

# BÖLGE ÇALIŞMALARI DERGİSİ

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**Mehmet DENİZ**

The Matter of Consistency within the European Union: Why Did the EU Fail to Devise a Coherent Policy in the Bosnian War?

**Özgür YILMAZ**

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Kırgız Halkından Kırgızistan Devletine: Etno-Sembolizm Bağlamında Bir Analiz

**Christian Aime Gedeon Fundy MUYUMBA**

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# BÖLGE ÇALIŞMALARI DERGİSİ

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## İÇİNDEKİLER / CONTENTS

## ARAŞTIRMA MAKALELERİ / RESEARCH ARTICLES

- The Matter of Consistency within the European Union: Why Did the EU Fail to Devise a Coherent Policy in the Bosnian War?** 97-120

*Avrupa Birliği İçerisinde Tutarlılık Meselesi: AB, Bosna Savaşında Neden Tutarlı Bir Politika Geliştiremedi?*

Mehmet DENİZ

- Social Movements in Latin America: 26th of July Movement** 121-138

*Latin Amerika'da Toplumsal Hareketler: 26 Temmuz Hareketi*

Özgür YILMAZ

- China and Global Food Security Dynamics amidst the Russian Invasion of Ukraine** 139-157

*Rusya'nın Ukrayna'yı İşgal Sürecinde Çin ve Küresel Gıda Güvenliği Dinamikleri*

Alfi NUR AZIZAH & Hendra Maujana SARAGIH

- Kırgız Halkından Kırgızistan Devletine: Etno-Sembolizm Bağlamında Bir Analiz** 158-178

*From the Kyrgyz People to the Kyrgyzstan State: An Analysis in the Context of Ethno-Symbolism*

Burcu TEMÜR

## KİTAP İNCELEMESİ / BOOK REVIEW

- Tuğrul Oğuzhan Yılmaz, Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Teşkilât-ı Mahsûsa'nın Doğu Afrika'daki Faaliyetleri** 179-181

Christian Aime Gedeon Fundy MUYUMBA

## The Matter of Consistency within the European Union: Why Did the EU Fail to Devise a Coherent Policy in the Bosnian War?

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### Abstract

The Bosnian War witnessed horrifying humanitarian crimes, particularly systematic rapes perpetrated by Serbs against Bosnian women. More than 35,000 women and children were subjected to such atrocities in Serb-run “rape/death camps”. Additionally, the fall of Srebrenica resulted in the loss of thousands of civilian lives. International intervention to halt the Bosnian War faced challenges and complexities. Various countries involved in the matter held differing interpretations of the conflict, leading to diverse views on potential solutions. The lack of consensus and political will hindered the effectiveness of the European Union’s intervention efforts. This paper critically examines the international intervention in the Bosnian War, focusing on the approaches of key EU countries: France, Germany, and the UK. These countries’ divergent policies and objectives impacted the EU’s ability to adopt a coherent stance towards the conflict. The study employs Nuttall and Duke’s theoretical approach to consistency in decision-making within the EU to explain why a consistent approach was not achieved during the intervention. By analysing the complexities of the EU’s intervention in the Bosnian War, this study seeks to answer the question of what went wrong and provides insights into the challenges of decision-making and consensus-building within the EU.



**Introduction**

The dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, resulting from the collapse of Communism and the end of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe, marked a significant event. This period of post-Cold War uncertainty witnessed the resurgence of nationalist sentiments, ethnic conflicts, and regional power struggles. Yugoslavia's disintegration led to three ethnic wars in Europe, with the Bosnian War (1992-1995) being the most devastating. Javier Solano, High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (henceforth, CFSP), (Solano, 2005: 1) characterized it as “the darkest hour of the wars in the former Yugoslavia” and “the worst atrocity in Europe since the Second World War”. One of the most tragic aspects of the Bosnian War was the systematic rape of Bosnian women by Serbian forces. The scale of these crimes was staggering, with over 35,000 women and children held in Serb-run “rape/death camps” (Niod Report, 2002: 640). Houses and hotels were converted into brothels, where women endured prolonged and repeated sexual violence. Additionally, the fall of Srebrenica resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians, with an estimated 7,500 losing their lives (Brunborg et al., 2003: 236).

The Bosnian civil war holds significance for the European Union (henceforth, EU) as it had the potential to unveil whether the EU would adopt decisive measures to cease the aggressions perpetrated by Serbs against the shared values of humanity. Additionally, the crisis highlighted the potential consequences a Balkan conflict could have for European member states, notably Italy and Greece. In this respect, the Bosnian civil war should be considered as the first major test for the EU. Diplomatically, the EU's handling of the Bosnian crisis not only fell short of deterring or slowing the escalation of the conflict into a civil war but actually accelerated it.

France advocated for an active EU role with potential military intervention and airstrikes, the United Kingdom (henceforth, UK) remained cautious but opposed airstrikes, Germany pursued a middle path, and Belgium and Holland supported military intervention while Greece opposed it. This article critically examines international intervention in the Bosnian War, particularly focusing on the EU due to the conflict's taking place in Europe. The EU was expected to play a pivotal role in preventing Serbian nationalists' atrocities against Bosnians. However, the varying perceptions of the Yugoslav Wars, including the Bosnian War, by the leading EU countries (Germany, France, and the UK) profoundly influenced the EU's overall approach to the conflict. These countries failed to agree on the conflict's exact characterization, which, to my understanding, led to significant disparities in policies related to recognition, military involvement, arms embargoes, and airstrikes (Gow, 1997: 182).

France's policies appeared contradictory due to their initial support for Yugoslav unity but also their efforts to end hostilities and enhance their international standing. Germany, on the other hand, played a key role in recognizing the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, which was, I believe, an extremely premature move and also disrupted the nascent CFSP. However, Germany later sought to normalize relations with EU partners, failing to exhibit the political will needed to address ethnic violence in Bosnia. The UK aimed to impose its own insights on recognition, lifting arms embargoes, and initiating airstrikes against Serbian forces. The UK preferred to act through multilateral bodies, such as the EU, the United Nations (henceforth the UN), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (henceforth NATO), believing that if action were to be taken in Bosnia, it should involve these multilateral organizations. The UK strongly opposed lifting the arms embargo and armed intervention due to a lack of political will, similar to Germany. These differing perceptions and objectives among the three major EU players led to the EU's inability to adopt a consistent and determined stance during the Bosnian War. The lack of consensus, inconsistent policies, and a lack of leadership and political will hindered the EU's efforts to end the violence (Raunio and Saarikivi, 2001:16), resulting in a fragmented approach characterized by uncertainty and disintegration among EU member states.

The study seeks to answer the question of what went wrong during the EU's intervention in the Bosnian War. It examines the issue of consistency in decision-making within the EU, by benefitting from Nuttall (2005) and Duke's (1999) theoretical approach to consistency. The former author deals with the issue of consistency by dividing it into three categories such as "horizontal", "institutional" and "vertical", while the latter analyses it within the confines of "horizontal" and "vertical". Horizontal consistency pertains to the alignment and harmony in the policies pursued by various components of the EU apparatus, while institutional consistency refers to the challenges arising from the EU's decision to address a single policy domain, such as external affairs, through two distinct sets of actors, each characterized by differing oversight and procedural mechanisms. Vertical consistency, on the other hand, pertains to the alignment of the EU with the domestic policies of its member states. The lack of consistency, as demonstrated by the obligations and escape clauses in EU treaties, is highlighted as a key factor contributing to the EU's failure to adopt a coherent approach during the Bosnian crisis.

The article is structured into three parts covering the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the theoretical exploration of consistency within the EU, and the leading countries' approaches to the Bosnian War. The aim is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the complexities surrounding

### The Matter of Consistency within the European Union

international intervention in the Bosnian War and the factors that contributed to its challenges and failures.

#### 1. The Brief History of Bosnia-Herzegovina

As is known, Bosnia was a part of the Roman Empire during the initial centuries of the Christian era, like the other provinces of the Mediterranean region. Following the fall of Rome, Bosnia saw Slavic settlements by the 7th century AD with the result that a number of counties and duchies were established in the region. Serbia and Croatia emerged as two neighbouring kingdoms around Bosnia (Serbia on the southeast and Croatia on the west of Bosnia). Bosnia was ruled by local nobles under the control of the Hungarian kings during the 11th and 12th centuries, after that it gained its independence around 1200 AD and remained as an independent country for more than 260 years (Riedlmayer, A. 1995: 2).

In the consequence of the Balkans` conquest by the Ottomans in the late 14th century onward, Bosnia, eventually, became an Ottoman province in 1463. Under the Ottomans` rule, Bosnia experienced some alterations in terms of administrative, religious, ethnical and architectural aspects. Riedlmayer, in his article, (1995: 2) indicates that

“The Ottoman sultans and their local governors embellished Bosnia`s towns and cities with splendid mosques and established pious endowments that supported schools, Islamic seminaries, libraries, orphanages, soup-kitchens and almshouses”.

To be sure, all of these alterations were of pivotal importance, but in terms of their close relations to the topic of this paper, it would be useful to emphasize the shifts in ethnic and religious patterns of the area. Ottomans` tolerance towards the other religions and minorities caused Bosnia to receive considerable amount of migration, which increased the area`s multi-faith and multi-ethnic structure. Riedlmayer, A. (1995: 2) states that “The Ottomans were tolerant of non-Muslim minorities, allowing them full freedom to worship, live and trade as they pleased”.

Eventually, Ottomans` sovereignty, which had lasted for over 400 years, in Bosnia came to an abrupt end in 1878 through the agreement among the great powers in Berlin, and the rule of Bosnia was ceded to the Austria-Hungarian Empire. The disintegration of Austria-Hungary Empire right in the wake of the First World War led the entire area and its neighbouring kingdoms to a chaotic state. However, the political unity among the kingdoms in the area -including Bosnia and Herzegovina- was able to be attained in 1929 under the name of “the Kingdom of Yugoslavia” (or merely Yugoslavia).

The area -under the name of Yugoslavia- saw another disintegration due to the Nazi's invasion under the leadership of Hitler in 1941, which again led the area to chaos. However, the area was saved from the invaders and, once more, the political stability was achieved through the resistance group called "Partizans" under the command of Josip Broz Tito. At the end of the war, Marshall Tito and his Partizans were considered as the undisputed masters of Yugoslavia. Under Tito's rule in Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina was re-established as a republic and became one of the six federal republics of Yugoslavia in 1945 in its Ottoman borders.



**Figure 1.** Post-WW2 Yugoslavia was a federation of six states.


Unfortunately, this condition of political stability would end owing to Tito's death in 1980. In addition, the collapse of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe and the end of Cold War accelerated the process of disintegration. Furthermore, the rise of Slobodan Milosevic and his extreme Serb nationalist agenda played a crucial role in the process (Niod Report, 2002: 66).

## **1.2. The Source of Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina**

The collapse of Communism as an ideology and a state system, the end of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War paved the way for the dissolution of Yugoslavia. At this stage, nationalism emerged as an option for the people in the entire area to fill the gap, because each of Yugoslavia's member republics wanted to make its own way. These factors, to be sure, can be underlying reasons for the disintegration of Yugoslavia, but can never account for the ethnic cleansing which turned into a tragedy in the heart of Europe in the 20th century.

### The Matter of Consistency within the European Union

The origins of conflict in Bosnia can be dealt with in two dimensions. The first aspect is based on the idea of primordial ties, according to which – in the case of Bosnia in particular- ethnic hatred was embedded deeply within the history of the Balkans. Riedlmayer, A. (1995: 6) states that “Kosovo... famous battle, fought in 1389, that ended medieval Serbia’s independence and began its centuries of subjection to the Islamic Ottoman Empire”. The second element is the manipulation of this ethnic hatred by the Serbian elites. Cox (1998: 10) defines this as; “Ethnic mobilisation was a political strategy used by former communist leaders, especially Slobodan Milosevic, to sustain their power following the collapse of communism”.



**Figure 2.** The chart below shows the demographic distribution of Bosnia & Herzegovina in 1991 census (Suffragio, 2013).

The conflict in Bosnia started following the referendum, held in Bosnia in the first days of March 1992, on the independence of Bosnia & Herzegovina. The Croats and Muslims voted in favour of independence, yet the referendum was both boycotted and declared invalid by the Bosnian Serbs with the result that violence broke out and escalated to war in April 1992, at which time Bosnia’s independence was recognised by the International Community.

The Bosnian War continued some 2 years and was put to an end through the negotiation of the Dayton Agreement in November 1995. This was preceded by NATO air strikes over the Serbs in May 1995, after permission was given by the UN (Raunio and Saarikivi, 2001: 9).

April-1992	→ The break out of the Bosnian War
Jan/Feb-1993	→ The failing of Vance-Owen Plan
July-1995	→ Srebrenica massacre
August-1995	→ NATO air-strikes
September-1995	→ The imposition of cease-fire by the USA and other Western nations
November-1995	→ Dayton Peace Agreement

**Figure 3.** The brief chronology of the Bosnian War.

## 2. Theoretical Framework

The decision-making process within the EU stands out as one of the most intricate among multilateral institutions. It involves the active participation of the governments of Member States, the European Parliament, civil services, the European Commission, parliaments, numerous Courts, consultative bodies, various interest groups and Committees. The substantial political divergences across the EU pose challenges in formulating coherent policies grounded in shared principles. The decision-making process within the EU faces significant challenges due to conflicting national interests of the member states, as has often been the case among the permanent representatives of the UN (the United States, Russia, the UK, China and France). The logic behind this is that the most able member or members of the body tend to manipulate the decisions to be taken for the sake of their national political goals.

### 2.1. Consistency within the EU

The issue of consistency is one of the most significant matters in the EU's external relations in particular, and it has been included in some important official text regularising the Union's external relations since 1974 (Nuttall, 2002: 93). This situation indicates that member states have been attaching great importance to the problem of consistency and trying to improve their collective performance by means of institutional and procedural changes. However, to what degree the EU has achieved the desired level in the sense of consistency so far is worth examining in terms of the issues involving particularly European identity and national sovereignty which is closely related to the domestic policies in foreign policy-making.

While it is arguable that consistency is not a sine qua non in every issue and it may not matter very much depending on the particularities of given cases, it does matter a lot if the perception of inconsistency will impair the EU's credibility. On the other hand, the concept of consistency in the EU's foreign policy is not new and has been mentioned in a number of official texts, but the decision made in the Maastricht Treaty is a milestone on this matter, since it indicates how the EU's leaders are determined in their pursuit for consistency. In the Maastricht Treaty, the provision regarding consistency is;

“The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its respective powers” (Nuttal, 2002: 96).

### The Matter of Consistency within the European Union

However, to what degree the above-cited provision is sanctioning when the issues are related to the national political preferences will be handled later on in this part.

## 2.2. Theoretical Classification of the Concept of Consistency

The perception of consistency can be dealt with at different levels within the EU's root, depending on the policies, objectives, pillar structures and the national interests of the member states. While Duke (Duke, 1999: 4) deals with the issue of consistency by dividing it into two as "horizontal" and "vertical", Nuttall (2005: 97-98) discusses the issue by dividing it into three as "horizontal", "institutional" and "vertical".

Duke's definition of horizontal consistency refers to activities of the EU between the Community and CFSP regarding external issues, where he combines horizontal and institutional consistencies in Nuttall's elaboration. On the other hand, vertical consistency, according to Duke, applies to relations between the Union and the member states when the issue in question is within the sphere of both the Union's external policy and any individual member state's domestic policy (Duke, 1999: 4). The focus concerning the theoretical framework of consistency will be on Nuttall's approach since it is more extended and elaborative.

### 2.2.1. Horizontal Consistency

Horizontal consistency refers to coherence in the policies pursued by different parts of the EU machinery. In broader terms, any given policy adopted by one pillar or body should not contradict the one agreed in another pillar, which calls for effective arbitration mechanism. The frequently-given example resulting in inconsistency in this sense is the disharmony between the Common Agricultural Policy (henceforth, CAP) and the EU's development policy. Nuttall (2002:97) states that the coexistence of the CAP, which subsidises exports and on occasion protects the European market, and the EU's development policy, which encourages its partners to develop their agricultural sectors for exports.

The EU's handing its external relations over two different bodies is problematic in that it may create a significant problem with respect to fundamental principles of the Union involving human rights. The Bosnian War made it clear that this implementation contradicts with the EU's main principles and objectives on which it is based.

### 2.2.2. Institutional Consistency

It refers to the problems that grow out of EU's choosing to deal with a single policy realm (i.e. external affairs) by two sets of actors, each of whose scrutiny and procedures are different from each other. Naturally, this brings out inconsistency in most cases. What distinguishes institutional consistency from horizontal one is that any particular foreign policy has been dealt with by two set of bureaucrats. This means approaching any external issue from different angles by different bodies. As a matter of fact, here we come across to "turf wars" between the bureaucrats of first and second pillars. As known, the EU's foreign policies are formed of external relations, security, economic and development policies. While the external relations and security fields are largely under the authority of second pillar, economic and development policies fall within the competence of first pillar.

However, the increasing rate of cross-pillar activities sometimes leads to dead-lock situations. For example, since the concept of security have naturally been expanded, such issues as conflict prevention or crisis management are considered inherently as inter pillar. In this respect, according to Nuttall (2002: 98), if the EU wishes to impose sanctions, it must adopt both a Common Position or Joint Action, through CFSP procedures involving unanimity, and a Council Regulation, through Community procedures which may involve qualified majority voting".

### 2.2.3. Vertical Consistency

Vertical consistency is concerned with the relations between the EU and the national policies of the member states. This type of consistency is quite challenging and gives rise to the greatest political difficulties that are difficult to reconcile. When examining some provisions concluded in the European Community Treaty regarding the EU and the national policies, it is clear that the EU's structure is quite fostering in this type of consistency.

Some provisions can be listed as;

- The member states shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.
- The member states shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.
- The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with. (Art. 11.2. Consolidated)



**The Matter of Consistency within the European Union**

- Member states shall ensure that their national policies conform to the Common Positions. (Art. 15)
- Joint Actions shall commit the member states in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity. (Art. 14.3) (Nuttal, 2005: 107).

However, in the case of conflict between member states and the EU on any external issue, there is no sanctioning body. To be sure, there is the European Court of Justice (henceforth, CFSP), but it does not have jurisdiction. This situation lessens the respect and obedience to the above-mentioned provisions by the member states. In addition, the treaty has gaps in it, which enable member states to abstain from the obligations. In this respect, the treaty is subjected to severe criticism. Nuttall (2005:107) suggests that “Indeed, the authors of the treaty seem to have been more concerned with providing the member states with the ways of avoiding their obligations; the text are full of escape clauses which have increased in number over years”. Similarly, Duke (1999-9) argues that

“In spite of the binding nature of the obligations assumed under the CFSP upon the member states, the national identities and the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states are safeguarded in several ways by the EU. Although provision is made for the use of qualified majority voting in the second pillar, the practice remained unanimity that safeguards the essential interests of the member states”.

Personally, I think the intergovernmental nature of CFSP requiring unanimity and thus enabling each member to pursue their individual policies outside of it brought forth the most compelling impediments in both Yugoslav and Bosnian conflicts. Vertical inconsistency was also experienced in such issues as “lifting arms embargo” and “air strikes” (briefly “lift and strike”, was put forward by the US) during the Bosnian War. For instance, French government supported this idea, because since the beginning of the crisis they supported the idea that the conflict should be brought to an end, and this proposal was the only one left after a number of initiatives had been resorted to. By contrast, the UK government strongly opposed to the idea of lift and strike. The underlying reasons behind this opposition were that lifting arms embargo would increase the bloodshed and air strikes would necessitate military intervention. As will be discussed in the following part in “the lack of political will”, no governments would desire to risk any financial and military assets. Similarly, Greek government was strongly against the military intervention and air strike. The logic behind this was having good relations with Serbia, limiting the expansion of the influence of Türkiye, whose foreign policy, they believed, since the end of the Cold War had been driven in part by often

unsuccessful endeavour to establish herself as a regional power and tensed relations with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Lavdas, 1996: 220). As for Germany, there is no particular account on the German side as regards lift and strike. However, air strikes meant a follow up with ground troops, and it was impossible for the German troops to be deployed due to both the domestic pressure and the constraints included in the German Constitution. Therefore, they did not favour the military mission.

