınıf ortamında bunu yapamazdım. Yabancı olduğum için iyi oldu." (S5)

İfade 10. Pandemi döneminde öğretim üyeleriyle ders dışı iletişimde daha fazla sorun yaşıyorum.

	1	2	3	4	5	EN YÜKSEK CEVAP
İfade 10 (%)	15,58	29,87	24,68	19,48	10,39	KATILIYORUM

Ankete katılan öğrencilerin % 45,45'i bu ifade için "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" derken, % 29,87'si "katılmıyorum / kesinlikle katılmıyorum" şeklinde görüş bildirmiştir. Tüm katılımcıların yaklaşık dörtte biri (% 24,68) ise "kararsız" olduklarını ifade etmiştir.

Derinlemesine görüşmelerde Suriyeli öğrencilerin pandemi döneminde öğretim elemanlarıyla ders dışı ilişkilerinin sınırlı kaldığı anlaşılmaktadır. Öğrencilerden birinin bu konudaki ifadeleri ise şu şekildedir:

> "İletişimim iyiydi, bir defa sıkıntı yaşadım. Bir hoca ile ısrarla mail atmama rağmen iletişim kuramadım." (S6)

İfade 11. Pandemi döneminde Türk arkadaşlarımla iletişimde daha fazla problem yaşıyorum.

	1	2	3	4	5	EN YÜKSEK CEVAP
İfade 11 (%)	16,88	23,38	28,57	25,97	5,19	**KARARSIZIM**

Ankete katılanların % 28,57'si bu ifade için "kararsız" olduğunu belirtmiştir. Buna karşılık öğrencilerin % 40,6'sı "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" derken, % 31,16'sı ise "katılmıyorum / kesinlikle katılmıyorum" şeklinde görüş bildirmiştir.

Derinlemesine görüşmelerde bir Suriyeli öğrenci şu ifadeleri kullanmıştır:

"Birkaç kere Türk arkadaş edinmeyi denedim ama olmadı. Suriyeli olduğumu öğrenince konuşmuyorlar. Arkadaş olduğumuzu sandım… Suriyeli olduğumu duyunca çekip gittiler." (S2)

Bir diğer öğrenci ise sorununu şöyle ifade etmiştir:

"Okuldan çıkınca ilişkiler kopuyor. Bu yüzden çok iletişim kuramıyorsunuz. Sorular soruyordum fakat yardım aldığım olmadı." (S6)

İfade 12. Pandemi döneminde medyada çıkan haberler Türkiye'deki ilişkilerimi olumsuz etkiliyor.

	1	2	3	4	5	EN YÜKSEK CEVAP
İfade 12 (%)	9,09	31,17	28,57	20,78	10,39	**KATILIYORUM**

Ankete katılanların % 40,26'sı bu ifade için "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" derken, % 31,17'si ise "katılmıyorum / kesinlikle katılmıyorum" şeklinde görüş bildirmiştir. Dikkat çeken bir husus da "kararsızım" diyenlerin oranının tüm katılımcıların dörtte birinden (% 28,57) fazla olmasıdır.

Derinlemesine görüşmelerde Suriyeli öğrencilerin medyada çıkan haberlerden olumsuz etkilendiği görülmektedir. Bir öğrenci sorununu şu şekilde ifade etmiştir:

"Çok etkiliyor ve tabii ki rahatsız oluyorum. Hem yalan haberlere hem doğru olmayan şeylere insanlar inanıyor ve ben üzülüyorum. Suriyelilerin hepsi pür-i pak değil tabii ki. Elbette yanlış olanlar var ve ortaya çıkıyor. Biz kendimizi hiçbir şekilde savunamıyoruz. Sayımız az ve % 90'ın Türkçesi çok az (özellikle büyükler) ... Medya buradaki insanları çok iyi yönetiyor. Buradaki insanlar çektikleri zorluklara bahane bulmak istiyor. Bu bahane onlara Suriyeliler oldu." (S6)

Bir diğer Suriyeli öğrencinin ise bu konudaki görüşleri şöyledir:

"Başlarda etkilenmiyordum, fakat son zamanlarda çıkan haberler ilişkilerimi etkilemeye başladı. Açıkçası üzülüyordum. Yeni tanıştığım insanlarla diyaloglarımda olumsuzluklarla karşılaşmaya başladım. Son zamanlarda bu üzüntüm öfkeye dönüşmeye başladı. Biz bu ülkeye rastgele gelmedik. Bunu düşünemiyorlar mı?" (S4)

İfade 13. Pandemi döneminde sosyal ilişkilerim sadece Suriyeli arkadaşlarımla sınırlı olmuştur.

	1	2	3	4	5	EN YÜKSEK CEVAP
İfade 13 (%)	22,08	15,58	16,88	24,68	20,78	KATILMIYORUM

Ankete katılanların % 45,46'sı bu ifade için "katılmıyorum / kesinlikle katılmıyorum" derken, % 37,66'lık bir oran ise "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" şeklinde görüş bildirmiştir. Derinlemesine görüşmelerde de Suriyeli öğrencilerin sosyal ilişkilerinin diğer Suriyeli öğrencilerle sınırlı kalıp kalmadığına ilişkin görüşler anket bulgularıyla örtüşmektedir.

İfade 14. Pandemi ve/veya öğrenim hayatım bitince Türkiye'de kalmak ve iş bulmak istiyorum.

	1	2	3	4	5	EN YÜKSEK CEVAP
İfade 14 (%)	33,77	16,88	29,87	9,09	10,39	KESİNLİKLE KATILIYORUM

Ankete katılanların yarıdan fazlası (% 50,65) bu ifade için "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" derken, tüm katılımcıların % 29,87'sinin ise "kararsız" kalması dikkat çekicidir.

Derinlemesine görüşmelerde Suriyeli öğrencilerin Türkiye'deki eğitim hayatları bitince Türkiye'de kalıp kalmayacaklarına ilişkin olarak elde edilen veriler, anket bulgularına göre daha yüksek oranda kalma eğilimi içinde olduklarını göstermektedir. Bu konuda öğrencilerden birinin görüşü şu şekildedir:

"Suriye'ye bu durumda dönmek tabii ki istemiyorum. Esad giderse büyük ihtimal dönerim diye düşünüyorum. Hükümet değişirse her şey değişir diye düşünüyorum. Türkiye'de kalmaktan başka seçeneğim yok şu an." (S6)

Bir diğer öğrenci ise görüşlerini şu şekilde ifade etmiştir:

"Açıkçası iyi bir fırsat yakalarsam burada da kalırım. Eğer olmazsa ya Ürdün'e ya da Fas'a gidebilirim. Türkiye bu üçü arasında en düşük ihtimali olan ülke çünkü kâğıt üzerinde baktığımızda buradaki gelir seviyesi iyi değil." (S1)

Başka bir öğrencinin görüşleri ise şu şekildedir:

"Ben zaten Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı olduğum için Türkiye'de kalmaya devam etmek istiyorum. Humus'a geri dönme planım yok. Siyaset Bilimi okumam sebebiyle Türkiye'de siyaset yapma planım var. Belki Türkiye'de Suriye ile ilgili bir temsilcilik veya Suriye sözcülüğü gibi bir planım var, fakat bunun çok zor olduğunun da farkındayım." (S4)

Türkiye'de kalmak konusunda bir diğer öğrenci de şunları söylemiştir:

"Daha önce dönmeyi düşündük ama şimdi istemiyoruz. Açıkçası ne yapacağımı bilmiyorum. Yasal olmayan yollarla çalışmak istemiyorum. Burada yaşamak açıkçası benim için daha kolay olacak. Ama Türkler bizi istemiyor." (S2)

İfade 15. Pandemi ve/veya öğrenim hayatım bitince Suriye'ye gidip ülkemin yeniden inşa edilmesine katkı vermek istiyorum.

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**EN YÜKSEK CEVAP**
İfade 15 (%)	**9,09**	**15,58**	**32,47**	**18,18**	**24,68**	**KARARSIZIM**

Ankete katılanların % 42,86'sı bu ifade için "katılmıyorum / kesinlikle katılmıyorum" derken, % 24,67'si "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" demiştir. Daha önemlisi ise "kararsızım" diyenlerin oranının (% 32,47) yüksek olmasıdır. Derinlemesine görüşmelerde öğrencilerin büyük bir bölümü Suriye'ye dönmek istemediklerini dile getirmiştir.

İfade 16. Pandemi ve/veya öğrenim hayatım bitince imkânım olursa yurt dışına gitmek istiyorum.

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**EN YÜKSEK CEVAP**
İfade 16 (%)	**25,97**	**19,48**	**27,27**	**12,99**	**14,29**	**KARARSIZIM**

Ankete katılanların % 45,45'i bu ifade için "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" derken, % 26,56'sı "katılmıyorum / kesinlikle katılmıyorum" demiştir. Bu ifadede dikkat çeken nokta "kararsızım" diyenlerin oranının (% 27,27) yüksek olmasıdır.

Derinlemesine görüşmelerde Suriyeli öğrencilerin büyük bir bölümünde fırsat olursa Avrupa veya Amerika'ya gitme eğilimi ağır basmaktadır. Bir öğrencinin bu konudaki görüşü şu şekildedir:

"Avrupa'ya gitmeyi elbette düşünüyorum. Fakat çıkamıyoruz şu an Avrupa'ya." (S6)

İfade 17. Pandemi sürecinde ailemin ve / veya kendi gelirimde ciddi bir düşme olmadı.

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**EN YÜKSEK CEVAP**
İfade 17 (%)	10,39	29,87	15,58	25,97	18,18	**KATILIYORUM**

Ankete katılanların % 44,15'i bu ifade için "katılmıyorum / kesinlikle katılmıyorum" derken, öğrencilerin % 40,26'sı "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" şeklinde görüş bildirmiştir. "Kararsızım" diyen öğrencilerin oranı ise % 15,58'dir.

İfade 18. Pandemi döneminde harcamalarımda ciddi bir düşme olmadı.

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**EN YÜKSEK CEVAP**
İfade 18 (%)	12,99	28,57	22,08	20,78	15,58	**KATILIYORUM**

Ankete katılan öğrencilerin % 41,56'sı bu ifade için "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" derken, öğrencilerin % 36,36'sı "katılmıyorum / kesinlikle katılmıyorum" demiştir. Bu görüş için "kararsızım" diyenlerin oranı ise % 22,08'dir.

İfade 19. Pandemi döneminde ihtiyaç olduğunda "tutorial" (özel dersler) verilmektedir.

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**EN YÜKSEK CEVAP**
İfade 19 (%)	7,79	22,08	37,66	24,68	7,79	**KARARSIZIM**

Ankete katılanların % 32,47'si Pandemi döneminde ihtiyaç olduğunda "tutorial" (özel / tamamlayıcı dersler) verilmektedir ifadesine "katılmıyorum / kesinlikle katılmıyorum" derken, öğrencilerin % 29,87'si "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" demiştir. Tüm öğrencilerin üçte birinden fazlası (% 37,66) ise bu ifade için "kararsızım" şeklinde görüş bildirmiştir.

Derinlemesine görüşmelerde tutorial talep etmekle ilgili olarak bir öğrenci şu ifadeleri kullanmıştır:

"Hayır, yoktu. Evet aslında böyle bir şey iyi olurdu." (S2)

Bir diğer öğrenci görüşlerini şu şekilde ifade etmiştir:

"Hayır, eğer böyle bir şey olsaydı isterdim." (S5)

İfade 20. Pandemi döneminde sınavların test şeklinde yapılması uygundur.

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**EN YÜKSEK CEVAP**
İfade 20 (%)	35,06	40,26	12,99	7,79	3,90	**KATILIYORUM**

Ankete katılanların dörtte üçü (% 75,32) bu ifade için "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" derken, öğrencilerin % 11,69'u "katılmıyorum / kesinlikle katılmıyorum" şeklinde görüş bildirmiştir. "Kararsızım" diyenlerin oranı ise % 12,99'dur.

Derinlemesine görüşmelerde Suriyeli öğrencilerin hepsi sınavların test usulü yapılmasını tercih ettiklerini belirtmiştir. Bir öğrenci bu sorunun cevabı için şu ifadeleri kullanmıştır:

"Testin daha kolay olduğunu düşünüyorum. Bu yüzden test olmasını tercih ederim fakat yazılı sınavların bana daha çok katkı sağladığını biliyorum." (S4)

Diğer bir öğrenci şöyle demiştir:

"Koronadan önce bazı sınavlar test usulü bazı sınavlar yazılı biçimde yapılıyordu. Yazılı sınavlarda hiçbir şey yapamıyordum. 1. ve 2. sınıftayken hiçbir şey yazamadım. Test gelince güzel çözüyorum. Notlardan çok iyi okuyorum ve güzel geçiyor. Korona esnasında hepsi test oldu, bazı dersler proje ödevi oldu ve onlar da güzel geçti. Proje ödevleri yazılı olduğundan internetten bakarak beğendiğim şeyleri yazarak gönderiyorum." (S5)

Bir öğrenci de bu konudaki görüşlerini şöyle ifade etmiştir:

"Test isterim, klasik sevmiyorum. Hep yazılı yapıyorlar bu dönem (korona başlangıcına kadar) sadece bir tane test oldu, her şey klasik. Ben ezberleme yapıyorum soru okuyorum, hiçbir şey anlamıyordum. Hoca ne istiyor anlamıyordum, bu yüzden her şeyi yazıyordum. O yüzden süre çok az geliyor bana. (Testleri kastederek) Şimdi biraz daha iyi ama nasıl oldu bilmiyorum." (S3)

İfade 21. Pandemi döneminde tedbirli ve mesafeli olarak kampüste yapılacak sosyal / kültürel ve spor etkinliklerine katılmak isterim.

	1	2	3	4	5	EN YÜKSEK CEVAP
İfade 21 (%)	22,08	33,77	28,57	7,79	7,79	KATILIYORUM

Ankete katılan öğrencilerin % 55,85'i bu ifade için "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" derken, % 15,58'inin ise "katılmıyorum / kesinlikle katılmıyorum" dediği görülmektedir. Bu görüş için "kararsızım" diyenlerin oranı da % 28,57'dir.

Derinlemesine görüşmelerde bu konuda bir öğrenci şu ifadeleri kullanmıştır:

"Hiçbir yere gitmedim, sadece bir gün gittim, spor maçı izledim. Yakın arkadaşımla Suriye yemeklerini denedik, çok güzel dediler. Ama okulda bir şey yapmadım." (S3)

Diğer bir öğrenci konuyla ilgili görüşlerini şöyle ifade etmiştir:

"Okul ile ilgili sadece derslere gidip geliyorum." (S4)

İfade 22. Pandemi döneminde öğrenci yemekhanesinin açık olmasını isterim.

	1	2	3	4	5	EN YÜKSEK CEVAP
İfade 22 (%)	19,48	40,26	23,38	7,79	9,09	KATILIYORUM

Ankete katılanların % 59,74'ü bu ifade için "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" derken, "katılmıyorum / kesinlikle katılmıyorum" diyenlerin oranı ise % 16,88'dir. Dikkat çeken yüksek bir oran da (% 23,18) "kararsızlar" grubuna aittir.

Derinlemesine görüşmelerde bir öğrenci üniversite yemekhanesiyle ilgili şunları söylemiştir:

"Evet. Bazen çok iyi oluyor. Bazen çok kötü oluyor. O yüzden kantinler ve kafeler var. Orada da yiyorum." (S2)

Diğer bir öğrenci ise görüşlerini şöyle ifade etmiştir:

"Evet. Yemekleri çok güzel, sadece derslerim geç olduğunda gidemiyorum. Fiyatları çok ucuz." (S5)

İfade 23. Pandemi döneminde sürekli evde kalarak eğitime devam etmek yerine eğitimin hybrid (karma) olmasını isterim.

	1	2	3	4	5	EN YÜKSEK CEVAP
İfade 23 (%)	37,66	23,38	18,18	10,39	10,39	KESİNLİKLE KATILIYORUM

Ankete katılanların büyük bir bölümü (% 61,04) bu ifade için "katılıyorum / kesinlikle katılıyorum" derken, % 20,78 oranında öğrenci ise "katılmıyorum / kesinlikle katılmıyorum" demiştir.

Derinlemesine görüşmelerde ise öğrencilerin çoğunlukla uzaktan eğitimi tercih ettikleri görülmektedir. Bir öğrenci bu soruya cevaben şunları söylemiştir:

> "Uzaktan eğitim döneminde bir sorunla karşılaşmadım. Bu süreç benim için faydalı oldu. Ders kayıtlarını tekrar dinleme fırsatım oldu. Evim okula uzak olduğu için okula gelmemek ekstra zamanın bana kalmasını sağladı. Evde yeni hobiler edindim ve bunlardan gelir elde etmeye başladım." (S2)

Bir diğer Suriyeli öğrencinin cevabı ise şu şekildedir:

> "(Uzaktan eğitimde) anlamadığım bir şey olunca videoyu tekrarlayabiliyordum. Sınıf ortamında bunu yapamazdım. Yabancı olduğum için iyi oldu." (S5)

Tartışma

Bu araştırmada elde edilen bulgulardan öne çıkanlar literatür taramasında yer verilen çalışmaların bulgularıyla birlikte aşağıda değerlendirilmektedir. Bulgulardan ilki, araştırmada yer alan Suriyeli öğrencilerin "dil" sorunu nedeniyle hibrit eğitim uygulamasında dersleri izleme konusunda sorunlarla karşılaşmalarıdır. Bu bulgu yukarıda ele alınan çalışmalarda da öncelikli sorun olarak dile getirilmiştir. Buna örnek olarak Altunbaş (2020), Sağır ve Aydın (2020), Hohberger'in (2018), Çopur ve Demirel'in (2017) çalışmaları verilebilir. Marmara Üniversitesi'nde yapılan çalışmada ise diğer çalışmalardan farklı şekilde Suriyeli öğrencilerin en azından bir bölümünün yavaş konuşacağı ve düzgün formüle edemeyeceği endişesiyle soru sormaktan da çekindiği tespit edilmiştir.

İkinci bulgu, derslerde anekdotlara başvurulmasının Suriyeli öğrenciler üzerindeki etkisiyle ilgilidir. Literatür taramasında yer verilen çalışmaların bulgularından ayrışan şekilde, Marmara Üniversitesi'nde yapılan bu çalışmada ele alınan çevrim içi derslerde (özellikle sosyal bilim branşlarında) sıkça anekdotlara başvurulmasının, dil zorluğu olan Suriyeli öğrencilerin dersleri

düzenli biçimde takip etmeleri ve anlamalarını olumsuz etkilediği sonucuna varılmıştır.

Üçüncü olarak, araştırmaya katılan Suriyeli öğrencilerin büyük bir bölümü İngilizce ve / veya Türkçe bildiklerini beyan etmelerine karşın dersleri izleme ve ders materyallerinden faydalanma konusunda zorluk çektikleri ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu bulgu, TÖMER'de verilen Türkçe eğitiminin dersleri takip etmede yeterli olmadığı şeklinde tespitin yapıldığı Şahin ve Çelik'in (2020) ve Yaralı Akkaya vd.'nin (2018) çalışmalarıyla örtüşmektedir.

Dördüncü bulgu, ankete katılan Suriyeli öğrencilerin yarısının, burs imkanlarının kısıtlı olması nedeniyle, eğitimlerine paralel olarak çalışmak zorunda kalmış olmasıdır. Burs / kredi imkanlarının sınırlı olmasıyla ilgili olan bu bulgu, Taşar'ın (2019) ve Harunoğulları vd.'nin (2019) sonuçlarıyla olduğu gibi, Sezgin ve Yolcu'nun (2016) öğrencilerin çalışmak zorunda kaldıklarına ilişkin bulgusuyla paralellik göstermektedir.

Beşinci olarak, araştırmaya katılan Suriyeli öğrencilerin üniversitedeki Türk arkadaşlarıyla yaşadıkları iletişim sorunlarının pandemi döneminde daha da arttığı ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu nedenle Suriyeli öğrenciler çoğunlukla kendi aralarında iletişim kurmuş ve Türk arkadaşları ile iletişimleri genel olarak derslerle sınırlı kalmıştır. Kaya (2021), Attar ve Küçükşen (2019) ve Şahin ve Çelik'in (2020) çalışmalarındaki bulgular da bu araştırmanın bulgularıyla örtüşür niteliktedir.

Altıncı bulgu Suriyeli üniversite öğrencilerinin gelecek planlarıyla ilgilidir. Ankete katılanlar arasında pandemi ve / veya öğrenim hayatları bitince, imkanları olursa, Türkiye'de kalmayıp üçüncü ülkelere gitmek isteyen öğrencilerin oranı yüksektir. Sağır ve Aydın'ın (2020) çalışmasındaki bulguların aksine bu bulgu, Akbaşlı ve Mavi'nin (2021) araştırmasıyla paralellik arz etmektedir. Araştırmaya katılan öğrencilerin bir bölümü de eğitimleri sonrasında yaşamlarını Türkiye'de sürdürmek istemektedir. Her ne kadar Suriyelilerin geri gönderilmesi kamuoyunda yaygın olarak tartışılmakta ise de Türkiye'de kalmayı tercih eden Suriyeli üniversite öğrencilerinin teşvik edilmesi bu bağlamda önem kazanmaktadır. Nitekim bu durum Erdoğan, Erdoğan ve Yavcan'ın (2017) çalışmasında da dile getirilmiştir.

Yedinci olarak, ankete katılan Suriyeli öğrencilerin yaklaşık üçte ikisi ailelerinin yanında ikamet etmek durumunda kaldığı ortaya çıkmıştır. Bulgu Harunoğulları vd. (2019) ve Kaya ve Şahin'in (2021) araştırmaları ile örtüşmektedir. Bu durumun nedenleri ayrı bir inceleme konusu olmakla birlikte, Marmara Üniversitesi araştırması kapsamında yapılan derinlemesine görüşmelerde ise farklı olarak iki husus öne çıkmaktadır. Bunlardan biri maddi imkanların öğrencinin ailesi dışında barınmasını sınırlamasıdır. İkincisi ise devlet yurtlarında yer bulmanın çok zor olmasıdır. Söz konusu nedenlerden

ötürü Suriyeli öğrencilerin büyük bir bölümünün ailelerinin yanında kalması, onları Türk toplumundan uzaklaştırmaktadır. Ayrıca, pandeminin ilk döneminde öğrenimin çevrim içi platformlarda yapılması nedeniyle, üniversitede Türk arkadaşlarıyla birlikte bulunma olanağını yitiren Suriyeli öğrenciler tamamen kendi içlerine kapanmak durumunda kalmışlardır. Derinlemesine görüşmelerde Suriyeli öğrencilerin genelde imkanları olduğunda yurtlarda kalmayı tercih ettikleri ve bunu sosyalleşmeleri için önemsedikleri de saptanmıştır.

Sekizinci olarak, ankete katılan Suriyeli öğrencilerin, özellikle pandemi döneminde medyada Suriyeli zorunlu göçmenlerle ilgili yer alan tek taraflı haberler nedeniyle toplum nezdinde olumsuz algının oluşmasından rahatsızlık duydukları tespit edilmiştir. Benzer bulgular ise Gültekin vd.'nin (2019) çalışmasında da görülmektedir.

Son olarak, ankete ve derinlemesine görüşmelere katılan Marmara Üniversitesi öğrencileri İdari işler ile ilgili Türkçe dışında da iletişim kurabilecekleri kişi/birime ihtiyaç duyduklarını dile getirmişlerdir. Bu bulgu Hohberger (2018) ve Altunbaş'ın (2020) çalışmaları ile paralellik göstermektedir.

