

Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi

ATATÜRK STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR
VE LİSANSÜSTÜ EĞİTİM ENSTİTÜSÜ

ATATÜRK STRATEGIC STUDIES
AND GRADUATE INSTITUTE

Savaş ve Uluslararası Sistem Özel Sayısı
War and International System Special Issue
Aralık / December 2024

BASKI / PRINTED BY

MSÜ Basım ve Yayınevi Müdürlüğü / TNDU Printing and Publishing Office

YAZIŞMA VE HABERLEŞME ADRESİ / CORRESPONDENCE AND COMMUNICATION

Millî Savunma Üniversitesi
Atatürk Stratejik Araştırmalar
ve Lisansüstü Eğitim Enstitüsü
Yenilevent / İSTANBUL
TÜRKİYE

Web : gsd.msu.edu.tr/
dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/guvenlikstrj
E-posta: makale@msu.edu.tr

Savaş ve Uluslararası Sistem Özel Sayısı • ISSN 1305-4740 • E-ISSN 2822-6984
Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi / International Peer-Reviewed Journal

Atatürk Stratejik Araştırmalar
ve Lisansüstü Eğitim Enstitüsü
adına Sahibi ve Sorumlusu

Owner on behalf of
Atatürk Strategic Studies
and Graduate Institute

Prof. Dr. Faruk UÇAR (MSÜ, ATASAREN, İstanbul, Türkiye)

Editör / Editor

Prof. Dr. Gültekin YILDIZ (MSÜ, ATASAREN, İstanbul, Türkiye)

Özel Sayı Editörü / Special Issue Editor

Doç. Dr. Öner AKGÜL (MSÜ, ATASAREN, İstanbul, Türkiye)

Editör Yardımcıları / Assistant Editors

Doç. Dr. Barış ATEŞ (MSÜ, ATASAREN, İstanbul, Türkiye)

Öğr. Gör. Esra Ecem ŞAHİN (MSÜ, ATASAREN, İstanbul, Türkiye)

Arş. Gör. Alperen Kürşad ZENGİN (MSÜ, ATASAREN, İstanbul, Türkiye)

Arş. Gör. Dağhan YET (MSÜ, ATASAREN, İstanbul, Türkiye)

İngilizce Dil Editörü / English Language Editor

Öğr. Gör. Dilek KARABACAK (MSÜ, Fatih HATEN, İstanbul, Türkiye)

İstatistik Editörü/Statistics Editor

Arş. Gör. Sibel DİNÇ (MSÜ, ATASAREN, İstanbul, Türkiye)

Yayın Kurulu / Editorial Board

Prof. Dr. Zeynep SELÇUK (MSÜ, ATASAREN, İstanbul, Türkiye)

Prof. Dr. Adam Leong Kok Way LEONG (National Defence University, Malaysia)

Doç. Dr. Barış ATEŞ (MSÜ, ATASAREN, İstanbul, Türkiye)

Doç. Dr. Güngör ŞAHİN (MSÜ, ATASAREN, İstanbul, Türkiye)

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ahmet BÜYÜKAKSOY (MSÜ, ATASAREN, İstanbul, Türkiye)

TARANDIĞIMIZ VERİTABANLARI / DATABASES INDEXING OUR JOURNAL

EBSCO Publishing - Academic Complete Search

DOAJ

Central and Eastern European Online Library (CEEOL)

ULAKBİM-CABİM TR Dizin

Atatürk Stratejik Araştırmalar ve Lisansüstü Eğitim Enstitüsü yayını olan Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi, yılda üç kez Nisan, Ağustos ve Aralık aylarında yayımlanan uluslararası hakemli bir dergidir. Makalelerdeki düşünce, görüş, varsayım, sav veya tezler eser sahiplerine aittir; Millî Savunma Üniversitesi ve Atatürk Stratejik Araştırmalar ve Lisansüstü Eğitim Enstitüsü sorumlu tutulamaz.

Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi is an international peer-reviewed journal and published tri-annually in April, August, and December. The opinions, thoughts, postulations, or proposals within the articles are but reflections of the authors and do not, in any way, represent those of Turkish National Defence University or of Atatürk Strategic Studies and Graduate Institute.

DANIŐMA KURULU / ADVISORY BOARD

Prof. Dr. Faruk YALVAÇ (Atılım Üniversitesi, Türkiye)
Prof. Dr. Mustafa KİBAROĐLU (MEF Üniversitesi, Türkiye)
Prof. Dr. Lindy HEINECKEN (Stellenbosch University, South Africa)
Prof. Dr. Carlo MASALA (University of the Bundeswehr Munich, Germany)
Prof. Dr. Young Ho KİM (National Defence University, South Korea)
Prof. Dr. Yunus YOLDAŐ (Milli Savunma Üniversitesi, Türkiye)
Prof. Dr. Burak Samih GÜLBOY (İstanbul Üniversitesi, Türkiye)
Assoc. Prof. Stephen GRENIER (John Hopkins University, USA)
Assoc. Prof. Adem BAŐPINAR (Kırlareli Üniversitesi, Türkiye)
Assoc. Prof. Hakkı Hakan ERKİNER (Marmara Üniversitesi, Türkiye)
Asst. Prof. Dorota DOMALEWSKA (War Studies University, Poland)

İÇİNDEKİLER / TABLE OF CONTENTS

Editorial Introduction: War and International System Envisioning Systemic Transition..... 1 Öner AKGÜL	1
Envisioning Systemic Transition Period Wars through the Thirty Years' War and the First and Second World Wars 5 Bilgehan EMEKLİER - Nihal EMEKLİER	5
“Why Nations Fight?”: An Analysis of the Causes of the Russian Federation-Ukraine War from Russian Perspective within the Framework of Richard Ned Lebow’s Approach 23 Murat JANE - Hazar JANE	23
The Competition of Dominant Powers in the International System and the US-China Encounter in the Horn of Africa (2012-2022) 41 Kaan DEVECİOĞLU	41
Adapting Military Doctrines to Shifting Power Dynamics in the International System: Looking Beyond Unipolarity through the Analyses of Charles Kupchan 65 Erhan BÜYÜKAKINCI	65
Germany’s Strategic Contraction Following American Hegemony in the Context of Offensive Realism Theory 91 Tolga ÖZTÜRK	91
The Threat of Tomorrow: Impacts of Artificial Intelligence - Enhanced Cyber-attacks on International Relations 109 Esra Merve ÇALIŞKAN	109
Is a Theory of Cyberspace Dominance Possible? An Assessment from the Perspective of China’s Cyber Sovereignty Approach 131 Aybala LALE KAHRAMAN	131
Technology, Organization, and the Militarization of Intelligence: The Turkish Experience 151 Tolga ÖKTEN	151
Submission Guidelines..... 171	171

Editorial Introduction: War and International System

Öner AKGÜL*

* Assoc.Prof. Öner Akgül (Ph.D)
Turkish National Defence
University, Atatürk Strategic
Studies and Graduate Institute,
Department of War Studies
İstanbul, Türkiye
e-mail: oner.akgul@msu.edu.tr
ORCID: 0000-0002-2245-5124

Throughout history, humanity has strived to understand the underlying reasons for the occurrence of war. The initial focus of this inquiry was predominantly on systemic war. Despite enduring the challenges presented by two world wars, we find ourselves once again confronted with similar concerns after many years. Observers argue that various factors may serve as indicators of the likelihood of conflict within the international system. A consensus exists that we are witnessing a shift in power dynamics and a transformation in the polarization of the system. As such, a range of elements must be examined and assessed in detail.

At the outset of this special issue, we aim to provide a preliminary theoretical review in order to establish a framework. What factors contribute to a system's vulnerability to war? What are the origins of these power shifts? What elements foster international rivalries among nations? While these inquiries extend beyond the scope of this special issue, empirical evidence from the existing literature that enhances our understanding of the international system's propensity for conflict may aid in developing a framework to explain the current state of international relations and its association with wartime behavior.

After the end of the Cold War, scholars argued that unipolarity emerged, and humanity upgraded its level by committing to the value of democracy. Because the polar defending democratic values, the West, was the winner of the Cold War, unipolarity meant that the new world order would be liberal under the auspices of the United States, representing the "free world." According to the democratic peace theory, countries with liberal values did not fight each other.¹ Scholars contended that the "end of history"² is anticipated due to the unprecedented potential for governments to shift to democracy, which will soon usher in a period of "pax" under US hegemony. After a short period of World History, once again, the power shifts started as a result of the nature of "power." Structural conditions create a

1 Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism* (Norton, 1997); Michael W. Doyle, *Liberal Peace: Selected Essays* (Routledge, 2011); Z. Mao ve B. Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986", *American Political Science Review* 87 (1993): 624-38, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2938740>; Bruce Russett, "The Democratic Peace", içinde *Conflicts and New Departures in World Society* (Routledge, 1994).

2 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Hamish Hamilton, 1992).

shift in power distribution by confirming the authors of systemic change.³ Power is inherently dynamic rather than static, which means there will always be an increasing number of actors seeking to reshape the dynamics of international order to serve their own interests. Disparities in economic development among various actors, heightened investments in both defensive and offensive weaponry, and the formation of new alliances are all natural consequences of a polarized system, driven by divergent perspectives. This results in discourses, actions, and preparations that are prone to conflict. At this juncture, we find ourselves examining the interplay between satisfied and dissatisfied parties, revisionist versus status quo defenders, and the contrast between democracies and autocracies, ultimately leading to the potential for conflict among these opposing entities.

In light of the importance of discussing these scholarly and intellectual topics, we have published a special issue titled “War and the International System.” With the valuable contributions from various authors across multiple universities in Türkiye, we have completed this issue and are pleased to present it to our readers. Therefore, I would like to overview and present each article featured in our special issue briefly.

From the positivist viewpoint, history serves as a laboratory for our scientific inquiry. We comprehend current power dynamics through an examination of historical systemic transformations. Bilgehan Emeklier and Nihal Emeklier explore historical systemic transition conflicts in “*Envisioning Systemic Transition Period Wars through the Thirty Years’ War and the First and Second World Wars*” They recognize the transformative impacts of such wars on global power dynamics and structural frameworks. The aforementioned shifts in power have instigated significant developments that precipitated the outbreak of war. The Russo-Ukrainian War stands as a paramount instance of interstate conflict in contemporary history. Murat Jane and Hazar Vural Jane discuss the causes of the Russian Federation-Ukraine War through the lens of Richard Ned Lebow’s methodology in their paper, “*Why Nations Fight?*” They offer an in-depth analysis of the tensions among Russia, Ukraine, and the West via the lens of Lebow’s position. Moreover, power transitions in international relations literature primarily emphasize international rivalry, encompassing great power competition, dissatisfaction or any form of status disparity. In this sense, Organski is considered one of the most quoted authors who elucidates the dissatisfaction that led to a transformation in the worldwide power hierarchy. This alteration in power hierarchy may manifest its impacts in specific regions such as the Balkans, Asia, or Africa. Kaan Devocioğlu investigates the US-China rivalry in the Horn of Africa from 2012 to 2022 in “*The Competition of Dominant Powers in the International System and the US-China Encounter in the Horn of Africa.*” He utilizes Organski’s Power Transition Theory to examine how geopolitical and geoeconomic dynamics influence competition in this region. There is a prevailing consensus regarding the transition to multipolarity among both satisfied and dissatisfied nations within the international system. It is evident in the White Papers (National Security, Defense, Military Doctrines) of both major and middle powers. Consequently, governments are recalibrating their national security strategy to align with the current distribution of power. Erhan Büyükkakıncı analyzes the adaptation of military strategy in response to systemic changes in “*Adapting Military Doctrines to Shifting Power Dynamics in the International System: Looking Beyond Unipolarity through the Analyses of Charles Kupchan*”. He emphasizes the challenges and opportunities governments face in defining their strategic priorities within the

3 George Modelski ve William R. Thompson, “The Long Cycle of World Leadership”, içinde *Seapower in Global Politics, 1494–1993* (Springer, 1988), 97-132; A. F. K. Organski ve Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (University of Chicago Press, 1981); Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1981). {\Ni} {The War Ledger} (University of Chicago Press, 1981

changing multipolar context. Additionally, power vacuums represent a significant issue of our era as the Great Powers undergo transformation. Tolga Öztürk examines Germany's strategic modifications after the Cold War in "*Germany's Strategic Contraction Following American Hegemony in the Context of Offensive Realist Theory.*" He explores Germany's role in the international system in light of shifting power dynamics and increasing multipolarity.

In addition to understanding and explaining systemic development, specific challenges are evidently significant for emerging countries as well as middle and smaller ones. The actions of certain actors within the international system are crucial for comprehending warfare and the dynamics of the international system. In this context, Esra Merve Çalışkan examines the ramifications of AI-enhanced cyber-attacks on global security in "*The Threat of Tomorrow: Impacts of Artificial Intelligence-Enhanced Cyber-attacks on International Relations.*" She emphasized the necessity for legislative frameworks and international cooperation to mitigate the risks associated with AI-driven cyber threats. Another study question pertains to the efficacy of China's cyber power inside the international system, as discussed in the article "*Is a Theory of Cyberspace Dominance Feasible?*" Aybala Lale Kahraman analyzes China's cybersecurity policies and stance on cyber sovereignty. She examines the theoretical aspects of cyberspace as a novel realm of authority and investigates how cyber sovereignty influences global power dynamics and cybersecurity approaches. The final article in our special issue is about intelligence, which holds greater significance in contemporary warfare. Intelligence is increasingly becoming a crucial factor for success in the current battlefield. Tolga Ökten analyzes the militarization of intelligence operations in "*Technology, Organization, and the Militarization of Intelligence: The Turkish Experience.*" He emphasizes how technology innovations and organizational transformations have positioned MİT at the front of unconventional conflicts, especially in counterterrorism.

All papers featured in this issue reflect the views and opinions of their respective authors and are not binding for the Turkish National Defence University. I want to extend my heartfelt gratitude to the contributors and peer reviewers for this special issue. Their rigorous peer reviews enhanced our articles, while our contributors exhibited great dedication. I also wish to acknowledge the efforts of the Turkish National Defence University members: Prof. Gültekin Yıldız (Ph.D) who is the chief editor of our journal, Assoc. Prof. Barış Ateş (Ph.D.) oversaw the evaluation processes; Lecturer Esra Ecem Şahin, who coordinated the entire process; Translator and Lecturer Dilek Karabacak, who managed proofreading and grammar checks; and Graphic Designer Serap Derman, responsible for the layout and page formatting.

We hope this issue contributes meaningfully to the academic discourse surrounding war and the international system.

Envisioning Systemic Transition Period Wars through the Thirty Years' War and the First and Second World Wars

Otuz Yıl Savaşları ve Birinci ve İkinci Dünya Savaşları Üzerinden Sistemik Geçiş Dönemi Savaşlarını Tasavvur Etmek

Bilgehan
EMEKLİER*

Nihal
EMEKLİER**

* Asst. Prof., Manisa Celal Bayar
University, Salihi Vocational
School (SVS), Management and
Organization Department, Manisa,
Türkiye e-mail:
bilgehanemeklier@yahoo.com
ORCID: 0000-0003-3402-1013

** Ass. Prof., Turkish National
Police Academy, İzmir Rüşti Ünsal
Police Vocational School, İzmir,
Türkiye,
e-mail: nihalgul@yahoo.fr
ORCID: 0000-0002-6480-2059

Geliş Tarihi / Submitted:
30.06.2024

Kabul Tarihi / Accepted:
29.11.2024

Abstract

This article focuses on “systemic transition period wars” emerging during specific historical periods and bringing about transformative changes in the international power configuration, leading to a new systemic structure. It aims to elucidate the distinct characteristics and outcomes of systemic transition period wars by exploring two historical examples –the Thirty Years' War and the First and Second World Wars. The article's focus is to reveal under which circumstances these systemic transition period wars occur and how these systemic wars not only alter the distribution of power among international actors but also fundamentally reshape the global systemic structure.

Keywords: Systemic Wars, Systemic Transition, Great Powers, Thirty Years' War, First and Second World War

Öz

Bu makale, belirli tarihsel dönemlerde ortaya çıkan ve uluslararası güç konfigürasyonunda dönüştürücü değişimlere yol açarak yeni bir sistemik yapının ortaya çıkmasına yol açan “sistemik geçiş dönemi savaşları”na odaklanmaktadır. Makale, Otuz Yıl Savaşları ve Birinci ve İkinci Dünya Savaşları olmak üzere iki tarihsel örneği inceleyerek sistemik geçiş dönemi savaşlarının farklı özelliklerini ve sonuçlarını aydınlatmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu makalenin odak noktası, bu sistemik geçiş dönemi savaşlarının hangi koşullar altında ortaya çıktığını ve bu sistemik savaşların sadece uluslararası aktörler arasındaki güç dağılımını değiştirmekle kalmayıp aynı zamanda küresel sistemik yapıyı temelden nasıl yeniden şekillendirdiğini ortaya koymaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sistemik Savaşlar, Sistemik Geçiş, Büyük Güçler, Otuz Yıl Savaşları, Birinci ve İkinci Dünya Savaşları

Introduction

In the War Studies literature, studies examining war at the systemic level have a significant place. The systemic level of war addresses a systemic situation in which a large scale of major powers conflicts with the inter-constructing structural dynamics of the system. The pioneer thinkers analyzing the phenomenon of war at the system level discuss a macro-scale war with different concepts by focusing on the effects of global structures and dynamics of the world capitalist and international political systems.¹ Regarding this conceptual variety, these wars are called “hegemonic wars” by Robert Gilpin and Immanuel Wallerstein, “global wars” by the leadership long cycle program of George Modelski and William R. Thompson, “great wars” by A. F. Kenneth Organski and Jacek Kugler, “general wars” by Arnold Toynbee and Jack Levy, “major wars” by power cycle theory of Charles F. Doran, and “systemic wars” by Manus I. Midlarsky.² Although they have been defined in different terminological categories and their numbers vary from one thinker to another, there exists a consensus on some examples of systemic level wars in the modern period (between 17th and 20th centuries): The Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), the Wars of Louis XIV (1688-1713), the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815), the World War I (1914-1918) and the World War II (1939-1945).³

As Midlarsky defines, “systemic war is a war entailing the breakdown of the international system as it existed prior to the outbreak of war”.⁴ In other words, the breakdown of the international system leads to the onset of war, which, in turn, redesigns the system's structure.⁵ These wars are characterized by their extensive geopolitical reach, long duration, and involvement of numerous states, often including both great powers and smaller states aligned through complex alliances.⁶ Systemic wars are triggered by shifts in power dynamics and systemic instability, causing actors to recalibrate their strategies to maintain the status quo or pursue revisionist goals. The multiplicative effect of interdependence among participants escalates conflicts, leading to widespread polarization and the potential for miscalculation.⁷ Ultimately, systemic wars result in significant transformations in the international system,

1 Terry Boswell and Mike Sweat, “Hegemony, Long Waves, and Major Wars: A Time Series Analysis of Systemic Dynamics, 1496-1967”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 35:2, 1991, p. 124.

2 Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. A. F. K. Organski, Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980. William R. Thompson, *On Global War*, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1988. George Modelski and William R. Thompson, “Long Cycles and Global War”, Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), *Handbook of War Studies*, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, pp. 23-54. Charles F. Doran, “Power Cycle Theory of Systems Structure and Stability: Commonalities and Complementarities”, Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), *Handbook of War Studies II*, Michigan University Press, Ann Arbor, 1996, pp. 83-110. Manus I. Midlarsky, *The Onset of World War.*: Routledge, New York, 1988. For a comparative analysis, see Franz Kohout, “Cyclical, Hegemonic, and Pluralistic Theories of International Relations: Some Comparative Reflections on War Causation”, *International Political Science Review*, 24:1, 2003, pp. 51-66.

3 For an article discussing different conceptualizations and classifications of historical examples of general wars in detail, see Matthew Melko, “The Importance of General Wars in World History”, *Peace Research*, 33:1, 2001, pp. 83-100.

4 *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

5 Manus I. Midlarsky, “A Hierarchical Equilibrium Theory of Systemic War”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 30, 1986, p. 77.

6 Midlarsky, *The Onset of World War*, pp. 3-4.

7 Midlarsky, “A Hierarchical Equilibrium Theory”, p. 79. In addition, because of the multiplicative effect of interdependences among actors and allies on war contagion, this kind of war can transform into “umbrella wars”, which also become a scene for multiple dyadic conflicts where several minor states join the ongoing war in order to have their private wars and strategic calculations by falling under coalitional equations; Jack S. Levy, “The Contagion of Great Power War Behavior, 1495-1975”, *American Journal of Political Science*, 26:3, 1982, p. 566. Brandon Valeriano, John A. Vasquez, “Identifying and Classifying Complex Interstate Wars”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 54, 2010, p. 566.

including changes in power configurations, territorial boundaries, and international norms, leading to either a new systemic structure or the reinforcement of the existing one.

In this framework, systemic wars can be distinguished and categorized based on their impact on the system's structure, balance of power, and order. This categorization yields two primary types: systemic transition period wars and systemic crisis period wars. Systemic transition period wars lead to the creation of a new international structure, balance of power, and order, while systemic crisis period wars focus on restoring and preserving the existing framework.⁸ This article analyzes systemic transition period wars, focusing on their systemic causality and outcomes and examining the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) and the World Wars (1914-1918/1939-1945) as pivotal examples from the modern era. Thus, the article aims to illustrate the critical elements of systemic transition period wars, highlighting their transformative roles and patterns. The analysis will begin with a general framework for systemic transition period wars. The Thirty Years' War and the First and Second World Wars will then be examined as historical case studies, or "laboratories", of systemic transition.

1. An introduction to the concept of systemic transition period wars

The classification of wars facilitates the introduction of different causal processes and complicated causal structures through empirical distinctive variables. It also provides a methodological guide to analyze, describe, explain, and identify key dimensions of wars. Thus, typological categorization is used to improve both quantitative and theoretical analyses by facilitating the identification of different empirical patterns and similar symptoms.⁹ At this point, the modest initiative in this article to classify systemic war by taking into consideration its consequences and historical transitive effects as a distinctive indicator seeks at first to discuss a mutually constructive linkage between the breakdown of the system and the onset of systemic war, and considerably to suggest a subcategorization based on the comparative appearance of the structure of the system in the post-war period. The article concentrates on the outcomes or the results that explain that systemic wars affect structural change or the structural restoration of the system: systemic crisis period wars and systemic transition period wars. In a similar framework, Matthew Melko pointed out remarkably a distinction regarding the consequences of war by categorizing general wars into two dimensions and applying them to historical war sets: turning points and status quo. Melko argues that turning points refer to a reconstitution of the state system under a new configuration of powers, a significant expansion of the system, or the construction of a new and different international system like a civilizational empire, while the status quo implies maintenance and continuation of the system, and its relationships even if a shift in power.¹⁰

Within this theoretical framework, the systemic transition period means a radical change-transformation process in the structure of the international system. The process in question includes a total and macro scale change-transformation, unlike situational changes in specific and limited areas in the systemic structure; it is a period in which the dynamics of change that appear in political, military/strategic, economic, industrial/technological, and socio-cultural fields are accelerated, concentrated, and spread all over the world. In the axis of a paradigm shift based on such a rapid change momentum, new searches increase because the established and traditional regulatory mechanisms and behavioral patterns cannot respond to this intense change, and a significant gap emerges in the institutional and normative fields.

⁸ The War of the Spanish Succession and the Napoleonic Wars are historical examples of systemic crisis period wars that will be covered in another article.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 562-563.

¹⁰ Melko, "The Importance of General Wars", p. 96.

While the throes of change bring insecurity, uncertainty, unpredictability, and anxiety for all actor levels in its wake, these also cause misperception, miscalculation, fear-driven hard politics, and social mass movements. The resulting shocking and irregular situation creates the quest for new power distribution and hegemonic and expansionist aspirations; a substantial shift occurs in center-periphery relations; the power politics are exacerbated; the identity boundaries thicken; and the state of exception and exclusion increases. In short, as Wallerstein pointed out, it is the end of the world as we know it, and the spirit of time transforms.¹¹ In summary, the source of all these changes and transformations in the interactions between actors is a deep, dramatic, and traumatic turbulence in the structure of the international system, and this is a historical transition period triggered by political, economic, and technological changes.

The transition periods are the product of a difficult, painful, critical, and lengthy process; these are the “quarter-century cycles” that last about 30 years in which the existing systemic structure loses its function, and a new systemic structure is constructed. In these repetitive cycles, the interstate power configuration, power hierarchy, balance of power, and international order are redesigned; the old gives its place to a new systemic structure; and the states' internal social and administrative structures are reconstructed. Briefly, the systemic transition periods are a cyclical, multi-dimensional, complex, and interpenetrating process with symptoms making themselves felt in every social field, in which the interstate and intra-state systems are determined. Based on William R. Thompson's argument that a global war is a dependent variable most attractive for systemic transition rather than being considered as a predictor of systemic transition, it is possible to summarize systemic transition periods' symptoms:

- i- relative decline of the global system leader,
- ii- rising opposition to the status quo,
- iii- coalition building,
- iv- interaction of global and regional concentration,
- v- first of two innovation spurts or peaks,
- vi- competitive frictions between technological pioneers and latecomers,
- vii- more authoritarian catch-up strategies,
- viii- multiple serial clashes,
- ix- bipolarization,
- x- central power transitions,
- xi- intensive global warfare.¹²

11 Immanuel Wallerstein, *The End of the World as we Know It: Social Sciences for the Twenty First Century*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999; Daniel Nexon, “Zeitgeist? The New Idealism in the Study of International Change”, *Review of International Political Economy*, 12:4, 2005, p. 702.

12 William R. Thompson, “Structural Preludes to Systemic Transition since 1494”, William R. Thompson (ed.), *Systemic Transitions: Past, Present, and Future*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009, pp. 68-69. They argue that the systemic war is also an outcome of relative decline and deconcentration in the global political economy, whose timing involves a considerable change of economic innovation and technological capabilities, which affects globally leading sector position, relative military position, and long wave dynamics. This transformative indicator considerably corresponds to historical patterns of the systemic transition wars; Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, “Technological Innovation, Capability Positional Shifts, and Systemic War”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 35:3, 1991, pp. 424-425.

All in all, all actors face symptomatically these outcomes:

- i- uncertainty, unpredictability, and disorder,
- ii- fear, anxiety, misunderstandings, and security dilemmas caused by the anxiety of change-transformation,
- iii- increasing demands and expectations, perceptual shocks, slippery ground of competition and alliances, bandwagoning and its impacts,
- iv- challenge of revisionist policies to status quo policies,
- v- escalation of structural violence and global warfare.

Systemic transition period war, which appears as the resultant of all these symptoms, is an alliance war between the major revisionist powers dissatisfied with the existing power hierarchy in the international system and the great powers trying to protect the systemic structure. Accordingly, while the requests seeking to redesign the systemic power distribution, the aggressive attitudes and behaviors, the coercion and power politics of the revisionist big states lead the international system to imbalance and disorder, the reactive and reflexive actions of the status quoist great powers deepen systemic turbulence and breakage. The ongoing polarization, characterized by escalating conflictual policies and aggressive military forces, makes global war seem inevitable. This situation arises from the alliance blocs of revisionist and status quo powers, which trap a system already plagued by uncertainty and unpredictability in a tangled and vicious circle of insecurity.¹³ The systemic transition period of war, whether it results in the victory of the revisionist or status quo alliance, disrupts the existing distribution of power and leads to a new structure of the international system.


Three main factors play a significant role in the systemic transition period war's destructive impact on systemic structure: First, this kind of war occurs between two multi-actor alliance blocs, both of which consist of many great powers. In this perspective, the systemic transition period wars are literally "global wars between the alliances of great powers". Second, the sum of the power capacities of the actors in the revisionist and status quo blocs is relatively balanced or close to each other. Third, actors see war as the only political instrument for the interstate system and do not avoid mobilizing nearly all their military capacity and potential for becoming the absolute winner of the war based on the zero-sum game logic. This modifying-transforming role attributed to war and the qualitative and quantitative destructive outcomes indicates the end of the existing international structure. Moreover, every end brings an opportunity to start over; the peace treaties are signed at the end of the war, and the institutional and normative regulations mark a new period. As Ikenberry points out, the leading states in the post-war period focused on order-building strategies, maintaining their superiority and facilitating their political control, while on the other hand, they made institutional arrangements that would stabilize the structure of the international system in the long term.¹⁴ In this respect, the newly emerging order should be evaluated not only in terms of the distribution of power but also in terms of the formation of institutional structures. As Barkawi highlights, these wars are creative and generative sets of social processes and interactions that enable particular social and political worlds while destroying others, and their impact on industrialization, capitalism, state capacity, science, and technology shapes the imperial and neo-imperial relations of organized violence between

13 Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability", *International Security*, 11: 2, 1986, pp. 154.

14 G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 4-5.

the powerful and the weak in world politics, which, in turn, facilitate specific political, social, and economic arrangements.¹⁵ Consequently, as Table I summarizes the trajectory of war,¹⁶ the international structure, balance, order, and stability are newly reconstructed at the end of this structural change-driven systemic war.

Table I: The Cycle of the Systemic Transition Period War within the Framework of Actor, Process, and Structure



2. The Thirty Years' War

The Thirty Years' War, which is considered a starting point for the classical narrative of modern international relations and the European states-system, represents a cumulative output of several transformation signs by the interpenetrated coexistence of old and new aspects in terms of actors, governmentality characteristics, modes of production, technological capability, its reasons, etc. Furthermore, these wars ensure and symbolize the crystallization of the ongoing systemic transition toward the modern international system. Within the frame of systemic transition symptoms, the main tendencies of the period can be resumed as follows:

i- Structural dynamics: systemic effects of discoveries, global economic mobility and expansion, spread of trade and urbanization, dissolution of the feudal system and structural change to feudalism to commercial capitalism, technological development in mode of production, revolution in military affairs.

ii- Sociopolitical dynamics: transformation of norms, breakage of medieval church doctrine and acceleration of state-building process by Reformation, acceleration of political diversity and existence of revisionist/challenger blocs in terms of social structure and political system, a series of clashes between emerging and established powers, rise of polarization dynamics in dynastic and religious conflicts.

iii- Actorial dynamics: relative decline of the global system leader (the Holy Roman Empire and Spain), great power rivalry dominated by both regional and global aspirations (France and Spain), simultaneous trends of integration and fragmentation across various levels of actors.

¹⁵ Tarak Barkawi, "States, Armies, and Wars in Global Context", Julian Go, George Lawson (ed.), *Global Historical Sociology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 72.

¹⁶ Table I was designed by the authors of this article.

In other terms, this period consolidating the Thirty Years' War is a total state of systemic transition far beyond the change in the relative power configuration among actors. Consequently, these long-standing system-level structural contradictions or these great upheaval signs brought together apparent causations of the Thirty Years' War.¹⁷

As a series of wars, the Thirty Years' War had a fragmented and complex structure regarding its causes and actor variety at the center of systemic turbulence and structural change. While the outbreak of war was based on a civil war motivated religiously between the Holy Roman Empire and its components, the trajectory of war by multiple issues, including sectarian divisions and struggles, dynasty problems, independence and hegemony quests, tended to an international war between France, Spain, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden. Even if the central zone of war was central Europe, especially German lands, the war expanded to Northern and Western Europe, and it also included the trans-oceanic struggle regarding sea dominance in the context of great powers rivalry. First, this article focuses on the causes at the actor level of this major war, which was the first global war in the modern international system, to reveal the relationship between actors' behaviors and symptomatic facts of the systemic transition period because actor-level causation lies on the energy accumulation of structural change' fault lines. The Holy Roman Empire, a major side of the war representing the characteristics of the older order and medieval era, was in a relative power decline and failed to adapt its domestic and foreign policies to the change dynamics. As a result of increasing political and social restrictions on protestant princes despite the Augsburg Peace (1555), which proclaimed that a prince could determine the religion of his subjects, the tension among protestant and catholic princes gave rise to the outbreak of civil war in the Empire with the maturation of coalition-building among Protestant Union and Catholic League.¹⁸

This internal rising opposition to the status quo also possessed a counterpart in the European power rivalry, when the complex dynastic relations and increasing trade and hegemony struggle in the expanding world economy were considered. At this point, Myron P. Gutmann highlights that while the real starting point was the imperial civil war, the continuation of the war was based on the opportunistic schemes of several European actors seeking regional dominance or global system leadership.¹⁹ As such, the war originated through a confessional struggle between universal faith reflecting medieval authority and plurality adapting to a new transition period and then transformed into a multiple-case struggle dominated by political interests transcending religious fragmentation and tending to cross-confessional alliances such as that between Catholic France and Lutheran Sweden.²⁰ Therefore, the Thirty Years' War is a complex umbrella war containing all interconnected questions of social, political, and economic changes in a transition period corresponding to the European modernization process.²¹

17 Charles F. Doran, "Economics, Philosophy of History, and the 'Single Dynamic' of Power Cycle Theory: Expectations, Competition, and Statecraft", *International Political Science Review*, 24:1, 2003, p. 32.

18 This militarized religious polarization was clarified in 1608 by forming the Protestant Union of German princes and cities and countered by the Catholic League a year later. As Peter H. Wilson pointed out, both parties "stood armed and ready for the decisive battle". The religious polarization and concerns correspond to a mobilizing role among all other reasons underlying structural exigencies; see Peter H. Wilson, "Dynasty, Constitution, and Confession: The Role of Religion in the Thirty Years War", *The International History Review*, 30:3, 2008, pp. 478-479.

19 Myron P. Gutmann, "The Origins of the Thirty Years' War", *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18:4, 1988, pp. 749-750.

20 Peter H. Wilson, "The Causes of the Thirty Years War 1618-48", *The English Historical Review*, 123:502, 2008, p. 576.

21 J. V. Polišíenský, "The Thirty Years' War", *Past & Present*, 6, 1954, pp. 41-42; Wilson, "Dynasty, Constitution, and Confession", pp. 478-479. Thompson, "Structural Preludes to", pp. 68-69.

In the context of the actors' positions in this systemic transition, even if Spanish-Austrian Habsburg was the dominant power in Europe for a long time, its systemic role capacity and relative power tended to decline. There was a rising opposition bloc composed of a range of powers of various sizes and with different motivations consolidating their power and state formation and demanding more roles and status, such as Sweden, Holland, France, Denmark, and England.²² In other terms, Spain and, as its semi-peripheral extension, the Holy Roman Empire (Catholic German states) constitute the status quo-seeking part. In contrast, revisionist challengers were German Protestant princes, Low Countries demanding their independence from Spain, France as a rising continental power opposing Spanish-Habsburg universalism, and Sweden seeking its recognition as a legitimate actor in the power equation of this structural transition period.²³

Regarding the conflicts between these components of the emerging European states-system, there were inevitably a lot of long-standing struggles born of the early modern structural impacts, such as hegemonic transition, role, power, and independence disputes. First, France was a primary representative and ideological pioneer of the coming European order by implementing a strategy of balance between competing actors, by giving priority to state centralization, by constructing its foreign policies according to *raison d'état* principle transcending religious standards and thus was the strongest rising power against Spanish-Habsburg hegemony.²⁴ Even though there were short-lived peace periods, these two major powers have been in an ongoing rivalry for pre-eminence in Western Europe and Italy since the last century, which was dominated by Wars of Religion and internal interventions. Second, there was an ongoing conflict between the Dutch and the Spanish since the middle of the 1500s due to the spread of Calvinism and the trade rivalry in the Dutch region. While Spain sought total territorial control and a strong authority, the local elites expected to maintain their liberties and demanded independence for the Netherlands.²⁵ Third, the Northern Germany zone and the Baltic region had an ongoing rivalry between Denmark and Sweden, as regional actors sought their recognition at a systemic level and competed with each other to obtain regional pre-eminence regarding their economic, commercial, and political interests.²⁶ As Ringmar asserts, under the leadership of Gustav Adolf, Sweden, as a peripheric country, articulated to this war series to secure its sovereignty and to proclaim its request for recognition and its national identity as a legitimate member of the community of European states.²⁷ To sum up, the religious and political conflicts in Habsburg lands, such as civil war, were extended outward of the empire by unifying several complicated and linked mutual problems and political ambitions of European powers. As a catalyzer of continental war by maturing conjuncture, this polarization of German princes was functionally similar to the metaphor of a "pressure cooker" most historians used.²⁸ In other terms, via the involvement

22 Doran, "Power Cycle Theory", p. 91.

23 Albert J. Bergesen, Omar Lizardo, "International Terrorism and the World-System", *Sociological Theory*, 22:1, 2004, p. 48. Wilson, "The Causes of", pp. 567-568.

24 S. H. Steinberg, "The Thirty Years' War: A New Interpretation", *History, New Series*, 32:116, 1947, pp. 93-94.

25 Gutmann, "The Origins of", pp. 756-757.

26 Gutmann, "The Origins of", pp. 756-757.

27 Erik Ringmar, *Identity, interest and action: A cultural explanation of Sweden's intervention in the Thirty Years War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 9-10. The message to foreigners of Gustav Adolf was very clear in this sense: "Recognise me and my country as a legitimate actor on the world stage!"; "A prince and a country equal to all others and worthy of the same treatment and the same respect!"; Ringmar, *Identity, interest and*, p. 178.

28 Wilson, "The Causes of", p. 558.

of foreign powers in imperial politics, internal disputes and confessional division of the Empire resulted in a great struggle for the international balance of power.²⁹

As for the process and spread of war, the Thirty Years' War is generally categorized into periods in terms of the articulation of main actors to war in different stages. Accordingly, the starting point of the war was the outbreak of a civil war in the empire and its semi-peripheral lands. The revolt of Protestant Bohemians against the Catholic Roman Empire's restrictive policies to local princes turned into a civil war in the heart of the empire through the event of the Second Defenestration of Prague in which two ambassadors of the empire were thrown out of a second-floor window in 1618; this incident was accepted the starting point of this war series.³⁰ At this point of cumulation of the causality leading to this outbreak of war, it is necessary to emphasize again that these conflicts arose from Europe's sectarian division, the Augsburg Peace's inefficiency, and the dynastic and hegemonic problems of the previous century.³¹ This first period of war (1618-1625), which had intervals of conflicts and the characteristic of a civil war in the Habsburg empire between Bohemian rebels and imperial armies, was called the Bohemian War, spreading into central and northern Germany through the sectarian fault lines among German princes. This civil war in German lands was the worst civil war ever seen and sparked off an intense chosen trauma in the collective memory of Germany.³² This period, which was dominated by religious issues and imperial authority struggles, was followed by the Danish Period (1625-1630) as the second phase and by the Swedish Period (1630-1635) as the third phase, in which European power conflictual fault lines were interpenetrated by latent support of France. Thus, the struggle became a geographically and intensively spreading systemic war in which many actors articulated their own interests in a manner transcending religious issues and fragmentations. While Austrian-Spanish Habsburgs had relative supremacy at intervals in these phases, reaching the war's end with a victory was naturally very difficult as the conflicts spread and became more complex. The last phase of the Thirty Years' War was the Swedish-French Period (1635-1648), in which France became a major visible power in the war against the Habsburgs.³³ This phase was indeed the turning point in terms of France's status as a major power, thanks to the strategic moves of Cardinal Richelieu before and during the war with the target of restraining the progress of Spain and Austria and reaching up to the natural frontiers of France.³⁴ In the meantime, the power struggle between France and Spain would not end until the Pyrenees Treaty in 1659, which strengthened French hegemony.

The Thirty Years' War was a highly complex series of wars due to the multitude of belligerents (including the usage of *Condottieri*), the overlapping reasons accompanied by old and new dynamics inside and outside, and also the inability of any participant to achieve a decisive military victory in the phases of the war. Thus, the duration of the war extended, and its destructiveness dramatically increased.³⁵ In addition, in terms of great power rivalry leading to multiple serial clashes and intensive global warfare and as a consequence of the fact that rising opposition motivated by various robust aspirations consolidated its military power on many geographic fronts, it was not easy to bring an end to the war by victory

29 Geoffrey Parker, *The Thirty Years' War*, London: Routledge, 1997, p. 17.

30 Bergesen, Lizardo, "International Terrorism and the World-System", p. 50.

31 N. M. Sutherland, "The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Structure of European Politics", *The English Historical Review*, 107:424, 1992, pp. 588-589.

32 Stephen J. Lee, *Aspects of European History (1494-1789)*, Routledge, London, 1984, p. 78.

33 Jack S. Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975*, The University Press of Kentucky, Kentucky, 1983, pp. 67-68.

34 Lee, *Aspects of European*, p. 79.

35 Wilson, "Dynasty, Constitution, and", pp. 474.

and to restrain or prevent its relative decline for the global system leader. Austrian-Spanish Habsburgs, burdened by overextension, faced multiple adversaries on several fronts. They fought against France, which held a geographical advantage, and contended with German princes, Denmark, and Sweden, pressing imperial armies in the North. At the same time, they struggled with the Portuguese revolt and the Dutch quest for independence, extending the conflict to overseas territories such as Brazil, Angola, and Ceylon. The cumulative destructiveness of these conflicts resulted in the deaths of at least eight million people. The intensity and geographical scope of the war allowed the Thirty Years' War to be described as "the first global war", encompassing a complex array of reasons, actors, and outcomes across a vast geopolitical area.³⁶

As for the consequences of the Thirty Years' War corresponding to the systemic transition period, which deepened and broadened the conflict spiral reflecting the exigencies of the time, a new international system, a new nation-state reality for participating actors, a new diplomatic structuration, and hegemonic power relationships were revealed.³⁷ In fact, all these results already maturing were the facts that henceforth showed that the systemic transition, which was gradually ongoing from the medieval to the modern era,³⁸ was crystallizing under this rising military, economic, and political structural configuration based on the "birth" of absolutism dissolving feudal structure, of the regular armies, and of a multipolar international order composed by sovereign states constructed on the principles of autonomy and territory of the Peace of Westphalia 1648.³⁹ After a seven-year conflict resolution process among the participants seeking the maximum gain and recognition, the Peace of Westphalia reinforcing state sovereignty overcame the forces of the Church, underpinned the secular character of the international system being born, revealed a reality of fragmented German states at the heart of European states-system, and lastly pointed out that Holland and France crystallized their rising position in the face to the falling Spanish systemic leadership.⁴⁰ The state authority was

36 Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 40. Thompson highlights the remarkable role of global wars, the pioneering radical economic innovations in the systemic transition, and the change of political-economic and military leadership in the global political system. The Thirty Years' Wars -and remarkably ongoing global warfare process since the Hundred Years' War, which had revealed strongly European regional dynamics- and the rise of the capitalist world economic system in the era mentioned proved this argument by facilitating systemic reconcentration in global reach capabilities; William R. Thompson, "Systemic Leadership, Evolutionary Processes, and International Relations Theory: The Unipolarity Question", *International Studies Review*, 8:1, 2006, p. 4, 9.

37 Gutmann, "The Origins of", p. 751.

38 As a significant fact of epochal change, the Thirty Years' Wars simultaneously contained double aspects of old and new age, such as the regional integration and disintegration of states, violent non-state actors (especially mercenaries), and regular state armies -as the characteristics of complex type war-, old armaments and new technological innovations in military industry and other sectors, old institutional dynamics and new norms erasing religious and dynastic beliefs and exigencies; see Robert J. Bunker, Pamela Ligouri Bunker, "The modern state in epochal transition: The significance of irregular warfare, state deconstruction, and the rise of new warfighting entities beyond neo-medievalism", *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 27:2, 2016, pp. 336-337. In this context, for instance, correspondingly to the technological communication revolution of the era mentioned, the widespread use of propaganda by presses and the flood of pamphlets and newsletters mobilizing public opinion and manipulating the rival camps was a sign of new characteristic of the policy-making process during war period as a practice of reason of state; see Noel Malcolm, *Reason of State, Propaganda, and the Thirty Years' War*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, pp. 30-31. In addition, unlike being a cause of war, the trajectory of war demonstrated that religion as an older dominant element became a modern instrument of propaganda as Gustav Adolf used the defense of Protestantism to unite his country and consolidate the public force, and those religious differences had no more a significance in the context of decisions taken behalf to reason of state as Richelieu's strategic moves demonstrated; see Ringmar, *Identity, interest and*, pp. 21-22.

39 Wilson, "The Causes of", p. 554. Stephen D. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia", *International Security*, 20:3, 1995-1996, pp. 115-116; Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 110.