As it is crystal clear, it was impossible for the EU to adopt a coherent approach in the Bosnian conflict. Because, almost all leading members in the EU had different policies and calculations, which usually took precedence over the European approach.

### **3. France, Germany and the UK's Perceptions of the Yugoslavian War and Their Reflections on the EU's Overall Approach to Yugoslavian and Bosnian Conflicts**

International responses to the Yugoslavian War and the following Bosnian conflict were mainly expressed through multilateral bodies such as the EU, the NATO, the UN and the Western European Union (henceforth, WEU) (Gow, 1997: 156). However, despite having some independent character, all of the above-cited bodies' entire course of actions was inevitably subject to the will and individual policies of their most influential members. Concerning the EU, France, Germany and the UK have been the leading and the most influential states behind the activities of the Union during the crisis. Due to not having an exact definition of the crisis, there were clear distinctions in each country's way of interpreting the conflict, which profoundly affected the course of the war.

#### **3.1. Paris's Diplomacy with Respect to the Crisis**

Initial characterization of the crisis by the French politicians can be considered within the framework of Bonapartist, state-centric terms. Accordingly, accepting the break up of Yugoslavia, in other words, recognizing the independence of Yugoslav republics might have had negative implications over Corsica (Gow, 1997: 159). Therefore, Paris pursued the policy of protecting the unity of Yugoslavia through assigning itself as Belgrade's old friend in the West, by which France would be able to keep a diplomatic channel to create an opportunity to influence the Serbs. This policy can be interpreted as a political attempt to counter German support for Slovenia and Croatia, as well as to coerce Serbia. However, this policy exacerbated Serbian belligerence, and eventually, France had to withdraw its support for the maintenance of the Yugoslav state. From the late 1991 onward, French politicians directed their attentions towards protecting civilians, and they even agreed

### The Matter of Consistency within the European Union

to resort to military force, though under very limited terms, under the UN supervision where and when necessary.

This political shift in France resulted mainly from four reasons. The major reason was the change of government in France. Following the governmental change in Paris, the foreign minister, “pro-Serbian” Roland Dumas was replaced by stricter Alain Juppe (Gow, 1997: 163). Juppe was of the opinion that the military force could be employed as a last panacea if it were to end the Serbian atrocity in Bosnia. While insisting on the military force through the EU and the UN structures, Juppe was also supporting the idea of moving closer to the formal military structures in NATO for practical and immediate outcomes. The second reason was related to the French military staff opinion, General Morillon in particular, concerning the Bosnian War. General Marillon, who was in the service of United Nations Protection Force (henceforth, UNPROFOR) as an officer in Bosnia-Herzegovina and who was initially strongly against the use of military force, became convinced to resorting to military force in certain conditions. Gow (1997: 163) states that “Morillon’s scrutiny had a notable impact on the French government”. The third factor for France was the recognition that something had to be done against those responsible for destruction in Bosnia. Because, it became evident for France that it was mainly the Serbs that were responsible for what was happening in Bosnia. The fourth and last element was concerning the human rights violations committed by the Serbs against the Bosnian civilians. According to Gow (1997: 163), the humanitarian aspects of the war in Bosnia had a great impact on President Mitterand’s decision to visit Sarajevo at the end of June, 1992. In the consequence of this visit, Sarajevo airport was opened to international humanitarian aid. Mitterand’s unexpected visit to Sarajevo removed the Serbian siege of Bosnian capital for the first time. This political move not only proved to the UK and Germany that they could take action if they wanted, but also enabled Sarajevo airport to be used by UNPROFOR. Mitterand’s initiative served as a very first step of the series of prospective political attempts that could put an early end to the conflict. However, this initiative could not be appreciated by the other major players.

One of the reasons that helps explain why France was so active when compared to other players was the French priority of asserting itself on the international arena, which was only possible through international bodies (Gow, 1997: 158-159). In this respect, it can be suggested that France played the membership cards of the EU, NATO, WEU and UN Security Council as a permanent member successfully.

Generally speaking, the French approach to the whole conflict was contradictory, when examining the Yugoslavian Wars and the French policy. However, in terms of its desire to seek an early end to hostilities and of improving France's position in the international stage, it was consistent. Particularly, deploying troops to Bosnia improved the France's image and kept it a step ahead of Germany (Gow, 1997: 166).

### 3.2. German Policies towards the Conflict

At the beginning and throughout the developing months of the crisis, Germany strongly supported the unity of Yugoslav state, yet this lasted quite a short time. When the fighting broke out in Slovenia and Croatia, public opinion in Germany begun to change in favour of Slovenia and Croatia's claims to independence from the communist-led Serbia, which reminded them their sufferings and struggle to become united till the collapse of Communism. Gow (1997: 167) states that

“For a country filled with the emotion of its own union at the end of the Cold War and celebrating the collapse of Communism throughout Eastern Europe, Slovenia and Croatia were understood as two more countries striving for self-determination and to throw off the communist yoke”.

From this point of view, the general public opinion in Germany regarding what happens in Yugoslavia was a war of aggression by the communist-led Serbia and the Yugoslav People's Army (henceforth, JNA) against the flourishing democracies in Slovenia and Croatia. What's more, in terms of Germany, it could be interpreted as a war at the end of which either self-determination or unity by force would be justified. Eventually, Germany, under great domestic pressure, decided to support those seeking for independence, and formally and unilaterally recognized Slovenia and Croatia in the late 1991 (Crawford, 1998: 19). The domestic pressure in Germany was such an extent that Chancellor Helmut Kohl received severe criticisms and being accused of supporting the communists from Serbia through the non-recognition of Slovenia and Croatia (Gow, 1997: 167).

Crawford (1998: 20) argues that “What Germany saw was a substantive link between the right for self-determination and international recognition; however, other countries saw it as a tactical move that was solely based on power calculations”. This view justifies the argument that French initial support for the Serbian cause as to the unity of Yugoslavia could be to counter the German support for Slovenia and Croatia. In addition, Germany's unilateral act of recognition both broke the ranks with the rest of the EU members states and critically damaged the embryonic CFSP, with the result that the relations between Germany and the Western powers became soured. This also functioned as catalysing element which not only caused the conflict to spread faster than expected, but also it gave

### The Matter of Consistency within the European Union

Serbs an opportunity to reason their cause in attacking Bosnia. After the recognition, Germany directed its attention to re-ordering its spoiled relations with the EU and tried not to offend the other members and players. Therefore, Germany's forceful initiative during the Slovenian and Croatian conflicts disappeared in the course of the Bosnian crisis. Although making contributions in terms of the delivery of humanitarian aids and carrying out some monitoring posts for the NATO forces, Germany failed to exhibit the required political enthusiasm in the attempts of ending the ethnic violence in Bosnia. German politicians preferred not to take part in the discussions as regards the military intervention. One of the crucial issues leading to hesitation in Germany regarding military intervention was caused by the constraints included in the German Constitution. Accordingly, it was out of question for the German troops to be deployed for any military mission outside NATO (Gow, 1997: 173). That's why, they could not produce any policy about whether the military force should be resorted to or not, and they preferred to remain somewhere in the middle.

### 3.3. The UK's Policies as Regards the Conflict

According to Gow (1997: 174), the UK's initial analysis of the Yugoslavian conflict was almost like that of French, conservative and restrained. However, it departs from the French initial analysis in that French held the view that Yugoslav state should be sustained, yet the UK's politicians were able to interpret the war through ethnic and historical angles. In other words, the commonly-held view in the UK was that the Yugoslavian Wars bore, to some extent, the modern dynamics of secession, but to a large extent, ethnic and historic animosity, where they identified the Yugoslav conflict with the Northern Ireland conflict. This situation dampened the UK's political enthusiasm in making any individual attempt regarding the crisis. Therefore, the UK adopted the policy that rather than acting separately, they would canalize their activities by means of multi-lateral bodies, mainly through the EU but also the UN, NATO, and the WEU. However, this policy does not necessarily mean that the UK was not active during the conflict. Gow (1997: 177) asserts that;

“In these international bodies, the UK saw not only forums in which to amplify British status on the international scene, but also the framework preventing others from making radical moves which it regarded as unsustainable, rush or running ahead of their own analysis of what such moves might imply”.

Within this framework, the UK tried to impose its own vision regarding the issues of a) recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, b) lifting the arms embargo in favour of Bosnia and c) commencing air strikes on Serbian forces in the country.

Concerning the recognition issue, the UK government of the time was aware that those republics would eventually be recognised, but what mattered for the UK was the timing and conditions of recognition. Those aspects were of paramount importance for the UK analysts, because they supported the theory that in any conflict bearing ethnic characteristics, any external move underpinning one belligerent (Croatia) against the other's interests (Serbia) could only antagonize the latter and instigate further bloodshed (in Bosnia). In short, the UK believed that without an overall settlement, recognition was nothing else than making the matters worse in the former Yugoslavia. There is a continuous debate as to whether the recognition prompted the Bosnian War. Crawford (1998: 20) argues that "the recognition of Croatia by the international community led to the recognition of Bosnia as an independent state and to a widening of the war". On the other hand, Gow (1997: 171) maintains that "Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia did not, as many have asserted, prompt the war in Bosnia –that had been coming since the previous August-September". The theoretical approach of the UK's analysts concerning this issue is undoubtedly reasonable. However, it is important to note that each and every ethnic conflict does bear different characteristics depending on historical, economic, political, cultural and religious aspects. The ethnic hatred by the Serbs towards the Bosnians was much deeper than the ones towards the Croats and Slovenes. That's why, the Bosnian War was, as Gow argues, inevitable, and the issue of recognition just brought it forward.

Regarding the lifting of arms embargo in favour of the Bosnians, the UK was strongly opposed to this idea, mainly claiming that more arms would only encourage reciprocal bloodshed. In addition, to the UK government, even if the arms embargo was partly removed, nobody could guarantee that the Bosnian Army would be victorious. What's more, the categories of the weapons the Bosnian Army required could only be delivered to the Bosnians by the US support. There was some debate as regards dispatching a large expeditionary force to Bosnia, but no government including the US was willing to commit its ground forces to the area. The UK's resistance to a military intervention was not caused so much by the concerns as to the complexity of the conflict on the ground, but largely by the fact that there was no political will either in the UK or in any government to realize the idea of expeditionary force. Douglas Hurd, the foreign secretary of the time in the UK, states that

"The only thing which could have guaranteed peace with justice would have been an expeditionary force... And no government, no government has at any time seriously proposed that. And that I think is a line which should run through any analysis because it cuts out so much of the rhetoric which has bedevilled this" (Gow, 1997: 179).

### The Matter of Consistency within the European Union

Another issue important for the UK was related to air strikes, which would subsequently necessitate a follow-up with ground troops. This situation raised two questions. The first one was that the UK and other troops might have undertaken this post, yet this would mean preventing the UN soldiers and officials from delivering the humanitarian aids and even risking their lives. At this point, those supporting air strikes, namely France and the US, proposed that the task of follow-up with ground troops could be fulfilled by the Bosnian Army after the withdrawal of UNPROFOR's forces. However, this would mean providing the Bosnian Army with the necessary weapon, in other words, lifting the arms embargo in favour of Bosnia. Therefore, air strikes were not favoured by the UK government at the outset, but their views about the air strikes altered when the Lieutenant General, Sir Michael Rose was appointed as head of Bosnia Command in UNPROFOR. Gow (1997:180) states that "The UK authorities were obliged to back their own general and persuaded by his judgement that there were very limited objectives which could be achieved by the judicious use of air capability".

In spite of the alterations in their opinion, the UK government held the view that more could be achieved through UNPROFOR rather than difficult course of withdrawal and lifting the arms embargo. Thus, the UK attached great importance to consensual approach in dealing with the conflict, by which they would be able to control or counter-act the others' unilateral and unreasonable moves incompatible with their own visions.

The issues of lifting the arms embargo in favour of Bosnia and air strikes constituted two of the most dramatic aspects of the Bosnian War. It is questionable to what degree it is reasonable to resist both lifting the arms embargo and air strikes when considering the fact that one side was almost disarmed while the other was fully equipped. Andreatta (1997: 6) asserts that

"The Bosnian Muslims may indeed have fallen victim to moral hazard and to the unrealistic expectation of foreign support which could have diminished the chance for an early settlement. This process may even have been reinforced by the multilateral arms embargo which had been imposed on all parties but penalized Sarajevo most since both Croats and Serbs could count on other sources".

Andreatta supports his argument by claiming that "Also Russia was extremely alarmed by the idea of lifting the embargo and its pro-Serbian stance dramatically emerged when *The Times* uncovered a flow of arms from Russia to the Bosnian Serbs" (Andreatta, 1997:10). In this respect, it is fair to argue that if the lifting of arms embargo had been supported, then the lives of the disarmed side would have been secured. When the Srebrenica massacre is considered, those civilians had neither a chance to protect themselves, nor was there any military force to protect them.

### 3.4. What Went Wrong for the EU When It Intervened in the Bosnian War?

There are some different claims with respect to the EU's approach to the oncoming crisis in Yugoslavia. One of the arguments is that the EU's attention was stolen due to a number of reasons such as the end of both the Cold War and the Gulf War, Germany's unification and the Union's enlargement, so that the EU could not realise the probable threat that is likely to be resulted from the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Lavdas (1996: 217) states that "Troika's early optimism, reflected in the Brioni Accord, was based on the notion that the Yugoslav crisis could be tackled on an ad hoc basis, beginning with the Slovene issue and, if necessary, dealing with other issues as they emerged". Similarly, Raunio and Saarikivi (2001: 13), state that "The politics until June 1991, when the hostilities broke out in Slovenia, seemed to be "maybe if we ignore the crisis, it will disappear". At this point, one may suggest that the EU lost the chance of an early approach to the Yugoslav conflict in a comprehensive and negotiated way.

Another argument, which I believe is the most salient, is related to the different perceptions of the crisis by the major EU members. This made it impossible for the EU to adopt a common stance in the face of the conflict. However, in the case of Bosnia, it appears that the EU's actions seem to be far from justification owing to the above-cited reasons, because the Bosnian War broke out when the conflicts were settled first in Slovenia and then Croatia. Therefore, this period of time –some 10 months-, during which the Slovenian and Croatian conflicts took place and then settled, was supposed to be enough for the EU to foresee that ethnic conflict would spread to Bosnia considering both Bosnia's ethnic patterns and the Serbs' aggressions. By contrast, the failure of the EU in exact characterization of the conflict on the whole and the precedence of the national policies over the EU's policies were greatly reflected in the Bosnian War. Furthermore, there were a number of obstacles in front of the EU to produce the necessary policies and implement them. The most important reasons can be listed as follows; a) lack of consensus, b) lack of political will and c) the matter of leadership.

### 3.5. Lack of Consensus

Lack of consensus among the EU is the first significant reason which prevented the Union from making the crucial attempts at the right time. The issue of "lack of consensus" suggests the idea of the dominance of national policies over the EU's aims and objectives. Lavdas (1996: 219) states that "fragmentation created obstacles to pro-active decision-making, as the national foreign policies assumed precedence over the requirements of a coherent European approach to the crisis".



### The Matter of Consistency within the European Union

Unfortunately, this situation frequently gave rise to dead lock situations which made it impossible for the EU to speak with one voice. Raunio and Saarikivi (2001: 18) state that

“France, Belgium and the Netherlands advocated military actions, and Greece opposed it. In addition, France argued that the EU and NATO should co-operate in the field of military action. The British remained cautious, while the Germans argued that something had to be done but not by German troops”.

The inability to reach a consensus originates from the decision-making system of CFSP, which allows each member state to pursue their national interests in critical occasions. The decision-making process in CFSP, concluded in the Maastricht Treaty, is based on the idea of consensus that has two strands. The first one is minimalist approach based on consensus decision-making favoured by Britain and France, and the second one is maximalist approach that supports the idea of majority voting favoured by Germany. According to Duke, however, although provision is made for the use of qualified majority voting in the second pillar, the practice remained unanimity that safeguards the essential interests of the member states (Duke, 1999). In addition, apart from national interests, the EU’s ability to adopt a common stance and formulate a common policy at the initial stages of the crisis was hindered by different allegiances that member states had with the component republics of Yugoslavia. Greece’s history of good relations with Serbia, Italy and Austria’s affinities towards Croatia due to both historical and religious grounds led to internal conflicts not only among the member states but between them and the EU. This, sometimes, resulted in the individual political moves by the member states, outside of CFSP framework with little or no consultation of the other members. To be sure, these individual policies deeply hampered the effectiveness of CFSP.

### 3.6. Lack of Political Will

It would be informative to start the argument with the question of whether the Balkans, though located in the continent of Europe, belongs to Europe or should it be defined as “the Balkans”. This debate –prior to the dissolution of Yugoslavia- used to be supported by the different camps involved in history due to the uneasy relationship between the Balkans and Europe. According to the Western imagery, The Balkans -where violence, chaos and authoritarian regimes have appeared- have mostly been depicted as an area at odds with “European” values and tradition. Junkos (2005:90) states that “the Balkans have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of “European” and “the Western” has been constructed”. Bosnia, located in the heart of the Balkans, resembles the best and the worst image of the Balkans, which

constitutes both ethnic and religious patterns of Bosnia. However, the above-mentioned hypothesis can only be considered as a secondary cause in seeking to an answer for the reasons of lack of political will.

The Bosnian War did not pose any threat to anyone`s fundamental interests, and that`s why, it was interpreted from different angles by the different members of the EU. One may raise the question of how the major players would act if there were huge amount of oil reserves in Bosnia like Kuwait. Most governments of the EU, for the sake of maintaining their political power, chose to consult public opinion and did not want to risk any financial or military assets. Andreatta`s assertion (2006: 4) on this matter is that;

“The lack of a catalyzing and compelling international threat induced democratic governments to rely heavily on public opinion. No government wanted to be blamed at elections that risked the lives of its soldiers in a contingency where no vital interests were involved without ensuring previous and undoubted public support”.

The End of the Cold War was another factor for the EU`s unwillingness to act, which led the members to focus on their internal problems. Therefore, most members were unwilling to take an active role in the Bosnian War, which was characterized as “a tunnel of uncertain length”. Thus, they did not commit any necessary means to enforce peace.

Another explanation for the reluctance to act militarily was what Dover (2005: 308) called as “push and pull” effect provided by the Europeans adopting the idea that European Affairs should be dealt with in the European context. Accordingly, pull effect was provided by the Americans supporting the thought that they should withdraw their forces seeing that the danger of the Cold War had ended. On the other hand, the push effect was based on the idea that the EU should make its decisions outside of NATO command structures if the Union was to acquire a fully operating military capability. However, considering the mutual co-operation continuing for many years between NATO structures and at least half of the EU members on security issues, it would be really a difficult task requiring a great deal of preparatory work for the EU to operate outside of these structures. In addition, it was a well-known fact that the European military effectiveness relied heavily on the American allies. This factor also deterred the EU to plan and launch a military operation in the Bosnian crisis. Lack of political will as regards the use of military force was also confirmed by the EC mediator Lord David Owen as;

“We were by now acutely aware of the reluctance of Defence Ministers in all NATO capitals except Ankara to take on new commitments, and I knew that there was no

### The Matter of Consistency within the European Union

support for suggestions that our troops should have their mandate extended beyond that of escorting convoys, for example to a role in stopping ethnic cleansing” (Andreatta, P. 2006: 5).

The idea that Ankara could fulfil the military mission in stopping ethnic cleansing was not favoured due to both Russian concerns and the probable Greek veto for the matter involved. However, it is still difficult to understand why the option of air strikes was delayed for some two years to be resorted to. Lavdas (1996: 221) states that “It is questionable whether there has been any clear strategic thinking behind the use of air strikes in the Yugoslav conflict before the summer of 1995”. In this respect, the failure stemming from the lack of political will about the military intervention was nothing but “political bankruptcy” of the member states within the root of the Union.

### 3.7. The Matter of Leadership

It is evident in the past records that the Council of Ministers was unwilling to undertake the leading role in searching for a resolution to the Bosnian conflict. Rather than conducting the international response themselves, the EU leaders preferred to underpin the American and Russian efforts. Dover (2005: 311) states that

“The Community and its member states are in contact through the Presidency with the United States` and Russian Governments to bring pressure to bear on those responsible with a view to ending the atrocities and securing free access for international relief efforts”.