Sonuç ve Öneriler

2020 Mart ayından itibaren uluslararası düzeyde yaşanan Covid-19 salgını Türkiye'de de toplumsal hayatı derinden etkilemiştir. Ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel alanlarda yaşanan tüm olumsuz etkilerden eğitim sektörü de payını almıştır. Bu çalışmada, Marmara Üniversitesi örneğinde Suriyeli öğrencilerin hibrit eğitim sürecinde yaşadıkları sorunlar tespit edilmekte ve çözüm önerileri sunulmaktadır. Bu amaçla üniversite genelinde bir anket uygulanmış ve ayrıca onun sonuçlarını desteklemek amacıyla ankete katılanlar arasından seçilen 6 öğrenciyle derinlemesine görüşmeler yapılmıştır. Buna göre, Suriyeli öğrencilerin eğitim alanında yaşadıkları entegrasyon sorunlarının pandemi döneminde daha da derinleştiği görülmektedir.

Türkiye'nin uluslararası göç yolları üzerinde bulunması nedeniyle gelecekte de Türk üniversitelerindeki yabancı öğrencilerin sayısının artması kuvvetle muhtemeldir. Dolayısıyla, Marmara Üniversitesi örneğinde Suriyeli öğrencilerin pandemi dönemindeki hibrit eğitim uygulamasında yaşadıkları spesifik sorunların analiz edilmesi, gelecekte Türk üniversitelerindeki eğitim sisteminin yeniden düzenlenmesi bakımından da önem arz etmektedir.

Marmara Üniversitesi'nde gerçekleştirilen bu araştırmadan elde edilen bulgular ışığında, Türkiye'deki diğer üniversitelerde öğrenim gören Suriyeli öğrencilerin de eğitim durumlarının iyileştirilmesine örnek olması düşüncesiyle

geliştirilen ve liselerde eğitim gören yüz binlerce Suriyeli üniversite adayı için de önem arz eden öneriler şöyle sıralanabilir:

Ders İşleme Yöntemleri:

Öncelikle hibrit eğitim uygulamasında ders işleme yöntemlerinin Marmara Üniversitesi Eğitim Bilimleri uzmanlarının önceliğinde Suriyeli öğrenciler de gözetilerek yeniden düzenlenmesi gerekmektedir. Bu bağlamda; ilk olarak, öğretim elemanlarının, dersleri Suriyeli öğrencileri de dikkate alarak daha anlaşılır biçimde anlatma yöntemlerini geliştirmesi gerekmektedir. İkinci olarak, uzaktan eğitimin başarısı için çevrim içi derslerin Marmara Üniversitesi UES üzerinden yapılarak kayda alınması ve ayrıca öğretim elemanının dersle ilgili materyalleri (slayt, makale vb.) öğrenciler ile paylaşması Suriyeli öğrencilerin dil sorununun azalmasına ve dersleri daha düzenli olarak takip etmelerine yardımcı olacaktır. Üçüncü olarak hem öğretim elemanlarının işlerini kolaylaştırmak hem de öğrencilere yardımcı olmak amacıyla tamamlayıcı dersler yaygınlaştırılmalıdır.

Öğrenci bursları:

Suriyeli üniversite öğrencilerinin daha geniş kapsamlı bir burs sistemine dahil edilmeleri eğitimlerini olumlu etkileyecektir. Bunun yanı sıra AB fonlarından Türkiye'deki Suriyeli üniversite öğrencilerine yönelik finansal destek sağlanmalıdır.

İletişim:

Suriyeli üniversite öğrencilerinin kendilerini "ötekileştirilmiş" hissetmemeleri için daha üniversite hayatı sürerken Türk arkadaşları ile iletişimlerinin güçlendirilmesi için gerekli ortam hazırlanmalıdır. Bu amaçla, üniversitelerin çeşitli alanlarında faaliyet gösteren "öğrenci kulüpleri" bir çözüm olarak düşünülebilir. Marmara Üniversitesi'nde hali hazırda 231 aktif öğrenci kulübünün faaliyet gösterdiği dikkate alınırsa, Suriyeli öğrencilerin de bu kulüplerde aktif olarak çalışmaya teşvik edilmesi, bu öğrencilerin Türk arkadaşlarıyla iletişimlerini güçlendirmesine katkı sağlayacaktır. Bunun için ilk adım olarak öğrenci kulüpleri yönetimlerinde bir Suriyeli öğrencinin yer alması sağlanabilir. Suriyeli öğrencilerin kulüp yönetimlerinde sorumluluk üstlenmeleri, bu öğrencilerin başta spor ve kültür faaliyetleri olmak üzere çeşitli etkinliklere katılmaları ve kampüsteki sosyal yaşamda yer almalarında önemli bir rol oynayacaktır. Suriyeli öğrencilerin kulüplere katılımları karşılıklı diyaloğu güçlendireceği gibi, öğrencilikle ilgili temel sorunların çözümüne ilişkin ortak kararları birlikte alabilmeleri için de bir zemin oluşturacaktır. Dolayısıyla Suriyeli öğrencilerin bu kulüplerde aktif görev almaları, onların üniversitelerine olan "aidiyet duygularını" da güçlendirecektir.

İkinci olarak, öğrenci kulüplerindeki faaliyetlerin sosyal sorumluluk projeleri kapsamında değerlendirilmesi, Türk öğrencilerin Suriyeli öğrencilerle dayanışmaları ve ortak çalışmalarını motive edici bir unsur olabilir. Bunun için söz konusu projelerin mezuniyet notundaki ağırlıkları artırılmalıdır. Böylece Türk ve Suriyeli öğrencilerin birbirlerini daha iyi tanımaları üniversite yıllarında gelişecek ve bu birikimler onların eğitimleri sonrasında üniversiteleri ile olan bağlarını da güçlendirecektir. Bunun yanı sıra, ankete katılan Suriyeli üniversite öğrencilerinin bir bölümünün eğitimleri sonrasında Türkiye'de kalmak istedikleri göz önüne alınırsa, üniversite yıllarında Türk arkadaşlarıyla geliştirecekleri güçlü iletişim Türkiye'ye entegrasyonlarına olumlu etki yapacaktır.

Üçüncü olarak, öğrenci kulüplerinde Türk ve Suriyeli öğrencilerin birlikte dayanışma içinde çalışmaları, eğitimlerini tamamladıktan sonra da iletişimlerini Marmara Üniversitesi Mezunlar Ofisi vasıtasıyla sürdürmelerinde önemli bir rol oynayacaktır. Bu da beş dilde eğitim veren Marmara Üniversitesi'nin uluslararasılaşma hedefine ulaşılması bakımından önem arz etmektedir.

Barınma:

Devlet yurtlarında yer bulmanın Türk öğrencileri için de büyük bir sorun olduğu dikkate alınırsa, Suriyeli öğrencilerin en azından bir bölümünün yurtlara yerleştirilmesi kısa ve orta vadede zor görünmektedir. Ancak kotalar uygulanarak yurtlara Türk öğrencilerle birlikte en az dörtte bir oranında Suriyeli öğrencinin yerleştirilmesi sağlanabilir. Bu öğrencilerin bir bölümünün yaşamlarını Türkiye'de sürdürmek istedikleri göz önüne alınırsa, Suriyeli üniversite öğrencilerine kota dahilinde devlet yurtlarında barınma imkanının sağlanması, Türk öğrencilerle iletişim kurmaları, birlikte yaşam tecrübesi kazanmaları, eğitimlerinde başarılı olmaları ve dolayısıyla entegrasyonlarının kolaylaşmasına katkıda bulunacaktır.

Medya haberleri:

Medyanın da katkısıyla, özellikle pandemi döneminde, Suriyeli zorunlu göçmenlerin Türk toplumunda yaşam standartlarının düşmesinde önemli bir rol oynadığı yönündeki algı daha da güçlenmiştir. Bu nedenle medya, Suriyeli zorunlu göçmenler gerçeğini Türk kamuoyuna daha objektif bir şekilde aktarmalıdır. Bu bağlamda, Suriyeli zorunlu göçmenler içinde üniversite öğrencilerine özel bir yer vermelidir. Suriyeli öğrencilerin bir kısmının Türkiye'de kalıcı olacağı düşünüldüğünde, eğitim masraflarının tamamını Türkiye'nin üstlendiği bu öğrencilerin meslek sahibi bireyler olarak Türkiye ekonomisi ve ülkenin geleceği açısından öneminin kamuoyuna anlatılmasında medya da önemli görevler üstlenmelidir.

Üniversite eğitimi sonrası üçüncü ülkeye göç:

Türkiye'nin önemli sorunlarından biri yetişmiş insan kaynağının, yaşam ve çalışma koşullarının daha iyi olduğu düşüncesiyle, gelişmiş ülkelere doğru artan göç eğilimidir. Bu eğilimin Suriyeli öğrenciler arasında da yaygın olduğu görülmektedir. Türkiye'nin kalkınmadaki temel hedeflerinden biri yetişmiş insan kaynağının öncelikle ülke hizmetinde kullanılması olduğu gerçeğinden hareketle, bütün eğitim maliyetinin üstlenildiği Suriyeli öğrencilerin en azından bir bölümünün pandemi ve / veya eğitimleri sonrasında üçüncü ülkelere göç etmeleri yerine, Türkiye'de kalarak üretim sürecinde yer almaları teşvik edilmelidir.

Bu öneriler Marmara Üniversitesi'nde okuyan Suriyeli öğrencilerin başarılarını artırmayı ve böylece topluma entegrasyonlarını kolaylaştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Suriyeli öğrencilerin yükseköğretimdeki başarıları ve sosyal hayata katılımlarının artması, üniversite öncesi eğitim gören yüz binlerce Suriyeli çocuk ve genci eğitimlerine devam etme konusunda motive edecektir.

Son olarak, bu araştırma sırasında, kapsam dışında olduğundan ötürü dokunulamayan ancak araştırılmaya değer başka hususların ortaya çıktığını belirtmekte yarar vardır. Bunlardan biri, Covid-19 döneminde yaygınlaşan uzaktan eğitim uygulamalarının yurtdışındaki üniversitelerde öğrenim gören göçmen kökenli öğrencilerin eğitim alanındaki entegrasyonlarına etkisidir. Diğeri ise, Suriyeli öğrencilerin yüksek öğrenime uyumlarının kolaylaştırılmasına yönelik lise eğitimlerinden itibaren hazırlanmalarıyla ilgili çalışmalardır. Bu bağlamda özellikle Suriyeli öğrencilerin yoğun olduğu liselerle üniversitelerin işbirliği içinde hareket etmeleri ve söz konusu işbirliğinin araştırılması Suriyeli öğrencilerin eğitim alanındaki entegrasyonları açısından önem taşımaktadır.

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EUROPEANIZATION OF CHILD RIGHTS IN ROMANIA: A TEMPLATE FOR FUTURE ENLARGEMENTS?[*]

Menekşe TOKYAY ÜNLÜHİSARCIKLI[**] ⓘ

Abstract

This article aims to investigate the role and impact of the European Union (EU) by deeply analyzing the situation of Romania in the period between early 1990s to 2007, the date of its accession to the EU. The involvement of the EU in this country's domestic transformation process was significant considering the place that was accorded to child rights due to the dire situation children faced under the communist regime. Child rights did not rank as a critical factor of harmonization with the EU acquis until the Romanian accession process. The article is based on a comprehensive literature review about Romania on child rights at the European and international levels. The argument of this article is that, following Romanian accession template, political conditionality in the child rights area could have become a referential for future accession processes to the EU, especially for Turkey, through pre-accession mechanisms such as funding, twinning programmes, field studies, etc. but that this did not happen. The article concludes that for the EU to generate domestic change in Turkey's child rights area under the candidacy period, it is a must that two negotiation chapters namely, Chapter 19, Social Policy and Employment and Chapter 23, Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, are opened as they are directly linked with the improvement of child protection.

Keywords: Child rights, Europeanization, transformation, conditionality.

ROMANYA'DA ÇOCUK HAKLARININ AVRUPALILAŞMASI: GELECEK GENİŞLEMELER İÇİN BİR ŞABLON MU?

Öz

Bu makale, Romanya'nın 1990'ların başından Avrupa Birliği'ne (AB) katılım tarihi olan 2007'ye kadar olan dönemdeki durumunu derinlemesine analiz ederek AB'nin rolünü ve etkisini araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. AB'nin bu ülkenin iç dönüşüm sürecine dahil olması, komünist rejimde çocukların içinde bulunduğu vahim durum nedeniyle çocuk haklarına atfedilen önem düşünüldüğünde oldukça anlamlıdır. Çocuk hakları, Romanya'nın katılım sürecine kadar AB müktesebatına uyum açısından kritik bir faktör olarak görülmemiştir. Bu makale, Avrupa ve uluslararası düzeyde çocuk hakları konusunda Romanya hakkında kapsamlı bir literatür taramasına dayanmaktadır. Makalenin argümanı, Romanya'nın katılım şablonunu takiben, çocuk hakları alanındaki siyasi koşulluluğun, AB'ye gelecekteki katılım süreçleri açısından – özellikle de Türkiye açısından- bir referans olabileceği, bunun da fonlama, eşleştirme programları, saha çalışmaları aracılığıyla gerçekleşebileceği, ancak bunun yapılmadığı yönündedir. Makalenin vardığı sonuç ise, AB'nin adaylık sürecinde Türkiye'de çocuk hakları alanında ulusal bir değişim yaratması için iki müzakere faslının – Sosyal Politika ve İstihdam (Fasıl 19) ve Yargı ve Temel Haklar (Fasıl 23) – açılması gerektiğidir; zira bu iki fasıl, çocuk korumanın iyileştirilmesiyle doğrudan bağlantılıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Çocuk hakları, Avrupalılaşma, dönüşüm, koşulluluk.

Introduction

The aim of this article is to examine the success of transformation by Romania in the field of child rights during its accession process while shedding light on the situation of potential new accession waves to reveal to what extent it is possible for other candidate countries to take the Romanian child rights' harmonization as a referential. Hence, the article starts with a section showing the process in Romania and presents Europeanization as a process of transformation in the field of child rights policy which can turn into a powerful instrument to push the candidate country towards the EU membership goal. The examination of the Europeanization effect on Romania is conceptually linked to the Europeanization literature, which tries to explain the process through which the EU generates domestic impact with various channels and instruments on member and candidate countries.

Since the mid-1990s and beyond, Europeanization has become a fashionable but contested term in the field of European studies (Olsen, 2002: 921, Kassim, 2000: 235). Some (Ladrech, 1994: 69; Radaelli, 2004) consider it as a top-down process by exclusively focusing on the influence of the EU on domestic political institutions, policies and actors in the member and candidate states. Others (James, 2007; Bache, 2008: 9, Börzel, 2003) pay much more attention on the necessity to take it from bottom-up and top-down approaches for a more comprehensive understanding. However, this article elaborates the Europeanization as a top-down process whereby the candidate states download a set of rules, norms and policies from the EU, as they were not in a position to export their preferences to the EU level or influence EU policies. The aim of the article is to bring about a template that will help a better understanding of the next enlargement waves where child rights are an inevitable part of the pre-accession process and can act as a trigger to revive the membership path through a human perspective. The article argues that the successful example of Romania's Europeanization in the realm of child rights can guide the further engagement of the EU in the child rights area in Turkey and that this would be instrumental in encouraging the candidate country for enacting domestic change in line with the EU requirements and for fulfilling the criteria for membership.

Children are defined by law as people under the age of 18 years old. Whatever their age, all children are entitled to pre-determined human rights that include the right to equality, health, education, to express their opinions, to participate in the decisions that affect them, to have a clean environment, a safe place to live in and a proper care system, as well as to be protected from all harm. These rights are mainly included in the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is the main referential and the most ratified human rights treaty across the world. Any ignorance and violation of these rights may put children at risk of exploitation, discrimination and abuse. However, children are still the group at the highest risk of abuse, malnourishment and poverty around the world because they are severely impacted by human rights crises. In this study, the conceptualization of child rights from the international framework, which is also adopted by the EU itself, will be taken as the basis.

In the Romanian child rights case, the child protection sector passed through a deep transformation as part of the EU accession process and it was the most visible and the most politicized condition of the EU during the harmonization of the candidate country to the EU requirements. The status of child rights protection was the weakest point of Romania, like all other former communist countries that generally violated child rights. However, the EU policy entrepreneurs assumed a great role and intervened in the Romanian child rights system, especially at the point of child protection standards to generate

domestic change, although the Commission initially lacked the necessary expertise and experience to do that. The main problem with the Romanian child care system was the uncontrolled and unregulated inter-country adoption which was highly open to child rights violation and corruption with several powerful adoption lobbies which acted as veto agents against any standardized practice, especially when the Commission asked Romania to ban all international adoptions. But, the domestic pro-EU coalition and other supporting institutions helped Romania to become one of the most advanced former communist countries with an aligned child rights system to reach the most-wanted carrot at the end: EU accession.

In this regard, the main research questions of this article are: (1) How and to what extent the EU played a normative transformation role in Romanian child rights policy between early 1990s and 2007? (2) Which logic did Romania follow in deciding to harmonize its legislation on child rights with the EU? Did the rewards exceed the membership costs? (3) How should Turkey-EU relations be re-conceptualized in light of the Europeanization experience of Romania during the accession process? Such a comparative conceptualization is innovative and thought-provoking in terms of elaborating Europeanization patterns of child rights in two candidate countries whose child issues are inevitably *sui generis* but can be handled by following a similar logic. In developing these research questions, a comprehensive literature review is used. The method of this article is the application of a conceptual framework (Europeanization) to a specific case (Europeanization of child rights in Romania) and official EU documents on child rights form the primary sources of the analysis provided here. Secondary sources such as scholarly books and articles are especially used for literature review.

Understanding the logic and the stimulus behind the main mechanisms, actors and institutions that allowed the Europeanization of child rights in Romania is of key importance because it is the first of its kind in the European enlargement process where child rights were put at the forefront of the negotiation process with the candidate country and where the EU candidacy was conditioned on making necessary reforms on child rights sector. The consistent and determinant interventions of the European Commission and the European Parliament in tackling the child rights provision of candidate countries as part of the EU enlargement should be therefore a referential for future enlargements because in the case of Romania, it had a real and tangible transformation effect.

What does Europeanization mean for a candidate country?

There has been a flurry of definitions for Europeanization in the recent past, with most of them interpreting the process as a form of domestic change that is

triggered by the European level. Europeanization can be largely described as the process of downloading EU regulations and institutional structures to the domestic level -a downloading process- and also, in some cases, uploading domestic policies and preferences to the EU level (Howell, 2004). Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse identify two circumstances that may trigger domestic changes in response to Europeanization. First, there must be some degree of "misfit" or incompatibility between EU and domestic processes, policies and institutions. Europeanization does not happen if there is a perfect match between European and domestic norms, policies and polities. However, if there is enough degree of misfit, adaptational pressure begins that may lead to domestic change. Consequently, the second circumstance is that domestic actors or institutions should respond to the adaptational pressure and meet adaptational costs at the domestic level to comply with EU requirements (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 58-66). Europeanization shows a critical transformative power both in the member and candidate states with the degree of pressure that is generated for obtaining necessary adjustments and reforms. The adaptational pressure is linked to the degree of fit or congruence between domestic and European levels (Caporaso, 2008: 29).

The misfit between EU-level and domestic policies, institutions and processes provides the necessary precondition for generating change, while the accession conditionality appears to be the main motivation behind this enlargement because it is a "bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides external incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions" (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 662). Therefore, accession conditionality which applies both to hard and soft law areas is a creative tool in the hands of the European Commission to impose rules and norms through softer mechanisms of conditionality.

Radaelli (2000:11) defines Europeanization as a "processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures and public policies". Radaelli (2003: 30) identifies four ways for responding to Europeanization: accommodation, when downloading fits with domestic policies; transformation, when downloading defies national policies; inertia, when there is no political resolve to initiate change; and retrenchment, when a downloaded EU policy, norm and institution bolsters an opposition trend against the EU.

The misfit between European and domestic policies, rules, procedures, norms and institutions provides national actors with new opportunities and constraints to pursue their interests. In this article, rationalist and sociological

institutionalism is employed to explain the pathway of domestic change. Rationalist institutionalism is based on a logic of resource redistribution and emphasizes the lack of multiple veto points and the presence of supporting institutions that facilitate change. However, for sociological institutionalism, the socialization and collective (social) learning process of norm entrepreneurs who act as agents of change are supported by a cooperative political culture which leads to the norm internalization and the development of new identities by following the logic of appropriateness.

The sociological pathway is more active when the actors are not certain about their strategy options and priorities, while the rationalist account prevails when their preferences are strictly defined with well-known strategy options. Domestic actors pass through the calculationof adaptational costs and redistribution of resources when they also use socialization and learning tools to induce change. In the scope of this article, these two explanations that are not mutually exclusive mostly converge with regard to policy processes and politics because they are not static logic considering the uninterrupted feedback processes between domestic and European levels. Sometimes, a norm entrepreneur in Turkey might be supported by a new institution, and then begin a socialization process of persuasion to convince multiple veto points in the domestic arena that hinder the EU-led change process. Likewise, if high redistributional costs are expected due to the adaptational process, a socialization pathway might be required in order to develop a new system where domestic actors can initiate a bargaining process about the distribution of costs.

Sociological institutionalism is thus based on the social learning model, according to which the EU impact happens through mediating factors such as 'the legitimacy of EU demands' and 'the legitimacy of the process' at the international level (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 18-19; Sedelmeier, 2011: 15-16), "positive normative resonance with domestic rules", "identification with the EU", and "transnational networks" working at the domestic level (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Sedelmeier, 2011: 12-14). Domestic change depends on the capabilities of institutions to develop similarities in their principles, and the ability of the actors to internalize new norms and rules through socialization processes.

Europeanization is therefore a long-term transformation project that is based on the approximation of EU and domestic interests through non-negotiable rules. It leads to the development of governance institutions at the member and candidate countries, while adapting national systems to the European norms and standards. Although Europeanization is a concept mostly attributed to member states, recent research shows that it can also be practiced to EU candidates because the EU's political conditionality directly influences the polity and the

policies in the candidate countries if the accession prospect is credible, real and consistent.

The success of Europeanization also comes from joint efforts by the EU and the candidate country in order to boost its acceptance by the domestic players. But with one big difference: When it comes to the candidate countries, it is an asymmetric relationship between unequal sides which offers the EU a chance to influence domestic policy-making processes with more coercive power, and candidate countries cannot upload their own preferences to the EU policy-making levels while, apart from some transitional periods and temporal derogations, they do not have so much room for maneuver to resist EU policies when they do not fit with their domestic preferences.

But Europeanization is not only about the adoption and implementation of EU rules, norms, policies and values in the domestic context. It is also important that the EU provides clear standards and membership prospect for the aspirant countries with a credible conditionality. In other words, the EU conditionality resides on strict conditions that the candidate country should respect in order to become a full member of the EU. As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004: 670) put it, "the dominant logic underpinning EU conditionality is a bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides external incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions".

Accession partnership documents and regular reports provide meaningful instruments for Brussels and the candidate country to identify the main points of misfit between the EU and domestic level because, in these official documents, the EU determines a list of policy priorities to be implemented in the short and medium term. On the other hand, pre-accession assistance and twinning programmes also help the candidate country to align its legislation with the EU and build bridges between the member states who might have faced similar challenges when implementing the EU legislation.

This kind of elite socialization and social learning through twinning programmes and meetings with their counterparts in Brussels provides the candidate country with the opportunity to assume the obligations of membership in a smoother and more effective way, while the pre-accession funding is a key instrument in alleviating the economic burden of the candidacy for several negotiation chapters and assist the country in rule adoption in technical fields with an easier cost-benefit calculation process. It is also noteworthy that domestic actors often put pressure on their national authorities to follow EU policies that seem beneficial for their interests (Börzel, 2001) but when it comes to the costs that incur from harmonizing with these policies, the national governments are always accused by the same actors (Börzel, 2003).

Why do Child Rights matter?