40 Ronald G. Asch, *The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618-48*, Macmillan, New

reinforced by the larger bureaucracies, more efficient systems of taxation, and more direct control of subjects, while the old domestic structural dynamics were being erased under the strong transformative influence of this catalyzer war.⁴¹ One of the most important outputs of the war is the embodiment of the fact that the Papacy's militant religious policy, the dynastic interests, and the hegemonic dominance of the Habsburgs -especially after 1659- were no longer a part of the European balance of power system.⁴² The Thirty Years' War marked a pivotal transition to a new multipolar European order, where shifts in warfare and economic relations played a crucial role in shaping the modern system of sovereign-territorial and nation-states, rather than religious changes alone.⁴³ As a result, it is accepted as a benchmark date of modern international order or quite the transition symbol of the new era by consolidating three hundred years of change dynamics.⁴⁴

3. The First and Second World Wars

Regarding systemic transition period wars, the First and Second World Wars needed to be eclectically analyzed because of the continuity of structural change and transformation symptoms and the triggering relationality between them in terms of causality. In this sense, Eric Hobsbawm uses the conceptualization of "the thirty-one years of world conflict" between 28 July 1914 (the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia) and 14 August 1945 (the unconditional surrender of Japan).⁴⁵ Because there is a set of constitutive elements for the continuity and causality relationship between the two World Wars in the economic, political, and social structural trajectory of world history, this unity corresponds to the systemic transition that took place in the end. With an emphasis on the idea that the Second World War was, in large part, a repeat performance of the First World War, A. J. P. Taylor pointed out that the First World War was about "how Europe should be remade", while the Second World War was about "whether this remade Europe should continue".⁴⁶ Thus, these interconnected wars are viewed together within a broader systemic transition, as the determination of Europe's future role in the global power distribution was a harbinger of the new bipolar order accompanied by new institutional structures and international norms. Additionally, the interwar period also witnessed the growing influence of globalization in world politics. Consequently, the Second World War brought both a hegemonic leadership shift and a structural transformation of the international system.

All the facts and events related to the global hegemonic rivalry among the European powers stimulated polarization and the struggle for commercial and economic superiority. The fall of two empires within the imbalance of role and power and the securitization of geopolitical expansion by great powers further intensified these dynamics. Additionally, increasing uncertainty, alliance politics, and the accumulation of global warfare trends in the

York, 1997, p. 148. At this point, Ikenberry highlights the role of Westphalia in strengthening state sovereignty by decentralizing power and reducing the influence of religious and imperial authorities. The codification of the legal independence of states in international law, granting them equal sovereign status, marked a shift towards a political order in Europe where territorial states, rather than hierarchical entities like the Holy Roman Empire or the Pope, held primacy; see Ikenberry, *After Victory*, pp. 37-38.

41 Geoffrey Treasure, *The Making of Modern Europe, 1648–1780*, Routledge, New York, 2003, pp. 145-146.

42 Gutmann, 'The Origins of', p. 767. Steinberg, 'The Thirty Years' War', pp. 89-90.

43 Jens Bartelson, "War and the Turn to History in International Relations", Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez and Halvard Leira (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations*, Routledge, New York, 2021, p. 131.

44 Barry Buzan, George Lawson, "Rethinking benchmark dates in International Relations", *European Journal of International Relations*, 20:2, 2014, p. 438.

45 Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991*, Abacus Book, London, 1995, p. 22.

46 A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2005, pp. 18-19.

19th century accelerated changes in the balance of power system.⁴⁷ These factors collectively shaped the path to the two world wars by exacerbating the aspirational reflexivity and confusion among actors, regardless of their status and relative power in the international system. As the First World War did not fully ensure the structural break on both actor and system levels, the Second World War recurred. In other words, the question of how to eliminate the structural problems of the system after the war could not be solved, and the old systemic imbalance continued because the power-role difference of the leading actors could not be closed; thus, the world war was renewed as a catalyzer of the structural transition of system.⁴⁸

The First World War erupted at a turning point for the system's structure, where the dominant actors competed to share the systemic power, and their claims and false perceptions were increasing. For this reason, they began to produce offensive and revisionist policies, increase their armaments, and pursue aggressive alliance strategies.⁴⁹ The rise of relative power outside the European system (like Russia, Japan, and the United States) and the emerging power of Germany as the primary challenger to the European balance of power system constituted the rising actors of new systemic relative power repartition against France and Great Britain as status quo-seeking actors.⁵⁰ In the actor-driven narrative, the fact that Germany's expansionist ambitions and Austria-Hungary's defensive approach seeking to regain great power status via coercion, threats, and violence against smaller neighbors clashed with a resistant Europe, leading to the war.⁵¹ Meanwhile, the two empires (the Ottoman Empire and the Empire of Austria-Hungary) were in decline in the context of dyadic rivalries,⁵² so the system's balance of power was fundamentally disrupted. Consequently, colonial rivalries, fears, stakeholders' security concerns, and dilemmas became more dominant and visible. Thus, in this fragile systemic conjuncture majorly influenced by economic imperialism,

47 For the path that led to the war in detail in the 19th century, see Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to the war*, Penguin Group, London, 2012, pp. 61-366.

48 Doran, "Economics, Philosophy of History", pp. 16-17.

49 Alliance politics and armament, which are critical elements in systemic wars, can be preferred interchangeably due to their costs or, when effectively combined, can enhance an actor's position in battle; see James D. Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security", *International Organization*, 47:2, 1993, pp. 223-224.

50 In the period of pre-World War I, Europe saw Germany as a rising state against the declining powers of France and Britain. Meanwhile, Russia was also rising against Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empires, which were declining actors. In Asia, Japan, which was in decline, faced Russia as a rising state. Britain was a declining power in the Americas compared to the rapidly growing power of the United States. In global geopolitical rivalry, this emphasizes dyadic power transition struggles stimulating the outbreak of war; see Dong Sun Lee, *Power Shifts, Strategy, and War: Declining states and international conflict*, Routledge, New York, 2008, p. 10. For a detailed exploration of the linkage of the balance of power theory and the outbreak of the First World War; see Peter Gellman, "The Elusive Explanation: Balance of Power 'Theory' and the Origins of World War I", *Review of International Studies*, 15:2, 1989, pp. 155-182.

51 Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War", *International Security*, 9:1, 1984, p. 66. Paul W. Schroeder, "The nineteenth century system: balance of power or political equilibrium?", *Review of International Studies*, 15, 1989, p. 146.

52 Midlarsky accentuates that the European balance of power system had been shaken by the conflicting interests of great powers in the Balkans, Mediterranean, and Middle East geopolitics and had generated the concretization of the alliance system, leading to war between the Dual Alliance and the Triple Entente. The Austria-Hungarian Empire, supported by Germany, has been challenged by Serbia and Russia since 1908. On the other side, the declining power of the Ottoman Empire was at the heart of expansionist tendencies of European power struggle; in this sense, the Italian-Turkish War and the Balkan Wars were milestone conflicts reflecting these ambitions and the instability of that period and immediately preceding the onset of the First World War. The collapse of two empires and the resulting gap in the European relative power distribution constituted one of the major areas of conflict in the hegemonic struggle during the First World War; see Midlarsky, "A Hierarchical Equilibrium", p. 83; Manus I. Midlarsky, "Preventing Systemic War: Crisis Decision-Making amidst a Structure of Conflict Relationships", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 28:4, 1984, p. 566.

militarism, nationalism, and dyadic rivalry dynamics, these expansionist demands combined with the security dilemmas of great powers within the highly polarized alliance system and briefly, these changing distributions of power within the changing structure of the international system led to the outbreak of the First World War.⁵³

The causality of the outbreak of the First World War does not contain only agency-oriented reasons such as challenging opposition of Germany to the status quo, rigid polarization in the alliance system, intensification of strategic rivalries, confusion, and misperception in the political decision-making process. It also includes the following structure-oriented reasons or systemic pressure impacts:

- i- military, technological, economic, and political global transformations,⁵⁴
- ii- dynamics of the global capitalist system, state-building and imperialism,
- iii- fall of empires, the rise of nationalism,⁵⁵
- iv- worldwide extension of colonialism and Eurocentric power equation,
- v- global shifts in power distribution,
- vi- need to establish a global norm order.⁵⁶

In this sense, Levy and Vasquez remarkably use the “powder keg” metaphor in which structure and agency incorporate both windows of opportunity and catalysts to create the

53 Charles F. Doran, “War and Power Dynamics: Economic Underpinnings”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 27, 1983, p. 430. Keir A. Lieber, “The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory”, *International Security*, 32:2, 2007, pp. 155-191. Jack S. Levy, John A. Vasquez, *The Outbreak of the First World War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 15-16. Levy and Vasquez briefly reveal the predominant causal factors relating to structure, politics, and decision-making by “extraordinary causal complexity involving an intricate interplay of variables from all levels of analysis: structural pressures, dyadic rivalries, social upheaval, insecure regimes, bureaucratic intrigue, long-standing strategic cultures, idiosyncratic leaders, and decision-making under enormous uncertainty”; *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

54 The underlying causes of the World Wars can be traced back to the global transformation of the long nineteenth century, particularly the interlinked processes of industrialization, rational state-building, and ideologies of progress, which collectively set the stage for the conflict; see Barry Buzan, George Lawson, *Global Transformation: History Modernity and the Making of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, pp. 6-8, 36-42. Regarding global military transformations, the First World War marked the onset of modern warfare, characterized by multi-dimensional attacks, intelligence-driven targeting, and integrated arms coordination. These innovations foreshadowed the more advanced military strategies in later conflicts; see David Stevenson, *With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011, p. 170.

55 Nationalism, a mixture of chauvinism and racism prevalent in both Europe and North America, can be considered a long-term cause of the First World War. In other words, in Germany, Britain, Russia, and France, nationalism often served as a centripetal force driving toward war; see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. “The Origins of World War I”, Robert I. Rotberg, Theodore K. Rabb (ed.), *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 233. Chauvinist nationalism fosters false optimism about the balance of will by glorifying one’s own people while demeaning the opponent, as the period before the First World War shows that propaganda exaggerated national virtues and foreign vices, creating illusions about both self and enemy strength; see Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1999, p. 27.

56 Holsti indicates that the breakdown of some of the norms and assumptions of the nineteenth-century states-system was one of the primary reasons for the systemic instability between 1914 and 1941 because the classical norms of the Concert system and status quo-seeking actors were inadequate to resolve in new global war conjuncture. So, the new structural composition of the international system sought a new institutionalization of international regulatory norms; see Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace And War: Armed Conflicts And International Order 1648-1989*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1998, p. 221. As a part of global conflict, the decision-makers can be strongly motivated to an advantageous determiner role while new international norms and rules are being shaped for systemic transition; see Raimo Vayrynen, “Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars between Major Powers”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 27:4, 1983, p. 391.

maximum causal effect. The structural transition dynamics constitute the “powder keg”, and the July 1914 Crisis provides agency reactions with a strong diffusion effect for the outbreak of war.⁵⁷ In the light of this structural timing coincidence of systemic transition preparing the conjuncture to a global conflict spiral, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the Italian conquest of Libya in 1911-1912 were precursor conflicts that reflected the instability of the period and introduced the intensification of expansionist tendencies, the moves of coalition building and the axes of geopolitical conflict zones before the onset of First World War. Indeed, the Balkan Wars and the Bosnian Crisis played a key role in the breakdown of the equilibrium in the East, increasing systemic instability and polarized composition of Europe between the Dual Alliance and Triple Entente in terms of dyadic rivalries between Germany and the other great powers (Russia, France, and Great Britain).⁵⁸ Briefly, in this balance of power's disequilibrium urging the status quoist actors to consolidate common interests with preventive motivation face to Germany's rise and strong expectations of a larger international political role, the severe structural politic-economic strains, including all the symptoms of systemic transition, the actor-driven shifting tides based on misperceptions, emotions of anxiety and insecurity, and the complex uncertainty of alliances made this systemic war unavoidable.⁵⁹ So, the experience of the First World War unveils when interstate rivalry becomes harmful to political equilibrium. Then, that balance is lost when a minimal balance of rights, status, security, and satisfaction among the participants in the system is no longer maintained.⁶⁰

Contrarily to the existence of great expectations to avoid a war and construct a better world, the tragedy of the First World War produced structural continuities, causing eclectically the repetition of history under the mask of a new world order, whose scene and actors were similar to the old one in the era of twenty years' crisis. Between 1919 and 1930, particularly during the Locarno Treaty period (1925-1930), the League of Nations and peace treaties aimed to establish international standards to prevent conflicts and ensure global peace. However, several key factors laid the groundwork for the Second World War. These factors included the persistence of alliance trends, geopolitical colonial rivalries, expansionist ambitions, and systemic instability. Additionally, the political challenges posed by Italy, Japan, and Germany against the status quo, the relative decline of Great Britain, and the failure of the hegemonic power transition contributed to rising tensions.⁶¹ The lack of effective political leadership, the intensification of ideological polarization, the spread of aggressive behavior among dictatorial leaders, and the imitation of such actions by political entities exacerbated the situation.⁶² Moreover, the unresolved grievances from the First World War, rapid shifts in industrial and economic power, and the transformative effects of the Great Depression, which first shook international stability and intensified global

57 Levy, Vasquez, *The Outbreak of*, pp. 19-20.

58 Midlarsky, “A Hierarchical Equilibrium”, p. 80. David Stevenson, *Armaments and the Coming War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 112-164.

59 Doran, “Economics, Philosophy of History”, p. 33; Steve Chan and Brock F. Tessman, “Relative Decline: Why Does It Induce War or Sustain Peace?”, William R. Thompson (ed.), *Systemic Transitions: Past, Present, and Future*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009, pp. 13-14.

60 Schroeder, “The Nineteenth Century System”, p. 148.

61 Doran remarked accurately on the dilemma of peaceful change in the conjecture of the global crisis in the 1930s. Because the First World War did not lead to a hegemonic transition between Great Britain and the United States, there was a lack of leadership in international disorder; thus, the burden of this crisis period, coupled with the old and deep anxieties of the great powers, made the solution of underlying structural problem much more difficult; that is “*how to reconcile changing power with legitimate interests*”; see Doran, “Economics, Philosophy of History”, pp. 16-17.

62 Midlarsky, “Preventing Systemic War”, pp. 565-566.

socio-economic anxieties, played critical roles.⁶³ In a nutshell, the systemic unresolved issues of the First World War significantly contributed to the processes leading to the Second World War, unveiling the interconnectedness of these two global conflicts.⁶⁴

A sequence of major political events preparing for the repetition of the World War occurred in this turbulent socio-political global scene: the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, the Italian and German intervention in the Spanish Civil War between 1936 and 1939, the German aggression and subsequent invasion of Austria in 1938, the German occupation of Czechoslovakia and the Italian occupation of Albania in 1939, the German claims concerning Poland, the appeasement policy of Britain and France towards Germany, the condonation of the Nazi threat in the face of Soviet threat, the total failure or non-interventionist attitude of the League of Nations in the face of all these events on the world stage, rise of fascism glorifying war and the warlike virtues.⁶⁵ All these events reflect the tension between status quoist powers (especially Great Britain and France) and challenger/revisionist powers seeking the breakdown of power distribution (Germany, Italy, and Japan). Indeed, this power struggle does not precisely reflect the power distribution and power-role dynamics because it does not include the power-role impact of the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, this political vacuum in the pre-war period, the failure of the policy of appeasement, and the delay in preventive steps caused international political leadership to shift from the defenders of the old order to the Soviet Union and the United States after the war.⁶⁶

Structural constraints and systemic power shifts, which forced multiple actors to have a new vital trajectory, eventually made the Second World War inevitable as one of the worst wars that was responsible for the systemic transition, dragging vortically major and minor powers into the conflict spiral.⁶⁷ Expansionist policies and state of global aggression reached their peak with the German invasion of Poland in 1939, triggering the conflict spiral, and France and the United Kingdom declared war on Germany. After the rapid fall of Poland, Germany started its invasion of the Soviet territories from the East. Japanese expansion in the Pacific, including the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, further intensified the conflict and expanded the fronts of the war on a global scale in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. The involvement of the United States after the attack on Pearl Harbor brought additional resources and workforce to the Allies. Key turning points, such as the Battle of Stalingrad and the Normandy Invasion, shifted momentum in favor of the Allies, which, in turn, conducted offensives to reclaim territories occupied by the Axis Powers. The Allied victories in Europe and the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki took their place in history as the turning points, declaring the end of the war in 1945. During the war, the Allies were in the quest to reshape the post-war world order, as the primary cause of war was the construction of a new global order. Consequently, the European-centric international system collapsed by spreading to the globe; a bipolar structural system based on the Soviet-American hegemonic power struggle emerged; the new sub-regional systems were concretized instead of the colonial system, which came to an end, by superpowers seeking to exert politic, economic, and military influence in this strictly polarized world order. In this systemic structuration, the new international rules and norms were established in UN institutions as spokespersons

63 Vayrynen, "Economic Cycles, Power", p. 405. Taylor, *The Origins of*, p. 61.

64 Boswell, Sweat, "Hegemony, Long Waves", p. 145.

65 Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes*, p. 37. Taylor, *The Origins of*, p. 108.

66 Doran, "Economics, Philosophy of", pp. 33-35.

67 Kohout, "Cyclical, Hegemonic, and", p. 62.

of the winners' club.⁶⁸ In summary, the 1945 order marked a pivotal systemic transition in the post-war world, characterized by the establishment of a comprehensive institutional framework—spanning global, regional, economic, security, and political domains—which facilitated a more structured and binding international system, mainly through the security arrangements between the United States and its post-war allies.⁶⁹

Conclusion

By analyzing the Thirty Years' War and the First and Second World Wars, the article aims to elucidate the distinct characteristics and outcomes of systemic transition period wars in terms of reshaping the global systemic structure. The systemic transition period is defined as a time of radical change and transformation on a macro scale, affecting political, military, economic, technological, and socio-cultural dimensions. It represents a period during which established regulatory mechanisms struggle to respond to the accelerated and widespread changes, leading to a profound restructuring of international relations. The analysis of systemic transition period wars revealed them as the result of symptoms such as the relative decline of global system leaders, rising opposition to the status quo, coalition building, ideological or religious polarizations, technological innovation peaks, and intensive global warfare. These global wars, characterized by the alliance of major revisionist powers against great powers seeking to protect the existing systemic structure, play a crucial role in determining the new power distribution in the international system. When examining the cases of the Thirty Years' War and the First and Second World Wars within the framework of systemic transition period wars, it becomes evident that these conflicts were pivotal in reshaping the global order and the structure of the system. The alliances formed during these wars, the challenges to existing power structures, and the subsequent peace treaties marked significant shifts in the balance of power and the structure of the international system. The transformative nature of these wars is further highlighted by the total reconstruction of international structures, norms, and institutions in the post-war period. In other terms, systemic orders may experience fluctuations when the relative distribution of power and roles among different political entities shifts; however, more profound transformations signifying systemic transition are likely to emerge when constitutional values, core institutions, and the principle of unit differentiation undergo concurrent changes. Therefore, examining systemic transition period wars through historical examples gives us several insights into how these conflicts occur and play a crucial role in shaping the global order and bringing about enduring changes in the international system. Given that the persistent challenges of balancing great powers' security, curbing hegemony, and managing peripheral conflicts remain relevant today, and when considering we are in a systemic transition period where the old order has died, but the new has not yet been born—resulting in normlessness in international politics—, the main patterns and processual analysis of systemic transition wars will contribute to making sense of current global conflicts.

Conflict of Interest Statement:

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

Author Contribution Statements:

The authors contributed to the study equally.

68 Charles F. Doran, "Modes, Mechanisms, and Turning Points: Perspectives on the Transformation of the International System", *International Political Science Review*, 1:1, 1980, p. 56.

69 Ikenberry, *After Victory*, p. 48.

REFERENCES

- ASCH Ronald G. (1997). *The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618-48*, Macmillan, New York.
- BARTELSON Jens (2021). "War and the Turn to History in International Relations", Benjamin de Carvalho, Julia Costa Lopez and Halvard Leira (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Historical International Relations*, Routledge, New York, 127-137.
- BARKAWI Tarak (2017). "States, Armies, and Wars in Global Context", Julian Go & George Lawson (eds.), *Global Historical Sociology*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 58-75.
- BERGESEN Albert J. and LIZARDO Omar (2004). "International Terrorism and the World-System", *Sociological Theory*, 22:1, 38-52.
- BOSWELL Terry and SWEAT Mike (1991). "Hegemony, Long Waves, and Major Wars: A Time Series Analysis of Systemic Dynamics, 1496-1967", *International Studies Quarterly*, 35:2, 123-149.
- BUNKER Robert J. and BUNKER Pamela Ligouri (2016). "The modern state in epochal transition: The significance of irregular warfare, state deconstruction, and the rise of new warfighting entities beyond neo-medievalism", *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 27:2, 325-344.
- BUZAN Barry and LAWSON George (2015). *Global Transformation: History Modernity and the Making of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- BUZAN Barry and LAWSON George (2014). "Rethinking benchmark dates in International Relations", *European Journal of International Relations*, 20:2, 437-462.
- CHAN Steve and TESSMAN Brock F. (2009). "Relative Decline: Why Does It Induce War or Sustain Peace?", William R. Thompson (ed.), *Systemic Transitions: Past, Present, and Future*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 9-30.
- CLARK Cristopher (2012). *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to the war*, Penguin Group, London.
- DORAN Charles F. (1980). "Modes, Mechanisms, and Turning Points: Perspectives on the Transformation of the International System", *International Political Science Review*, 1:1, 35-61.
- DORAN Charles F. (1983). "War and Power Dynamics: Economic Underpinnings", *International Studies Quarterly*, 27, 419-441.
- DORAN Charles F. (1996). "Power Cycle Theory of Systems Structure and Stability: Commonalities and Complementarities", Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), *Handbook of War Studies II*, Michigan University Press, Ann Arbor, 83-110.
- DORAN Charles F. (2003). "Economics, Philosophy of History, and the 'Single Dynamic' of Power Cycle Theory: Expectations, Competition, and Statecraft", *International Political Science Review*, 24:1, 13-49.
- EVERA Van Stephen (1999). *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict*, Cornell University Press, New York.
- EVERA Van Stephen (1984). "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War", *International Security*, 9:1, 58-107.
- GELLMAN Peter (1989). "The Elusive Explanation: Balance of Power 'Theory' and the Origins of World War I", *Review of International Studies*, 15:2, 155-182.
- GIDDENS Anthony (1985). *The Nation-State and Violence*, Polity Press Cambridge.
- GILPIN Robert (1981). *War and Change in International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- GUTMANN Myron P. (1988). "The Origins of the Thirty Years' War", *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18:4, 749-770.
- HOBBSBAMW Eric (1995). *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991*, Abacus Book, London.
- HOLSTI Kalevi J. (1998). *Peace And War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- IKENBERRY G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- KENNEDY Paul M. (1988). *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, Unwin Hyman, London.
- KOHOUT Franz (2003). "Cyclical, Hegemonic, and Pluralistic Theories of International Relations: Some Comparative Reflections on War Causation", *International Political Science Review*, 24:1, 51-66.
- KRASNER Stephen D. (1995-1996). "Compromising Westphalia", *International Security*, 20:3, 115-151.
- LEE Dong Sun (2008). *Power Shifts, Strategy, and War: Declining states and international conflict*, Routledge, New York.
- LEE Stephen J. (1984). *Aspects of European History (1494-1789)*, Routledge, London.
- LEVY Jack S. (1982). "The Contagion of Great Power War Behavior, 1495-1975", *American Journal of Political Science*, 26:3, 562-584.

- LEVY Jack S. (1983). *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975*, The University Press of Kentucky, Kentucky.
- LEVY Jack S. and Vasquez John A. (2014). *The Outbreak of the First World War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- LIEBER Keir A. (2007). "The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory", *International Security*, 32:2, 155-191.
- MALCOLM Noel (2007). *Reason of State, Propaganda, and the Thirty Years' War*, Oxford University Press, New York.
- MELKO Matthew (2001). "The Importance of General Wars in World History", *Peace Research*, 33:1, 83-100.
- MIDLARSKY Manus I. (1984). "Preventing Systemic War: Crisis Decision-Making amidst a Structure of Conflict Relationships", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 28:4, 563-584.
- MIDLARSKY Manus I. (1986). "A Hierarchical Equilibrium Theory of Systemic War", *International Studies Quarterly*, 30, 77-105.
- MIDLARSKY Manus I. (1988). *The Onset of World War*, Routledge, New York.
- MODELSKI George and THOMPSON William R. (1989). "Long Cycles and Global War", Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), *Handbook of War Studies*, Unwin Hyman, Boston, 23-54.
- MORROW James D. (1993). "Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security", *International Organization*, 47:2, 207-233.
- NEXON Daniel (2005). "Zeitgeist? The New Idealism in the Study of International Change", *Review of International Political Economy*, 12:4, 700-719.
- ORGANSKI A. F. K. and KUGLER Jacek (1980). *The War Ledger*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- PARKER Geoffrey (1997). *The Thirty Years' War*, Routledge, London.
- POLIŠENSKÝ J. V. (1954). "The Thirty Years' War", *Past & Present*, 6, 31-43.
- RASLER Karen and THOMPSON William R. (1991). "Technological Innovation, Capability Positional Shifts, and Systemic War", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 35:3, 412-442.
- RINGMAR Erik (1996). *Identity, interest and action: A cultural explanation of Sweden's intervention in the Thirty Years War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- SAGAN Scott D. (1986). "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability", *International Security*, 11: 2, pp. 151-175.
- SCHROEDER, Paul W. (1989). "The nineteenth century system: balance of power or political equilibrium?", *Review of International Studies*, 15, 135-153.
- STEINBERG S. H. (1947). "The Thirty Years' War: A New Interpretation", *History, New Series*, 32:116, 89-102.
- STEVENSON David (2011). *With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts.
- STEVENSON David (2002). *Armaments and the Coming War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- SUTHERLAND N. M. (1992). "The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Structure of European Politics", *The English Historical Review*, 107:424, 587-625.
- TAYLOR A. J. P. (2005). *The Origins of the Second World War*, Simon & Schuster, New York.
- THOMPSON William R. (1988). *On Global War*, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia.
- THOMPSON William R. (2006). "Systemic Leadership, Evolutionary Processes, and International Relations Theory: The Unipolarity Question", *International Studies Review*, 8:1, 1-22.
- THOMPSON William R. (2009). "Structural Preludes to Systemic Transition since 1494", William R. Thompson (ed.), *Systemic Transitions: Past, Present, and Future*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 55-73.
- TREASURE Geoffrey (2003). *The Making of Modern Europe, 1648-1780*, Routledge, New York.
- VALERIANO Brandon and VASQUEZ John A. (2010). "Identifying and Classifying Complex Interstate Wars", *International Studies Quarterly*, 54, 561-582.
- VAYRYNEN Raimo (1983). "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars between Major Powers", *International Studies Quarterly*, 27:4, 389-418.
- WALLERSTEIN Immanuel (1999). *The End of the World as we Know It: Social Sciences for the Twenty First Century*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
- WILLIAMSON Samuel R. Jr. (1998). "The Origins of World War I", Robert I. Rotberg & Theodore K. Rabb (eds.), *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 225-247.
- WILSON Peter H. (2008). "Dynasty, Constitution, and Confession: The Role of Religion in the Thirty Years War", *The International History Review*, 30:3, 473-514.
- WILSON Peter H. (2008). "The Causes of the Thirty Years War 1618-48", *The English Historical Review*, 123:502, 554-586.

“Why Nations Fight?": An Analysis of the Causes of the Russian Federation-Ukraine War from Russian Perspective within the Framework of Richard Ned Lebow's Approach “Devletler Neden Savaşı?": Richard Ned Lebow'un Yaklaşımı Çerçevesinde Rusya Federasyonu-Ukrayna Savaşı Sebeplerinin Rus Bakış Açısından Analizi

Murat JANE*

Hazar JANE**

* Assist Prof., Istanbul Aydın University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul, Türkiye
e-mail: muratjane@aydin.edu.tr
ORCID: 0000-0002-2409-131X

** Assist Prof., Istanbul Aydın University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul, Türkiye
e-mail: hazarjane@aydin.edu.tr
ORCID: 0000-0001-9584-3999

Geliş Tarihi / Submitted:
29.05.2024

Kabul Tarihi / Accepted:
04.12.2024

Abstract

The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation (RF) on March 18, 2014, and the declaration of the People's Republics in Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine are considered by many international relations experts as one of the most important developments of the post-Cold War era. In this respect, the ongoing RF-Ukraine War, which started on February 20, 2022, after the developments in 2014, can be interpreted as a reflection of the power struggle between the RF-West (Euro-Atlantic Alliance) rather than RF-Ukraine relations in the period from the Post-Cold War Period to 2022. There are many reasons for the RF-Ukraine War, especially the tension in RF-West relations. Richard Ned Lebow's perspectives on the nature and causes of the war make it possible to address the causes of this war holistically. Therefore, the study aims to understand why the RF wants to go to war with Ukraine within the framework of Lebow's approach. The study will utilize the process analysis method in this framework through primary and secondary sources.

Keywords: Russian Federation, Ukraine, Richard Ned Lebow, War, Post-Soviet

Öz

Rusya Federasyonu (RF)'nin 18 Mart 2014 tarihinde Kırım'ı ilhakı ve Ukrayna'nın doğusunda yer alan Donetsk ve Luhansk'ta halk cumhuriyetlerinin ilan edilmesi pek çok uluslararası ilişkiler uzmanına göre Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemin en önemli gelişmelerinden biri olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bu açıdan 2014'teki gelişmelerden sonra 20 Şubat 2022'de başlayan ve halen devam eden RF-Ukrayna Savaşı, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönem'den 2022 yılına kadar geçen süreçte RF-Ukrayna ilişkilerinden ziyade RF-Batı (Avro-Atlantik İttifak) arasındaki güç mücadelesinin yansımaları olarak yorumlanabilir.

RF-Batı ilişkilerindeki gerilim başta olmak üzere RF-Ukrayna Savaşı'nın pek çok nedeni bulunmaktadır. Richard Ned Lebow'un savaşın doğasına ve nedenlerine ilişkin bakış açıları, söz konusu savaşın nedenlerine bütüncül olarak ele almayı olanaklı hale getirmektedir. Dolayısıyla bu çalışma, Lebow'un yaklaşımı çerçevesinde RF'nin neden Ukrayna ile savaşmak istediğini anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu çerçevede çalışmada birincil ve ikincil kaynaklar üzerinden süreç analizi yöntemi kullanılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rusya Federasyonu, Ukrayna, Richard Ned Lebow, Savaş, Post-Sovyet

Introduction

War is undoubtedly one of the oldest realities of human history. Political units established in history have fought each other for different reasons and motivations. For example, at first glance, World War I began after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of the Austria-Hungarian Empire by Serbian nationalist Gavrillo Princip. This development was the apparent cause. However, when we look at the pre-war developments, there were many underlying causes ranging from the struggle for dominant power status between Germany and the United Kingdom to the policies of Wilhelm II, from imperialism to the breakdown of the Concert of Europe.¹ For example, although the Falklands War initially broke out for territorial reasons, the underlying reason was British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s desire to strengthen her country’s status in the international system.² In another example, the hegemonic power United States of America (USA) intervened in Afghanistan and invaded Iraq to fight against global terrorism as justification in the post-Cold War era.

As can be understood from the above examples, there are many reasons for wars, from honor to national interest, from the influence of leaders and decision-makers to normative values. The RF-Ukraine War, initiated by the RF with the rhetoric of “special operation”, also embodied many reasons that fall within the scope of history, sociology, psychology, and international politics beyond current developments. The RF-Ukraine War, including different and intricate dynamics, is thought to be better understood by academics via an inclusive perspective on the causes of the war, such as the perspective of theorist/historian Richard Ned Lebow.

In this framework, this study argues that it is insufficient to analyze the RF-Ukraine War only through current developments because war has sociological, historical, and psychological dimensions, as well as geopolitical ones. Lebow’s perspective includes a holistic approach that can explain why the RF attacked Ukraine.

1. General Approaches to Causes of Wars

War, one of the four basic foreign policy tools in international relations,³ is as old as human history. As diplomatic historian Oral Sander emphasizes, 87% of the 7000-year known human history has been spent in war.⁴ It is difficult to reduce war to a single definition because there is no general definition of war, even in international law documents. However, in the international law doctrine, scholars have tried to define war with its two elements: objective and subjective. This means that the armed conflicts in question must have taken place between two states, and at least one of the parties must have committed the act of armed conflict to wage war.⁵ Expressing the objective and subjective elements of war, Hüseyin Pazarıcı defined war as “an armed struggle between two or more states against each other in order to impose their will”.⁶ In addition to international law, Prussian General Carl Von Clausewitz described war as an extended version of a duel. According to Clausewitz, the primary purpose of this “extended duel” is to defeat the enemy and then bring it to a point

1 Barış Özdal, “1. Dünya Savaşı’nın Diplomasinin Gelişimine Etkileri”, Barış Özdal and R. Kutay Karaca (eds.), *Diplomasi Tarihi-2*, Dora Yayınları, Bursa, 2020, pp. 7-12.

2 İbrahim Çağrı Erkul, *Birleşik Krallık Dış Politikası 1979-2020*, Çizgi Kitabevi, Konya, 2021, pp. 15-21; İbrahim Çağrı Erkul, *Commonwealth’i Anlamak: Beşikten Mezara Britanya İmparatorluğu*, Çizgi Kitabevi, Konya, 2021, pp. 277-280.

3 Barış Özdal, “Diplomasi”, Barış Özdal and R. Kutay Karaca (eds.), *Diplomasi Tarihi-1*, Dora Yayınları, Bursa, 2022, p. 27.

4 Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, Ankara, 2009, p. 594.

5 Hüseyin Pazarıcı, *Uluslararası Hukuk*, Turhan Kitabevi, Ankara, 2004, p. 530.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 441.

where it cannot resist.⁷ Clausewitz does not separate this purpose and approach from politics and argues that war continues with politics through other means. In this context, he regards war as a political action.⁸

As there is no general definition of war on which many agree, there is also no clear consensus on the causes of war. The lack of consensus lies in the abundance of answers to why war broke out. This situation has brought about the formation of different theories/approaches regarding the origins of war.⁹ In other words, there is no grand theory regarding the causes of war. There is undoubtedly a need for a good classification to understand the theories and approaches to causes of war better. In this respect, the causes of war can be classified at the levels of individual, state, and international system within the framework of the discipline of International Relations.¹⁰

When focused on the causes of war at the individual level, it is possible to see the presupposition of evil human nature, which is one of Realism's main reference points. Among the foremost thinkers defending this point of view is Thomas Hobbes. According to Hobbes, man seeks to increase his power to survive in the state of nature. Hobbes claimed that human beings constantly compete for honor and reputation, that the ongoing power struggle over honor and reputation will ultimately lead to jealousy and hatred, and that war occurs due to jealousy and hatred.¹¹ Classical Realist theorist Hans Morgenthau also saw international relations from a Hobbesian perspective and claimed that international politics consisted of power struggles like all forms of politics. In other words, the act of power has always been the primary purpose of politics. Morgenthau defined power as control over competitors' and interlocutors' thoughts and practical policies. According to Morgenthau, although power is a concept that is too comprehensive to be reduced to types of violence, such as war, the phenomenon of war is one of the intrinsic elements of politics, like other types of violence (arrest, imprisonment, death penalty, etc.).¹² Morgenthau's claim that all social forces, including the state, are products of human nature,¹³ shows that war is also a part of human nature.

Sigmund Freud also claims that the cause of war is the tension between Eros (Life Principle) and Thanatos (Death). According to Freud, the formation of human associations, such as nations, is the result of civilization, and Eros is the power that binds individual people to larger units. However, the instinct of aggression inherent in man stands against civilization. This tension is at the center of the war, the battle for life.¹⁴ Jean Jacques Rousseau is one of the thinkers who claimed that individuals' reasons cause war but that individuals should not be entirely blamed for this. Unlike Freud and Hobbes, Rousseau argues that human nature is good. The factor that destroys the good nature of man is society. According to Rousseau,

7 Carl Von Clausewitz, *Savaş Üzerine* (Çev. Selma Koçak), Doruk Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2011, p. 29.

8 Ibid, pp. 45-46.

9 Öner Akgül, "Bilimsel Yöntemlerle Savaşın Nedenlerini Açıklama Yolu Olarak Savaş Çalışmaları Disiplini", *Güvenlik Stratejileri*, 12:23, 2016, p. 2.

10 The classification in question is inspired by Kenneth Waltz's point of view. For detailed information, see Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001.

11 Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan veya Bir Din ve Dünya Devletinin İçeriği, Biçimi ve Kudreti* (Çev. Semih Lim), Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007, p. 129.

12 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1948, p. 13.

13 Ibid., p. 4.

14 Sigmund Freud, *Bir Yanılsamanın Geleceği: Uygarlık ve Hoşnutsuzlukları* (Çev. Aziz Yardımlı), İdea Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2000, pp. 103-104.

people who are corrupted by society –whose nature is damaged– are prone to violence. The basis of violence lies in the inequality that occurred after the transition to a civilized society. The state, the political unit created by humans whose nature has been distorted by inequality, has also become prone to war. In this context, violence in the state of nature has become organized by the state.¹⁵

In addition to the assumption of human nature, issues such as leaders’ prejudices, emotional conditions, and hormonal imbalances are also among the causes of war.¹⁶ In foreign policy analysis, decisions taken by leaders, including declarations of war, are evaluated through operational code analysis and leadership trait analysis. Broadly speaking, operational code analysis examines the leader’s beliefs about the potential of their power and the beliefs underlying any foreign policy decision they make, including war.¹⁷ Operational code analysis, first examined in Nathan Leites’ works titled *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (1951) and *A Study of Bolshevism* (1953),¹⁸ was redefined and structured by Alexander George, who formed propositions regarding the nature of conflicts.¹⁹ According to George, the operational code refers to the worldview (*Weltanschauung*), cognitive map, and political culture of the elite, which is basically the actor’s belief system about political life.²⁰ Like George, Margaret Hermann also analyzed the foreign policy decision-making process through the leader’s behavior and revealed the criteria determining the leader’s decision-making. These criteria are belief in the ability to control events, seeking power and influence, self-confidence, conceptual complexity, task focus orientation, in-group bias, and distrust of others.²¹

In addition to the individual level, it is also possible to run across approaches that view the causes of war as state-oriented. For example, according to Jeremy Black, there is a direct and reciprocal relationship between war and the establishment of the state. In light of this symbiotic relationship, the war-state relationship has gained momentum since the 19th century, when the monopoly of violence passed from pirates and mercenaries to the state.²² Moreover, practices involving coercion, such as strengthening the state apparatus, state’s tax capacity, increasing its income source, and compulsory military service, are among the examples of the linear relationship between the state and war. The claims in question were put forward by theorists such as Max Weber, Charles Tilly, and Michael Mann.²³ For example, according to Tilly, both the nation-state and the international system are formed by war. In

15 Faruk Yalvaç, “Rousseau’nun Savaş ve Barış Kuramı: Adalet Olarak Barış”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 14:4, 2007, pp. 138-139.

16 Iain Hardie, Dominic Johnson, and Dominic Tierney, “Psychological Aspects of War”, Christopher J. Coyne and Rachel L. Mathers (eds.), *The Handbook on the Political Economy of War*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, Northampton, 2011, p. 72.

17 Valerie M. Hudson and Benjamin S. Day, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland, 2020, p. 21.

18 Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of Politburo*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1951; Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism*, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1953.

19 Hazar Vural Jane, Velayeti Fakih ve İran Dış Politikası: Ali Hamaney’in Konumu, Doktora Tezi, Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi, İstanbul, 2019, s. 64.

20 Alexander L. George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 13:2, 1969, p. 197.

21 Margaret Hermann, “Assesing Leadership Style: Trait Analysis”, Jerrold Post (ed.), *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2003, p. 204.

22 Jeremy Black, *Savaş ve Dünya: Askeri Güç ve Dünyanın kaderi 1945-2000*, (Çev. Süleyman Yazır), Phoneix Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2009, pp. 347-349.

23 Hakan Şahin, “Tarihsel Süreçte Savaşların Devletin Oluşumu ve Dönüşümündeki Rolü”, *Pamukkale Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 24, 2016, pp. 87-90.

addition, the nation-state is the political unit that responds most successfully to war compared to other political units in history. Tilly claimed that the unity of capital and power was the expansion of the nation-state; in other words, the formation process of the nation-state was at the center of wars.²⁴ Michael Mann also revealed a linear relationship between state, war, and capitalism and approached militarism as an institution that makes war seem normal.²⁵

The third level regarding the causes of wars is the structure of the international system. The most prominent theorist who emphasizes the relationship between the international system and war is Kenneth Waltz, the founder of Neo-Realism. Waltz put forward that the anarchic nature of the international system lies at the basis of conflicts.²⁶ Power transition theorists also see the dissatisfaction of a rising power in the international system with present conditions as the cause of wars. In parallel with this situation, a rising power in question declares war against a hegemonic power to accelerate the power transition in the international system and reshape the system economically, politically, and legally according to its expectations.²⁷ For example, according to Robert Gilpin, the hegemonic power struggle begins when a current hegemon cannot ensure the continuity of the system with present resources. The hegemonic power struggle constitutes the beginning of a new hegemonic cycle. This process continues until the power distribution is reorganized. The end of a hegemonic war marks the beginning of a new cycle of development, expansion, and decline.²⁸ According to George Modelski, the international system has been shaped by the influence of a hegemonic power in 100-year cycles since the 15th century. Modelski conceptualized this power as the “dominant power” of which criteria is controlling long-distance trade routes.²⁹ Some views, which place principles of liberalism and liberal economics at the center of the international system, explain the causes of wars by the deterioration of the liberal structure of the international system. For example, according to Charles Kindleberger, advocating hegemonic stability theory, there is always a need for a hegemonic power to maintain a liberal economy.³⁰ According to Capitalist Peace Theory, the stagnation of the economy and the disappearance of economy-based liberal interdependence make decision-makers prone to wage war.³¹ John Herz is one of the theorists analyzing the origins of war in the anarchic structure of the international system. According to Herz, since the international system is anarchic, states seek to increase their military capacities so as not to be attacked, completely destroyed, and under the sovereignty of another state. An increase in the capacity of the state in question is perceived as a threat by other states, and these states, in turn, also seek to increase their capacities. This vicious cycle of capacity building to ensure security makes the structure of the international system even more insecure. This vicious circle is called a “security dilemma”.³²

In addition to liberal and realist views seeing the causes of war in the structure of the international system, there are also critical approaches to the subject. For example, according

24 Burcu Kaleoğlu, “Charles Tilly: Ulus Devletin Oluşumu”, Faruk Yalvaç (ed.), *Tarihsel Sosyoloji ve Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Nika Yayınevi, Ankara, 2018, p. 134.

25 Aslı Akçayöz ve İrem Şengül, “Michael Mann: İktidarın Çokluğu”, Faruk Yalvaç (ed.), *Tarihsel Sosyoloji ve Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Nika Yayınevi, Ankara, 2018, pp. 193-194.

26 Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, pp. 237-238.

27 Jack S. Levy, “Theories and causes of war”, Christopher J. Coyne and Rachel L. Mathers (eds.), *The Handbook on the Political Economy of War*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, Northampton, 2011, p. 18.

28 Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1981, p. 210

29 Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih: İlkçağlardan 1918’e*, 2003, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2003, p. 96.

30 Robert Gilpin, *Uluslararası İlişkilerin Ekonomi Politigi* (Çev. Murat Duran, Selçuk Oktay, M. Kadir Ceyhan and Gürkan Polat), Kripto Basım-Yayın, Ankara, 2005, p. 105.

31 Levy, *Theories and causes of war*, p. 25.

32 John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma”, *World Politics*, 2:2, 1950, p. 157.

to Marxism, the cause of wars is class struggle. Karl Marx argued that war is nothing but the expression of a certain division of labor in the organization of nations and international relations. In this framework, war is a form of violent conflict between differentiated political communities.³³ In parallel with these views, Lenin argues that war is a consequence of imperialism, whereas Bukharin interprets war as a power struggle between the owners of capital.³⁴ Another critical approach to the causes of war is the feminist approach. According to feminism, war is a phenomenon shaped by patriarchy, militarism, white supremacy, and capitalism.³⁵ In this context, the idea that war is a natural phenomenon is also a product of the masculine perspective, and the feminists criticize the fact that war is a phenomenon decided by men.³⁶

In addition to realist, liberal, and critical approaches, there is also a normative approach to the causes of war. The type of wars categorized under “Just War” includes different ideologies and perspectives. In general and in the abstract, just war involves placing the phenomenon of war on a legitimized basis. The Just War Theory has two dimensions: *Jus ad bellum* (justification) and *jus in bello* (the way, norms, and tools of waging war). According to Walzer, as the idea regarding the legitimacy of war develops, the tendency to go beyond the rules of war increases.³⁷ The first one is expressed with an adjective (“just”/“unjust”), and the second one is expressed with an adverb (“fairly”/“unfairly”).³⁸ Therefore, the starting point of a just war in terms of *jus ad bellum* changes. For example, while just war theory was developed based on Christianity in Medieval Europe,³⁹ according to Hindu tradition, war under dharma and divine law (treating civilians and wounded well, not using inhumane weapons, not attacking those who retreat, etc.) is considered just.⁴⁰ According to Marxism, a just war is internationalist, and a war aimed at saving people living in different states and being oppressed is just. In the final analysis, the goal is to end exploitation-based wars caused by capitalism.⁴¹ In another example, the post-September 11 “war on terror” discourse was included within the scope of a just war. As the most powerful state of the international system, the USA was attacked on its territory by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, and then it stated that the attack in question was not only against the USA but also against democracy.⁴² Thus, a “just war” was launched against terrorism by bending the rules of international law.⁴³ Just War is also included in the United Nations (UN) system. Article 51 of the UN Charter

33 Benno Teschke, “War and International Relations”, Marcello Musto (ed.), *The Marx Revival: Key Concepts and New Interpretations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020, p. 302.