In the meantime, the rotating Presidency lasting only for six months was another issue related to the matter of leadership with the result that, during the Bosnian conflict, there was naturally nobody who was systematically responsible for policy formulation.

Apart from the above-cited reasons, the financial dimension of the military intervention on the part of the EU was also another point not to be ignored at that time. Andreatta (2006: 5) states that “This was true of the financial costs, especially at a time of budget cutting and peace dividends...”. In 1994, during which the Bosnian War in progress, only three members of the Union had paid their shares in the course of the completion of humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Mostar.

### Conclusion

This study focused on the international intervention during the Bosnian War, with a particular emphasis on the EU as the central actor. When the Bosnian conflict erupted in Europe, there were high expectations for the EU to play a pivotal role in ending it. However, several factors hindered the

development of a unified European approach. One significant obstacle was the differing perceptions of the crisis among leading EU countries such as France, Germany, and the UK. These countries held conflicting views on the nature of the conflict, leading to contradictions in their policies. For instance, Germany's unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and the UK's resistance to proposals like lifting the arms embargo and air strikes significantly impacted the course of the Bosnian War. This divergence not only hindered the EU's efforts but also tarnished its international reputation, ultimately eroding its credibility.

Within the context of the Bosnian War, this article has identified three major factors affecting EU strategies: the challenge of reaching a consensus, a lack of political will, and leadership issues. The absence of consensus stemmed from differing national perspectives, which prevented the rapid attainment of peace in Bosnia. France advocated for the EU's active role, while the UK believed NATO was better suited for intervention. Meanwhile, Germany refrained from debates due to domestic and constitutional constraints. The intergovernmental nature of CFSP, requiring unanimity, exacerbated this lack of consensus, allowing national policies to overshadow the European approach. A notable challenge during the Bosnian crisis was the EU's lack of political will, particularly concerning military intervention. This can be attributed to several factors, including a perception that the Balkans were a low-priority concern, the anticipation of greater pressure from the US and Russia, and a return to internal matters after the end of the Cold War. Additionally, the absence of clear national interests within the EU dampened enthusiasm for military involvement, as governments sought to align with public opinion and secure their political standing. Leadership issues and financial considerations further complicated the EU's response. No EU government wanted to take the lead in initiating action, and the rotating EU presidency hindered the continuity of crisis policies. The presence of the US and Russia as potential influencers also contributed to the EU's reluctance to assume responsibility.

The significance of the Bosnian civil war for the European Union lies behind its having potential to reveal whether the EU would take decisive measures to halt the aggressions committed by Serbs against the shared values of humanity. The crisis also underscored the potential repercussions a Balkan conflict could pose for European member states, particularly Italy and Greece. In this context, the Bosnian civil war should be viewed as the first significant trial for the EU. From a diplomatic perspective, the EU's response to the Bosnian crisis not only failed to deter or impede the progression into civil war but, in fact, hastened it. Therefore, it is difficult to predict the EU's response to a future

**The Matter of Consistency within the European Union**

crisis akin to the Bosnian War, given the influence of major member states and external actors like the US and Russia. Achieving consensus among member states, possibly through structural changes to CFSP, will be as crucial as it is challenging for the EU to effectively manage future crises.

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**The Matter of Consistency within the European Union**

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## Social Movements in Latin America: 26th of July Movement

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### Abstract

The Cuban Revolution and its historical process are at the centre of Latin American studies in social sciences in Türkiye. This article examines the Cuban 26th of July Movement in the context of Latin American social movements. The study is analysed in three parts. First, the structure of Latin America is examined, followed by the history of colonialism and social opposition. In this section, the 26th of July Movement and Cuba are read from the perspective of 'Latin America'. This section is the section in which the social movements literature is examined and the distinction between old and new social movements is examined. The social movement in Cuba is handled around the concept of social movements. The study argues that the Cuban Revolution is an example that transcends the distinction between old and new social movements. Again, in the same section, social movements in Latin America are examined based on the necessity of reading similar examples to understand the Cuban Revolution and the 26th of July Movement. Here, on the other hand, it is underlined that movements in Latin America were influenced by and influenced the Cuban Revolution. The second part of the study deals with the Cuban Revolution and its subject, the 26th of July Movement, in a historical continuity. Here, it is emphasized that it is necessary to examine the 26th of July Movement with a process-oriented perspective, not a leader-oriented perspective. Otherwise, the historical process will be denied, and it will be moved away from being scientific. In the conclusion part of the study, the Cuban Revolution in international relations and the results of this revolution are examined. In the study, the populist, modernizing and anti-imperialist character of the Cuban Revolution is emphasized before its socialist character. As a method in the study, it is based on literature review and document analysis from qualitative research methods.





## Social Movements in Latin America: 26th of July Movement

### Introduction

Latin America has a highly developed history in terms of social mobilization. The history of these social movements can be taken from the indigenous revolts that broke out after the Spanish Colonialism began in the continent in 1492. It is possible to talk about current examples. Perhaps the most important of these social movements, among which the Bolivarian Movement from Venezuela, the *Zapatistas* from Mexico and the Sandinistas of Nicaragua is the 26th of July Movement in Cuba. The major difference of this movement from other social movements in Latin America is that on January 1, 1959, the 26th of July Movement took power in Cuba and still is on the power.

What this study aims to reveal is that the main motivation underlying Fidel Castro, who was the leader of the 26th of July Movement and the leadership of the movement to meet the practical needs before the ideological needs, is related to populism. Populism here defines conflicting elements such as political equality fused with a certain type of authoritarianism under charismatic leadership and the demand for universal participation for ordinary people (Yılmaz, 2020a: 138). Populism is anti-elite and has no class aspect. Populism advocates the supremacy of the people against the rule of law. According to the narrative of populism, the masses are oppressed by the elite and threatened by “others” (Yılmaz, 2020a: 53). Populism is a style of making politics, not an ideology. It can be said that populism is a logic of politics used by ideological agents (Yılmaz, 2021a: 68).

The main claim of the study is that the populism of Castro and the leadership of the movement are hidden under socialist content. This has been touted as such by both capitalist ideologues and leftist thinkers. However, the Cuban Revolution and the leadership have had no effort to hide their populism. And this effort has not also happened so far. In the study, first, Cuba’s pre-revolutionary situation will be examined, then the social movements literature will be examined and finally the 26th of July Movement as a social movement will be discussed. The second title will examine social movements and question whether the 26th of July Movement is a social movement or not. To prove the main claim of the study, how populism and Marxism developed in Cuba will be examined in the third chapter. Another of the main purposes of the study is that the social movement in Cuba cannot be compressed into the old and new distinction. Finally, the thing that will be tried to be proved is to prevent the confusion of concepts about the

Cuban Revolution, especially in Türkiye. It will be argued that the process in Cuba is not a transition to socialism, but a modernization perspective in a peripheral country.

In Cuba, there was widespread opposition to the Batista regime, which ruled the country as a one-man dictatorship in the 1950s. This opposition movement included the Cuban Communist Party, which was supported by the Soviet Union. However, the movement that overthrew Batista was Fidel Castro and his team, which could be positioned as centre-left and created a break in the Orthodox Party<sup>1</sup>. While classifying this social movement, it could not be said that it was clearly positioned on the socialist left at its starting point. Both the pre-revolutionary and now of the revolution discourses of the leaders<sup>2</sup> of the movement supported this inference. All these details should be examined together with the background that created the 26th of July Movement, the conjuncture that created the movement, and the antagonisms created by the movement (Raby, 2017: 116).

In this sense, the limitations of the study are primarily the concept of Latin America, the social stratification caused by the conquest process, the concept of social movements, examples of social movements in the 19th and 20th centuries, and finally, the 26th of July Movement, which is chosen as an example of this study, between 1953-1959 in social movements in Cuba. In the study, other examples of social movements in Latin America are discussed to show examples of social movements before and after the Cuban Revolution and how the Cuban Revolution affected them. In the study, the 26th of July Movement is examined, and it is tried to shed light on other social movements in the region. While this is being done, the modernizing, populist and anti-imperialist features of the Cuban Revolution will serve as an icebreaker for the study. It will be argued that it is useless to read the subjects of the Cuban Revolution or other social movements in the region along two antagonistic lines: “old” and “new” social movements. While doing this, it will be said that some of the legacies left by the colonialism as a top determinant of the history of the region have shared some features of the social movements in the region.

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<sup>1</sup> “The Orthodox Party, under the leadership of Eduardo Chibas, believed that the Authentic Party, riddled with corruption, had betrayed the ideals of the Revolution of 1934 when it came to power in an overthrow of the Machado dictatorship. In 1940, Cuba had adopted a progressive constitution that guaranteed labor rights, but after World War II the Authentic Party under Batista’s leadership turned to the right and became corrupt as it welcomed North American mobsters into Cuba’s tourist industry” (Prevost, 2007: 19).

<sup>2</sup> For instance, Fidel Castro -the grand leader of the movement- in 1959 said that this Revolution “was a green one, thriving first of all on the natural virtues of the Cuban people rather than on material resources or capitalist -or Marxist-inspired visions on modernity” (Gabreëls, 2022: 5).



## Social Movements in Latin America: 26th of July Movement

### 1. Social Movements

Social movements refer to the whole of organized actions based on conflicts that are supra-institutional and have a certain continuity. On the theoretical level, the supra-institutionalism of social movements corresponds to organizational forms that frequently resort to disruptive actions such as demonstrations, marches, boycotts, sit-ins, occupation, and organized plunder, bypassing the established channels and bureaucratic regulations of traditional participatory democracy (Gürcan, 2019: 73). Sociologist Gordon Marshall says that social movements can be defined as a concept that shows the organized effort of a significant number of people to change (or resist changing) one or more of the salient features of society. According to Marshall, social movements have specific goals and formal organizations. Although they act outside the regular political channels of society, they can penetrate deep into the circles of political power as interest groups. While the goals of social movements can be narrow-scoped, they can also be as broad as overthrowing the hegemony of the capitalist world system (Marshall, 2009).

Social movements are defined as collective actions against elites, authorities, other groups, or cultural codes, developed by individuals who have common goals and are in solidarity, in permanent interaction with elites, other groups and elements. Social conflicts and demands that emerged in different geographies in history have begun to be expressed as social movements in accordance with the definition given above since the 19th century, when national states were fully formed and consolidated their power. In this context, the second half of the 19th century is accepted as the beginning of the development process of modern social movements. A very important change occurred in the 19th century, from defensive actions traditionally performed by community groups to organized, self-conscious, more permanent movements and actions that seek new rights and opportunities (Demiroğlu, 2014: 134).

According to another sociologist, David Newman, the common emphasis of all social movements is on social change: the desire to enact, stop or reverse something. For Newman, social movements can be divided into old ones and new ones. While the old-style movements followed a political line focused on seizing power, new social movements kept a line of struggle in the cultural context without seizing power (Newman, 2016). The shared characteristics of new social movements can be divided into four general areas: goal orientation, forms, participants, and value (D'anieri et al., 1990: 446). New social movements worked outside formal institutional channels and emphasized lifestyle, ethics, and identity concerns rather than socio-economic goals

(Calhoun, 1993: 385). After examining the old and new versions of social movements in the study, it should be looked at how these movements occurred in the Latin America region.

The classic social movements of the Latin America region had a strong anarchist influence, especially in their initial phase of formation, through European migration, mainly Italian and Spanish, at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th. These anarchist immigrants eventually headed towards rural areas, but mainly towards urban areas, forming the first levies of labour movements, which were artisans and workers in small economic activities. Starting with the First World War and later during the 1920s, the expansion of manufacturing in the region created conditions for the emergence of a more industrial proletariat, which would have its full development with the industrialization processes of the 1930s. The set of social movements that emerged throughout the first decades of the 20th century, with their own cultural base, with their own projects, would have the opportunity to approach power in the 1930s and 1940s with the formation of popular governments and populists. These governments seek to rely on these popular bases and structure this movement in the context of a great national democratic struggle, integrating all these social and cultural forces within a movement of national democratic content that would be in solidarity with the Afro-Asian anti-colonial movements after the Second World War, but which had already incorporated many common points within the anti-imperialist movements of the 1920s until Second World War. The communists managed to place these various movements within the same national democratic logic as the anti-colonialist struggle advanced (Bruckmann and Dos Santos, 2005: 1-6).

Some social movements, such as the EZLN<sup>3</sup>, belong to the family of new social movements that emerged after the 1980s. These new social movements “represents a radically new form of organisation and politics that highlights the postmodern condition: a radical subjectivity of experience and the self-constitution of a new social subject, a social actor seeking to define and express him/herself on a largely self-constructed stage” (Veltmeyer, 1997: 140). It can be said that the movement in Cuba is closer to the communist movement that occurred in the Second World War. Because it focuses directly on power and raises economic issues. However, in this movement, unlike the traditional communist movements, there is a dominant Cuban identity construction. However, this identity construction does not directly make the said movement a member of the new social movement’s family.

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<sup>3</sup> *El Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* (The Zapatista Army of National Liberation)



### **Social Movements in Latin America: 26th of July Movement**

In this context, it can be said that the sole agenda of the old social movements were economic, and their interest was on class antagonism. New social movements, on the other hand, moved away from the economic agenda and drifted into a more identity-related area. But how true and valid is this distinction? Can we classify any movement today according to these distinctions? For example, as we claimed in the study, the 26th of July Movement in Cuba is a populist and anti-imperialist movement and has an identical appearance in terms of both its class-economic agendas and the construction of a common identity against imperialist policies. Where should the movement in Cuba be positioned in this new and old divide? The answers to these questions are answered in the next section.

## **2. The 26th of July Movement and the Cuban Revolution**

To understand the dynamics of the Cuban Revolution, a brief overview of the country's history should be taken first. Cuba acquired its independence in 1898 after the war between the United States (US) and Spain. Cuba was also the last colony to gain independence from Spain. Between 1895 and 1898, Cuba also experienced a process of unsuccessful --many argue that the process was not unsuccessful, but rather that success was impeded by the US intervention (Crahan, 2003: 51)-- independence struggle under the leadership of José Martí. After the independence from the Spanish Kingdom in 1898, Cuba came under the control of the US. By 1902, the US controlled the central bank, customs, police, and the presidency. In addition, a clause was enshrined in the Cuban constitution that gave the United States the right to interfere in Cuba's internal affairs when the interests of its citizens were endangered (Gonzalez, 1994: 6). It is necessary to mention two presidents under the control of the US until the coup against Gerardo Machado by Fulgencio Batista in 1933. The first of these presidents is Tomas Estrada, who served between 1902-1906, and the other is Jose Miguel Gomez, who served between 1909 and 1913. Batista withdrew from the political scene in 1944 to take a role again in 1952, and during this time, he left his job to Ramon Grau San Martin (Navarro, 2015). In the history of Cuba, the unstable administrations of the presidents who came to power after independence legitimized the iron fist of the military-based Batista.

In the 1950s, Cuba's economy depended on sugar exports, whose production and marketing were controlled by foreign companies. Eleven US companies appropriated almost 1,200,000 hectares, which represented 47.4 percent of the land devoted to sugarcane cultivation. The social, economic, and political conditions were disastrous, proper circumstances for an

uprising (PL, 2017). At the beginning of that decade, accusations of corruption increased and, due to the protest mobilizations, a sector of the Army supported by US companies and Cuban businessmen staged a coup on March 10, 1952. The new dictator was Fulgencio Batista (PL, 2017). In this process, it can be said that Cuba was a semi-feudal peripheral country whose economy was based on a single product and dependent on a central country (Yılmaz, 2021b: 57).

Batista, who recaptured the power he had renounced in 1952, imported sugar beet to the US cheaply and built tourism more on gambling. Besides the bad economic situation, the Cuban people, whose national dignity was damaged, reacted to this trend. While the villagers were inactive, effective actions were taken by students and middle-class groups in the cities. Alongside Batista, there were two prominent subjects in Cuban politics: The Orthodox Party and the Cuban Communist Party. However, these parties were dissolved after Batista's coup in 1952. Fidel Castro, who was the leader of the movement, sued this coup in 1952. But this application was rejected. Since the military coup of 1952, universities had become a centre of anti-Batista activities. Numerous strikes and demonstrations had occurred in the student centres. Thus, a closer unity of action and purpose was forged among the revolutionary youth, which would be key to the defeat of the dictatorship (Oliveras, 2014: 3).

Batista's dictatorship only led to increased oppression and violence. In a short time, a resistance started against this dictatorship. Fidel Castro founded an organization called *Movimiento* (The Movement) with his brother Raul Castro. Before the establishment of this movement, Castro was involved in politics within the Orthodox Party for numerous years (Harnecker, 1997). The main axis of this resistance movement was the struggle against injustice and the inequality in the social order. On July 26, 1953, a group of workers and youth, who were part of this movement, led by Fidel Castro, tried to seize the country's second-largest military base, the Moncada Barracks. With this action, a new process began, leading to the downfall of Batista. The Moncada Barracks raid was unsuccessful, but this group of revolutionaries led the people to mass and unite in one goal. The 26th of July Movement took its name from this event (Yılmaz, 2018a).

The 26th of July Movement is an important physical/armed resistance movement that did not remain at the verbal or protest level in Cuban history. The movement first started secretly and illegally. Castro, in his trial after the Moncada Barracks raid, explained the program of the 26th of July Movement as "distributing land to the poor peasants, giving 30% of the profits in the factories to the workers, confiscating the riches that provide unjust enrichment". 26th of July

### Social Movements in Latin America: 26th of July Movement

Movement was based not just on a peasantry or working class, it was based on a broader foundation (Yaremko, 1993: vii). Mario Mencía Cobas identifies 4 important factors in the birth of the movement:

“1. The existence of a vanguard combatant core, the Moncadistas, endorsed by the lives offered and their willingness to continue fighting; with a realistic program of changes longed for by the people, an intelligent tactic and an accurate strategic vision, and an effective method to attract the masses and channel the revolution, in accordance with the political, social, temperamental, and psychological idiosyncrasies of the Cubans.

2. The growing discredit of the opposition representatives who advocated pseudo-insurrectionary, putschist solutions, without realizing them in practice, on the one hand, and, on the other, those who clamoured for civic, peaceful openings, all the more useless the more arrogant the regime scorned them.

3. The consolidation of the tyranny in power, based on a strong police-military coercive apparatus, and the use of imposing and repressive methods against those who oppose it: a wide range of opposition politicians, from peaceful to insurrectionalists, but more specifically against the explosive student movement, mostly insubordinate, some worker bases in rebellion against the imposed leaderships, dispersed peasant communities deprived of all rights and with little capacity to respond, and even progressive and liberal intellectuals who simply demanded a return to institutionality. .

4. The contradictory situations that occur in the so-called insurrectional sector. On the one hand, organizations that have disappeared, such as Acción Libertadora, or have suffered a state of dissolution, such as the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), or their leaders have begun to discredit themselves, such as Triple A” (Mencía Cobas, 2009).

Inquiring into the ideological and discourse genesis of the 26th of July Movement was relatively complex in the sense that there is not a profusion of bibliography on the matter, not so much about other issues such as the turning point or the construction of socialism in Cuba (Calvo González, 2012: 4). The main hypothesis of this work is that the Cuban revolution was populist but not socialist. It was not until 1961 that Fidel Castro declared himself as a communist. While Castro was not at this point ready to proclaim himself a Marxist, he was one for all intents and purpose. Socialism was not mentioned as a revolutionary goal (Gallo, 1974: 81-82). The Movement was looking for a unit in the rest of the country like the one that worked in practice in the East, where it had the direct support or sympathy of most of the population (Solar-Cabrales, 2014: 38). And it is known today that Ernesto Che Guevara was the only person in that revolutionary group to read Marxist literature (Goodsell, 1969: 789). Another name who was close to socialism was Raul Castro (Tennant, 1998).

Castro was sentenced to 15 years after Moncada. Castro was pardoned by Batista then was released in May 1955 (Preciado, 2017: 186). However, he was later escaped to Mexico in July 1955 (Miroff, 2014). In this process, the massiveness and mobility that the 26th of July Movement initiated in the country could be understood because the Batista regime was believed to have killed 20.000 people. Because of the pressures, the reaction to the Batista regime increased and the sympathy for the 26th of July Movement increased. The Movement initially also developed its tactics around the revolutionary general strike, but after its failure in April 1958 the Movement focused all its efforts and resources on a confrontation against the regular Army, the institution in which Batista cemented his power from his first appearance in Cuban politics (Patricia, 2018: 119).