From the Middle Age period when children were considered as "small adults" to the middle of the 19th century when children began progressively acquiring specific protective rights in the workplace, child rights passed through very combative stages in history. At the beginning of the 20th century, child protection was put at the center of medical, judicial and social issues in France, and then in many other countries across Europe. The creation of the League of Nations -the precursor of the United Nations- in 1919 became another threshold where the international community pledged to elaborate on child rights with the foundation of a committee for child protection and the adoption of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 1924.

To overcome the casualties of World War II over the well-being of children, the UN Fund for Urgency for the Children, which later became UNICEF, was created in 1947 and turned into a permanent international organization in 1953 when its mandate was broadened to developing countries by helping them in education, nutrition and health matters. More than three decades after the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child by the UN General Assembly in 1989 (hereinafter UNCRC), which is a gold benchmark to measure the rights of children, the concept has gained increased importance at the international, national and European levels both in terms of policy-making and social practices.

International engagement in child rights has therefore become a powerful instrument to protect children from all kinds of rights violations and to increase their well-being standards. Children, defined by the UNCRC's Article 1 as "any human being below the age of eighteen years, unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier" (UN Commission on Human Rights) are now full-fledged holders of rights. The Committee for the Rights of the Child, which was created by the Convention in 1991, is also made responsible for periodically monitoring the signatory states through reports and annual meetings. Although all signatory countries are responsible for implementing child rights according to the UNCRC, there are very few countries that fulfill this obligation and put in place appropriate strategies.

Prioritization of child rights protection by the EU

Child rights also matter for the EU which follows the same norms and policies as the United Nations. With the development of European citizenship, the increased awareness about fundamental rights protection and the poverty-driven problems coming from the successive EU enlargement waves, the European Union's approach towards child rights protection has gradually evolved throughout the years, especially after the 1990s when the child-related issues became much more relevant in the EU agenda. Accordingly, all EU

policies should be devised and implemented in line with the child's best interests, while the Member States are also obliged to respect European and international law.

On the other hand, the European Commission regularly monitors and reports on the progress of candidate countries in various policy areas through its Regular Reports. These reports, since 1998, also track the progress made in the area of child protection in Romania and Turkey, along with other candidate countries.

Legally, the most noteworthy development for child rights at the European level, and a quantum leap initiative, is the entry into force in December 2009 the Lisbon Treaty which put among the aims of the Union the 'protection of the rights of the child' in its Article 3, and made the European Charter of Fundamental Rights binding. The Article 24 of the Charter also emphasized that children now "have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being", while their best interests should be prioritized in "all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions". The European Commission follows the principles set out in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by all EU countries.

Two years later, the 2011 Commission Communication entitled "An EU Agenda for the Rights of the Child" laid down 11 actions "to step up efforts in protecting and promoting the rights of children" including for a child-friendly justice. The European Parliament and all other EU institutions, including Europol, also began mainstreaming child rights into their legislative processes with specific actions against child abuse, child trafficking, child labor and child exploitation (European Parliament, 2012).

Since 2007, there is a specific coordinator under the European Commission tasked with dealing with the rights of the child and ensuring that the rights of the child are properly integrated into all relevant policies and actions. The responsibility for policies about children therefore falls under the responsibility the Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship. The EU funding is essential to support the implementation of EU policies in the Member States, initially by *the rights, equality and citizenship programme 2014-2020* which was replaced in 2021 by the *Citizenship, Equality, Rights and Values*.

Although there is no hard law across the Union to legally implement a comprehensive set of child rights protection rules, the EU has for years been engaged in multi-dimensional action in the field of child rights and raised the issue in the framework of its relations with third countries and throughout its enlargement process. It outsourced child rights protection by referring to the international conventions and the Council of Europe's rulings. The Treaty of

Lisbon also included the objective to promote children's rights. The EU, which follows the UNCRC's context, should make sure that all policies and actions with an impact on children must be in line with the best interests of the child.

As the EU institutions do not have enough competence to adopt binding legislation for the protection of children's rights, civil society becomes much more active in monitoring and in using their leverage in policy development. But the European Commission, in turn, uses its pre-accession funding mechanism for the capacity development of these civil society actors.

Europeanization of Romanian child rights during the accession process

As Romania witnessed severe problems before and early 1990s in the area of child protection with a skyrocketing number of international adoptions, the country's general outlook on this crucial field was unsatisfactory besides the ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990. The Romanian government began adopting some legislative changes in 1997 in terms of the adoption and protection of children with modernized social services. Until 1997, which was the turning point for the reform wave, Romania had a very poor record in terms of the number of children in public care and the number of residential institutions.

For Romania, the EU conditionality, as the main driver of changes, was supported by an encouraging domestic environment after years of strong resistance to outside pressures. Between 1989-1996, National Salvation Party ruled Romania, with the same president, Ion Iliescu, who is also the leader of the National Salvation Front (FSN). This government however did not prioritize child protection policy, with no single reform willingness despite the apparent plight of institutionalized children and child poverty.

However, the presidential elections in 1996 and the subsequent governmental change helped Romania in taking steps towards Europeanizing its child protection regime. The presence of a pro-reform domestic coalition and the state's own engagement in following European standards provided a cooperative environment. In addition to this, the EU gave clear and consistent legislative targets and a credible membership conditionality to motivate the Romanian authorities while there was strong popular support for the EU harmonization process among Romanian elites. Against the EU's normative pressure and the threat of any suspension of the membership, Romanian utility-maximizing actors followed an external incentives model (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004) where rationalist bargaining prevailed based on the cost-benefit assessments and the "reinforcement by rewards", like pre-accession assistance and the ultimate prize of membership, which exceeded the costs.

Romania submitted its application for EU membership in 1995 and accession negotiations began in February 2000 to continue until 2007 when the country joined the Union. In order to be an EU member, Romania had to fulfill the economic and political conditions – called the Copenhagen criteria – and fully adopt the *acquis communautaire*. This step required adjustment of the candidate country's legal framework to respect EU legislation in various aspects including child rights. Beginning in 2005, Romania adopted a national strategy to ensure the implementation of child rights as required by the EU, with a decentralized protection system and assuming the obligations of the *acquis communautaire*.

For Romania, the establishment of the National Authority for the Protection of Children Rights (NAPCR) under the central administration, and the development of new forms of specialized services for child protection in order to promote the de-institutionalization of child care and end the international child adoption can be cited as key developments. During the period of accession, namely 2000-2006, the number of childcare institutions was reduced significantly and many of them were organized into family-type settings.

Romania also enjoyed significant political and financial support from the EU to reform its child protection system since 1990. This support strengthened the civil society and turn them into norm entrepreneurs. During this period, the adopted legislation that focused on ending international adoption rather than reforming the child protection system led to the abuses of child adoption procedures and increased international adoptions. "In the end of 90s, it became apparent that the adoption system had become close to a market for children" (Ask The EU, 2013). The strong adoption lobby in the country made it hard for the Romanian government to harmonize its legislation with the EU and replace the large old-style residential childcare institutions with alternative child protection systems.

In the light of Romanian accession negotiations that began in February 2000, the candidate country had a strong incentive and a mentor: the EU itself. The European Commission's DG Enlargement began working very closely with the EC Delegation in Bucharest to reform the child protection system in the country and to overcome the deteriorating situation of over 100,000 abandoned children in the institutionalized care system. It is also worth mentioning that Brussels justified child protection reform in Romania by linking it with the international human rights conditionality, by creatively bringing gradual benchmarks.

Beginning with the Romanian accession process, the improvement of child rights has become a prerequisite for EU accession and achieving progress in this field became an important way of gaining international recognition for

Romania in its post-communist context when legitimizing its political choices. Romania's enthusiasm to get the membership reward and the lack of substantial veto players against EU-induced reforms helped this process to proceed relatively smoothly. The EU played an important role in the childcare deinstitutionalization reform in Romania through child protection conditionality for the accession and got support from relevant international actors such as the United Nations (UN) as well as international non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

The EU conditionality for Romanian child rights is established by the general Copenhagen criteria, the joint oversight by European Parliament and European Commission through their specific rapporteurs, country-specific progress reports since 1998 as well as financial assistance. It is also important to keep in mind that the EU showed a unified institutional firmness on child protection and coordinate its stance through joint steps of the European Commission and the European Parliament, with the partnership of the EC Delegation in Bucharest to give a strong, consistent and credible message to the Romanian government about to what extent the EU accords importance to child protection. EU conditionality for Romanian child rights aimed at harmonizing its domestic legislation and pressing for rule adoption in order to promote reform by assessing the country on its own merit and vulnerabilities, which is cross-country child adoption. The European Commission used its conditionality tool with a carrot and stick policy, recommending to the European Council to make the opening of accession negotiations with Romania conditional on the effective implementation of structural reform of childcare institutions before the end of 1999 by allocating necessary resources and by showing political will in addressing the problems of institutionalized children.

Between the years 2000 to 2006, the EU-funded multi-annual Phare programme "Children First" was implemented with a total value of € 59.5 million as a capacity-building programme in a bid to lend support to the efforts of the Romanian government to reform child protection and finance the closure of childcare institutions by replacing them with the alternatives like foster care and family-type homes. In the meantime, social assistance for families improved as well. A wide-ranging public awareness campaign also accompanied this programme in order to inform the greater public about the impact of new EU-induced reforms on the country's childcare system.

Romania also ratified the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of Inter-country Adoption in 1994 and reformed its adoption system in 1997. However, as the legislation on adoption did not accord priority to the best interest of the child, it was criticized by the European Parliament and the European Commission jointly in 2000-2001, leading the way for the Romanian government to temporarily suspend inter-country

adoptions and review the legislation. There were however conflicting perspectives between the adoption agencies, adoptive parents -the "veto agents"- and the EU. The stakes were high, while the membership bid was important. Romanian authorities therefore asked for the assistance of the Commission in drafting the new legislation that meets the EU's requirements. As a result, an Independent Panel of EU Experts on Family Law was set up by DG Enlargement in December 2002. This panel was tasked with scrutinizing whether the new Romanian draft legislation on child rights and adoption complied with the UN norms and policies as well as with the European Convention on Human Rights, and practices in the EU member countries. The panel's technical opinion came in May 2004, emphasizing that inter-country adoption is a last resort and is not a protection measure for children.

Over the years, the number of children in public care decreased in favor of extended family and foster care mechanisms, while the majority of large residential institutions had been restructured into family-type places and equipped with decent living conditions. The new Romanian legislation -Law no. 272/2004- that addressed the EU's concerns entered into force in January 2005 and inter-country adoption was not considered as a general child protection measure. The principles and rights specified in the CRC were rather prioritized. By 2005, most of the large and old-style childcare institutions had been shut down, while only 0.65 percent of Romania's 5 million children between the ages 0 and 18 were institutionalized (European Commission, 2005).

Romania became a Member State of the European Union on 1 January 2007, completing a process initiated in the mid 90's. The EU accession process was instrumental in transforming the Romanian approach and practice of the child well-being system and inter-country adoptions and brought the country in line with the EU member states by decreasing the number of children under residential care over the years. In a nutshell, Romania, which inherited a defective child protection system from its communist past, had to face several challenges on its path to EU accession. Although it ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child relatively at an early date, its legal framework as well as its institutional capacity were insufficient for meeting the UNCRC's criteria, with high rates of institutionalized children in large residential care institutions without any alternative child protection services and with responsibilities for child protection split between several ministries.

The Europeanization of Romania, like all other candidate and member countries, therefore means that the candidate country benefitted from the EU accession process to harmonize its child rights system and child protection deficiencies in line with the EU requirements and it brought its child rights system to the level required by the European Commission. This

Europeanization process required both internal accommodation – with a pro-reform domestic coalition – and external pressure – with a consistent and rewarding reference point – to generate sustainable effects. Initially, the Romanian case did not meet any of these conditions. But Romanian stakeholders perceived the costs of reform and they compared the benefits of memberships in the long run, which resulted in the transformation of the country's child protection system (external incentives model). During this whole process, the European Commission and the European Parliament acted as the main EU institutions that used their leverage to manage this challenging process. Although the EU had no specific acquis in the child protection area and delegated it to the member states to decide on their own, the Romanian accession process showed that Brussels was able to promote domestic change in its candidate country in an innovative way by "borrowing" or "outsourcing" legislation from the United Nations and implementing its own "carrot and stick" policy tools (Jacoby et.al., 2009).

In this process, the European Commission, international organizations like UNICEF and Western media have therefore acted as pressure groups in restructuring the social services system. In the meantime, the Romanian accession process provided EU policy entrepreneurs with an opportunity to integrate child protection into the EU's internal policy and to make it a part of the accession requirements for the next enlargement waves because this area was initially an area where the EU had limited jurisdiction in relation to the member and candidate countries. The EU also stuck to its promises for the Romanian accession and set a key benchmark to achieve before Romania, as a lagging country, could start negotiations: to reform its state childcare institutions.

The issue of institutionalization ranked at the top of the key criticisms voiced by the EU. For instance, British MP and EP Rapporteur Baroness Emma Nicholson conducted a campaign to end this practice and maintain public awareness by pursuing increased pressure for ongoing reforms. Bucharest, having inherited a weak administrative and political capacity from the former communist regime, had to reform its state childcare institutions and align them with international and European standards. The strong institutional bonds between Nicholson and the then-Commissioner for Enlargement, Günter Verheugen acted as the main "push factor" during the reform of child protection especially because they acted together in a consistent way for solving the children's problem. The EU used its conditionality tool to push Bucharest towards specific changes that would solve such a pressing problem as child protection. Brussels warmheartedly funded and supported Romania's reform steps for the central child protection agency, closure of old-style residential institutions, decentralization of child protection services, launching child

protection alternatives with adequate human capacity and changing public perceptions about state-run child protection.

The EU also put a suspension clause to the Europe Agreement with Romania signed on 1 February 1993 in a bid to establish close relations between the Union and Romania on political, economic and trade issues, and linked this cooperation to some conditions including the improvement of living conditions for the Romanian children. "The children's rights accession conditionality applied to Romania amounted to an interventionist policy, which radically overhauled the Romanian children's rights provision. The Romanian children's case, however, provided EU policy entrepreneurs with the window of opportunity to introduce children's rights as an EU internal policy, while in the context of EU enlargement, positive feedback effects have entrenched the protection of children's rights as an EU accession condition" (Ingi, 2012: 210). Romania's EU accession process provided the Commission's Directorate General of Justice, Freedom and Security and Directorate General of Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities as well as the European Parliament with an institutional capacity and political expertise of involvement with children's rights matters as a matter of accession condition.

In this process, the EU drew inspiration from the UN and Council of Europe's existing conventions as a form of outsourcing its membership conditionality. It also used the non-negotiable Copenhagen political criteria to challenge child protection issues on human rights grounds. By using new tools such as the Panel of independent experts on Family Law, consisting of experts on children's rights from member countries, the EU applied creative instruments that brought about substantial changes and convinced the key actors about this necessity. On the other hand, during the Europeanization process of children's rights in Romania, the European Commission (EC) and the European Parliament (EP) cooperated very actively rather than working in a piecemeal fashion. While the EC asked for the adoption of new practices such as addressing the problems in institutional care, the European Parliament demanded that some existing institutions like the old-fashioned child care are demolished and defended the new child protection regime in Romania against some external actors who tried to reopen the country to international adoptions.

However, the moratorium put on all international adoptions from Romania in 2001 faced negative reactions from national and international veto agents – mainly in Spain, France and Italy- who were considering this process as a lucrative business because Romanian parents mostly gave their children to the state-run institutions from where about 30,000 babies where then exported to adoption lobbies (Laffan, 2005). Such EU-induced pressure obliged the Romanian government to breach the moratorium in 2004 and approve more than one hundred dossiers for international adoptions due to the pressure

coming from another EU member state – Italy. In 2004, Baroness Emma Nicholson threatened to suspend Romania's accession negotiations in case Bucharest does not end the international adoption process. This "stick" – the threat of exclusion from membership- was accompanied by a much-expected carrot for the country: financial and technical assistance, as well as a membership perspective. Consequently, the number of inter-country adoptions decreased to zero in 2006. The Romanian way of handling its acute children's rights crisis is best defined by Jacoby et.al. (2009) as 'success in slow motion'. The presence of pre-accession programmes such as Phare helped Romania in implementing the EU acquis and improving its institutional capacity in line with the EU templates. The Commission also monitored Romania through its annual progress reports and set some priorities to be implemented in this process.

The accession process of Bucharest to the EU also helped to formalize the issue of children's rights as a priority in the enlargement process, with the establishment of new institutions such as a Commission Coordinator for Children's Rights under DG Justice and a European Forum on the Rights of the Child. Besides them, a Child Helpline and a Hotline for Missing Children were established within the EU in light of the requirements of the UN Convention. The European Commission's country delegations have also now 'task managers on children's rights' who are made responsible for evaluating child rights in the candidate countries. The EU's commitment to the protection of children's rights is now accepted under Article 3 of the Treaty Establishing the European Union (TEU).

Children's rights are now an inseparable part of the EU's human rights policy both inside and outside the Union. According to Jacoby et.al. (2009:115):

> The EU experienced a very slow start with Romania but it cultivated an opposition that responded to EU initiatives when that opposition took power. Moreover, the EU found three "workarounds" to the obstacles: it asserted legislative targets it did not possess itself, invented new policy tools, and drew protection for its most controversial policy from another international organization, the ECHR.

In other terms, although the EU indeed had a slim *acquis* in this area, it was however able to defend existing United Nations conventions. Thus, Brussels turned into a real agenda-setter in Romanian domestic politics.

In the meantime, in the first progress reports, the European Commission used a "blunt" language for elaborating on the child protection policies in Romania that did not have a significant leverage on policy-makers. For instance, in the Progress Report of 1999, the Commission said it was "of crucial

importance" for the Romanian government to give top priority to child protection and to assume responsibility for the wellbeing of all children under childcare institutions by providing sufficient financial resources and appropriate standards of care for all of them.

However, such a language did not generate enough outcomes for the target audience, and the Commission, changing tactics, decided to use the conditionality tool to gain more leverage over the Romanian government. Following this determination on the EU side, Romania quickly put NACPA under the supervision of the Prime Ministry, as the European Commission asked. It also allocated about 40 million dollars to assist the reform process in child rights. In the meantime, the Commission also conditioned the transfer of annual assistance of 650 million Euros between 2000-2006 on the completion of a National Strategy for the Mid-Term Development of Romania, which made the reforms in the child protection sector a legislative priority.

In a nutshell, despite lacking a hard law power in the children's rights area, the experience and expertise that was acquired by the EU during the Romanian accession process provided an innovative and successful template for the EU's overall enlargement policy. Children's rights are now formalized and became a prerequisite for the enlargement processes. The UNCRC is now an integral part of the EU children's rights instruments. As a concrete step, the human rights-related issues, including children's rights, were formalized under Chapter 23 on Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, and also under the political criteria. Chapter 23 is currently being monitored under the political criteria of the progress reports that are prepared for the candidate countries, and the progress of the reforms in this area now poses a real risk of threatening the pace of the accession negotiations with the EU.

EU conditionality produced a significant effect on Romanian child protection, and these EU actions only generated a domestic impact after getting real and sustainable support from the Romanian domestic government, which favored Europeanization, rather than blocking as its predecessors. However, it is also noteworthy that the EU was able to transform the Romanian child protection system just because it was able to offer membership as a reward and there was a receptive and pro-EU coalition in the government. EU accession process, once it begins, already provides a good incentive for reform in candidate countries. With this political change, the plight of children in the care institutions turned into a priority area to resolve. And in a nutshell, the costs of exhaustive reforms in the Romanian child protection sector were worth the benefits of EU membership.

In light of this detailed examination, it is necessary to ask ourselves whether the Europeanization of institutional child care in Romania can trigger stronger

mechanisms generating domestic change in child rights policies and institutions in Turkey. It is however noteworthy that the child protection problem in Romania does not completely overlap with those in Turkey. The main argument of this article is that whatever accession country face in the candidacy process to the EU in terms of child rights, the EU accession process can be a strong impetus to trigger a change in the domestic sphere, be it in the adoption sector or childcare facilities, or child labor and education problems. In other words, the EU has the necessary power to stimulate policy and institutional change in the candidate country if the latter allows it with a pro-EU coalition in itself, supporting institutions, and facilitating civil society actors that use the EU funding mechanism to allow sustainable change.

Any template for the next enlargement waves? Turkish case under the spotlight

The developments in Romania cannot be separated from the evolution of child rights in the EU, but they rather prompted a major shift and created a precedent in the European children's rights agenda by mobilizing all kinds of international resources to address the issue of child institutionalization. The transformation of the Romanian child protection system from a flawed system to a modernized one that meets the EU's accession criteria showed that the European Union can act as a successful agent of change by applying its conditionality effectively to transform the candidate countries in critical policy fields although each country has its own characteristic in terms of child protection policy. In other words, there are general lessons that can be drawn for the current EU policy on enlargement. Such a template could boost the impact of child rights reform across the region by reframing the tools of Europeanization for candidate countries in this specific policy area.

Similar problems about child well-being exist in the near region and especially among candidate countries to the EU, which requires taking lessons from the Romanian accession. In this sense, the creation of the EU's External Action Service under the Lisbon Treaty could provide an adequate avenue for a unified stance on child rights across the candidate countries. On the other hand, a consistent and stubborn figure such as the then EP Special Rapporteur to Romania is needed for each case of the candidate country to push forward the political will and to encourage reforms by establishing visibility to child-related priorities.

The Europeanization process in Turkey in terms of child rights accelerated when the EU declared the country's official candidate status under the Helsinki Council decision of 1999 and was able to generate change in the country through the extensive constitutional reforms and harmonization packages where the fulfillment of Copenhagen criteria has been a mobilizing factor for political

elites because the political elite perceived the cost of reforms as lesser than the reward of EU membership (external incentives). Secondly, Turkey focused on reforms because the norm entrepreneurs in the country (be it the government and/or civil society actors) were influenced by the reforms and recognized the necessity of such changes (social learning). On the other hand, the reforms were considered as a panacea for the acute problems (lesson drawing). But, the EU's external influence on child rights in Turkey has remained patchy and limited, being restricted to temporal projects, twinning programmes, experts' meetings and regular reports, without being elaborated in a consistent flow.

While thinking through whether Turkish membership is possible, a significant energy can be devoted to Turkey's adoption and implementation of the Copenhagen criteria and acquis requirements for child rights. Although it seems unrelated at first step, it will be both a tangible step for transformation within Turkey and a show of willingness from the Turkish part to align with the EU's requirements. However, for this to happen, it is critically important that two chapters, namely, Chapter 19, Social Policy and Employment and Chapter 23, Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, are immediately opened.

> The expertise and experience accumulated at the Commission level due to children's rights case in Romania are now employed in the accession negotiations with the current candidate countries. (…) For instance, in terms on institutional structures now there are task managers on children's rights in the European Commission Delegations – a position created for the first time in relation to child rights in Romania – assessing the children's rights provision in the current candidate countries. The role and function of children's rights task manager has been defined and determined by the know-how and experience accumulated due to the Commission's intervention in the Romanian case. Furthermore, the employment of benchmarks in relation to children's rights and the inclusion of this human rights area in the acquis section amount to the formalisation and further enhancement of the Commission's role regarding the promotion of the rights of the child in the EU's external dimension. According to the Commission's Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-2011, children's rights are now monitored in all current and potential candidate states (European Commission, 2010). Various aspects related to child protection and children's rights are scrutinised and assessed in these countries, for instance children's access to education is monitored in Turkey. In brief, the protection of children's rights constitutes now a sine qua non accession condition in the current enlargement process. (Ingi, 2012: 222).

Under the accession framework, Turkey has between the years 1999-2016[1] received both financial and technical assistance to align with the EU legal framework and fundamental rights, which includes the protection and promotion of the rights of the child. Such assistance helped the country in sharing the adaptational costs and facilitating the accommodation of pressure for adaptation while balancing the interests of veto agents in the country. The portfolio for financial assistance to strengthen the protection of the rights of the child in Turkey has included both national programmes with different ministries as end-beneficiaries, as well as grant projects implemented by civil society organizations (CSOs).