34 Faruk Yalvaç, “Savaş ve Barış”, Atilla Eralp (ed.), *Devlet ve Otesi: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2014, p. 279.

35 Megan MacKenzie ve Nicole Wegner, “Introduction to Feminist Solutions for Ending War”, Megan MacKenzie and Nicole Wegner (eds.), *Feminist Solutions for Ending War*, Pluto Press, London, 2021, p. 1

36 Rebecca Grant, “The Quagmire of Gender and International Security”, V. Spike Peterson (ed.), *Gendered States Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder & London, 1992, p. 83 quoted in Özlem Tür and Çiğdem Aydın Koyuncu, “Feminist Uluslararası İlişkiler Yaklaşımı: Temelleri, Gelişimi, Katkı ve Sorunları”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 7:26, 2010, p. 13.

37 Michael Walzer, *Haklı Savaş Haksız Savaş: Tarihten Örneklerle Desteklenmiş Ahlakî bir Tez* (Çev. Mehmet Doğan), Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2010, pp. xi-xii.

38 Ibid, s. 46.

39 Fulya Aksu Ereker, “Haklı Savaş”, *Güvenlik Yazıları*, Ekim 2019, https://trguvenlikportali.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/HakliSavas_FulyaAksuEreker_v.1.pdf, accessed 24. 02. 2024, p. 4

40 Surya P. Sudebi, “The Concept in Hinduism of Just War”, *Journal of Conflict & Security Law*, 8:2, 2003 quoted in Alan Stephens ve Nicola Baker, *Savaşın Anlamak: 21. Yüzyıl için Strateji* (Çev. Süleyman Yazır), Phoneix Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2009, p. 268.

41 Darrel Moellendorf, “Marxism, Internationalism and the Justice of War”, *Science & Society*, 58:3, 1994, p. 264.

42 Muzaffer Ercan Yılmaz, “Westphalia’dan Günümüze Savaş”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 4:14, 2007, p. 29.

43 Richard Falk, “War and Peace in and Age of Terror and State Terrorism”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 4:14, 2007, pp. 2-4.

contains the general scope of just war within this system. However, states can use their self-defense rights until the UN Security Council takes the necessary measures.⁴⁴

As seen from the examples above, although there are similarities between perspectives on why wars occur, there are no commonalities. However, it can be argued that all these reasons affect war phenomenon from different perspectives.

2. “Why Nations Fight?” according to Richard Ned Lebow

As mentioned in the previous section, there are many different approaches to the causes of war at individual, state, and international levels. Making a hierarchy of importance among the causes of war has often induced some causes to be ignored. For example, explaining the causes of war solely in terms of the anarchic structure of the international system may lead to neglect of the inner world of individuals and the unique historicity of states. Lebow’s perspective aims to melt the different causes of the war into a single pot. Lebow demonstrates his commitment to developing an inclusive theory in international relations by dedicating his book titled *Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations* to “all those who transgress disciplinary boundaries and recognize the need to embed our understanding of international relations in a wider cultural and historical context”.⁴⁵ In this framework, emphasizing four basic reasons and motives as to why states go to war to cover fields of interest of different disciplines, Lebow claims six basic arguments about the causes of war. According to Lebow, the reasons why states go to war are fear, interest, standing, and revenge, among which the last two are particularly decisive.⁴⁶ He argues that in addition to these four reasons, there are also four basic motives driving states to war. These four motives are appetite, spirit, reason, and fear, which Lebow identifies by drawing on the ideas of Aristotle and Ancient Greek thinkers.⁴⁷ He demonstrates the relationship between the general causes of war and the motives leading to war in the following table:⁴⁸

Table 1: Relationship between Motives/Emotions, Goals, and Instruments:

Motive/Emotion	Goal	Instrument
Appetite	Satiation	Wealth
Spirit	Esteem	Honor/Standing
Fear	Security	Power

As stated before, Lebow aims to create a comprehensive theory in International Relations. In this framework, he emphasizes spirit more than other motives causing war.⁴⁹ In parallel with this, he states that most theorists neglect honor and standing as instruments of spirit as the main causes of war.⁵⁰ In this respect, Lebow claims to have developed a political paradigm based on –and attempts to explain– the spirit and applies it to International

44 Mehmet Gönlübol, *Milletlerarası Siyasi Teşkilatlanma*, Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1975, p. 364.

45 Richard Ned Lebow, *Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2010.

46 Richard Ned Lebow, *Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.

47 James Der Derian criticizes Lebow for basing his ideas too much on Ancient Greece. Lebow defends himself by stating that he prefers Ancient Greek thought because it analytically explains not only Ancient Greece but also the non-Greek world and contains essential approaches for international relations discipline. For detailed information, see Richard Ned Lebow, “Motives, evidence, identity: Engaging my critics”, *International Theory*, 2:3, 2010, p. 487, and Lebow, *Why Nations Fight?*, p. 65.

48 Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008, p. 90.

49 *Ibid.*, s. 505.

50 Richard Ned Lebow, “The Causes of War: A Reply to My Critics”, *Security Studies*, 21:2, 2012, p. 362.

Relations.⁵¹ In this framework, spirit-based causes of war are more prominent for Lebow than other causes.

The spirit-based perspective assumes that people individually and collectively seek self-esteem. Individuals want to feel good about themselves and have their self-esteem accepted by society. In other words, self-esteem not being approved by society is not meaningful.⁵² In this framework, the purpose of spirit is to gain self-respect, and the means for this is honor. Honor is divided into two categories: intrinsic and extrinsic honor. Intrinsic honor is related to one’s behavior and values.⁵³ Extrinsic honor includes behaviors that are accepted/approved through the respect of others.⁵⁴ As seen in the table above, honor, status, and standing are interwoven in Lebow’s approach.

Standing, honor, and status, which are linked to spirit, are culturally constructed phenomena as much as they are related to military power. National identity, linked to culture, is formed when a state and its citizens assert their distinctiveness from others. National identities, which form the psychological foundations of nationalism, build self-esteem.⁵⁵ As one of the main outputs of the individual or collective self and a product of political and social processes, national identity can also be formed as a result of competing discourses.⁵⁶

Lebow sees the international system as a hybrid structure in which spirit, appetite, reason, and fear coexist. He argues that balance in the international system is destabilized when reason fails to balance spirit and appetite.⁵⁷ When reason fails to balance appetite (satiation, wealth, and conquest-based politics) and spirit, fear motive emerges.⁵⁸ While spirit-driven societies conduct their conflicts for limited purposes, fear-based societies cannot limit themselves due to their confrontational characteristics. In this respect, fear-based societies are more likely to be caught in the “lobster trap” (a situation that is easy to get into and difficult to get out of).⁵⁹

In light of the abovementioned evaluations, Lebow puts forward six basic arguments about the causes of the war:⁶⁰

- The most aggressive states are rising powers aiming for great power status and dominant great powers wanting to become hegemons.
- Rising powers and dominant powers rarely fight each other.
- The preferred targets of dominant⁶¹ and rising powers⁶² are declining great powers or weaker third parties. They also target powers that are temporarily weak⁶³ and allied with other major powers.

51 Richard Ned Lebow, “Fear, interest and honour: Outlines of a theory of International Relations”, *International Affairs*, 82:3, 2006, p. 431.

52 Lebow, *Why Nations Fight?*, p. 66.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid., p. 72.

55 Richard Ned Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016, p. 3.

56 Richard Ned Lebow, “Identity and International Relations”, *International Relations*, 22:4, 2008, p. 474.

57 Lebow, *Fear, interest and honour*, pp. 446-447.

58 Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, p. 505.

59 Ibid., p. 92.

60 Lebow, *Why Nations Fight?*, pp. 91-96.

61 Dominant power is the actor more powerful than other major powers in the international system. Ibid., p. 99.

62 Rising powers are the actors aiming to achieve great power status and are recognized as such by the great powers of their time. Ibid., p. 101.

63 Weak powers are actors defined as militarily weak and can be easily defeated by dominant, rising, and great powers. Ibid. p. 103.

- Almost all so-called hegemonic wars result from accidental and unexpected escalation.
- The unexpected escalation and uncalculated balance of power have deeper causes than imperfect data.
- Weak and declining powers often start wars against great powers. Looking for revenge⁶⁴ and honor has an impact on this.

Lebow explains why states fight, the motivations leading to war, and basic assumptions about war, and then he classifies the causes of war in two ways. While the first relates to the long-term history of war and tension –its historical and sociological dimensions– the second relates to recent crises and developments.⁶⁵ This classification can also explain why the RF wants to fight with Ukraine.

3. “Why Russia fights” Ukraine?

As stated above, according to Lebow, states fight each other due to a multi-dynamic process at the intersection of motives, goals, and means. In addition, Lebow classifies the causes of war in two ways: underlying and direct causes. At first glance, it is possible to state that the RF began to fight Ukraine due to the developments occurring between 2014 and 2022. However, limiting the RF’s attacks on Ukraine to developments in these eight years may be quite superficial. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the historical and sociological dimensions of the war. It is also necessary to focus on Lebow’s classification as underlying and direct causes of the war.

The underlying causes are related to the historical and sociological roots of the war, as mentioned before. The historical roots of the war are related to how the Russians view Ukraine and Ukrainianness. For the Russians, Ukraine is an integral part of Russian history –especially of Eastern Slavism– together with Belarus.⁶⁶ Thus, Ukraine is referred to as “Little Russia” in Russian historiography.⁶⁷ The first republics that formed the USSR were the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), the Ukrainian SSR, and the Belarusian SSR.⁶⁸ In other words, according to the RF, the historical Russian territories must be together under the leadership of the RF. In this context, for Russian decision-makers and political elites, Ukraine’s becoming an independent state is considered a “weird joke of history”.⁶⁹ This approach was defended not only by the Russian nationalists but also by Russian liberal Boris Nemtsov and opposition politician Alexei Navalny, who was recently found dead in his cell.

64 Lebow mentions revenge in the context of regaining lost territory first. *Ibid.*, p. 14. However, operations launched by the USA after the September 11 Attacks were designed to restore reputation and position in the international system rather than to regain lost territories. In this respect, revenge was used to restore the self-esteem and status of the USA.

65 Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis*, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore & London, 1981, p. 1.

66 Taras Kuzio, “Ukrainian versus Pan-Russian Identities: The Roots of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine”, *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 2024, p. 3.

67 For detailed information, see Murat Jane, “Rusya Federasyonu’nun Güvenlik Strateji Belgeleri Bağlamında Kırım İlhakı’nın Tarihsel-Sembolik ve Askeri-Jeopolitik Analizi”, *International Journal of Social Inquiry*, 15:2, December 2022, pp. 418-419.

68 Daria Khlevnyuk, “The Russian “Old Left,” Conspiracies around the USSR’s Demise, and the Russo–Ukrainian War”, *Russian Analytical Digest*, 4 August 2023, <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD299.pdf>, accessed 01. 05. 2024, p. 16

69 Contrary to these views, Ukrainian nationalist elites claim that Ukraine had an ancient history of approximately 1000 years before Russian rule. In this narrative, Ukraine is part of European civilization, not historical Russia. Georgiy V. Kasanov, “Russia and Ukraine: Forever Apart? Two Countries at Loggerheads over ‘Common Past’”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 16:3, July-September, 2018, pp. 174-175.

Both politicians stated that they saw no difference between Russians and Ukrainians.⁷⁰ In his speech titled “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, RF President Vladimir Putin emphasized that Russians and Ukrainians share a common historical and spiritual space. According to Putin, Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians constitute ancient Russia. In short, the three people cannot be separated from each other. Among the arguments Putin uses when evaluating Ukraine as united with Russia is that the word Ukraine derives from the old Russian word “*okrania*” meaning periphery, and that word “Ukrainian” is the name of the security forces protecting the external borders.⁷¹ Parallel to Putin’s views, according to Kuzio, the Russian attacks in 2014 and 2022 are the result of the struggle between the idea of Ukrainianness and Pan-Russian identity, which regards Ukraine as part of the Russian world.⁷²

According to Lebow’s classification, direct causes are undoubtedly expansionist policies of the Euro-Atlantic alliance towards the near abroad of the RF.⁷³ There are historical reasons behind the RF’s perception of threats from Euro-Atlantic expansion. Therefore, anti-Westernism lies in the foundations of Russian strategic culture.⁷⁴ One of the most concrete indicators of this is that there are, in Russian historiography, two patriotic wars fought against two Western actors (Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany). Since NATO is regarded as a Western actor that expanded against Russia during the Cold War and its aftermath,⁷⁵ The Russians aimed to ensure their security against the West by establishing buffer zones around them (mainly in Eastern Europe).⁷⁶

The eastward expansion of the Euro-Atlantic alliance is a geopolitical problem for the RF, but the Russians perceive the West as a threat not only geopolitically but also culturally. According to Slavophiles and Eurasianists positioning Russians outside the West, Western civilization has a corrosive effect on Russian values and culture. While pro-Western policies were pursued in the early years of the RF, the Eurasianist and traditional discourse has become more dominant in Russian foreign policy after eastward enlargements of NATO and the EU.⁷⁷ The US-led Euro-Atlantic alliance’s attempt to transform non-Western states according to liberal values was met with a backlash from the actors critical of US hegemony, such as the RF. The two tools for the spread of the liberal civilizational model were colorful revolutions and military power.⁷⁸ Colorful revolutions were especially effective in the process leading

70 For detailed information, see Jane, *Rusya Federasyonu’nun Güvenlik Stratejileri*, p. 420.

71 Vladimir Putin, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181>, accessed 30. 04. 2024

72 Kuzio, *Ukrainian versus Pan-Russian Identities*, p. 1.

73 For example, the RF National Security Concept published in 1997 and 2000 accepts NATO’s eastern expansion as a threat. According to Sapmaz, the basis of the security documents announced in 2000 is NATO’s declaration of the “out of area” concept related to its intervention in Kosovo and the approval of post-Soviet states Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into NATO. For detailed information, see Murat Jane, *Rusya Federasyonu’nun Trans-Kafkasya Politikasının Analizi: Süreklilik mi Dönüşüm mü?*, Dora Yayıncılık, Bursa, 2020, pp. 233-235; Ahmet Sapmaz, *Rusya Federasyonu’nun Askeri Güvenlik Refleksindeki Dönüşüm: Askeri Doktrinler, Askeri Müdahaleler, Nedenler*, Nobel Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2018, p. 101. The RF’s post-2000 security documents also include its threat perceptions regarding the geopolitical and normative expansion of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance.

74 Elias Götz and Jorgen Staun, “Why Russia attacked Ukraine: Strategic culture and radicalized narratives”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 43:3, 2022, p. 482. In addition to this view, according to Sezgin Kaya, for Russians, the West is not only an interlocutor but also a target to belong to, be captured, and be overcome. With this feature, the West is positioned as “*constitutive outside*” or “*other*” in terms of Russian identity. Sezgin Kaya, *Rus Dış Politikasında Batı*, Dora Yayıncılık, Bursa, 2011, p. 251

75 Götz and Staun, *Why Russia attacked Ukraine*, p. 484.

76 *Ibid.*, p. 482.

77 Kaya, *Rus Dış Politikasında Batı*, pp. 254-256.

78 Zhao Huasheng, “The Pendulum of History: Thirty Years after the Soviet Union”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 20:1, January-March, 2022, p. 24.

to the RF's attack against Ukraine. The annexation of Crimea and the war in 2022 are the results of a colorful revolution in Ukraine. Therefore, these two developments are not only geopolitical-based but also civilization-based for the RF. According to the RF, the success of the "special operation"⁷⁹ against Ukraine will attract states in its near abroad to the Eurasian Economic Union. Moreover, this will increase the prestige of the RF.⁸⁰

According to Lebow, the status of actors in the international system directly relates to their tendency to impose their esteem on other actors. The efforts of the RF to assert its status began after the end of the Cold War and have been frequently emphasized, especially by Putin. The collapse of the USSR significantly impacted the RF's loss of status and its search for its aftermath. The collapse of the USSR should not be reduced to the collapse of any state because it was an ideological state and economic system.⁸¹ Russians established many political entities throughout history, such as Muscovite Russia, Russian Tsardom, and the RF; however, they claim to be a global power for the first time with the USSR. Therefore, the dissolution of the USSR led the Russians to define their identity and their status in the international system. This is where the "great power status", one of the components of Russian strategic culture, comes into play. According to the Russian perspective, a few great powers should lead the world, and these great powers should have their own spheres of influence. Near abroad doctrine and the Eurasian Union project include policies parallel with this perspective and discourse.⁸² According to Barry Buzan, the Russians have been trying to achieve great power status since the 19th century, but their ability to maintain it has remained limited.⁸³ For example, the Russian Tsardom was one of the five great states of the European Harmony but became disappointed after the Crimean War. After the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russians embraced Marxism, the "rebel child" of Western civilization, and being so, could not easily assert itself and its status. From the late USSR to the mid-1990s, Russia took rapid liberalization steps; however, it could not get the Euro-Atlantic Alliance to accept its concerns about NATO expansion and its need to be respected in its immediate neighborhood.⁸⁴ Ukraine's current situation is at the intersection of the security challenge the West poses and the RF's goal of achieving great power status. In this framework, not only Ukraine's membership to NATO but also Ukraine's cooperation with NATO without being a member is perceived as a threat by RF. This is because, as Götz and Staun underline, Ukraine's orientation towards the West hinders not only RF's security interests but also its perception of itself as a great power.⁸⁵ From Lebow's point of view, the loss of Ukraine negatively affects the RF's esteem, hence its standing, honor, status, and spirit as a motive.

In the post-Cold War period, facts and developments making Ukraine crucial for the RF's security and status in the international system can be summarized as follows:

79 The RF described the war with Ukraine as a "special operation" until March 22, 2024. On that date, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that the RF had launched a special operation against Ukraine; however, after the West supported Ukraine, the process turned into a de facto war. See "Rusya'dan bir ilk: Ukrayna'daki operasyon "savas" olarak tanımlandı", <https://www.haberturk.com/rusya-ukrayna-daki-ozel-askeri-operasyon-icin-ilk-defa-savas-kelimesini-kullandi-3671583>, accessed 19. 05. 2024.

80 Vyacheslav V. Sutyurin, "Special Military Operation in Ukraine: Consequences for the EAEU and Eurasian Integration", *Russia in Global Affairs*, 20: 2, April-June, 2022, p. 160.

81 Huasheng, *The Pendulum of History*, p. 12.

82 Götz and Staun, *Why Russia attacked Ukraine*, pp. 485-486.

83 Barry Buzan, "Russia in the Post-Cold War International Order", *Russia in Global Affairs*, 19:4, October-December, 2021, p. 22.

84 Richard Sakwa, "Crisis of the International System and International Politics", *Russia in Global Affairs*, 21:1, January-March, 2023, p. 77.

85 Götz and Staun, *Why Russia attacked Ukraine*, pp. 486-491.

- The presence of USSR-era nuclear weapons in newly independent post-Soviet states, including Ukraine.⁸⁶
- The significance of Crimea, a Ukrainian territory in the post-Cold War period, for both Orthodox Christianity and Russian history and the identification of possessing Crimea with great power status.⁸⁷
- Cultural reforms in Ukraine that are contrary to RF’s interests, such as the closure of the Russian Orthodox Church, the banning of pro-Russian opposition parties, and the decline of the Russian language in Ukraine.⁸⁸

As seen from the developments and examples above, and in light of Lebow’s approach, the Westernization of Ukraine has two-dimensional damage. Firstly, with the Westernization of Ukraine, the Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian ancient Russian civilization and identity will be divided, and the Russians will not be able to solve the identity problem they have been facing since the early 1990s. Secondly, a Westernized Ukraine could be used against the RF if necessary. In Lebow’s conceptualization, this would create a standing problem and mean a loss of status in the international system. For these reasons, to put it in Lebow’s approach, the RF is at war with Ukraine to preserve its spirit motive, status/pride, and impose itself on the other actors in the international system.

In light of Lebow’s perspective, this foreign policy choice of the RF is related to reasons of standing and revenge (in terms of gaining back its lost territories based on “historical justice” discourse). In his study analyzing the RF-Ukraine War in the light of international relations theories, Lebow claims that the main reason for the war in question was spirit. According to Lebow, Putin believes that the USA is determined to weaken the RF.⁸⁹

The RF’s increasing security concerns have led to an inability to balance reason with spirit, which, in turn, has led to the emergence of fear motive and the outbreak of war. In other words, according to the RF, the inability to impose its position on the other actors in the international system (great power status) has led to fear, fear has led to security concerns, and security concerns have led to the use of hard power.

Conclusion

The question “What is the West and why should its values spread?” was answered by Francis Fukuyama two years before the Cold War de jure ended: “Liberalism is good and should spread”. The spread of liberalism in the last years of the Cold War and even in the first decade of the post-Cold War period was almost unproblematic. The newly independent former Soviet republics, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which adopted the market economy from 1978 onwards, as well as India and even the RF, which rapidly progressed with shock therapy and Western integration in the post-Cold War period and even had NATO membership on the agenda, practiced liberal principles. In other words, at first glance, the liberal “end” of history seemed imminent.

Fast liberalization adopted in the post-Cold War period did not yield the expected results for the RF, which then politically and economically weakened. Developments such

86 Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism”, *International Organization*, 48:2, Spring 1994, p. 258.

87 Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*, p. 127.

88 Andrei A. Sushentshov, “Strategic Foundations of the Ukraine Crisis”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 20:2, April-June 2022, p. 25.

89 Richard Ned Lebow, “International Relations Theory and the Ukrainian War”, *Analyse & Kritik*, 44:1, 2022, p. 128.

as defeat in the First Chechnya War, the bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO, the eastward expansion of NATO, and the colorful revolutions caused the RF to reconsider its relations with the West.

Colorful revolutions, Ukraine's EU and NATO membership on the agenda, and the Maidan protests are developments escalating RF's concerns about Ukraine in the post-Cold War period. Within this framework, RF responded to developments regarding Ukraine's integration into the West with hard power. Undoubtedly, RF has also been disturbed by the inclusion of the former Soviet republics of Eastern Europe into NATO and the EU. However, in Putin's words, "Ukraine is different".⁹⁰ The reasons why Ukraine is different can be summarized as follows:

- Ukraine is in the transit geography connecting the RF with Europe.
- Ukraine's accession to NATO and the EU will negatively affect the position of the RF in the Black Sea, and the RF will also be surrounded from the south in the Black Sea.
- Ukraine is an essential part of the historic Russian identity.
- Ukraine's entry into Western influence will also mean the defeat of Russia's Eurasianist civilizational discourse.
- If Ukraine joins the Western axis, RF will lose its buffer zone with the West.

In light of the justifications mentioned above, firstly, the RF annexed Crimea in 2014 and recognized the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine, where the pro-Russian population was densely populated. Then, it annexed these four regions as a result of the referendums held in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia on September 30, 2022, after the outbreak of the RF-Ukraine War in February 2022. Within the framework of Lebow's approach, reasons for the RF-Ukraine war can be listed as follows:

- One of Lebow's six arguments regarding the causes of war is the aggressiveness of rising powers seeking great power status or those seeking to become hegemons. In the post-Cold War period, RF policymakers frequently argued that the great powers of the international system did not respect the great power status of the RF. RF foreign policy decision-makers, including Putin, emphasized that the great power status of the RF should be respected and Russian interests in the near abroad must not be ignored.
- Revenge, one of the four main causes of war identified by Lebow, generally involves regaining lost territories. Putin's "historical justice" rhetoric, which he often emphasized after the annexation of Crimea, refers to the compensation for giving Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR in 1953 and then to independent Ukraine after the collapse of the USSR. This development is one of the factors accelerating the process leading to war in 2022.
- One of the reasons for war that Lebow emphasizes is standing. According to Lebow, who equates standing with a sense of honor, the basic motivation for standing is spirit, and the aim of spirit seeking to achieve through standing is esteem. As Lebow stated in his article about the RF-Ukraine War, the main reason

⁹⁰ Vladimir Putin, "Talks with President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev", <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67830>, accessed 17. 05. 2024.

for this war is spirit. Since it lost its great power status in the international system after the USSR, the RF has aimed to regain this status during the Putin era. On the other hand, Putin, in his speech on the annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson to the RF, identified RF’s position in the international system by saying, “In 1991, the West thought that Russia would never rise after such shocks and would fall to pieces on its own. This almost happened. We remember the horrible 1990s, hungry, cold, and hopeless. But Russia remained standing, came alive, grew stronger, and occupied its rightful place in the world”. In other words, according to Lebow’s approach, the loss of Ukraine and the expansion of the West through Ukraine is considered an attack on RF’s esteem.

- Lebow identified interest as another cause of war with attacks for wealth and conquest. According to Lebow, although conquest is possible today, the cost of controlling conquered territories is not as low as it used to be. Therefore, states do not usually go to war to gain territory. However, the annexation of Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson since 2014 may contradict Lebow’s claim. Yet, Putin’s rhetoric and nature of the annexed territories –they have been described in Russian history as “*Novorossiia*”– suggest that these foreign policy moves are less about conquest and more about standing, enhancing RF’s status and affirming esteem.
- According to Lebow, the fear motive is security-oriented and can only be eliminated by force. It can be argued that the perception of the West in Russian history, the linear relationship between containment and loss of power, was behind the RF’s war against Ukraine. So, Ukraine’s possible NATO and EU membership destabilized the RF’s spirit, and the fear motive centered on security concerns led to the RF attack on Ukraine. In short, reason failed to balance spirit.

As can be understood from the developments and evaluations above, Lebow aims to analyze the causes of war in different dimensions. Therefore, it is possible to explain the historical, contemporary, and psychological dimensions of the causes of the RF-Ukraine War simultaneously through the interdisciplinary approaches of Lebow and similar theorists.

Conflict of Interest Statement:

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Author Contribution Statements:

The authors contributed to the study equally.

REFERENCES

Published Works

- AKÇAYÖZ Aslı and ŞENGÜL İrem (2018). “Michael Mann: İktidarın Çokluğu”, Faruk Yalvaç (ed.), *Tarihsel Sosyoloji ve Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Nika Yayınevi, Ankara, 181-197.
- AKGÜL Öner (2016). “Bilimsel Yöntemlerle Savaşın Nedenlerini Açıklama Yolu Olarak Savaş Çalışmaları Disiplini”, *Güvenlik Stratejileri*, 12:23, 2016, 1-34.
- BLACK Jeremy (2009). *Savaş ve Dünya: Askeri Güç ve Dünyanın kaderi 1945-2000* (Çev. Süleyman Yazır), Phoneix Yayınevi, İstanbul.
- BUZAN Barry (2021). “Russia in the Post-Cold War International Order”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 19:4, 22-35.
- CLAUSEWITZ Carl Von (2011). *Savaş Üzerine* (Çev. Selma Koçak), Doruk Yayıncılık, İstanbul.
- FALK Richard (2007). “War and Peace in and Age of Terror and State Terrorism”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 4:14, 1-15.
- FREUD Sigmund (2000). *Bir Yanılsamanın Geleceği: Uygarlık ve Hoşnutsuzlukları* (Çev. Aziz Yardımlı), İdea Yayınevi, İstanbul.
- GEORGE Alexandr L. (1969). “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 13:2, 190-222.
- GILPIN Robert (1981). *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- GILPIN Robert (2005). *Uluslararası İlişkilerin Ekonomi Politigi* (Çev. Murat Duran, Selçuk Oktay, M. Kadir Ceyhan and Gürkan Polat), Kripto Basım-Yayın, Ankara.
- GÖNLÜBOL Mehmet (1975). *Milletlerarası Siyasi Teşkilatlanma*, Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara.
- GÖTZ Elias and Jorgen Staun (2022). “Why Russia attacked Ukraine: Strategic culture and radicalized narratives”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 43:3, 482-497.
- HARDIE Iain, JOHNSON Dominic and TIERNEY Dominic (2011). “Psychological Aspects of War”, Christopher J. Coyne and Rachel L. Mathers (eds.), *The Handbook on the Political Economy of War*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, Northampton, 72-92.
- HERMANN Margaret (2003). “Assesing Leadership Style: Trait Analysis”, Jerrold Post (ed.), *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 178-214.
- HERZ John H. (1950). “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma”, *World Politics*, 2:2, 157-180.
- HOBBS Thomas (2007). *Leviathan veya Bir Din ve Dünya Devletinin İçeriği, Biçimi ve Kudreti* (çev. Semih Lim), Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul.
- HUASHENG Zhao (2022). “The Pendulum of History: Thirty Years after the Soviet Union”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 20:1, 12-18.
- HUDSON Valerie M. and DAY Benjamin S. (2020). *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland.
- ERKUL İbrahim Çağrı (2021). *Birleşik Krallık Dış Politikası 1979-2020*, Çizgi Kitabevi, Konya.
- ERKUL İbrahim Çağrı (2021). *Commonwealth’i Anlamak: Besikten Mezara Britanya İmparatorluğu*, Çizgi Kitabevi, Konya.
- JANE Hazar Vural (2019). *Velayeti Fakih ve İran Dış Politikası: Ali Hamaney’in Konumu*, Doktora Tezi, Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi, İstanbul.
- JANE Murat (2020). *Rusya Federasyonu’nun Trans-Kafkasya Politikasının Analizi: Süreklilik mi Dönüşüm mü?*, Dora Yayıncılık, Bursa.
- JANE Murat (2022). “Rusya Federasyonu’nun Güvenlik Strateji Belgeleri Bağlamında Kırım İlhakı’nın Tarihsel-Sembolik ve Askeri-Jeopolitik Analizi”, *International Journal of Social Inquiry*, 15:2, 415-436.
- KALEOĞLU Burcu (2018). “Charles Tilly: Ulus Devletin Oluşumu”, Faruk Yalvaç (ed.), *Tarihsel Sosyoloji ve Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Nika Yayınevi, Ankara, 117-134.
- KASANOV Georgiy V. (2018). “Russia and Ukraine: Forever Apart? Two Countries at Loggerheads over ‘Common Past’”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 16:3, 174-189.
- KAYA Sezgin (2011). *Rus Dış Politikasında Batı*, Dora Yayıncılık, Bursa.
- KUZIO Taras (2024). “Ukrainian versus Pan-Russian Identities: The Roots of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine”, *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 1-24.
- LEBOW Richard Ned (1981). *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis*, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore & London.
- LEBOW Richard Ned (1994). “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism”, *International Organization*, 48:2, 249-277.

- LEBOW Richard Ned (2006). “Fear, interest and honour: Outlines of a theory of International Relations”, *International Affairs*, 82:3, 431-448.
- LEBOW Richard Ned (2008). *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- LEBOW Richard Ned (2010). “Motives, evidence, identity: Engaging my critics”, *International Theory*, 2:3, 486-494.
- LEBOW Richard Ned (2010). *Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- LEBOW Richard Ned (2012). “The Causes of War: A Reply to My Critics”, *Security Studies*, 21:2, 362-367.
- LEBOW Richard Ned (2016). *National Identities and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- LEBOW Richard Ned (2022). “International Relations Theory and the Ukrainian War”, *Analyse & Kritik*, 44:1, 111-135.
- LEBOW, Richard Ned (2010). *Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.
- LEITES, Nathan (1951). *The Operational Code of Politburo*, McGraw-Hill, New York.
- LEITES, Nathan (1953). *A Study of Bolshevism*, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois.
- LEVY Jack S. (2011). “Theories and causes of war”, Christopher J. Coyne and Rachel L. Mathers (eds.), *The Handbook on the Political Economy of War*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, Northampton, 13-33.
- MACKENZIE Megan and WEGNER Nicole (2021). “Introduction to Feminist Solutions for Ending War”, Megan MacKenzie and Nicole Wegner (eds.), *Feminist Solutions for Ending War*, Pluto Press, London, 1-14.
- MOELLENDORF Darrel (1994). “Marxism, Internationalism and the Justice of War”, *Science & Society*, 58:3, 264-286.
- MORGENTHAU Hans J. (1948). *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York.
- ÖZDAL Barış (2020). “1. Dünya Savaşı’nın Diplomasinin Gelişimine Etkileri”, Barış Özdal and R. Kutay Karaca (eds.), *Diplomasi Tarihi-2*, Dora Yayınları, Bursa, 1-82.
- ÖZDAL Barış (2022). “Diplomasi”, Barış Özdal and R. Kutay Karaca (eds.), *Diplomasi Tarihi-1*, Dora Yayınları, Bursa, 27-96.
- PAZARCI Hüseyin (2004). *Uluslararası Hukuk*, Turhan Kitabevi, Ankara.
- SAKWA Richard (2023). “Crisis of the International System and International Politics”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 21:1, 70-91.
- SANDER Oral (2003). *Siyasi Tarih: İlkçağlardan 1918’e*, 2003, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, Ankara.
- SANDER Oral (2009). *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, Ankara.
- SAPMAZ Ahmet (2018). *Rusya Federasyonu’nun Askeri Güvenlik Refleksindeki Dönüşüm: Askeri Doktrinler, Askeri Müdahaleler, Nedenler*, Nobel Yayıncılık, Ankara.
- STEPHENS Alan and BAKER Nicola (2009). *Savaşın Anlamak: 21. Yüzyıl için Strateji* (Çev. Süleyman Yazır), Phoneix Yayınevi, İstanbul.
- SUSHENTSHOV Andrei A. (2022). “Strategic Foundations of the Ukraine Crisis”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 20:2, 24-27.
- SUTYRIN Vyacheslav V. (2022). “Special Military Operation in Ukraine: Consequences for the EAEU and Eurasian Integration”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, 20:2, 158-163.
- ŞAHİN Hakan (2016). “Tarihsel Süreçte Savaşların Devletin Oluşumu ve Dönüşümündeki Rolü”, *Pamukkale Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 24, 368-386.
- TESCHKE Benno (2020). “War and International Relations”, Marcello Musto (ed.), *The Marx Revival: Key Concepts and New Interpretations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 302-319.
- TÜR Özlem and KOYUNCU Çiğdem Aydın (2010). “Feminist Uluslararası İlişkiler Yaklaşımı: Temelleri, Gelişimi, Katkı ve Sorunları”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 7:26, 3-24.
- WALTZ Kenneth (2001). *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, Columbia University Press, New York.
- WALZER Michael (2010). *Haklı Savaş Haksız Savaş: Tarihten Örneklerle Desteklenmiş Ahlaki bir Tez* (çev. Mehmet Doğan), Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul.
- YALVAÇ Faruk (2007). “Rousseau’nun Savaş ve Barış Kuramı: Adalet Olarak Barış”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 14:4, 121-160.

- YALVAÇ Faruk (2014), “Savaş ve Barış”, Atilla Eralp (ed.), *Devlet ve Ötesi: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 251-285.
- YILMAZ Muzaffer Ercan (2007). “Westphalia’ dan Günümüze Savaş”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 4:14, 17-38.

Internet Sources

- EREKER Fulya Aksu (2019). “Haklı Savaş”, *Güvenlik Yazıları*, Ekim 2019, https://trguvenlikportali.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/HakliSavas_FulyaAksuEreker_v.1.pdf, accessed 24. 02. 2024.
- KHLEVNYUK Daria (2023). “The Russian “Old Left,” Conspiracies around the USSR’s Demise, and the Russo–Ukrainian War”, *Russian Analytical Digest*, 4 August 2023, <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD299.pdf>, accessed 01. 05. 2024.
- PUTIN Vladimir (2021). “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181>, accessed 30. 04. 2024.
- PUTIN Vladimir (2022). “Signing of treaties on accession of Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics and Zaporozhye and Kherson regions to Russia”, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465>, accessed 17.05.2024.
- PUTIN Vladimir (2022). “Talks with President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev”, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67830>, accessed 17. 05. 2024.
- “Rusya’ dan bir ilk: Ukrayna’ daki operasyon “savaş” olarak tanımlandı”, <https://www.haberturk.com/rusya-ukrayna-daki-ozel-askeri-operasyon-icin-ilk-defa-savas-kelimesini-kullandi-3671583>, accessed 19. 05. 2024.

The Competition of Dominant Powers in the International System and the US-China Encounter in the Horn of Africa (2012-2022)*

Uluslararası Sistemde Hakim Güçlerin Rekabeti ve Afrika Boynuzu'nda
ABD-Çin Karşılaşması (2012-2022)

Kaan

DEVECİOĞLU**

* This article is based on the author's doctoral dissertation titled "US-China Competition in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait from the Perspective of Power Transition Theory (2011-2021)."

** Dr., Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM), North African Studies, Ankara, Türkiye
e-mail: kaandevecioglu@yahoo.com
ORCID: 0000-0001-5635-4308

Geliş Tarihi / Submitted:
02.06.2024

Kabul Tarihi / Accepted:
31.07.2024

Abstract

This study examines the power competition between the United States (US) and China in the Horn of Africa within the framework of Power Transition Theory (PTT). Using the concept of dissatisfaction, the study explores three main hypotheses: 1) the US as a satisfied dominant power and China as a dissatisfied rising power; 2) the US as a dissatisfied dominant power and China as a satisfied rising power; and 3) both actors being satisfied with the current international system. The Multiple Hierarchy Model is also applied when arguing these hypotheses. Through theory-testing process tracing, the study analyzes the geopolitical and geoeconomic implications of the competition in the Horn of Africa, focusing on military presence, technological infrastructure, regional disputes, and economic investments. The findings highlight how the strategic location of Djibouti and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait plays a critical role in the US-China rivalry, influencing military strategies, telecommunications projects, and regional stability efforts. The study concludes that both the US and China engage in a mix of competition and cooperation, with significant impacts on the Horn of Africa's political and economic landscape. This nuanced analysis contributes to the literature on PTT by providing empirical insights into the complex dynamics of US-China relations in a strategically vital region.

Keywords: Power Transition Theory, US-China Rivalry, International System, Horn of Africa, Red Sea

Öz


Bu çalışma, Güç Geçişi Teorisi (Power Transition Theory-PTT) çerçevesinde Afrika Boynuzu'nda Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ile Çin arasındaki güç rekabetini incelemektedir. Çalışma, memnuniyetsizlik kavramından yararlanarak, üç ana hipotezi araştırmaktadır: 1) mevcut uluslararası sistemden memnun bir hâkim güç olarak ABD ve bundan memnun olmayan yükselen bir güç olarak Çin; 2) mevcut uluslararası sistemden memnun olmayan hakim bir güç olarak ABD ve bundan memnun yükselen bir güç olarak Çin; 3) mevcut uluslararası sistemden memnun olan ABD ve Çin. Bu hipotezler ele alınırken Çoklu Hiyerarşi Modeli'ne başvurulmaktadır. Çalışma teori testi aracılığıyla Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki bu rekabetin jeopolitik ve jeoekonomik etkilerini analiz etmekte ve askerî varlık, teknolojik altyapı, bölgesel anlaşmazlıklar ve ekonomik yatırımlara odaklanmaktadır. Elde edilen bulgular, Cibuti ve Babülmendep Boğazı'nın stratejik konumunun ABD-Çin rekabetinde nasıl kritik bir rol oynadığını ve bu konumun askerî stratejileri, telekomünikasyon projelerini ve bölgesel istikrar çabalarını nasıl etkilediğini ortaya koymaktadır. Çalışma hem ABD hem de Çin'in bir rekabet ve iş birliği karşımı içinde olduğu ve bunun da Afrika Boynuzu'nun siyasi ve ekonomik manzarası üzerinde önemli etkiler doğurduğu sonucuna varmaktadır. Bu analiz, stratejik açıdan hayati bir bölgede ABD-Çin ilişkilerinin karmaşık dinamiklerine dair ampirik bilgiler sunarak PTT literatürüne katkıda bulunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güç Geçişi Teorisi, ABD-Çin Rekabeti, Uluslararası Sistem, Afrika Boynuzu, Kızıldeniz

Introduction

In International Relations (IR), power refers to the control actors exert over events and resources. The power of states in the international system is determined by numerous variables, including their internal political capacities, qualities of territories and demographics, economic and military development, and technological advancements. According to the Power Transition Theory (PTT) proposed by Abramson Kenneth (AFK) Organski in 1958 after the 1956 Suez Crisis, the rise or fall of these capacities brings states' power capabilities closer together. This convergence escalates competition among states over political, economic, military, social, and societal influence in various regions. In this context, dissatisfaction with their current status in the international system leads states to desire a revision of the power hierarchy, triggering negative outcomes such as civil wars and coups in sub-regional systems like the Horn of Africa. This competition in the hierarchy among states can result in the fragmentation of existing countries and the emergence of new states, or, as seen in the case of Djibouti, contribute to the development of these nations.

Figure 1. The Inverted Pyramid of Power, Hierarchy, and Satisfaction¹



In examining the power transition dynamics between the United States (US) and China within the context of their competition in the Horn of Africa, this study explores the varying degrees of satisfaction these actors have with the existing international order, offering a nuanced perspective on their strategic interactions. Traditional PTT posits two primary hypotheses: 1) the US, as the established hegemon, is inherently satisfied with the current system, while China, as the ascendant power, is revisionist and dissatisfied; alternatively, 2) China, benefiting from the existing system, is satisfied, and the US, threatened by China's rise, is revisionist and dissatisfied. This study proposes a third hypothesis, suggesting that both powers exhibit satisfaction with the current system to varying extents, influenced by geopolitical, economic, and strategic factors in the Horn of Africa. The region's strategic importance—marked by its location at the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden nexus, pivotal trade routes, and significant energy transportation corridors—coupled with China's Belt and Road investments and the US's commitment to security and free passage, underscores its role in

¹ Ronald Tammen, "The Organski Legacy: A Fifty-Year Research Program", *International Interactions*, 34, 2008, p. 319.

US-China power dynamics. Additionally, local conflicts, terrorism threats, and recurrent humanitarian crises necessitate robust involvement from both powers, each leveraging aid and development efforts to enhance their influence, thereby rendering the Horn of Africa a critical arena for interpreting US-China relations through the lens of competition, cooperation, and pragmatic indirect cooperation.

In the literature of IR, most studies examine the hypothesis of a dissatisfied China. However, there are limited studies on the hypothesis that the US is dissatisfied with the system it established.² Therefore, this study contributes to the existing literature by examining both propositions and exploring a third alternative hypothesis that both actors are satisfied with the current system.

On the other hand, in this article, with a focus on the Horn of Africa, applying the Multiple Hierarchy Model³ in the analysis of PTT allows us to evaluate the power dynamics in the region more accurately and comprehensively. As mentioned above, while PTT emphasizes the satisfaction of dominant powers with the current international system, the Multiple Hierarchy Model suggests that this satisfaction can vary across different regions and issues. In a strategically significant region like the Horn of Africa, understanding the positions of actors such as the US and China in various hierarchical orders and their satisfaction with these orders enables us to identify their strategic goals and interests in the region more clearly. This model provides a more balanced and detailed power assessment by analyzing the influence of each actor separately in different areas such as security, economy, and diplomacy.

The application of this model helps us reflect the power balances and international relations in the Horn of Africa more accurately. Analyzing the levels of satisfaction/dissatisfaction of actors in different issues addresses the shortcomings that may arise from focusing on a single hierarchy. For example, while the US may be satisfied with the regional order in security matters, China may experience dissatisfaction with its economic projects. The integration of the Multiple Hierarchy Model into this article contributes to a better understanding of the complex power dynamics and strategic behaviors of actors in the region, thereby aiding in the development of more effective and sustainable policy recommendations.

The Multiple Hierarchy Model offers a useful framework for explaining how the international system operates within different regions and local hierarchies. The Horn of Africa is a significant region that demonstrates the explanatory power of this model. The competition between the US and China in this region is important for understanding both global and local power dynamics. Due to its strategic geographic location at the intersection of maritime trade routes and its natural resources, the Horn of Africa is a significant region for both local and global powers. In the local hierarchy, Ethiopia is the dominant power, while the influence of global powers (the US and China) is also decisive. According to the Multiple Hierarchy Model, the intervention of dominant powers in local hierarchies directly affects the order and power dynamics in the region. The competition between the US and China in the

2 Ronald L. Tammen and Jacek Kugler, "Power Transition and China-US Conflicts", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 1:1, 2006, pp. 35-55; Shaun Breslin, "China's Emerging Global Role: Dissatisfied Responsible Great Power", *Politics*, 30:1, 2010, pp. 52-62; Yves-Heng Lim, "How (dis) Satisfied is China? A Power Transition Theory Perspective", *Journal of Contemporary China*, 24:92, 2015, pp. 280-297; Serafettin Yilmaz and Wang Xiangyu, "Power Transition Theory Revisited: When Rising China Meets Dissatisfied United States", *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, 50:3, 2019, pp. 317-341.

3 Douglas Lemke, *Multiple Hierarchies in World Politics*, Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, 1993; Douglas Lemke, *Regions of War and Peace*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.

Horn of Africa should be examined in this context. Both countries pursue different strategies to increase their influence in the region.