The armed struggle deepened when Fidel Castro and his revolutionary troops landed in the south of Cuba with their ship Granma, on December 2, 1956. They were received by an army of thousands of men who quickly wreaked havoc in the revolutionary ranks (Editorial, 2023). Slowly gaining strength, the rebel movement assassinated Batista in 1957, and Batista narrowly escaped this assassination (Faria Jr, 2023: 14). In 1958, the Movement waged an all-out war against the Batista regime (Plazas, 2014: 44). Castro's, who entered the country again in 1956, captured the capital Havana on January 1, 1959, after a 25-month struggle -Castro and his troops entered Havana on January 8th. Just before this event, Batista left the country. After Fidel Castro and his friends seized power, Cuba witnessed various changes in the political, social, and economic spheres (Aremu and Soetan, 2017: 64):

“When Castro assumed power in 1959, Cuba ranked among the most developed countries in the region. While available data must be viewed cautiously and assumed to portray merely a rough approximation of conditions at the time, the island ranked eighth and fifth respectively, among Latin America's twenty principal countries in gross domestic product (GDP) and gross domestic product per capita. Even more impressive, only two countries had manufacturing sectors that contributed more to the national product than Cuba's” (Eckstein, 1986: 503).

This reflects the situation in Cuba when Castro came to power, meaning that it was the result of the work of Batista's and previous governments. Fidel Castro did not declare himself a communist until 1961. So, what happened during this period? Answering this question will shed light on the ideological transformation of the Castro- led movement. Fidel Castro went to North America trip in April 1959 (four months later after the Revolution) (McPherson, 2007: 237). He was not a Marxist at that time (Schlesinger Jr, 1986: 612). Before the revolution, Fidel Castro's



### **Social Movements in Latin America: 26th of July Movement**

political position was like an outsider (Ambrose-Carson, 1995: 301). The outsiders say that they “come from the outside”, so they are not involved in the existing pollution of the established order. In this context, outsiders are one of the most well-known features of populism (Yılmaz, 2021: 52). Fidel Castro became a Marxist, less for ideological reasons than out of the pragmatic need to consolidate the revolution (Schlesinger Jr, 1986: 613). At that time, the Eisenhower administration in the US tried to block Castro’s assumption of power by finding the proverbial safe pair of hands to protect American interests from the populist rebels (Dunne, 2011: 450).

“The first crude and imperfect expressions of these historical realities were not long in coming. During 1959, as the revolutionary government moved toward urban and agrarian reform, the nationalization of some foreign properties, and the freeing of Cuba from U.S. control, cries of ‘betrayal,’ ‘subversion,’ and ‘communism’ were heard both in Cuba and abroad. Although causality should not be assumed, it is not entirely coincidental that in March 1960, one month after Cuba signed a \$100 million loan and a sugar and trade agreement with the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower directed the CIA to begin organizing, training, and equipping the Cuban exiles who 13 months later came ashore at the Bay of Pigs” (Fagen, 1978: 70).

For 30 years, the Soviet Union has been Cuba’s biggest ally. In addition to the mutual solidarity of the two states, the Soviet Union and Cuba were major support providers for the revolutionary movements in the region. The Soviet Union provided aid such as weapons, money, and education to the revolutionary movements in the region through Cuba. It is said that in the 1980s, 4 billion dollars of economic aid was given to the region annually, 3 billion of which went to Cuba and the rest to other movements (Yılmaz, 2020b). So, if Cuba associated with the Soviet Union for pragmatic reasons, as we mentioned, if it was not a socialist before the revolution, why does it still describe itself as communist today? Why is it still on bad terms with the US after the Soviet Union collapsed?

The most well-known answer to this question is that Fidel Castro traumatized the US (Pérez Jr, 2016). However, this is not scientifically sufficient. After the missile crisis, the US started to impose an embargo on Cuba in 1962. This embargo continues today and is seen as the main reason for Cuba’s isolation (The Conversation, 2021). So much so that the economic crisis caused by these embargoes also caused social explosions in Cuba (Cueto, 2021). There is also literature that blamed this economic situation on the Castro regime’s socialist/communist economic policies (Hawkins, 2001: 441). The Cuban leadership tried to prevent these social explosions by allowing exits from the country (de la Nuez, 1998: 105). Moreover, this date when relations were cut, did not progress straight. Relations between the two countries were established

from time to time. So much so that the embargo was eased, according to the agreement signed in 2015, but this agreement ended in 2017 with the administration of Donald Trump (Lamrani, 2015: 8).

The point I want to reach is that Cuba's insistence on the socialist system is not a one-sided demand. There are sufficient reasons that push Cuba to do this. While one of them is the imposition of the capitalist system, as we will see above, the other can be put forward as the left populist governments in Latin America since the 2000s and the support these governments give to Cuba. Here, with the Bolivarian Revolution, Venezuela's inexpensive oil aid to Cuba on the condition of getting support in fields such as education and health can be recalled (Yılmaz, 2018b). At this point, it can be added that the relations with China are also beneficial for Cuba (Erikson, 2005: 410). It would be useful to examine the relationship of Martí's thought with Marxism.

Martí's thought and Marxist thought converged in the twenties around the university reform movement. Within this brand, Julio Antonio Mella promoted the creation of the José Martí popular universities and, at the same time, was convinced that there was no university reform without revolution (Harnecker, 1988: 2). Martí's thought documented a moral nationalism, and it can be noted that Martí had a great impact on the Cuban Revolution (Santí, 1986: 140-141). Martí approached the problems of society with idealism and optimism. Martí's ideas were incompatible with Marxism-Leninism. The Castro leadership had no choice but to conceal those views: how could one explain how the anti-Marxist Martí—the historical figure—became the pre-Leninist Martí embraced by the Communists after 1959? When the Communists joined the Castro government, the party recast Martí as a herald of Marxism (Ripoll, 1994: 5). It can be said that Martí's thoughts are based on modernizing Cuba (Yılmaz, 2021b: 51). Its core ideals are rationality and order - these two words are the hallmarks of modernity (Yılmaz, 2021b: 54).

Therefore, we can ask this question: Why Fidel Castro did not join the Communist Party before the revolution? The answer is simple: Before the revolution, Castro was not a communist. Viewed from today, his pre-revolutionary ideas can be called populist. Cuba is a link in this chain of social movements.

“In this regard, we can see the Cuban Revolution, at this point, as a populist one. It promoted revolutionary and retaliatory justice against those who'd exploited the common people. Jose Martí's quest to strip away privilege and corruption that oppressed the people seemed within reach. Subsequently, an agrarian reform law



### **Social Movements in Latin America: 26th of July Movement**

promulgated in May 1959 restricted the size of island estates, leading to a dramatic redistribution of land to small farmers” (Hartnett, 2022).

It is said that Cuba entered a transformation process, especially after the death of Fidel Castro. It can be said that this transformation has been subjected to criticism, especially by left-wing thinkers, as a break with socialism. Especially after Raul Castro’s retirement, Miguel Díaz-Canel’s coming to power intensified these criticisms (Biegon, 2021: 147). The discourse of advancing the reforms that came with the new constitution also strengthened these criticisms (Oxford Analytica, 2018). However, as this study reveals, any decision made by the Cuban Revolution should not be judged when it is pragmatic, like Fidel Castro’s approach to the Soviet Union. In conclusion, it can be said that the Cuban Revolution was conducted in a peripheral country with a modernization perspective (Yılmaz, 2021b: 56). The subject of this modernization process is the 26th of July Movement.

### **Conclusion**

After the Cuban Revolution, Castro visited US and declared that they (he meant the 26th of July Movement) were not communists. However, when asked if they would like financial help, he replied he went there to establish good relations. After these statements, which were made after the revolution, it is possible to infer that the Cuban Revolution had a national independence character that wanted to establish equal relations with other countries. However, when the interests of US companies were adversely affected after Cuba’s land reform, a conjuncture emerged that the US, the sole buyer of sugarcane, which was Cuba’s sole source of income, did not buy this product. This situation led to a rapprochement with Soviet Union, albeit based on economy. Over time, this convergence turned into an ideological convergence since the movement in Cuba was structurally on the left. The 26th of July Movement left its place in the Cuban Communist Party during the rolling process.

As a result, for the Cuban Revolution, a remarkable number of people made their organized efforts to change one or more of the salient features of society and have specific goals, formal organizations, continuity. At the end of the process, it falls into the category of old social movements to seize power. It has an anti-imperialist and national independence character, being against the US. It can be said that in the participation context of the people in the power process, it has a populist character and the subject who takes power has an egalitarian line in staying in power.

The leaders of the revolutionary movement in Cuba -especially Fidel Castro- were influenced by Martí's popular discourse and organized around this idea. Therefore, it cannot be said that Fidel Castro's statements and decisions in the early 1960s created a dilemma for him. Because Castro was not a communist, as he had declared before, and to protect his popular revolution, he made the decision required by the conjuncture of that time: to approach the Soviet Union. Although Castro wanted to restart his relations with the US before this decision, the damage to the interests of the US in Cuba prevented the restoration of these relations.

What this study aims to reveal is that the main motivation underlying Castro and the leadership of the movement to meet the practical needs before the ideological needs is related to populism. Castro and the movement's populism were hidden under the socialist content it later took on. This has been touted as such by both capitalist ideologues and leftist thinkers. However, the Cuban Revolution and the leadership have no effort to hide their populism. It has not happened so far. In addition to these, the 26th of July Movement in Cuba does not fit into the distinction between old and new social movements. The fact that the studied movement offers both class and identity contents show that some examples in the social movements literature can be categorized as neither old nor new movements. The 26th of July Movement is one of these movements. The 26th of July Movement is one of the most important events in Cuban history. So much so that its influence continues today. Today, Cubans celebrate this date as a national holiday. The Cuban Revolution is an important turning point in the modernization process. The modernization was released to the public in this period. Salaries were increased, renters were reduced, public services were expanded throughout the country, agricultural and educational reforms were made, the distinction between urban and rural areas was trying to be reduced, and a social security system was established (Yılmaz, 2021b: 63).

Finally, it can be said that the 26th of July Movement has the characteristics of populism and anti-imperialism, in line with the tradition of social movements in Latin America. With these aspects, the Cuban Revolution is the executor of modernity. This is not to belittle the Cuban Revolution, but to define its position. The heritage of the region influenced just as the social movement in Cuba, the revolution in Cuba also influenced, spawned, and supported other social movements in the region (Marín Roig and Vélez Jiménez, 2012: 39). Perhaps that is why, thanks to the popular notions it provides, the Cuban Revolution is presented as the only alternative to neoliberal capitalism after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Di Piramo, 2009: 190).

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## China and Global Food Security Dynamics amidst the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

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### Abstract

This paper aims to investigate how China is handling national security and wheat production amid international sanctions in 2022. The study employs the Food Security Theory and Supply Chain Theory, utilizing qualitative research methods for a comprehensive analysis. The research concludes that the significant diplomatic tension between Russia and Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has economic implications for both countries. China's main goal is to maintain stability and economic growth. The Ukraine-Russia relationship is marked by instability in the global market, with the Ukraine-Russia trade deficit causing tension. China's desire to diversify and increase trade with Russia will help China diversify its trade with other countries, resulting in a larger global trade surplus. Wheat is a significant food in China, with a wide range of products and inputs. The consumption of wheat in China has led to increased domestic consumption, influencing the country's economy.



## **Introduction**

The quantity of imports and exports in China is determined by the balance of domestic grain market. Grain production in China fluctuates due to varying weather conditions, price fluctuations, and policy adjustments. Even more crucially, the circulated grains account for only about 30% of the production, thus the behavior of farmers in supplying has a significant impact on the grain market equilibrium. Since the 1980s, the grain circulation system has undergone reforms, and market prices have varied significantly over time, both of which greatly influence the expectations of farmers and their supply behavior. Fluctuations in the domestic grain market have led to considerable variations in China's imports and exports during the reform era (Talhelm et al., 2014).

Wheat is a dominant plant in moderate climate countries that is used for human food and animal feed. Its success partially relies on its adaptability and high yield potential, as well as the gluten protein fraction that imparts viscoelastic properties, allowing dough to be processed into bread, pasta, noodles, and other food products. Wheat also contributes essential amino acids, minerals, vitamins, beneficial phytochemicals, and dietary fiber components to human nutrition, especially enriched in whole grain products. Wheat is also referred to as a vital cereal crop worldwide, playing a strategic role in supporting food security and meeting human dietary needs. Wheat is the most widely produced food commodity in the world compared to corn and rice. Its production has been increasing year by year, making it a major global crop. Wheat is a raw material that can be processed into wheat flour, which is then used to make various products such as noodles, bread, pasta, pastries, cakes, biscuits, and more. Current and future concerns include maintaining wheat production and quality while reducing the use of agricultural chemicals as inputs, and developing pathways with enhanced qualities for specific end uses, especially for biofuels and human nutrition. In recent years, China's rapid commodity consumption growth has exceeded its domestic supply, leading the government to import significant amounts of food commodities. Xi Jinping acknowledges the urgent need to increase agricultural imports to meet domestic demand, but overreliance on imports makes China vulnerable in its pursuit of becoming a self-sufficient nation (Zhang et al., 2022).

The main goal of China's food security is to safeguard one of the country's key wheat supplies. In comparison to rice, the significance of wheat as a staple food is often overlooked. Globally, China stands as the world's largest wheat producer and is reported to possess the largest

global wheat reserves, accounting for over half of the world's wheat stocks in 2022. China's current wheat production contributes to over 17 percent of the global total. However, in recent years, the impacts of climate change, including extreme weather leading to disasters like severe floods, have jeopardized domestic wheat and cereal crop production, causing production deficits. Beyond being a major wheat stock producer, China is also one of the world's leading wheat importers, purchasing nearly 10 million tons of wheat in 2021 (Donnellon-May and Hongzhou, 2021).

The outbreak of the war between Russia and Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has posed a significant diplomatic challenge for China and has had a significant impact on various aspects of the country's economy and development. China's primary concern at present is the war's impact on its food security and stability. In recent years, despite the central government's emphasis on the importance of domestic food production, food imports into China have increased and are likely to continue to rise. However, the Russia-Ukraine war is likely to impede these efforts. Amid the ongoing war in Ukraine with broad global repercussions, Ukraine's wheat exports have largely come to a halt since the Russian invasion. The connection between the Russia-Ukraine War and the instability of food supply is indeed a tangible issue. The ongoing war and the difficulty in exporting agricultural products, especially wheat, have triggered a number of restrictions on agricultural exports in other countries.

The demand in China for high-quality wheat continues to grow as the high and middle-income consumers in first-tier cities increasingly shift to greater consumption of convenient and healthy foods. The rupture caused by the Russia-Ukraine war, disrupting supplies from Ukraine and the ban on wheat exports to Russia, will undoubtedly impact China's efforts to diversify its wheat sources. China's push to secure more wheat supplies during the war, despite the international sanctions imposed by many countries against Russia, could introduce more uncertainty into the global wheat market. For instance, the emergence of food protectionism leading to fewer exporting nations for wheat, combined with sanctions against Russia and the Ukraine conflict (Russia and Ukraine jointly supply around 26 percent of global wheat exports), as well as China hoarding its own wheat stocks, could potentially pit wheat-importing countries against each other in competition for reduced global wheat supplies. This could also contribute to the already rising global food prices.



## China and Global Food Security Dynamics amidst the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

The conflicting situation and ongoing Ukraine-Russia conflict hold many implications for the global order. China's self-reliant stance on food security and its focus on increasing food production have mitigated the severity of the war's effects, yet Ukraine has also played a vital role in China's food security. In such a scenario, any barriers to importing activities from Ukraine are likely to elevate inflation in China. Wheat imports are likely to be disrupted, creating inflationary pressures in China. Furthermore, China's agricultural industry is also likely to be impacted significantly as Russian fertilizers become difficult to import due to international sanctions (Ali et al., 2019).

### 1. Theoretical Framework

#### 1.1. Food Security Theory

Food Security was theorised in 1974, or precisely at the World Food Conference. According to Malett, the concept of food resilience actually falls within the discussion of human security, where the focus on security issues then shifts to problems that often affect individuals. The term "food security" at the 1974 World Food Conference primarily referred to the global issue of food shortages or deficiencies on a global scale. Food security is defined as a form of adequate food supply availability to meet the world's food needs. At the national level, all countries must ensure that their food supply is well met. Thus, there are four main pillars in achieving food security: food availability, physical and economic access to food, the biological benefits of food for the human body, and stability in terms of food availability, access, and benefits. The concept of food resilience can be applied to describe food situations at various levels, including global, national, regional, household, and individual levels. The concept of food resilience was further refined in the World Food Summit's 1996 Action Plan, which states that "when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active life" (Petra Hellegers, 2022).

The concept of food security is broader compared to the concept of food self-sufficiency, which is solely focused on the physical aspect of food production adequacy. Food security encompasses at least two essential elements: food itself and the community's access and stability regarding that food. If either of these elements is not fulfilled, a country cannot be considered to have good food resilience. Food resilience is still considered fragile if individuals access to meet their food needs is uneven, even if an ample supply of food is available at the national and regional levels.

The development of food distribution subsystem aims to ensure food stability and maintain strategic food prices. The distribution subsystem encompasses both the physical and economic accessibility aspects of evenly distributing food. The distribution system goes beyond just the physical aspect of having food available in all needed locations; it also pertains to the economic affordability reflected in prices and purchasing power of the society. Regional food surplus does not necessarily guarantee sufficient food for individuals in the community. The distribution system needs to be optimally managed and not conflict with the global market mechanisms to achieve efficiency in the process of equalizing food access for the entire population. The development of the consumption subsystem aims to ensure that every citizen consumes an adequate, safe, and diverse amount of food. This subsystem involves efforts to increase the knowledge and capabilities of the community to understand the importance of food, nutrition, and good health in order to manage consumption optimally. Within the consumption subsystem, another important aspect is diversification. Food diversification is a way to obtain a variety of nutrient consumption and reduce dependency on a particular staple food, such as wheat. The development of these three subsystems is carried out simultaneously and harmoniously using a participatory community empowerment approach, a competitive and sustainable agribusiness system approach, which is people-centered and decentralized, and an economic approach. The expected output of food security development is the fulfillment of human rights to food, increased human resources, and improved economic resilience.

## 1.2. Supply Chain Theory

The definition of supply chain proposed by Langley in 2008 is that a supply chain carries a broad and comprehensive meaning, encompassing demand and highly relevant value. Therefore, it can be stated that supply chain, demand chain, value network, and value chain are synonymous. There is a broader usage of the concept of supply chain management and a comprehensive perspective on supply chain management. Supply Chain Management is directly related to the complete cycle of raw materials from suppliers to production, warehouses, distribution, and finally reaching consumers. As companies enhance their competitive capabilities through product adaptation, high quality, cost reduction, and speed to market, there is an additional emphasis on the supply chain (Langley et al., 2008).

Supply chain management pertains to the management of the flow of goods and information through the value chain, from raw material acquisition to final consumption. Supply



### China and Global Food Security Dynamics amidst the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

chain management is about obtaining the right product, in the right quantity, with the right quality, at the right place, and at the right time for the right customers, in the right location. Supply chain management encompasses various business functions such as forecasting, inventory management, procurement management, warehouse management, information technology, and transportation management.

According to Heizer & Render, supply chain management involves the coordination of activities aimed at transforming raw materials into work-in-progress or finished goods and subsequently delivering these products to consumers through a distribution system. This activity includes traditional purchasing functions as well as other critical activities that connect suppliers with distributors. The supply chain also constitutes a network of companies working collaboratively to produce and deliver a product to end consumers. Managing the appropriate product flow is one of the objectives of the supply chain. Supply chain theory is a concept used to manage inventory issues. Evolving customer demands and the increasing number of retailers necessitate effective coordination between sellers and buyers (Bhagwat and Raut, 2012).

Food resources are often linked to a vast global food chain with little to no positive impact on the communities where the chain originates. Using international wheat trade data to reconstruct the global trade network and identify the most influential countries, it was found that the most central countries in global grain trade account for more than a significant portion of global wheat exports in terms of volume. This makes the wheat value chain vulnerable, as disruptions in one of these countries are likely to propagate worldwide. To rectify the imbalanced trade network structure, researchers advocate for a greater emphasis on regional and local food systems, as well-functioning local food systems are more effective at addressing shortages and disruptions in the larger global food system.