The need for further strengthening efforts to tackle the child labor issue was put among the short-term priorities in the field of employment and social affairs under the Accession Partnership Document dated 2001 (European Commission, 2001: 18), while in the revised document in 2003, "continuing efforts to tackle the problem of child labour" again ranked among short-term priorities, this time under the "Social Policy and Employment" title (European Commission, 2003: 47). In response to the Accession Partnership, Turkey adopted a National Programme in 2001 and the elimination of child labor was made an integral part of this first national programme. The 2003 National Programme also focussed on child labour.

In the meantime, the EU continued supporting Turkey under the pre-accession assistance with different projects (e.g. support to the Gendarme General Commander and judiciary staff to ensure children's right to a fair trial; support to the Ministry of National Education to build the capacity of institutions for the protection of children in contact with the law or at risk of coming into contact with the law; support to the Ministry of Justice to develop a risk assessment tool in accordance with EU standards for the reintegration of juveniles under probation, support to the capacity building capacities for civil society organizations working in child rights field. Some twinning projects were also conducted such as the Development of Work with Juveniles and Victims by the Turkish Probation Service, twinning with the United Kingdom (IPA 2007) and Increasing the Organizational Capacity of the Women and Children Sections of the Gendarmerie General Command, twinning with Lithuania (IPA 2015). The parties regularly came together to work on the rule adoption and implementation, while generating domestic change in the child justice system since 2005, particularly after the adoption of the new Penal Code

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[1] Note that this article takes 2016 as the end date for analyzing Turkey-EU relations in terms of child rights, because after that date the bilateral relationship began facing significant hurdles with the EU's criticisms about the democratization trends in Turkey and both sides preferred framing their relationship through a pragmatic lense by merely cooperating on technical issues and refugee management under the veil of positive agenda.

(No. 5237), new Criminal Procedures Code (No. 5271) and the Child Protection Code (No. 5395) along with secondary legislation. While the protection of children was identified as a legal requirement for the Turkish justice system, the Child Monitoring Centers (ÇİMs) were established to ensure the protection of child victims from the difficulties of the judicial processes. "Child-friendly Judicial Interview Rooms" were also developed under the "Justice for Children Project" funded by the EU and implemented by UNICEF in order to prevent further victimization of children under judiciary processes. Several experts – both from Turkey and abroad – were invited to the EU-funded conferences for sharing international best practices and developed standards for the child judicial interview rooms to be established in Turkey. UNICEF acted as the technical partner of the EU on the ground for the rule adoption in child rights.

The European Commission also financed programmes in education, child protection, protection of the rights of children with disabilities, protection and access to education for children in vulnerable situations (including children in migrant communities), and combating child labour. The Turkish Ombudsman Institution also benefited in the past years from four projects co-financed by the European Union, strengthening elite socialization dimension of Europeanization with field studies to the EU member states, twinning projects and networking. The European Commission provided support to the establishment of the ombudsman system in Turkey. The project, co-financed by the European Commission and Turkey (IPA 2011), included a technical assistance project and a twinning component with Spain and France implemented 2014-2016. This was followed by a technical assistance project and a Twinning Light with Portugal implemented in 2018-2019, with the project title "Empowerment of the Role of Ombudsman in the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights" (IPA 2015). Reform Monitoring Group (RMG) -then renamed as Reform Action Group- also convened between 2003-2014 with the presence of four Ministers, but the initiatives of this group on child rights remained limited although the issue -especially sexual assault and exploitation of children, immigration and juvenile justice- and ranked among its discussion topics.

However, the projects were conducted in a piecemeal fashion, without the existence of a pro-reform domestic coalition that is committed to improve the child rights system in line with the EU requirements, while the EU accession target lost its credibility and appeal both among the rulers and the public opinion. Now, to what extent this policy entrepreneurship will pave the way for the far-reaching reforms in the successive enlargement waves, and especially in Turkey, will remain to be seen because its success depends on whether the EU has any power in driving the reform processes in the candidate countries in the field of child rights, and whether it can still trigger domestic change by social

learning and rational calculations of the possible rewards rather than proceeding with patchy reform steps without using any membership conditionality tool.

In this sense, the outcome of EU engagement should not be necessarily based on external incentives, but it should also take inspiration from social learning models by creating epistemic communities promoting EU norms on child rights. Some civil society organizations from Turkey like Ozge-Der and Gundem Cocuk were consulted by the EU for the preparation of progress reports, but they were only invited to the meetings when they were organized by the European Union although they were very active in implementing the EU's requirements for child rights, for instance in the juvenile justice sector. On the other hand, another NGO active in child rights, Gundem Cocuk, prepared a report about police violence against children in Turkey and submitted it to the United Nations under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture. Then, the report was examined in detail by Turkey's ombudsperson tasked with child rights and led her to issue a ruling about using violence by police forces against children which was sent to the provincial authorities and police forces. Civil society, which uses its international and EU contacts to induce change, should be therefore much more involved in this process to boost the sustainability and social acceptance of the reforms. As "outsider reformers need to build informal links with insiders if they are to succeed in promoting lasting changes" (Jacoby et.al, 2009: 113), Turkish authorities and NGOs generate domestic change in terms of child rights as long as they keep their informal and formal links through networking, regular meetings, twinning projects and pre-accession funding.

What is clear is that Brussels instrumentalized child rights policy to transform Romania in line with the European and international standards, while a similar outcome can only be expected for Turkey if and only if key negotiation chapters such as the judiciary and fundamental rights as well as justice, freedom and security are opened. The outcome can only be visible and sustainable with the opening of these chapters where elite socialization and rule adoption will trigger domestic change because the reward of membership will be real and tangible.

Conclusion

Much of the debate about Turkish membership in the EU has focused on cultural comparisons or political obstacles. However, this focus ignores the need for building mutual trust and developing innovative strategies for cementing mutual values. One of the greatest achievements of the EU lies in reforming its child rights system through the accession process by merging both external pressure and getting internal accommodation from national and transnational actors. This article claimed that with the entrepreneurship of the

EU following the improvement of child rights during the Romanian accession process, the experience that was acquired can inspire successive enlargement waves and further energize the ties between Brussels and the candidate country by encouraging rule adoption and restructuring domestic institutions in line with the EU rules and standards. The increased importance accorded by the EU to human rights since the 2004 enlargement and to child rights since the 2007 enlargement should provide a new perspective to those who study Europeanization from a wider perspective. Such a perspective is very important in re-conceptualizing Turkey-EU relations through a specific but "concrete" angle that can be translated into tangible outcomes for children and for Turkey's membership bid as well.

The EU has essentially a thin *acquis* in this area and child rights is a field for member and candidate countries to decide on their own. But, Brussels "was able to essentially outsource the writing of substantive conditions by drawing on existing United Nations conventions and then credibly defend them in ways the UN had been unable to do" (Jacoby et.al., 2009: 113). It is also necessary to underline that unlike the other supportive institutions like UNICEF that help the candidate country on the ground in reforming its child protection regime, the EU has political conditionality to sustain the rule adoption process.

Romania's challenges related to the democratic and economic transition passed through a process in which the conditionality tool of the EU assumed an important role in the Europeanization of public policies. Due to the similar Turkish and Romanian general flaws in terms of child protection, the examination of the long-running experience of Romania during its accession period, with all its successes and inherent failures, is very convenient and can be taken as a "mirror example" for avoiding same mistakes to be repeated, taking some exemplary practices to emulate and acknowledging that the EU involvement produced different impacts over the child protection system of the candidate countries. In order to re-generate Turkey's ties with the EU and pass beyond a strategic partnership model that is only based on positive agenda, Brussels should be more specific about how the Copenhagen criteria can be handled during accession negotiations and what is the role of child rights in giving more substance to this critical process. Such a step could re-define what membership would mean for both parties and what both parties expect from this process. As long as the EU focuses on social policy issues, such as child rights, in a more consistent and determinant way, it will also boost the image of the EU in the eyes of the candidate country's ordinary citizens and will mobilize both internal accommodation and elite socialization that will build further bridges between the parties for successive cooperation avenues and help them in better framing the cost-benefit ratio of Turkish membership.

Finally, it is also noteworthy that the Europeanisation process implies a certain change of hearts and minds of domestic authorities in the candidate countries to sustain the change. Thus further research into the relevant officials' and institutions' approach in Turkey and in Romania is needed to explain the long-term impact of the Europeanisation process.

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THE EU'S DIGITAL EQUATION: RE-REGULATING THE EU'S KNOWLEDGE, POWER, AND SOVEREIGN RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF ITS UNDERSTANDING OF GOVERNMENTALITY[*]

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Abstract

The European Union complements its political and economic integration with digital and technological policies in order to align itself with digitalization and technological progress. As the EU digitalizes and harmonizes itself with technology, it aims to incorporate its citizens, member states, and global technology companies within this process of harmonization. With this new approach, the EU establishes the practices of neoliberal digital governmentality, which engage with the equation of sovereignty, power, and knowledge in a data-centric order. This is because, in today's world, data determines knowledge, shapes the subject, transforms the international system. In such a situation, the EU lays out its own particular models of power and attempts to control and discipline the international system. Hence, this article aims to explicate – through the EU's digital policies – that the EU has developed new dispositifs that will allow it to maintain its governmentality in the digital sphere. Embracing Foucault's post-structuralist approach, this article consists of four main sections as well as the introduction and conclusion. The first section includes Foucault's terminology. The second section analyses Foucault's understanding of neoliberal governmentality. The third section engages in the relationship between digitalization, data, and the individual. The fourth section examines the EU's practices of governmentality with respect to digitalization.

Keywords: Data, Digitalisation, Knowledge, Power, Foucault, the EU.

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AB'NİN DİJİTAL DENKLEMİ: AB'NİN GÜÇ, BİLGİ VE İKTİDAR İLİŞKİLERİNİN YÖNETİMSELLİK ANLAYIŞI IŞIĞINDA YENİDEN DÜZENLENMESİ

Öz

Avrupa Birliği (AB) dijitalleşme ve teknolojik gelişimle uyumlu olabilmek için siyasal ve ekonomik entegrasyonunu dijital ve teknolojik politikalarla bütünleştirmektedir. AB kendini dijitalleştirirken ve teknolojiye uyumlu hale getirirken aynı zamanda vatandaşlarını, üye devletlerini ve küresel teknoloji şirketlerini söz konusu uyumlaşmanın bir parçası haline getirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu yeni yaklaşımıyla AB, dijital neoliberal yönetimsellik uygulamaları inşa etmektedir. AB'nin dijital neoliberal yönetimsellik uygulamaları iktidar, güç ve bilgi denklemini veri odaklı bir düzen içinde ele almaktadır. Çünkü veri bugünün dünyasında bilgiyi belirlemekte, özneyi şekillendirmekte ve uluslararası sistemi değiştirmektedir. Böylesi bir durumda AB; kendine has iktidar modelleri ortaya koymakta, uluslararası sistemi kontrol ve disipline etmeye çalışmaktadır. Dolayısıyla makalenin amacı, AB'nin dijital alanda yönetimselliğini devam ettirebileceği yeni dispozitifler geliştirdiğini, AB'nin dijital politikaları üzerinden izah etmeye çalışmaktır. Foucault'nun post-yapısalcı yaklaşımını benimseyen makale, giriş ve sonuç bölümlerinin yanı sıra dört ana bölümden meydana gelmektedir. İlk bölümde Foucault'nun terminolojisine yer verilmektedir. İkinci bölümde Foucault'nun neoliberal yönetimsellik anlayışı analiz edilmektedir. Üçündе bölümde dijitalleşme, veri ve birey ilişkisi ele alınmaktadır. Dördüncü bölümde ise AB'nin dijitalleşmeye ilişkin yönetimsellik uygulamaları incelenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Veri, dijitalleşme, bilgi, iktidar, Foucault, AB.*

Introduction

As digital technologies and social media platforms take over more of daily life, data and knowledge have become more valuable than ever. Subjects and objects are created through digitally produced and consumed interactions in the online world. This situation not only causes epistemological and ontological change of data, but also forces the restructuring of the international system in this context. Hence, the complex relationship between knowledge-subject and knowledge-power is being restructured once again. This ever so digitalization of daily life not only forced the regulation of subject-object interactions, but it became so big that it eventually started an inevitable power and authority struggle between the nation-states and global technology companies. Along with digital subjectivity, issues of digital security, property and sovereignty

come to the fore. The EU has enhanced certain regulations which consist of not only its own digitalization process but also the balance between nation-states and global technology companies. It should be noted at this point that in a new digital world where data is more valuable than ever, where knowledge is constructed and subjects are defined, the EU deploys a particular set of governmentality techniques and strategies in achieving its objectives. The EU aims to be a leading example in taming and regulating the digital world for the rest of the international community.

This article provides an analysis – through knowledge-subject and power-sovereign relations– of how the EU engages with the digital world, and, the article examines the power struggle between nation-states and global technology companies in the context of neoliberal governmentality. Hence, this article aims to explicate – through the EU's digital policies – that the EU has developed new dispositifs that will allow it to maintain its governmentality in the digital sphere. The article has a poststructuralist approach and it benefits from Foucault's notion of governmentality as its theoretical background. It also carries out a profound investigation of the epistemological and ontological change in the knowledge-power-subject-data relationship. Through the example of the EU, it explicates the questions as to why data has become so important, how it determines knowledge, what kind of power relationship it establishes and what kind of power theme it transforms these power relations into. It especially looks into how the position that the EU has taken in the age of digital surveillance brings about changes in its neoliberal governmentality; as the relationship among knowledge-truth-power-subject is constructed once again. In this regard, this article provides an analysis as to how the EU utilizes its digital regulations as a neoliberal dispositif, including extensively examining the utilization of digital normative regulations.

Relying on this information, this article embraces a research strategy that elucidates the EU's policies on data and digitalization through Foucault's theory of governmentality. Official sources, including the statements of the EU authorities and leaders of Member States are examined throughout the writing process of this article. Consequently, the article attempts to establish the power relations that form the EU's approach to governmentality. It scrutinizes discursive and normative texts in order to explain the approach with respect to data. It examines the EU's official sources (agreements, by-laws, directives, communiqués, strategy documents etc.) as primary sources.

This is because the article asserts that the EU resorts to its digital regulations to reinforce its digital normative structure, to enable the determination of the normal, and even to solidify the Union's economic and political integration. As the EU's approach to neoliberal governmentality is evaluated in epistemological and ontological terms, the scope of the article includes the

EU's behaviour, the experiences of subjectivity that the individual is exposed to by the EU, and the link between member states and the third parties that they have relations with. The article is structured in a way to first provide a clear and understandable explanation of essential concepts and phrases from the Foucauldian viewpoint. Second, it evaluates neoliberalism from the Foucauldian perspective. Thirdly, it provides evaluations of the EU's digitalization venture and subjectivity practices to which its exposes the subject. Fourthly, it examines the EU's practices of governmentality concerning digitalization.

Discourse, Dispositif, Knowledge, Subject, and Data

The EU's neoliberal transformation is constantly being constructed through knowledge-subject and power-sovereign relations. The neoliberal policies of the EU – which shape it based on a theme of continuity – are a result of the rationality process. The rationality[1] process here concentrates on progressive language, freedom, and collective consciousness. At this stage, this "neoliberal rationality"[2] reveals itself as it develops a governmentality approach that incorporates power, knowledge, and subject. Hence the relationship among discourse, dispositif, knowledge, and data, and indeed how they shape the domain of governmentality are extremely important.

Thus, discourse provides materiality to a word, enables its circulation and its service to certain things, allows for its concealment, enables or disables the materialization of a desire, enables it to be against or for certain interests, and allows for the inclusion of this word in the contexts of conflict and struggle (Foucault, 2012: xi). Fundamentally, discourse is a series of governmental phrases (Foucault, 1972: 21-40; A. van Dijk, 2014: 10-14). From a Foucauldian perspective, discourse is a series of words, actions, institutions, and infrastructures that are coherent in themselves and produce new truth regimes, and are not solely related to words (Cresswell, 2009: 211-214). Also – as a name given to all practices and relations arranged in an organization or system – discourse has features such as the ability to change the object or practices that it engages, and to establish special connections (Foucault, 2016: 33-68). It is this structure that enables the involvement of discourse in a production process and its formation of knowledge (Foucault, 2016: 33-68; McHoul, 2006). Moreover, the content of discourse includes ideas and meanings and is not solely related to the language (Foucault, 2016: 33-68). In this context, all

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[1] In Foucauldian studies, the concept of rationality indicates globality. The concept of rationality is used as the capitalist rationality.

[2] From a Foucauldian point of view, neoliberal rationality is completely accepted as the general norm for the historical formation and life. It, also, represents the rationality of a capitalism that is relieved of its archaising references.

practices and relations that are arranged in an organization or system are accepted as discourse. Discourse determines the scope of society's style of thought and defines its boundaries, and indeed enables such societies to focus on certain thoughts (Baumgarten and Ullrich, 2016: 13-38). As a strategic concept, it plays an active role in shaping the power-sovereign relationship (Wandel, 2011: 370-372).

From this viewpoint, it is not wrong to make the assessment that it is in the nature of discourse that the system either determines or directs all practices and relations. In fact, discourse is a product of systemization (Foucault, 2016: 77-78). A product of systemization that is transferred from mouth to ear indeed (Foucault, 2016: 78). The thing that is being explained here is the reproduction of the already existing phrases and their integration into the existing system. The relevant methods are the pedagogically available in certain technical units, institutions, behavioural schemes, and categories of transfer and expansion that both force and maintain discursive practices (Foucault, 2012: 226).

Discourse is not aimed at neutralizing events, joining the silent thing, or reducing the intensity of events; on the contrary, it tends to secure the continuity of events during intensity and to uncover events in its own peculiar chaos (Foucault, 1981: 51-78). The reason for this is that discourse is heavily subject to the practices of power (Foucault, 1981: 51-78; Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 521-547), as the essential role of discourse is to turn knowledge into an object of political practice through language (Foucault, 1991: 53-72). The EU's discourse also helps it legitimize its power practice. The EU's governmentality is partly based on its depiction as a normative power (as an entity which defines "the normal" for its others) and it is reproduced through its discourse on norms and values, and, by its definitions of the normal and its standardization policies.

As a tool of power, the dispositif serves the dominant strategic function that makes power visible. Hence, the dispositif is the second important concept that needs to be touched upon. From Foucault's perspective, "dispositif" is the name given to all tools (apparatuses) of governmentality that determine the relationship between knowledge and power (Foucault, 1980: 194-198). The dispositif is an apparatus that explains the links between events through social analyses – either discursive or otherwise (Peltonen, 2004: 205-219) – that always incorporates concrete strategic functions, is not independent of history, is concerned with providing an urgent response, and is positioned within power relations (Agamben, 2009: 3; Bussolini, 2010: 88; Foucault, 1980: 194-195). Moreover, over time, the dispositif becomes inseparable and even operates like an analytical mechanism that is interconnected and derivative (Ditrych, 2013: 226).

Essentially, the dispositif is the totality of the process, namely the actions, carried out to achieve a certain goal. Hence, all the processes that construct the dispositif need to be assessed together. At this point, the concepts of knowledge, power, data, and sovereignty demand explanation. Knowledge is an assessment carried out by processing data (Boisot and Canals, 2004: 43-67). Moreover, knowledge is also a cluster of factional or ideational phrases that are organized and lead to a reasoned judgment or experimental result (Bell, 1979: 163-168). Although the definitions above are not in line with the Foucauldian perspective, they illustrate the gist of the concept. Nevertheless, the Foucauldian perspective acknowledges the fact that knowledge is constituted in a social context and that it brings about power, or vice versa (Nola, 1998: 109).

Knowledge and power are intertwined concepts. For Francis Bacon, they even signify the same meaning as according to Bacon the acquisition of knowledge and its governance is an indication of the ability to wield power (Nola, 1998). Foucault, on the other hand, articulates that the concept of power acquires meaning through the influence of the truth regime. Hence, power is an apparatus that aims to establish the truth regime, helps systemize sovereign governance, and enables the correction of abnormalities (Vallebona and Weber, 2018: 262; Manokha, 2009: 430).

Discourse's ability to constitute knowledge solidifies the effective role of knowledge in social, cultural, and political practices. It is not wrong to propound that, as a formative system, the most precious source of discourse is knowledge (Foucault, 1972: 64-71). Hence – as an object of desire that is attained in different historical forms and the human mind is compelled to approach– knowledge's characterization on the basis of the relationship between truth and power reveals how discursive practices are utilized in the neoliberal sphere of governmentality. This is because the thing that determines discourse is the transmission of knowledge and the truth created by knowledge. The main source of all this systemization and direction is power and the relations it establishes with other actors and instruments.

According to Foucault, behind knowledge, there is a wall which is not knowledge (Foucault, 2012: 204). Knowledge acquires an epistemic form within this complex structure, and it is ontological as it attempts to clarify the extent of reasoning that discourse provides for the rightness value. Hence, discourse seeks knowledge, knowledge seeks truth, truth seeks right. As a strategic product, knowledge is not an element that is acquired with the acquisition of truth; on the contrary, it is a source that produces truth (Foucault, 2012: xvi-xix). Knowledge is invented and subsequently, truth is invented (Foucault, 2012: xvi-xix). Thus, truth is an object of knowledge (Foucault, 2012: xvi-xix).

On the other hand, Foucault considers knowledge as something that accompanies certain types of power (Love, 1989: 280). In short, knowledge becomes functional as a method of production of power (Giddens, 1994: 57-58). Hence, this generates the need for the evaluation of knowledge, power, and sovereignty to be inseparable concepts (Arnason, 2012: 295-299). In his lecture on the 24th of January 1979, Foucault articulated that he considers sovereignty to be the gist of power as, according to him, knowledge is a dispositif that defines the relations between power and the sovereign. Based on this information, it must be indicated that in fact, for Foucault, the concept of the sovereign corresponds to the actors that hold power (Foucault, 1998). Here, the sovereign, with its own dispositifs, constantly re-regulates the society and – through knowledge and power – it creates distinct methods for disciplining bodies.

For the EU, dispositifs are the key to its further domination over the online world, post-digitalization, as today's struggle is based on data, and the information created from data. Data becomes an ever-valuable notion. Ownership of knowledge in the digitalized world requires the ability to keep pace with technology and its progression. The EU takes many steps in this regard, prominent examples of which are the 95/46/EC Directive[3], the 2000/31/EC Directive (E-Commerce Directive)[4], and the GDPR[5]. Moreover, the EU portrays a desire to produce a digital constitution in order to increase its pace, be positioned at the centre of knowledge in the digitalized world, and integrate neoliberal policies into the field of digital technology (De Gregorio, 2021).

The 95/46/EC Directive, the E-Commerce Directive and the GDPR envision the EU's approach to data governance and are, in essence, the EU's methods of power production with respect to the digital sphere. The regulations in question are essential elements of the process towards an EU strategy for a single digital market; relatedly, they also serve as the dispositifs of the neoliberal approach the EU maintains in the digital sphere. Hence, these regulations explain how the EU determines and utilizes digital knowledge, as well as what kind of a digital

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[3] The 95/46/EC Directive is the first legal instrument that regulates the protection of personal data within the EU. The Directive is prepared to coordinate the collection, processing, and storage of commercially acquired personal data in accordance with human rights (Aldhouse, 1999: 75-79).

[4] As a dispositif that regulates the EU's digital competition policies, the E-Commerce Directive is a text that pertains to the legal conduct of e-commerce in the EU territories and aims to ensure the free movement of information society services in the internal market (Commission of the European Communities, 2000).

[5] The GDPR is a legal text that provides epistemological and ontological content on data, the subject, global technology companies, and other actors, as well as regulating data technology with data economy (Albrecht, 2016: 287-289; Vatanparast, 2020: 821).

truth regime it establishes for this purpose. From a different perspective, the aforementioned regulations establish the EU's struggle for power in the digital sphere.