The US adopts a security-based approach in the Horn of Africa, while China exhibits an economy-based approach. In this context, there are areas in which these two actors perform cooperation or competition. Counterterrorism, maritime security, and the support of stable governments are among the US' primary goals. This strategy is manifested through the establishment of military bases, military cooperation with local governments, and intelligence sharing. In particular, the US has developed close military relations with Somalia and Kenya. On the other hand, China aims to increase its influence in the region through infrastructure investments, trade agreements, and economic aid. Establishing a large naval base in Djibouti as part of the "Belt and Road" initiative indicates China's strategic interests in the region. Additionally, China expands its economic influence by investing in large infrastructure projects in countries like Ethiopia and Kenya.

The competition between the US and China in the Horn of Africa also affects the dynamics of local hierarchies. The intervention of dominant powers increases the potential for both cooperation and conflict among local powers.⁴ For example, the US military aid and China's economic investments enable the states in the region to maximize their own interests while also fueling regional competition. According to the Multiple Hierarchy Model, local powers' dissatisfaction and parity status determine the likelihood of stability and war in the region.⁵ For instance, if Ethiopia feels unsupported by the US, it might pursue aggressive policies to change the order in the regional hierarchy and establish closer relations with alternative actors, primarily China. In this scenario, the intervention of dominant powers could lead to an increase in local conflicts.

When analyzed within the conceptual framework of the Multiple Hierarchy Model, the US-China competition in the Horn of Africa provides a better understanding of the region's power dynamics. The intervention of dominant powers in local hierarchies increases the potential for both cooperation and conflict. In this context, the strategies of the US and China in the region are shaped by the dissatisfaction and parity statuses of local powers, directly affecting the stability dynamics in the region. The primary aim of this study is to understand the US-China competition, cooperation, competition, or indirect pragmatic cooperation in the Horn of Africa from the perspective of the dissatisfaction concept in PTT, starting from the inception of the "Pivot to Asia" strategy during the Obama administration⁶ and China's "Marching Westwards" strategy⁷ until 2021. In this context, US dissatisfaction is typically shaped by a series of internal and external factors legitimized by referring to China as a challenging actor. The US utilizes and benefits from various international organizations (such as the United Nations [UN], North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], and World Trade Organization [WTO]) that it dominates within its interests.

Research Problems

This study addresses two primary problems. The first is to scrutinize the hypotheses in the context of the dissatisfaction concept in PTT: the US is satisfied, and China is dissatisfied; the US is dissatisfied, and China is satisfied; and both actors are satisfied. The second problem

4 Lemke, *Regions of War and Peace*, p. 52.

5 Ibid, pp. 67-69.

6 Chi Wang, *Obama's Challenge to China: The Pivot to Asia*, Routledge, New York, 2016.

7 Cheng Yi Lin, "Xi Jinping, the US, and New Model of Major Country Relations", *Prospect Journal*, 34:1, 2015, pp.12-19.

is to explain the US-China encounter in the Horn of Africa in terms of the dissatisfaction concept of PTT, given the strategic importance of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which borders the Horn of Africa and serves as a competition arena for major powers regarding control over international economics and politics. Therefore, the main research problem of this study is to understand the reasons for the reflections of the US-China competition in the Horn of Africa and explain these actors' levels of satisfaction with the order in this geography within the context of PTT.

Methodology

The literature on process tracing methodology has four variants: theory testing, theory building, theory revision, and explaining case outcomes. Considering the content of this study, the theory-testing process tracing method is used. The primary aim of this method is to determine whether the selected theory works on the case study and whether the theory needs revision.⁸ In this context, the “theory-testing process tracing” method is chosen in this study to test the hypotheses established within the framework of PTT regarding the US-China competition in the Horn of Africa.

The theory-testing process tracing method is used to explain whether a theory with defined causes and effects works on a selected case.⁹ In the literature, this method has two dimensions: minimalist and in-depth research. Minimalist theory-testing analysis is used when there is little knowledge about the theory and the case. In this sense, in their study “Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool”, Andrew Bennet and Jeffrey Checkel question whether the minimalist theory testing analysis is “diagnostic evidence”.¹⁰ Therefore, the minimalist dimension is used when there is little information about the theory and the case, and in this sense, the cause-and-effect relationships between the selected cases in the context of the theory should be analyzed.¹¹

For example, in the context of this study, during the US-China competition in the Horn of Africa, while the US decided to develop its military base in Djibouti in 2015, China made an agreement to establish a military facility in Djibouti the same year and opened its base in 2017. On the other hand, while their interests conflicted in the Tigray crisis in Ethiopia, the US and China continued their indirect pragmatic cooperation in combating terrorism in Somalia and ensuring trade security against piracy in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.


8 Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, *Process-tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines*, University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 2019, p. 1-12.

9 Ingo Rohlffing, “Comparative Hypothesis Testing via Process Tracing”, *Sociological Methods and Research*, 43:4, 2014, p. 613.

10 Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel, *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, p. 7.

11 Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, *Process-Tracing Methods...*, pp. 245-246.

Figure 2. The Three Steps of In-depth Theory-Testing Process Tracing Method¹²



The in-depth theory-testing dimension is employed by establishing cause-and-effect relationships through empirical data pertaining to a theory with a justified belief. This dimension aims to yield stronger inferences. In-depth theory-testing process tracing enables the establishment of inferences about how a process will conclude by presenting empirical data for each part of the activities within a causal mechanism.¹³ Thus, while the minimalist dimension in theory-testing process tracing allows for macro-level evaluation of studies, the in-depth dimension contributes to the analysis of micro-level processes.

Figure 2 illustrates the three steps involved in the in-depth theory-testing process tracing method. According to this method, the first step involves using two actions presumed to be linked by cause and effect in the context of the empirical findings of the hypothesis established in the study. Therefore, this step employs the existing theoretical and empirical literature, which helps articulate the intervening variables (causal links) between cause and effect. In his 1996 study “Causal Explanation in the Social Sciences”, Daniel Little describes this step as the “capacity to produce a particular kind of result under the right antecedent conditions”.¹⁴ The second step involves operationalizing the intervening variables within the cause-and-effect relationship in the context of the theory. Hence, empirical findings are positioned within the hypotheses established in the theoretical context. The third step involves developing and analyzing the collected evidence.

¹² Ibid, p. 246.

¹³ Phyllis McKay Illari and Federica Russo, *Causality: Philosophical Theory Meets Scientific Practice*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, p. 207.

¹⁴ Daniel Little, “Causal Explanation in the Social Sciences”, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 34:S1, 1996, p. 31-56.

Therefore, in the first step context, this article addresses the arguments of three fundamental hypotheses regarding the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the US and China with the order in the international system. In the second step, these arguments are reinforced through empirical findings. In the third step, the article analyzes the empirical findings obtained concerning the cause-and-effect relationships of the hypotheses.

In the practical application of the methodology, both primary and secondary sources have been utilized. For primary sources, the study has examined official documents from the US and China, as well as statements from leaders and foreign policy-makers. It also has scanned newspaper reports and conducted interviews with academics, diplomats, researchers, and journalists during various academic meetings. As for secondary sources, the articles, theses, books, and current journal reports of academic value have been utilized through a review of academic databases.

Based on this, the study first conceptualizes of the dominant power competition between the US and China and the concept of dissatisfaction in PTT. This section scrutinizes the theoretical approach of the study and the competition between the US and China within the context of the international system. The second part of the study analyzes how the levels of satisfaction of actors with the international system, based on the international competition between the US and China, reflect in the sub-regional system of the Horn of Africa. Within this scope, topics such as military bases, undersea fiber optic networks, the Eritrea-Ethiopia dispute, the Tigray civil war, and China's debt-trap diplomacy are examined through the lenses of competition and cooperation.

1. Dominant Power Competition Between the US and China: Dissatisfaction in the International System and Conceptual Framework

In this study, the term “dominant power” is used instead of the more commonly used term “hegemony” in the IR literature to describe the competition between the US and China. The primary reason for this choice is the events following September 11, 2001, in which allied states did not support the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the subsequent withdrawal from these countries, indicating that the US is not a “hegemon” anymore in the international system. Despite maintaining its economic power during this period, the US suffered an image loss in terms of its political, security, and socio-cultural power capacities.¹⁵ In the model of international system hierarchy within PTT, actors satisfied with the order are defined as dominant powers.

In PTT, the concept of dissatisfaction fundamentally implies that a rising power tends to be dissatisfied with the existing order in the international system and seeks to reform or change it, while the dominant power is naturally satisfied with the structure of the current system and inclined to maintain the order.¹⁶ Studies in the IR literature examining global power competition between the US and China within the context of PTT's concept of dissatisfaction primarily discuss two hypotheses as inverse correlation.

Organski formulated PTT with two fundamental domestic variables: industrialization and political capacity.¹⁷ This approach is similar to Robert Gilpin's concept of differential growth rates, which he defined as a destabilizing factor in the international system in

15 Christopher Layne, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay”, *International Security*, 34:1, 2009, pp. 147-172.

16 Serafettin Yilmaz and Wang Xiangyu, “Power Transition Theory Revisited When Rising China Meets Dissatisfied United States”, *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, 5:3, 2019, pp. 317-341.

17 A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1968, p. 42.

his hegemonic stability theory. However, it can be said that Gilpin's approach expanded Organski's view and gained more prominent acceptance. In this context, Gilpin emphasizes that the changing power distributions among domestic political elites and local rival coalitions influence the states' foreign policy and can be linked to the political capacity of leaders to achieve their foreign policy goals.¹⁸ Additionally, in the PTT literature on the concept of dissatisfaction, the analysis level of the international system is assumed to be a theory, and the causes of the results are explained through a series of formulations such as globalization, industrialization, economic growth, technological development, and military modernization.¹⁹

On the other hand, Douglas Lemke's Multiple Hierarchy Model is helpful for explaining these hypotheses in the context of the international system in general and sub-regional systems in particular. In this context, Douglas Lemke argues that the international system has a multi-layered structure and that major powers can establish their own hegemonic hierarchies in different regions.²⁰ This model helps us understand the effects of global powers like the USA and China not only on a global level but also on a regional level. For example, China tries to establish a strong hierarchy in East Asia and Southeast Asia, consolidating its power in these regions through its claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea and its economic influence over the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. The USA, on the other hand, tries to balance China's influence in East Asia with allies like Japan and South Korea and in Southeast Asia with countries like the Philippines and Vietnam. The overlapping hierarchical structures in these regions increase the potential for conflict at both regional and global levels.²¹

In Africa, China's efforts to increase its influence through extensive investments and infrastructure projects are countered by the USA's attempts to balance this influence through diplomatic and economic means. According to Lemke's model, the hierarchical structures in these sub-regional systems become the stage for competition between major powers. This competition has the potential to lead to direct military conflict in regions like the East China Sea or the South China Sea, as well as causing instabilities through economic and diplomatic tensions in Africa.²² The Multiple Hierarchy Model provides an essential theoretical framework to understand the effects of the US-China rivalry on the international system and its reflections in sub-regional systems.

Based on this background, the following sections of the study will examine the power competition between the US and China in the international system within the framework of these three hypotheses:

1. The dissatisfaction of rising power China with the order in the international system dominated by the US.
2. The dissatisfaction of the US with the order due to the challenge posed by rising power China to Washington's influence in international politics.
3. The satisfaction of both actors with the order in the international system.

18 Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pp. 96-104.

19 Richard Lebow, Ned Richard Ned and Benjamin Valentino, "Lost in Transition: A Critical Analysis of Power Transition Theory", *International Relations*, 23:3, 2009, p. 390.

20 Lemke, *Regions of War and Peace*, pp. 48-66

21 Tammen, Ronald L., et al., *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century*, Chatham House Publishers, London, UK, 2000.

22 Lemke, *Regions of War and Peace*, pp. 161-181.

1.1. Hypothesis of China as a Revisionist Actor

The IR literature discusses that the rise of China as a growing power challenging the interests of the dominant power, the US, has led to tensions in the international system. In this context, the concept of dissatisfaction within PTT, examined in this study, is enriched by contributions from both liberal and realist schools of thought in IR. Both liberal and realist schools agree that states at the lower levels of the international system hierarchy (see Figure 1) can be satisfied through consent or coercion, thereby maintaining peace and stability.

The liberals' "hegemonic stability theory" asserts that peace and stability are ensured in the international system, provided that there is a hegemonic power. The dominant power can achieve this through consent-based acceptance or by compelling other states to accept its hegemonic position through colonialism and hard power.²³ Neorealists' "balance of power" theory, on the other hand, assumes that rising powers are keen to join and be satisfied with the global regime established by the dominant state due to an asymmetrical power alignment between themselves and the "hegemon state".²⁴

The PTT literature on the concept of dissatisfaction aims to identify the factors that lead to satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the international system. Thus, satisfaction denotes cooperation between the dominant power and the rising power, while dissatisfaction signifies competition and challenge to the dominant power. Organski also posits that a state dominating the international system is naturally more satisfied with the international order it mainly created and controls.²⁵ Hence, in the context of this study, China, as a rising power, is identified as the primary agent of dissatisfaction with the international system.

As China rises in the international system, there has been a parallel increase in academic studies focusing on Beijing's stance towards the current global order and the dominant power, the US. The hypothesis depicting China as a dissatisfied rising power in an international system dominated by the US is analyzed in the study through fundamental concepts like economic growth agreements fostering mutual dependency (free trade and regional trade agreements), military alliances (such as NATO and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific), security arrangements (such as nuclear arms control), global governance mechanisms (such as climate change), and categorizations of foreign policy preferences (revisionist, reformist, conformist, or indifferent). This approach is taken because the PTT literature on dissatisfaction developed during a period of unipolarity in the international system after the Cold War, where the US was considered the unrivaled dominant power, even by its Western allies.²⁶

In the 1990s, while it was on the verge of rapid growth,²⁷ China presented a profile of a weak state in terms of economic and technological development. During this period, the US portrayed a profile of a satisfied actor with the international order, while China emerged as a rising yet dissatisfied challenger in economic, political, cultural, and military terms in both East Asia and other regions of the world.²⁸ For instance, during the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, China's response to the US's security aid to Taiwan by placing missiles on its

23 Michael C. Webb and Stephen D. Krasner, "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment", *Review of International Studies*, 15:2, 1989, pp. 184-186.

24 John Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism", Tim Dunne, Kurki Milja & Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, pp. 71-88.

25 Organski, "World Politics", p. 366.

26 Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment" *Foreign Affairs*, 70:1, 1991, p. 23.

27 Kadir Temiz, "Çin'in Ortadoğu Bölgesini Etkileyen Bölgesel ve Küresel Rekabet Unsurları", *Istanbul Medeniyet Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 3:2, 2018, p. 33.

28 Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy, "Power Shifts and Problems Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43:6, 1999, pp. 675-704.

own shore led to a series of geopolitical challenges.²⁹ Similarly, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO forces led by the US in 1999³⁰ and the collision of a US Navy reconnaissance plane with a Chinese fighter jet near Hainan Island in 2001 (known as the spy plane crisis) are historical developments indicating Beijing's dissatisfaction with the order.³¹

There are three main approaches in the PTT literature critiquing China's dissatisfaction with the current configuration of the international system. The first approach is Alastair Iain Johnston's (2003) five indicators, categorizing state behavior into two groups. The first three indicators identify China's willingness to change the international system: insufficient participation, temporary participation, and participation without accepting institutional rules. The second group consists of two indicators: the internationalization of a radical redistribution of power in the international system and, if necessary, the redistribution of power through military means.³² Johnston concludes that China's revisionism in the international system has become more compatible and participatory within international institutional arrangements.³³

The second approach is Ronald Tammen and Jacek Kugler's five fundamental indicators to measure China's satisfaction with the US-led international system. These indicators include territorial disputes between actors (such as China's Taiwan issue), security matters (like the US's arms exports to regional states in the Taiwan issue and China's missile deployment against this move), participation in international and regional organizations (like the US in NATO and China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization), ideological differences between actors, and economic interdependence as competitive areas. Based on these indicators, Tammen and Kugler conclude that there is no balance of power in the competition between the US and China, and their relations progress on a stable ground.³⁴

The third approach assumes that China's revisionist demands in the international system are limited to the demands for economic prosperity and regional security (such as the Taiwan issue) within its domestic politics.³⁵ Therefore, the Beijing administration will only make revisionist demands limited to economic issues if Chinese society is dissatisfied with the economic situation and environmental security. According to authors supporting the third approach, such as Breslin, China depends on the US for its economic development due to the need for institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) established by the Bretton Woods Agreement.³⁶ Therefore, if China becomes a power equal to the US in political, economic, and military terms, it may demand changes in the structure of these institutions in its favor.

In conclusion, as noted in the studies by academics questioning the orientation of the international system over the last twenty years from mainstream theories of IR such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism, China is dissatisfied with the order where the US is

29 Robert S. Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force", *International Security*, 25:2, 2000, p. 87-123.

30 Kerry Dumbaugh, "Chinese Embassy Bombing in Belgrade: Compensation Issues", *Congressional Research Service*, Washington D.C., 2000.

31 Patrick Martin, "Spy Plane Standoff Heightens US-China Tensions", *World Socialist Web Site*, 03.04.2001. <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2001/04/spy-a03.pdf>, accessed 30.05.2024.

32 Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" *International Security*, 27:4, 2003, p. 11.

33 Ibid. p.49.

34 Ronald L. Tammen and Jacek Kugler, "Power Transition and China-US Conflicts", *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 1:1, 2006, pp. 46-50.

35 Avery Goldstein, "Power Transitions, Institutions, and China's Rise in East Asia: Theoretical Expectations and Evidence", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 30:5, 2007, pp. 643-644.

36 Shaun Breslin, "China's Emerging Global Role: Dissatisfied Responsible Great Power", *Politics*, 30:1, p. 55.

the dominant power. In this sense, China follows revisionist political strategies regarding the current order of the international system. However, China's revisionist stance has been pragmatic rather than ideological, as seen during the Cold War. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), announced by China in 2013, was interpreted as ideological alignment with the US's interests.³⁷ However, this initiative by Beijing has led to the emergence of harsh views against China in the mainstream circles of US politics due to its challenge to the fundamental areas of economic and geopolitical interests of the US in international politics.³⁸ Consequently, former US President Donald Trump's "trade war" initiated against China's rise in the international system is based on policies following the announcement of the BRI, as well as the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In this context, the SCO and AIIB can be interpreted as a reinterpretation of the US's Marshall Aid policies after World War II. Therefore, these criticisms give rise to the hypothesis that the US is dissatisfied with the international system, which will be examined in the next section.

1.2. Hypothesis of the US as a Revisionist Actor

The second hypothesis discussed in the literature on the concept of dissatisfaction within PTT is that China, as a rising power, is satisfied with the order and challenges the US, the dominant power that dominates the international system and that is dissatisfied. This section aims to examine this hypothesis. This hypothesis gained prominence in the IR literature, particularly following the trade war initiated by the Trump administration against China after Donald Trump took office in 2017. Therefore, it examines events indicating the US's dissatisfaction with the international system, starting from the trade war by the Trump administration following Obama's 2011 Pivot to Asia policy. The primary research problem in this context is to understand the reasons for the US's dissatisfaction with the international order and the implications of this dissatisfaction for the international system.

Examined in the previous section, the hypothesis of China as a dissatisfied rising power in the international system dominated by the US has revealed a vast body of literature on this topic. However, the literature on China being satisfied with the order and the US being dissatisfied is less extensively explored. The literature in this area primarily focuses on the economic, technological, ideological, security, regional, and global dynamics of the US policies following Trump's victory in the 2017 election. For instance, during the Trump era, the US administration enacted several significant international regulations in political, economic, and technological fields, demonstrating its dissatisfaction with the order in the international system.³⁹ Through this method, the US developed policies to weaken the Chinese administration.

The US's dissatisfaction with the international system can be explained by four main reasons. First, during the Trump era, the US withdrew from global governance mechanisms such as the Paris Agreement on climate change, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).⁴⁰ Second, in the context of security interests, the US withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)

37 Joel Gehrke, "State Department Preparing for Clash of Civilizations with China", *Washington Examiner*, 30.04.2019. <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/state-department-preparing-for-clash-of-civilizations-with-china>, accessed 30.05.2024.

38 Ibid.

39 Serafettin Yilmaz ve Wang Xiangyu, "Power Transition Theory Revisited When Rising China Meets Dissatisfied United States", *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, 5:3, 2019, pp. 317-341.

40 Matt McGrath, "US rejoins Paris accord: Biden's first act sets tone for ambitious approach", *BBC News*, 19.02.2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-55732386>, accessed 30.05.2024.

and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran (P5+1: US, China, UK, France, Russia, and Germany). Third, the US withdrew from UN-affiliated organizations such as the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Human Rights Council. Fourth, the US decided to reduce the number of troops involved in peacekeeping and peace-sustaining activities in various parts of the world and invited other regional powers to share responsibilities. Additionally, alongside these withdrawals, the US also pulled its financial and administrative support from many international institutions,⁴¹ indicating its dissatisfaction with its position in the international system due to geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges.

The US's dissatisfaction with the international system due to China's rise can be examined through three primary approaches. The first approach is the development of the "America First" rhetoric of the Trump era.⁴² As explained above, the Trump administration adopted unilateral rhetoric in diplomacy by withdrawing from international organizations and agreements and presenting an anti-globalization profile. In contrast, China has positioned itself as a global actor that adapts to new conditions. For instance, during the Trump era, China's constructive political stance on many global crises (such as the peace process on the Korean Peninsula, the Iran nuclear deal, and disputes in the South and East China Seas) demonstrated that it is a rising power satisfied with the international system. Conversely, the US's unilateral policies, such as the "trade war" and withdrawal from international organizations under the Trump administration, indicated that the US was a dissatisfied dominant power in the international system.⁴³ While the US localized itself with the "America First" rhetoric, it also pressured China in its region over issues like human rights violations in East Turkestan and Myanmar.

The second primary approach to explaining the US's dissatisfaction with the international system due to China's rise is economy-based. Beijing's BRI and AIIB initiatives have caused concern for Washington⁴⁴ However, with these initiatives, China has both complemented the international institutions dominated by the US in the global system and aligned its interests with the existing arrangements. The Beijing administration has been cautious about trading in yuan and continues to use the dollar as a reserve currency, financially strengthening China against the US. Therefore, China's rise in the global order, adhering to the rules set by the US without openly challenging them, has affected Washington's areas of interest.⁴⁵ For example, China's position as the world's second-largest economy after the US and its geopolitical and geoeconomic identity through the BRI by sourcing raw materials from the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America and branding its products in these markets have worried the Trump administration.

The third approach indicating the US's dissatisfaction with the international system due to China's rise focuses on "security" in regional and global geopolitical competition and

41 Mark Hensch, "Trump Order to Target UN, Other Global Organizations: Report", *The Hill*, 25.01.2017. <https://thehill.com/policy/international/un-treaties/316148-trump-order-to-target-un-other-global-orgs-report>, accessed 30.05.2024.

42 Silvia Amaro and Hadley Gamble, "US Government Is 'Exceptionally Vulnerable' to Cyberattacks, Security Expert Says", *CNBC*, 17.02.2018. <https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/17/us-government-is-exceptionally-vulnerable-to-cyber-attacks-security-expert-says>, accessed 30.05.2024.

43 "U.S. Foreign Policy: Multilateralism or Unilateralism?", *Model Diplomacy*, 2020. <https://modeldiplomacy.cfr.org/pop-up-cases/us-foreign-policy-multilateralism-or-unilateralism> accessed 30.05.2024.

44 William H. Overholt, "Is the China Model a Threat?", *East Asia Forum*, 07.07.2019. <https://www.easiaforum.org/2019/07/07/is-the-china-model-a-threat/>, accessed 30.05.2024.

45 Serafettin Yilmaz ve Wang Xiangyu, "Power Transition Theory Revisited When Rising China Meets Dissatisfied United States", *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, 5:3, 2019, pp. 334-337.

“economy” in technological developments. In regional terms, geopolitical security competition between actors includes the Taiwan issue, Korea, Vietnam, and the South China Sea, while issues such as climate change, China’s human rights violations (repression and persecution against Uyghurs), and withdrawal from international agreements can be mentioned at the global level. Regarding economic competition in technological developments, the trade war initiated by the US against China has two dimensions. The first is the US’s bilateral trade imbalance with China, where imports exceed exports. The second is the sanctions imposed by the US against Chinese high-tech companies within the framework of the trade war. Thus, the two phenomena shaped at different levels —security and economy— indicate the US’s dissatisfaction with the order in the international system due to China’s rising power.

In conclusion, the competition between the US and China has been examined in the context of the hypothesis that the dominant power, the US, is dissatisfied with the international system, while the rising power, China, is satisfied. This hypothesis is consistent, especially since the policies implemented by the US during the Trump administration are considered. However, the continued rhetoric of confrontation following the COVID-19 pandemic and the Biden administration’s tendency to return to international agreements (such as the Paris Climate Agreement) indicate a softening of the US’s response to its dissatisfaction with China. This leads us to examine the hypothesis that both actors are satisfied with the international system in the following section.

1.3. Hypothesis of Satisfaction with the Order by Both the US and China

After the Trump administration eased the supply ban on Huawei following the meeting with Xi Jinping in Osaka in June 2019⁴⁶ and the global conditions created by the COVID-19 pandemic, tensions between the two countries softened. Additionally, China’s participation in and satisfaction with the international system dominated by the US through its influence in international organizations like the UN, and the World Bank, along with initiatives such as BRI extending from Latin America to Africa, show China’s engagement with the liberal economic order. This section examines the hypothesis that both the US and China are satisfied with the order in the international system.

The literature has extensively discussed hypotheses based on the dissatisfaction of either China or the US with the international system, providing substantial arguments and explanations that have enriched the existing literature. However, the hypothesis that both actors are satisfied with the order has yet to be adequately explored, indicating a significant gap. Therefore, this section discusses this hypothesis within the framework of the study’s time frame (2011-2021) and methodology (theory-testing process tracing) based on two main claims.

The first claim is that neither actor desires the emergence of a third power. This claim can be explained from two perspectives. For instance, the US is an actor in a bipolar rather than a unipolar world order. During the Cold War, the US consolidated its power in the international system in the presence of two major powers, the US and the Soviet Union. This situation does not strategically concern the US about the existence of China. Similarly, this applies to China, which aligns with the US-dominated system as it rises economically. Therefore, both countries are satisfied with the order and would be disturbed by the emergence of a third power.

46 Jenny Leonard and Ian King, “Why Trump Eased Huawei Tech Ban. U.S. Chipmakers Said It Could Hurt Economy and National Security”, *Los Angeles Times*, 19.07.2019. <https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-chipmakers-pressed-trump-huawei-ban-20190702-story.html>, accessed 30.05.2024.

The second claim is that China has become globalized for the first time in its history, which does not challenge the international order established and dominated by the US despite affecting Washington's areas of interest. For example, China's global initiatives, such as AIIB and BRI, operate harmoniously within the international order rather than challenge it. Consequently, China's rise through globalization and alignment with the international order does not alarm the US as the dominant power in the international system.

China's globalization and its policies in international politics, while negatively impacting the US's areas of interest, do not disrupt the international order through the competition between the two countries. This argument can be interpreted from two perspectives. The first is China's direct consolidation of its economic and political power through policies implemented by AIIB in its near and far geography. For example, the participation of US allies, such as the UK, Australia, South Korea, and Vietnam, in AIIB is of concern to the Washington administration.⁴⁷ The US's proposal of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2015 to challenge China in its nearby geography also exemplifies this. However, while the competition between China and the US poses risks such as regional bloc formation and global trade crisis, both actors can act harmoniously by establishing stronger institutions and deepening integration, especially in the Asia-Pacific.

China's assumption of global responsibilities in international politics does not negatively affect the US's areas of interest. The participation of US allies in AIIB, with their adherence to existing governance and standards of the global economy, suggests that AIIB is a complementary institution rather than a challenge to the Washington-led system. Additionally, the US's allies in Asia and Europe who joined AIIB wish to avoid being forced to choose between Washington and Beijing, perceiving no rational reason to do so.⁴⁸ These countries apply rational political strategies that benefit from both AIIB and TPP. For example, Vietnam's engagement with TPP provides an opportunity for integration with the US economy, while the country also benefits from the infrastructure development loans by AIIB within the BRI framework⁴⁹.

The second perspective is that the BRI, a complement to AIIB, also aligns with and contributes to the global order dominated by the US. Initially aimed at connecting Asian countries, BRI now focuses on commercial activities across a maritime route extending from Asia to the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. BRI encourages investment in developing and selling 5G technology, establishing high-speed railways (for logistics purposes), producing solar and wind energy, expanding electronic payment platforms, and developing ultra-high voltage transmission systems in these regions through funds provided by AIIB.⁵⁰ Therefore, BRI aims to fill gaps in the global economy without contradicting the functioning of the liberal economic order dominated by the US.

The COVID-19 pandemic, which started in 2019 and negatively impacted the international order, forced the countries that received loans for infrastructure enhancement projects within BRI to halt or cancel payments due to their inability to repay their debts to

47 David Dollar, "China's Rise as a Regional and Global Power: The AIIB and the 'One Belt, One Road'", *Horizons*, CIRSD, Summer 2015, p. 162.

48 *Ibid.*, pp.171-172.

49 Tomoya Onishi, "AIIB makes first loan to Vietnam bank amid South China Sea tensions", *Nikkei Asia*, 24.07.2020. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/AIIB-makes-first-loan-to-Vietnam-bank-amid-South-China-Sea-tensions>, accessed 30.05.2024.

50 Jennifer Hillman and David Sacks, "How Should the United States Compete With China's Belt and Road Initiative?" *Council on Foreign Relations*, 23.04.2021. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-should-united-states-compete-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative>, accessed 30.05.2024.

China. The global economic contraction raised questions about BRI's sustainability, putting countries in a dilemma between paying infrastructure project debts and providing healthcare and other social services to their populations. However, recognizing these countries' inability to repay, the Beijing administration prepared a low-cost and technology-focused program for the weaker BRI partners.⁵¹ Therefore, the new context created by the COVID-19 pandemic has broadened BRI's perspective rather than narrowing it, creating new geopolitical and economic opportunities.

In conclusion, the competition between the US and China carries the risk of leading to economic blocs. However, the ultimate outcome could be achieved through indirect pragmatic cooperation. In the future, China could join TPP, and the US could join AIIB, which would provide significant benefits to both actors' areas of interest. Hence, it is possible to see cooperation based on mutual interests in US-China relations in the near future.

2. US-China Competition and Cooperation in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa holds strategic importance in the international system and regional politics. It attracts significant attention due to its economic potential and geostrategic location, particularly in the context of the US-China competition. The US adopts a distinct approach to protect its strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, maintaining a military presence and collaborating with local governments to ensure security and stability. However, the US strategy in the region often appears inconsistent and insufficient, particularly in the face of China's rapid and extensive investments. This has limited US influence in the area.⁵²

On the other hand, China increases its influence in the Horn of Africa through economic, political, and military means. Countries such as Ethiopia and Djibouti are China's most important African allies. China has invested in significant infrastructure projects in Ethiopia and established a military base in Djibouti. These investments aim to enhance China's influence in the region under the BRI. China consolidates its economic and political power in the region through these means.⁵³

The Horn of Africa is not only a battleground for US-China competition, but it also attracts the attention of Middle Eastern countries and other global powers. The region is a stage for strategic calculations by countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran, which seek to increase their influence through various economic and military initiatives.⁵⁴ Thus, the Horn of Africa stands out as a convergence point for the strategic goals of both global and regional actors. The US-China competition affects the economic and political balance in the region, with local actors attempting to benefit from this power struggle. This situation makes the Horn of Africa's role in the international system and regional politics even more critical.

There are three main points of discussion regarding the global competition between the US and China in the context of the Horn of Africa, which are to be examined in the following sub-sections. First, both countries have established their military presence in

51 Frank Mouritz, "Implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic on China's Belt and Road Initiative", *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, 19:2, 2020, pp. 115-117.

52 Guido Lanfranchi, "Geopolitics Meets Local Politics in the Horn of Africa", *Clingendael*, 01.12.2021, <https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/geopolitics-meets-local-politics-horn-africa>, accessed 30.05.2024.

53 Rebuma Dejene, "The New Geo-politics in the Horn of Africa and its Implications for Ethiopia's Foreign Policy", *Master Thesis*, Addis Ababa University Department of Political Science and International Relations, June 2020, pp. 85-94.

54 Ibid. pp. 43-80.

Djibouti. Second, technological competition stems from China's Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to create an alternative to the fiber optic network linking Europe and Asia, established initially by the US and the UK in 1945. Third, regional issues have arisen within the Horn of Africa between 2011 and 2021, such as the Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute and the Tigray crisis in Ethiopia that began in November 2020.

2.1. Indirect Pragmatic Cooperation in Combating Terrorism and Piracy at Military Bases in Djibouti

Djibouti's strategic location at the northwest of the Indian Ocean and the entrance of the Red Sea provides both the US and China with access and control over the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal. Due to global trade and the Yemen crisis, Djibouti's importance has increased among global actors. The country hosts more foreign military bases than any other in the world, accommodating bases from France, Italy, Japan, the US, and China, earning approximately \$300 million annually from this policy and thus the label of a "rentier state".⁵⁵ However, the proximity of these military bases to each other also leads to tensions. For instance, the US and Chinese bases are about 10 kilometers apart, and Washington officials have accused their Beijing counterparts of targeting US pilots with lasers that impair their vision, a claim Chinese officials deny.⁵⁶

The US military presence in Djibouti, which was established post-9/11 and expanded through the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, focuses on three main objectives: combating Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist elements in the Arabian Peninsula, fighting terrorist organizations from the Sahel to North Africa, especially Al-Shabaab in Somalia, and securing economic relations with regional countries through support.⁵⁷ Similarly, China's objectives in the region include contributing to peacekeeping operations, resolving interstate border disputes, and achieving geoeconomic goals, although it officially describes its Djibouti base as a logistical facility. China has criticized AFRICOM, claiming that the US military presence in Djibouti increases regional instability and undermines counterterrorism operations.⁵⁸

The primary concern of the US regarding China's base in Djibouti is Beijing's attempt to consolidate its growing economic influence in the Middle East and Africa with a military presence, extending the geopolitical and geoeconomic competition from Asia to distant geographies. Considering that about 50% of China's energy imports pass through the Gulf of Aden,⁵⁹ Djibouti's significance to Beijing is apparent. Furthermore, besides establishing a military base, China has also provided grants and loans for development projects in Djibouti, whose government views them as mutually beneficial, despite criticism from the US and other Western actors. Thus, the US perceives China's military presence in Djibouti as a threat,⁶⁰ even though US-Djibouti relations remain strong.

55 Jessica Borowicz, "Strategic Location and Neopatrimonialism in Djibouti", *University of Kansas*, Lawrence, 2017, p.77.

56 "US warns airmen to beware of laser attacks near China's military base in Djibouti", *SCMP*, 02.05.2019. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2144387/us-warns-airmen-beware-laser-attacks-near-chinas>, accessed 30.05.2024.

57 Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, "Obama's Africa Policy: The Limits of Symbolic Power", *Africa Studies Review*, 56:2, 2013, p. 658.

58 Nathaniel Allen, "Assessing a Decade of U.S. Military Strategy in Africa", *Orbis*, 62:4, 2018, pp. 655-669.

59 Jeremy Page, "China Builds First Overseas Military Outpost", *Wall Street Journal*, 19.08.2016. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-builds-first-overseas-military-outpost-1471622690>, accessed 30.05.2024.

60 Carla Babb, "Djibouti: Pentagon Chief Visits Djibouti, Sole US Base in Africa", *South Africa Today*, 24.04.2017. <https://southafricatoday.net/africa-news/east-africa/djibouti/djibouti-pentagon-chief-visits-djibouti-sole-us-base-in-africa/>, accessed 30.05.2024.

China's cooperation with the international community has increased through partnerships developed under the BRI, which is reflected in its relationships with the UN and the EU. For example, in October 2018, China hosted the EU's Operation Atalanta, monitoring the Somali coastline, and conducted joint naval exercises with the EU. China's participation in this operation, alongside India and Japan, included protecting World Food Program ships, thus contributing to the initiative.⁶¹ China's cooperation in this context balances its presence in the South China Sea with that of Japan and EU countries.

China is an active member of several international organizations, such as the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (UNCTC), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN, and SCO. These memberships provide platforms for China to engage with the international community. Additionally, China's cooperation in counterterrorism across Africa, including the Horn of Africa, complements US counterterrorism policies. This cooperation allows the US to pressure China's policy implementations if American interests feel threatened.⁶² This situation also points to indirect pragmatic cooperation between the US and China in the Horn of Africa sub-regional system.

Despite ideological differences, maintaining relative stability in sub-regional systems like the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Horn of Africa, which are critical for international trade security, is in the common interest of the US and China. Establishing of the US-China Counterterrorism Working Group has enabled both states to progress in counterterrorism by negotiating, conducting research, and discussing solution scenarios. This cooperation developed post-9/11, with China approving the assignment of an FBI legal attaché in Beijing in 2004 and the establishment of a US Coast Guard Liaison Office in 2006. In addition, the 2006 Memorandum of Understanding allowed for mutual visits of law enforcement officers and establishment of a financial intelligence unit in China that worked with US officials, leading to anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing legislation in China. These agreements formed the basis for cooperation in counterterrorism between the two actors from 2011 to 2021. According to a Washington-based US-China Economic and Security Review Commission report, China is open to counterterrorism and anti-money laundering communication at its Djibouti military base.⁶³

In conclusion, while the US increased its military presence in Djibouti and the Horn of Africa in the 2000s, China has consolidated its economic power. However, China revealed its ambition to be a significant player in regional and global politics by opening a military base in Djibouti in 2017. Both actors face a security dilemma, increasing their capacities to minimize perceived threats. However, in the context of the fight against terrorism and piracy in the Horn of Africa, there is an area of cooperation in which both actors have common interests. This suggests that both parties are content with the Horn of Africa sub-region.

2.2. Submarine Fiber Optic Networks as a Competitive Element

Submarine fiber optic networks, which use seabed-laid cables to transmit large amounts of data at high speeds with low latency and fewer weather-related disruptions than satellite and microwave communications, are vital for global communication, trade, and finance

61 "Welcoming Returning Support from French Multi-role Frigate 'La FS Surcouf', *EU NAVFOR*, 03.06.2019. <https://eunavfor.eu/news/welcoming-returning-support-french-multi-role-frigate-la-fs-surcouf>, accessed 30.05.2024.

62 Murray Scot Tanner and James Bellacqua, *China's Response to Terrorism*, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington D.C., 2016.

63 Tanner and Bellacqua, *China's Response to Terrorism*.

due to their security and reliability.⁶⁴ Besides their economic importance, submarine fiber optic networks are critical for military and strategic purposes, as they enable governments to monitor global shipping and trade, gather intelligence, and communicate with military bases and personnel worldwide, making them strategic assets in geopolitical competition among global actors like the US, China, and Russia. These networks also carry over 95% of international voice and data traffic despite inadequate protection by international law.⁶⁵

As the world becomes increasingly interconnected and digital, the importance of submarine fiber optic networks in international politics will continue to grow. Governments and companies will continue to invest in these networks in order to expand their economic and strategic reach, making control and access to these networks a critical factor in global politics. In this context, one of the ways in which China tries to expand its influence in the Bab-el-Mandeb region is to develop submarine fiber optic networks. For example, in 2018, Chinese telecommunications company Huawei Marine Networks completed a project connecting Pakistan with East Africa through a submarine cable system passing through the Red Sea, which the US opposed.⁶⁶ Known as the Pakistan-East Africa Cable Express (PEACE), this system is a strategic move by China to expand its digital connectivity and influence in the region. The PEACE project, announced as a geoeconomic initiative by China's BRI, links Pakistan's Gwadar port to the Maritime Silk Road, standing as an alternative to the existing fiber optic network connecting Asia, Africa, and Europe through the US and UK partnership.⁶⁷

In response to China's PEACE project, the US aims to control internet networks connecting Asia and Europe through the "Southeast Asia-Middle East-Western Europe 6" (SEA-ME-WE 6) project. This project, undertaken by US telecommunications company SubCom with an estimated \$600 million investment, will connect Southeast Asia to Europe via Singapore, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean, terminating in France. The 19,200-kilometer-long submarine cable network is expected to be completed by 2025 and will cover countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Maldives, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and France.⁶⁸

China has also emerged as a prominent actor in the region over the past decade, with its Belt and Road Initiative and its military base in Djibouti. Since 2012, Xi Jinping's administration has outlined plans for expanding economic cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative, which includes building factories, roads, bridges, ports, airports, gas and oil pipelines, electric grids, and telecommunications networks. Over 60 countries, representing two-thirds of the world's population, have signed on to Belt and Road Initiative projects.⁶⁹ Djibouti is a critical point in these initiatives, intersecting with the PEACE project and the

64 Scott Coffen-Smout and Herbert Glen, "Submarine Cables: A Challenge for Ocean Management", *Marine Policy*, 24:6, 2000, pp. 441-448.

65 Paul Cochrane, "Red Sea cables: How UK and US spy agencies listen to the Middle East", *Middle East Eye*, 04.03.2021. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/red-sea-cables-how-us-uk-spy-agencies-listen-middle-east>, accessed 30.05.2024.

66 Lauren P. Blanchard and Sarah R. Collins, *Report: China's Engagement in Djibouti*, Library of Congress, Washington DC, 2019.

67 Emre Aytakin, "Kıtalararası Fiber Optik İnternet Ağları ABD-Çin Rekabetinde Yeni Cephe Açıyor", *Anadolu Ajansı*, 17.08.2022. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/kitalararasi-fiber-optik-internet-aglari-abd-cin-rekabetinde-yeni-cephe-aciyor/2662882>, accessed 30.05.2024.

68 Ibid.

69 Chao Wang, Ming K. Lim, Xinyi Zhang, Longfeng Zhao, Paul Tae-Woo Lee, "Railway and Road Infrastructure in the Belt and Road Initiative Countries: Estimating the Impact of Transport Infrastructure on Economic Growth", *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice*, 134, 2020, pp. 288-307.

existing SEA-ME-WE 6 network and emphasizing its significance in the geopolitics of fiber optic networks, given the presence of both US and Chinese military bases in the country.⁷⁰ For both the US and China, having control or influence on another state's critical infrastructure provides not only economic benefits but also significant geopolitical advantages.

In conclusion, the development of submarine fiber optic networks has significantly impacted international politics, especially in the context of dominant power competition. The competition between the US and China in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait through these networks is one of the tools by which they seek to maintain and enhance their technological influence in the region and control the geopolitical outcomes. Therefore, submarine fiber optic networks are fundamental for US-China competition in the international politics of dominant power rivalry. As a result, this issue also clearly illustrates the US-China competition in the Horn of Africa.

2.3. Geopolitical Competition: Eritrea-Ethiopia Dispute and Tigray Civil War

The reflections of US-China competition in international politics on crisis zones in the Horn of Africa between 2011 and 2021 can be seen in the Eritrea-Ethiopia dispute and the Tigray crisis that erupted in November 2020 in Ethiopia. As previously discussed, the influence of the US and China in Djibouti is directly or indirectly experienced in these interactions among the Horn of Africa countries. Before analyzing the competition between the US and China concerning the Tigray crisis, it is essential to examine the background of the crisis itself.

According to the Addis Ababa administration, the Tigray crisis began in November 2020 when the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) fired on the Ethiopian federal army.⁷¹ The TPLF had ruled Ethiopia for 30 years and represented the Tigray ethnic group, which makes up 7% of Ethiopia's approximately 100 million population. Due to its long rule, the TPLF has strong local and international influence through its well-trained military structure and civil bureaucracy. The conflict between the Addis Ababa government and the TPLF escalated after Abiy Ahmed was elected in 2018. He consolidated his power nationally and internationally by resolving the border dispute with Eritrea, earning the Nobel Peace Prize, and removing Tigrayans from security and civil bureaucracies. This led to tensions between the TPLF, which had lost its influence, and Abiy Ahmed.⁷² The TPLF held elections independently in Tigray in September 2020, questioning the legitimacy of the Addis Ababa government, which had previously postponed general elections due to the COVID-19 crisis.⁷³ The official start of the conflict was November 4, 2020, when Abiy Ahmed announced that the Ethiopian army had blockaded Mekelle, the capital of Tigray, following an attack by the TPLF on the Northern Command on the night of November 3, 2020.⁷⁴

Despite the removal of TPLF officials from the federal government in 2018, the US maintained good relations with the Addis Ababa government due to the peace process

70 Thomas Blaubauch, "Connecting Beijing's Global Infrastructure: The PEACE Cable in the Middle East and North Africa", *Middle East Institute*, 07.03.2022. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/connecting-beijings-global-infrastructure-peace-cable-middle-east-and-north-africa>, accessed 30.05.2024.

71 "Ethiopian PM Abiy accuses TPLF of camp 'attack', vows response", *Al Jazeera*, 02.10.2020. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/4/pm-ahmed-vows-response-after-deadly-attack-in-northern-ethiopia>, accessed 30.05.2024.