The supply chain theory is a network system within a company that is interconnected, interdependent, and mutually beneficial within an organization that collaborates to control, manage, and develop the flow of materials, products, services, and information from suppliers, companies, distributors, stores or retailers, and supporting companies such as logistics service providers, all the way to customers.

## **2. Methodology**

### **2.1. Research Approach**

In this study, a qualitative descriptive approach was utilized as the primary method for data processing. This method involves portraying or revealing the researched object based on facts and other actions holistically, describing them in words and language within a specific context, and utilizing various natural methods. This method is expected to elucidate how the author perceives the issue and endeavors to depict it in a straightforward and systematic manner, establishing connections between the observed phenomena and theories or concepts.

### **2.2. Data Collection Techniques**

In any research, the collection of necessary data is essential to present evidence or findings from the field in order to address the research questions. The data collection technique employed in this study involves the use of secondary data. Secondary data refers to data sources obtained indirectly through intermediaries. Secondary data generally consist of evidence, records, or historical reports that are organized in documented data, both published and unpublished. In this research, secondary data was acquired through literature review.

### **2.3. Data Processing and Analysis Techniques**

The analysis technique employed by the author to analyze the data is descriptive content analysis. This type of content analysis is utilized to provide a detailed depiction of a message or text without the necessity of testing a specific hypothesis. The objective is to comprehend the content of the acquired data. In this study, the data pertains to China's Food Security Efforts in Wheat Production Amidst International Sanctions. The author then proceeds to descriptively map out the contents of each aspect containing international economic elements (Eriyanto, 2011).

## **3. Approach and Strategy of China's Food Security**

Chinese agriculture has undergone significant changes since the late 1970s. Agriculture has grown at an average rate of 4.6% per year for over three decades. Despite per capita water availability being only a quarter of the global average and arable land contributing only 8% of the world's total, China provided around 95% of the total food supply for approximately 20% of the global population in 2015. This growth has been accompanied by significant shifts in food production and consumption. The growth of both agricultural and non-agricultural employment





### China and Global Food Security Dynamics amidst the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

has increased farmers' incomes and drastically reduced rural poverty. China was the first developing country to achieve the Millennium Development Goals of halving its poverty rate by 2015. While past achievements are remarkable, China has entered a phase of agricultural development where previous challenges have intensified and new challenges have emerged. The increase in food production has come at the expense of the environment and sustainable development. Additionally, recent wage hikes have substantially raised the costs of food production and lowered agricultural competitiveness in the global market, thereby amplifying concerns about food security in China. Moreover, despite stable growth in farmers' incomes, their average earnings remain low, and the rural-urban income gap remains significant. Ensuring national food security, achieving higher farmers' income growth, and promoting sustainable agricultural development are the primary goals of China's recent agricultural and food policies (Sun et al., 2008).

In terms of food security within China itself, the 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, which integrates the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with China's policies, sets two crucial goals for agriculture in achieving food security. The first goal is to achieve self-sufficiency in key food commodities that are essential for the Chinese population, such as rice, corn, and wheat, which serve as calorie sources to meet human dietary needs. The second goal is to achieve absolute food security. However, attaining the desired outcomes in terms of food commodities is not an easy task for China.

Food security is always linked with price stability, particularly for staple foods like rice. Indeed, food security is often synonymous with price stability, and this perspective employs a food stability approach for food security. This necessitates the modernization of agriculture, including maximizing the potential of small-scale farming operations in China to increase economic scale. Farmers also need education in the form of additional training in modern farming practices to optimize agricultural yields and meet demands. The forthcoming challenges related to food encompass multidimensional factors spanning across various sectors, commodities, regions, and populations. The cross-sectoral interconnectedness in addressing food-related issues is so strong that both its national and international political implications are significant. Given these realities, to support national food security, future strategies for enhancing food security need to anticipate various conditions. Approaches to developing future food security should prioritize household or individual food security with a decentralized management pattern, which would be a

consequence of implementing policies supporting regional autonomy (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2014).

Food, as the primary determinant of national prosperity and human well-being, holds the key to national security. Its security is a fundamental prerequisite for overall national security. In recent years, food security has gained attention across both developing and developed countries. However, the situation is particularly concerning in Asia and Africa, where the number of individuals experiencing hunger reached 418 million and 282 million, respectively, in the year 2020. China, home to a fifth of the global population, faces unique pressures on its food production. To maintain food security and meet the demands of its substantial population, a larger quantity of grains needs to be produced on 9% of the world's arable land and utilizing 6% of its water resources. This underscores that future challenges relating to environmental sustainability and resource availability will intensify. Further complicating this situation are climate change, urbanization, and a shift in dietary habits from grains to more meat-based products. These factors have caused, or will cause, significant shifts in China's food security landscape. Therefore, adopting a multidimensional assessment of China's food security situation will facilitate a more comprehensive and objective understanding. A quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the barriers affecting China's food security status plays a pivotal role in defining the primary objectives of China's own food security strategy and agricultural policies (Huang and Yang, 2017).

Over the past several years, China has achieved self-reliance in securing its food supply, and its citizens now not only have sufficient food but also a wider variety of choices than ever before. However, the large population, coupled with the increasing intensity of extreme environmental events such as floods, droughts, and extreme temperature and rainfall variability, undoubtedly presents significant challenges to current food security in China. Hence, determining how to ensure the supply of agricultural products and enhance agricultural development sustainability under the constraints of limited resources and the need for environmental preservation constitutes the most critical food security challenge to be addressed. Additionally, human factors such as technological innovation in agriculture, assurance through policy mechanisms, and increased investment in water conservation for agricultural land construction appear to be avenues that can mitigate various impacts. (Coates, 2013).



### 3.1. China in the World Wheat Market

From 1977 to 1997, China's grain imports accumulated to 248.7 million tons, and exports reached 110.3 million tons, resulting in a net import of 138.4 million tons. In the past 20 years, China has been a grain exporter for 6 years and a net importer for 14 years. During the 1990s, the average annual global grain production was about 1.7 billion tons, with international trade amounting to around 227 million tons, accounting for approximately 13% of global grain production. China's net import ratio relative to domestic production decreased from 4.5% in 1982 to a low of -1.2% in 1997. China's participation in international grain trade aims not only to bridge the gap between aggregate supply and demand but also to balance the respective types of grains. For instance, China has been the world's largest importer of wheat for several years (Zhao and Zhang, 2017).

The quantity of imports and exports in China is determined by the balance of the domestic grain market. Grain production in China experiences fluctuations due to weather variations, price fluctuations, and policy adjustments. Moreover, the circulating grains constitute only around 30% of the total production, which means that farmers' supply behavior significantly impacts the grain market balance. Since the 1980s, the grain circulation system has undergone reforms, and market prices have varied significantly over time, both of which heavily influence farmers' expectations and supply behaviors. The variations in the domestic grain market have led to substantial fluctuations in China's imports and exports during the reform era.

Grain exports are projected to grow in the near future, potentially transforming China into a net grain exporter. In recent years, due to policies aimed at increasing grain production, China has experienced a surplus of grains coupled with low domestic demand. Although the government mandates that state grain circulation enterprises purchase the amount of grains farmers intend to sell, farmers still face difficulties in selling their desired quantities due to a lack of state facilities for grain storage. As a result, domestic grain prices have declined from their peak in 1996. To address the issue of low demand, both the Chinese government and grain companies have been seeking solutions. The current study indicates that the highest import growth rates are anticipated in the meat and live animal sectors. Oilseeds, oils, and fats of vegetable origin continue to be dominant agricultural import commodities by 2030. Imports of grain products are projected to experience rapid growth in the upcoming decades. The share of vegetable and fruit exports as

well as animal products is expected to decline over the research period. Conversely, fisheries products, grain products, and fat and oil products are likely to maintain a stable market share during the 2013–2030 period.

#### **4. Support from Social and Political Environment for National Resilience**

##### **4.1. Economic Environment**

Indicators of economic status significantly relate to the perception of food security issues. Compared to individuals with only elementary education, those with higher education tend to have a greater awareness of food security problems. People with higher income levels are more likely to be concerned about food security compared to their lower-income counterparts. The results confirm the uneven distribution of vulnerability to food security risks. While food security threats affect everyone, those less fortunate tend to have less awareness of the dangers and take appropriate preventive actions. This cognitive deficit results in higher food security risks for the less fortunate.

The uneven distribution of risk implies that people adopt different strategies to address food security issues, and there exists a gap in problem perception due to varying socio-economic statuses. As a result, food security policies in China manifest as an uneven distribution of vulnerability to food security risks among individuals of differing socio-economic statuses, which is an outcome of increased inequality after state-led modernization. Individuals with higher socio-economic statuses possess greater financial and cognitive abilities to protect themselves from risks, while those with lower economic statuses are more susceptible to health hazards.

China spends a significant amount on agricultural subsidies compared to other countries. Expenditure on agricultural subsidies increased in 2015. The subsidies provided by China to farmers for producing specific types of crops have driven the production of food commodities at lower production costs, making them competitive for import in other countries. Moreover, these subsidies are also implemented with consideration for their environmental impact.

The environmental conditions in China often do not align with the requirements for producing certain types of crops. As a result, Chinese farmers tend to use excessive water and fertilizers to maximize agricultural crop growth. However, this practice ultimately disrupts environmental and water security. By shifting subsidies from price support to modernization,



### China and Global Food Security Dynamics amidst the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

agricultural research and development, as well as anti-pollution programs, China is more inclined to enhance efficiency and productivity within its farming system.

Due to economic globalization, food supply and demand are interconnected across nations. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has had a profound impact on the global economy and food security. Ukraine possesses some of the world's most fertile lands, which significantly contribute to food production. The ongoing conflict has created significant uncertainty about its consequences. Despite the crisis's negative repercussions on the Russian economy, the global economy has also felt the effects of this crisis. Preliminary outcomes present challenging economic impacts resulting from the Russia-Ukraine conflict (Pereira et al., 2022).

#### 4.2. Public Concern for Food Security and Political Trust

The issue of political food security implies that food security is not solely a societal matter but also impacts public trust in the government. Trust in the government is fundamental for the effectiveness of governance and political stability. When the performance of the administration falls short of public expectations, citizens may lose their trust in the government. Consequently, citizens can become distrustful of the government due to its failure in overseeing and regulating food security. As certain government officials become involved in food safety scandals, corruption within regulatory bodies arguably exacerbates public dissatisfaction. China's multi-level governance system ensures that both the central and local governments have separate responsibilities in food regulation. The central government can play a leadership role in the food safety regulation cycle. It enforces food safety laws and can also institute regulations to govern. Local governments perform specific oversight tasks, including monitoring food quality and imposing penalties for violations.

Researchers employ the term "fragmented authoritarianism" to elucidate the political and social characteristics of China's authoritarian system. Authoritarian central power coexists with divided power, and various implementing agencies have narrow organizational and political goals that may not always align with the central authority's objectives. This dual-layered administrative structure affects the supervision and policy implementation regarding food security. Food security issues can have effects on trust, although their impact can vary between the central and local government levels.

The Chinese government fully acknowledges the potential threats posed by food security issues in its decisions. To understand the influence of food security issues on public trust in the government, we must consider government institutions. Clearly, the government seeks to avoid mass blame for food safety issues and constructs discourse on food safety responsibility. Rhetorically, this responsibility is distributed among the state, food producers, and consumers. However, the government manipulates the primary subjects responsible for food safety risks in a sophisticated manner. To minimize the impact of food security issues on political trust, the Chinese government adopts two strategies.

*Firstly*, the government encourages individuals to manage risks and emphasizes individual consumer responsibility. Marketization and individualization compel ordinary people to take responsibility for food safety risks. In a risk-prone society, individualization creates a state of “disconnection”, where individuals are separated from collective institutions and traditional support networks. They become the agents of action and individually must tackle the risks of daily life. This process enforces compulsive self-determination on individuals who must take responsibility for all their problems themselves. Chinese society is too fragile to confront the authoritarian state, so the government shifts responsibility onto ordinary people and asks individuals to bear the responsibility for food safety risks.

Specifically, asymmetric information about food production, distribution, and sales heightens consumers’ vulnerability in facing food safety risks, while quality control and food safety lie in the hands of producers and government institutions. The government discreetly evades its responsibility by making ordinary people confront food safety risks after the individualization of society. Chinese citizens unconsciously have to accept a new personal responsibility burden placed by the state and develop various methods to select and purchase safe food.

*Secondly*, when scandals are exposed, the government shifts all responsibility onto immoral and greedy individuals involved in food production, processing, and transportation, framing them as self-serving wrongdoers. The government openly promotes its efforts in overseeing and regulating food safety issues and acts as an arbiter in food safety incidents. When these incidents occur, the government openly criticizes immoral food producers and processors, swiftly announcing steps to inspect relevant companies and individuals. The government never



### China and Global Food Security Dynamics amidst the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

mentions its own regulatory failures, and it portrays corrupt officials as responsible parties in specific cases to avoid undermining its own authority. Rhetorically, the Chinese government labels itself as the representative of the people's interests and the protector of the masses.

Hence, the government allows certain types of food safety incidents to be reported; small, locally-focused issues not tied to broader social instability are often tolerated. Every media coverage on food safety issues is under contention between the combined interests of the state and the hegemony of corporations, and the counter-hegemony of citizen-consumers.

#### 5. Analysis of Wheat Food Availability in China through the Supply Chain

Developments in food security in China, both in terms of food production and total per capita food availability, have followed a similar trajectory, driven in part by small-scale food imports. It is evident that in 1998-1999, China's food availability was relatively stagnant and even declined in the following two years. In 2018, production approached 660 million tons, a 30% increase from 1996 (500 million tons). Notably, the year China issued its first white paper on food security saw a 116% increase over 1978 (300 million tons), the year of China's land reform launch, showing an almost 600% increase since 1949 (110 million tons). Supply chain availability is a network of interconnected organizations working collaboratively to control, regulate, and enhance the flow of materials and information from suppliers to end-users. Supply chain management involves systematic and strategic coordination of traditional business functions within a company and cross-business functions in the supply chain to improve the long-term performance of the company and the supply chain as a whole. The activities within the chain are interdependent, such as material procurement, conversion of materials into semi-finished or finished goods, and distribution and storage as needed.

Sudden crises catalyze the digitization of food supply chains and agricultural services, contributing to the diversification of food distribution channels and the transformation of the food system. Changes have been observed throughout the food chain. Many farmers and wholesale traders who had never used online platforms before are now familiar with these innovative tools and recognize their benefits. Consumers are forming habits of ordering fresh food online and are accustomed to direct home delivery. E-commerce platforms have further developed their supply chains in agriculture, promoting strategies to collaborate closely with

agricultural production and support farmers. The central government is also developing programs that support cold chain storage and facilitate the online sale of agricultural products.

Compared to agriculture in other countries, Chinese agriculture is characterized by limited arable land and a large workforce involved in agricultural production. The scarcity of arable land generally implies that China tends to have a comparative advantage in labor-intensive crop production, such as fruits and vegetables, and a disadvantage in intensive land crop production, such as grains. However, the current product structure does not reflect its underlying comparative advantage but rather reflects production patterns dictated by government policies supporting cereal and grain production to meet demand. Moreover, since 2012, food availability in China has increased more significantly compared to other countries with similar populations like India and Russia.

Russia and Ukraine are known as the world's largest wheat suppliers, providing almost a quarter of the world's wheat supply. Experts from many countries worldwide indicate that European countries will face disruptions in the supply chain due to Russia's attack on Ukraine in 2022. This crisis has led to higher inflation, decreased household consumption due to price increases (oil, gas, wheat, minerals), supply chain disruptions, uncertainty, hindrance to economic growth, decreased investment, and global stock fluctuations, particularly in Europe. Both Russia and Ukraine are significant exporters to Europe. Much has changed in China since the two previous wheat research efforts, both in terms of national development and access to new data sources. Chinese agriculture is undergoing rapid modernization, bringing opportunities for commercialization and environmental pressures. The national system has also expanded its data collection efforts and opened its archives to researchers to an unprecedented extent. The importance of wheat to both China's food economy and the global market, its rapid shift within China, and new information sources justify a fresh perspective on wheat supply. These changes allow and demand that the analysis focus on measuring the influence of various socio-economic forces. These findings help speculate whether China's wheat producers can meet self-sufficiency targets in grain leadership or if the country will increasingly depend on the global market. Wheat Supply Chain refers to the management of material and information flow, as well as the capital that follows it, from the beginning to the end of the wheat agribusiness chain to optimize the fulfillment of needs at each entity in the wheat supply chain. Supply chain management efforts





### China and Global Food Security Dynamics amidst the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

run effectively and efficiently if the basic system and behaviors of the wheat supply chain system consider sustainability from economic, social, and environmental aspects.

Food sustainability using supply chain or supply chain theories cannot be achieved without cross-sector integration, including government, companies, and knowledge providers. Given the complexity of the supply chain and the vulnerability of small farmers, relying solely on the social responsibility of farmers to achieve supply chain sustainability is not feasible. Therefore, policies should focus on improving the economic resilience of the supply chain, attracting more small farmers' involvement, and further encouraging their contributions to greenhouse gas emissions mitigation and resource conservation.

### Conclusion

The significant diplomatic tension between Russia and Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has substantial economic and geopolitical implications for both countries. China's main objective is to maintain stability and economic growth. The Ukraine-Russia relationship is marked by instability in the global market, with the Ukraine-Russia trade deficit causing tensions. China's desire to diversify and enhance trade with Russia will assist in diversifying its trade with other nations, resulting in a larger global trade surplus. Wheat is a popular food product in China used for both consumption and human consumption. Wheat contains amino acids, minerals, vitamins, and other nutrients for human consumption. It holds significance in China's food landscape, with a wide variety of products and uses. The consumption of wheat in China has led to increased domestic consumption, influencing the country's economy and encouraging domestic consumption.

China has actively developed its agricultural production since 2000, contributing to food security and the global food security system. This has resulted in a significant increase in China's population, with a 7% increase in agricultural numbers. China has also focused on agricultural sector reform, introducing new technology, modernizing agricultural practices, and investing in infrastructure. Quality improvement in produced food is a focus in China, with an emphasis on producing high-quality products and promoting sustainable agriculture. The Chinese government has set national food security targets for 2022, aiming for 71.75 hectares of arable land by 2025 and 80 hectares by 2030. China also imports high-quality products from countries like the United

States and Brazil, with a target of 165 hectares by 2021. China's impact on the global food security system is significant as it aims to develop a comprehensive strategy for global food security. This includes promoting global cooperation, fostering collaboration, and building a more inclusive and sustainable food system.

China's economic growth is highly influenced by the increasing number of Chinese people who are the main consumers of food products. The total production of food products in China has increased significantly, with data from China's National Bureau of Statistics and the China Rural Statistical Yearbook revealing a significant increase from 28.9% in 2001 to 9.4% in 2020. The distribution of food products in China is a significant factor influencing its economic growth. The country has significantly improved its infrastructure and transportation, resulting in a stable and growing economy. The agricultural sector has also seen significant growth, with the US exporting \$1.62 billion worth of food products in 2020 and \$173.91 billion in 2021. The Chinese government has worked to enhance its agricultural sector and innovate in the synthetic field. In 2021, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA) announced that the country would implement new agricultural policies to increase national agricultural output and reduce dependence on foreign aid.

Furthermore, the role of the MARA is actively implementing Agricultural Reform in China, with a focus on enhancing the agricultural sector. MARA focuses on multi-level coordination to ensure the success of reform implementation. The key principle of reform implementation is to improve local production processes and inputs, ensuring efficient transportation of products and inputs. The government also strives to enhance the distribution and production of agricultural products, utilizing e-commerce platforms and a combination of government and private sector engagement. Innovation is also being employed to address current situations and challenges. Big data platforms, such as big data streaming, live streaming, and social media, are used to provide real-time information on agricultural production situations. Online platforms are also utilized to promote the production of agricultural products, making it an effective model to boost local production.

As primary providers, small-scale farmers play a significant role in the sustainability of the wheat supply chain in China. To produce 1,220 kg of steamed bread to meet the daily consumption needs of 10,000 people, a comparison with conventional farmer practices is made.