Another important concept, which is central to most Foucauldian perspectives, is the subject. The subject is the most strategic element of neoliberal governmentality. The subject is the individual who is exposed to certain experiences of subjectivity along the axis of knowledge and power and who is articulated as the passive object of power (Foucault, 2011: 64). Foucault argues that sovereigns intentionally create subjective experiences in order for individuals to become subjects (Heller, 1996: 78). Therefore, the forms of power create subjects who are subject to others through control and dependency and, also, are dependent on their self-identity through conscience and self-knowledge (Foucault, 2011: 63). Hence the individual is transformed into a subject of the sovereign and is not involved in an opposition to topple it.

The subject encounters the fields of knowledge that limit its actions against subjectivity. Naturally, the relevant fields of knowledge make a claim to speak the truth. Truth is the game of discourse that progresses along with knowledge as its object (Foucault, 1980: 133). The game of truth is a relationship of governmentality aimed at the thing that has become an object of thought through certain propositions and concepts. Indeed, depending on this situation, truth experiences its last change. Eventually, it subjectifies itself as a result of the subjective circumstances it encounters.

However, knowledge is not the only thing that subjectifies the subject. The forms of power that impose identities on the individual and put the individual in the place of the subject of these identities also subjectify the subject. In short, the power practices that involve knowledge run a process of the subjectification of the individual. Although identity is experiential and historical, it is also a cluster of subjective experiences that are imposed by governments (Foucault, 2019). This process is normative and regulatory. Indeed, according to the neoliberal paradigm, it is a result of a tendency to expose the subject to disciplinary dispositifs. Knowledge – which valorizes the history of both the fields of knowledge and normative power practices – subjectifies the72ubjectt as it affects the behaviours of individuals. The individual both represents this process in their mind and exposes themself to this process.

At this point, there is a need to concentrate on the concept of data to see its relationship with power and knowledge and, of course, governmentality, because the collection and procession, as well as the regulation of data, have become crucial dispositifs. Today, data is in a different place than before, as with the advent of digitalization data leads to changes in power balances. Moreover, it provides new connections between the object of knowledge and

the techniques of power. Therefore, first, the experiences of subjectivity and second, the sphere of sovereignty are reconstructed.

Data is, of its nature, non-directional, neutral numbers, words, and symbols that do not mean anything by themselves (Sanders. 2016: 223-228). Data is a form of modelling that is used to obtain desired outputs and the smallest particle of knowledge; in other words, the nucleus of knowledge (Medeni and Aktas, 2010: 1-5). Data acts like a mechanism that is valuable as much as the attributed meanings and, moreover, like a mechanism that transforms knowledge, power, subject, and sovereign relations from an epistemological material to an ontological one. In fact, it is noticeably clear as to why humans have struggled to analyze data for thousands of years[6].

The EU, on the other hand, exposes the individual to the new practices of securitization as it engages with normative processes that are centred around data and data security. In actuality, the relevant norms that embrace a positive language create subjects that discipline themselves. The guidance provided for digital customers in Europe's "2030 Digital Compass"[7] include similar expectations. Also, nowadays – independent of nation states – global technology companies can obtain and use data and, further, they can establish a new international system. Hence, due to data and related information, global technology companies hold the power to control and discipline the individual, nations, and even the international system. This extremely complex and extraordinary situation will probably lead to existential questions about the nation-state in the future. For all these reasons, the concept of data needs to be boldly underlined.

In this situation, what is the essence of knowledge that the EU wants to provide individuals with? The EU provides individuals with twofold

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[6] The reason for the development of writing in Antique Mesopotamia is the effective record-keeping and tracking by bureaucrats. Due to writing, numerous data about Antique Mesopotamia is accessible. Since the Bible, governments can easily decide on their policies as they can compile enormous clusters of data about their citizens. Data, which is ineffective and neutral in itself, is now transformed into a part of the analysis about the individual. All these developments indicate that data is used as a tool of making final decisions and this feature constitutes the essential layer of its ontology.

[7] As it aims to deepen the digital internal market, the 2030 Digital Compass intends to improve and increase the harmony between the technological transformation and the digitalised public order and infrastructure of the EU, its digital business world and its digitalised citizen. Naturally, data is a crucial source during this process as it serves as the shortest path to digital knowledge. On the other hand, algorithmic tools also support the EU's digitalisation voyage. Hence, as the EU continues to digitalise, it constantly utilises algorithmic tools. Innovations aimed at digital progress, such as e-health, the digital identity card, and cloud storage networks are among the EU's digital goals for 2030 (European Commission, 2021).

knowledge: The first one is discursive knowledge. It subjectifies individuals through the construction of a progressive European identity which can be called historical episteme. It also essentially incorporates instructions like freedom, adaptation, and responsibility. The second one is the non-discursive knowledge perspective that exposes individuals to normalization practices, the regulatory apparatuses of normative power systems and the disciplinary dispositifs of the system.

What, then, is the subject that the EU wants to create? The EU creates a subject that is loyal to normative regimes and political restrictions, completely devoted, individualized, exposed to competition and that learnt to be an active and autonomous subject, approved to be exposed to technics that aim for their engagement with the other[8]. As with all other societies that have embraced modernity, the EU subjectifies the individual on the condition that they are subordinated to itself. Also, the subjectification that the EU exposes the individual to existentially involves the execution of economic and political knowledge. The individual is responsible for both their own and others' behaviours. The EU, which seeks economic solutions even for political problems, exposes the subject to a subjectivity that is accountable and can be held accountable. Hence, the individual internalizes certain identities within the boundaries drawn for them. As the individual relates the boundaries of the identities provided for them to their existence, they experience a natural acceptance in their consciousness. Eventually, the individual – either intentionally or unintentionally – becomes the subject of subjective experiences.

A Foucauldian interpretation of this would suggest that this is a technique of neoliberal governmentality to subordinate and dominate the individual. That is to say, Foucault calls the convergence of domination techniques on others and self-techniques as governmentality (Dardot and Laval, 2018: 9). Thus, elaborating on the concept of governmentality facilitates an understanding of the EU's governmentality. It also clarifies the points of convergence between the EU's digital governmentality and the changing nature of knowledge as it establishes how the balance within the relationship between governmentality and knowledge-data-subject is formed, and indeed how neoliberalism contributes to this.

Foucault's Neoliberal Governmentality

What Foucault attempts to articulate with governmentality is that it is a dispositif that acts as an intermediary in the relationship between power and the subject and combines the technologies of selfhood with the tools of domination

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[8] The other is seen as the population that is excluded from normalisation processes or refuse to accept or fail to internalise normalisation practices.

(Foucault, 2015). Foucault states that the concept of governmentality indicates three main points (Foucault, 2009: 144): Firstly, the concept of governmentality is a form of technical and technological governance that incorporates the population in certain strategies, tactics, analyses, and calculations while adhering to political economy's knowledge and security apparatuses (Foucault, 2009; Tellman, 2010: 290-298; Merlingen, 2011: 152-153). Second, the concept of governmentality is a technique that develops knowledge through a series of government apparatuses. Finally, the concept of governmentality is a process of statization.

At the centre of Foucault's concept of governmentality lies the focal points of success and failure, not an investigation of legitimacy or illegitimacy. Foucault advocates that governmentality is a governmental perspective that shapes behaviours, subjects, lifestyles, and draws the conceptual boundary between the state and society (Foucault, 1991: 22-36; Foucault, 2015: 17-29; Lorenzini, 2018: 161). In short, governmentality, which rationalises the governmental practices in the implementation of political sovereignty, is a technical and technological dispositif that designs the relationship between the sovereign and the subject on the basis of the relationship between knowledge and power (Lemke, 2012: 12-17).

According to Foucault, neoliberal governmentality regulates extant governmentality as an extreme form of the liberal truth regime (Oksala, 2013: 54). Rather than a top-down governance mechanism, neoliberal governmentality is about the internal government of individuals. This model, which emerged after the industrial revolution, is strictly loyal to the doctrine of neoliberalism, concerned with political economy, and essentially concerned with freedom.

The new art of government requires freedom and needs to benefit from liberties (Mckinlay and Pezet, 2018: 61). Benefitting from liberties leads to the need for the concurrent production of liberties. Hence, the perspective of "I will produce what liberates you and provide you with the freedom of liberty" (Foucault, 2015: 54-55) is a discourse that constructs the field of neoliberal governmentality. Thus, to enable freedom, the focus is on the free movement of labour, capital, and goods (Dardot and Laval, 2018). This movement is also one that is needed by capitalism. It needs to be freely actualized and secured as well. This is actually the starting point of Foucault's security society.

The reason for establishing the required mechanisms to secure freedom and govern the world and things is that governmentality is a technical instrument. Instead of legislating reality, that is to say, transforming reality by forbidding or

ordering reality, placing reality under surveillance[9] is also an outcome of the same strategy. The gist of the governmentality approach is to scientifically determine what path reality will follow, determine the potential problems on this path, take the necessary measures to prevent these problems or be of the opinion that it will resolve these problems once they have occurred. It is a governmentality that places the subject, knowledge, truth, power, and sovereignty on an extremely technological and technical infrastructure (Lemke, 2012; Lorenzini, 2018).

The key point of the governmentality approach is instead of directly intervening in reality, to accept reality as it is. However, it is also governing reality by estimating the path reality will follow. In this way, the link between knowledge and security is established. Thus, what is meant by government is not ruling and forbidding. The government is accepting of the existence as it is, providing a field for freedom and enabling all these to progress and develop as part of state policy. This is what Foucault means by the process of statization (Dean, 2018: 40-53). The neoliberal governmentality approach aims to curb the political engagement of the individual, determine the adequate models of behaviour for the individual, include the individual in a performance process and expose the individual to certain supervisory technologies in accordance with these models of behaviours (Leander and van Munster, 2007: 201-216). The essential feature of neoliberal governmentality that distinguishes it from disciplinary power reveals itself at this stage.

Digitalisation, Data, and the Individual

Neoliberalism exposes the individual to subjectification practices. Foucault interprets subjectification as the ideational and behavioural change in the subject in accordance with their subjective intentions due to the influence of power relations (Foucault, 1998). Subjectification is an experiential relationship that the individual establishes with themself. Hence, neoliberal rationality is the development of a form of pleasure and performance mechanism during the subjectification of the individual (Foucault, 1998). It attempts to unify the individual and world by transforming performance into pleasure and considering pleasure as performance. The performance relationship above is so important that the individual thinks itself as the world and the world as themself. Undoubtedly, this leads to an ontological transformation in the subject. To even argue the following is not an exaggeration and is fitting for the practical situation: the neoliberal subject eternalzes itself to the extent that there is no place left for the other in the life of the neoliberal subject.

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[9] What is meant by surveillance is close monitoring, not controlling.

This is the largest obstacle to the digital individual. The digital individual becomes a subject like the Leibnizian concept of the "monad", which is closed to external influences, and changed and moved under its own internal effects. The subjectivity approach on the part of the individual who is only divisible by themself and cannot go beyond themself is designed by neoliberalism on the basis of sentiments like performance and pleasure. This strengthens the functioning of digital governmentality as the concept of performance is not limited to success in business, but it also incorporates success in all other processes. Hence, the subjectification venture of the digital subject begins by the voluntary transfer of all their data to the digital sphere in the name of experiencing the sentiment of performance and pleasure. In short, the performance subjects of neoliberalism now occupy digital life.

Neoliberal governmentality constantly subjects the individual to measurement through certain mechanisms. As they systematize, control and discipline mechanisms utilize the techniques of normalization (Mckinlay and Pezet, 2018: 59). What Foucault attempts to stress via the techniques of normalization is the technology that enables population management (Foucault, 2013: 49-75). First, a norm is determined. Then, by drawing a distinction between the normal and abnormal on the basis of this norm, the population is controlled. *Raison d'etat* thus determines the tools and practices of governmentality. Similar connections are relevant to the EU's understanding of neoliberal governmentality, which is portrayed in the GDPR. As the GDPR provides the digital subject with certain liberties, the subject is also exposed to certain disciplinary techniques. For instance, while the right to be forgotten, as an important element of the GDPR, grants the data subject the right to self-determination, it also creates a new area of fragility for the data subject. This right renders the data subject, who is forced to constantly discipline himself/herself against algorithms that process data, dependent on the EU's disciplinary apparatuses. The EU aims to discipline both global technology companies and the data subject by controlling technology companies through the GDPR. Consequently, the EU is able to maintain its neoliberal governmentality in the digital sphere through its disciplinary dispositifs.

The transformation in digitalization begins via these processes. In the past, the state (and *raison d'etat*) used to produce and collect information on the individual through its own technologies; now, technology companies do the work for it. Although states do not intend to delegate leadership, the change in the balance of power leads to a change in the hierarchical relationship between the nation-state and global technology companies. Second, as an object of knowledge, the individual creates their own phenomena by getting involved in a sphere of reality among the techniques of power. Thus, possible information begins producing new objects with data. While every data produced becomes a

new object, it is placed in the position of the subject of power techniques and data. Due to the existing techniques, in the cycle of object and subject, these two reciprocally produce each other. As knowledge positions the object – namely the individual – by means of data, the individual takes up a position of the subject of data.

Beyond the concept of technology which controls the population, a power model in which technology is technologized reveals itself as well. On the one hand, this power model transmits new experiences of subjectivity on the basis of the relationship between pleasure and performance, whilst on the other, it produces technologies that expose the individual to tracking mechanisms. The neoliberal human being is a competitive one, and completely embedded in the global competition (Dardot and Laval, 2018: 362). Hence, performance and pleasure are vital to the individual in order to enable the greatest happiness and increase the effectiveness of neoliberalism. This is because the greatest happiness facilitates the systemisation of the subject. The subject, who considers themself to be hierarchically superior to the other, voluntarily embraces the practices of subjectification in order to integrate into the system. Thus, normalization processes are streamlined, and the effectiveness of the techniques of control and discipline is also increased. The individual, who is completely under the neoliberal sphere of influence, is positioned as the object of their own data and adds more data to their digital property[10] in order to feel more pleasure. The individual, finally, learns how to be an active and independent subject (Dardot and Laval, 2018: 375).

In such an order, the ontology of data is concentrated on two points. Firstly, data is an essential source that greatly empowers the knowledge economy. As they feature in the digital domain, companies transform the production of knowledge into an economic structure. In particular, global companies collect customers' information through the apps they develop and re-organize company strategies like marketing, purchasing, and communication, based on the information obtained. This situation gives rise to the need to collect, store, and analyze clusters of data.

Secondly, data is itself transformed into an economic source. Today, all the information added by the individual in the online world constitutes an economic source for companies in the digital domain. As they purchase this information from online platforms, companies open new spaces for capital. For example, the fact that a hospital's check-up department runs a Facebook advertising campaign only for cardiac patients over the age of 65 demonstrates how valuable data is as an economic source.

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[10] Zuboff (2019: 167) states that "the digital tracks that a consumer leaves when using a network are the property of that consumer".

While the abundance of data and the increase in its quality in the neoliberal order, embolden the competition sentiment on the part of global technology companies, it also leads nation-states to transfer more funds, technology, and technic into this domain. As it is a technique of power, competition is also an indispensable element of data. Both nation-states and global technology companies come under the influence of the concept of competition that lies at the centre of neoliberalism. This is because the extensive social transformation that the digital world brings about affects the international competitiveness of the digital industry (Wladawsky-Berger, 2019). A serious field of competition to acquire, store, and use data – if required – is established both within nation-states and technology companies and between nation-states and global technology companies.

Data is now a tremendously valuable source with which to determine knowledge. That is to say, data is no longer a neutral source but rather an economic and political value. For exactly these reasons, the EU develops numerous digitalization strategies to avoid being excluded from the system and even to move ahead and shape the system. In this context, the EU focuses on fundamental texts like the EU Toolbox for 5G Security, the EU Digital Strategy, the European Data Strategy, the White Paper on Artificial Intelligence, the Artificial Intelligence Act Proposal, and the Digital Services Act. These texts discipline the individual, member states, and third-party actors, and also include regulatory and controlling mechanisms.

Another issue is that the fact that data as a strong source of capital encourages technology companies to obtain more data. This situation, in turn, paves the path for more data processing and data's exposure to technical analysis. The European Commission's plan for artificial intelligence reveals itself at this point. In this context, the Commission's proposal for artificial intelligence promises to forestall the fragile structure of the digital domain and protect against the negative implications of data-centric technologies (Lilkov, 2021). However, the relevant analyses produce calculable subjects that neoliberalism imagines. The subject who accepts judgments and their consequences based on the evaluations they face is positioned as a subject that is always available for evaluation (Dardot and Laval, 2018: 387). Thus, every track in the subject's sphere of property and privacy can be traced, analyzed, and translated into a political or economic strategy. The reflection of surveillance systems on data economy occurs under these conditions. The data economy catches and calculates digital tracks through surveillance mechanisms. Hence, the relationship between data and the subject is transformed into one of a surveillance relationship. Digital tracks are not only put under surveillance but also simultaneously recorded and achieved in order to contribute to the

economy in the future. In short, data economy and neoliberal governmentality together act like a surveillance mechanism.

The EU's Practices of Governmentality Concerning Digitalization

For the reasons articulated above, the EU begins to use its regulations and normative sanctions as a dispositif, both to be able to exist in the technological system and also to prevent the individual from becoming a digital economy. Thus, the EU wants both to design its digital milieu in the future and to govern its digital economy. Undoubtedly, it categorically refuses to engage in a jurisdictional struggle with global technology companies not only in terms of economic matters but also in matters pertaining to digital sovereignty. Hence, the EU establishes a link between its own existence and data. On the one hand, the EU tries to govern the digital economy and restrict global technology companies, whilst on the other, it incorporates the European individual into new spheres of subjectivity through its own digital norms and regulations. Hence, it determines knowledge even in the digital domain by imposing normative restrictions on every intervention to its own citizens, places limitations on the access to knowledge and tries to enable a secure circulation of knowledge in the digital domain. It thus attempts to prevent digital sovereignty from getting monopolized by global technology companies. This situation, which is seen as a future threat by nation-states, raises questions about their *raison d'être*.

This is because, although it is in the digital domain, with territorial sovereignty, nation-states want to establish a presence as figures of power in relation to the issue of sovereignty that is raised by the individual's data. In short, nation-states are unwilling to open their spheres of legitimacy to discussion even in the digital domain. This is the essential issue that lies at the root of the EU's development of a series of normative regulations concerning its digital future. The E-Commerce Directive, the Digital Single Market (DSM) Strategy and the GDPR are among these regulations. However, the GDPR is one step ahead when compared to other regulations, because it reproduces the EU's neoliberal governmentality in the digital age as a dispositif. At the same time, it offers a global understanding to control data, the data owner, technology companies and other actors at the EU level (Harvard Business Review Analytic Services, 2017).

As part of the EU's governmentality, the GDPR provides epistemological and ontological content concerning data, the subject, global technology companies, nation-states and other actors. In an ever-growing digital world, the GDPR is a legal text which does not solely focus on data and concurrently regulates the economic system and data technologies (Albrecht, 2016: 287-289; Vatanparast, 2020: 821). The GDPR strengthens personal data protection rights concerning the digital sphere (Hoofnagle, Van Der Sloot and Borgesius, 2019:

65- 98). It also places a variety of legal responsibilities on global technology companies and national businesses that collect and process personal data (Lu Yu and He, 2019: 1-6).

In answer to the question of what kind of neoliberal digital governmentality does the EU portray through the GDPR, it can be seen that the EU both places certain restrictions and confers liberties related to data processing, specifically for data owners and global technology companies. For instance, data processing is subject to the consent of the data owner (European Commission, 2016: 37). On the one hand, this right conferred upon data owners shifts them from the position of 'contract taker' to that of' contract maker' (Lanzone 2018: 1-14). On the other hand, it exposes them to complex algorithms and software. Consequently, the data owner encounters a new practice of subjectification. In other words, this practice of the GDPR liberates data owners on one hand and disciplines them on the other.

Global technology companies become dependent on certain control mechanisms when collecting and storing the data acquired online (European Commission, 2016). As they are responsible for violations in data categories, data processing time limits and post-data processing procedures, the EU imposes serious administrative fines on global technology companies due to their improper data processing behaviours (European Commission, 2016).

It can be claimed that the EU is unwilling to give up the control mechanism that relies on its global normative power. Thus, while controlling the individual, data and global technology companies, the EU designs its own algorithmic world in a parallel process. Now, algorithmic tools constitute the content of the EU's sphere of governmentality (Brkan, 2019: 1-31). Naturally, this situation alters the epistemological and ontological composition of the EU's rationality of governmentality. At the root of this change, lies a multi-layered governmentality (Marks, 1996: 20-38; Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 1-32). In this sphere of governmentality, the Commission and Parliament have extremely effective initiatives. While the Commission strives to establish the balance between member states in the internal market, the Parliament attempts to ensure that European citizens are digitalized, and their legal rights are not violated in the process of digitalization. Within this multi-layered understanding of governmentality, two strong dispositifs feature: the DSM strategy in the establishment of balance in the internal market and the GDPR in the protection of European citizens.

Hence, it can be said that the E-Commerce Directive, the DSM strategy, and the GDPR are important dispositifs in the standardisation of data policies and the reinforcement of the EU's neoliberal digital governmentality. Certainly, the reasons for this are the digital control language of the new neoliberal world

(Rodrigues, 2016: 1-22; Leese, 2014: 494-511; Bellanova, 2017: 330), the reliance on digital measurements for the quality of data (Cheney-Lippold, 2011: 166), and the increased attachment of the individual to technological and technical procedures of calculation (Gillespie, 2014: 167-193).

In other words, the 95/46/EC Directive, the E-Commerce Directive, the DSM strategy and the GDPR provide a framework showing how data governance and digitalization are envisioned by the EU, and how progress is made in all of these. It must be stated that the dispositifs in question are a disciplinary apparatus for the EU. These disciplinary apparatuses provide a framework for how the digital individual, technological companies, nation-states and other actors should behave in the digital sphere[11]. With references to essential rights and liberties, the EU disciplines the aforementioned groups through data. Additionally, through the regulations mentioned above, the EU attempts to standardize its digital competition policies, digital free market and strong digital economy[12]. As a result, the EU features its own particular disciplinary elements and exhibits its unique form of governmentality.

Alongside this, the EU utilizes the aforementioned regulations as a security apparatus. Specifically, the EU benefits from these regulations in order to tame global technology companies that began to eclipse nation-states with the advent of digitalization. As these companies outcompete nation-states in data governance and the determination of knowledge, they establish their own truth regimes.[13] Naturally, this situation raises questions about the raison d'être of nation-states. Conversely, the EU aspires to limit the influence of global technology companies on individuals in order to safeguard its sovereignty. In

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[11] What Foucault expresses as the "conduct of conduct" reveals itself at this point. In fact, this situation is a result of the EU's neoliberal stance. The "conduct of conduct" is the deliberate transformation of the individual's behaviour by power/the sovereign? (Li, 2007; Cruikshank, 1999: 55). Conversely, in the example of the EU's digitalisation the conduct of conduct approach not only influences individuals but also extends to nation states and global technology companies.

[12] When examining the conditions of competition across various digital platforms, a significant difference is observed in terms of implementation and access. For instance, all businesses on Amazon's Marketplace gather ideas on issues like what do their own consumers purchase and how much do they spend on these products. However, Amazon retains all the consumer data from the Marketplace. It keeps track of consumers' behavioural data (Zuboff, 2019: 377). As a result, Amazon is able to utilise this data for its own commercial benefit when it sells its own products and thus cause unfair competition (Vestager, 2021). This is exactly what Zuboff articulates as surveillance capitalism. Similar considerations are also applicable to Facebook, Google and other information technology platforms.