72 Kaan Devecioglu, "Ethiopia's Tigray conflict evolves in favor of the TPLF", *Mena Affairs*, 02.11.2021. <https://menaaffairs.com/ethiopia-tigray-conflict-evolves-in-favor-of-the-tplf/>, accessed 30 May 2024.

73 "Ethiopia Says Forced into 'Aimless War' as Bombings Alleged" *AP News*. <https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-abiy-ahmed-africa-ethiopia-kenya-268321050c766661de9fc843dde3d94>, accessed 30.05.2024.

74 "Ethiopia army threatens 'no mercy' in assault on regional capital", *The New Arab*, 25.11.2020. <https://www.newarab.com/news/ethiopia-army-threatens-no-mercy-assault-mekele>, accessed 30.05.2024.

between Ethiopia and Eritrea. However, as Eritrean troops fought in Tigray alongside Ethiopian forces, the US condemned both countries and called on the Asmara administration to withdraw its soldiers.⁷⁵ The US also proposed sanctions on Ethiopian and Eritrean forces at the UN Security Council, which were vetoed by Russia and China.⁷⁶ In a November 2021 interview with BBC Africa, AFRICOM Commander Major General William Zana stated that the US forces at the Djibouti military camp were “ready to respond to crises”.⁷⁷ This statement indicates that the US’s primary priorities in the Horn of Africa are to prevent the spread of Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabaab in Somalia and to leverage the crisis to counter China’s rising influence in the region. These concerns became central to the Biden administration’s regional policies by the end of 2021.

While the governments of Addis Ababa and Asmara faced increasing pressure from Western governments over the Tigray war, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Ethiopia and Eritrea. During his visit, Wang Yi emphasized that China did not interfere in Ethiopia’s internal affairs and opposed such interventions.⁷⁸ This statement directly targeted the US and its allies, as Beijing defined the pressure from the US and its allies on Addis Ababa as “interference in internal affairs”. However, Beijing remained silent on Eritrea’s involvement in Ethiopia’s internal affairs. As previously discussed, China’s and the US’s engagement with Ethiopia and other countries in the Horn of Africa in political, military, and socio-cultural areas aims to consolidate their economic interests. Therefore, both actors will likely continue their regional competition regarding the Tigray crisis in the coming years.

Conclusion

This study, within the Power Transition Theory (PTT) framework and specifically utilizing the concept of dissatisfaction, has investigated the complex dynamics of US-China competition in the Horn of Africa from 2012 to 2022. By applying the Multiple Hierarchy Model, the research aimed to explain the different levels of satisfaction both powers exhibited towards the existing international system based on their positions in the Horn of Africa sub-region hierarchy. The primary findings and causal results provide a detailed understanding of how this dominant power competition has shaped the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa.

According to the first hypothesis analyzed in the study, which posits the US as a satisfied dominant power and China as a dissatisfied rising power, it is understood that the US, as an established hegemon, is naturally satisfied with the existing international system, while China, as a rising power, seeks to revise the order to suit its growing influence better. The study found that China’s actions in the Horn of Africa, such as its military base in Djibouti and extensive infrastructure investments, reflect its dissatisfaction with the status quo and its desire to establish its influence in the region. According to the Multiple Hierarchy Model in the Horn of Africa, this situation indicates two key findings. First, despite Ethiopia being the dominant power in the local hierarchy, Djibouti is also a rising power with the support of both China and the US. Second, similar to its position in the international system,

75 “United States Action to Press for the Resolution of the Crisis in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia” *US Department of State*, 23.05.2021. <https://www.state.gov/united-states-actions-to-press-for-the-resolution-of-the-crisis-in-the-tigray-region-of-ethiopia/>, accessed 30.05.2024.

76 Michelle Nichols and Daphne Psaledakis, “US Pushes U.N. Security Council to publicly address Ethiopia’s Tigray”, *Reuters*, 10.06.2021. <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-pushes-un-security-council-publicly-address-ethiopias-tigray-2021-06-10/>, accessed 30.05.2024.

77 William Zana, “US force ‘Ready to respond’ to Ethiopia crisis”, *BBC Africa*, 12.11.2021. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-59265578>, accessed 30.05.2024.

78 Fasika Tadesse, “China’s FM visit to Ethiopia”, *Bloomberg*, 12.01.2021. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-01/chinese-foreign-minister-visits-ethiopia-in-support-of-pm-abi>, accessed 30.05.2024.

China is also a dissatisfied actor in the Horn of Africa sub-region, as evidenced by its military base in Djibouti and its competition with the US in the Tigray crisis in Ethiopia. In this context, the emphasis the US places on human rights and security contrasts with China's policy of non-interference, highlighting their different approaches to regional stability and governance. Additionally, the competition between the two countries extends to technological developments. In this context, China aims to establish alternative communication networks such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the PEACE cable system, directly challenging the existing networks dominated by Western powers and emphasizing the technological dimension of the competition.

The second hypothesis discussed in the study positions the US as a dissatisfied dominant power and China as a satisfied rising power, contrary to traditional views. This hypothesis explores the idea that the US may not be satisfied with the current system due to the perceived threat from China's rise, while China sees the benefits of the existing order and is satisfied with it. The research indicates that the strategic responses of the US, such as increased military presence and trade wars, demonstrate Washington's dissatisfaction and efforts against China's growing power. Similarly, this situation suggests that the US is a dissatisfied actor against China's growing economic, diplomatic, and military presence in the Horn of Africa sub-region.

Finally, the third hypothesis posits that both the US and China can find elements of satisfaction by cooperating where mutual interests overlap within the existing system. In the Horn of Africa context, pragmatic examples of cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and ensuring maritime security, were observed, highlighting areas where both powers benefited from the status quo despite underlying tensions. Additionally, Djibouti's strategic location has made it a focal point for the military presence of these two powers. The proximity of their bases to each other underscores intense competition but also necessitates some pragmatic cooperation in areas such as anti-piracy operations and counterterrorism efforts. Within the framework of this hypothesis, the Multiple Hierarchy Model, which assumes that global powers can establish hierarchies in different regions, provided a comprehensive framework for understanding the US-China dynamics in the Horn of Africa. This model illuminated how both powers have managed their regional influences and balanced between competition and cooperation in the Horn of Africa.

The study concludes that the US-China competition in the Horn of Africa is characterized by a complex interplay of dissatisfaction and strategic interests shaped by both geopolitical and geoeconomic factors. The findings reveal that, while both powers are fundamentally competitive, there are critical areas where their interests align, leading to instances of cooperation. This nuanced relationship, examined through the lenses of PTT and the Multiple Hierarchy Model, underscores the importance of strategic flexibility and pragmatic engagement in understanding and navigating the contemporary international order.

In summary, the US-China rivalry in the Horn of Africa is a microcosm of their broader global competition, reflecting both the challenges and opportunities inherent in a multipolar world. This study contributes to the literature on power transition by providing empirical insights into how dominant powers interact in strategically vital regions, offering valuable perspectives for policymakers and scholars alike.

Conflict of Interest Statement:

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

References

Published Works

- ALLEN Nathaniel (2018). "Assessing a Decade of U.S. Military Strategy in Africa", *Orbis*, 62:4, 655–669
- BEACH Derek and PEDERSEN Rasmus Brun (2019). "Process-tracing methods: Foundations and guidelines", *University of Michigan Press*, Michigan.
- BENNETT Andrew and CHECKEL Jeffrey (2014). *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- BLANCHARD Lauren P. and COLLINS Sarah R. (2019). "Report: China's Engagement in Djibouti", *Library of Congress*, Washington DC.
- BRESLIN Shaun (2010). "China's Emerging Global Role: Dissatisfied Responsible Great Power", *Politics*, 30:1, 52–62.
- BOROWICZ Jessica (2017). *Strategic Location and Neopatrimonialism in Djibouti*, University of Kansas, Lawrence.
- COFFEN-SMOOUT Scott and GLEN Herbert (2000). "Submarine cables: a challenge for ocean management", *Marine Policy*, 24:6, 441-448.
- DEJENE Rebuma (2020). "The New Geo-politics in the Horn of Africa and its Implications for Ethiopia's Foreign Policy", *Master Thesis*, Addis Ababa University Department of Political Science and International Relations, Addis Ababa.
- DI CICCIO Jonathan M. and LEVY Jack S. (1999). "Power Shifts and Problems Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43:6, 675–704.
- DOLLAR David (2015). "China's Rise as a Regional and Global Power: The AIIB and the 'One Belt, One Road'", *Horizons CIRSD*, 162 – 172.
- DUMBAUGH Kerry (2000). "Chinese Embassy Bombing in Belgrade: Compensation Issues", *Congressional Research Service*, Washington D.C..
- GILPIN Robert (1981). *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- GOLDSTEIN Avery (2007). "Power Transitions, Institutions, and China's Rise in East Asia: Theoretical Expectations and Evidence", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 30:5, 639–682.
- ILLARI Phyllis McKay and RUSSO Federica (2014). *Causality: Philosophical Theory Meets Scientific Practice*, Oxford University, Oxford.
- JOHNSTON Alastair Iain (2003). "Is China a Status Quo Power?" *International Security*, 27:4, 5-56.
- KRAUTHAMMER Charles (1991). "The Unipolar Moment", *Foreign Affairs*, 70:1, p.23. 23-33.
- LAYNE Christopher (2009). "The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay", *International Security*, 34:1, 147–172.
- LEBOW Richard RICHARD Ned and VALENTINO Benjamin (2009). "Lost in Transition: A Critical Analysis of Power Transition Theory", *International Relations*, 23:3, 389-410.
- LEMKE Douglas, (1993). "Multiple Hierarchies in World Politics." Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee.
- LEMKE Douglas (2002). *Regions of War and Peace*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- LIM Yves-Heng (2015). "How (Dis)satisfied Is China? A Power Transition Theory Perspective", *Journal of Contemporary China*, 24:92, 280-297.
- LITTLE Daniel (1996). "Causal Explanation in the Social Sciences", *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 34:1, 31-56.
- MEARSHEIMER John (2006). "Structural Realism", Tim Dunne, Kurki Milja and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 77-94.
- MORITZ Frank (2020). "Implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic on China's Belt and Road Initiative", *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, 19:2, 115-124.
- ORGANSKI A.F.K. (1968). *World Politics*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York.

- ROHLFING Ingo (2014). “Comparative Hypothesis Testing via Process Tracing”, *Sociological Methods and Research*, 43:4, 606–642.
- ROSS Robert S. (2000). “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force”, *International Security*, 25:2, 87-123.
- TAMMEN Ronald L. and KUGLER Jacek (2006). “Power Transition and China-US Conflicts”, *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 1:1, 35-55.
- TAMMEN Ronald (2008). “The Organski Legacy: A Fifty-Year Research Program”, *International Interactions*, 34, 314–332.
- TANNER Murray Scot and BELLACQUA James, (2016). “China’s Response to Terrorism”, *U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, Washington DC.
- TEMİZ Kadir (2018). “Çin’in Ortadoğu Bölgesini Etkileyen Bölgesel ve Küresel Rekabet Unsurları”, *Istanbul Medeniyet Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 3:2, 31-41.
- WANG Chao and MING Lim K. (2020). “Railway and road infrastructure in the Belt and Road Initiative countries: Estimating the Impact of Transport Infrastructure on Economic Growth”, *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice*, 134, 288-307.
- WANG Chi (2016). *Obama’s Challenge to China: The Pivot to Asia*, Routledge, New York.
- WEBB Michael C. and KRASNER Stephen D. (1989). “Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment”, *Review of International Studies*, 15:2, 183 – 198.
- YILMAZ Serafettin and XIANGYU Wang (2019). “Power Transition Theory Revisited When Rising China Meets Dissatisfied United States”, *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, 5:3, 317-341.
- Yİ LİN Cheng (2015). “Xi Jinping, the US, and New Model of Major Country Relations”, *Prospect Journal*, 34:1, 1-34.
- ZELEZA Paul Tiyambe (2013). “Obama’s Africa Policy: The Limits of Symbolic Power”, *Africa Studies Review*, 56:2, 655-669.

Internet Sources

- “Ethiopia Army Threatens ‘No Mercy’ in Assault on Regional Capital”, <https://www.newarab.com/news/ethiopia-army-threatens-no-mercy-assault-mekele>, Accessed 30.05.2024.
- “Ethiopia Says Forced Into ‘Aimless War’ as Bombings Alleged”, <https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-abi-ahmed-africa-ethiopia-kenya-268321050c766661de9fcf843d94>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- “Ethiopian PM Abiy Aaccuses TPLF of Ccamp ‘Aattack’, Vows Rresponse”, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/4/pm-ahmed-vows-response-after-deadly-attack-in-northern-ethiopia>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- “U.S. Foreign Policy: Multilateralism or Unilateralism?”, <https://modeldiplomacy.cfr.org/pop-up-cases/us-foreign-policy-multilateralism-or-unilateralism>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- “United States Action to Press for the Resolution of the Crisis in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia”. <https://www.state.gov/united-states-actions-to-press-for-the-resolution-of-the-crisis-in-the-tigray-region-of-ethiopia/>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- “US Warns Airmen to Beware of Laser Attacks Near China’s Military Base in Djibouti”, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2144387/us-warns-airmen-beware-laser-attacks-near-chinas>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- “Welcoming Returning Support from French Multi-role Frigate ‘La FS Surcouf’”, <https://eunavfor.eu/news/welcoming-returning-support-french-multi-role-frigate-la-fs-surcouf>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- AMARO Silvia and GAMBLE Hadley (2018). “US Government Is ‘Exceptionally Vulnerable’ to Cyberattacks, Security Expert Says”, <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/17/us-government-is-exceptionally-vulnerable-to-cyber-attacks-security-expert-says>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- AYTEKİN Emre (2022). “Kıtalararası Fiber Optik İnternet Ağları ABD-Çin Rekabetinde Yeni Cephe Açıyor”, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/kitalararasi-fiber-optik-internet-aglari-abd-cin-rekabetinde-yeni-cephe-aciyor/2662882>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- BABB Carla (2017). “Djibouti: Pentagon Chief Visits Djibouti, Sole US Base in Africa”, <https://southafricatoday.net/africa-news/east-africa/djibouti/djibouti-pentagon-chief-visits-djibouti-sole-us-base-in-africa/>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- BLAUBACH Thomas (2022). “Connecting Beijing’s Global Infrastructure: The PEACE Cable in the Middle East and North Africa”, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/connecting-beijings-global-infrastructure-peace-cable-middle-east-and-north-africa>, accessed 30.05.2024.

- COCHRANE Paul (2021). "Red Sea cables: How UK and US spy agencies listen to the Middle East". <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/red-sea-cables-how-us-uk-spy-agencies-listen-middle-east>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- DEVCIUGLU Kaan (2021). "Ethiopia's Tigray Conflict Evolves in Favor Of The TPLF", <https://menaaffairs.com/ethiopias-tigray-conflict-evolves-in-favor-of-the-tplf/>, Accessed 30.05.2024.
- GHERKE Joel (2019). "State Department Preparing for Clash of Civilizations with China", Washington Examiner. <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/state-department-preparing-for-clash-of-civilizations-with-china>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- HENSCH Mark (2017). "Trump Order to Target UN, Other Global Organizations: Report", The Hill, <https://thehill.com/policy/international/un-treaties/316148-trump-order-to-target-un-other-global-orgs-report>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- HILLMAN Jennifer and SACKS David (2021). "How Should the United States Compete With China's Belt and Road Initiative?", <https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-should-united-states-compete-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- LANFRANCHI Guido (2021). "Geopolitics Meets Local Politics in the Horn of Africa", Clingendael. <https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/geopolitics-meets-local-politics-horn-africa>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- LEONARD Jenny and KING Ian (2019). "Why Trump Eased Huawei Tech Ban. U.S. Chipmakers Said It Could Hurt Economy and National Security", <https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-chipmakers-pressed-trump-huawei-ban-20190702-story.html>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- MARTIN Patrick (2001). "Spy Plane Standoff Heightens US-China Tensions", *World Socialist Web Site*. <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2001/04/spy-a03.pdf>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- MCGRATH Matt (2019). "US Rejoins Paris Accord: Biden's First Act Sets Tone For Ambitious Approach", <https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-55732386>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- NICHOLS Michelle and PSLEDAKIS Daphne (2021). "US Pushes U.N. Security Council to Publicly Address Ethiopia's Tigray", <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-pushes-un-security-council-publicly-address-ethiopias-tigray-2021-06-10/>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- ONISHI Tomoya (2020). "AIIB Makes First Loan to Vietnam Bank Amid South China Sea Tensions", <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/AIIB-makes-first-loan-to-Vietnam-bank-amid-South-China-Sea-tensions>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- OVERHOLT William H. (2019). "Is the China Model a Threat?", <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/07/07/is-the-china-model-a-threat/>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- PAGE Jeremy (2016). "China Builds First Overseas Military Outpost". <http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-builds-first-overseas-military-outpost-1471622690>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- TADESSE Fasika (2021). "China's FM visit to Ethiopia". <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-01/chinese-foreign-minister-visits-ethiopia-in-support-of-pm-abiy>, accessed 30.05.2024.
- ZANA William (2021). "US force 'Ready to respond' to Ethiopia crisis". <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-59265578>, accessed 30.05.2024.

Adapting Military Doctrines to Shifting Power Dynamics in the International System: Looking beyond Unipolarity through the Analyses of Charles Kupchan

Uluslararası Sistemin Değişen Güç Dinamikleri Karşısında
Askerî Doktrinleri Adapte Etmek: Charles Kupchan'ın Analizleri
Çerçevesinde Tek Kutupluluğun Ötesine Bakışlar

Erhan
BÜYÜKAKINCI*

* Prof. Dr., Galatasaray
University, Faculty of Economics
And Administrative Sciences,
Department of International
Relations, İstanbul, Türkiye,
e-mail: esbakinci@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0003-4469-6751

Abstract

With the end of the bipolar system at the end of the Cold War, the world order shifted to a unipolar era led by the United States (US). However, with the increase in asymmetric threats and diversity of actors in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks, this stabilization process has given way to uncertainties and multi-vector debates. Charles Kupchan's work analyses different system transformations from a more structuralist perspective. This article aims to analyze how states determine their military doctrines and strategies in the face of constantly transforming system balances. Within the analytical framework discussed by Kupchan, it is possible to discuss how military doctrines are adapted to the variables of the international system. Many factors are at play here, from regionalism to alliance formations and threat perceptions to actors' diversity. Kupchan's "No One's World" argument leads us to the problem of the opportunities and contradictions that states face in determining their strategic priorities within the framework of the complex structure of the multipolar order, which is this article's main starting point.

Keywords: Charles Kupchan, Military Doctrines, International System, Multipolarity, Balance of Power

Geliş Tarihi / Submitted:
21.06.2024

Kabul Tarihi / Accepted:
12.12.2024

Öz

Soğuk Savaş dönemi sonunda iki kutuplu sistemin sona ermesiyle dünya düzeni ABD'nin öncülüğündeki tek kutuplu bir döneme geçmişti, ancak 11 Eylül saldırıları sonrasında asimetrik tehditlerin ve aktör çeşitliliğinin artmasıyla bu istikrar süreci yerini belirsizliklere ve çok vektörlü tartışmalara bırakmıştır. Charles Kupchan'ın çalışmaları farklı sistem dönüşümlerini daha yapısal bakış açılarıyla incelemektedir. Bu çalışmamızda devletlerin sürekli dönüşen sistem dengeleri karşısında askerî doktrinlerini ve stratejilerini nasıl belirlediklerini analiz etmek istiyoruz. Kupchan'ın tartıştığı analitik çerçeve kapsamında askerî doktrinlerin uluslararası sistem değişkenlerine nasıl uyarlandığını ele almak çabamızdır. Bölgeselcilikten ittifak oluşumlarına, tehdit algılamalarından aktör çeşitliliğine değin birçok faktör burada söz konusudur. Kupchan'ın ileri sürdüğü "Hiç Kimsenin Dünyası" savı çok kutuplu düzenin karmaşık yapısı çerçevesinde devletlerin stratejik önceliklerinin belirlerken hangi fırsatlar ve çelişkiler karşısında kaldıkları sorunsalı tartışmaktadır ve bu da makalemizin ana çıkış noktasını oluşturmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Charles Kupchan, Askerî Doktrinler, Uluslararası Sistem, Çok Kutupluluk, Güçler Dengesi

Introduction

As the Cold War era came to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union, a unipolar world order dominated the international system, guided by the United States of America's strategic interests and priorities. However, after the 11 September 2001 attacks, this new order was replaced by a deep transformation process in which unipolarity was radically eroded. Beyond the diplomatic and economic spheres, this structural change had consequences that would fundamentally affect the strategic thinking of all nation-states. As the unipolar order disintegrated, a diversity of different power centers emerged, and a more complex era began with the increasing influence of multiple actors. In this process, a new topic of debate emerged: How would states design and operationalize their military strategies beyond their diplomatic maneuvers?

In the evolving international system balances following the unipolar era, states have had to reassess their strategic positions in an emerging multipolar and multi-actor world. Scholars and theorists have argued that in this process of radical change, states have had to revise their military doctrines to adapt to the new global conditions, which are characterized by a more complex and uneven distribution of power. The theoretical implications of this paradigm shift have been discussed by scholars such as Charles A. Kupchan, who explores the implications of a multipolar world order. Kupchan's works provide an important conceptual framework for understanding the decentralized nature of the new power structure that emerged after unipolarity. Following the collapse of unipolarity, states faced a series of structural security challenges that required a departure from traditional doctrines. In the new order, which Kupchan describes as "No One's world", in a multi-actor and threatening environment characterized by the fragmentation of the balance of power, it has been an important challenge to discuss how states will deal with the complexities involved in determining their military doctrine.¹

One of the leading hypotheses to be discussed here is that the end of unipolarity has pushed states to diversify their strategic postures. No longer centered around a single superpower, states have had to recalibrate their military doctrines to a more complex and multipolar reality and constantly update them according to changing conjunctures. This diversification has manifested itself in a range of responses, from cooperative security initiatives to the development of more rapid and adaptable military capabilities. The fluidity of power dynamics requires constantly updating geostrategic strategies and military doctrines. Adopting multipolarity has necessitated more flexible and adaptive approaches for states to ensure their security and global influence rather than traditional alliances.

On the other hand, with the dissolution of unipolarity, non-traditional threats such as cyber warfare, asymmetric conflicts, and transnational challenges have become prevalent in the international system. The changing global order requires military strategies that are not only capable of traditional state-centric defense but also adapt to the conditions of hybrid warfare and the complexities of non-state actors. Therefore, the main problem we want to discuss in this study is to identify the links between systemic transformation and preparation of military strategies and doctrines. In this framework, by analyzing Kupchan's views on

1 In this article, we will largely use Charles Kupchan's main works that affected the related literature for two decades: Charles Kupchan, Emanuel Adler, and al., *Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order*, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2001; Charles Kupchan, *The End of the American Era*, Vintage/Knopf, New York, 2002; Charles Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace*, Princeton Uni. Press, NY, 2010; Charles Kupchan, *No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn* Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2012; Charles Kupchan, *Isolationism: A History of America's Efforts to Shield Itself from the World*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2020.

the transformation of the international system in conjunction with other relevant literature, we want to address the debates on the intersection of global power shifts and strategic imperatives that shape the military doctrines of states from different angles. In addition, it will be important to discuss how states are using this transition to forge new alliances, improve their defense capabilities, and provide strategic vision. We aim to contribute to a deeper understanding of the complex interplay between geopolitical shifts and national military doctrines in the post-unipolar international system.

1. Renegotiating Military Doctrines Beyond a Unipolar World: Limits and Critics

Understanding the transformation of the military doctrines of the dominant powers in the unipolar world order of the post-Cold War era, defined by the central dominance of the United States (US), is crucial because the strategic conditions in the global order are deeply intertwined with American strategic interests. As the dominant power at the time, the US shaped its military doctrines following its global strategic priorities. While the existence of the unipolar system provided the US with a leadership position in the international order, this new conjuncture oriented many states to revise their military doctrines. Taking Posen's comments at this point, it is possible to emphasize here the need to make structural adjustments to make US military doctrines more sustainable and adapt them to the "grand strategy" and, therefore, to develop more measured and selective approaches in military engagements.²

During this period, the US administration adopted a new approach with the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. The unipolar system further consolidated the international position of the United States and emphasized its military presence at the global level. In the transition from unipolarity to multipolarity, the declaration of the Bush Doctrine and the subsequent strategic behaviors and multilateral diplomacy initiatives of the Obama administration were new steps in American military doctrines. At this stage, these doctrinal adjustments should be considered as new responses to emerging global threats, technological advances, and shifting strategic priorities in the international order.³

In the unipolar era, the strategic interests of the United States and its recalibrated military doctrines directly impacted global security dynamics. At this point, Kupchan describes the hierarchical power structures that existed during the unipolar era and discusses how the singular dominance of the United States in the system affected global politics.⁴ During this period, the military doctrines of many states were influenced by the United States' global primacy due to the nature of the system. In this framework, the US administration revised its national security strategy frameworks and operational structures almost every year (between 1989 and 2002) within the framework of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.⁵

2 Barry Posen, *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, NY, 2014, pp. 16-23.

3 For detailed information on the US military doctrines, see Bert Chapman, *Military Doctrine: A Reference Handbook*, Praeger Security International, Santa Barbara, 2009, pp. 6-74.

4 Charles Kupchan, "The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy", *Political Science Quarterly*, 118:2, 2003, pp. 235-231.

5 The *National Security Strategy*, the *National Defense Strategy*, which is determined by the Department of Defense, and the *National Military Strategy*, which has operational importance for the command level, are the basic documents framing the US military doctrines. B. Chapman, *Military Doctrine*, pp. 42, 48, 169. Reference to these authoritative texts and the guidance provided in the *Joint Vision Series* provides a comprehensive understanding of the principles guiding US military strategy in the unipolar era. US Government, Direction for Strategic Plans and Policy, *Joint Vision 2020*, Washington, 2000. https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/CE5F5937-49EC-44EF-83F3-FC25CB0CB942-1274110898250/alecd_ref/joint_vision_2020.pdf, accessed 10.05.2024.

Although unipolarity provided a degree of stability, it also provoked many challenges that required strategic revisions. In *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Mearsheimer discusses how unipolarity has provoked security dilemmas and caused power shifts for the leading international powers. In this context, the US administration had to significantly revise its military doctrines to respond to new threat sources and maintain its strategic advantage.⁶ However, the US military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11 were the main historical examples to show how the nature of military doctrines has changed and evolved in a unipolar world. This new era marked a shift from conventional to counterinsurgency strategies in response to asymmetric threats, as evidenced by works like Petraeus' "Counterinsurgency Field Manual" and Ricks' "Fiasco".⁷

Moreover, technological advancements played a critical role in shaping military doctrines, influencing strategic thinking and force structures, as analyzed by scholars such as van Creveld and Biddle.⁸ Unipolarity aligned with the technological superiority debates, shaping military doctrines around advanced capabilities. Horowitz emphasizes how technology diffusion can directly affect the strategic landscape.⁹ As a parallel study, Mahnken sheds light on how technological developments have influenced military doctrines.¹⁰ From this perspective, doctrines were geared toward maintaining technological superiority and anticipating emerging capabilities in a unipolar world where the US led in military technology. However, many technological capabilities and threats would emerge in the new multipolar era, from cyber warfare to precision-guided munitions and unmanned systems.¹¹

On the other side, the rise of competitors like China and Russia at the beginning of the 21st century signaled challenges to unipolarity's sustainability, prompting debates highlighted by theorists such as Layne. His theoretical perspectives, starting from the idea that unipolarity is, in fact, a "temporary illusion", emphasize the necessity for military doctrines and strategies adapted accordingly to be able to move quickly to more significant revisions while trying to read the changing geopolitical constraints.¹² Looking at post-Cold War conflicts, the Gulf War, and the interventions in the Balkans and Africa, we see how US military strategic priorities and directions provided quick solutions in the international arena, and, in this context, the role and participation of the international community and its institutions in US-centered interventions is also important. Specific analyses of these cases will help to understand the effectiveness and limits of US military strategies.¹³ Indeed, the US intervention in Afghanistan after the 11 September attacks can be interpreted in a similar framework.

6 John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2001, pp. 29-54.

7 These works provide relevant discussions on the difficulty of dynamic adjustments in response to changing geopolitical challenges. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The Petraeus Doctrine: The Field Manual on Counterinsurgency Operations*, Joint Publication No. 3-24, 2009; Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005*, Penguin Books, New York, 2007, pp. 430-439.

8 Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, The Free Press, New York, 1991; Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*, Princeton University Press, New York, 2004.

9 Michael C. Horowitz, *Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences*, Princeton University Press, New York, 2010, pp. 18-63.

10 Thomas Mahnken, *Technology and the American Way of War Since 1945*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2010, pp. 2-14.

11 Thomas Rid, *Cyber War Will Not Take Place*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012; Martin C. Libicki, *Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar*, RAND Corporation, Washington, 2009.

12 Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise", *International Security*, 17:4, 1993, pp. 5-51.

13 Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Defense Policy Choices for the Bush Administration*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 1997; Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to save Kosovo*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 2000.

The unipolar era witnessed the US as the sole global hegemon, not only influencing the political and economic spheres but also shaping the military doctrines of the dominant countries of the international system. Traditional US military strategies, often based on the concepts of power projection and deterrence, were adapted to maintain dominance in a unipolar system.¹⁴ Scholars like Mearsheimer and Huntington have criticized the sustainability of unipolarity and predicted that systemic pressures could lead to sharp adjustments in American military strategies, emphasizing the historically changing nature of military doctrines.¹⁵

In order to adapt to the new geopolitical realities emerging in the international system, many countries, especially the US, have had to make sharp structural revisions in their military doctrines. Transiting from unipolarity to an era of strategic competition and cooperation required a nuanced approach. The theoretical frameworks of “grand strategy” proposed by Gray and Posen offer insights into the “adaptive nature” of military doctrines.¹⁶ The post-9/11 landscape and the emergence of new global power dynamics compelled strategic recalibrations and doctrinal adaptations across all challenging and defied nations.

1.1. Understanding the Correlation between System Transformation and Adjustment of Military Doctrines

In the dynamic realm of international relations, the evolution of military doctrines plays a pivotal role in shaping nation-states’ security and defense strategies, adapting to shifting geopolitical realities and power transitions. Unavoidably flexible and responsive, military doctrines require continuous reassessment as states adjust their strategic priorities, force structures, and operational concepts in light of changing capabilities and global power shifts. Kupchan’s insights highlight the significance of adapting military doctrines to evolving power dynamics in the international system. Initially describing unipolarity as a period dominated by a single superpower,¹⁷ notably the United States, Kupchan acknowledges the subsequent emergence of a more pluralistic global order. This transformation includes the ascent of non-Western powers and shifts in the roles of Western states, marking a departure from the unipolar framework.¹⁸

In response to these changes, states, as rational actors, recalibrate their military doctrines to safeguard their interests amidst a multipolar and multi-actor environment. Military doctrines, thus, serve as strategic instruments for projecting power and influence in a complex international landscape characterized by diverse geopolitical forces and shifting power structures.

At the center of this debate lies the theoretical foundations of multipolarity and its implications for international relations. Kupchan’s ideas overlap with the principles of Waltz’s structural realism. Waltz’s paradigm provides a basis for understanding transitions in systemic orders by arguing that the power distribution within the international system directly shapes the strategic behavior of states. At this stage, it is important for states to

14 Charles Kupchan, *The End of American Era*; Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, Basic Books, NYC, 1990.

15 John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power*; Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” *Foreign Affairs*, 78:2, March/April 1999, p. 36; William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World”, *International Security*, 24:1, 1999, pp. 5-41.

16 Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000; Barry Posen, *Restraint*, pp. 162-164.

17 For Ikenberry, unipolarity could have created many problems for the integrity of US diplomacy. For this discussion, see John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambitions”, in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), *The Use of Force*, Rowman and Littlefield, Oxford, 2004, pp. 321-332.

18 Charles Kupchan, “Introduction: Explaining Peaceful Power Transition,” Charles. Kupchan et.al. (eds.), *Power in Transition*, pp. 1-2.; Kupchan, *No One’s World*, pp. 74-85.

maintain their balance of power within the system as they formulate military strategies.¹⁹ When elaborating their new strategies, they emphasize the instruments that can have a direct impact on the balance of power: first, in response to security dilemma situations, states may consider strategic cooperation to avoid the risk of mistrusting each other and thus engaging in the potential arms race, and by this way, they formulate their military strategies in order to improve their balance of power-based relations. Secondly, while relations between nuclear powers are shaped based on deterrence strategies, states may focus on specific armament for defense purposes and to ensure their national security by abandoning aggressive actions. Thirdly, in response to changing regional power shifts, states should form spontaneous alliances to prevent potential conflicts and ensure national security through more defensive means. Finally, all the states should constantly seek to balance their power and achieve their strategic objectives through multilateral relations and international institutions.²⁰

Explaining the relationship between power distribution and state behavior is crucial to deciphering how military doctrines become strategic responses to ensure national security. The intersection of power transitions and military doctrines is a complex area for debate. Considering the impact of the power transition theories in forming Kupchan's approaches will guide us in understanding the importance of recognizing the direct relationship between systems and power cycles. Within the framework of the "Power transitions" approach, it is emphasized that, in the face of the rise of new challenger powers, adjustments in military strategies are imperative for the defender powers to manage the changing system dynamics properly and avoid potential conflicts.²¹

Based on the approaches of Gilpin, Organski, and Modelski, it is possible to discuss how states revise their military doctrines in the face of the changing power dynamics of the international system. According to Gilpin, in the event of a structural change in the distribution of power at the global level, all sovereign actors face the need for revisionism and adaptation in their defense policies and thus have to adapt their strategic thinking to the new conjuncture by developing or changing their military doctrines. At this stage, Gilpin emphasizes the inevitability of the need for all the states to be flexible in military doctrines in situations of uncertainty caused by periods of power transition. While rising challenger powers may increase their military capacities and develop more ambitious goals to reflect the power shift, defender powers (in decline) may strategically retreat and adopt more deterrent or more aggressive positions to deal with these new competitors. In Gilpin's "hegemonic stability" approach, rising powers challenge the established order, while periods of power transition are fraught with uncertainty and potential conflict. Here, it will be inevitable for both rising and defensive states to make strategic adjustments to protect or advance their national interests in the face of changing power dynamics at the international level. On the other hand, Gilpin's concept of "hegemonic war" speaks of the significant risks of conflict during periods of power transition. As new rising powers challenge the established hegemonic structures in the system, the potential for military conflict will increase. Therefore, states may revise their military doctrines to improve their strategic flexibility, deter rivals, or maintain regional dominance. Power transition dynamics act as a catalyst for strategic reassessment, and this is where the transformation of military doctrines can offer us many clues to the possibilities of hegemonic war.²²

19 Posen discusses the relationship between the balance-of-power theory and military doctrines in detail. Barry Posen, "The Sources of Military Doctrine", Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), *The Use of Force*, Rowman and Littlefield, Oxford, UK, 2004, pp. 32-42.

20 Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Waveland Press, Long Grove, Illinois, 2010.

21 Charles A. Kupchan, Emanuel Adler, *Power in Transition*; Charles Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends*.

22 Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981.

Organski's "Power Transitions Theory" proposes that power transitions occur as new powers rise and challenge the existing hegemon, which leads to international conflicts. This theoretical framework serves as a starting point for understanding how great nations adjust their military strategies during periods of power shifts in global or regional leadership. The theory suggests that power imbalances motivate states to recalibrate their military approaches to maintain or gain influence. Organski's broader theoretical relationship with "Hegemonic Stability Theory" emphasizes that a stable international system requires a single dominant power to maintain order. However, when power transitions occur, they create instability and affect how nations formulate military strategies to navigate a changing security environment.²³

Similarly, Modelski's "Long Cycles Theory" suggests that the international system experiences recurring cycles of the rise and fall of global powers and extends the temporal dimension of power transitions, highlighting recurring cycles of global power dynamics. These cycles influence geopolitical landscapes and compel nations to adjust their military doctrines in response to shifting systemic leadership. Modelski's emphasis on systemic leadership suggests that a dominant power leads the global system during each long cycle, but as systemic leadership changes, it leads to adjustments in military strategies as nations seek to secure their interests within shifting power dynamics. States may exhibit cyclical adjustments in military doctrine by aligning their strategic posture with the dominant phase of the long cycle.²⁴

Theoretical debates on power transitions present different perspectives on adapting military doctrines according to systemic conditions; firstly, power cycles necessitate "strategic realignment" as states seek to adapt to a changing international order. According to Gilpin, rising powers will challenge the existing systemic norms with aggressive policies, while the dominant powers will have to reassess their military strategies to counter these new potential threats or maintain their influence. On the other hand, transformations in power dynamics often occur in parallel with "advances in military technology". By recognizing the strategic importance of technological superiority, as Modelski emphasizes, states need to adjust their military doctrines to incorporate technical innovations. Finally, power shifts in the system force states to reconsider their existing alliance structures, and thus, the changing balance of power may lead to new models of partnership and cooperation, affecting the cooperative or competitive aspects of military doctrines. Modelski's approach to long cycles approach argues that alliances are more influential in shaping the trajectory of rising powers.

Another focal point of Kupchan's approach is the rise of non-Western powers that challenge the traditional narrative of Western exceptionalism, especially after 9/11. Since the early 21st century, there has been a transformative new geopolitical landscape marked by the erosion of Western dominance and the rise of emerging powers from various regions. By presenting the "No One's world" approach, Kupchan argues for a complex fabric emerging from the decline of the West and the rise of "the rest"; here is finally a world characterized by the declining influence of traditional Western powers and the rise of new global actors.²⁵ In this context, it is possible to focus on Buzan and Wæver's discussion of how multipolarity has developed through the diversification of global influence. Kupchan's views on the rise of

23 Roahl Tammen et al., *Power Transitions*, CQ Press, 2000; Abramo F. K. Organski, *World Politics*, Alfred A. Knopf, NY, 1968; Abramo F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981.

24 George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1987.

25 Charles Kupchan, "The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and the Coming Challenge to Pax Americana," *Security Studies*, 23:2, 2014, pp. 219-257.

China, India, Russia, and other regional actors overlap with Buzan and Wæver's emphasis on different power centers and regional dynamics.²⁶

Buzan and Waever have made significant contributions to the field of security studies with their "Regional Security Complex Theory". This theoretical framework provides a unique lens through which we can understand the complex relationship between security dynamics and national military strategies, especially in the context of power shifts in regional systems. According to them, the security perceptions of nations are not only fueled by international dynamics but also depend on regional developments. At this point, Buzan and Waever put forward the concept of "security complexes", arguing that security problems often develop at the regional level and that regional systems are, therefore, crucial in shaping state behaviors and security priorities. In such a strategic vision in which regional dynamics will be more determinant than global realities, the interactions between states in a given region will constitute a special security complex, and the security of a state will be directly interlinked with that of other states in the region in which it is located.

On the other hand, by introducing the concept of "securitization", Buzan and Waever emphasize the importance of threat perceptions at the level of specific actors and the associated need for strategic behaviors; in this respect, the process of securitization is important for understanding how national military strategies develop. Defining a problem as a security concern not only frames threat perceptions but also requires channeling military resources. National military strategies never remain static; they have to adapt to changing security conditions. In the context of regional security complexes, Buzan and Waever's approach is essential to make the military strategies of states dynamic during power shifts. For example, when a region undergoes a power shift, states in that region reassess their security priorities, alliances, and force postures. This adaptation is not only a response to external threats but is also influenced by evolving regional power relations. To illustrate, the post-Cold War period witnessed a power shift in Eastern Europe, characterized by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. With the Eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the former Soviet bloc countries aligned their military doctrines with the changing power dynamics and created new counterbalances to regional security complexities.²⁷

1.2. Challenges to Offensive Realism

In Mearsheimer's realist approach, states primarily act to maximize their power and ensure security within an anarchic international system. According to offensive realism, power struggles, competition, and conflict are inevitable in shaping the international order, driven by security concerns and the pursuit of dominance among great powers. This perspective explains the perpetual quest for security and survival underpinned by the balance of power dynamics.²⁸ However, Kupchan criticizes the defensive realist framework, arguing that it oversimplifies power dynamics in international relations and neglects the complexities of power distribution in the contemporary world. According to Kupchan, the neo-realist perspective ignores the cultural, historical, and intellectual factors that shape global politics.²⁹ Arguing that focusing on power dynamics alone disregards the changing nature of international relations, Kupchan

26 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.

27 Charles Kupchan, "The origins and future of NATO enlargement", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 21:2, 2000, pp. 127-148.

28 John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

29 Charles Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security", *International Security*, 20:1, 1995, pp. 52-61.

emphasizes that, in order to avoid a minimalist treatment of cultural and historical factors in international relations, ignoring these elements obscures the nuances of state behaviors and prevents a comprehensive understanding of why states behave as they do.

Kupchan also discusses how shared values, norms, and identity in the system can promote cooperation between states. Thus, states do not act solely out of survival concerns, and alliances or cooperation policies inevitably gain importance in this framework, as collective actions are likely to have effective outcomes.³⁰ On the other hand, offensive realism underestimates the effectiveness of international institutions and sees them as the sole instruments powerful states use to pursue their interests. According to Kupchan, institutions directly contribute to cooperation and alleviate the security dilemma.³¹

In contrast to Mearsheimer's arguably pessimistic view of state behaviors and his focus on material capabilities and power politics, Kupchan argues that, at the international level, shared values, normative frameworks, and cooperative ideas play a crucial role in maintaining stability among states. In the same vein, in today's globalized world, entities beyond traditional nation-states, such as transnational corporations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and sub-state entities, are now taking important roles in adjusting international security dynamics.³² Kupchan underlines how the shift from bipolarity to multipolarity in the post-Cold War period led states to adapt their strategies beyond mere power politics. He argues that, in a multipolar world, states balance power with other strategic considerations such as coalition-building, diplomacy, and managing diverse global challenges.³³

Moreover, Kupchan argues that neo-realism neglects the influence of regional powers, emerging states, and non-state actors in great power politics in the context of emerging multipolarity. By analyzing Russia's resurgence, China's rise, and India's potential, a broader understanding of international relations should consider regional dynamics, economic interdependence, and cultural factors that play an important role in shaping the international order. On the other hand, Kupchan disagrees with Mearsheimer's skepticism towards global governance and multilateralism in relation to the liberal order, and he underlines the relevance of international institutions and cooperation in addressing global challenges. In today's globalized world, entities beyond traditional nation-states, such as transnational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and sub-state actors, significantly impact international dynamics.³⁴

2. From Multiplicity of Actors to Diversity of Threats

2.1. *Adaptation of Military Doctrines to Multipolarity: Geopolitical Transformations*

In the context of reassessing military strategies and doctrines in a multipolar world, Kupchan emphasizes the importance of understanding the changing power structures and making the necessary adjustments to ensure the survival and effectiveness of dominant structures. In today's multipolar world, the traditional concepts of alliance and inter-state rivalry have changed their content. Therefore, the dominant actors of the system are forced to adopt strategies that are more adaptable to the international conjuncture. Here, it is imperative to

30 Charles Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends*.

31 Charles Kupchan, *The End of the American Era*.

32 Charles Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective...", pp. 52-61.

33 Charles Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends*.

34 Charles. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective...", pp. 52-61; Charles Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends*.

depart from dualist security thinking and recognize the inherent complexity and constant variability inherent in multipolarity as fundamental strategic needs. Therefore, states may be forced to leave their traditional power structures or revise their relations with them while trying to adapt to the irregularity of the new system. In this structural change, military strategies are the most important tool for both ensuring national security and developing global power.³⁵

The unipolarity that developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new power centers after the September 11 attacks have profoundly affected the existing military doctrines of the dominant countries of the international system. Beyond unipolarity, states such as China, India, and Brazil came to the fore and changed the traditional dynamics of international relations. This period necessitates shaping power structures with spontaneous realities and the need for strategic flexibility. In this way, the rise of challenging powers and new power structures with pluralistic elements has prompted Western states to revise their military positions.³⁶

For instance, to respond to China's rise as both an economic and strategic actor and to maintain its influence in the Asia-Indo-Pacific region, the US administration has had to adjust its regional military strategies and multilateral cooperation structures over the last decade. In this context, the multilateral organization of the AUKUS (trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) is an important initiative for developing regional security cooperation. On the other hand, China's military modernization, its vast territorial claims in the South China Sea, and its Belt and Road Initiative have made Beijing a very important player in the multipolar order, which has shifted from a defensive policy to a more offensive approach against the disorder of the international system. The transformation of China's military doctrines shows its desire to consolidate its position as a regional hegemon within the confines of a complex global power structure, and thus, its rise as a major global player will develop gradually.³⁷

On the other hand, Russia's revisionist initiatives in recent years (military intervention in Syria, its annexation of Crimea, and the Ukrainian War) can be seen as a response to the global order through the continuous adjustment of military doctrines during the Putin era. Russia's overly aggressive strategic behavior and its interventions in frozen conflict zones reflect an effort to protect its interests in the face of the shifting dynamics of the multipolar system. These developments across regions like Eastern Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East signify a process of doctrinal adaptation aligned with Kupchan's vision of a multipolar world where regional powers play pivotal roles amidst structural flexibility and evolving circumstances.³⁸

As a collective entity, the European Union (EU) has endeavored to reassess its defense and security policies in light of the evolving international landscape. Efforts to enhance defense integration among EU member states reflect a recognition of the imperative for cooperation and coordinated military strategies within a multipolar context. Challenges such as increased refugee flows post-Arab Spring, ongoing political instability in Africa,

35 Charles Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends*.

36 Charles Kupchan, *No One's World*, pp. 74-85.

37 For further discussions on Chinese military doctrines, see M. Taylor Fravel, *Active Defense: China's Military Strategy Since 1949*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019; Timothy A. Ornelas, "China's Active Defense Military Strategy: Competition considerations for U.S. forces operating in the Indo-Pacific region", *Marine Corps Gazette*, October, 2021, pp. 57-62.