### China and Global Food Security Dynamics amidst the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

In this context, this demonstrates an effective approach to enhancing the overall sustainability of the entire food supply chain. Further research should focus on the mechanisms of this approach through multi-stakeholder engagement in the field.

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## Kırgız Halkından Kırgızistan Devletine: Etno-Sembolizm Bağlamında Bir Analiz

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### Özet

Kadim bir tarihe sahip ve Orta Asya'nın en eski toplumlarından biri olan Kırgızistan'ın millet inşasını incelerken onun modernite öncesine dayanan güçlü bir geçmişi olduğu görülmektedir. Milattan önceki dönemlerden itibaren birtakım hanlıkların, devletlerin himayesi altına giren Kırgız halkı, bu toplumlarla etkileşimi sonucunda onları çeşitli yönlerden etkilemiş ya da onlardan etkilenmiştir. Ayrıca dönem dönem bağımsızlık deneyimi de yaşamıştır. Bütün bunlar günümüz Kırgız halkını ifade eden değerlerin oluşumunda büyük bir öneme sahiptir. Milliyetçilik yaklaşımlarından etno-sembolizmin önemli temsilcilerinden biri olan Anthony Smith'in de ifade ettiği gibi günümüz milliyetçiliğinin oluşmasını yalnızca modern dönemin bir çıktısı olarak açıklamak mümkün görünmemektedir. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışma kapsamında Kırgız kimliğinin bir parçası olan, ulus inşa sürecinde fazlaca araçsallaştırılan, dünyanın en uzun destanı Manas örnek olarak ele alınmış ve günümüz milliyetçiliğinin oluşmasında Smith'in ifade ettiği şekliyle sembollerin, geleneklerin, etnik kökenin, yaşam tarzının vs. önemli rolü olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Sonuç olarak milliyetçiliği modernite dönemi ile başlatan Modernist yaklaşımın tek başına yeterli olmadığı, Kırgız ulus devletinin moderniteden önce oluşturulmuş Manas destanı üzerine inşa edilmesi örneğiyle açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu makale ile etno-sembolizm yaklaşımı temel alınarak modern Kırgız ulusunun geçmiş Kırgız toplumu ile arasında bir bağ kurulup kurulamayacağı araştırılmaya çalışılmıştır.

## From the Kyrgyz People to the Kyrgyz State: An Analysis in the Context of Ethno-Symbolism

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### Abstract

When examining nation building in Kyrgyzstan, which has an ancient history as one of the oldest societies in Central Asia, it evidently has a strong history dating back to pre-modernity. The Kyrgyz people, who have been under the auspices of numerous khanates and states since BC, have either affected or been affected by external influences in diverse ways as a consequence of interaction with these societies. Moreover, a Kyrgyz state also experienced independence from time to time. All these have a significant importance in the formation of values that represent the Kyrgyz people today. Anthony Smith, who is one of the key defenders of ethno-symbolism as one of the nationalist approaches, pointed out that it is not possible to explain the emergence of contemporary nationalism solely as a product of the modern era. In this context within the scope of this study, the longest epic, Manas, which is a part of the Kyrgyz identity and instrumentalized in the nation building process, has been taken as an example, and as Smith expresses that symbols, traditions, ethnicity, lifestyle etc. have a significant role in the formation of contemporary nationalism. Consequently, it has been demonstrated that the modernist approach which began nationalism by modern era is insufficient on its own, with the example of constructing the Kyrgyz nation-state on the epic of Manas, which was established before modernity. This article, which is based on the ethno-symbolism approach, has been scrutinized regarding the link between the modern Kyrgyz nation and the historic Kyrgyz society.

## Kırgız Halkından Kırgızistan Devletine: Etno-Sembolizm Bağlamında Bir Analiz

### Giriş

Millet ve milliyetçilik tanımlanması güç iki olgu olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Birçok araştırmacının üstünde durduğu bu kavramlar için henüz bir ortak payda yaratılamamıştır. Kökenleri ise birçok bilim insanının üzerinde düşündüğü bir konu olarak gündemde yerini almaktadır. Milliyetçilik yaklaşımları genel anlamda üç ana başlık altında incelenmektedir. Primordiyalistler (ilkçiler), milliyetçiliğin doğal bir oluşum olduğunu savunurken, modernistler modern dönemin bir ürünü olduğu ve modernite ile ortaya çıktığı tezini ortaya atmaktadırlar. Yani Fransız Devrimi, merkezi hükümetlerin oluşmaya başlaması gibi etmenlerle beraber gelen modern dönem, milliyetçiliğin de olduğu dönemin başlangıcı olarak düşünülmektedir. Etno-sembolistler ise bu iki yaklaşım arasında kalmakta, ne geçmişle bağlarını reddetmemektedirler ne de modern çağın ürünü olduğu gerçeğini göz ardı etmemektedirler.

Bu çalışma Kırgız toplumu örneğinde, sembolleri önemli bir araç kabul eden etno-sembolcülerin yaklaşımını ele almaktadır. Kadim bir geçmişe sahip Kırgız toplumunun sadece modernitenin bir ürünü olmadığı gerçeği açıklanmaya çalışılmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, her ne kadar modernite öncesi, tam anlamıyla modern manada devlet olma bilinci olmamış olsa bile, varlıkları oldukça eski dönemlere dayanan toplumun geçmişine atıf yapan ve geçmişte sahip olunan semboller, mitler, destanlar gibi değerlerin günümüz Kırgızistan'ının oluşumunda önemli rolü olduğunu vurgulamaya çalışmıştır. Bu hususta Kırgızların modern dönem öncesi oluşan ünlü Manas destanı, modern anlamda Kırgız toplumunun yapılanmasında ve inşasında büyük rol oynamış ve oynamaya devam etmekte olduğu, bundan dolayı Kırgız toplumunu sadece 18. yüzyıl çıktısı olarak ele almanın eksik olduğu tezini açıklamaya çalışılmaktadır.

### 1. Millet ve Milliyetçilik

#### 1.1. Millet

Fransız ihtilali, krallık ve imparatorlukların tarih sahnesinden silinmesine, ulus-devletlerin ortaya çıkmasına sebep olmuş ve bu ulus-devletler yüzyıllardır varlığını koruyarak günümüze ulaşmıştır. Bu süreçle beraber toplumsal yapıda ve toplum bilincinde meydana gelen değişikliklerle ulus-devletlerin temeli olan millet kavramının ve milletin yarattığı milliyetçilik ideolojisinin uluslararası arenada daha fazla gündeme gelmesi söz konusu olmuştur. Ne zaman ortaya çıktığı konusu kadar tanımlanması da zor bir kavram olan millet ve milliyetçilik konusunda bilim insanlarının ortak bir payda bulması mümkün olmamıştır. Alptekin'e göre ulus "vatan, ülke, devlet, vatandaşlık, dil, moral değerler, üst kültür gibi bir takım ortak maddi ve manevi değerlere

sahip, ama özellikle modern devletin marifetiyle siyasal olarak oluşmuş bir halkın adıdır” (2022: 6). Güldiken’in ulus tanımına bakıldığında ise iradi olmasının yanı sıra, geçmişte belirli bir zamanda var olmaya başlayan, toplumsal ve coğrafi olduğu kadar siyasal ve ekonomik bir oluşum olan verilmiş değil, edinilmiş bir durum olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır (2006: 158). Bunlara ilaveten Weber’in tanımına bakılacak olunursa; kendini bağımsız bir devlet şeklinde ortaya koyan duygu birliği olarak tanımlanan millet bu nedenle kendi devletini oluşturma eğiliminde olan topluluktur (1946: 176). Anthony D. Smith’e göre ise “millet, tarihi bir toprağı/ülkeyi, ortak mitleri ve tarihi belleği, kitlevi ve kamu kültürünü, ortak bir ekonomiyi, ortak yasal hak ve görevleri paylaşan bir insan topluluğunun adı” şeklinde tanımlanmıştır (2022: 32). Kısacası aynı manevi birliğe sahip ve aynı değerler etrafında birleşen ve yukarıdaki tanımlardan da anlaşılacağı üzere bilinçli olarak yaratılan siyasi ekonomik bir oluşumdan bahsedilmektedir.

## 1.2. Milliyetçilik

Milliyetçilik olgusu da tıpkı millet olgusu gibi çeşitli tanımlamalara tabi tutulmuş bir kavramdır. Umut Özkırmı’ya göre milliyetçilik bir ideoloji ve bir sosyal hareket olarak 18. yüzyılın sonlarından itibaren varlığını güçlü bir şekilde sürdürmektedir (2000: 12). Alptekin’e göre ulusçuluk ise ulusu oluşturan halkın kimliğini benimsemesi ve diğer uluslar arasında kendi ulusunun konumunu daha değerli konuma getirme ideali olarak açıklanabilir (2022: 6). Tunç ve Bilir’e göre ise aynı millettten olan kişilerin içinde yaşadıkları toplumu yüceltme arzusu şeklinde tezahür etmektedir (1998). Alptekin gibi milliyetçiliği daha soyut perspektiften açıklayan Tunç ve Bilir’in aksine Ertan ve Örs ise kavramın karmaşıklığı hususuna değinmişlerdir. Onlara göre milliyetçilik kavramı “millet, milliyet, etnisite, kültür, ırk, ırkçılık, halk, yurtseverlik” gibi terimlerle iç içe geçmiş belirsiz bir kavramdır (2018: 41). Buna göre kavramın net sınırlarının olmaması tanımlanması açısından zorluk meydana getirmektedir. Anthony Smith’e göre milliyetçilik, insan nüfusunun özerklik, birlik ve kimlik elde etmesi ve sürdürmesi için bir ideolojidir (2011: 37). Toplumların inşasında, modern devletlerin kullandığı, toplumda yaşayan insanları bir çatı altında toplamayı ve aidiyet duygusu yaratmayı hedef edinen bir ideolojidir (Zabunoğlu, 2018: 535). Böylelikle denilebilir ki milliyetçilik, milletleri ifade eden ve ötekenden ayıran belli değerler etrafında bir araya gelmesine yardım eden bir kavram, bir ideolojidir.

Burada ulusçuluk ile milliyetçilik kavramlarının karşılıklarına bakılacak olunursa Alptekin’e göre modern Türkçede ulusçuluğu ifade eden kavramın Osmanlı Türkçesindeki karşılığı milliyetçilik olarak açıklanmaktadır (2022: 6). Fakat Agoston ve Masters’a göre ise Arapça millet



### Kırgız Halkından Kırgızistan Devletine: Etno-Sembolizm Bağlamında Bir Analiz

anlamında kullanılan bir kelime olan *milla*'dan türemekte, fakat Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda dini topluluk anlamına gelmekte, özellikle imparatorluk içinde resmi bir siyasi lider tarafından temsil edilen Müslüman olmayan dini azınlıklar anlamına gelmektedir (2009: 383). Diğer bir değişle, Osmanlı dönemindeki millet kavramı, etnisite veya dil faktörü değil mezhep veya din faktörü üzerine inşa edilmiştir (Yılmaz ve Erdem, 2020: 2567). Alptekin'in ifadesine göre millet ve milliyetçilik kavramları ulus ve ulusçuluk kavramlarına göre daha fazla geleneksel ve yerlidir; fakat bununla birlikte ulus ve ulusçuluk kavramları hem daha yenilikçi ve modern hem de biraz daha seküler anlamlara sahiptirler (2022: 7). Türk Dil Kurumu'nun (TDK) tanımlarına bakıldığında ise millet ve milliyetçilik, ulus ve ulusçuluk kavramları ile eş anlamlı kullanılmaktadır. Bu kapsamda sözlükte ifade edildiği şekliyle millet, aynı topraklarda yaşayan, “aralarında dil, tarih, duygu, ülkü, gelenek ve görenek birliği olan insan topluluğu; ulus, budun” şeklinde, milliyetçilik ise “maddi ve manevi açılardan millet ve ülkesinin çıkarlarını her şeyin üstünde tutma anlayışı; ulusçuluk, ulusalcılık, milletseverlik, milletperverlik, nasyonalizm” şeklinde tanımlanmaktadır (TDK, 2023).

Literatürde yer alan ve ulusun kökenlerini açıklamaya çalışan, onun doğuşuyla ilgili genel olarak üç temel yaklaşım söz konusudur. Bunlar: Primordializm (İlkçilik), Modernizm ve Etno-Sembolizmdir. Bu yaklaşımlar ele alınırken genel anlamda Türkçe literatürde *ulus* ve *ulusçuluk* kavramlarından ziyade *millet* ve *milliyetçilik* kavramları kullanılmıştır. Bu bağlamda anlam karışıklığı yaratmamak adına millet ve milliyet; ulus ve ulusçuluk ile eş anlamlı olarak ele alınacaktır.

#### 1.2.1. Primordiyalizm (İlkçilik)

Primordiyalizm, milletlerin oluşumunu etnik temellere, etnisiteye dayandırır. Eller ve Coughlan'ın ifade ettiği şekliyle terim ilk olarak Shils tarafından türetilmiş ve 1950'derde Geertz tarafından geliştirilmiştir (1993: 183). Özkırmılı'ya göre ilkçilik bir teori değil bir yaklaşımdır. İlkçiliği savunanlar için milliyetçilik, konuşma, görme ya da koku alma gibi insanoğlunun doğal bir parçasıdır ve milletler çok eski zamanlardan beri var olmuştur (2000: 64). İlkel bir bağlılık ile toplumsal varoluşun “verilenlerinden” (*given*) kaynaklanan bir bağlılık ifade edilmektedir. Daha net bir şekilde “verilmişlik” (*givenness*) belli bir dini topluluk içinde doğmak, belli bir dili hatta dilin belli bir lehçesini konuşmak ve belli sosyal teamülleri uygulamaktan kaynaklanır (Geertz, 1973: 259). Etnisiteyi kan bağı ile açıklayan primordialistler, bu kan bağı algısının zamana ve mekâna bağlı olmadan süreceğini ileri sürmektedirler (Aktürk, 2006: 25). Özkırmılı ilkçiliği doğalcı, sosyo-biyolojik ve kültürel olarak üç başlık altında analiz etmiştir. İlkçiliğin en uç versiyonu olarak düşünülen doğalcı yaklaşıma göre milli kimlikler insanın doğal bir parçasıdır (2000: 66). İnsan bir

buruna ve iki kulağa sahip olmak zorunda olduğu gibi bir milliyete sahip olmak zorundadır (Gellner, 1983: 6). Söz konusu ikinci yaklaşım ise etnik ve milli bağların kökenini genetik mekanizmalarda ve içgüdülerde ararken, kültürel ilkçiler ise bireylerin algı ve inanışlarına odaklanırlar (Özkırımlı, 2000: 75).

### 1.2.2. Modernizm

Modernist teori ise ilkçi teorisyenlerin aksine milletlerin varlığının modern dönemlerde oluştuğunu ileri süren teoridir. John Breuilly'ye göre milliyetçilik bir siyaset biçimidir. Milliyetçilik en iyi şekilde modern devlet ve modern devlet sistemi bağlamında politik davranışın uygun bir biçimi şeklinde anlaşılmaktadır (1993: 1). İlkçi yaklaşımın aksine Gellner'e göre ise milletleri doğal, tanrı vergisi olarak sınıflandırılması, doğuştan olan uzun süre ertelenmiş politik kader olarak ele alınması bir efsanedir (1983: 48-49). Modern çağın ürünü olan milliyetçilik Fransız devrimiyle beraber ideolojik olarak varlık göstermeye başlamıştır. Yani başka bir deyişle, ilkçilerin iddia ettiği gibi insanlığın doğal bir parçası değil daha sonradan inşa edilen bir olgu olduğu söylenebilir. Gellner'e göre milliyetçilik, bazen önceden var olan kültürleri alır ve onları ulusa dönüştürür, bazen onları yaratır ve sıklıkla da önceden var olan kültürleri yok eder. Bu, gerçek ve kaçınılmaz olandır (Gellner, 1983: 49). Gellner için irade ve kültür ulusal kimlik için önem arz eden kavramlar olarak görülseler de yeterli değildir (1992: 101). Yazara göre irade sadece milletlerin temelini oluşturmakla kalmaz birçok oluşum ve grup için de temel teşkil ettiğinden millet tanımı için yeterli olmamaktadır (1992: 103). Aynı zamanda kültür de toplulukları millet yapmak için gerekli olmakta fakat yalnız başına yeterli olmamaktadır. Gellner kültürel sınırların kesinliği kadar belirsizliğinin de söz konusu olduğunu vurgulamaktadır (1992: 103). Ona göre kültürle irade eğer siyasal birimlerle gerçek manada birleşirse millet oluşmaktadır (Gellner, 1992: 105). Milliyetçiliğe farklı bir bakış kazandıran Benedict Anderson ise milleti egemen, sınırlı bir cemaat şeklinde hayal edilmiş siyasal bir topluluk olarak tanımlamaktadır (Anderson, 1995: 20-22). Modern gelişmelerin ürünü olabilecek sanayi devrinin başlaması, kentleşmenin ve sekülerleşmenin yaşanmaya başlanması, merkezi hükümetlerin kurulması, kapitalizm gibi bir sistemin ortaya çıkması milletler ve milliyetçiliğin doğmasına sebep olmuştur (Gökçalp, 2007: 282). Görüldüğü gibi çok eskiye dayanan bir olgu olduğu varsayımı modernistler tarafından reddedilmekte, modern dünyanın bir parçası olduğu savı kabul görmektedir.

## Kırgız Halkından Kırgızistan Devletine: Etno-Sembolizm Bağlamında Bir Analiz

### 1.2.3. Etno-sembolizm

Etno-sembolcü yaklaşım ise modern teoriye katılmakla birlikte etnik temelleri de göz ardı etmeyen teoridir. Ne tam olarak milliyetçiliğin insan ırkının doğal uzantısı olduğunu kabul etmekte, ne de modernistlerin öne sürdüğü gibi 18. yüzyıldan itibaren oluşmaya başlayan bir kavram olduğu görüşünü savunmaktadırlar. Özkırımlı'ya göre etno-sembolcü yaklaşım, ilkçi yaklaşıma ve modernist yaklaşıma göre daha homojendir (2000: 168). Bu yaklaşımın en önemli temsilcilerinden biri olan Anthony Smith'e göre milliyetçilik, siyasi bir doktrin ve siyaset üslubu olmaktan daha ziyade kültür, ideoloji, dil, mitoloji, sembolizm ve bilinç biçimi şeklinde ifade edilebilir (2022: 147). Ona göre modern politik milliyetçilik etnik bağlar ve anılar hatta bazı durumlarda modern dönem öncesi etnik kimlikler ve topluluklar dikkate alınmadan anlaşılabilir (Smith, 1996: 361). Smith'e göre semboller, amblemler, ilahiler, festivaller, yaşam ortamları, gelenekler, dilsel kodlar, kutsal yerler ve benzerleri etnik topluluğun eşsiz kültür ve kaderinin güçlü farklılaştırıcıları ve hatırlatıcılarıdır (1998: 191). Buna ek olarak Conversi'nin de ifadesine göre milletler modern bir olgu olmasına rağmen, onların varlığı önceden var olan mitler, anılar, değerler ve son olarak da sembollere dayanır (1995: 74). Bunların yanı sıra geçmiş bağların önemini Armstrong da vurgulamış ve ona göre yüzyıllara dayanan bir zaman boyutu bağımsız etnik deneyimlerin yayılma ve benzeme etkilerinden kurtulması için elzemdir. Genişletilmiş zamansal perspektif, modern milliyetçiliği etnik bilinç döngüsünün bir parçası olarak algılamak bakımından önem arz etmektedir (Armstrong, 1982: 4). Bütün bu açıklamalara bakarak geçmiş bağın günümüz milletlerinin oluşumunun en önemli unsurlarından biri olduğu görülmektedir. Armstrong, tıpkı Conversi'nin vurguladığı gibi semboller, anılar ve iletişime vurgu yapmış ve modern öncesi dönemde milletlerin ortaya çıkmasında bu üç konseptin analizinin önemli olduğuna değinmiştir (1982: 7). İdeoloji bakımından milliyetçilik hareketleri ve kavramları 18. yüzyılın sonlarına dayandırılrsa da, ulusal yapılar, duygular, semboller açısından resim çok daha karmaşıktır (Smith, 1998: 190). Denilebilir ki, nesilden nesle aktarılan mitler, semboller ve bir millete has kavramlar modern milletin analizinde karşılaşılabilecek öğeler olmaktadır. Smith, millet kavramında mitler ve anılardan çok daha fazlasının olduğunu kabul etmekle birlikte bunların olmazsa olmaz (*sine qua non*) olduğunu dile getirmektedir (1986: 2). Modern dönemde milliyetçilik olgusu, Smith'in üstünde durduğu "olmazsa olmazların" üstüne inşa edilmesiyle mümkün olduğu söylenebilir. Ona göre hafıza olmadan kimlik (seçici de olsa), mit olmadan kolektif amaç olmaz. Bir millet kavramında kimlik ve amaç veya kader gerekli unsurlardır (Smith, 1986: 2). Ayrıca toplumların etnik kökenine de vurgu yapmakta ve etnisitenin şekillenmesi yine toplulukların en eski dönemlerdeki kültürel

değer ve sembolleriyle alakalı olduğuna dikkat çekmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle Smith etnisiteyi büyük ölçüde mitik ve sembolik bir karaktere sahip bir durum olarak tanımlamaktadır (1986: 16). Aktürk'ün etnik kategori ya da etnisite tanımı da yine Smith'in tanımını destekler niteliktedir. Bu bağlamda yazara göre etnisite; din, mezhep, dilin yanı sıra kabile, klan ve ırk gibi toplumu ifade eden parçalardan bir tanesidir (Aktürk, 2006: 23). Bu kategorilere ait toplumların sahip olduğu, Smith'in ifadesiyle mitler, semboller, anılar, değerlerin de çok yavaş değişen formlar ve türlerin içinde ve onlar tarafından taşındığından dolayı *ethnie* bir defa şekillendikten sonra normal değişimler altında son derece dayanıklı olma ve birçok nesil ve hatta yüzyıllar boyunca devam etme eğilimindedir (1986: 16). Kısacası etniğin değişmesi ya da tamamen yok olması kolaylıkla gerçekleşecek bir durum olmamaktadır. Akıncı'ya göre Smith etnik gruplar ve modern milletler arasında doğrudan bir ilişkiye vurgu yapmasa bile birçok etnik grubun millet olamadığını belirtse de, modern milletlerin ve milliyetçiliklerin oluşmasında daha önceki zamanların etnik gruplarının tesiri olduğunu savunmaktadır (2014: 143). Bu bağlamda milletlerin oluşumunun 18.yüzyılda yaşanan gelişmelere bağlı ele almak toplumun parçası olan değerleri, modern anlamda toplumu inşa ederken göz ardı etmiş olmak anlamına geldiği söylenebilir.