[13] A telling example in this regard is the acquisition of 50 million Facebook users' data by Cambridge Analytica in 2014 and its use in preparing political communication campaigns for the elections in the USA (Akpinar, 2022).

this context, the normative regulations in question are employed as security apparatus against global technology companies.

Today, neoliberal governmentality in the new era is formulated as the digital governmentality of neoliberalism. Fundamentally, this is a process that profoundly transforms all processes of knowledge, power, sovereignty, and subject. Digital governmentality or algorithmic governmentality aims to discipline data by taking a novel approach to the general rationality of neoliberal governmentality. This is because the neoliberal sovereign's need for statistics is transformed into a form of governmentality that is run by intelligent machine-learning systems of information processing which can automatically capture and process data (Rouvroy and Berns, 2013: 163-196). Based on this, the source of the will for power in the sovereign is changed. Certainly, the distinction concerning the will for power transforms the nature of knowledge and the truth associated with it.

Knowledge and truth are derived from the question of how happy the individual is in the digital domain. On the other hand, the subject finds the self in the government of digital identity. In particular, the GDPR grants the subject an extensive authority to self-govern his/her own digital identity. For instance, consent provides extensive rights to the data owner in relation to the question of what data the owner wants to be processed. Otherwise, the limits of data processing are left to the discretion of the data processor if the data owner consents to default settings. Hence, as consent is employed as the dispositif of a liberation policy, it regulates the data owner's behaviour and disciplines the owner. In other words, the subject constructs his/her digital identity himself/herself within these practices.

Eventually, governmentality renews itself by jumping on the bandwagon of digital discourses. The EU wants to completely adapt to this change and, at this stage, to become an actor whose words can translate into sanctions in the international system. Hence, the following are the prominent topics in the EU's digitalization voyage: the establishment of a digital competition market through the DSM strategy; ensuring digital sovereignty against global technology companies via the GDPR; and the EU's defence that it retains its citizens' digital property rights through all these normative regulations. Thus, the EU intends to maintain its digital economic and political integration.

Indeed, these practices demonstrate that the EU aspires to govern digital truth regimes by employing its own particular neoliberal approach. Therefore, all the dispositifs mentioned above are developed as a result of the EU's neoliberal understanding. Consequently, the EU portrays a new form of governmentality through digital knowledge and reinforces its supranational position.

Conclusion

This article has aimed to provide an in-depth analysis of the EU's understanding of governmentality in the digital sphere through a post-structuralist analysis and Foucault's theory of governmentality. It has explained how the dispositifs that maintain the EU's governmentality in the digital sphere operate. Also, the article has attempted to analyze how the EU responds to the new language of the digital world and the changing nature of knowledge as well as how it envisions the digital power relationship. Naturally, the EU's digital voyage is extremely multi-layered, and this digital voyage incorporates a very extensive sphere. For these reasons, this article only features dispositifs that reveal neoliberal digital governmentality. Thus, the article revolves around four main topics. The first section has analysed concepts like language, discourse, dispositive, subject, knowledge, and truth. The second section has conceptualized the limitations of the Foucauldian governmentality, with a specific focus on data and digitalization. The third section has concentrated on the connection between digitalization, data, and the subject. Lastly, the fourth section has revealed what kind of truth regime the EU's practices of neoliberal digital governmentality produce through data.

The digitalization of the EU concurrently progresses with the development of data policies. In the EU's digital transformation data, knowledge, individual and competition policies hold extremely important positions, because both the individual and economy are transformed as data becomes an object of knowledge. The governmentality exhibited by the EU through digitalization aims not only to govern data and its associated connections, but also to sustain economic development, become the guarantor of permanent peace and provide the characteristics of the security community (Gambles, 1995). As it prioritizes data, the EU's digitalization voyage incorporates multifaceted policies. On one hand, it establishes fields for the digitalization of its own and member states' internal processes (European Commission, 2017). On the other hand, it constructs fields for the digitalization of the individual, private companies and third-party actors (European Commission, 2021). The EU's digitalization voyage restructures information technologies and the information/knowledge economy of the EU. Naturally, this situation brings about changes in the EU's sphere of neoliberal governmentality. The EU invents new areas of governmentality in a way that reflects neoliberal elements. Among the most renowned of these areas are those mentioned above: the 95/46/EC Directive, the E-Commerce Directive, the DSM strategy, and the GDPR.

As this perspective transforms the attitude of the EU towards data, it is compelled to act beyond the data. The EU's consistent stance towards data helps Europe shape its digital future. The EU's understanding of neoliberal digital governmentality centres on the reconstruction of both the digital

competition and economy, as well as the digitally transformed political and social order. Consequently, the topics of digital rights, digital sovereignty and digital property are incorporated in the EU's practices of neoliberal digital governmentality through data.

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RECONSTRUCTION OF POLISH IDENTITY WITHIN THE EU: A FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVE[∗]

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Abstract

This article aims to analyze the evolution of Poland's behaviour in the EU over the years. Such an analysis reveals that the Polish position as a member of the EU is not static and formed once and for all but is rather subject to a continuous reconstruction process. This article argues that the identity of Poland within the EU is not constructed once and for all but is rather subject to changes - specifically between Euro-enthusiasm and Euroscepticism - also affecting the interplay between Polish and European foreign policies. In the process of its candidacy to become a member of the EU, Poland endeavoured to adjust itself to EU standards and adopted EU norms and values. In the first decade of its membership in the EU, Poland had effectively downloaded the EU norms and standards and by behaving according to the logic of appropriateness it gained the necessary trust and approval from the EU. However, the current situation in Poland demonstrates that Poland has retreated from its previous course and has become Eurosceptic. This article further explores the factors behind the current distancing of Poland from the EU.

Keywords: Poland, the EU, social constructivism, identity, foreign policy.

POLONYA KİMLİĞİNİN AB İÇİNDE YENİDEN İNŞASI: DIŞ POLİTİKA PERSPEKTİFİ

Öz

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Bu makale, Polonya'nın AB'deki davranışının yıllar içindeki gelişimini analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu tip bir analiz, Polonya'nın AB üyesi olarak konumunun statik olmadığını ve kesin olarak oluşmadığını, bunun yerine sürekli bir yeniden yapılanma sürecine tabi olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Bu makale, Polonya'nın AB içindeki kimliğinin kesin olarak inşa edilmediğini, bunun yerine - özellikle Avrupa hevesliliği ve Avrupa şüpheciliği arasındaki gitgellerle - Polonya ve Avrupa dış politikaları arasındaki etkileşimi de etkileyen değişikliklere tabi olduğunu savunmaktadır. Polonya, AB'ye aday olma sürecinde AB standartlarına uyum sağlamaya çalışmış, AB norm ve değerlerini benimsemiştir. Polonya, AB üyeliğinin ilk on yılında AB norm ve standartlarını etkin bir şekilde indirmiş ve uygunluk mantığına göre davranarak AB'den gerekli güven ve onayı almıştır. Ancak Polonya'daki mevcut durum, Polonya'nın önceki rotasından geri çekildiğini ve Avrupa şüpheci olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu makale, Polonya'nın AB'den şu anda uzaklaşmasının ardındaki faktörleri de ayrıntılı olarak incelemektedir.

***Anahtar Kelimeler:** Polonya, Avrupa Birliği, sosyal inşacılık, kimlik, dış politika.*

Introduction

According to constructivists, interactions between different actors have an impact on the identity and interest formation of individual states; hence they influence the transformation of the world order. Each actor has its own distinctive "private knowledge" that derives from subjective beliefs, which can be considered one of the major explanations for the way how states frame reality (Wendt, 1999: 140–141). In this respect adding Poland's national identity to the analysis of its foreign policy is crucial because the country represents a particularly interesting case study, as it had gone through a significant transformation for EU membership that has contributed to the reconstruction of Polish national identity. This article aims to explore the changes in Polish identity since its membership in the EU and specifically focuses on how these changes have affected the interplay between Polish and European foreign policies. In this endeavour, Poland's path in the EU is analyzed through a constructivist lens. This article argues that the identity of Poland within the EU is not constructed once and for all but is rather subject to changes – specifically between Euro-enthusiasm and Euroscepticism – also affecting the interplay between Polish and European foreign policies, and that this mainly depends on the stance of the governing elites, and the nationalistic/populist tendency of the Polish public as well as on the widespread – and historically – negative perception of Russia in the country.

This article aims to narrow the gap in the existing literature which mainly focuses on the Europeanisation of foreign policies of EU member states (see, e.g.: Wong, 2005; Müller and Alecu de Flers, 2009; Kamińska, 2007; Pomorska, 2011) and thus lacks a more general, social constructivist International Relations (IR) perspective in the analysis of the interaction between the EU and its member states regarding the formation of European foreign policy. Thus this article applies a social constructivist framework to analyze how the reconstruction of Polish identity has affected its EU membership and European foreign policy. It inquires into the extent to which Polish behaviour in the world arena stems from the country's national identity, the identity that has been formed through interactions with other actors such as (and mainly) the EU, Germany, and Russia. The methodology used here is the application of a theoretical framework to a specific issue area. It mainly relies on an intensive analysis of secondary sources such as academic articles and books (on Social Constructivism as well as on Poland's membership in the EU and Polish foreign policy) as well as think-tank reports (on Poland's membership in the EU and Polish foreign policy). The primary sources used are mainly EU official documents (that concern Poland, Ukraine and Russia) as well as official speeches/declarations by Polish leaders/authorities (on the EU and on Polish foreign policy). The main time frame of the analysis provided here is 2004-2021 – the year of Polish accession to the EU and the last full year before Russia's invasion of Ukraine – however, historical developments are also mentioned to provide an overview. Recent developments are also referred to when and where necessary.

Theoretical and Historical Overview: Reading Polish Identity and its Stance in the EU through a Constructivist Lens

Constructivists argue that identity is not pre-given, but, rather, a socially constructed notion that is continuously (re)built through the socialization process among actors[1]. Keeping in mind that the "relationship between identity and foreign policy" is "mutually constitutive" (Tonra, 2011: 1192-1193). For social constructivists, EU foreign policy is "an ideal empirical testing ground" for analysis (Tonra, 2003: 738). The social constructivist approach enables us to comprehend EU foreign policy by focusing on the interaction between actors included in the process. Constructivists analyze the EU foreign policy formation process through the identities of the actors that are continuously being reconstructed through a socialization process that shapes their interests and foreign policies. They evaluate the establishment of and developments in EU foreign policy not as pre-given and stable, but rather as a process characterized by different "phases". Constructivists see the EU foreign policy

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[1] See e.g. Wendt (1999).

as a continuously ongoing social process with the central role of knowledge transaction and sharing of understandings among the parts.

Identity politics is central to the constructivist accounts of EU foreign policy (Risse, 2012: 87), furthermore in "hard-core variants", the CFSP "can be understood as being all about identity creation" (Tonra, 1999: 4). Thus, both EU identity and the identities of its member states are amenable to change and their identities remain in constant flux. The EU and its members unceasingly influence each other and it leads to the (re)definition of their identities. Such a (re)definition of the EU and Member States' identities determines their foreign policies and preferences. Rumelili argues: "The identity of Europe is changing depending on who identifies with Europe, in what ways, and to what extent and what meanings and understandings relevant actors ascribe to Europe" (Rumelili, 2015: 4).

Each EU member state has its own identity that is reflected in its relations with other actors. They bring to the EU their understandings, they affect the EU's interests, thus also its foreign policy and also identity and in turn, gets affected by them (i.e., their identities, interests and foreign policies also get transformed in this process). The EU unites states with specific characteristics and diverse identities that derive from attributes such as historical influence, culture, religion and geographical location. In these circumstances, new identities and common understandings come to the fore. The Polish case is significant in this regard as Polish identity and its foreign policy have gone through significant change during both its candidacy to become an EU member and its membership.

After the end of the Cold War, Poland immediately signalled its willingness to be a part of the Western world and emphasized its European roots. Poland was determined to succeed in joining NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004. Its willingness to join Western organizations, namely North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) and the European Union (EU) might be considered as a crucial step in the country's redefinition of its identity and its intention to abandon its communist past. In practice, such a reframing of Polish identity meant leaving the Russian sphere of influence. So, entrance to the competitive and contrasting Western camp was the goal that Poland sought to achieve. This was mainly because Polish leaders believed that only such a Polish "return to Europe" could distance Poland from the threatening Russian Other.

Although the governing elites changed in Poland, they were consistent in their endeavours to achieve Poland's main objective of rapprochement and integration with the West. Poland's determination, strong aspirations, unified voice and clear approach contributed to the country being labelled as a "success story" (e.g. Follath and Puhl, 2012, Summa, 2008: 25). All levels of Polish

society expressed a wish for change and to break with Poland's communist identity. This was reflected in the attitude of Poland's new authorities who "rejected the paradigms and mechanisms of the old bloc system of security, which in fact meant a rejection of the Eastern Bloc and the eastern orientation for the sake of the western one" (Zięba, 2004: 16). Poland's endeavours along with the favourable political conditions resulted in Poland's eventual accession to the NATO and the EU. Poland's entrance into Western organizations inaugurated a new chapter in Polish history and was a significant breakthrough in the country's transformation process. Poland's identity was redefined, from the Soviet Satellite State into an independent democratic country able to draw its own path.

Poland's strenuous endeavours and the rhetoric of European identity employed by its politicians and the media resulted in its construction, along with the Czech Republic and Hungary, "as a part of Europe without which Europe cannot be whole" (Neumann, 1999: 25). Moreover, the construction of a particular Polish identity was confirmed "by the West European countries", which was reflected in the accession to the EU (Neumann, 1999: 25). Poland's accession to the EU was labelled a "success story" and it had widespread support from the Polish population. Poles felt that they regained their European identity, which had been suppressed during the years of communist rule. Romaniszyn (2016: 170) points out that "the research shows that the national and the European identities are mutually inclusive, and being a Pole means being a European".

On the other hand, Polish integration with the EU was not also devoid of problems. The uncompromising stance of Polish officials during the accession negotiations and Poland's approach to the Nice voting system[2] influenced the perception of Poland as a "noisy newcomer" and a rather difficult partner that was not eager to find a consensus (Longhurst and Zaborowski, 2007: 2). Szczerbiak (2012: 44) states that Poland had a "unique status as a 'geopolitical giant' but an 'economic dwarf', which gave it limited political resources to achieve its ambitions, made it a potentially extremely problematic EU member state". Poland portrayed itself as an actor that aspired to a position among "the leading states within the EU – at worst a middle-ranking power"; thus, it

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[2] The Nice voting system issue refers to Poland's reaction to the proposal of a new voting system proposed in a draft of the Constitutional Treaty (2003). Poland argued that the new voting system for the Council of the European Union proposed by the Convention was most beneficial for the largest EU states, especially for Germany and at the same time this new voting rule was diminishing the possibility to block the decisions that would be unfavourable for Poland (Bielawska, 2012: 239). So, Poland assertively endeavoured to keep the previous votingsystem, the Nice voting system. See more e.g. (Kaczynski, 2007).

expected to be a respected partner that wanted its voice heard (Szczerbiak, 2012: 43).

Furthermore, there was also political instability in Poland. The Miller government, which took office in 2001, resigned over a corruption scandal in May 2005, just after Poland's accession to the EU. The next government, that of Belka, which was in office from June 2004 to October 2005, proved to be unstable and short-lived, and it did not succeed in efficiently shaping the direction of Polish foreign affairs. Between 2005 and 2007, three coalition parties were in office, all of which were "extremely critical towards the EU and which we have labelled 'Eurosceptic'" (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2013: 28). The new coalition of the PiS, the Self-Defence Party (Samoobrona) and the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin) took a sceptical position on the EU, which was reflected in the rhetoric adopted by the ruling authorities. Discord among the members of this "Eurosceptic" coalition meant that it was unable to take a common stance and exercise a coherent foreign policy.

The policy pursued by the PiS government significantly affected Polish–EU relations and contributed to the perception of Poland as an uneasy partner that insisted on maintaining its approach without compromise. This rather demanding attitude adopted by the new government and supported by Polish President Lech Kaczyński was not welcomed in EU circles.[3] The government took a negative stance regarding Germany, the country at the core of the EU and that had strongly supported Polish membership: "The Kaczyński twins, Lech and prime minister Jaroslaw, view Berlin as a threat to Polish sovereignty, and are convinced that Chancellor Angela Merkel has abused her role as EU president to push the German national interest" (Traynor, 2007). The narratives used by Polish authorities had seriously shaken Polish- German relations and contributed to the common view of Poland as a problematic and difficult actor. The negative attitude of the governing elites and the digging up of the past was not consistent with the EU's representation as a peace project that aims to unite nations. The course of foreign policy adopted by the new government also suggested that Poland had not learnt the rules prevailing in the EU and its institutions. Thus, as Bieńczyk-Missala (2016: 104) argues: "the first years in the EU made it evident that Poland had no clear vision of the future of the Union. It took time for the country to gain experience and develop a constructive approach to policy within Europe".

During its early years in the EU, Poland distanced itself from new initiatives. This was reflected in its approach towards the idea of the Constitution for Europe, and it was later continued in the debate on the Lisbon

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[3] Lech Kaczyński was Jaroslaw Kaczyński's twin brother; he served as the president between 2005 and 2010.

Treaty. The Polish president, Lech Kaczyński clearly expressed his reluctance to agree to the changes that were planned to be introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, and he insisted that Poland was not going to lose its rights or pool them further at the EU level because he believed that would limit the Polish voice in the EU (Euroactiv, 2008). Kaczyński even saw this as a threat to Poland's national interests. He refused to sign the Lisbon Treaty and he made his decision depend on the Irish referendum, maintaining that efforts were "now pointless" due to the Irish rejection of the treaty (Castle and Dempsey, 2008).

Poland's concerns about losing its sovereign rights and its sensitivity about this matter stemmed from the Polish identity which was strongly shaped by the experience of loss of sovereignty in the past. The scrupulousness of Polish officials towards any changes that could affect Polish independence was caused by meanings formed in the years when Poland remained under the invasion of other actors, and these meanings were strongly embedded in the citizens' and democratically elected governing elites' minds. Thus, these circumstances had a crucial impact on the Polish approach towards the EU. Bieńczyk-Missala (2016: 104) emphasizes: "The Polish government supported a vision of a European Union of sovereign member states rather than a federation of states". On the other hand, the then Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk from the Civic Platform (PO) expressed support for the Treaty of Lisbon, stating: "We are convinced the treaty's ratification is in Poland's best interest [...] It is hard to accept a situation where Poland would be put in the same position as Ireland, a very troublesome position" (The Irish Times, 2008). Tusk declared that "Poland should ratify the treaty as soon as possible" (The Irish Times, 2008). Finally, on 10 October 2009, the Polish president signed the Lisbon Treaty with opt-outs from the EU Human Rights Charter.

The contradictory positions towards the EU exposed the discord among Polish governing elites. Although both the centrist PO party and the conservative Law and PiS "agreed that membership in NATO and the EU provided the foundation of security and development of the country, and both were in favour of strengthening relations with the United States", their approaches to foreign policy framing regarding other issues and how these goals could be realized differed (Bieńczyk-Missala, 2016: 103). While the PiS administration "was and is Eurosceptical, distrustful towards Germany, and with very limited initiatives in the relations with Russia", the Civic Platform government, which was in office from 2008 until 2015, was "strongly pro-European" (Bieńczyk-Missala, 2016:103). Thus, these mixed signals negatively influenced the Polish image in the international arena. The struggle among the governing elites in Poland exposed the immaturity of Polish foreign policy and divisions within the ruling group.

A new period in EU-Poland relations began with the office of Donald Tusk's Cabinet, on 16 November 2007 and lasted until 16 November 2015[4]. It was the stage when Poland began actively – and what is even more important, successfully – uploading its national interests and preferences onto the EU's agenda. The redefinition of Poland's behaviour has resulted in the strengthening of Poland's position in the EU and reinforced the reconstruction of the European understanding of Poland. At that time Poland proved that it effectively downloaded the EU norms and standards, by behaving according to the logic of appropriateness Warsaw gained the necessary trust and approval from the EU. Poland's learning ability facilitated Poland's potential to upload its interests onto the EU agenda, and the establishment of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) may serve as a case in point.

The Tusk government greatly contributed to the reconstruction of Poland's European identity. Kamińska (2007: 2) points out: "Poland had developed a new Post-Cold War identity, with a new role for the country, as the regional leader, predestin[ed] to promote democracy in the neighbourhood and import knowledge about Eastern Europe to her Western partners". However, the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PiS) government that came to power in 2015 proved to take on a different course in their foreign policy strategy that once again caused the shift in the perception about Poland in Europe. Along with the PiS government the third phase in the interplay between EU foreign policy and Polish foreign policy has begun. This phase has manifested that Poland's downloading EU norms and values was not deep enough and internalization by the domestic actors did fully not take place.

The PiS government retreated from the Euroenthusiastic path followed by the previous government and abandoned the willingness to download the EU standards to the domestic level. Buras (2017) contends that "PiS since they came to power in 2015" aimed at "the de-Europeanisation of Polish domestic and foreign policy" (Buras, 2017). In his view, PiS government has "neither reject[ed] the EU as such, nor oppose[d] Poland's EU membership" but it "reject[ed] the paradigm of 'Europeanisation' that ha[d] informed Poland's transformation over the last 25 years" (Buras, 2017)[5].

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[4] On 16 November 2015 the Cabinet of Beata Szydło was formed by coalition of right Law and Justice party (PiS), centre-right Poland Together (PR) party and right United Poland party (SP).

[5] It should be noted at this point that the Polish backslide from democracy and its reluctance to download EU policies can also be explained through the conceptual framework of de-Europeanization, however, because this article espacially focuses on the shift in Polish identity and its reflections on the interplay between Polish and European foreign policies, social conctructivism was preferred as its anlytical conceptual framework. On the

Changes in Polish Identity: Euro-enthusiasm and Euroscepticism in Poland after EU Membership

Kołodziejczyk (2016: 18) argues that "the poor political experience in the first years after accession was an excellent lesson, and Poland was able to learn from it". Tusk's government, which took office in 2007, framed a new agenda for Polish foreign policy, and it also reconsidered Poland's approach toward the EU. It was during the Tusk government that Polish foreign policy got crystallized. In 2009, foreign affairs Minister Radosław Sikorski (2009) announced: "we already know that it is safer to sail the stormy waves of global politics and economy not on a national boat, but on a European liner". The narrative employed by the Tusk government indicated that Poland had learnt its lesson and realized that it could achieve much more by acting according to the European rules of the game. In other words, a logic of appropriateness started to prevail in Polish foreign policy. The main objectives of Polish foreign policy were defined as follows:

- A Poland strong in Europe, a patron and promoter of Europe's eastern policy;

- Poland as a strong link in the North Atlantic Alliance;

- Poland as an attractive brand: a country of success which loves freedom and knows how to share freedom;

- Poland as a country which supports its diaspora and which is fuelled by its vitality;

- Polish diplomacy as an effective service (Sikorski, 2009).

The foreign policy exercised during Tusk's government contributed to the perception of Poland as an influential player ready to compromise and open to constructive discussion. Furthermore, Poland seemed to learn that it could gain more when it followed the rules prevailing in the EU, such as by forming coalitions and building good relations with other members to achieve greater support for its ideas, as in the case of the EaP and Poland's support for Ukraine. In December 2008, Poland joined the Schengen area, which was Poland's next step in integration with the EU. This was an evidence of the strengthening of the trust between both actors.

Polish foreign policy between 2007 and 2014 turned out to be more stable, with Polish authorities more willing to compromise. However, the domestic discords between the president and prime minister undermined the image of Poland as a serious and influential actor. Tensions between President Kaczyński

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employments of de-Europeanisation as a conceptual framework in the analysis of various cases, see, for example: Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber (2016) and Dyduch and Müller (2021).

and Prime Minister Tusk led to significant disagreements in the area of foreign affairs that resulted in a negative and unfavourable perception of the country (Kamińska, 2014: 44). The president and the prime minister "clashed repeatedly on the division of competencies" (Hebel, 2008). The acrimonious relations between the ruling authorities in Poland negatively echoed in the international arena.