38 Charles Kupchan, *No One's World*, pp. 125-126.

fundamentalist terrorism, Russia's military actions in Crimea and Ukraine, and the proliferation of instability near Europe's borders have compelled European countries and the EU to adopt more multifaceted military doctrines.³⁹

In the context of EU-NATO relations, there is an erosion of the founding principles of both the EU and NATO in the face of the strategic priorities of the member states, as conflicting tactics and strategies are determined among the allied states. This situation leads to a loss of solidarity between the member and allied states, the prominence of extra-institutional or extra-alliance relations, and the spontaneous emergence of more competitive behavioral patterns.⁴⁰

Similarly, in the Middle East, traditional powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, and Israel (with its opaque nuclear power status), alongside emerging medium-sized powers such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, continually reassess their military doctrines amidst evolving geopolitical landscapes.⁴¹ The strategic balances created by the changes of political powers in the Middle East after the Arab Spring and the new bilateral relationship grounds like the Abraham Accords can be considered as the results of the multipolar reality, and in this respect, they require strategic calculations that need to be constantly renewed, involving regional and extra-regional actors and power centers. Furthermore, sources of instability and disorder can be defined as the weakening and fragility of the internal structures of states and their reflection and reaction as a threat to regional sub-system balances with the effects of contagion and diffusion to neighboring geographies.

2.2. Diversifying Threat Perceptions: Navigating Uncertainty through Adaptability and Fluidity

In response to a complex and multipolar world, military doctrines must diversify their threat perceptions in order not only to achieve effective results but also to create strategies that can adapt to the uncertainties of the 21st century. The ability of states to anticipate and respond to potential threats has become crucial for global security and stability, driving the pivotal role of military doctrines in this recalibration process. Traditional doctrines, formulated during periods of unipolarity or bipolarity, are inadequate in today's multipolar context, necessitating a re-evaluation informed by classical military theorists such as Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, interpreted through the lens of contemporary multipolarity. As states adjust their military approaches to navigate shifting power dynamics in a multipolar arena, concepts like "fluidity of strategy", "comprehensive deterrence", and "fog of war" gain heightened importance.⁴² Discussions within this framework, incorporating insights from Kupchan, recognize that states engage in diverse forms of competition and cooperation. The complexity inherent in multipolarity demands military doctrines that balance traditional considerations with emerging challenges such as cyber threats, terrorism, counterinsurgency operations, regional conflicts, and non-traditional security risks.

39 GLOBE – The European Union and the Future of Global Governance, *Case study of the European Security Architecture: NATO and OSCE*, European Union, Brussels, 2020, 109 pages. https://www.globe-project.eu/case-study-of-the-european-security-architecture-nato-and-osce_11317.pdf, accessed 02.05.24.

40 European Defence Agency, *Enhancing EU Military Capabilities beyond 2040: Main findings from the 2023 Long-Term Assessment of the Capability Development Plan*, Brussels, 2023; Daniel Keohane, "EU Military Cooperation and National Defense", *German Marshall Fund of US Policy Brief* - 004, 2018, p. 8.

41 Amr Yossef, "Changes of Military Doctrines in the Middle East", Paper presented at the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) 52nd Annual Meeting in San Antonio, Texas, 2018. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329656279_Changes_of_Military_Doctrines_in_the_Middle_East, accessed 10.05.24

42 Carl von Clausewitz, *De la Guerre*, Le Monde En, Paris, 1955.

Military theorists like Gray and Arquilla underscore the importance of strategic foresight and adaptability in combating multifaceted threats. The unpredictability of modern security challenges emphasizes the need for flexible and adaptive military doctrines capable of navigating an ever-evolving threat landscape.⁴³ Arquilla's concept of "netwar" expands this theoretical framework, advocating doctrines that transcend traditional military boundaries to counter decentralized and networked adversaries.⁴⁴

Historical case studies from the post-9/11 and Arab Spring periods are particularly considered, as they demonstrate the changing nature of threats. The transition from a unipolar to a multipolar security environment has exposed the inadequacies of state-centered warfare against autonomous non-state actors, transnational terrorism, and cyber threats. US responses, outlined in the post-9/11 *National Security Strategy*, exemplify the imperative of diversified military doctrines to address emerging threats effectively. The shift from deterrence to preventive war doctrine, the emphasis on counterinsurgency and counterinsurgency strategies following the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq,⁴⁵ and the adoption of temporary alliance policies with both international coalitions and local forces in the context of many civil wars in the Middle East following the Arab Spring illustrate the unavoidable fluidity of US military strategies.

China's ascendancy as a global power presents challenges for Western powers, compelling adaptations in military doctrines to address areas like power projection, naval capabilities, artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and hybrid tactics. This challenge has prompted the US and the United Kingdom to forge enhanced alliances and security arrangements in the Indo-Pacific region. Similarly, Russia's military doctrines reflect efforts to assert influence through hybrid warfare, cyber capabilities, and regional dominance strategies, aligning with Kupchan's observations on the complexities of multipolar power distribution.

Likewise, there is a simultaneous or gradual introduction of both conventional and hybrid tools in the transition from frozen to active conflict models, and the emphasis on nuclear deterrence is also prominent in military doctrines.⁴⁶ Russia's multidimensional operational perspective, ranging from comprehensive deterrence to strategic flexibility, and a mix of conventional and hybrid tools, as well as strategic behavior in very different geographies and with very different tools, from the annexation of Crimea in 2014 to the Ukrainian War which started in 2022, from the initiatives of private military companies in Africa to their cooperation with North Korea, support the unpredictability of the multipolar system and lead other relevant actors to similarly asymmetric strategies and hybrid tools.

The asymmetric diversification of threat perceptions across geographical, actor, and methodological dimensions necessitates a paradigm shift in military planning. States must move beyond conventional warfare concepts and adopt hybrid warfare strategies integrating diplomatic, economic, and informational elements. NATO's "Comprehensive Approach"

43 Colin Gray, *Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History*, Routledge, London, 2004.

44 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *The Advent of Netwar*, RAND Corporation, Washington, 1996; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, RAND Corporation, Washington, 2000.

45 David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009; John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*. Praeger, 2002.

46 William Alberque, "Russian Military Thought and Doctrine Related to Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons: Change and Continuity," *IISS Research Papers*, 2024. <https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2024/01/russian-military-thought-and-doctrine-related-to-nonstrategic-nuclear-weapons/>, accessed 02.04.24.

exemplifies this shift, advocating a holistic response to contemporary threats that integrates military and civilian instruments of power.⁴⁷

In alignment with Kupchan's analytical perspectives, Buzan and Wæver advocate for an expanded understanding of security beyond traditional military threats. They propose the concept of "comprehensive security," which aligns strategic priorities with economic, environmental, and social dimensions, reflecting the interconnected nature of contemporary challenges. This theoretical framework guides states in restructuring military doctrines to address a broader array of security issues that transcend national borders.⁴⁸ The post-unipolar era has witnessed the rise of non-traditional threats such as terrorism, cyber warfare, and pandemics, alongside increased civil wars and conflicts that provoke refugee flows and necessitate widespread international interventions.

Historically, the adaptive nature of military doctrines, inspired by von Clausewitz's emphasis on evolving military theory ("chameleon metaphor"), underscores the relevance of the "fog of war" and strategic flexibility in confronting multifaceted challenges. The emergence of "hybrid warfare", integrating conventional and unconventional tactics, necessitates effective preparation against diverse threats, including cyber and information warfare. As states broaden their threat perceptions, they face the imperative of developing comprehensive, resilient, and continually evolving military doctrines. Such doctrines must adeptly address contextual, operational, and instrumental dimensions. Today, a holistic approach goes beyond traditional state-centered security paradigms, encompassing military, economic, environmental, and social considerations. The concept of "security complexes", developed by Buzan and Wæver, provides insights into navigating blurred distinctions between domestic and international threats.⁴⁹ The inclusion of climate change as a security issue in the 2022 *US National Security Strategy*⁵⁰ underscores the evolving nature of threats, prompting the adaptation of military doctrines to address a broader spectrum of security challenges across borders.

When we analyze historical case studies, it is possible to see how unpredictable threats have influenced military doctrines. Following the 11 September attacks, the emergence of terrorism as a powerful and non-traditional threat led to a reassessment of security priorities, including the incorporation of counterterrorism strategies into military doctrine to confront non-state actors using asymmetric tactics, and the further technological development of intelligence capabilities and tailoring them to the resources of non-state actors.

Similarly, the changing nature of cyber threats has prompted states to rethink their national security approaches. Traditional military doctrines and tools designed for conventional warfare are ill-equipped to counter the complexity of cyber warfare. For example, the *Stuxnet* incident, a cyber-attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, demonstrated the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to unconventional threats and showed that doctrines need to be developed according to defensive and offensive objectives along with technological advances.⁵¹

47 Kathleen J. McInnis and Clementine G. Starling, *The Case for a Comprehensive Approach 2.0: How NATO Can Combat Chinese and Russian Political Warfare*, Atlantic Council, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Washington, 2021.

48 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jacob de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, UK, 1998; Dritero Arifi, "The concept of "Comprehensive security" as a draft for reconstructing security in a system of international relations," *Iliria International Review*, 1:1, 2011, pp 19-32.

49 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers*, p. 40-70.

50 Jessica O. Yllemo, "Climate and the 2022 National Defense Strategy," *American Security Project*, 2022. <https://www.americansecurityproject.org/climate-and-the-2022-national-defense-strategy/>, accessed 05.05.24.

51 Lukas Milevski, "Stuxnet and Strategy: A Special Operation in Cyberspace?", *JPO*, 63:4, 2011, pp. 64-69.

3. Alliance Dynamics and Collective Security: International System and Regions

3.1. Revisiting the Evolution of Military Doctrines in Collective Defense Mechanisms for Adaptation to Multipolarity

In response to the paradigm shift towards multipolarity, states are compelled to reassess traditional power dynamics by embracing collaborative security arrangements. In this complex global environment characterized by diverse and dynamic threats, military doctrines must adaptively reflect the necessity for cooperative strategies and alliance-building to ensure global stability in the 21st century. Walt's theoretical framework on alliance politics and cooperative security is particularly pertinent amidst the decline of unipolarity.⁵² During the unipolar era dominated by the US, powerful states enjoyed strategic autonomy; however, the shift to multipolarity necessitated a reconsideration of collective defense mechanisms and a pivot towards new and shifting alliances in response to evolving circumstances.

The multipolar system constantly leads states to new behaviors in alliance-building policies and cooperative security arrangements within the framework of reconsidering collective defense mechanisms. According to Walt, states form or develop alliances against perceived threats. Walt's "balance of threat theory" suggests that states enter alliances with other stakeholders with whom they share common concerns about potential threats and enemies. Walt's views have become particularly important in a multipolar world where threats come from many different sources and power is fragmented. At this stage, alliance-building can be considered as a rational response to rapidly evolving security challenges. States adopt collective deterrence strategies by mobilizing their internal and external resources, structuring their intelligence capabilities, and forming alliances against potential adversaries.⁵³

Moreover, as power becomes more distributed among multiple major actors in a multipolar system, traditional alliances transform. Walt argues that states enter alliances to enhance their security capabilities and deter aggressors, necessitating recalibrated strategic partnerships in response to changing power dynamics. The flexibility and adaptability of military doctrines are crucial at this juncture, moving away from Cold War-era rigidity to embrace fluid approaches that facilitate ad hoc coalitions and cooperative responses to emerging threats.

The increasing emphasis in military doctrines on building flexible alliances indicates a shift away from unilateral approaches to security. Today, military strategists are not only assessing the different capabilities of multiple actors but also producing doctrines that include the ability to work together with actors at many different levels, including joint operations. As Walt emphasizes, addressing common threats in cooperative security approaches is important for both identifying common interests and collective responsibilities. States recognize the limits of their infrastructure in cyber areas and form many cyber alliances to combine resources and technical expertise.⁵⁴ This situation shows a shift towards non-traditional cooperative approaches to transnational security challenges.

The reorganization of military doctrines is not only a theoretical debate but has concrete indicators at the global level. The evolving security strategies of European states

52 Stephen Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse", *Survival*, 39:1, 1997, pp. 156-179.

53 Stephen Walt, "Keeping the World Off Balance: Self Restraint and US Foreign Policy", John Ikenberry (ed.), *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power*, Cornell University Press, New York, 2002, pp. 121-154.

54 The Tallinn Handbook on International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations reflects the joint efforts of legal experts from various states to establish norms and guidelines for cyber warfare. Michael N. Schmitt, *The Tallinn Manual 2.0 Handbook on International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017.

in the post-Cold War era are among the most important examples that can be considered here. Likewise, NATO, as the cornerstone of European security and the primary institution of transatlantic cooperation, is the most important example of the adaptability of military alliances in response to the changing global order. A structural product of the Cold War era, NATO was the cornerstone of collective defense in both bipolar and unipolar periods. However, with multipolarity, the organization faced the challenge of adapting to new system dynamics. The expansion of the alliance's mandate and membership due to international instabilities and conflicts, as well as its engagement with non-traditional security issues such as cyber threats and terrorism, demonstrate its efforts to maintain its relevance in the face of changing conjunctural dynamics. Moreover, the "Partnership for Peace" program can be considered a cooperative approach that involves non-member states to promote regional stability through cooperation.⁵⁵

On the other hand, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an important example of a new security cooperation arrangement in Eurasia. Initially established to address regional security concerns among its members, the SCO has evolved to cover various issues, including economic cooperation, border security, and counterterrorism. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can be taken as an example of how member states are increasingly engaged in cooperative security mechanisms to address common challenges. Walt's propositions on the functions and limits of collective security arrangements well justify the reasons for these regional shifts in the face of system transformation.

The emphasis on alliance-building and cooperative security in post-unipolar military doctrines is not only a response to external threats but is also shaped by a nuanced understanding of common interests and the interdependence of states. As Walt suggests, alliances are not static structures but dynamic networks of relationships that respond to the evolving strategic environment. Since they recognize the limitations of unilateral approaches, states tend to develop cooperative frameworks to enhance their security. Consequently, the post-unipolar world points to the necessity of a paradigm shift in military doctrines. The evolution towards multipolarity emphasizes the importance of alliances and cooperative security arrangements, prompting states to constantly reevaluate their defense strategies.

3.2. Formulation of Military Doctrines in the Context of Regional Security Architectures

With the end of unipolarity, states have had to reassess not only their global strategies but also their regional engagements. Kupchan's analysis of regional dynamics supports understanding how states construct their military doctrines to contribute to or to deftly navigate regional security architectures. As states seek to adapt to the realities of multipolarity, crafting military doctrines responsive to the regional conjuncture emerges as a strategic necessity. The complex balance between global and regional interests requires recalibrating military doctrines to consider the unique challenges and opportunities in specific geographic regions. Kupchan's perspective that the world has become a concert of regions encourages us to think about how states can develop military doctrines likely to contribute to regional stability or navigate the complexity of regional dynamics and emphasize cooperative mechanisms; hence, multidimensional cooperation and structures. This perspective should not be seen as a rejection of globalist thinking but rather a recognition that regional dynamics play an important role in shaping a state's security environment as global balances.

⁵⁵ For various discussions on NATO's role in the new world order, see Janne H. Matlary and Robert Johnson (eds.), *Military Strategy in the 21st Century: The Challenge for NATO*, Hurst, London, UK, 2021.

The theoretical insights of scholars such as Art and Waltz can be utilized to discuss the regional dynamics shaping military doctrines. Art's concept of regional power structures explains that regional dynamics significantly influence a state's security perceptions and, thus, its military doctrines.⁵⁶ Waltz's neorealism provides a framework through which we can analyze how the distribution of power in regions shapes states' behaviors and informs their strategic thinking. Regional dynamics frequently present main security challenges, from historical disputes to contemporary rivalries. In an era marked by fluidity and uncertainty due to multipolarity, states crafting military doctrines must adopt a comprehensive and tailored approach to security.

Regionalism, marked by diplomatic, economic, and security interactions among neighboring states, compels states to reassess their military doctrines, recognizing the region-specific manifestations of security challenges. Strategic thinking must acknowledge the significance of regional security architectures, as military doctrine formulation increasingly intertwines with and is influenced by regional dynamics emphasized by scholars like Buzan and Acharya.⁵⁷ As states navigate the complexities of an ever-changing world, the strategic thinking behind military doctrines will foreground the influence of regional dynamics and emphasize the need for adaptive and cooperative approaches to security in specific geographical contexts. Buzan argues that regional security complexes play an important role in shaping the security agendas of states in a given geographical area. The concept of security complex highlights shared security concerns and the resulting interdependence among states in a region, emphasizing the need for region-specific military doctrines due to the recognition that security threats often originate from specific geographical areas. Likewise, Acharya discusses how regional institutions like ASEAN in Asia serve as forums for dialogue and cooperation, influencing the formulation of military doctrine and shaping the security strategies of member states.⁵⁸

The existence of a complex web of interdependence between neighboring countries can be discussed as a regional dimension. Keohane and Nye's work on complex interdependence provides a theoretical basis for understanding the interdependent relationships that characterize regional dynamics.⁵⁹ As states increasingly interconnect and interdepend at regional levels, military doctrines must evolve to encompass the multifaceted nature of these relationships, emphasizing cooperative approaches that extend beyond traditional national security paradigms, including prioritizing confidence-building mechanisms and regional security institutions.

The rise of hybrid threats like cyber warfare and transnational terrorism further underscores the imperative for regional cooperation in military doctrines. As articulated by scholars such as Holmes and Yoshihara, contemporary security challenges necessitate military doctrines that transcend traditional military threats to encompass cross-border, non-traditional challenges endemic to regional dynamics.⁶⁰ The regionalism argument

56 For various discussions on military doctrines for different regions, see Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), *The Use of Force*, Rowman and Littlefield, Oxford, UK, 2004.

57 Barry Buzan and Amitav Acharya, *The Making of Global International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019; Amitav Acharya, *The End of American World Order*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2015.

58 Amitav Acharya, *ASEAN and Regional Order: Revisiting Security Community in Southeast Asia*, Routledge, London, UK, 2021.

59 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Longman, Little Brown, 1977.

60 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, 2012.

is increasingly recognized as an important factor in new strategic thinking on military doctrines. States now recognize that global considerations alone are insufficient to consider problems in specific geographical contexts. The recognition that regional security is linked to its internal actors is evident in the shift towards cooperative security arrangements, as seen in the Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union. Moreover, the rise of China as a major power in the Asia-Pacific region and the South China Sea dispute has led neighboring and extra-regional states, particularly the United States, to reassess their military doctrines. The concept of the Asia-Indo-Pacific security region, which has come to the fore today, is important for discussing how states such as Japan and India have adapted their military strategies to balance China's rising influence in the region. Similarly, regional organizations such as the ASEAN demonstrate the importance of regionalism in shaping military doctrines through different instruments.

Military doctrines tailored to regional dynamics involve strategic adaptations to address specific threats and opportunities. The outbreak of the Ukraine War radically affected the military doctrines and strategies of Eastern and Northern European countries in the face of changing relationship dynamics with Russia. States in the region have not only revised their strategies based on global power shifts (e.g., joining NATO) but have also emphasized cooperative defense initiatives in a regional context. In the Middle East, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in particular has direct implications for the military doctrines of its member states; with their common security concerns and strategic partnership, the GCC member states have developed many collective solutions based on military cooperation, including joint military exercises and the establishment of a unified military command. This new regional approach in the Middle East demonstrates how the Gulf states recognize the interdependent nature of their security challenges and, accordingly, are developing cooperation with extra-regional powers and coordinating the military doctrines of states within the GCC. The establishment of the *Peninsula Shield Force* demonstrates how regional security concerns can lead to the creation of collective defense mechanisms.⁶¹ In parallel, the rapprochement between Israel and the Gulf states through the Abraham Accords should be seen in the context of changing regional balances. Complex regional dynamics, characterized by multiple actors with divergent interests, significantly influence the development of military strategies, often complicated by regional conflicts and historical enmities that hinder the coherence of military doctrines. Effective regional security architectures, such as the Organization of American States (OAS) in the Americas, offer platforms for conflict resolution and confidence-building measures that inform military strategies. However, rivalries between countries in the region occasionally detract from efforts to establish cohesive security policies. Formun ÜstüFormun Altı⁶²

Conclusion: Challenges from the New Actors to Global Governance and Military Doctrines: Discussing Normative Responsibilities

In the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world, there is an increasing need for nuanced and inclusive assessments of strategic approaches. Kupchan argues that deficits in global governance within this multipolar framework compel states to continuously redefine their strategies for projecting power and intervening in foreign affairs, seeking new balances.

61 Julian Reder, "The Peninsula Shield Force: The Gulf Cooperation Council's Vestigial Organ", *International Policy Digest*, 2017. <https://intpolicydigest.org/peninsula-shield-force-gulf-cooperation-council-s-vestigial-organ/>, accessed 03.05.2024; Wojciech Grabowski, "Application of the Regional Security Complex Theory for Security Analysis in the Persian Gulf", *Athenaemum, Polish Political Science Review*, 68:4, 2020, pp. 18-31.

62 Brigitte Weiffen, "Persistence and Change in Regional Security Institutions: Does the OAS Still Have a Project?," *Contemporary Security Policy*, 33:2, 2012, pp. 360-383.

Concurrently, stakeholders exhibit more individualistic and self-interested behaviors.⁶³ Global governance deficits pose significant challenges in addressing humanitarian and non-traditional security issues. Military doctrines must now include human security challenges such as epidemics, climate change, and mass migration. Moreover, the multiplicity and complexity of non-state actors undermine traditional hierarchical structures, necessitating adaptations in military strategies to engage with these diverse entities effectively.

Non-state actors present a broad spectrum, including transnational corporations, NGOs, terrorist groups, religious institutions, and cybercriminal networks. Their expanding influence challenges the conventional state-centered view of international relations. It is possible to argue that non-state actors can be both disruptors and contributors to global stability, which necessitates a closer examination of their role. This requires a basis for cooperation between sovereign actors at the global level, both normatively and operationally.⁶⁴

Non-state actors, ranging from transnational corporations to rebel groups, have the capacity to challenge state-centered norms, and such disruptions have negative implications for global stability.⁶⁵ We can examine different case studies to discuss this argumentation. Cybersecurity threats from hacktivist groups and transnational criminal organizations challenge state sovereignty and global security.⁶⁶ Hacktivist groups like *Anonymous* challenge national security and sovereignty by disrupting state-controlled digital spaces. In the case of *Anonymous and Operation Payback* (2010), the distributed denial-of-service attacks against companies perceived as enemies of internet freedom proved how non-state entities could challenge state and corporate norms in the digital space.⁶⁷ Transnational criminal organizations, such as drug cartels, human trafficking networks, and organized crime groups, provoke serious threats against state authority and international governance structures by operating illegally across borders and benefiting from jurisdictional gaps. For example, drug cartels in Mexico and Colombia not only challenge state authority but also contribute to regional destabilization through pervasive violence and corruption, which undermine traditional state-centered norms.⁶⁸

On the other hand, non-state armed groups challenge state-centered norms by engaging in conflicts independently of recognized state authorities. These groups, ranging from militias to insurgent forces, can destabilize by employing unconventional warfare strategies. For example, the rise of the *Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant* has challenged state-centered norms, as the group effectively controls territory, challenging established international borders and governance structures and reshaping conflict dynamics in the

63 Charles Kupchan, "The Normative Foundations ...", pp. 219-257; Charles Kupchan, *Isolationism*.

64 Robert D. Kaplan et al., *The Return of Marco Polo's World: War, Strategy, and American Interests in the Twenty-First Century*, Random House, New York, 2018; Charles Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends*.

65 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Globalization: What's New? What's Not? (And So What?)," *Foreign Policy*, 118, 2000, pp. 104-119; Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime", in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, et al. (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, pp. 169-191.

66 Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, "Attributing Cyber Attacks," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 38:1-2, 2015, pp. 4-37.

67 Gabriella Coleman, *Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy: The Many Faces of Anonymous*, Verso, New York, 2014.

68 Ginette L. Gautreau, "To Rid the World of the Drug Scourge: A Human Security Perspective on the War on Drugs in Colombia and Mexico", *Paterson Review of International Affairs*, 12:1, 2012, pp. 61-83, Ioan Grillo, *El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency*, Bloomsbury Press, London, UK, 2011; Jeremy McDermott, "The Changing Face of Colombian Organized Crime", *Perspectivas*, 9, 2014, pp. 1-9.

Near East.⁶⁹ Addressing these threats requires states to explore normative and operational cooperation to combat transnational challenges, often necessitating interventions in domestic law and national security contexts.

Contrary to destructive roles, non-state actors have contributed to global stability through cooperative efforts. Here, it is possible to examine examples of organizations, such as non-governmental organizations and transnational corporations, that have engaged in activities that promote peace and stability.⁷⁰ Many NGOs have demonstrated their vital roles in humanitarian efforts, conflict resolution, and development projects. They support peace and stability, actively participating in humanitarian work globally and contributing to stability by addressing critical issues such as health, education, and disaster response. In particular, the *Médecins sans Frontières* (MSF's) global operations providing medical assistance in crisis zones, conflict areas, and areas affected by natural disasters exemplify the significant impact that NGOs can have in promoting stability through health and humanitarian efforts.⁷¹ NGOs such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) also contribute to peacebuilding initiatives and reconciliation by acting as mediators and facilitators in conflict zones. The ICG has played a vital role in conflict resolution through its research and advocacy, advising policymakers, and actively engaging in dialogue to prevent and resolve conflicts in various regions.⁷²

However, the relationship between NGOs and states should not always be seen in a cooperative framework. In many cases, NGOs challenge governments and demonstrate their willingness to act more independently. In particular, humanitarian NGOs often seek to bypass state sovereignty structures for aid and intervention when engaging in cross-border activities. For example, the MSF sometimes challenges or conflicts with traditional state administration in its autonomous activities and health service delivery in many conflict and disaster zones around the world. This quest for autonomy contributes to the fragmentation of local authority, making it more difficult for national governments to maintain control over their territory. At the international level, the actions of certain economic interest-based non-state entities influence regional power dynamics and challenge the traditional hierarchy of state authority by gaining influence. These challenges have direct implications for global governance and stability. Finally, the involvement of non-state actors in local and regional conflicts means that state-centered approaches are inadequate to address unconventional warfare tactics and asymmetric threats.

The dual nature of non-state actors, both cooperative and disruptive, has different implications for global governance, often differing on a case-by-case basis.⁷³ The new roles of non-state actors have changed traditional power dynamics. The case of rebel groups in the Syrian Civil War illustrates how non-state actors can initially be destabilizing but transform

69 Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, *ISIS: The State of Terror*, Ecco Press, New York, 2015; A.Vincent Elemanya, "Terrorism and Global Security: A Study of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)", *Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences*, 11:6, 2023, pp. 63-78.

70 Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*. Cornell University Press, New York, 2004; Thomas G. Weiss, "NGOization of the World Politics," *World Development*, 28:12, 2000, pp. 2225-2242.

71 Médecins Sans Frontières, "International Activity Report 2021", 2022. <https://www.msf.org/international-activity-report-2021>, accessed 10.04.24.

72 International Crisis Group, "About Us", <https://www.crisisgroup.org/about>, accessed 02.03.24.

73 Robert D. Kaplan *The Return of Marco Polo.*; Ann M. Slaughter, *A New World Order*, Princeton University Press, NJ, 2004; Thomas Risse, *Governance without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2012; Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift," *Foreign Affairs*, 76:1, 1997, pp. 50-66; Ann Peters, Lucy Koehlin, et al., *Non-State Actors as Standard Setters*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009.

into contributing stakeholders during peace negotiations and post-conflict reconstruction.⁷⁴ On the other hand, this dual nature of non-state actors also poses challenges for global governance structures. The Paris Agreement on climate change brought to the fore the role of both state and non-state actors in addressing a common global challenge.⁷⁵

Military doctrines to guide armed forces have traditionally focused primarily on state-centered threats. However, in a multipolar context, including the complexities posed by non-state actors has become imperative. The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks accelerated this evolution, prompting adaptations to counter unconventional threats. Examples include counterterrorism operations against groups like Al-Qaeda, cyber defense strategies against hacktivist organizations, and collaborative humanitarian relief efforts involving NGOs.⁷⁶

There is a pressing need for enhanced international cooperation, surveillance technologies and response capabilities advancements, and the integration of soft power strategies alongside traditional military approaches. Moreover, opportunities for cooperation between state and non-state entities are increasingly crucial for bolstering global security.⁷⁷ This new strategic framework advocates increased international collaboration, technological innovation, and the strategic integration of soft power tools.⁷⁸

As military strategies adapt to accommodate the influence of emerging powers and non-state entities in the geopolitical landscape, adjustments are imperative due to evolving multilateral dynamics and shifting alliance roles. Contemporary perspectives emphasize cooperative security endeavors aimed at addressing spontaneous rather than protracted crises while also considering the recalibration of Western dominance in global security dynamics.⁷⁹ Examining NATO's role in post-Cold War security challenges, ranging from refugee crises to counterpiracy operations and interventions in conflicts like Afghanistan and Libya, provides practical insights into the evolution of military doctrines among the allies.⁸⁰

When the adaptation of military doctrines to the roles of humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping missions became a matter of debate, normative debates against new threat sources came to the fore in international platforms. The intersection of human rights and military doctrines in the post-Cold War humanitarian interventions has led to a complex interplay between ethical imperatives, strategic considerations, and the changing nature of conflicts. The strategic considerations of political leaders regarding the incorporation of

74 Steven Heydemann, "Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World," *Comparative Politics*, 45:3, 2013, pp. 253-272; United Nations. (2021). "Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2254", <https://undocs.org/en/S/2021/1030>, accessed 05.04.2024.

75 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, "Paris Agreement," 2015. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf, accessed 05.04.24; Harriett Bulkeley et al., "Governing climate change transnationally: assessing the evidence from a database of sixty initiatives," *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 32:2, 2014, pp. 341-362.

76 Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006; Bruce Hoffman, "A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21:3, 2009, p. 359-377; Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, "Attributing...," pp. 4-37.

77 Thomas G. Weiss, *Global Governance and Non-State Actors: A Comparative Analysis*, Routledge, London, UK, 2014.

78 Barry Buzan and Lena Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009; Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs Books, New York, 2009.

79 Charles Kupchan, "The Democratic Malaise: Globalization and the Threat to the West," *Foreign Affairs*, 91(1), 2012, pp. 61-67.

80 Ali B. Varlık, "NATO's Military Structure: Change and Continuity," *Gazi Akademik Bakış*, 13:26, 2020, pp. 113-134; A. Žotkevičiūtė-Banevičienė, "The Cultural Element in NATO Military Doctrines: Important, but a Declarative Issue?," *Politologija*, 108:4, 2022, pp. 85-105.

human rights into military doctrines vary from country to country. However, adherence to human rights norms can enhance international legitimacy, encourage cooperation with civil society, and contribute to long-term stability in post-conflict scenarios. Moreover, the rule of law approach in Western states nowadays requires the protection of not only civilians but also military personnel in terms of human rights-based domestic laws and the avoidance of debate on human casualties—an aspect underscored by the concept of “post-heroic warfare” as introduced by Luttwak.⁸¹

Returning to traditionalist approaches, however, Clausewitz’s conventional approach emphasizes that war is a continuation of politics by other means. This view of the instrumental use of military power to achieve political objectives has implications for the integration of military doctrines into humanitarian interventions.⁸² Ethical considerations are now pivotal in shaping military doctrines aligned with national interests, particularly in balancing strategic goals with the imperative to minimize civilian casualties and maintain political legitimacy.⁸³ Here, Gray emphasizes that balancing strategic objectives and ethical considerations in addressing humanitarian crises in the new era is politically necessary but has practical limits. In the context of military doctrines in the service of national interests, a certain degree of ethical sensitivity becomes important for the successful coordination of civil-military relations, both in terms of political legitimacy and casualty avoidance, and this sensitivity is particularly critical in the context of counterinsurgency efforts, even posing moral dilemmas.⁸⁴ Kilcullen underlines the need for holistic approaches to addressing complex conflicts and integrating military doctrine with humanitarian endeavors, including counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare strategies.⁸⁵ According to Howard, to harmonize military doctrines with humanitarian principles, the role of liberal conscience should be integrated as the ethical dimensions of war.⁸⁶ The 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo after the massive casualties in the Bosnian War clearly demonstrated the complexity of transforming military strategies to protect civilians and alleviate their suffering during the conflict. While the concept of the responsibility to protect has evolved into a strategy generally accepted by the international community, it has faced major obstacles, particularly with the civil wars in Syria and Libya. Subsequently, we can interpret that the states involved in these conflicts ignored this ethical debate through proxy instruments or direct military interventions. As a matter of fact, the war in Ukraine has shown that normative principles have been completely excluded from military strategies for both warring parties.

Conflict of Interest Statement:

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

81 Edward Luttwak, “Toward Post-heroic Warfare”, *Foreign Affairs*, 74:3, 1995, p. 109-122; Richard Lacquement, “The Casualty-Aversion Myth,” *Naval War College Review*, 57:1, 2004, pp. 39-57.

82 Barry Posen, “The Source of Military Doctrine”, pp. 26-27.

83 John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011.

84 Aaron P. Jackson, *The Roots of Military Doctrine Change and Continuity in Understanding the Practice of Warfare*, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2013, pp. 65-86; Colin Gray, *Strategy for Chaos*.

85 Daniel Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*.

86 Michael Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1978.

References

Published Works

- ACHARYA Amitav (2015). *The End of American World Order*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
- ACHARYA Amitav (2021). *ASEAN and Regional Order: Revisiting Security Community in Southeast Asia*, Routledge, London, UK.
- ARIFI Dritero (2011). "The Concept of "Comprehensive Security" as a Draft for Reconstructing Security in a System of International Relations", *Iliria International Review*, 1:1, 19-32.
- ARQUILLA John and RONFELDT David (1996). *The Advent of Netwar*, RAND Corporation, Washington D.C.
- ARQUILLA John and RONFELDT David (2000). *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, RAND Corporation, Washington D.C.
- ART Robert J. and WALTZ Kenneth N. (eds.) (2004). *The Use of Force*, Rowman and Littlefield, Oxford.
- BARNETT Michael and FINNEMORE Martha (2004). *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*, Cornell University Press, New York, N.Y.
- BULKELEY H. and al. (2014). "Governing Climate Change Transnationally: Assessing the Evidence from a Database of Sixty Initiatives", *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 32:2, 341-362.
- BIDDLE Stephen (2004). *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*, Princeton University Press, New York.
- BUZAN Barry and ACHARYA Amitav (2019). *The Making of Global International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
- BUZAN Barry WAEVER Ole and DE WILDE Jacob (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, UK.
- BUZAN Barry and WAEVER Ole (2003). *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- BUZAN Barry and HANSEN Lena (2009). *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
- CHAPMAN Bert (2009). *Military Doctrine: A Reference Handbook*, Praeger Security International, Santa Barbara.
- COLEMAN Gabriella (2014). *Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy: The Many Faces of Anonymous*, Verso, New York, N.Y.
- DAALDER Ivo H. and O'HANLON Michael E. (2000). *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington.
- ELEMANYA A. Vincent (2023). "Terrorism and Global Security: A Study of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)", *Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences*, 11:6, 63-78.
- EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY (2023). *Enhancing EU Military Capabilities beyond 2040: Main Findings from the 2023 Long-Term Assessment of the Capability Development Plan*, Brussels.
- FRAVEL M. Taylor (2019). *Active Defense: China's Military Strategy Since 1949*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- GILPIN Robert (1981). *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- GAUTREAU Ginette L. (2012). "To Rid the World of the Drug Scourge: A Human Security Perspective on the War on Drugs in Colombia and Mexico", *Paterson Review of International Affairs*, 12:1, 61-83.
- GRABOWSKI Wojciech (2020). "Application of the Regional Security Complex Theory for Security Analysis in the Persian Gulf", *Athenaeum, Polish Political Science Review*, 68:4, 18-31.
- GRAY Colin (1999). *Modern Strategy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
- GRAY Colin (2004). *Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History*, Routledge, London, UK.
- GRILLO Ioan (2011). *El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency*, Bloomsbury Press, London.
- HEYDEMANN Steven (2013). "Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World", *Comparative Politics*, 45:3, 253-272.
- HOFFMAN Bruce (2006). *Inside Terrorism*, Columbia University Press, New York.
- HOFFMAN Bruce (2009). "A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21:3, 359-377.
- HOROWITZ Michael C. (2010). *Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences*, Princeton University Press, New York, NY.
- HOWARD Michael (1978). *War and the Liberal Conscience*, Rutgers University Press, New York, NY.
- HUNTINGTON Samuel (1999) "The Lonely Superpower", *Foreign Affairs*, 78:2, 35-49.

- IKENBERRY John (2004). "America's Imperial Ambitions", Robert J. Art & Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), *The Use of Force*, Rowman and Littlefield, Oxford, UK, 321-332.
- IKENBERRY John (2011). *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- JACKSON Aaron P. (2013). *The Roots of Military Doctrine Change and Continuity in Understanding the Practice of Warfare*, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
- JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (2009). *The Petraeus Doctrine: The Field Manual on Counterinsurgency Operations*, Joint Publication 3-24, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
- KAPLAN Robert D. (2018). *The Return of Marco Polo's World: War, Strategy, and American Interests in the Twenty-First Century*, Random House, New York, NY.
- KEOHANE D. (2018). "EU Military Cooperation and National Defense", *German Marshall Fund of US Policy Brief* - No. 004, 8 pages.
- KEOHANE Robert O. and NYE Joseph S. (1977). *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Longman Little Brown.
- KEOHANE Robert O. and NYE Joseph S. (2000). "Globalization: What's New? What's Not? (And So What?)", *Foreign Policy*, 118, 104-119.
- KILCULLEN David (2009). *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- KUPCHAN Charles A. ADLER, E. and et al. (2001). *Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order*, United Nations University Press, Tokyo.
- KUPCHAN Charles A. and KUPCHAN Cl. A. (1995). "The Promise of Collective Security", *International Security*, 20:1, 52-61.
- KUPCHAN Charles A. (2000). "The Origins and Future of NATO Enlargement", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 21:2, 127-148.
- KUPCHAN Charles A. (2002) *The End of the American Era*, Vintage/Knopf, New York, NY.
- KUPCHAN Charles A. (2003). "The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy", *Political Science Quarterly*, 118:2, 205-231.
- KUPCHAN Charles A. (2010). *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace*, Princeton University Press, NY.
- KUPCHAN Charles A. (2012). *No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
- KUPCHAN Charles A. (2012). "The Democratic Malaise: Globalization and the Threat to the West", *Foreign Affairs*, 91:1, 61-67.
- KUPCHAN Charles A. (2014). "The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and the Coming Challenge to Pax Americana", *Security Studies*, 23:2, 219-257.
- KUPCHAN Charles A. (2020). *Isolationism: A History of America's Efforts to Shield Itself from the World*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
- LACQUEMENT Richard A. (2004). "The Casualty-Aversion Myth", *Naval War College Review*, 57:1, 39-57.
- LAYNE Christopher (1993). "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise", *International Security*, 17:4, 5-51.
- LIBICKI Martin C. (2009). *Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar*, RAND Corporation, Washington.
- LUTTWAK Edward (1995). "Toward Post-heroic Warfare", *Foreign Affairs*, 74:3, 109-122.
- MAHNKEN Thomas G. (2010). *Technology and the American Way of War Since 1945*, Columbia University Press, NY.
- MATLARY Janne H. and JOHNSON Robert (eds.), (2021). *Military Strategy in the 21st Century: The Challenge for NATO*, Hurst.
- MATHEWS Jessica T. (1997). "Power Shift", *Foreign Affairs*, 76:1, 50-66.
- MCDERMOTT Jeremy (2014). "The Changing Face of Colombian Organized Crime", *Perspectivas*, 9, 1-9.
- MCINNIS Kathleen J. and STARLING Clementine G. (2021). *The Case for a Comprehensive Approach 2.0: How NATO Can Combat Chinese and Russian Political Warfare*, Atlantic Council, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Washington.
- MEARSHEIMER John (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, NY.
- MILEVSKI Lukas (2011). "Stuxnet and Strategy: A Special Operation in Cyberspace?", *JPO*, 63:4, 64-69.
- MODELSKI George (1987). *Long Cycles in World Politics*, University of Washington Press, Seattle.
- NAGL John A. (2002). *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*. Praeger.

- NYE Joseph S. (1990). *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, Basic Books, New York, NY.
- NYE Joseph S. (2009). *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs Books, New York, NY.
- O'HANLON M.E. (1997). *Defense Policy Choices for the Bush Administration*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C..
- ORGANSKI Abramo F. K. (1968). *World Politics*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, NY.
- ORGANSKI Abramo F. K. and KUGLER Jacek (1981). *The War Ledger*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- ORNELAS Timothy A. (2021). "China's Active Defense Military Strategy: Competition Considerations for U.S. Forces Operating in the Indo-Pacific Region", *Marine Corps Gazette*, October, 57-62.
- PETERS Ann and KOEHLIN Lucy (2009). *Non-State Actors as Standard Setters*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
- POSEN Barry (2004). "The Sources of Military Doctrine", Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), *The Use of Force*, Rowman and Littlefield, Oxford, UK, 32-42.
- POSEN Barry (2014). *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.
- RICKS Thomas E. (2007). *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005*, Penguin Books, New York.
- RID Thomas (2012). *Cyber War Will Not Take Place*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- RID Thomas and BUCHANAN B. (2015). "Attributing Cyber Attacks", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 38:1-2, 4-37.
- RISSE Thomas (2012). *Governance without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood*, Columbia University Press, New York.
- SCHMITT Michael N. (2017). *The Tallinn Manual 2.0 Handbook on International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations*, Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge.
- SLAUGHTER Ann M. (2004). *A New World Order*, Princeton Uni. Press, Princeton.
- STERN Jessica and BERGER J. M. (2015). *ISIS: The State of Terror*, Ecco Press, New York.
- TAMMEN Roahl LEMKE Douglas KUGLER Jacek et al. (2000). *Power Transitions*, CQ Press, Washington D.C..
- TILLY Charles (1985). "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime", Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, et al. (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 169-191.
- VAN CREVELD Martin (1991). *The Transformation of War*, The Free Press, New York.
- VARLIK Ali B. (2020). "NATO's Military Structure: Change and Continuity", *Gazi Akademik Bakış*, 13:26, 113-134.
- VON CLAUSEWITZ Carl (1955). *De la Guerre*, Le Monte En, Paris
- WALT Stephen (1997). "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse", *Survival*, 39:1, 156-179.
- WALT Stephen (2002). "Keeping the World Off Balance: Self Restraint and US Foreign Policy", G. John Ikenberry (ed.), *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power*, Cornell University Press, New York, 121-154.
- WALTZ, Kenneth (2010). *Theory of International Politics*, Waveland Press, Long Grove, Illinois.
- WEIFFEN Brigitte (2012). "Persistence and Change in Regional Security Institutions: Does the OAS Still Have a Project?", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 33:2, 360-383.
- WEISS Thomas G. (2000). "NGOization of the World Politics", *World Development*, 28:12, 2225-2242.
- WEISS Thomas G. (2014). *Global Governance and Non-State Actors: A Comparative Analysis*, Routledge, London, UK.
- WOHLFORTH William C. (1999). "The Stability of a Unipolar World", *International Security*, 24:1, 5-41.
- YOSHIHARA Toshi and HOLMES James R. (2012). *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon*, Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C.
- ŽOTKEVIČIŪTĖ-BANEVIČIENĖ Agniete (2022). "The Cultural Element in NATO Military Doctrines: Important, but a Declarative Issue?", *Politologija*, 108:4, 85-105.

Internet Sources

- ALBERQUE William (2024) "Russian Military Thought and Doctrine Related to Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons: Change and Continuity," *IISS Research Papers*. <https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2024/01/russian-military-thought-and-doctrine-related-to-nonstrategic-nuclear-weapons/>, accessed 02.04.2024.