## 2. Kırgız Halkının Kökenine Genel Bakış

Varlığı çok eski zamanlara dayanan, günümüzde Orta Asya topraklarının bir parçası olan, Çin kaynaklarından milattan önceki (MÖ) dönemlere kadar gittiği anlaşılan bir millet olan Kırgızlar, Sovyetler Birliği hâkimiyetine girene kadar göçebe olarak yaşamış, boy, klan, kabileler şeklinde varlıklarını sürdürmüşlerdir. Bartold'a göre Orta Asya'nın en kadim topluluklarından biri olan Kırgızlar dışında, bilindiği kadarıyla bu bölgede yaşayan topluluklar içinde tarihte adı bu kadar erken görülen başka bir toplumun olmadığı söylenebilir (2014: 184). Kırgız adı Göktürkçe ve bunun yanında Uygurca metinlerde Kırgız olarak ifade edilmiş olmasına rağmen, Arapça ile Farsça kaynaklarda “Kır-kız”, “Hır-hız” ya da “Kır-gız” şeklinde ifade edilmektedir (Akarslan, 2020: 98). Çin tarafından ise “Demir Halk” anlamına gelen Tszsiyangunlar şeklinde isimlendirilmişlerdir (Osmanov, 2013: 147). Kırgız halkı ilk devletlerini MÖ ikinci yüzyılda “Ki-Ku”, “Kien-Kun” ya da “Gen-gün”, “Gegün” ismiyle günümüz Kırgızistan'ın doğusunda ve kuzeydoğusunda kurmuşlardır (Toraman, t.y.: 3-4).

Oldukça eski bir tarihe sahip toplumun yaşadığı bölgeler hakkında çeşitli bilgiler mevcuttur. Kalkan'a göre *Yenisey-Altay, Sibir, Hakasya ve Moğolistan* bölgelerini içeren yerlerde uzun süre yaşadıkları fakat Hun, Göktürk ve Uygur devrinde Kırgız toplumunun tabi tutulduğu göç

### Kırgız Halkından Kırgızistan Devletine: Etno-Sembolizm Bağlamında Bir Analiz

politikası dolayısıyla eski topraklarından ayrıldıkları söylenebilir (2005: 77). Bartold ise MÖ 201'deki olaylar döneminde ve daha sonraki zamanlarda, Yenisey civarlarında yaşadıklarının muhtemel olduğunu ifade etmiştir (2014: 186). Yenisey bölgesine ilaveten, Osmanov ise günümüz Kuzeybatı Moğolistan'da yer alan Hırkız Nur (Kırgız Gölü) bölgesinde yaşadıkları konusunu savunanların olduğunu ifade etmiştir (2013: 151). Tarihi kaynaklara bakıldığında onların 19. yüzyıla kadar Fergana Vadisi'nde yaşadıkları bilgisine rastlanmaktadır (Alımbayev, 2018: 113).

Çin resmi tarihçiliğinin ilk yapıtının sahibi Sih-ma Ch'ien'e göre Hun Devleti, kuzeyde Gegun hükümdarlığını MÖ 201'de hâkimiyet altına almıştır ve bu dönemdeki olaylar hakkında bilgi, Kırgızlarla ilgili ilk bilgiler olarak kabul edilmelidir (Bartold, 2014: 185). Bunlara ilaveten Orhon nehri civarındaki tarihi kitabelerde birkaç defa Kırgızların bahsinin geçmesi tarihleri hakkında önemli bir detay oluşturmaktadır (Bartold, 2014: 189). Kırgız toplumu MÖ 60'lı dönemlere kadar Hunların oldukça güvenilir tebaası olarak gösterilmektedirler (Osmanov, 2013: 153). Hun Devleti'nin yıkılmasıyla beraber Baykal Gölü ile Tibet arasındaki bölgede Hakas Devleti'ni kuran Kırgızlar 6. yüzyılda Göktürk Devleti'nin ve 8. yüzyılda ise Uygurların egemenliği altına girmiştir (Kırgızistan, t.y.). Fakat Uygur Devleti'nin uyguladığı ağır vergilerden ötürü ayaklanıp Uygurların kuzeyde bulunan topraklarını ele geçirmişler ve 840'da Ötüken'de ikinci Kırgız Devleti'ni kurmuşlardır (Toraman, t.y.: 4). 13. yüzyılda Moğol İmparatorluğu karşısında, Kırgızlar boyun eğmek zorunda kalmışlar ve onların egemenlikleri altına girmişlerdir. Toraman'ın ifadesine göre Cengiz Han tarafından kurulan Çağatay hanedanının bir parçası olan Kırgızlar, 1399'da bağımsızlıklarını yeniden kazanmışlardır (t.y.: 4). 15. yüzyıl başlarında Timur devletinin egemenliği altına giren Kırgızlar bu dönemdeki Moğol saldırıları dolayısıyla Kazakların yaşadığı bölgelere yerleşmişler ve onlara Kırgız-Kazak adı verilmiştir (Kırgızistan, t.y.). Fergana Vadisi'nde yaşayan toplumlar tarafından 1709'da başkent Hokand şehri olmak üzere Hokand Hanlığı kurulmuştur (Alımbayev, 2018: 114). Bu bölgede yaşayan Kırgız toplumunun da Hokand Hanlığının bir parçası olarak 1876 yılına, Rus Çarlığı'nın bölgeyi işgaline kadar Hokand Hanlığının hâkimiyeti altında yaşadıkları söylenebilir.

Orta Asya toprakları 1876 yılında Rus Çarlığı egemenliği altına girmiş olmasına rağmen o dönemlerde Kırgız devletinin oluşumundan bahsetmek mümkün değildir. Etnik kimlikten ziyade eski dönemlerde Orta Asya'da yaşayan topluluklar kendilerini Müslüman olarak tanımlamaktaydılar (Coldoşov, 2017: 245). Lowe'ye göre Sovyet dönemine kadar Kırgızlarda milliyet bağlarından ziyade akrabalık bağlarına dayanan toplum söz konusuydu ve özellikle güçlü

bir “Kırgız” bilinci hiçbir zaman gelişmedi (2003: 106). Tam manasıyla Kırgız olma bilincinin olmamasının, Rus Çarlığının bu topraklarda ilerlemesinde ve toprakların işgal edilmesinde kolaylaştırıcı etkisinin olduğu söylenebilir. Rus Çarlığının zayıflaması ve 1917 yılında gerçekleşen Rus Devrimi akabinde çarlığın yıkılmasını beraberinde getirmiştir. Rus devrimiyle gelen iç savaşın bitimi sonrasında Sovyetler Birliği kurulmuştur. Böylece Kırgız milleti Sovyetler Birliği çatısı altında varlık göstermeye devam etmiştir.

Kısacası milattan önceki dönemlerden itibaren tarih sahnesinde varlık gösteren Kırgız toplumu birtakım devletlerle ve hanlıklarla etkileşim içine girmiş, onların egemenliği altında yaşamış, zaman zaman kendi devletini kurma teşebbüsünde bulunmuş ve başarmış bir toplum olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle bir millet olarak varlık göstermemiş olsa da bir halk olarak her zaman var olduğu görülmektedir.

### 3. Sovyetler Dönemi Kırgız Devleti’nin Oluşumu

Sovyetler Birliği’nin kurulmasıyla beraber, Orta Asya’daki toplumlar da artık Sovyetler Birliği sınırlarına dahil edilmişlerdir. Sovyetler Birliği, Rus Çarlığından farklı olarak Orta Asya’daki toplumların birer cumhuriyet olarak varlıklarını sürdürmelerinin kendi çıkarları açısından daha iyi olduğunu düşünerek Orta Asya topraklarını çeşitli şekillerde bölme yoluna gitmiştir. Haugen’e göre Çarlık rejimin aksine, Sovyet komünistleri Orta Asya toplumunu temelden değiştirmeyi amaçlıyorlardı ve projenin önemli kısmı feodal, ataerkil ve kabile, klana dayalı geleneksel sosyal yapıyı değiştirmektir (2013: 234). Pınar Köksal’a göre ise Sovyet liderleri, bölgeyi şekillendiren çeşitli kimliklerin, dini inanış, kabileler arası bağlar, etnisiteye dayanan milliyetçilik gibi, uzun vadede ulus kimliği yaratılarak yok edebileceklerini düşünmüşlerdir (2020: 24). Sabol ise Orta Asya’nın ulusal birimlere bölünmesi merkez tarafından yönetimi kolaylaştıracağı, dine ve liderlere olan geleneksel bağlılıkları ortadan kaldıracağı, Bolşeviklerin, sosyalizm altında meydana geleceğini varsaydığı ulusal düşmanlıkları hafifleteceği şeklinde yorumlamıştır (1995: 226). Bu nedenle Sovyetler Birliği, Orta Asya’da kurulacak devlet fikrine sıcak bakmış ve desteklemiştir.

Orta Asya, Rus işgalinden öncesine dayanan zengin bir tarihe sahiptir. Fakat bölge, Sovyetler Birliği 1924’te ulusal sınırları ayırana ve modern, son derece yapay ulusal cumhuriyetler oluşturana kadar etno-milliyetçi çizgide yönetilmemiştir (Lowe, 2003: 106). 1800’lü yılların sonlarında bölgede etnik kimlik üzerine bir ayrım söz konusu olmayıp bu etnik kimlikler bulanık olarak varlığını sürdürmüştür ve Sovyetler Birliği döneminde de etnik kimliğin temeli dil kabul edilmiş ve bu bağlamda etnik kimlikler yeniden oluşturulmuştur (Joldoshov, 2013: 121). 1920’lerde

### Kırgız Halkından Kırgızistan Devletine: Etno-Sembolizm Bağlamında Bir Analiz

Orta Asya için Sovyet milliyetçilerinin politikası etnik dil kriteri temel alınarak ayrı ulusal cumhuriyetler yaratmak olmuştur (Sengupta, 2000: 407).

Sovyetler Birliği'nin sınırları belirleme politikası öncesi, Moskova yönetimi, insanları yerli yöneticilerden ve din oluşumlardan ayırmayı amaçlayan kendi kaderini tayin etme politikasını belirgin bir şekilde savunarak olumsuz askeri ve politik durumu hafifletmeyi amaçladı (Sabol, 1995: 225). 1917 ve 1920 yılları arasında kendi kaderini tayin hakkı ilkesi; coğrafi konum, Rusya için önem, uluslararası ortam, ulusal hareketlerin gücü gibi bireysel koşullara bağlı olarak çeşitli şekillerde, milletin tanınması arzusunun dile getirildiği farklı bölgelerde uygulanmıştır (d'Encausse, 1992: 97). Sistemin yeni kurulduğu ve ihtilalin ilk zamanlarında kendi kaderini tayin hakkının kısa bir dönem için verildiği ve Sovyetler Birliği'nin kurulma aşamasında olduğu dönemde oluşturulmak istenen rejimin kurumsallaşması için gereken zamanı kazanmak adına uygulanan bir politika olmuştur (Kara, 2021: 101). Lenin'in asıl amacı Rus Çarlığı'nın ortadan kalkması için azınlığın desteğini almak ve Sovyetler Birliği kurulmadan önce yönetimde olan geçici hükümet karşısında yer almalarını sağlamaktı (Yarımoğlu, 2022: 35). Sovyetler Birliği'ne karşı bölgede ortaya çıkabilecek toplu ayaklanmaların olma ihtimali Sovyetler Birliği'ni endişelendirmiş ve bölgede “böl ve yönet” politikası uygulamasına sebebiyet vermiştir.

Bu bağlamda Buyar'ın da ifade ettiği gibi Bütün Rusya İcra Komisyonu tarafından 14 Ekim 1924'te alınan kararla Orta Asya'daki toplumların ulusal devletlere bölünmesi kararlaştırılmıştır (2017: 81). Böylece Sovyetler Birliği içinde ulusal cumhuriyetler oluşturulmaya başlanmıştır. Bolşeviklerin Orta Asya'da beş tane ulus devlet yaratmadaki amaçları, bölgede var olan farklı ulusal ve etnik grupların karışıklığı ile mücadele etmekten kaçınmak ve tamamen yok etmek olmasa da bölgede Pantürkizm'in yayılmasını ve etkisini azaltmaktı (Dagiev, 2014: 15). Aynı zamanda bu, aynı kökenden olan toplumları ayırtırmayı ve birbirlerinden uzaklaştırmayı amaçlayan politika olmuştur (Buyar, 2017: 81). En nihayetinde ise Sovyet kimliğini benimsemiş “Sovyet İnsanı” yaratmak amaçlanmıştır. Bu bağlamda politikasını “böl ve yönet” ilkesi doğrultusunda şekillendiren Sovyetler Birliği'nin, 1924 yılında başlayan sınır belirleme çalışmaları 1936 yılına kadar devam etmiş, bölgedeki toplulukların sınırları defalarca değiştirilmiş, bu toplumlar yeniden isimlendirilmiş ve 1936 yılında son şekli verilmiştir.

1918 yılında kurulan Rusya Federasyonu'nun ilk özerk cumhuriyeti olan Türkistan Özerk Cumhuriyeti, Kırgızistan'ı da kapsayan Türkistan Türklerinin Sovyet Devleti kurulması ve geliştirilmesi yönündeki ilk basamak oldu (Kara, 2013: 1754-1755). 26 Ağustos 1920 tarihinde,

Bütün Rusya Merkez İcra Komisyonu ve Sovyet Halk Komiserleri Rusya Sovyet Federe Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti içinde Özerk Kırgız (Kazak) Sosyalist Sovyet Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulduğunu bildiren bir kararname yayınladılar (Sabol, 1995: 232). Bu tarihten sonra Yedisu, Sırderya çevresinde yaşayan Kırgızlar kendi devletlerini kurmak için daha yoğun çalışmaya başlamışlardır ve Türkistan Özerk Cumhuriyeti içinde bir Kırgız bölgesi yaratma fikri ilk defa 1921'de gündeme gelmiştir (Kara, 2013: 1755-1756). Sınırlandırma projesi Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği Merkez Yürütme Komitesi tarafından onaylanmış, Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri ve özerk oblastları resmen ilan edilmiştir (Sabol, 1995: 236). Bu bağlamda 14 Ekim 1924'te alınan kararla "Türkmen SSC, Özbek SSC, Tacik Özerk Oblastı, Kazak Özerk SSC'ne bağlı Kara Kalpak Özerk Oblastı, RSFSR'e bağlı *Kara Kırgız Özerk Oblastı* (Kara-Kırgızskaya Avtonomnaya Oblast)" oluşturulmuştur (Buyar, 2017: 82). 1929'a gelindiğinde ise Tacikistan özerk oblast statüsünden tam bir birliğin cumhuriyeti statüsüne yükselmiş, Kırgızistan ise bu statüyü yedi yıl sonra, 1936'da elde etmiştir (Smith, 1996: 315).

1985 senesinde Gorbaçov'un iktidara gelmesiyle Sovyetler Birliği'ni canlandırmak ve ekonomiyi düzeltmek amacıyla planlamış olduğu perestroyka ve glasnost politikaları Sovyetler Birliği için sonun başlangıcı olmuştur. Bu politikalar birliğin çözülüşünü hızlandırmış ve birlik 1991 senesinde dağılmıştır. 31 Ağustos 1991 yılında da Kırgızistan bağımsızlığına kavuşmuştur. Yaklaşık yetmiş yıl boyunca Sovyet egemenliği altında kalan devlet, 1991 yılından itibaren hızlı bir şekilde kendi ulusunu inşa sürecine girmiştir. Marksist-Leninist ideolojiyi temel alan ulus kimliği yerine, Sovyetler Birliği öncesi toplumsal değerlerin temel alındığı ve o çerçevede yeniden oluşturulan ulus kimliği önem kazanmıştır (Köksal, 2020: 25).

Özetle Kırgızistan, Sovyetler tarafından 1936 yılında alınan kararla devlet statüsü almıştır. O dönemden 1991 yılına, birliğin dağılmasına kadar, Sovyetler Birliği'ne bağlı ve onun tarafından yönetilen bir eyalet statüsündeyken, 1991'den itibaren artık uluslararası platformda kendi ulusal kimliği olması gereken bir devlet olma zorunluluğu doğmuştur.

#### 4. Kimlik Oluşumunda Destan

Semboller/simgeler toplumları bir arada tutan ve geçmişle bağlarını sağlamlaştırıp, kimlik inşasında büyük öneme sahip olan unsurlardır. Gökalp'e göre bir topluluğa ait gelenekleri ve onların kodlarını bilenler tarafından anlaşılabilir olan nesne, işaret ya da kelime olup, onları tanıyanlar için bir değer ve önemi olan unsurlardır (2007: 291). Toplumların geçmişleriyle bu günleri arasında bağ kuran en önemli olgulardan birisi olan destanlar, onlara atalarından miras



### Kırgız Halkından Kırgızistan Devletine: Etno-Sembolizm Bağlamında Bir Analiz

kalan folklorlarıdır. Folklorun bir parçası olan destanlar o topluma ait olan sembolleri, değerleri tarihin bir parçası olarak nesilden nesle aktarılmasını sağlamaktadır. Bars'ın da ifade ettiği gibi destanlar, tarihle kurulan bağlar konusunda en güçlü halk anlatılarından biridir (2021: 187). Onların en önemli görevi sadece topluma millet olma duygusunu vermesi değil aynı zamanda toplumu oluşturan bireyler arasındaki bağın ve uzlaşmaların destanlar vasıtasıyla inşa edilmesidir (Yurdigül ve Ayhan, 2018: 1891). Bazancır'e göre ise destanlar, halkların ortaya çıkış hikâyeleri veya milletlerin yaşamlarına büyük etkiler etmiş kahramanlık durumlarının toplumda "milli değerler, ortak semboller ve çeşitli kavramlarla" birleştirilerek ortaya çıkarılmış uzun hikâyelerdir (2022: 243). Böylelikle denilebilir ki, destanların, toplumların milli değerlerinden, kimliklerinden izler taşıması yadırganamaz bir gerçektir. Bir milletin kimlik ve kültürünü anlayabilmek için destanlar da önemli aydınlatıcı rolü üstlenmektedirler. Akyüz'ün belirttiği gibi varlıkları tarihin derinliklerine uzanan milletlerin düşüncelerini, hayallerini dünyaya bakış açılarını ve hayatlarını destanlardan öğrenebilmek mümkündür (2011: 16). Destanların oluşabilmesi için de çeşitli şartların yerine getirilmesi gerekmektedir. Oğuz'un makalesinde destanların oluşabilmesi için o toplumun "destan devri" denilen, mitolojik unsurların o toplumun yaşamında etkisinin olduğu dönemde yaşaması gerekmektedir (2004: 7). Bu bağlamda mitolojik unsurların tarihin çok eski zamanlarında yoğun bir şekilde kullanılması ve o dönemlerde oluşan destanların oluşturulduğu toplumun bir parçası olarak yüzyıllar boyu süregelmesi ile o toplumun tarihinin ne kadar eskiye dayandığı yorumu yapılabilir.