However, the situation changed after Bronisław Komorowski won the presidential election in July 2010[6]. Since Komorowski was a member of the Civic Platform, the prime minister and president had their roots in the same liberal-political party, with the result that their views on Poland's future were harmonious. This was positively reflected in Poland's behaviour on the world stage. There were significant developments in Polish foreign policy, and Polish officials became more constructive and pragmatic. Foreign minister Radosław Sikorski's attitude became more flexible and pragmatic, with his strategy based on building good relations with other member states such as Germany and Sweden. The Tusk government's approach was welcomed by the EU and its members; furthermore, it enjoyed the support of the Polish people.

The Civic Platform – the Polish People's Party (PO-PSL) coalition cabinet was reelected in November 2011 and remained in office until September 2014. Popular support for the coalition decreased in comparison to the election of 2007, although there was more satisfaction than dissatisfaction with it (CBOS, 2011). Tusk's government introduced major changes in Poland, and the coalition's foreign policy strengthened Poland's position in the EU. Their approach was economically and politically successful. Despite the global economic crisis, Poland remained "Europe's growth champion"[7] (Piatkowski, 2015; Piatkowski, 2018). In 2009, Jerzy Buzek was appointed president of the European Parliament, and in 2014 Donald Tusk became the President of the European Council (The Chancellery of the Prime Minister, 2014). The appointment of two Poles to crucial positions in the EU might be perceived as a reward for Poland's good performance and for grounding its position in Europe. Kołodziejczyk (2016: 10) argues that "after slightly more than a decade, Poland made a significant leap forward"; became "the leader of economic growth in the EU"; and "the symbolical crowning achievement so far was the appointment of Donald Tusk to the office of President of the European Council in the tenth year after accession". This assignment rewarded the endeavours of Tusk's government and contributed to the new understanding that Poland had been transformed into a strong player.

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[6] President Bronisław Komorowski's predeccessor Lech Kaczyński died in an airplane crash in Russia on 10 April2010.

[7] See more about Poland's economic growth e.g. Fredriksson (2019).

Upon Tusk's resignation, the new prime minister, Ewa Kopacz, was appointed by President Bronisław Komorowski on 15 September 2014. She was the head of the PO-PSL coalition government from 2014 to 2015. Kopacz (2014) highlighted the achievements of the preceding government, contending that "[t]hanks to the predictable and credible policy of recent years Poland finally joined European first league and began to discover the role that is corresponding to its potential and aspirations". She also announced that one of her cabinet's main objectives would be the continuation of "further strengthening of [Poland's] position in the European Union" (Kopacz, 2014). However, this positive state of affairs did not last very long and the course of events changed with the election of a new government on 25 October 2015.

The conservative and Eurosceptic PiS candidate Andrzej Duda won the presidential election, and in 2015 the PiS formed a coalition with the conservative-liberal party, Poland Together (Polska Razem – PR), and the Catholic-nationalist party, Solidarity Poland (Solidarna Polska – SP). Thus, the PiS held both the presidency and the government. From the outset of PiS's rule, it seemed that relations between the EU and Poland would be difficult. Poland did not attend the Valletta summit on migration due to the official ceremony of changing government. President Duda explained that "he was not aware of the Valetta summit taking place on the same day", an attitude that was perceived by many as "either a sign of the sheer ignorance of his advisors or pure arrogance" (Buras, 2015). The cabinet of Beata Szydło marked an era of harder relations between the EU and Poland. The new government initially refused to fulfil the refugees' agreement concluded with the EU that had previously been agreed by Tusk's government. Poland's refusal to accept 6,200 asylum seekers was explained through the statement that the approval of the EU quotas "could be a problem for Poland's homogenous society" (Cienski, 2017). Political discourse about refugees suggested that Poland was a rather unwelcome place for refugees. Controversial changes introduced by the Polish government caused deterioration in relations between both sides, as new reforms posed a threat to media freedom and the rule of law.[8] Prime Minister Szydło declared that because the government was democratically elected, the reforms were "the decision of Polish citizens" (The Chancellery of the Prime Minister, 2016).

The next government was also formed by the PiS in coalition with PR and SP, and Morawiecki's cabinet was formed in December 2017. The new Prime Minister declared "continuation rather than change" and his tone towards the EU seemed to soften, which "reflected a major motive behind the sudden

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[8] The new bill proposed by the PiS government posed a threat to the balance of powers in the country since the new law planned to replace the Supreme Court judges with judges nominated by the government. It was argued that this reform would undermine the rule of law in the country. See more: BBC News (2017).

leadership swap: lessening friction between Brussels and Warsaw" (Broniatowski, 2017). The spreading wave of populism and turn to nationalism in Europe created a fertile ground for the conservative and nationalist ideology of the PiS party. Furthermore, the refugee issue was portrayed as a threat to European and Polish culture; strengthening right-wing parties, which gained popular support and were elected to the most important offices in the country's administration.

Polish identity was reframed from being a constructive partner in the EU during the Tusk government to becoming a difficult and unpredictable player during PiS rule. Poland's Euro-enthusiasm and its aspirations to be at the core of EU decision-making were replaced by Euroscepticism. Moreover, polarization in Polish foreign policy and the clash between Tusk and PiS continued even when Tusk became President of the European Council: the relations between the two sides were "so bad that Poland was the only country to vote against his re-election as EU president in March"[9] (Deutsche Welle, 2017), and this contributed to the image of Poland as an unpredictable player. Although Tusk's government succeeded in framing a foreign policy that empowered Poland's self-projection as a strong and important player in the EU, the situation was drastically changing. Poland's foreign policy agenda underwent a transformation process, and the PiS government's policy of "getting up off Poland's knees" and "leaving the policy of mainstream" contributed to the loss of its influence in the West (Kokot, 2016) and to the negative construction of Poland's image. A close alliance with Hungary, ruled by the far-right leader Victor Orban who also has a reputation for controversial views and for going against the EU stream, has fostered the perception that Poland lacks a crystalized foreign policy and that it was not a coherent entity that could speak with one voice.

Poland's current attitude marks its position as a member that is moving away from Europe's core and might even be considered as Europe's Other that is gradually departing from European norms values and ideas. A case in point is the introduction of a new juridical law[10] in December 2017 that became a bone of contention between the two sides[11]. Poland was warned by the Commission that the Covid recovery fund for Poland would not be released in case Poland did not make significant progress in the area of the rule of law (CNN World, 2021). Although the EU reached an agreement with Poland about the steps necessary for unblocking the funds (Ptak, 2022), the dispute between the EU

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[9] Donald Tusk was re-elected as the President of the European Council on 9 March 2017.

[10] See more about the changes in judicial system in Poland adopted by PiS: Democracy Reporting International(2018).

[11] The rule of law crisis is perceived to be very serious since it even "poses an existential threat to the EuropeanUnion" (Monciunskaite, 2022: 50).

and Poland over the rule of law remains unresolved. Jarosław Kaczyński claimed that Poland has fulfilled its obligation but the Commission did not act its part, he added that Poland "do[es] not fit into German-Russian plans to rule Europe" and that "[a]n independent, economically, socially and militarily strong Poland is an obstacle for them" (Cienski, 2022). Such rhetoric suggests the continuation of the U-turn in the construction of Polish identity from being in alignment with the EU standards for altering it.

The polarization and instability present in Polish politics undermine Poland's endeavours to project itself as an influential and credible actor. Thus, as Rotfeld[12] (2004:106), former deputy of foreign affairs, has suggested "the greatest threat to Poland is the instability of its domestic situation and the imbalance between internal and external policy is enormous". Therefore Poland might be for the EU either a stable pillar that facilitates the EU's development or an obstacle that hampers the unity of the EU and that deepened to the high extent of the "style" of behaviour that Polish governing elites prefer to adopt. Poland's stance since its accession has changed dramatically, and so do the perception of Poland has been revised and Poland's overall potential to influence positively the EU.

Within the span of a few years, Poland has transformed as a country from a "rising engine of European integration" (Bajczuk, 2011: 1) to a "threat to European solidarity" (Stephens, 2016). Thus, the understanding about Poland has been redefined, which might be considered as proof of the constructivist assumption that the social world is in a continuous process that is reflected in actors' identities and, hence, their foreign policies.

Changes in Polish Identity and the Interplay between Polish and European Foreign Policies

After accession to the EU, Polish foreign policy elites realized that the country did not have a clearly defined foreign policy. During the accession negotiations, the major aim was to gain membership in the EU as quickly as possible. However, once the main objective of Polish foreign policy had been achieved and Poland had become an EU member, Polish elites could not agree on the shape of Polish foreign policy. The lack of a coherent official Polish foreign policy agenda and the continuous changes in the Polish political arena significantly contributed to the perception that Poland was a country without a crystallized vision of its future. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrzej Olechowski (2004: 20), argued that the successful accession to NATO and the EU ended a particular stage in Polish foreign policy, commenting that Poland did not have a defined strategy for the future nor a vision of its future position

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[12] Adam Rotfeld served also as the Polish foreign minister in 2005.

in the EU. Thus, it became clear that after the main objectives of Polish foreign policy had been fulfilled, Poland needed to pursue new goals and reframe its foreign affairs agenda. Moreover, a lack of experts and educated officers familiar with the EU's rules hampered adaptation processes (Kamińska, 2014: 221). Furthermore, the rotation of the ruling elites seriously limited the establishment of contact between the EU and Poland, undermining the possibility of building consistent cooperation between both sides (Kamińska, 2014: 221).

After Poland acceded to the EU, socialization between the EU and Poland was difficult for both sides because Poland's behaviour deviated from the standards prevailing among the older member states. Even though Poland has undergone the Europeanisation process but "on important occasions, [it] also forcefully insisted on its national interests in its dealings with the EU" (Müller and Alecu de Flers, 2009:18). In certain cases where its national interests were at stake, Poland was not open to constructive discussion but rather tended to insist on furthering its own preferences. In other words, Warsaw was not ready to reach compromises. Such an approach stemmed from Poland remaining a long time in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence and the Polish political system was characterized by dependency on its Big Brother[13].

Poland's first steps in its independent foreign policy formation process were deeply influenced by Poland's previous identity. Even though Poland was willing to transform itself it needed time to learn how to behave after the end of the Cold War. In this regard, the redefinition of Poland's relationship with Germany was a crucial element in the reconstruction process of Polish identity. Reconciliation with Germany was one of the cases that exhibits the fact that gradually Poland was coming to understand that the actions driven by the logic of appropriateness and eagerness for constructive discussion opened new opportunities for Poland in the EU. Through social practice, Poland has learnt that in order not to merely download the EU rules but also to get the ability to upload its national interests and preferences into the EU agenda, Warsaw's approach necessitates reconsideration. Such a redefinition of Polish behaviour has inaugurated the second stage in the relationship between the EU and Poland.

A significant Polish contribution to European Foreign Policy had been giving a significant boost to the EU's relations with its Eastern neighbours. From the beginning of its path to the EU, Poland expressed its support for strengthening the relations between the EU and its Eastern partners. The

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[13] Big Brother in this context regards the Soviet Union. The main characteristic of the foreign policy conducted by the Polish People's Republic (PRL) was a dependency on the Soviet Union which was reflected in Poland's relations with the outer world (Weremiuk, 2014: 43).

"Eastern dimension" had a high priority in the Polish foreign policy agenda and even on the eve of the Big-Bang enlargement, Poland submitted a "Non-paper with Polish proposals concerning policy towards new Eastern neighbours after EU enlargement", in January 2003. This non-paper declared that "Poland would like to contribute to shaping Union's policy towards its future eastern neighbours understanding that, however important, this is only a part of the EU external relations and the Union's neighbourhood policy" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, 2003: 85). This stance also continued after its membership and Poland expressed its interest in guiding and actively participating in the definition of the Eastern Dimension of the EU's foreign policy. The Polish position on the Eastern dimension was evidence that "[i]ndependent and transformed, Poland had developed a new Post-Cold war identity, with a new role for the country, as a regional leader, [predestined] to promote democracy in the neighbourhood and import knowledge about Eastern Europe to its Western partners" (Kamińska, 2008: 2).

Framing the EU's agenda for relations with its new Eastern neighbours was both a great challenge and an opportunity for Poland to manifest its reconstructed identity. Legucka (2013) argues that older EU member states also gave Poland a "constructive role" in creating European foreign policy towards Ukraine and Belarus; in an attempt to see whether, despite its bitter past, Poland would be able to maintain good relations with its Eastern neighbours. Thus, the way in which Poland chose to pursue a foreign policy towards its Eastern neighbours might be considered a test for Polish identity and the country's position both in the region and in the EU. Browning and Joenniemi (2003: 474) argue that Poland's Eastern Partnership initiative "constitute[d] a legitimate move in reflecting an apparent Polish ambition to contribute constructively to the Union's policies in a new and challenging environment".

The Eastern Dimension was inspired by the Mediterranean policy promoted by Spain, and by the Northern Dimension initiated by Finland (Meister and May, 2009: 1). Both of these frameworks were perceived by Poland as effective tools for the uploading of member states' national interests into EU foreign policy (Pomorska, 2011:5-6). Although Poland continuously referred to the Eastern Dimension, this was not included in the ENP framework in 2004. Poland's inability to influence the EU's agenda towards the East in the first few years after its accession was regarded by analysts to be the result of Poland's inexperience in acting according to the "Brussels game" (Kamińska, 2014; Pomorska, 2011: 6). When the ENP was established Poland expressed its discontent about the ENP's shape, claiming that this policy lumped widely divergent countries together under the same framework. It became clear, therefore, that Poland was aspiring to play a significant role in defining the EU's foreign policy toward the Eastern neighbours.

At the beginning of its membership in the EU, Poland was not prepared to present its projects about the Eastern Neighbourhood and get the necessary support from the Union and other member states. The lack of awareness about the rules prevailing in the EU foreign policy formation process, alongside the demanding attitude of the Polish authorities, contributed to Poland's uncompromising reputation. Because Poland's approach was not in line with the rules prevailing in the EU, which were based on the continuous exchange of ideas and the willingness to compromise (i.e., acting with a logic of appropriateness) its Eastern policy endeavours were not taken seriously, and did not gain support[14].

Poland realized that it had to change its approach to achieve its Eastern Project. In the meantime, domestic and external circumstances were favouring the establishment of the Eastern Project. In the context of the domestic situation, shifts in the Polish government led to a significant reconstruction of Polish foreign policy. Along with the nomination of Radosław Sikorski as minister of foreign affairs in 2007, a new, more dynamic, and clearer foreign policy began to be pursued by the country as mentioned before. In 2008, Sikorski listed his five priorities, making clear which one occupied the first place: "Poland strong in Europe, patron and promoter of its Eastern policy" (Sikorski, 2008:17). He highlighted that "Poland [would] be a normal European country when it has normal European neighbours on both sides of its border" (Sikorski, 2008: 3). Moreover, developments in the East, as well as assertive Russian behaviour in the region and its imperialist aspirations which became clear with the Georgia crisis of 2008, reinforced the Polish narrative about the "Russian threat" and led to increased interest in the Eastern dimension among the EU member states. The "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine that took place from 2004-to 2005 demonstrated the necessity to create a specific framework for the region, and the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 helped to prompt the preparation of the EaP project (Stańczyk, 2011: 192).

Poland formed a coalition with Sweden to initiate the Eastern Partnership project. As a result, on 26 May 2008 Radosław Sikorski and Carl Bildt, foreign ministers of Poland and Sweden respectively, proposed an ambitious programme to the EU's General Affairs and External Relations Council in Brussels. The proposal was welcomed by the EU, and the Commission issued a communication to the European Parliament and the Council. The joint Polish and Swedish project aimed to develop closer relations between six post-Soviet countries[15] in the ENP and the EU. The Polish decision to present the Eastern Dimension idea together with Sweden bore fruitful results. Thus, this calculated

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[14] See e.g. Copsey and Pomorska (2014); Kamińska (2014:194-195).
[15] Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

move revealed that Poland was learning its lesson in terms of playing "the Brussels game"[16]. The Polish authorities had concluded that a coalition with Sweden, a country that was regarded as an experienced and respected EU member and that would soon be holding the EU Presidency, could boost the chances of success for the Eastern Project (Copsey and Pomorska, 2014: 425). Furthermore, the coalition with Sweden aimed to soften the perception that the EaP was a project directed against Russia. The EaP was formally launched in Prague on 7 May 2009 and had been a great success for the Tusk government. Tusk's cabinet with Sikorski, who served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, proved to be more successful than its predecessors in furthering Polish foreign policy priorities and integrating them into EU foreign policy. The Tusk government, in this regard, was more open to dialogue and turned out to be more flexible. This approach caused the reconstruction of understanding about Poland as an influential European player that not merely pushes forward its interests but also aspires to promote the EU's norms and standards further eastward. So, the establishment of the EaP is an example of the successful export of Polish ideas to the EU agenda (Kamińska, 2014: 280).

Nevertheless, this positive perception of Poland in the EU got totally reversed with the PiS government's policies which came to power in 2015. Polish identity also took a new bend with the PiS government as nationalism rose to a new height in the country and Euro-scepticism peaked. The EU domestic and international crisis resulted in the rise of nationalist and populist parties in Europe, including in Poland where the national-conservative Law and Justice (PiS) received strong support. When the PiS returned to power in 2015[17], Poland began to pursue different policies, one based on the bitter experiences of the past[18] and that was often antagonistic to EU policy. Moreover, the style adopted by the newly-elected governing elite initiated a critical juncture in Polish foreign policy, changing Poland's "style" of conducting its foreign policy.

The retreat from democracy in Poland (Bąk et.al, 2017) led to serious confrontation with the EU. The Union expressed its discontent by raising the possibility of sanctions against Poland.[19] Since the beginning of the passing of controversial laws in Poland, the EU has been following the course of events and has been expressing its discontent. However, the lack of improvement in Poland led to the triggering of Art.7 (1)[20] of the TEU in December 2017. The

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[16] "Brussels game" term is used by e.g Kamińska (2014).
[17] PiS had previously been in power from October 2005 to November 2007.
[18] See more e.g. Belavusau (2017), Sawicka and Skibicki (2017).
[19] The introduction of sanctions requires the unanimity of all members of the EU.
[20] European Commission (2017) explained "The Procedure foreseen under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) aims at ensuring that all EU Member States respect the

democratic backslide in the country seriously damaged Poland's image and raised doubts about its credibility as a foreign policy actor as well, reducing its potential to influence EU foreign policy. For example it undermined Poland's status as a source of inspiration for the transition for Ukraine (Balcer, 2019).

Several international developments also fed into the divide between Poland and the EU. The migration crisis of 2015 was one of those issues dividing the EU and Poland. In ethnic and national terms, Poland is one of the most homogeneous countries in the EU (European Union, 2019) – 96,9 per cent of citizens are of Polish ethnic origin and 85,9 per cent of the population is Catholic (The World Factbook, 2021). Therefore during the migration crisis in 2015, the quotas proposed by the EU[21] to accept refugees from the Middle East and Africa had been a challenge for Poland. Although the Civic Platform government with Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz has agreed to host refugees, the PiS government that came into power in October 2015 opposed the decision adopted by its predecessors. The perspective to accept refugees from countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria was perceived by the PiS as a threat to Polish security. Refugees were often portrayed by conservative authorities as the Other that pose a threat to Polish culture and national identity. Furthermore, mandatory migrant quotas were perceived by Poland as EU interference in the country's sovereignty.

Poland's Eurocepticism was reinforced by the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. The UK was one of Poland's close partners within the EU since both countries had often similar views on the issues discussed on the EU table such as their staunch Transatlanticism and their shared an assertive stance in relations with Russia. The UK was in a way a counterbalance for France and Germany's lead in the EU, and, that was advantageous for Poland. Furthermore, the PiS government was planning to cooperate with the UK to push for the reformation of the EU towards a "Europe of Homelands" (Gostynska-Jakubowska, 2019). Along with Brexit, Poland lost a partner in shaping the EU and especially its foreign policy.

Another aspect that has pushed Poland to the Eurosceptical course had been some member states' stance toward Russia. Russian assertive behaviour[22] in the

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common values of the EU, including the Rule of Law. It foresees two legal possibilities in such a situation: a preventive mechanism in case of a 'clear risk of a serious breach of the [Union's] values' (Article 7(1) TEU) and a sanctioning mechanism in the case of 'the existence of a serious and persistent breach' of the Union's value, including the Rule of Law (Article 7(2) and Article 7(3) TEU). Article 7 TEU has until today not been used". It should be noted that the European Council has not taken a decision about the application of Article 7 against Poland yet.

[21] For more, see: European Commission (2015).

[22] War in Georgia, annexation of Crimea, and Ukrainian–Russian conflict.

region recalled Poland's fears about Russian neo-imperialistic aspirations. During the Georgian conflict, President Lech Kaczyński highlighted that Russia sought to dominate in the region and subdue the countries in its proximity, he said: "Today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow the Baltic states, and then, perhaps, the time will come for my country, Poland" (Polskie Radio, 2019). Poland's accession to the EU was, for Poland, a chance to leave the Russian sphere of influence and Poland did believe that it could use the EU leverage to limit the Russian threat. However, in practice, the Polish expectations in this regard were not fully met because the EU did not efficiently address Polish concerns and the member states' stances remained deeply divided over the Russian issue until Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Although on the occasion of the Russian annexation of Crimea and aggression on Ukraine all member states agreed to impose sanctions[23] on Russia, after some time countries such as France, Belgium, Italy, Austria, Croatia, Greece and Bulgaria preferred to negotiate a compromise with Russia (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). France was insisting on the improvement of relations with Russia (Deni, 2020) and Italy agreed with Moscow on boosting economic relations (Isachenkov, 2018). these countries had not perceived Russia as a threat before it invaded Ukraine, and this differentiated them from Poland, as the latter had still perceived Russia as a threatening Other and a strong enemy.

Poland's threat perceptions regarding Russia also got exacerbated with the completion of the Nord Stream gas pipeline transporting gas from Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea, in 2011. Furthermore, the initiation of the Nord Stream 2 project in spite of Poland's and the Baltic States' objections reinforced Polish fears and undermined Warsaw's trust in the EU. This project recalled Poland's fears deeply ingrained in the country's identity about its two powerful neighbours: Germany and Russia cooperating against Poland. However, the situation changed due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine[24] in February 2022. This invasion has further complicated the relations between Russia and the EU and its member states, and, has also proved that Polish security concerns regarding Russia were not baseless. As a response to Russian aggression on Ukraine, the EU has imposed economic, trade and financial sanctions on Russia (European Commission, 2022). The norms and values celebrated by the EU were attacked in its close neighbourhood and in this difficult moment, the EU has behaved in line with its identity and condemned

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[23] The restrictive measures imposed by the EU on Russia were "diplomatic measures, individual restrictive measures (asset freeze and travel restrictions), restrictions on economic relations with Crimea and Sevastopol, economic sanctions, and restrictions on economic cooperation" (European Council, 2020).

[24] At the time of writing, Russia has continued its military aggression against Ukraine, see e.g. BBC News (2022).

Russian military aggression on Ukraine and also "strongly condemn the involvement of Belarus in this aggression against Ukraine" (European Council, 2022).

All in all, the examples covered so far suggest that the Polish position depends to a large extent on the governing elites because the two clashing sides of Euroenthusiasts and Eurosceptics have contrasting visions about Poland's role in the EU and about the EU itself. The reshuffling of high-level positions impacted the framing of Polish foreign policy and Poland's approach toward the EU. In a democratic system, it is important which political group will be able to persuade people to vote for a particular party. The economic and migration crises that shook the continent had a great impact on the formation of "Euro-sceptic patterns" (Grosse, 2019: 7). Thus, during those times right-wing parties in Europe enjoyed great support because of references to threats to "European" and "national" identity and culture. Economic crises made it easier for parties on the right to gain endorsement.