- GLOBE – The European Union and the Future of Global Governance (2020) *Case study of the European Security Architecture: NATO and OSCE*, European Union, Brussels, https://www.globe-project.eu/case-study-of-the-european-security-architecture-nato-and-osce_11317.pdf, accessed 02.05.2024.
- INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (ICG). (2022). “About Us”, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/about>, accessed 02.03.2024.
- MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES (MSF) (2022) “International Activity Report 2021”, <https://www.msf.org/international-activity-report-2021>, accessed 10.04.2024.
- REDER Julian (2017) “The Peninsula Shield Force: The Gulf Cooperation Council’s Vestigial Organ”, *International Policy Digest*, <https://intpolicydigest.org/peninsula-shield-force-gulf-cooperation-council-s-vestigial-organ/>, accessed 03.05.2024.
- UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (UNFCCC) (2015). “Paris Agreement”, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf, accessed 05.04.2024.
- UNITED NATIONS (2021). “Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015)”, <https://undocs.org/en/S/2021/1030>, accessed 05.04.2024.
- US GOVERNMENT, DIRECTION FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY (2000). *Joint Vision 2020*, Washington, https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/CE5F5937-49EC-44EF-83F3-FC25CB0CB942-1274110898250/aledc_ref/joint_vision_2020.pdf, accessed 10.05.2024.
- YLLEMO Jessica O. (2022). “Climate and the 2022 National Defense Strategy”, *American Security Project*, Blog on <https://www.americansecurityproject.org/climate-and-the-2022-national-defense-strategy/>, accessed 02.04.2024.
- YOSSEF Amr (2018). “Changes of Military Doctrines in the Middle East”, Paper presented at the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) 52nd Annual Meeting in San Antonio, Texas, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329656279_Changes_of_Military_Doctrines_in_the_Middle_East, accessed 10.05.2024.

Germany's Strategic Contraction Following American Hegemony in the Context of Offensive Realism Theory

Saldırgan Realizm Kuramı Bağlamında

Amerikan Hegemonyasının Ardından Almanya'nın Stratejik Daralması

Tolga ÖZTÜRK*

* Assoc. Prof. Alaaddin Keykubat University, Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences, Department of International Trade, Antalya, Türkiye
e-mail: tolga.ozturk@alanya.edu.tr
ORCID: 0000-0002-8236-0389

Geliş Tarihi / Submitted:
28.05.2024

Kabul Tarihi / Accepted:
04.12.2024

Abstract

This study examines the position of the European continent within the international system, focusing specifically on Germany, from the years when the future of the global international system began to be debated following the Cold War up to the present day. Since the 1990s, there has been ongoing debate regarding whether the international system will remain dominated solely by the United States (U.S.) as a hegemon or evolve towards a multipolar world. Following the reunification of Germany after the Cold War, Europe and particularly Germany entered a new and notably economically prosperous period. This period has been characterized by the prominence of international organizations and the concept of "soft power". The article's research question is whether Germany's prominence and the concepts of democracy and international cooperation in Europe are related to U.S. hegemony, and if so, which factors can explain this. Considering the current emphasis on the multipolar world and the prevalence of potential conflict areas rather than the functionality of international cooperation and institutions, the article aims to elucidate the systemic reasons for Germany's constrictions vis-à-vis global powers and the options for alleviating this constriction by utilizing Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism.

Keywords: International System, Instability, Germany, Hegemony, Europe

Öz

Bu çalışma, Soğuk Savaş'ın ardından küresel uluslararası sistemin geleceğinin tartışılmaya başlandığı yıllardan günümüze kadar olan süreçte, Avrupa kıtasının uluslararası sistem içindeki yerini Almanya özelinde incelemektedir. 1990 sonrası, uluslararası sistemin, ABD'nin tek başına hegemon olarak mı kalacağı yoksa çok kutuplu bir dünyaya doğru mu evrileceği yaklaşık 30 senedir tartışılmaktadır. Avrupa kıtası özelinde ise Almanya Soğuk Savaş sonrası birleşmesinin akabinde yeni ve bilhassa ekonomik olarak parlak bir döneme giriş yapmıştır. Söz konusu dönem Uluslararası kuruluşların ve "yumuşak güç" kavramının ön plana çıktığı dönemler olarak tarihte yer edinmiştir. Makalenin araştırma sorusu ise; Almanya'nın ön plana çıktığı, Avrupa'nın demokrasi ve uluslararası iş birliği kavramlarının ABD hegemonyası ile ilintili olup olmadığı, eğer ilintili ise bunun hangi faktörlerle açıklanabileceğidir. Günümüzde uluslararası iş birliği ve uluslararası kurumların işlevselliği değil, çok kutuplu dünya ve potansiyel çatışma alanlarının fazlaca gündemde olmasından hareketle, Almanya'nın Küresel güçler karşısında yaşadığı sıkışmışlığın sistemsel nedenleri, söz konusu sıkışmışlıktan kurtulmasının seçenekleri John Mearsheimer'in saldırgan realizm kuramından faydalanarak ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası Sistem, İstikrarlılık, Almanya, Hegemonya, Avrupa

Introduction: Purpose, Methodology, and Outline

World War II can be defined as the second Thirty Years' War ending on the European continent. It can be described as the twinges of the transition of world hegemony from Great Britain to the United States (U.S.) under the control of the Anglo-Saxons.¹ In World War II, Germany aspired to world hegemony, but having lost the war, it came under the control of the U.S. As commonly stated regarding the founding purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the primary goal was to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.² Between 1945 and 1990, during the Cold War, Germany was already divided and rendered ineffective, as stated in NATO's objectives. However, the main issue here was what kind of conjuncture would emerge across Europe in general and in Germany in particular after the Cold War and how Germany's reunification after the Cold War would affect the international system. In this regard, one of Mearsheimer's famous observations predicted that a period of instability would return to Europe with Germany's reunification after the Cold War. This prediction was made in his highly debated 1990 article "Back to the Future". In this article, Mearsheimer anticipated that Germany would aspire to its pre-Cold War ambitions and position, subsequently leading Europe into another period of instability.³ Mearsheimer's prediction did not materialize in the 1990s and 2000s. Instead, a world emerged with the brightest economic indicators in the history of the European Union and its institutions, along with a liberal global climate. During the approximately 20-year period from the early 1990s to the 2008 global economic crisis, the international system was in a state of flux. The competition between the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold War can be likened to competition between partners. For a system to survive, it needs an adversary that sustains it dialectically and legitimizes the system. During the Cold War, this adversary was the USSR. Thus, the brief history and system of the 20th century were upheld by the U.S.-USSR competition, which one can describe as a form of rivalry between partners.⁴

When the competitive system between these partners collapsed, the U.S. entered a period of searching. This search was also prominently reflected in the academic community. In the early 1990s, thinkers like Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington produced works that attracted widespread attention regarding the nature of the new international system. Fukuyama posited that the liberal capitalism established by the U.S. was the ultimate system for humanity and that the U.S. had emerged victorious.⁵

However, the problems produced by American capitalism first manifested economically during the Asian crises in the 1990s and later in the global economic crisis of 2008. These systemic crises, which Wallerstein analyzed from an economic-political perspective, were shown to have emerged much earlier, as seen in his analysis of the 1973 oil crisis.⁶

1 For additional information, see Kevin Cramer, *The Thirty Years' War and German Memory in the Nineteenth Century*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2007.

2 Kori Shalke, Erica Pepe, "70 Years of NATO: The Strength of the Past, Looking into the Future", *Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay*, [https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/1097618a-96c9-45b2-89f7-092198f84a7c#:~:text=Lord%20Hastings%20Lionel%20Ismay%2C%20NATO's,%2C%20and%20the%20Germans%20down%E2%80%9D.](https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/1097618a-96c9-45b2-89f7-092198f84a7c#:~:text=Lord%20Hastings%20Lionel%20Ismay%2C%20NATO's,%2C%20and%20the%20Germans%20down%E2%80%9D.,), accessed 26.09.2024.

3 John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", *International Security*, 15:1, 1990, p. 56.

4 For additional information see Immanuel Wallerstein, *Friends as foes. The Political Economy: Readings in the Politics and Economics of American Public Policy*, Routledge, Oxford, 2021.

5 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, 16, 1989, pp. 3-4.

6 Immanuel Wallerstein, "Entering Global Anarchy", Samir Dasgupta and Jan Nederveen Pieterse (ed.), *Politics of Globalization*, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2009, pp. 147-154.

With the 2008 global economic crisis, the brief discourse on system search gave way to discussions of an international system crisis. Until 2008, the European Union (EU) was regarded as the epitome of global soft power and was admired as a supranational entity. However, in the years following the global economic crisis and up to the present day, it has become an entity whose future is increasingly questioned.⁷ In the EU context, Germany's position is among the most significant. There are two primary reasons for this. First, the unification of the two Germanys resulted in a major economic power emergence, subsequently triggering profound changes that deeply affected Europe's Cold War-era political positions. These changes can be broadly seen in the breakup of Yugoslavia and the division of Czechoslovakia. The second was the rapid economic influence that Germany exerted over the economies of the Iron Curtain countries.⁸ This situation can be explained by the rapid accession of these countries to the EU, which Germany encouraged. John Mearsheimer's prediction that Germany could once again pursue expansionist policies in Europe has been realized economically, if not politically. The concept of "*Lebensraum*", which Hitler used to justify German expansionism, and the implementation of "*Ostpolitik*" have been economically validated by Germany's influence over Eastern Europe through the integration of new member states and economic dominance. Although different individuals and ideological groups proposed *Lebensraum* and *Ostpolitik*, these policies became a geopolitical reality as Germany's overall power increased.⁹

This study's main problem is whether Germany has exhibited its early 20th-century expansionist "offensive" reflexes again after the Cold War. If so, to what extent and in which areas? Have the pragmatic aggressive initiatives of major powers, particularly Germany, been the source of instability in Europe, as Mearsheimer suggested, or could they be in the future? This constitutes our core issue. The question is whether Germany's pragmatic expansionism, partially realized economically, has been interrupted by the Russia-Ukraine war according to the offensive realist approach. The signs of this began with the Anglo-Saxon world establishing its global agenda. How has Germany's position changed as the shift from the Atlantic world to the Pacific world occurs? Evaluating Germany's position within the context of the gripes of this international system change, this study aims to analyze Germany's place in the global system by analyzing historical and current findings methodologically based on Mearsheimer's offensive realism.

1. The Decline of American Hegemony

The 20th century can be defined as the shortest century due to the establishment of American hegemony during this century, which was built around a balance of dread, as explained by the systemic school of thought. The two main actors in this balance of dread were the U.S. and the USSR. This balance of dread can also be likened to competition between partners. However, this balance was disrupted in 1991 when the USSR exited the stage. Consequently, the dialectical counterpart to American hegemony disappeared. The period from 1945 to

7 Patryk Kugiel, "End of European soft power? Implications for EU foreign policy", *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, 26:1, 2017, pp. 59-72.

8 Arfi Badredine, "State collapse in a new theoretical framework: The case of Yugoslavia", *International Journal of Sociology*, 28:3, 1998, p. 33.

9 Willeke Sandler, "'Here Too Lies Our Lebensraum': Colonial Space as German Space", Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann & Maiken Umbach (eds.), *Heimat, Region, and Empire: Spatial Identities under National Socialism*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012, pp. 148-165.

1991, during which American hegemony¹⁰ was established, can be seen as the shortest century, lasting approximately 45 years.¹¹

Since 1945, stability on the European continent was initially maintained by dividing Germany into two and bringing it under control. However, with reunification and the country's integration into the capitalist world, the EU emerged as a successful welfare project that has helped sustain peace and cooperation. Germany was made smaller, more controllable, prosperous, and a substantial industrial base for industrial capitalism.¹² For the U.S., the security of the European continent was too important to be left to the EU alone. Consequently, the U.S. has maintained direct control over Europe's security through NATO.¹³

After 1991, with the USSR withdrawing from the global system, the U.S. fell into a deep void. It is evident in International Relations articles from the early 1990s that the U.S. was searching for a new enemy. For example, alongside popular publications like Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations*, some strategists believed that Japan, which is still an ally of the U.S. today, would emerge as a future adversary.¹⁴ This notion, which can be explained by reflexes dating back to World War II, also found a place in the studies regarding Germany. One of the most significant analyses in this context came from Mearsheimer. In his analysis, Mearsheimer predicted that after Germany's reunification, it would rapidly attempt to re-establish hegemony in Europe, leading to instability on the continent.¹⁵ We will analyze the current relevance of these predictions in detail; however, it is essential to diagnose that these evaluations were made as a result of the void left by American hegemony.

We can assume that if American hegemony had not declined, there would not have been many publications on the nature of the new international order after the 1990s. While most of these publications and analyses suggest that American dominance would continue in a diminished form, thinkers like Fukuyama posited that American hegemony and its system represented the ultimate point of human progress.¹⁶ Given that this assumption has been refuted today, we must ask: Has American hegemony tangibly declined? If the answer is yes, how has this decline occurred?

The decline of American hegemony can be understood through various indicators. The most concrete and accessible indicators are economic indicators. In the 1950s, more than

10 In modern terms, the concept of "Hegemony" indicates that an element within a system is superior and dominant over others. In Marxist theory, this concept has been used more technically and more specifically. Antonio Gramsci is considered the first person to use this concept in its modern sense. In his works, Gramsci refers to the dominant class gaining power with the consent of the subjugated. In the discipline of International Relations, Robert Cox adapted Antonio Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony to the international system. According to this theory, known as the neo-Gramscian approach, hegemony is not established solely through domination and power, that is, through coercion, but also by producing consent and creating voluntary compliance, thus being evaluated as a means of exerting influence alongside the element of power. The article uses the concept of "hegemony" in this regard. Robert W. Cox "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method", *Millennium*, 12.2, 1983, pp. 162-175.

11 Immanuel Wallerstein, "Revolts against the system", *New Left Review*, 18, 2002, pp. 29-30.

12 John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", *International Security*, 15:1, 1990, pp. 55-56.

13 Christopher Layne, "US Hegemony and the Perpetuation of NATO", Ted Galen Carpenter (ed.), *NATO Enters the 21st Century*, Routledge, London, 2013, pp. 59-91.

14 Edward Luttwak, *The Endangered American Dream: How to Stop the United States from Becoming a Third World Country and How to Win the Geo-Economic Struggle for Industrial Supremacy*, Touchstone Books, New York, 2013, p.45.

15 John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", *International Security*, 15:1, 1990, pp. 48-49.

16 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, 16, 1989, pp. 3-4.

half of the global trade volume belonged to the U.S. Today, this figure has decreased to less than one-fifth.¹⁷ From a military and strategic perspective, the only rival to the U.S. military with nuclear weapons in the mid-20th century was the USSR. However, today, the number of countries with nuclear weapons is close to ten, while countries like China challenge the U.S. military both technologically and numerically.¹⁸ Moreover, in the mid-20th century, no country could conduct operations without the consent of the U.S. or the USSR in a world practically divided between these two powers. However, since the 1990s, this rigid division has gradually dissolved. For instance, Russia's increased freedom of action in Africa, China's military maneuvers in the Pacific and its economic investments all around the world, and Türkiye's establishment of military bases in countries such as Somalia, Sudan, and Qatar can be cited as evidence of this shift.¹⁹

With the decline of American hegemony, the theoretical evolution of the international system is still debated today. Regarding Germany's role and expectations on the European continent and globally, John Mearsheimer, the founder of offensive realism, made predictions in the early 1990s. Unlike defensive realism, established by Kenneth Waltz, offensive realism posits that great powers will take actions aimed at dominating the international system or subsystems rather than merely balancing. It suggests that great powers will always strive to maximize their own power and will not hesitate to take measures against rival powers. In this context, offensive realism helps explain contemporary American behavior, particularly the foreign policy actions of the Biden administration.²⁰

According to Mearsheimer's theory, hegemonic states or great powers that aspire to be hegemons approach the management of the international system as pragmatically as possible and act in a goal-oriented manner. The fundamentals of offensive realism, pioneered by Mearsheimer, can be summarized as follows: The architects of the international system are the main actors in world politics, and they play a dominant role in an anarchic international system. Despite being commonly referred to as defensive alliances, defense industries, etc., every state possesses offensive capabilities. In this context, states can never be entirely certain of the intentions of other states, and thus, they must always remain vigilant. Additionally, the primary objective of states is survival and they continually focus on developing rational strategies to ensure their survival. Therefore, in offensive realism, unlike defensive realism, the fundamental difference is that regardless of alliances, states prioritize their interests and may opportunistically change their strategies accordingly.²¹

As mentioned above, does the U.S., in line with Mearsheimer's assertions, actually prioritize its interests and not act in concert with its allies? Or, conversely, does it operate under defensive realism, making decisions based on alliances and the balance of power?²² The same questions need to be asked regarding Germany. Given the EU in general and Germany in particular, especially after the Ukraine-Russia war, one can say that a new era has begun concerning the international system, Germany's future, and U.S.-Germany relations. In the

17 Paul Krugman, Richard N. Cooper, T. N. Srinivasan, "Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences", *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, vol. 1995: 1, 1995, p. 341.

18 Steven E. Miller, Scott D. Sagan, "Nuclear power without nuclear proliferation?", *Daedalus*, 138:4, 2009, pp. 7-18.

19 Mohammad Abdelrahman Banisalah and Mariam Ibrahim Al-Hamadi, "The New Turkey: The Spread of Turkish Military Bases Abroad, Role and Indications 2002-2020", *Dirasat: Human and Social Sciences*, 50:2, 2023, pp. 553-568.

20 John Mearsheimer, "The Inevitable Rivalry: America, China, and the Tragedy of Great-power Politics", *Foreign Affairs*, 100, 2021, pp. 48-58.

21 *Ibid.*, p. 58.

22 Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of World Power", *Journal of International Affairs*, 21:2, 1967, pp. 215-231.

case of the U.S., it can now be said that Germany has become a punished ally rather than a straightforward ally.

The reason for this lies in Germany's geopolitics. When Germany regained its dominant position in Central Europe, and its strong industry, the only thing missing was the energy deficit. Germany compensated for this deficit with the energy it supplied from Russia. The energy trade in question also meant that the economies of Russia and Germany complemented each other. If this situation evolved into a capacity that could lead to closer rapprochement in the future, it could pose a danger to the U.S. and the Anglo-Saxon world.²³ In this context, the danger in question was eliminated for the U.S. with the Russia-Ukraine war. This situation shows us that the U.S. is not taking a step in favor of its ally, Germany, but on the contrary, it is taking a step to strangle it economically. A theoretical analysis of the policy implemented by the hegemonic power, that is, the U.S., across the EU and Germany in particular, on a continental basis will further clarify the picture.

2. The Global Role of the European Union and Germany

Mearsheimer argues that Germany will once again seek to become the hegemonic actor in Europe, leading to instability.²⁴ This has been achieved not politically or militarily but economically.²⁵ Therefore, Mearsheimer's claim regarding Germany can be examined under two main pillars.

First, in his article "Back to the Future", Mearsheimer predicts that Germany will revert to its pre-World War II status, with its political ambitions reawakening.²⁶ This resurgence is linked to Germany's large population, its developed industry, and the place of past ambitions in its national memory. After achieving political unity, Germany quickly became the regional hegemonic power on the European continent and fought for global hegemony during the two World Wars.²⁷ The loss experienced in these wars led to the division of Germany and its subjugation to predominantly American control.

West Germany was kept under American control, and the U.S. revived its industry through the Marshall Plan. Integrated into Western capitalism, West Germany became prosperous and economically significant, but it remained a country where American influence was strongly felt militarily and politically. Within this context, the EU (then called the European Coal and Steel Community) became both a central production center and market for the capitalist economic world on the western edge of Eurasia. The concept of

23 Ian Klinke, "Geopolitics and the political right: lessons from Germany", *International Affairs*, 94:3, 2018, pp. 495-514.

24 John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", *International Security*, 15:1, 1990, pp. 9-11.

25 "German Revival" refers to the resurgence of Germany as a central power in Europe after the Cold War, particularly following its reunification in 1990. The term comes from American political commentator Charles Krauthammer, who argued that the reunification of Germany and its growing economic and political influence posed significant challenges for Europe and the broader international order. Krauthammer expressed concern that the reunification would lead to a resurgence of German nationalism and a shift in the balance of power in Europe, as Germany would become the dominant force on the continent. He worried that this "revival" could disrupt the peace and stability that had been maintained in Europe since World War II by dividing Germany and bringing it under Western control. His "German Revival" theory reflected anxieties about Germany potentially moving away from its post-war pacifism and becoming more assertive, both economically and militarily. While discussing these concerns, it can be said that although most of Krauthammer's fears did not come true politically, they did come true economically. For more information, see Charles Krauthammer, "The German Revival", *New Republic*, 202.13, 1990, pp. 18-21.

26 *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

27 Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson, "Germany as the EU's Reluctant Hegemon? Of Economic Strength and Political Constraints", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20:10, 2013, pp. 1387-1405.

Rhine capitalism, which has found its place in economic and political literature, also emerged due to Germany's successful economic performance. Through Rhine capitalism, Germany both supported the global capitalist system and became a significant economic power. The contributions of the EU to this economic power cannot be denied. Therefore, during the 20th century, which is defined as the American Century, Germany continued as an essential economic factor serving this hegemony.²⁸

The EU is one of the critical global elements that must be discussed when analyzing Germany. The process of European integration transformed into a structure with direct Anglo-Saxon involvement when the United Kingdom (UK) joined the European Community in the early 1970s. French General and then President Charles de Gaulle, who never wanted Britain to be a member of the European Community, described it as a Trojan horse of the U.S.²⁹ This perspective can be attributed to the French general's desire to maintain a distance from Britain, which he believed served American hegemony. Additionally, France's withdrawal from NATO's military command is another testament to this stance.

Germany, however, was not fully politically aligned with France's vision of continental European unity. One of the main reasons for the difference in this subject was the pervasive American influence on the German political, military, and bureaucratic life.³⁰ A tangible example of this influence is the presence of over 40 American military bases in Germany, with more than 35,000 personnel stationed there. This figure was close to 250,000 personnel in 1985, just before the end of the Cold War. Even today, Germany hosts Europe's largest American military presence, with 11 American bases.³¹

In this context, the resistance against Anglo-Saxon influence on Europe observed in France was not seen in Germany. Throughout the 20th century, Germany appeared more reserved in political decision-making than France and avoided openly opposing American policies.

Mearsheimer's assertion that, following the Cold War and the reunification of Germany, there would be a return to its former political and military ambitions requires a two-pronged evaluative perspective. Considering the presence and influence of the U.S. in Germany, it would be inaccurate to say that this presence ended after the Cold War. Although the number of American military personnel has been reduced, it remains substantial through the American bases mentioned above and also through NATO bases and engagements, indicating that U.S. influence in Germany is still significant. It cannot be said that Mearsheimer's assumption of Germany seeking military and political hegemony in Europe after the Cold War has fully materialized. Nonetheless, it cannot be entirely dismissed either. This assessment can be explained by Germany's economic influence and the structural changes led by Germany within the EU.³²

Germany has been a critical driving force behind the EU's political and economic integration, particularly following the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which laid the foundation

28 Michel Albert, "The Rhine Model of Capitalism: An Investigation", *European Business Journal*, 4:3, 1992, pp. 8-22.

29 Tim Oliver, "A European Union without the United Kingdom: The Geopolitics of a British Exit from the EU", *Strategic Update LSE*, 16:1, 2016, pp.1-19.

30 Damon A. Terrill, "Power and Politics: The New German Question", Gale Maltox, Geoffrey Oliver & Jonathan Tucker, (eds.), *Germany in Transition*, Routledge, London, 2019, pp. 23-38.

31 <https://www.deutschland.de/en/usa/the-importance-of-american-troops-in-germany>, accessed 04.05.2024.

32 Hanna Ojanen, "EU-NATO Relations after the Cold War.", Jussi Hanhimäki, Georges-Henri Soutou & Basil Germond, (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Security*, Routledge, 2010, pp. 180-193.

for a more unified Europe. As the largest economy in Europe, Germany has consistently supported initiatives to deepen economic ties, promote stability, and ensure closer cooperation among the EU member states. Additionally, German leaders made significant decisions that had undeniable economic impacts. Germany spearheaded the introduction of a common currency and the expansion policy towards the East, specifically towards the former Iron Curtain countries.³³ Mearsheimer's claim that Germany has reverted to its pre-World War II reflexes not through traditional military means but through indirect means is embedded here. Germany has utilized its economic power within the EU, which is derived from the Rhine capitalism mentioned earlier. Immediately following reunification, Germany influenced the EU's *Acquis Communautaire* in line with its economic expansionism. As the EU's largest economy, Germany has used its economic clout to promote policies that encourage fiscal discipline, economic integration, and free-market competition. For example, Germany's advocacy for the Stability and Growth Pact,³⁴ which enforces strict limits on budget deficits and public debt, reflects its priority on financial stability, a key element of its economic model. This approach safeguards the strength of the Euro and prevents economic volatility within the EU, ensuring a favorable environment for German exports, which form the backbone of its economic power. With its robust economy characterized by a consistent current account surplus, Germany leveraged the common currency to exert significant economic influence over Mediterranean countries, which generally run current account deficits. Specific examples of this influence can be seen during the 2008 global economic crisis when Germany acquired numerous Greek public enterprises and exerted considerable influence over the Greek economy.³⁵

Germany has also exerted economic and some political influence over the former Soviet countries in Eastern Europe. The reunification of Germany led to shockwaves that caused the disintegration of some countries in Eastern Europe. Shortly after Germany's reunification, its disruptive impact on Yugoslavia became evident. Croatia experienced a heightened desire for independence, ultimately leading to Yugoslavia's dismantlement. Croatia's historical ties with Austria and Germany, particularly beginning with the Habsburg Monarchy era, played a significant role in shaping the political, cultural, and economic dynamics of Central and Eastern Europe. These connections were forged during the lengthy period when Croatia was part of the Austrian Empire and later the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Especially after 1527, when Croatia came under the rule of the Habsburg dynasty, the region became politically integrated with Austria. Over the several centuries of Habsburg rule, Croatians developed deep political and cultural relations with Austria and Germany.³⁶ In the 19th century, the growing influence of Germany and Austria contributed to the shaping of Croatian nationalism and its quest for independence. Croatian intellectual and political elites were influenced by developments in Vienna and Berlin and they mainly showed an affinity for German and Austrian cultural and legal models. Consequently, these close ties with Austria and Germany shaped Croatia's political identity and strategic preferences.³⁷

33 Michael J Baun, "The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany, France, and European Integration", *Political Science Quarterly*, 110:4, 1995, pp. 605-624.

34 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31997Y0802%2801%29&qid=1728299709948>, accessed 07.10.2024.

35 Ignacio Ramirez Cisneros, "German Economic Dominance within the Eurozone and Minsky's Proposal for a Shared Burden Between the Hegemon and Core Economic Powers", *Levy Economics Institute, Working Papers Series*, 913, 2018, pp.1-23.

36 Stanko Guldescu, *The Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom: 1526–1792*, Mouton & Co Printers, 1970, The Hague, pp.29-30.

37 Stipe Kljaić, "Theories of Central European Integration in Croatian Politics and Culture (1848–1971)", *Great Theorists of Central European Integration. Legal Studies on Central Europe*, CEA Publishing, Miskolc, Budapest,

By the time of Yugoslavia's dissolution, Croatia's historical ties with Germany and Austria had become one of the factors that accelerated Croatia's independence process. During Yugoslavia's disintegration in the early 1990s, both Germany and Austria strongly supported Croatia's bid for independence. Germany was among the first countries to recognize Croatia's independence, demonstrating that these historical ties remained influential in modern political developments. These historical affinities also played a role in Yugoslavia's breakup, which fueled Croatia's pursuit of deeper integration with Western Europe and caused tensions with other federative structures within Yugoslavia. By reviving its historical connections with Germany and Austria, Croatia gained Western support during its secession from Yugoslavia. This secession, in turn, became a crucial geopolitical factor in accelerating Yugoslavia's disintegration. In summary, Croatia's historical relations with Germany and Austria not only provided a historical backdrop but also emerged as a pivotal factor in supporting Croatia's independence claims during Yugoslavia's dissolution and in securing international recognition.³⁸

The fact that only Croatia and Slovenia from the former Yugoslavia are EU members today supports this (Yugoslavia's fragmentation) claim. Additionally, the division of Czechoslovakia and the increasing economic influence of Germany spreading eastwards over the years indicate that the political landscape in Eastern Europe has undergone significant changes due to Germany's reunification.³⁹

Following its reunification, Germany's increasing economic influence and political weight within the EU facilitated the implementation of expansion policies of the union. The Eastern European enlargement was completed in 2004 and 2007, and many new EU members became integral components of the German economy.⁴⁰ This development demonstrates the realization of Mearsheimer's prediction in the economic realm. Germany has emerged as a dominant economic actor within Europe, causing significant difficulties for several EU member states, including France, in coping with German industrial and economic power within the union. This situation can be described as Germany's economic hegemony within the EU. The concept of "*Lebensraum*" (living space), a doctrine of Hitler during World War II, has now been realized through the EU by adding new member states peacefully and economically.⁴¹

Between 1992 and 2008, under Germany's leadership, the EU evolved into a globally admired "soft power" characterized by economic strength and democratic values. However, Germany, heavily influenced by the U.S., did not exhibit the aggressive reflexes seen before World War II. Moreover, NATO's founding rationale was not solely to counter the Soviet Union, but one of its objectives was to keep the Germans "down" or, in other words, under control.⁴² This situation has persisted to the present day. Consequently, while Germany has

2023, pp. 176-183.

38 Sabrina P. Ramet, "The Dissolution of Yugoslavia: Competing Narratives of Resentment and Blame" *Comparative Southeast European Studies*, 55:1, 2007, p. 61.

39 Daniele Conversi, "German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia.", *The Donald W. Treadgold Papers the University of Washington*, 16, 1998, pp. 7-58. https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/35336/Treadgold_No16_1998.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 20.05.2024.

40 Theofanis Exadaktylos, "The EU Enlargement to the East: Europeanizing German Foreign Policy.", *ECPR 5th Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, 23-26 June 2010*, https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=8002935646448240912&hl=tr&as_sdt=0,5 accessed 30.11.2024

41 Shelley Baranowski, "Legacies of Lebensraum: German Identity and Multi-Ethnicity", *Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs in Postwar Germany and France: Comparative Perspectives*, Manuel Borutta & Jan C. Jansen (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2016, pp. 35-52.

42 Peter W. Rodman, "NATO's Role in a New European Security Order", Academic Forum Conferences, October

achieved regional economic hegemony in Europe, it has not been able to establish military and political hegemony due to the control mechanisms in place.

3. Germany's Crisis Toward a Multipolar World

“*Ostpolitik*” refers to Germany’s eastern policy from when it established its political unity to the present. *Ostpolitik* also signifies Germany’s geopolitical stance stemming from its fixed geographical necessities. While Germany has shown a tendency and desire to expand eastward, it has continually faced its biggest rival, Russia, in this direction. This desire is strategically important due to the vast and fertile lands of the East being highly alluring to Germany. *Ostpolitik*, in its formal sense, was established most recently by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s desire to normalize relations with the USSR. The main reason West Germany sought to normalize relations with the USSR was to escape the overwhelming and unilateral influence of the U.S. Consequently, West Germany established direct relations with the USSR, initiating the first steps of normalizing relations with Warsaw Pact countries and establishing contact with East Germany, a country not officially recognized. *Ostpolitik*’s declaration can be attributed to West Germany’s attempt to alleviate the oppressive control of U.S. hegemony. This intense control and pressure made West Germany dependent on the U.S. and was the most significant factor triggering the declaration of *Ostpolitik*.⁴³

Since Willy Brandt’s *Ostpolitik* doctrine, Germany has continually sought an “Eastern” expansion in alignment with its geographical imperatives. The first phase of this approach can be characterized by *détente* steps with the USSR. The second phase involved shaping the EU institutions to support Germany’s eastern expansion after reunification. As previously mentioned, Germany’s efforts to swiftly integrate former Warsaw Pact countries into the EU, coupled with its negative contributions to the political instability and disintegration of Eastern European countries after the Cold War, form the second pillar of its eastern policy. The third and final phase can be associated with Germany’s relations with global powers such as Russia and China.⁴⁴

By the end of the Cold War, no state, even Russia or China, was perceived as a potential threat to the U.S. In the 1990s, a potential threat or an enemy necessary for legitimizing U.S. hegemony had yet to emerge. This situation created a dialectical deficiency in terms of U.S. hegemony. Some thinkers speculated that China might become a potential adversary.⁴⁵ Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. attempted to substitute “terrorism” as the sought-after enemy, but it can be argued that this effort was not entirely successful.⁴⁶ Starting in the 2000s, under the rule of Vladimir Putin, Russia began a rapid recovery process and gradually emerged as a global threat to the U.S. Moreover, Russia effectively utilized its hydrocarbon resources for economic development and experienced a swift recovery after the collapse of the Soviet economy. Already possessing a strong military-industrial and technological infrastructure inherited from the USSR, Russia successfully leveraged this foundation alongside its economic improvement.⁴⁷ Germany, the leading economic power in the EU, became Russia’s largest hydrocarbon customer in Europe. Consequently, a win-

1995, <https://www.nato.int/acad/conf/future95/rodman.htm>, accessed 20.05.2024.

43 Sara Lorenzini, “Globalising *Ostpolitik*: *Ostpolitik* revisited”, *Cold War History*, 9:2, 2009, pp. 223-242.

44 *Ibid.*, pp. 240-242.

45 Robert J. Art, “The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul”, *Political Science Quarterly*, 125:3, 2010, pp. 359–391.

46 Richard Jackson, “Religion, politics and terrorism: a critical analysis of narratives of ‘Islamic terrorism’”, *Centre for International Politics Working Paper Series* 21, 2006, pp. 1-22.

47 Natalia Morozova, “Geopolitics, Eurasianism and Russian Foreign Policy under Putin”, *Geopolitics*, 14:4, 2009, pp. 667-686.

win relationship emerged between Germany and Russia based on energy trade. The “Nord Stream” projects further developed this energy trade relationship.⁴⁸

China has emerged as the primary global rival to U.S. hegemony in the Pacific.⁴⁹ Since the early 1990s, China’s economic growth rate has been unprecedented. The Chinese economy, valued at \$413 billion in 1991, has now surpassed \$18 trillion.⁵⁰ By rationally channeling this economic growth into technological investments, China has caught up with and, in some areas, surpassed the U.S. in various fields of technology production. This development has jeopardized the U.S.’s global leadership, compelling it to adopt aggressive China-focused policies and strategic measures.⁵¹

The Eurasian plans of the U.S. and China will clearly illustrate this confrontation. China has initiated the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to extend traditional Chinese trade routes from China to Western Europe through three main corridors, establishing new commercial links. This project is largely funded by Chinese state finances, utilizing the trade surpluses China has accumulated over the years. Through the BRI, China has forged significant partnerships in Eurasia, including Russia, Pakistan, and Iran, extending its trade routes to Eastern Europe. This development has seriously alarmed the U.S., as the control of Eurasia has been a central tenet for global hegemony, according to early 20th-century strategists. Geopolitical experts like Nicholas Spykman, Alfred Mahan, and later Henry Kissinger and Alfred Marshall have all emphasized the importance of focusing on this region.⁵²

In order to prevent losing control in Eurasia and hinder China’s advance, the U.S. has initiated a strategic plan directly involving Germany. By putting Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism into practice, the U.S. is perceived to have instigated and encouraged the Ukraine-Russia war. This encouragement and the policies aimed at provoking Russia’s fundamental security boundaries began with NATO expansion following the collapse of the USSR. Although Russia initially remained relatively quiet, NATO’s expansion eventually threatened the security of the Black Sea, prompting Russia to declare certain red lines. This NATO expansion in Eastern Europe has followed a path that aligns closely with the EU enlargement, further complicating the geopolitical landscape and intensifying Russia’s security concerns. The most significant of these security concerns were Georgia and Ukraine. Although Russia managed to maintain its control in the region with the 2008 intervention in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the direct intervention in Ukraine in 2022 have escalated into an ongoing war.⁵³

The U.S. and UK can be viewed as the primary instigators of the Ukraine-Russia war. This claim is supported not only by numerous concrete indicators but also by a strategic backdrop that must be considered. From a strategic perspective, the U.S. has disrupted China’s BRI through the Russia-Ukraine war. One of the most crucial routes for the BRI projects to reach Europe has become a war zone. Germany’s potential future as a global power has been

48 Bjorn Gens, “Germany’s Russia Policy and Geo-Economics: Nord Stream 2, Sanctions and the Question of EU Leadership Towards Russia”, *Global Affairs*, 5:4-5, 2019, pp. 315-334.

49 Randall Schweller, “Opposite but compatible nationalisms: a neoclassical realist approach to the future of U.S.–China relations”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 11.1, 2018, pp. 23-48.

50 Worldbank, <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/CHN>, accessed 15.05.2024.

51 Andrew B. Kennedy and Darren J. Lim, “The Innovation Imperative: Technology and US–China Rivalry in the Twenty-first Century”, *International Affairs*, 94:3, 2018, pp. 553-572.

52 Arzan Tarapore, “The US Response to The Belt and Road Initiative: Answering New Threats with New Partnerships”, *Asia Policy*, 14:2, 2019, pp. 34-41.

53 David Matsaberidze, “Russia vs. EU/US Through Georgia and Ukraine”, *Connections*, 14:2, 2015, pp. 77-86.

jeopardized. This has several dimensions. For example, Germany has been pushed back into the U.S. sphere of influence, reminiscent of the 20th century. The U.S. has achieved this pull-back through NATO. The Biden administration, emphasizing the need to revitalize NATO, has declared Russia a significant adversary again and successfully consolidated Europe under NATO.⁵⁴

The Ukraine-Russia war has significantly disrupted hydrocarbon trade between Germany and Russia, bringing it nearly to a standstill. With the start of the conflict in Ukraine, Russia progressively reduced its gas supplies to Europe, culminating in severe reductions by May 2022. This reduction was marked by the cessation of gas supplies to Poland and Finland, followed by the complete shutdown of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline in September 2022. The decline in gas supplies began in 2021, with partial cuts preceding the war and full-scale reductions in 2022. As a result, Russia's gas exports to Europe fell below 20% of its previous levels. Before the conflict in Ukraine, Russia supplied approximately 40% of Europe's natural gas, but this share had plummeted to 15% by the end of 2023. The closure of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines and the Yamal pipeline further exacerbated the situation, dramatically reducing Germany's energy dependence on Russia. This shift was compounded by payment disputes, with Russia demanding payment in rubles—a request that European countries rejected—and prompting Russia to hasten its supply cuts, particularly to Poland and Finland, in May 2022. To ensure its energy security, Germany has been forced to pivot towards alternative energy sources, including liquefied natural gas (LNG). These developments underscore the substantial decline in hydrocarbon trade between Russia and Germany, as well as Europe more broadly, and have necessitated a profound restructuring of Germany's energy strategy.⁵⁵

Consequently, Germany has been compelled to take a strong anti-Russia stance within the NATO alliance system. The previously close relationship between Russia and Germany, based on hydrocarbon trade, has abruptly ended. This ending is evidenced by the sabotage and explosion of the Nord Stream pipeline, severing tangible commercial ties. The disruption of these commercial links has eliminated access to nearby and consequently cheap energy, thereby placing German industry and economy under significant strain in the medium and long term. Finally, Germany has been cornered within the EU.⁵⁶ Germany's greater dependence on Russian gas compared to France has placed Berlin in a politically difficult position within the EU in the aftermath of the Ukraine-Russia war. This energy dependence has constrained Germany's broader role in EU politics, especially when ensuring energy security has been particularly challenging. While France, with its reliance on nuclear energy, has maintained a more flexible stance, Germany has faced significant pressures due to its reliance on Russian gas. During Angela Merkel's tenure as the Chancellor, Germany pursued a more independent foreign policy, particularly in relation to the U.S. Merkel's strategy of engaging with Russia was primarily driven by economic interests, which allowed Germany to maintain greater autonomy in terms of energy policy. The Nord Stream 2 project symbolized this approach. However, the Ukraine-Russia war and the risks associated with dependence on Russian gas have forced Germany to reconsider its energy policy and geopolitical choices. Nowadays,

54 Edmund Li Sheng, "The Reconstruction of the US–EU Alliance in Joe Biden's Administration: The G7 and NATO as Instruments to Contain China and Russia", Edmund Li Sheng, (ed.), *China's Belt and Road Initiative and the Triangle Great Game of Contemporary International Politics*, Springer Nature, Singapore, 2023, pp. 79-109.

55 <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/europes-messy-russian-gas-divorce/>, accessed 26.09.2024.

56 Christian Sellar and Gianfranco Battisti, "A Century of Struggles. A Comparison of Multiple Geopolitical Agendas in Europe, the USA, and Beyond", *Geopolitical Perspectives from the Italian Border*, Springer International Publishing, 2023, pp. 103-119.

German politicians have increasingly turned to the U.S. to address the energy crisis, seeking alternative energy sources, such as LNG. This shift has made Germany more dependent on U.S. leadership. Under pressure from the U.S., Germany has had to modify its energy policies, rendering it more vulnerable within the EU particularly in relation to countries like France. Germany also has had to align itself more closely with U.S. security and foreign policy strategies.⁵⁷

In fact, the events leading up to Russia's direct intervention in Ukraine were foreshadowed by the Brexit process. Following the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, which began in 2016 and was completed in 2020, Britain announced its new foreign policy doctrine in 2021 under the title "Global Britain in a Competitive Age". This doctrine aimed for Britain to strengthen its ties with the Anglo-Saxon world while identifying Russia and China as rivals to be contended with.⁵⁸ For Germany, this doctrine implies that with Britain's departure, the EU, which Germany now leads, has suffered significant global influence loss and has begun to fade from prominence. Additionally, the revival of NATO under U.S. leadership has ultimately thwarted Germany's "*Ostpolitik*" strategy, effectively turning Germany into a satellite of the Anglo-Saxon world.

Here, one can conclude that Mearsheimer's offensive realism, consistent with the spirit of neorealism, has been adopted and implemented by some governments (decision-makers) while not by others. It is possible to assert that the current Biden administration in the U.S. applies offensive realism. In the aforementioned Eurasian strategies, the Biden team has taken measures concerning China, Russia, and Germany, whom they perceive as rivals to the U.S. As is well known, a more isolationist foreign policy was preferred during the Trump administration. Regarding our topic, Trump explicitly stated policies such as NATO having no future and that the U.S. should not spend more money on NATO. Furthermore, he mentioned that the Ukraine-Russia war would never have occurred under his administration, and if re-elected, he would cease aid to Ukraine.⁵⁹ These statements indicate that Trump's approach was more isolationist and defensively realist. Such a sharp foreign policy divide has perhaps never been witnessed to this extent in U.S. history. In this sense, it can be inferred that the Biden administration directly implements Mearsheimer's offensive realism-based foreign policy.

Conclusion

According to Mearsheimer, those who shape the international system constitute the main actors in world politics and take on a dominant role within the anarchic international system. Therefore, analyzing Germany without evaluating the attitudes of the U.S., which has been a dominant power since 1945, is impossible. As mentioned above, Mearsheimer's theory tells us that every state maintains offensive capabilities despite being referred to as defensive alliances or defense industries. However, offensive capabilities should not be understood solely as tangible military capacity. The concept of "keeping down" Germany via NATO, implemented by the U.S., has generally been associated with both NATO and pro-American German bureaucrats and decision-makers within Germany. Consequently, this U.S. influence emerges from within Germany itself.

57 <https://americangerman.institute/2021/09/aicgs-asks-what-is-angela-merkels-foreign-policy-legacy/>, accessed 26.09.2024.

58 British Government, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/975077/Global_Britain_in_a_Competitive_Age-the_Integrated_Review_of_Security_Defence_Development_and_Foreign_Policy.pdf, accessed 16.05.2024.

59 Juliet Kaarbo, Kai Oppermann and Ryan K. Beasley, "What if? Counterfactual Trump and the Western Response to the War in Ukraine", *International Affairs*, 99:2, 2023, pp. 605-624.

Moreover, as Mearsheimer pointed out, states can never be entirely sure of other states' intentions, which can be seen as why the U.S. seeks to keep Germany down. Despite being under the same alliance umbrella (NATO), this alliance primarily keeps its members under U.S. hegemony and control. Therefore, the member states must always remain vigilant. Additionally, the fundamental goal of states is survival, and they focus on constantly developing rational strategies to ensure this. The U.S. strategy involves containing Russia and China as much as possible and doing everything possible to prevent the world from becoming multipolar. This means controlling not only its allies (such as Germany and Japan) but also other countries and taking preemptive actions when necessary. In this context, as Mearsheimer's offensive realism suggests, the U.S. prioritizes itself and can opportunistically change its strategies.