#### 4.1. Manas Destanının Rolü

Kadim bir tarihe sahip olan Kırgız halkı için büyük önem arz eden dünyanın en uzun milli destanı Manas Destanı, Kırgız kimliğinin bir parçası olarak kabul edilebilir. Manas Destanı, o dönemlerde henüz devlet kurma, dünyayı fethedip ülkeleri egemenliği altına almak gibi bir amacı olmayan ve kabileler şeklinde yaşayan eski Kırgızların hayatını anlatmaktadır (Gülensoy, 2003). Manas Destanı'nda Kırgızların doğumdan, evliliğe, ölüm törenlerinden, inanç, dünya görüşleri ve doğa anlayışlarına kadar birçok kültürel özellikleri sergilenmektedir (Ekinci, 2016: 343). Bağımsız Kırgızistan'ın inşasında ve Kırgız halkının tarihsel anlamda ne kadar eskiye dayandığının izahı niteliğinde kullanılması konusunda Manas simgesi büyük önem arz etmektedir (Beşirli, 2015: 35). Etnik grubun ve Kırgız öz kimliğinin sağlamaştırıcı faktörü olarak Manas Destanı, Kırgız halkının manevi kültüründe merkezi role sahiptir (Isaeva, 2015: 191). Manas Destanı sıradan bir destan olarak kalmamış, Kırgızların bütün kültürel özelliklerini, tarihini, gelenek göreneklerini, yaşam

tarzlarını, düşüncelerini de içeren, ansiklopedik özellik taşıyan bir değer olmuştur (Geyikoğlu, 2001: 203). Ayrıca Manas Destanı, devletçiliğe sahip olma arzularının da temsili niteliğinde olmuştur (Akayev, t.y.). Bu hususta denilebilir ki, Kırgız tarihini anlatan en önemli sözlü eserlerden biri olan Manas Destanı, Kırgızların geçmişine, medeniyetine ayna tutan değerli bir kaynak niteliği taşımaktadır. Yine Geyikoğlu'nun makalesinde ifade ettiği gibi oluşumu İslamiyet'ten önceki döneme tekabül eden Manas Destanı'nda millet olma, bağımsızlık ve buna ilaveten özgürlük gibi kavramlar destanın ruhunu yansıtmakta (2001: 203) ve günümüz Kırgız milleti ile ilgili de önemli unsurları sunmaktadır. Marat'a göre ise Manas Destanı, vatanseverliğin son derece etno-merkezci bir kimliğini taşımasını ve komşu milletlerle arkadaş olurken Kırgız ulusunu yabancılardan koruma ruhunu vurgular. Manas'a dayalı ideoloji, Kırgız dilinin kullanılmasını ve ulusal geleneklere geri dönüşü teşvik eder (Marat, 2008: 39).

Kırgız toplumunun en önemli simgelerinden biri niteliğinde olan Manas Destanı, bağımsızlık sonrası Kırgız toplumunun tanımlanmasında sadece kültürel anlamda bir araç olarak kullanılmamış, politik olarak da derin anlamlar yüklenmiştir. Elitler politik arenada da Kırgız ulus devletini inşa ederlerken, Manas Destanı'nı inşa sürecinin önemli bir parçası olarak ele almışlar ve destan, milliyetçilik bilincinin toplumda güçlenmesi amacıyla aktif olarak kullanılmış bir simge olmuştur. Milli kimlik bilincinin oluşması ve ulusun inşasının bir parçası olarak kullanılması dolayısıyla Manas Destanı'nın önemi yadsınamaz. Bu bağlamda Jacquesson'un ifade ettiği gibi ulusal miras olarak bir destanı koruma ve geliştirme hususunda dünyada kanun yapan ve resmi tatil olarak kutlayan tek ülke olan Kırgızistan (2020: 1) için Manas Destanı, ulusal ideolojik bir çerçeve oluşturmak amacıyla rahat bir seçenek olarak sunulmuştur (Marat, 2008: 35). 1995 yılında, Manas'ın 1000. yılını kutlamak amacıyla festival düzenlenmiş ve bu festivalde Askar Akayev, destandan çıkarılan yedi nasihati bağımsız Kırgızistan için kendi eylem programının içeriği yapacağını belirten bir politik konuşma yapmıştır (Laruelle, 2012: 41). Hem toplumsal hayatı şekillendiren hem de hükümetin ulusu inşa etme aşamasında politik bir araç olarak kullandığı yedi nasihat şu şekilde sıralanmıştır:

- Milli birlik ve beraberlik,
- Uluslararası uyum, dostluk ve iş birliği,
- Milli onur ve vatanseverlik,
- Titiz ve yorulmak bilmez çalışma yoluyla zenginlik ve refah,
- Hümanizm, cömertlik ve tolerans,

### Kırgız Halkından Kırgızistan Devletine: Etno-Sembolizm Bağlamında Bir Analiz

- Tabiat ile uyum,
- Kırgız devletinin güçlendirilmesi ve muhafaza edilmesi (Marat, 2008: 35)

Kırgız Devleti ve ulusunun inşası hususunda önemli noktalara vurgu yapan yedi nasihatın üçüncü öğüdü kapsamında Kırgız Devleti'nin refaha erişebilmesi için vatanseverlik ve yüksek milli ruhun önemli olduğu vurgulanmıştır (Akayev, t.y.). Buna ilaveten, önem arz eden diğer bir öğüt “Demokrasi Adası” olarak isimlendirilen Kırgızistan’ın bunu koruması hususudur. Akayev’in de ifade ettiği gibi devletçilik ve demokrasiyi korumak bütün halkın en önemli görevidir. Ayrıca “Kırgızistan İnsan Haklarının Ülkesi” milli fikrinin, yedinci öğüdün hayata geçirilmesi için en uygun araç olduğu düşünülmektedir (Akayev, t.y.). Denilebilir ki, Manas Destanı bağımsız Kırgız Devleti’nin oluşumunda hem devletin temelini teşkil etmekte hem de önemli bir yol göstericidir. Ayrıca sadece Kırgız devletinin değil hem de Kırgız ulusunun üzerine inşa edildiği ilkeleri anlama bakımından Manas’ın yedi nasihati önem arz etmektedir.

26-28 Ağustos 1995’de yapılan *Uluslararası Manas Destanı ve Dünya Halklarının Epik Mirasları Sempozyumunda*, Akayev tarafından Manas’ın yedi öğüdü ortaya atılarak, genç kuşakların eğitim öğretiminde kullanılması hususunda çeşitli çalışmalar yapılmıştır (Beşirli ve Ünal, 2015: 7). 9 Haziran 2011’de “Manas Destanı Hakkında” kanun, Kırgızistan’ın meclisi tarafından kabul edilmiştir (Beşirli, 2015: 37). 2012 yılında Kırgızistan eğitim bakanlığı tarafından imzalanan kararname, “Manas Çalışmaları” dersini ülkedeki her üniversite öğrencisi için mezun olma şartı olarak kabul etmiştir (Wachtel, 2016: 8-9). Görüldüğü gibi kökeni modernite öncesi döneme uzanan, tarihi bir simge olan Manas Destanı, bir ulus kimliği yaratmak için sadece siyasi arenada kullanılmamış, genç nesillerin eğitimi hususunda da bir araç olmuştur.

Ayrıca Manas Destanı sadece Kırgız toprakları içinde kalmamış, uluslararası anlamda Kırgız kimliğinin ayırt edici unsuru olarak yer almıştır. UNESCO’nun Dünya mirası listesinde yer alan destan, 2015 yılından itibaren, 4 Aralık günü hükümetin çıkarmış olduğu kararname ile “Manas Destanı Günü” olarak kutlanmaktadır (Kaptan, 2022). Bütün bunlara ek olarak, Türk dünyasının kültür başkenti olan Bursa’da 4. Dünya Göçebe Oyunları’nda Kırgızistan’ın da katkılarıyla düzenlenen “Manas Haftası” kapsamında etkinlikler yapılmıştır (Balcıkoca, 2022). Son olarak 2023 yılının Haziran ayında, Manas Destanı’nın ilk el yazması UNESCO tarafından insanlığın ortak mirası kabul edilmiştir (Tayfur, 2023).

Özetle, kadim bir tarihe sahip olan Kırgızistan’ın modern anlamda inşa edilebilmesi için, tarihi çok eski dönemlere dayanan Manas Destanı’nın rolü elzemdir. Bir toplumun modern

anlamda oluşması; toplum bilincinin ortaya çıkması ve toplumun kendi köklerine sahip çıkması bakımından büyük önem arz etmektedir. Ayrıca Manas Destanı ile kökene vurgu yapılması ve her fırsatta bunun kullanılması, modern anlamda ülkenin millet olma çabasını daha sağlam temellere dayandırdığı çıkarımı yapılabilir.

### Sonuç

Manas Destanı, Kırgızistan'ın ulusunun inşası bakımından bağımsızlığından günümüze kadar, bütün liderlerin döneminde önemli roller üstlenmiştir. Oluşumu oldukça eski dönemlere uzanan Manas Destanı, yalnızca Kırgız halkını bir çatı altında birleştiren bir araç olarak kalmamış, aynı zamanda toplumu uluslararası platformda temsil eden bir simge olarak varlık göstermiştir. Günümüzde Kırgızistan'ında yüzlerce yıl önce oluşturulmuş destanın temel alınarak politika oluşturulması, sadece kültürel olarak değil, ulusun oluşması aşamasında ideolojik ve politik olarak kullanılması dikkate alınması gereken unsurlar olduğu söylenebilir.

Bu bağlamda milliyetçilik yaklaşımlarına odaklanmak gerekirse, Kırgızistan örneğinde milliyetçiliğin oluşumunu sadece birkaç yüzyıl geriye gidip ele almak, Kırgızistan gibi kadim bir geçmişe sahip bir millete haksızlık etmek olur. Modern anlamda milliyetçiliğin oluşumu Kırgızistan örneğinde de geçerliliğini korumakla birlikte, etnik kökeni tamamen bir ulusun kimliğinden ayırmak eksik analiz etmek olacaktır. Kökler, ulusun inşasının daha sağlam temellere oturtulması açısından önem arz eden değerlerdir. Bu anlamda Smith'in ifade ettiği gibi modern dönem öncesine ait bağlar, semboller, anılar vs. dikkate alınmadan modern dönem milliyetçiliği anlaşılacaktır. Bu noktada modern dönem öncesi oluşmuş Manas Destanı'na bakıldığında, günümüz Kırgız halkına ve onun kimliğine ait birtakım değerler görülecektir. Bu nedenle modern öncesi dönemin göz ardı edilmesi Kırgızistan'ın modern ulus devletinin tam olarak anlaşılabilmesi anlamına gelmektedir.

### Kırgız Halkından Kırgızistan Devletine: Etno-Sembolizm Bağlamında Bir Analiz

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**Kırgız Halkından Kırgızistan Devletine: Etno-Sembolizm Bağlamında Bir Analiz**

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**Kırgız Halkından Kırgızistan Devletine: Etno-Sembolizm Bağlamında Bir Analiz**

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## Kitap İncelemesi

### Tuğrul Oğuzhan Yılmaz, Teşkilât-ı Mahsûsa'nın Doğu Afrika Faaliyetleri: Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Sudan, Habeşistan, Somali (Ötüken Neşriyat, İstanbul, 2021, 510 sayfa)

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#### Kitap İncelemesi

#### Book Review

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İncelediğimiz kitap, Türklerin Afrika kıtasının doğusundaki son dönem faaliyetlerini konu edinerek alanda pek fazla çalışılmayan bir sahadaki detayları ortaya koymaktadır. Osmanlılar Kuzey Afrika bölgesiyle birlikte Habeşistan, Somali ve Sudan'dan müteşekkil Doğu Afrika bölgesinde hâkimiyet sürdükten sonra Birinci Dünya Savaşı sürecinde adı geçen bölgelerde doğrudan asker göndermekte zorlanmış, dolaylı yoldan mücadele etmeye çalışmıştır. Nitekim Teşkilât-ı Mahsûsa ve faaliyetlerinin öne çıktığı bu bölgelerde yerel idare ve oluşumların İtilaf Devletlerine karşı harekete geçirilmesi sürecindeki detaylar kitabın içeriğini oluşturmaktadır.

XIX. yüzyılda İslâm dünyası Avrupalı sömürgecilerin hedefi hâline geldiğinde üç kıtaya hükmetmiş Osmanlı Devleti de dağılma sürecine girmiştir. İngiliz, Fransız ve İtalyanların Afrika'yı işgali kıtada milliyetçi ve pan-İslâmist karakterli çeşitli direniş hareketlerini doğurmuştur.

### Kitap İncelemesi: Teşkilât-ı Mahsûsa'nın Doğu Afrika Faaliyetleri

Aynı zamanda Trablusgarp ve Balkan Savaşları sırasında temeli atılan Teşkilât-ı Mahsûsa da Birinci Dünya Savaşı başladığında artık son günlerini yaşayan imparatorluğu ayakta tutabilmek için bir ölüm-kalım savaşına girişecektir. Müttefikleri olan Almanlarla birlikte birçok farklı cephede İtilaf Devletleri ile mücadeleye giren Osmanlı Devleti, bu mücadelenin bir başka boyutunu ise Afrika kıtasında vermiştir.

Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Harbiye Nezareti'nin resmî bir kurumu olarak Enver Paşa'nın öncülüğünde gayri nizamî harp, istihbarat ve propaganda faaliyetleri yürütmek amacıyla kurulan Teşkilât-ı Mahsûsa, birçok cephede İtilaf Devletleri'ne karşı mücadelenin başını çekiyordu. Vatanlarını ayakta tutabilmek için uzak cephelerden çöllere, dağ başlarına kadar savaşa koşan İttihatçıların Teşkilât-ı Mahsûsa üzerinden örtülü olarak faaliyet gösterdiği bölgelerden biri de Doğu Afrika'ydı. Sudan, Habeşistan ve Somali'den müteşekkil bu çalışma alanı üzerinde daha çok durulan Kuzey Afrika ile kıyaslandığında yapılmış çalışmaların sınırlı olması bu anlamda çalışmanın kıymetini önemli hale getirmektedir.

Müttefik olunan Almanların Doğu Afrika'daki mücadelelerine paralel olarak kendisine daha yakın sayılabilecek Sudan, Habeşistan ve Somali'de faaliyetleri yürüten Teşkilât-ı Mahsûsa, savaş boyunca Sudan, Habeşistan ve Somali'deki yerel unsurlarla kurduğu ilişkiler sayesinde Osmanlı Devleti'ne müzahir kuvvetleri düşmana karşı Afrika Grupları Komutanlığı ile Habeşistan Başşehbenderliği üzerinden sevk ve idare etmeye çalışmıştır. Buna göre millî ve dinî motivasyonlar doğrultusunda Sudan'da Darfur Sultanı Ali Dinar, Habeşistan'da İmparator V. Lic Iyasu ve Somali'de Derviş Devleti'nin lideri Molla Seyyid Muhammed Abdullah Hassan ile sağlanan temaslar çerçevesinde bu isimlerin tamamı İtilaf Devletleri'ne karşı direnişlerinde desteklenmiş ve böylece Osmanlı Devleti doğrudan cephede yer alamasa da dolaylı yoldan bölgedeki yapıları harekete geçirmek üzere ciddi mesafeler katetmiştir.

İçerik açısından değerlendirdiğimizde literatürdeki büyük bir eksikliği doldurabilmek amacıyla hem Afrika hem de Teşkilât-ı Mahsûsa gibi iki önemli konuyu inceleyen yazar, kaleme aldığı bölümlerde yakın tarihe ışık tutacak çok çeşitli bilgiler vermiştir. Birinci bölümde konunun arka planının daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi adına sömürgecilerin işgal ettiği Doğu Afrika'nın siyasi, sosyal ve ekonomik durumuyla ilgili bilgiler okuyucuya sunulmuştur. İkinci bölümde Teşkilat-ı Mahsûsâ'nın Doğu Afrika'daki stratejisi irdelenmiştir. Üçüncü bölümde ise toplumsal dinamiklerin harekete geçirilebilmesi ve yerel unsurların stratejik hedeflere yönlendirilmesi için uygulamaya konulan motivasyon tartışmaya açılmaktadır. Son olarak dördüncü ve beşinci bölümlerde de

Teşkilât-ı Mahsûsa'nın Afrika Grupları Komutanlığı ve Habeşistan Başşehbenderliği üzerinden yürüttüğü siyasi ve askerî faaliyetler hakkında geniş bilgiler verilmektedir.

Giriş, sonuç, kaynakça ve fotoğraflar ile haritalar gibi ekler hariç toplamda beş ana bölümden meydana gelen bu çalışma 510 sayfalık bir eserdir. Tuğrul Oğuzhan Yılmaz'ın yüksek lisans tezinin genişletilmiş ve gözden geçirilmiş hâli olan “Teşkilât-ı Mahsûsa'nın Doğu Afrika Faaliyetleri: Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Sudan, Habeşitan, Somali” başlıklı bu kitapta Osmanlı Devleti'nin Doğu Afrika'daki nüfuz mücadelesine dâhil olduğu, tarihin tozlu sayfalarında kalmış bir döneme odaklanılmaktadır. Başta Türkiye olmak üzere İngiltere, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Almanya, İtalya, Katar, Avusturya, Fransa, İsveç gibi ülkelerden çeşitli arşivlerin kullanıldığı bu çalışma; kaynakça açısından son derece zengin olmasının yanı sıra konuyla ilgili kitaplar, makaleler, tezler, internet kaynakları ve sözlü tarih çalışmalarıyla da desteklenmiştir.

Sonuç olarak Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sonuna kadar Doğu Afrika'daki etkisini Teşkilât-ı Mahsûsa üzerinden sağlayan Osmanlı Devleti, bölge liderleriyle mevcut ilişkilerini de devletin son dönemlerine kadar devam ettirmeyi başarmıştır. İttihatçılardan çıkan bu idealist kuşak dört yıl süren savaş boyunca Osmanlı Devleti'nin yıkılışına tanıklık etmek zorunda kalsa da Türk devletinin savaş sırasında eldeki imkânlar çerçevesinde Sudan, Habeşistan ve Somali Müslümanlarına sağladığı destek bölge halkının hafızasında derin izler bırakmıştır. Buradaki mücadeleye sonuç itibarıyla bakıldığında her ne kadar İtilaf Devletlerinin bölgeye hâkim olmasına engel olunamamışsa da gerek bölgenin mücadele hafızası gerekse de Osmanlı-Doğu Afrika ilişkilerinin önemi ve bu ortak hafızanın geleceğe aktarımı anlamında oldukça değerli bir süreç yaşanmıştır. Bu anlamda söz konusu kitapta ilgili coğrafyada kurulacak devletlerin temelini atılmasını sağlayan Teşkilât-ı Mahsûsa mensuplarının bilinmeyen hikâyeleri özenli bir şekilde bölgeye ve dönem tarihine ilgi duyanlara sunulmuştur.