On the other hand, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Warsaw's stance in this regard have "transformed Poland's international image", which started to be praised in European capitals (Buras and Zerka, 2022). Russia's invasion of Ukraine has destabilized the region and it confirmed Poland's concerns regarding Russia. However, it is worth mentioning that the behaviour of the EU and its members has also been of great importance to Poland. It is possible to assume that in the situation when Poland seizes any signs of the EU and/or its members sympathizing with Russia, it might further distance Warsaw from the EU and deepen the element of suspicion in Polish identity. However, it is rather difficult to estimate how the position of each member state toward Russia will be in the near future. It might be assumed that such kind of critical situation will reframe the current order and shared understandings. Time will tell how the situation evolves and how it affects the identities of the actors involved, including Poland and this might be the subject of future research.

Conclusion

This article has argued that Polish behaviour in the EU is a reflection of the Polish identity, which is not fixed once and for all but is redefined through social interaction with other actors. Therefore the Polish changeable stance in the EU is a reflection of Polish identity. The above analysis has demonstrated that Poland's stance within the EU is unceasingly reconstructed according to the circumstances occurring in the social world. The EU itself is changing so its members' ideas, the appearance of new conditions such as the initiation of Nord Stream 2 or rising populism in Europe have affected Poland's understanding and its identity, that in turn is reflected in Poland's behaviour. A perspective of the EU being more centralized, without the UK and with many members that

sympathize with Russia despite its violating international law is something that Poland is afraid of and not willing to accept since such conditions are against the preferences deriving from Poland's national identity. The aforementioned circumstances along with rising populism in Europe, which also found fertile ground in Poland, cause the country to be distanced from the EU. One may claim that currently, Poland seems to not seek the EU favour by aligning itself to the EU norms and values but rather prefer to swim against the current by redrawing its path. The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated that Polish threats perceptions from Russia were not baseless and that the country was, indeed, pursuing neo-imperial policies as Poland has always claimed. Furthermore, the Russian behaviour toward Ukraine led to the reconstruction of understandings about Russia in Europe. It might be claimed that such a redefinition contributes to the fact that Europe now defines Russia as "Other" just as Poland has for decades. Russia has become the "Other" for Europe in a similar way as Poland defines Russia as its "Other". However, this topic remains beyond the scope of this article and necessitates further research.

All in all, this article has revealed that Poland's position in the EU is in a continuous (re)construction process. At one point, Poland was Euro-enthusiastic and had the potential to be one of the main pillars of the EU, but Poland has also experienced Eurosceptics in power who were not merely sceptical about the EU project but also posed a threat to European norms and values. Thus, Poland's role in the EU has been shaped by its domestic circumstances and social relations, which is reflected in Polish foreign policy in the EU context.

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BOOK REVIEW:

Integration and Differentiation in the European Union

**Authors**

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The modern history of European integration begins with the end of World War II. Reunification was emphasized to eliminate the physical and spiritual destructions caused by the war. The idea of European integration is built on this foundation. Every step taken on the continent has been made concerning the breakthroughs that integration will create. At the end of approximately seventy-five years, different ideas emerged on the systematics of European integration. Traditionally, the understanding that integration will expand and deepen as a "spillover" has been shaken to its foundations (Haas, 1961). Instead of a uniform progressive model, there have been cases where integration has become idle or differentiated occasionally. With each enlargement wave, the European Union (EU), whose members have increased in number, has become open to this. It has yet to be possible for member states to achieve consensus in every policy area. While some countries have eagerly integrated into certain policy areas, others have chosen to stay out of the system. Policy areas such as defence and security remained in a subjective position due to the sensitivities of the member states. All these debates have squeezed European integration between integration and differentiation. This dilemma has created a new field of discussion for EU studies.

Dirk Leuffen, Berthold Rittberger, and Frank Schimmelfening filled the gap in this discussion area by publishing "Integration and Differentiation in the European Union: Theory and Policies" in 2022. Approximately ten years before the publication of this book, the authors had also contributed to the literature with the book "Differentiated Integration Explaining Variation in the European Union," (Leuffen, Rittberger and Schimmelfening, 2012). However, over time, the EU has experienced successive internal and external crises, namely, the problem of immigration, Russia's annexation of Crimea, the US Presidency of Donald Trump, the rise of China in world politics, the UK's departure from the Union, and the coronavirus pandemic, as listed in the Preface of "Integration and Differentiation in the European Union: Theory and Policies" (p. v-vi). These local and international developments motivated the authors to a new publication. The book deals with the EU's position regarding integration and differentiation dichotomy with the help of theories and policies. The authors provide an in-depth analysis of the theoretical approaches to regional integration" and they apply integration theories to explain how different policy areas in the EU are subject to horizontal and vertical differentiation/integration. In this regard, they especially focus on differentiation, arguing that "the combination of vertical and horizontal differentiation has become a core feature of the EU that is likely to persist" (p. 403). Underlining the negative impact of Brexit and the possibility of further enlargement, they conclude that heterogeneity in the EU is likely to grow as well as "the pressures for further deepening" and they put forward "differentiation" as a possibility that could "reconcile the tension created by deepening and widening" (p. 403).

This book, prepared for publication by Palgrave Macmillan, has 11 chapters, including an introduction and conclusion. It has been categorized by the authors as follows: The introduction, conclusion, and second chapter were written independently without being included in any part. Then, the book is divided into two parts: theories and policies. In the theories part, the authors examine the most important theoretical approaches to European integration in four chapters: *intergovernmentalism, supranationalism, constructivism,* and *postfunctionalism*. The policies part is also composed of four chapters: *The single market, economic and monetary union, security and defence,* and *the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ).*

The introduction to the book is a summary of why this publication was created. The authors state that understanding European integration is essential and indispensable to studying the EU (p. 17). For them, the practice of differentiation is more important than integration. This is because explaining the institutions, powers, dynamics, and mechanisms of European integration is possible with differentiation analysis. In their view, the supranational structure of the EU facilitates differentiation. The Introduction provides a general

framework for the theories and policies used in the book. It presents a perspective on why theories and policies were included in the study. Eliminating the reader's question marks about the book is the purpose of the chapter.

The second chapter starts with an explanation of the EU as a differentiated integration system. First, the authors touch on what kind of a management system the EU is and the main points of its development process. The features that distinguish the EU from other actors of the international system, such as states and international organizations, are listed, then, the historical background of European integration until today is examined. The chapter also shows how integration is divided according to its types: vertical and horizontal integration. The increase in the duties and powers of the EU is called vertical integration, and the increase in its members is called horizontal integration (p. 35). The dynamics around which these two integrations have changed due to the political preferences of the EU are analyzed in detail in this chapter.

After the first two chapters, the part of the book that distinguishes it from other studies in the field begins. Part I presents the theoretical perspective and deals with four main theories: intergovernmentalism, supranationalism, constructivism and postfunctionalism. In this part, the general assumptions of these theories and their connection with vertical and horizontal integration are laid out. This part draws attention to the role of theories as policy tools. The theory to be explained in the first place is intergovernmentalism. The roots of the theory of intergovernmentalism in international relations constitute the main theme of the third chapter. Rational institutionalism, which is used to explain interstate cooperation is also discussed within this framework (p. 55). The authors further demonstrate this theory's role in perceiving European integration. They also underline the relationship between the system of negotiations created by the institutional culture of the EU and the differentiated integration phenomenon.

The fourth chapter on supranationalism mainly draws on neo-functionalism, the first fully developed European integration theory. The authors discuss supranationalism as a phenomenon included in the analysis of the intellectual foundations of European integration. For them, supranationalism is the advanced version of intergovernmentalism (p. 91). Furthermore, they argue that the theory represents the unstable aspect of the integration process that has survived today (p. 92). The chapter first puts the differences between the nation-state and the supranational system into question. Subsequently, the supranational assumptions of differentiated integration are tested through examples of supranationalism in the EU's policies.

The fifth chapter is devoted to another European integration theory: constructivism. The first two theories of the part, intergovernmentalism, and supranationalism, are based on the causal relationship of material structures. Constructivism, on the other hand, argues that social structures—ideas, identities, and discourses—simplify the understanding of European integration. The authors aim to put the theory into practice to confirm this claim. The theory's connection with sociological institutionalism, one of the international relations theories is also questioned (p. 118). Finally, the contribution of the theory to differentiated integration in understanding European integration is examined.

The last theory of Part I (covered in the sixth chapter) has been added to the European studies literature in recent years: Postfunctionalism. The theory developed under the influence of sociological and institutionalist assumptions. The theory, by the book's authors, represents a hope for the regionalization of integration (p. 144). According to them, ideas about the right to self-determination among EU member states are intertwined with postfunctionalism (p. 145). Within the chapter, there is a reference to the politicization of regional integration. Thus, the arguments of the previously described theories are also criticized in this chapter.

Each chapter of Part II of the study is devoted to a comprehensive analysis of selected EU policies. The authors declare four policy reasons for choosing the related policies covered in chapters 7 to 10: "These policies are not only politically important in and of themselves, but also represent different levels of vertical integration and different types of differentiated membership. Thus, the integration theory can be applied in various settings. They allow us to apply and evaluate" (p. 18). Part II is crucial for the book as this is where the theories covered in Part I are applied to explain the EU practice. The first chapter of Part II, the seventh chapter, is about the Single Market, reflecting the character of European integration. The authors of the chapter examine the differentiation in the Single Market in terms of vertical and horizontal integration. First, the outlines of the development of this fundamental area of European integration are evaluated. Then, the power of the four theories in the first chapter to explain the Single Market was tested (p. 179). In particular, how these theories help explain the functionalization of market integration is demonstrated. Finally, the findings of the Brexit process are presented as a case study.

The eighth chapter covers the EU's monetary and fiscal policies. This chapter gives rich data on differentiated integration in the realm of monetary policies of the EU. The authors added the economic and monetary union to the study, which started to gain importance, especially after the euro crisis. The fact that the EU is seen as an economic organization undeniably affects this. The

authors argue that this policy area is suitable for analysis, especially in terms of vertical and horizontal integration.

The ninth chapter touches on one of the most discussed topics of the EU from past to present: Security and defence. The chapter deals with the subject through vertical and horizontal integration as is the case with the other policies covered in Part II. The authors look at this policy of the EU, starting with the European Defense Community in the 1950s. The conclusion is that EU security and defense policy needs to produce stronger cooperation and that this policy is vertically integrated and horizontally differentiated (p. 282). Finally, the chapter examines some security and defense developments in the history of the EU with the help of the theories covered in Part I.

The last chapter of Part II deals with the Freedom, Security and Justice Area (AFSJ). This policy is one of the first delayed and then surprisingly advanced topics of European integration. This is because the core values on which the EU is built are within the scope of this policy (p. 337). As in the previous sections, the chapter starts with the historical development of the AFSJ. The article outlines how the four theories view the selected policy. The chapter has been enriched with data on the Schengen area and the migration crisis. The fact that migration is a current issue (and a hot topic) across the EU makes the chapter more interesting for readers.

The conclusion of the book is where both theories and policies are compared. The conclusion drawn from the four theories and policies is: No single element explains the EU's integration adventure. Theories have helped to make the complex structure of the EU understandable. However, the unstable outlook of the EU has made it difficult to make a definitive analysis. The fact that there are weaknesses, as well as academic strengths, proves this situation. According to the authors, the solution is to synthesize different integration theories (p. 397). This formulation will make it easier to know the EU cumulatively and make sense of the policies covered in the book.

In conclusion, this book is a publication that reflects on European integration. The most vital aspect of the study is that it explains why and how the EU has become what it is today through theories and policies. An extensive literature review supports the analytical framework of vertical and horizontal integration. The meeting of theories and approaches in the same book has made it possible to establish a connection between theory and practice. Researchers or readers interested in the subject can learn the theory first and gain insight through case studies. Theoretical tools have proven to be adaptable to critical developments and policies of European integration. In addition, including differentiated aspects of integration in line with the present is a sign of the up-to-dateness of EU studies. Despite its positive aspects, there are also aspects

that the research lacks. As the authors stated in the book's introduction, the study must provide information about EU politics and policy formation (p. 17). In other words, how the EU decides and works needs to be answered. As a dynamic international organization, this aspect of the EU could also be further presented in the book. Considering all these evaluations, it can finally be said that the book would be helpful for anyone who wants to follow and make sense of the latest developments in the European Studies field. The book is especially valuable as it shows that there may be other ways of European integration.

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BOOK REVIEW:

Borderlands - Europe and the Mediterranean Middle East

Author

Raffaella A. Del Sarto

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In *Borderlands: Europe and the Mediterranean Middle East*, a monograph, Del Sarto aims to offer a different reading of the EU's relations with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) which she interchangeably refers to as the Southern Mediterranean. Defining borderlands as "hybrid zones of crossover from one political, socioeconomic, and legal order to another", she argues that in its policies towards the region, the EU "seeks to extend many of its rules and practices to the countries in the southern neighbourhood, thereby transforming them into Europe's borderlands" (p. 2). The book fills a void in the literature on the EU-Middle East relations as it goes beyond spotting the norms-interest dichotomy in the EU's approach towards the region and thus adds a new dimension to the critique of the EU's normative power by her conception of "Normative Empire Europe". The novelty in her criticism rests on a definition of this imperial foreign policy-making as one that refers to "a distinct 'process of Europeanization'" (p.36) within which "the colonial and postcolonial policies of single member states vis-à-vis their southern neighbours became a common European project" (p.40). The core-periphery dichotomy is used in the book to refer to the imperial relationship between the EU and the MENA countries. The concept of borderlands is employed because the EU's major bordering practices pertain first and foremost to its trade policies (common commercial policy as well as the common customs tariffs), and, second, to its

border control, migration and security practices, which have especially become prioritized after the Arab uprisings and the ensuing mass flow of refugees from the region to Europe. Del Sarto underlines the asymmetrical relations that the EU establishes with its Southern Mediterranean partners, and, attempts to show how its practices represent a continuation of the colonial policies of its member states. She further reveals how the EU expects the Southern Mediterranean countries to adopt EU values and standards, without giving them equal say in their partnership. On the other hand, she also draws attention to the fact that the EU's relations with the Southern Mediterranean countries are not unidirectional and that especially after the intensification of refugee flows to Europe from the MENA region, the agency of the countries in the region has increased due to the emerging complex interdependence between them and the EU concerning the management of the EU's borderlands.

Borderlands: Europe and the Mediterranean Middle East composes of seven chapters (introduction and conclusion included). In the introduction, Del Sarto states the major argument of the book as the EU following imperial (and inherently asymmetrical) patterns of behaviour in its relations with Southern Mediterranean countries, mainly through the imposition of its neoliberal values and norms on them, while at the same time being increasingly affected by them because of its migration concerns and thus being in a relationship of complex interdependence marked by various bordering practices (and not only material ones). She further defines the terms used throughout the book such as Europe (being comprised of the EU and its Member States) and the Southern Mediterranean or the Mediterranean Middle East (the EU's Southern partners included in the European Neighbourhood Policy).

The second chapter lays down the book's conceptual framework, further explaining the concepts used such as borders and borderlands that constitute the basis of the analysis. Underlining the ambiguity of the EU's relations with its Southern Mediterranean partners (the ambiguity arising from the EU's being a supranational entity and not a state, its invisibility compared to other influential actors in the region such as the US and China, and the role played by its member states throughout their bilateral relations with MENA countries), Del Sarto claims that this ambiguity can be solved through a borderlands approach. In her view, "a borderlands approach best captures the basic patterns and development of [the EU's relations with MENA countries as it] highlights how European rules and practices are expanded to the southern periphery and how interconnected the two regions become as a result" (pp.13-14). Thus, she argues that the borderlands approach manifests "the various functions that borders play while conceptualizing the European Union and its member states as an empire of sorts" (p.14). In this endeavour, she defines borders and borderlands as "social and political constructs" and refers to borders "as institutions that

govern inclusion and exclusion through the establishment and maintenance of different modalities of transboundary movement (pp.14-15). Here, she underlines that the EU's borders are still marked by the borders of the internal market (as the Eurozone and the Schengen area cover different member states and thus do not correspond to the EU's actual borders). She underlines that the EU's borders are fluid not only because of enlargement but also because of the various policy configurations as well as different constructions of identity in Europe (e.g. Norwegians, citizens of a non-EU country, defining themselves as Europeans versus the British who, during the UK's membership in the EU, had hardly defined themselves as such). Then she refers to the European empire and its borders, where she explains the EU's projection of its norms and values beyond its borders and criticizes the conception of normative power Europe, offering "normative empire Europe" as a concept that better captures what the EU does beyond its borders, especially in its Southern neighbourhood. She lists five features of the EU that match the conception of an empire in this regard: The first one is the various configuration of different cores and peripheries (in identity and policy terms) that constitute the vast territories that the EU covers. Second, she refers to the EU's fluid borders which are marked by continuous rounds of enlargement (and also loss of territory by Brexit). The third feature is "the strongly normative political discourse that the EU maintains"; i.e. the normative power Europe discourse, as it "is still reminiscent of the civilizing missions of past empires" (p. 27). Fourth, she emphasizes "the variable border geometry" constituted by the EU in its relationship with its peripheries and especially with its Southern periphery, arguing that this involves "their highly selective, gradual, and differentiated [integration] into the European order, with the aim of stabilizing Europe's borderlands" (p. 27). The fifth and last feature that del Sato puts forward is the EU's reliance on and co-optation of local political structures and elites in the periphery to export this European order beyond its borders (p. 28).

The third chapter is the place where Del Sarto lays down the major characteristics of Europe's colonial past to reflect on the EU's normative empire in the period between its establishment and the early 2000s, and, to show how this manifests itself in its policies regarding the Southern Mediterranean. In this regard, she refers to the "Eurafrica" project and argues that the EU's establishment (the establishment of the European Economic Community - EEC) is also the result of European (mainly, the EEC's colonial member states') concerns about finding alternative ways of exploiting the MENA region. Then she uncovers the Europeanization of colonial policies through the Global Mediterranean Policy and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Here, Europeanization means that these policies were no longer confined to the former colonial EU member states' interests but have gradually become the EU's and its member states' interests as a whole,

reflecting the neoliberal market-oriented logic of the EU as well as its prioritization of security and stability (i.e., its interests) over its norms and values. Under the subtitle "the Crystallization of European Imperial Ambitions" she refers to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) underlining the shift towards bilateral relations with the Southern Mediterranean partners as opposed to the regionalist one-size-fits-all approach of the EMP. She further demonstrates how the ENP and its tying of a stake in the single market for the EU's partners to the fulfillment of its conditionality regarding respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law had been in line with its self-proclaimed normative power. On the other hand, she also asserts that despite this image of being a normative power, the EU continued its interest-driven policies on the region, again especially prioritizing its own security through the discourse of creating "a ring of well-governed countries" (Commission of the European Communities, 2004) around itself. Del Sarto concludes the chapter with the claim that from the initiation of the ENP onwards, the EU has increasingly been acting as a "normative empire" in its relations with the MENA countries, expecting them to follow its rules and practices and thus recreating "core-periphery patterns of interaction, a process that ultimately serves European economic and security interests", and that surely resembles imperial patterns of behaviour (p.50).

The fourth chapter begins with a brief discussion of recent developments in EU-MENA relations with a view to setting the background for analyzing how the EU integrates its Southern Mediterranean partners into the European order. This is also the chapter where Del Sarto discusses the EU response to the Arab uprisings. The chapter reveals how the EU imposes its preferences concerning trade, border policies, security and migration on the MENA countries. Del Sarto argues that the EU's trade relations with the MENA countries include their selective integration into the single market but only in terms that are favourable to the EU rather than the countries concerned. She further demonstrates how the EU externalizes and outsources its border control and migration policies, cooperating with the countries in the region in a manner that does not take into consideration the EU's own norms and values. She reflects on how the security of the EU and its member states are prioritized in all these practices. Finally, she also shows how the EU collaborates with co-opted elites in these countries to pursue its policies and interests, a trait that is reminiscent of both colonial and imperial practices.

Under the title "Restructuring the Socio-Economic and Political Order in the Mediterranean Middle East", the fifth chapter uncovers how the EU's policies affect the countries in the region. First, Del Sarto looks at the socio-economic implications of the EU's policies in the region which are mainly marked by the EU's being the MENA countries' biggest trade partner. Here, she contends that

the impact of colonial relations can still be observed as they remain the basis of the EU's trade relations with these countries. She refers to this relationship as a distorted and typically imperial one, "with MENA states importing high value-added manufactured goods and services from Europe while exporting raw materials, 'simple' labour-intensive or resource-based goods, and some agricultural products to the European core" (pp. 91-92). She further criticizes the Western neoliberal financial mechanisms (such as IMF funds) and especially EU financial aid provided to these countries only with conditions that work in favour of the global markets-oriented liberal logic rather than actually helping these countries. She underlines the negative impact of this hegemonic neoliberal economic development model on MENA countries' socio-economic structures such as rising inequality and unemployment. Regarding the political implications of the EU's policies, del Sato reveals how authoritarian rule is strengthened in the MENA countries because the EU mainly works with authoritarian governments and the co-opted civil society in these countries in the realms of both trade-related policies and border control, security, and migration policies. She further elaborates on how the EU's outsourcing and externalization of its border and migration policies violate human rights, while at the same time strengthening the hold of the authoritarian regimes.

In the sixth chapter, Del Sarto uncovers the agency of MENA countries in their relationship with the EU. She demonstrates the complex interdependence between the EU and these countries which developed on the basis of colonial ties as well as geographical proximity. She underlines the increasingly more effective agency of MENA countries, especially in the realm of border controls, security and migration. She demonstrates how MENA countries openly reject the imposition of EU rules and norms in certain areas (e.g., the regulatory realm) and how they seem to agree on certain EU conditions (e.g., in the realm of democracy and political reform) in the first place but then "quietly" alter them according to their national preferences (pp. 127-128). She also stresses how the refugee deals have given considerable leverage to certain countries in the region in their relations with the EU. Finally, she highlights the "highly selective interpretation and application of rules and practices" on the part of both the EU and the MENA countries. This chapter is especially important as it provides a comprehensive account of the perception and response of MENA countries regarding the EU's policies, which is an understudied topic in International Relations and European Studies.

Finally, Del Sarto concludes with the seventh chapter where she lists the findings of her book. In her view, EU-MENA relations still reflect and build on Europe's colonial ties with the region, and today, this asymmetrical relationship is marked by the EU's imperial or quasi-imperial policies. She further underlines that the borderlands approach was suitable for explaining this

unequal and hub-and-spoke type of relationship. She also draws attention to the commonly criticized contradiction between the EU's discourse of normative power and its interest-driven policies that prioritize security and stability in the region, many times at the expense of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. She also shows how the EU and the MENA countries are tied in a complex relationship of interdependence and how both of them abide by EU rules and norms selectively and can alter them according to their own preferences. She concludes that the borderlands approach is especially useful in distinguishing "between Europe's ambitions to diffuse liberal norms on the world stage and the technocratic reality of transferring regulations pertaining to trade, efficient economic governance, and administrative practice to the periphery" (p.147) as well as in revealing how its border control, migration and security policies empower authoritarian regimes in the region.

All in all, it can be argued that Del Sarto's book fills a significant void in European foreign policy studies as it not only provides a comprehensive criticism of the EU's policies on the Southern Mediterranean and the normative power Europe discourse but it also offers a detailed account of how MENA countries circumvent and resist European rules and preferences, revealing the complex relationship between the EU and the countries concerned. Her notion of normative empire Europe fits well with conceptualizing this relationship and the application of a borderlands approach especially helps uncover the dynamics of this unequal core-periphery relationship and the fluid borders and borderlands of the EU produced and reproduced by its trade policy as well as border control, migration and security practices.

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