One of the most significant recent examples of this opportunistic strategy is Brexit. Through the Brexit process, Britain left the EU to align itself with the U.S. against Russia and China. Continental Europe, particularly Germany, could not prevent a significant loss of prestige for the EU, which had been a prominent political entity for the past 30 years. The reason for the inability to develop a common defense since the founding of the EU was NATO. Through NATO, the U.S. has always managed to control Europe. Today, the prominence of NATO also means the decline of the EU. The EU evolves into an entity with limited political maneuvering beyond economic union. As a result of the disruption of Germany's energy supply, the EU's economy heads into a deadlock in the medium and long term. In this context, it can be said that the concepts of democracy and cooperation within the EU are directly linked to U.S. influence. During times of economic prosperity, these concepts came to the forefront, especially when the U.S. declared "victory" over the USSR. This situation persisted until the 2008 global economic crisis, which revealed the unsustainability of the U.S. system. During this crisis, the German economy did not paint a bleak picture like the other Western economies because, rather than being negatively affected, Germany emerged stronger by purchasing many public assets in Mediterranean countries that had suffered significant economic damage and, thus, increased its influence within the EU. This situation has concerned the U.S. and the UK, which was never a member of the Eurozone. Despite being controlled militarily and bureaucratically, Germany has always posed economic challenges to the U.S.

The U.S. aims to achieve several objectives simultaneously by triggering the Ukraine-Russia war. First, NATO has been reconsolidated, and its influence on the western edge of Eurasia has increased. Second, the U.S. has seized an opportunity to weaken Russia, which has risen primarily through hydrocarbon trade and become a candidate for a global power position in a possible multipolar world. Third, Germany, which needs to be kept "down" but has rapidly risen by using the EU as leverage since the 1990s, has been forcibly brought back under the NATO umbrella. Germany has shrunk economically and strategically, losing cheap Russian hydrocarbons essential for its industry. During the 20th century, the U.S. kept Germany controlled but relatively prosperous. However, in the 21st century, as the world steps into a multipolar era led by China, the U.S. has pressured and constrained Germany, a potential future rival, under the guise of alliance.

Lastly, the question arises of how Germany can strategically respond to this pressure. One can suggest that Germany could overcome this predicament with a similar approach to its "*Ostpolitik*" doctrine. To do this, Germany could maintain its trade with Russia, which was crucial to its economic interests, and remain neutral in the Ukraine-Russia war, similar to Türkiye. If Germany were to adopt such a position and even form a Germany-Russia-Türkiye

triangle, it could escape U.S. dominance. This tripartite alignment would provide economic relief through energy routes and break Anglo-Saxon influence in Eastern Europe. However, Germany does not seem capable of taking such actions due to its internal dynamics, which have been under U.S. control since 1945. In this context, as stated in Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism, the U.S. uses its influence to suppress potential actors, like Germany, in a multipolar world. Therefore, if Germany cannot devise a unique strategy from within, it is foreseeable that it will remain a second-tier actor in the new international relations order. Thus, Mearsheimer's predictions from the 1990s that Germany would destabilize Europe have materialized differently, with the U.S. playing the destabilizing role to preserve its hegemony.

Conflict of Interest Statement:

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

REFERENCES

Published Works

- ALBERT Michel (1992). "The Rhine Model of Capitalism: An Investigation", *European Business Journal*, 4:3, 8-22.
- ART Robert J. (2010). "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul", *Political Science Quarterly*, 125:3, 359-391.
- BADREDINE Arfi (1998). "State Collapse in a New Theoretical Framework: The Case of Yugoslavia", *International Journal of Sociology*, 28:3, 15-42.
- BANISALAMAH Mohammad A. and AL- HAMADI Mariam I., (2023). "The New Turkey: The Spread of Turkish Military Bases Abroad, Role and Indications 2002-2020", *Dirasat: Human and Social Sciences*, 50:2, 553-568.
- BARANOWSKI Shelley (2016). "Legacies of Lebensraum: German Identity and Multi-Ethnicity", Manuel Borutta & Jan C. Jansen (eds.), *Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs in Postwar Germany and France: Comparative Perspectives*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 35-52.
- BAUN Michael J. (1995). "The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany, France, and European Integration", *Political Science Quarterly*, 110:4, 605-624.
- BULMER, Simon and PATERSON, William E. (2013). "Germany as the EU's Reluctant Hegemon? Of Economic Strength and Political Constraints", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20:10, 1387-1405.
- CISNEROS Ignacio Ramirez (2018). "German Economic Dominance within the Eurozone and Minsky's Proposal for a Shared Burden Between the Hegemon and Core Economic Powers.", Levy Economics Institute, Working Papers Series, 913,1-23.
- CRAMER Kevin (2007). *The Thirty Years' War and German Memory in the Nineteenth Century*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln.
- COX Robert W. (1983). "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method", *Millennium*, 12:2, 162-175.
- FUKUYAMA Francis (1989). "The End of History?", *The National Interest*, 16, 3-18.
- GENS, Bjorn (2019). "Germany's Russia Policy and Geo-Economics: Nord Stream 2, Sanctions and the Question of EU Leadership Towards Russia", *Global Affairs*, 5:4-5, 315-334.
- GULDESCU, Stanko (2014). *The Croatian-Slavonian Kingdom: 1526-1792*, Mouton & Co Printers, The Hague.
- JACKSON Richard (2006). "Religion, Politics and Terrorism: A Critical Analysis of Narratives of "Islamic Terrorism", *Centre for International Politics Working Paper Series*, 21, 1-22.
- KAARBO Juliet OPPERMANN Kai and BEASLEY Ryan K. (2023). "What if? Counterfactual Trump and the Western Response to the War in Ukraine", *International Affairs*, 99:2, 605-624.

- KENNEDY Andrew B. and DARREN J. Lim (2018). "The Innovation Imperative: Technology and U.S.–China Rivalry in the Twenty-first Century", *International Affairs*, 94:3, 553-572.
- KLJAIĆ Stipe (2023). "Theories of Central European Integration in Croatian Politics and Culture (1848–1971)", *Great Theorists of Central European Integration, Legal Studies on Central Europe*, CEA Publishing, Miskolc, Budapest, pp. 175-198.
- KLINKE Ian (2018). "Geopolitics And the Political Right: Lessons from Germany", *International Affairs*, 94:3, 495-514.
- KRAUTHAMMER Charles (1990). "The German Revival", *New Republic*, 202:13, 18-21.
- KRUGMAN Paul COOPER Richard N. and SRINIVASAN T. N. (1995). "Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences", *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 1995:1, 327-377.
- KUGIEL Patryk (2017). "End of European Soft Foreign Policy", *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, 26:1, 59-72.
- LAYNE, Christopher (2013). "US Hegemony and the Perpetuation of NATO", Ted Galen Carpenter (ed.), *NATO Enters the 21st Century*, Routledge, London, 59-91.
- LORENZINI Sara (2009). "Globalising Ostpolitik: Ostpolitik Revisited" *Cold War History*, 9:2, 223-242.
- LUTTWAK Edward (2013). *The Endangered American Dream: How to Stop the United States from Becoming a Third World Country and How to Win the Geo-Economic Struggle for Industrial Supremacy*, Touchstone Books, New York.
- MATSABERIDZE David (2015). "Russia vs. EU/US through Georgia and Ukraine", *Connections*, 14:2, 77-86.
- MEARSHEIMER John (2021). "The Inevitable Rivalry: America, China, and the Tragedy of Great-Power Politics", *Foreign Affairs*, 100, 48-58.
- MEARSHEIMER John J. (1990). "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", *International Security*, 15:1, 5-58.
- MILLER Steven E. and SAGAN Scott D. (2009). "Nuclear Power Without Nuclear Proliferation?", *Daedalus*, 138:4, 7–18.
- MOROZOVA Natalia (2009). "Geopolitics, Eurasianism and Russian Foreign Policy under Putin", *Geopolitics*, 14:4, 667-686.
- OJANEN Hanna (2010). "EU–NATO relations after the Cold War", Jussi Hanhimäki, Georges-Henri Soutou & Basil Germond (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Security*, Routledge, London, 180-193.
- OLIVER Tim (2016). "A European Union without the United Kingdom: The Geopolitics of a British Exit from the EU", *Strategic Update LSE*, 16:1, 1-19.
- RAMET Sabrina P. (2007). "The dissolution of Yugoslavia: Competing Narratives of Resentment and Blame", *Comparative Southeast European Studies*, 55:1, 26-69.
- SCHWELLER Randall (2018). "Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 11:1, 23-48.
- SANDLER Willeke (2012). "'Here Too Lies Our Lebensraum': Colonial Space as German Space", Claus-Christian W. Szejnmann & Maiken Umbach (eds.), *Heimat, Region, and Empire: Spatial Identities under National Socialism*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 148-165.
- SELLAR Christian and BATTISTI Gianfranco (2023). "A Century of Struggles. A Comparison of Multiple Geopolitical Agendas in Europe, the USA, and Beyond.", *Geopolitical Perspectives from the Italian Border*, Springer International Publishing, 103-119.
- SHENG Edmund L. (2023). "China's Belt and Road Initiative and the Triangle Great Game of Contemporary International Politics", Edmund Li Sheng (ed.), *The Reconstruction of the US–EU Alliance in Joe Biden's Administration: The G7 and NATO as Instruments to Contain China and Russia*, Springer Nature Singapore, 79-109.
- TARAPORE Arzan (2019). "The US Response to the Belt and Road Initiative: Answering New Threats with New Partnerships", *Asia Policy*, 14:2, 34-41.
- TERRILL Damon A. (2019). "Power and Politics: The New German Question", Gale Maltox, Geoffrey Oliver & Jonathan Tucker (eds.), *Germany in Transition*, Routledge, London, 2019. 23-38.
- WALLERSTEIN Immanuel (2002). "Revolts Against the System", *New Left Review*, 18, 29-30.
- WALLERSTEIN Immanuel (2009). "Entering Global Anarchy", Samir Dasgupta & Jan Nederveen Pieterse (eds.), *Politics of Globalization*, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 147-154.
- WALLERSTEIN Immanuel (2021). *Friends as Foes. The Political Economy: Readings in the Politics and Economics of American Public Policy*, Routledge, Oxford, 2021.

WALTZ Kenneth N. (1967). “International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of World Power”, *Journal of International Affairs*, 21:2, 215-231.

Internet Sources

- AMERICAN-GERMAN INSTITUTE. <https://americangerman.institute/2021/09/aicgs-asks-what-is-angela-merkels-foreign-policy-legacy/>, accessed 26.09.2024.
- BRITISH GOVERNMENT. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/975077/Global_Britain_in_a_Competitive_Age_the_Integrated_Review_of_Security_Defence_Development_and_Foreign_Policy.pdf, accessed 16.05.2024.
- BROOKINGS INSTITUTE. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/europes-messy-russian-gas-divorce/>, accessed 26.09.2024.
- CONVERSI Daniele (1998). “German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia.”, *The Donald W. Treadgold Papers the University of Washington*, 16, 7-58. https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/35336/Treadgold_No16_1998.pdf?sequence=1, accessed 20.05.2024.
- EUROPEAN UNION. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31997Y0802%2801%29&qid=1728299709948>, accessed 07.10.2024
- EXADAKTYLOS Theofanis (2010). “The EU Enlargement to the East: Europeanizing German Foreign Policy.”, *ECPR 5th Pan-European Conference on EU Politics*, 23-26 June 2010, https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/83225359/138-libre.pdf?1649121896=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DEuropeanizing_German_Foreign_Policy.pdf&Expires=1716808401&Signature=c3qOrfhOMbr~F~uNMol360f~11BAfiyT2IRGSZhdIdtqdnriNqv6rMSkDHTjipG~vVpa7fRRRv1HgJeuURBMTFBH1CyfVYv5aQywFu-9NSd6pUtZyNENjJMTJc8IrOwruFhsaguPbyePKVCUhhJr4W6dIfUltBqStev5NIBQMhCjLY8GMi0yZXH5WtoZx-AbiH6xZUATEuW--~vmz4AXuoEyFzI0qzUPuMU7rkz~tBw2uin194AWCvhMH3gzQ9KCpUeWHWom8Kgp11uyZDX5WO6kE0jWYf187J605oNreZ1AVzI3~~WFcDI27IWOOGnzqNIGQCaitD7R3Df5ajJNig__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA, accessed 20.05.2024.
- RODMAN Peter W. (1995). “NATO’s Role in a New European Security Order” *Academic Forum Conferences*, October 1995, <https://www.nato.int/acad/conf/future95/rodman.htm>, accessed 06.05.2024.
- SELIGER Marco (2019). “The U.S. Military in Germany”, *deutschland.de*. <https://www.deutschland.de/en/usa/the-importance-of-american-troops-in-germany>, accessed 04.05.2024.
- WORLDBANK. <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/CHN>, accessed 15.05.2024.

The Threat of Tomorrow: Impacts of Artificial Intelligence-Enhanced Cyber-attacks on International Relations

Yarının Tehditleri: Yapay Zekâ-Güçlendirilmiş Siber Saldırıların Uluslararası İlişkiler Üzerindeki Etkileri

Esra Merve
ÇALIŞKAN*

*Ph.D. Research Assistant, Istanbul
Medipol University, Faculty
of Business and Management
Sciences, Department of Business
Administration, Istanbul, Türkiye
e-mail: ecaliskan@medipol.edu.tr
ORCID: 0000-0001-5226-3177

Geliş Tarihi / Submitted:
02.06.2024

Kabul Tarihi / Accepted:
31.07.2024

Abstract

Artificial intelligence (AI) has revolutionized many sectors with its development, but it is also likely to pose new threats when used maliciously. This study examines the implications of state and non-state actors using AI to conduct more sophisticated cyber-attacks and their potential consequences for international relations and global security. Cyber-attack detection has become more automated, targeted, and challenging due to rapid advances in AI. Thanks to AI, adversaries can now impersonate humans, manipulate data, eavesdrop on conversations, and exploit system weaknesses on an unprecedented scale. Unchecked, AI-enabled cyber-attacks can undermine diplomatic relations, increase the likelihood of military conflict between governments, and destabilize the economy. The international community will need new legal frameworks and technological measures to mitigate these risks. International cooperation is necessary to limit the development of AI cyber weapons, develop robust systems, and establish guidelines for responsible state activity in cyberspace. Through cooperation and foresight, the potential of AI is more likely to be achieved while reducing the likelihood of intensified cyber warfare. This paper provides a broad literature perspective and offers recommendations for both legal and technological solutions to reduce the likelihood of the effects of AI-based cyber-attacks.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Cyber-attacks, Cyber Conflict, Cyber Security, International Security

Öz

Yapay zekâ (YZ) gelişimi ile birçok sektörde devrim yaratmıştır, ancak kötü niyetli kullanıldığında yeni tehditler de oluşturması muhtemeldir. Bu çalışmada, yapay zekâ kullanılarak devlet ve devlet dışı aktörlerin daha sofistike siber saldırılar gerçekleştirmesinin nasıl etkiler doğurabileceği ve bu durumun uluslararası ilişkiler ve küresel güvenlik açısından olası sonuçları incelenmektedir. Siber saldırı tespiti, YZ'deki hızlı gelişmeler nedeniyle daha otomatik, daha hedefli ve daha zorlu hale gelmiştir. Yapay zekâ sayesinde, düşmanlar artık insanları taklit edebilmekte, verileri değiştirebilmekte, konuşmaları dinleyebilmekte ve sistem zayıflıklarını daha önce hiç görülmemiş bir ölçekte kullanabilmektedir. Kontrol edilmeyen YZ-destekli siber saldırılar diplomatik ilişkileri baltalama, hükümetler arasında askeri çatışma olasılığını artırma ve ekonomiyi istikrarsızlaştırma kapasitesine sahiptir. Bu riskleri azaltmak için uluslararası toplumun yeni yasal çerçevelere ve teknolojik önlemlere ihtiyacı olacaktır. YZ siber silahlarının gelişimini sınırlandırmak, dirençli sistemler geliştirmek ve siber uzayda sorumlu devlet faaliyeti için kılavuz ilkeler oluşturmak için uluslararası iş birliği gereklidir. İş birliği ve öngörü yoluyla, yoğunlaştırılmış siber savaş olasılığını azaltırken YZ'nin potansiyeline ulaşılabilmesi daha olasıdır. Bu makale, YZ tabanlı siber saldırıların etkilerinin olasılığını azaltmak için geniş bir literatür perspektifi ortaya koymakta ve hem yasal hem de teknolojik çözümler için öneriler sunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yapay Zekâ, Siber Saldırıları, Siber Çatışma, Siber Güvenlik, Uluslararası Güvenlik

Introduction

While the dizzying pace of technological progress with artificial intelligence (AI) continues to rise, research on the possible impact of AI-enabled cyber threats on international relations and global security is limited. Recent research has highlighted this gap, emphasizing the need for a thorough knowledge of how AI-enabled combat, particularly cyber threats, will transform global security dynamics.¹ However, this topic is critical for ensuring peace and stability in the 21st century. Robust inter-state cooperation is required before AI's uncertainties and hazards take on irreversible dimensions. According to this study, AI technology's rapid evolution in cybersecurity creates extraordinary opportunities and difficulties, necessitating ongoing research and worldwide collaboration to combat emerging threats.² Experts also note that while AI has the potential to improve cybersecurity capabilities dramatically, its implementation creates new risks and ethical concerns that must be carefully considered and addressed globally.³ These complex dynamics highlight the critical need for expanded academic research and policy activities to address the multiple effects of AI-enabled cyber threats on global security and international relations.

Although AI's comprehensive reflection on daily life and cyber security continues, most studies focus on technical dimensions.⁴ Studies focus mainly on how AI strengthens cyber-attacks and defenses and how these effects can be reflected in the dynamics of international relations.⁵ However, studies on the potential effects of AI-supported cyber threats on inter-state relations, international security, and global peace remain scarce. The possible practical consequences of the uncertainties AI will bring to these areas have yet to be adequately addressed.⁶ Also, theoretical discussions on this subject in the international relations literature are inadequate. We must understand the effects of AI-supported cyber-attacks on international security to grasp the international community's situation in this AI-shaped technological age.⁷

The study is generally shaped around the question, "How does AI-enhanced cyber-attack potential affect international relations and global security?". To answer this question, the following hypothesis has been formulated: "Developments in artificial intelligence technology have the potential to make cyber-attacks carried out by state and non-state actors more powerful and destructive. If not controlled, AI-supported cyber-attacks can lead to conflicts between states, threaten international stability, and increase the risks of war." According to this hypothesis, the advanced analysis and capabilities of learning and automation provided by AI make cyber-attacks faster, more scalable, and more destructive. AI-enabled attacks can lead to diplomatic, economic, and military tensions, jeopardizing peace. The study assesses the hypothesis that advances in AI technology have the potential to make cyber-attacks by state and non-state actors more powerful and destructive. When left

1 James Johnson, "Artificial Intelligence & Future Warfare: Implications for International Security", *Defense and Security Analysis*, 35:2, 2019, p. 153.

2 Ramanpreet Kaur, Dušan Gabrijelečić and Tomaž Klobučar, "Artificial Intelligence for Cybersecurity: Literature Review and Future Research Directions", *Information Fusion*, 97:September 1, 2023, p. 3.

3 Mariarosaria Taddeo, Tom McCutcheon and Luciano Floridi, "Trusting Artificial Intelligence in Cybersecurity Is a Double-Edged Sword", *Nature Machine Intelligence*, 1: 12, November 11, 2019, p. 558.

4 Joseph Nye, "Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace", *International Security*, 41:3, 2017, p. 67.

5 Max Smeets, "A Matter of Time: On The Transitory Nature of Cyberweapons", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 41:(1-2), 2018, p.10-12.

6 Adam Segal, "The hacked world order: How nations fight, trade, maneuver, and manipulate in the digital age" *PublicAffairs*, 2016, p 68-70.

7 Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, "Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace", *Security Studies*, 24:2, 2015, p.320

unchecked, AI-enabled cyber-attacks can lead to conflicts in inter-state relations, threaten international stability, and increase the risk of war.


The scope of this study includes a wide range of AI technologies. This study covers not only language models such as ChatGPT but also other advanced language models such as GPT-3, BERT, XLNet, Roberta, T5, ALBERT, ELECTRA, and ERNIE, as well as the impact of machine learning, deep learning, neural networks, and other AI technologies on cyber security. This broad perspective will provide a more comprehensive understanding of how AI transforms cyber-attacks and defense mechanisms.

In terms of technique, this study employs a qualitative research approach and secondary data analysis. Academic articles, think tank reports, government policy documents, reports from international organizations, and trustworthy news sources have been thoroughly evaluated. The study uses the collected data to investigate how AI is developing cyber-attack capabilities, as well as the potential effects of these attacks on international relations, economic balances, and conflict risks. In the literature review part, we will thoroughly examine existing research in AI and cybersecurity. This will allow us to properly position our study within the current body of knowledge while emphasizing the unique contribution of our research. AI's impact extends beyond technology to politics, economics, and social issues. AI has significant implications for business, economics, and diplomacy. In addition, this study identifies and evaluates factors that contribute to a better understanding of the subject matter. In the conclusion section, we will present findings and recommendations for developing effective policies against AI-powered cyber threats. These guidelines apply to all actors, developers, and other stakeholders. Aiming to fill these gaps in the literature, this study aims to theoretically and empirically examine the effects of developments in AI technology on international peace and security. It aims to guide policymakers by comprehensively analyzing the possible effects of AI-enabled cyber-attacks on the international system.

1. Literature Review

With the rapid development of AI in recent years and its spread across all fields, a major mechanism of influence has emerged. The 3R (robustness, response, and resilience, created by AI for cyber-attacks has made the existing nature of cyber-attacks exceedingly difficult to control.⁸

Figure 1. Purpose of ChatGPT Usage in Cybercrime 2023⁹



⁸ Mariarosaria Taddeo, Tom McCutcheon and Luciano Floridi, "Trusting Artificial Intelligence in Cybersecurity Is a Double-Edged Sword", *Nature Machine Intelligence*, 12:1, November 11, 2019, p. 557.

⁹ Statista, "Possible usage of ChatGPT for cyber crime purposes according to IT and security professionals in selected countries worldwide as of January 2023", <https://www-statista-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/1378211/chatgpt-usage-cyber-crime-global/>, accessed 17.07.2024.

As shown in Figure 1, AI tools such as ChatGPT will be used in cybercrimes in many different areas around the world in 2023.¹⁰ AI has now shown its effectiveness in cybercrimes and cyber-attacks.

In addition to ChatGPT, many other advanced AI applications have seen increased use in cyber-attacks. Experts have found that 70% of cyber-attacks worldwide were AI-enabled last year.¹¹ This situation reveals the gravity of the impact mechanism of AI. In the face of this spread of AI, states have had to take new initiatives to keep their security systems under control. The establishment of AI-supported infrastructure in attack and defense mechanisms has become a priority for states. With the development of AI and the increase in investments based on AI, the global commercial competition environment and the international security environment have experienced a significant transformation.¹² In addition to this transformation, the fact that AI enables attackers to automate, customize, and scale their attacks has begun to affect the cyber security capabilities of states.¹³ In light of all these developments, this section will examine the literature on AI-supported cyber-attacks and international relations to better understand AI's rapid development. Considering the studies in AI and cyber security, essential theories, concepts, and findings in these fields will be summarized, and the theoretical basis will be supported with concrete facts.

Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to a field that aims to enable computer systems to acquire human-like thinking and learning capabilities. AI also includes many algorithms and techniques known for their data analysis, pattern recognition, autonomous decision-making, and problem-solving capabilities. Approaches such as machine learning and deep learning form the basis of AI applications. Thanks to this multifunctional structure, AI finds a wide range of applications in different sectors. Especially in cyber security, it has a high potential to be used effectively in both cyber-attacks and defense.

Within this development, the characteristics of AI will inevitably affect the global order.¹⁴ In particular, advanced AI techniques such as deep learning have the potential to revolutionize cyber-attacks. Deep learning is defined as a subset of machine learning capable of learning and generalizing complex patterns from large data sets using multiple layers of artificial neural networks.¹⁵ This technology allows malware to continuously improve itself, evade defenses, and mimic human behavior.¹⁶ This multifaceted effect of deep learning takes the offensive defense system to a different dimension. It also has the potential to change the known war-conflict equation. Beyond traditional military balances of power, a country or group's cyber capabilities and the ability to use deep learning technology will make it a decisive factor in international relations and security policies.

Another significant impact of AI on the attack-defense balance is its ability to detect vulnerabilities and exploit large datasets much faster. This capability enables automated

10 Statista, "Possible usage of ChatGPT for cyber crime purposes according to IT and security professionals in selected countries worldwide as of January 2023", <https://www-statista-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/1378211/chatgpt-usage-cyber-crime-global/>, accessed 17.07.2024.

11 Adam Zaki, "85% of Cybersecurity Leaders Say Recent Attacks Powered by AI: Weekly Stat", <https://www.cfo.com/news/cybersecurity-attacks-generative-ai-security-ransom/692176/> accessed ed 17.07.2024.

12 Micheal N. Schmitt, "Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics", *Harvard National Security Journal Feature*, 2013, p. 3.

13 Max Smeets, "A Matter of time: On the Transitory Nature of Cyberweapons", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 41:1-2, 2018, p. 17.

14 James P. Farwell and Rafal Rohozinski, "Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War", *Survival*, 53:1, 2011, p. 33.

15 LeCun Yann, Bengio Yoshua and Hinton Geoffrey, "Deep Learning", *Nature*, 521:7553, 2015, p. 436.

16 Emily Otto, 2024, "Be-aware of AI-Enhanced Cyber-attacks", <https://cepa.org/article/beware-of-ai-enhanced-cyber-attacks/>, accessed 17.07.2024.

attacks on systems to scale even further. For example, by analyzing network traffic, machine learning algorithms can discover previously unknown vulnerabilities and use this knowledge to optimize attack vectors.¹⁷ Furthermore, AI-based social engineering activities make it easier to manipulate human targets. Advanced language models and deep learning techniques can analyze the online behavior of targets to create personalized and persuasive messages.¹⁸ This analysis can increase the success rate of phishing attacks and threaten corporate security. However, AI technologies are also used in defense. In areas such as anomaly detection, threat intelligence, and automated response systems, AI offers valuable tools to cyber security experts. However, the fine line between misuse and ethical use of these technologies will be one of the biggest challenges in cybersecurity in the future.

AI's advanced cyber capabilities and versatile attack mechanisms will inevitably become an essential threat to international security. Considering the effects of AI attacks, the activities of countries to strengthen their cyber security increase daily¹⁹.

With the instantaneous orchestration of AI-based attacks, it has become relatively easy to paralyze critical infrastructures such as financial markets, energy grids, and transportation systems.²⁰ This increases the likelihood of economic crises and tensions between countries. In addition, automatic disinformation, propaganda, and political manipulation targeting democratic systems with the support of AI have the potential to destabilize regimes by interfering in elections and public opinion.²¹ Again, as one of the possible attacks supported by AI, deepfakes, identity and content generation can undermine diplomatic confidence by misleading public opinion.²² Finally, AI-enabled cyber-attacks are likely to lead to mutual retaliation and even conflict.²³ It is also possible to expect this tense situation to indirectly lead to an arms race and constitute a security crisis between states. All these types of attacks reveal that it has become easier to create more effective destruction with the effect of AI than conventional warfare.²⁴ Ultimately, this is a possible scenario threatening international stability and security.

The discussions in the international relations literature on AI are handled not only through possible attack potential and security mechanisms but also theoretically. Realist theorists have presented cyberspace as a new field of competition when addressing the issue. They have adopted the approach that cyber armament can change traditional military power balances. AI has also been readily adopted as an indispensable tool in the balance of power to gain power in this field. Liberal theorists, on the other hand, argue that the transparency and connectivity brought by AI can increase cooperation.²⁵ However, some theorists argue that this is an idealistic view. Structuralists argue that technological change will reshape power

17 Olga Illiashenko et al., "Security-Informed Safety Analysis of Autonomous Transport Systems Considering AI-Powered Cyber-attacks and Protection", *Entropy (Basel)*, 26-25(8):1123,2023, p. 5.

18 Eleonore Fournier-Tombs et al., "Artificial Intelligence-Powered Disinformation and Conflict", Policy Brief, *United Nations University Centre for Policy Research*,2023, p. 3.

19 Max Smeets, 2018, p. 21.

20 Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin M. Jensen and Ryan C. Maness, *Cyber strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2020, p. 70-73

21 Susan Morgan, "Fake news, disinformation, manipulation and online tactics to undermine democracy", *Journal of Cyber Policy*,3:1, 2018, p. 40.

22 Henry Ajder, Giorgio Patrini, Francesco Cavalli and Laurence Cullen, "The State of Deepfakes: Landscape, Threats, and Impact", *Deepttrace*, 2019, p. 9-11.

23 Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, "Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace", *Security Studies*, 24:2, 2015, p. 320.

24 John R Lindsay, "Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare", *Security Studies*, 22:3, 2013, p. 369-370.

25 Joseph Nye, "Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace", *International Security*,41:3, 2017, p. 50.

balances²⁶ and that cyberspace will inevitably become a new source of structural power. According to feminist theorists, the risks posed by the masculine cyber security discourses revealed in cyberspace make the field more complex.²⁷ They argue that cyberspace should focus on human security rather than armament and power and that the issue cannot be considered separately from gender identities.

On the theoretical grounds, AI has also affected the balance of power between countries. The United States (US) and China stand out as the leading powers in AI technologies. Both countries' human resources and strong research infrastructures have given them a dominant position in this field.²⁸ They use these advantages effectively, especially in developing AI's cybersecurity and attack capabilities.

Table 1. AI Investments by Countries²⁹

Country	Number of AI Startups (2013-2022)	Private Investment (2013-2022) (billion dollars)
United States	4643	\$249B
China	1337	\$95B
United Kingdom	630	\$18B
Israel	402	\$11B
Canada	341	\$9B
France	338	\$7B
India	296	\$8B
Japan	294	\$4B
Germany	245	\$7B
Singapore	165	\$5B

The leadership of the US and China in AI is reflected in concrete data. Between 2013 and 2022, 4643 AI companies were established in the US, attracting \$249 billion in private-sector investment. In the same period, China hosted 1337 AI companies and attracted \$95 billion in private investment.³⁰ These figures show how both countries attach great importance to AI technologies and allocate resources to consolidate their leadership in this field. On the other hand, countries such as the UK, Israel, Canada, France, India, Japan, Germany, and Singapore have also made significant investments in AI, but these numbers are well below the investment in the US and China. The number of AI companies in these countries and the private investment they receive lag far behind the two giant economies.

Table 1 confirms the profound “knowledge and resource gap” in the development of AI technologies and their integration into cybersecurity.³¹ The US and China use their human

26 Amy Zegart, “Cheap Fights, Credible Threats: The Future of Armed Drones and Coercion”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 41:1-2, 2018, p. 9-11.

27 Elsa Bengtsson Meuller, “A Feminist Theorisation of Cybersecurity to Identify and Tackle Online Extremism”, London: *Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET)*, May 2023, p. 12.

28 Tkacheva, Olesya, Lowell H. Schwartz, Martin C. Libicki, Julie E. Taylor, Jeffrey Martini and Caroline Baxter, “Internet Freedom and Political Space”, Santa Monica, CA: *RAND Corporation*, 2013, p. 4-7.

29 Allan Kennedy, “Ranked: Artificial Intelligence Startups, by Country”, 2023, <https://www.visualcapitalist.com/sp/global-ai-investment/>, accessed 26.05.2024.

30 Al Majalla, “US and China Forefront of AI Investment”, <https://en.majalla.com/node/305236/infographics/us-and-china-forefront-ai-investment> accessed 25.05.2024.

31 Allan Kennedy, “Ranked: Artificial Intelligence Startup by Country”, 2023, <https://www.visualcapitalist.com/sp/global-ai-investment/>, accessed 26.05.2024.

resource and financial superiority in this field to increase their effectiveness on a global scale. On the other hand, developing countries face significant challenges in accessing and integrating AI technologies. Problems such as inadequate infrastructure, budget constraints, and lack of qualified human resources make them vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Many developing countries that cannot keep up with these rapidly developing technologies become targets of attackers and suffer economic losses.

This situation causes significant power imbalances and instability in international relations. The knowledge and resource gap in AI leads developed countries to gain more influence in cyberspace and become more effective globally.³² On the other hand, the inability of developing countries to access and integrate into this field causes them to lose power and experience greater vulnerability.³³

While the impact of AI is so advanced and the potential for competition between countries has increased immensely, serious threats that may arise if AI is abused emerge. These real-life attack examples demonstrate the potential of AI to make cyber-attacks more effective and difficult to detect³⁴. AI-enhanced phishing attacks reach targets by creating highly convincing e-mails. During the COVID-19 pandemic, cybercriminals have capitalized on fear and uncertainty to craft e-mails appearing to originate from legitimate sources and offer pandemic-related information or services.³⁵ These e-mails were virtually indistinguishable from authentic communications, significantly increasing the success rate of attacks.

In 2024, an Iranian government-backed hacker group interrupted TV streaming services in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to broadcast a deepfake newsreader delivering a report on the war in Gaza.³⁶ This example reveals how powerful the impact of AI is.

Furthermore, in 2020, in an AI-powered voice cloning attack, criminals mimicked the voice of a UK firm's CEO to trick an employee into transferring \$240,000 to a fake account.³⁷ This attack demonstrates AI's potential to provide a high degree of realism in social engineering attacks.

An advanced malware called DeepLocker remains dormant until it detects its specific target using AI through facial recognition, geolocation, or other parameters.³⁸ The malware is activated once the parameter set is detected, making it extremely difficult to detect and prevent.

With the increase in remote working, ransomware attacks have also increased. AI is constantly used to identify vulnerable systems and deploy ransomware more efficiently. For example, the use of AI to evade traditional security measures and distribute ransomware

32 Joseph Nye, "Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace", *International Security*, 2017, p. 50.

33 Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Andreas Wenger, *Cyber Security Politics: Socio-Technological Transformations and Political Fragmentation*, 1 Edition. New York, NY: Routledge, 2022, p. 6.

34 MIT Technology, "Preparing for AI-Enhanced Cyber-attacks", 2021, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/04/08/1021696/preparing-for-ai-enabled-cyber-attacks/>, accessed 22.05.2024.

35 MIT Technology, "Preparing for AI-Enhanced Cyber-attacks", 2021, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/04/08/1021696/preparing-for-ai-enabled-cyber-attacks/>, accessed 22.05.2024.

36 Dan Milmo, "Iran-Backed Hackers Interrupt UAE TV Streaming Services With Deepfake News", 2024, <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/feb/08/iran-backed-hackers-interrupt-uae-tv-streaming-services-with-deepfake-news>, accessed 17.07. 2024.

37 Giannis Tziakouris, "The Rise of AI-Powered Criminals: Identifying Threats And Opportunities", <https://blog.talosintelligence.com/the-rise-of-ai-powered-criminals/>, accessed 26.05. 2024

38 Trend Micro, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), and Europol, 2020, 'Exploiting AI', <https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/exploiting-ai-how-cybercriminals-misuse-abuse-ai-and-ml>, accessed 17.07. 2024.

has become a significant threat, especially for organizations depending on remote access solutions.³⁹

Cybercriminals and state-sponsored actors have used AI to create deepfake videos and launch disinformation campaigns. These campaigns manipulate public opinion and spread fake information rapidly on social media platforms. For example, during the pandemic, AI-generated content was used to spread misinformation about COVID-19, tailoring content to specific demographic groups through machine learning.⁴⁰

These examples illustrate the two-sided nature of AI. While AI offers significant benefits, it also enables cybercriminals to conduct more effective and harder-to-detect attacks. With the advancement of AI technology, there is a growing need for strong cybersecurity measures and AI-powered defense mechanisms.

Existing literature suggests that AI will play an important role in cyber-attacks and defense mechanisms. The development of AI technologies has increased the ability of attackers to automate, customize, and scale their attacks, thus impacting cyber security capabilities. Notably, advanced AI techniques such as deep learning have the potential to revolutionize cyber-attacks. However, the advancement of AI also offers the possibility to strengthen defense systems and detect vulnerabilities faster.⁴¹

The effects of AI in cyberspace have significant implications for international security and stability. The paralysis of critical infrastructures has the potential to lead to economic crises and tensions between countries. Moreover, AI-enabled disinformation, propaganda, and political manipulation can destabilize democratic systems. Therefore, countries are forced to invest in AI technologies to strengthen their cyber security.

In conclusion, the rapid development and proliferation of AI in cybersecurity has had a profound impact on international relations and security dynamics. AI technologies offer the potential to strengthen defense mechanisms while increasing the sophistication and impact of cyber-attacks. Advanced AI techniques such as deep learning have significantly increased the capabilities of attackers, enabling automated and scalable attacks. This development makes countries reassess their cybersecurity strategies and invest in AI-enabled defense systems. At the same time, the misuse of AI has given rise to new types of threats, such as deepfakes, social engineering, and disinformation campaigns. These developments affect the international balance of power, reinforcing the advantages of AI leaders, such as the US and China. The difficulties experienced by developing countries in accessing and integrating AI technologies deepen inequalities in the global cybersecurity ecosystem. As a result, the role of AI in cyberspace is becoming central to international security, diplomacy, and cooperation efforts. In the future, ethical and responsible use of AI technologies will be critical to stabilizing cyberspace and maintaining international security.

2. Method

This study aims to investigate the potential impacts of AI-enabled cyber-attacks on international relations and global security through a comprehensive literature review. The focus question of the study is, “How does the potential for AI-enabled cyber-attacks affect international relations and global security?” To answer this critical question, the following hypothesis was developed: “Recent advances in AI technology have the potential to make

39 MIT Technology Review, 2021.

40 Giannis Tziakouris, 2023.

41 Max Smeets, 2018, p. 36.

cyber-attacks by state and non-state actors more powerful, smarter, and more destructive. If left unchecked, AI-enabled advanced cyber-attacks could lead to serious tensions and conflicts in inter-state relations, threaten international stability and security, and even increase the risks of hot conflict”.⁴²

The study adopts a systematic literature review methodology. This method involves systematically scanning, analyzing, and synthesizing existing academic studies, policy documents, and industry reports.⁴³ Academic databases, policy documents, think tank reports, sector reports, and publications of international organizations have been used for the literature review. The search strategy included keywords such as AI, cyber-attacks, international relations, and global security. The review covers studies published in the last ten years (2014-2024). The collected literature was systematically examined under the headings of international consequences, economic impacts, imbalances between countries, the inadequacy of defense measures, cybercrimes and economic losses, international cooperation, and the need for new rules. The quality of the sources included in the review has been evaluated according to criteria such as the reliability of the publication’s source, the author’s expertise, the soundness of the methodology, the consistency of the findings, and the currentness of the source. The information obtained from the reviewed literature has been synthesized under specified headings. Considering the findings from the literature review, comprehensive policy recommendations are developed in the conclusion section. These recommendations include measures that can be taken and strategies that international actors, states, and the private sector can follow against AI-supported cyber threats.

Limitations of the study include the focus on English-language sources only, the inaccessibility of confidential or limited-access sources, and the risk that some information may be outdated due to rapid developments in AI and cyber security. This methodology aims to comprehensively examine the impact of AI-enabled cyber-attacks on international relations and global security and to provide guiding recommendations for policymakers in this field. Recommendations will include strengthening cybersecurity capacities, increasing international cooperation, developing AI regulations and codes of ethics, and strengthening defense mechanisms.⁴⁴ This article, which offers a different perspective to the studies in the field, aims to shed light on the possible threats of AI-assisted attacks in cyber security.

3. International Consequences

AI-assisted attacks are likely to have different impacts in many ways. The impact on international security is undeniable. Attacks on critical infrastructures target a country’s economic and social stability.⁴⁵ Power outages, transportation disruptions, and financial collapses threaten personal security and ignite social unrest. In addition, cyber interference in political processes undermines the sovereignty and stability of countries and negatively affects democratization processes.⁴⁶ Election and public opinion manipulation has become a significant threat to regimes. In light of all these, the literature review reveals that

42 Malatji M. Jourand Tolah Alaa, “Artificial Intelligence (AI) Cybersecurity Dimensions: A Comprehensive Framework for Understanding Adversarial and Offensive AI”, *AI and Ethics*, Springer, p. 5.

43 Kimberly A.Neuendorf, “Content Analysis and Thematic Analysis”, *Advanced Research Methods for Applied Psychology*, 1:2, 2020, p. 214. John W. Creswell and David Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*, SAGE Publications, 2022, p. 76-78.

44 “Net Losses: Estimating the Global Cost of Cybercrime”, *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. https://csiswebsiteprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/140609_rp_economic_impact_cybercrime_report.pdf p. 6-8. accessed 17.07.2024.

45 Lucas Kello, *The Virtual Weapon and International Order*, Yale University Press, 2017, p. 32-33.

46 Joseph Nye, “Cyber Power”, *Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs*, 2021, p. 3-7.

AI-supported cyber-attacks have multifaceted effects on international relations and global security. This section will systematically present the findings from the reviewed studies.

The global proliferation of AI-supported cyber-attacks can have consequences that will profoundly shake the international system. Increasing cybercrime rates could jeopardize the economic stability of many countries.⁴⁷ Critical infrastructures such as finance, health, and education will especially be subject to intense attacks.⁴⁸ The inability of international organizations to prepare for this threat may call into question their legitimacy.⁴⁹

It would be one-sided to evaluate the effects of AI on international security only in terms of attacks and threats. The ambiguity about the origins of these attacks will stoke distrust between states.⁵⁰ The triggering of an AI arms race is also likely. States will invest in cyber programs to increase deterrence capabilities. As in the Cold War era, the risks of a cyber arms race are likely to increase with the impact of AI.⁵¹ It is also obvious that distrust can lead to miscalculations and conflicts. Cyber operations perceived as violations of sovereignty can lead to retaliation.⁵² Escalation brought about by mutual cyber operations is also likely to occur. In addition, due to the difficulty of detecting and tracking them, these attacks may be attributed to wrong targets, or miscalculations may occur.⁵³ Ultimately, cyber-attacks can trigger military operations and lead to cyber armaments becoming a race.⁵⁴ Since cyber weapons are cheaper than conventional weapons, the race in this area can progress faster than in other areas. Losing control of this race can create a security dilemma. In addition, doubts and concerns will increase since it will not be transparent at what level of AI capability each state has. Increasing cyber espionage activities will also deepen distrust between national security institutions. All these factors bring the danger of creating a global crisis of confidence. The competition between the USA and China can be perceived as the driving force in the cyber race, but other powers may also try to participate in this race. Ultimately, if international cooperation cannot be achieved, this situation may lead to instability on a global scale. From the perspective of technological determinism, AI-supported cyber-attacks can redraw international power balances. Technologically superior actors can attack more effectively in cyberspace, while actors unable to develop defense capabilities become vulnerable. This situation will reveal the power balance in international relations from a technological perspective.

It is unavoidable that AI-powered attacks will impact political tensions as one of their potential impact centers. Using AI for attacks to manipulate political processes and public opinion will also entail political tensions. Organization of attacks such as interfering in elections, conducting smear campaigns against political opponents, and imposing mass

47 Ramanpreet Kaur, et al., "Artificial Intelligence for Cybersecurity: Literature Review and Future Research Directions", *Information Fusion*, 97, 2023, p. 4-5.

48 Zeinab Rouhollahi, "Towards Artificial Intelligence Enabled Financial Crime Detection", arXiv preprint arXiv:2105.10866. 2021, p. 10-11.

49 Blessing Guembe et al. "The Emerging Threat of Ai-driven Cyber-attacks: A Review", *Applied Artificial Intelligence*, 36:1, 2022, p. 17

50 John P. Caves, Jr., and W. Seth Carus, "The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030", Occasional Paper 10 National Defense University, 2021, p.52

51 Eric Gartzke, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth", *International Security*, 43:2, 2019, p. 64.

52 Ben Buchanan, *The Cybersecurity Dilemma*, Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 118.

53 John R. Lindsay, "The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction", *International Security*, 39:3, 2015, p. 33.

54 Paul K. Davis, "Deterrence, Influence, Cyber-attack, and Cyberwar", *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, 47:2, 2014, p. 345.

ensorship is also possible. Using AI to organize these attacks will both easily disable the tracking mechanism and expand the impact area. One possible consequence of this may be the wounding of democratic processes. As a result of the attacks, radicalizing public opinion, fueling tension between ethnic and religious groups, and encouraging protests can create social unrest.⁵⁵ In addition, deepfakes can undermine the credibility of politicians and institutions by shaking confidence, leading to legitimacy crises.⁵⁶ All of these actions may weaken political regimes by increasing the risks of social conflict. As a result, AI can become a means of political instability on a global scale.

AI-supported cyber-attacks in cyber security profoundly affect the international security paradigm. The digitization of the attack-defense balance and technological determinism factors transform the power structures in international relations. Uncertainties regarding attack and defense capabilities also reveal dangerous insecurity dynamics. By its very nature, cyber-attacks that may occur with the support of AI can trigger conflicts intentionally or accidentally, revealing new obstacles to cooperation that may arise in cyber security. All these show that new policies and practices are required in the AI age to maintain international peace and stability.⁵⁷ Developing global cyber security regimes and confidence-building measures are of vital importance.

On the other hand, regional security organizations will also gain significant importance. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and similar platforms can develop joint cyber defense mechanisms for their member states. Also, under the United Nations (UN) roof, there is an urgent need to establish a global agreement and rules regulating cyberspace.⁵⁸ Otherwise, global stability will be under serious threat.

4. Economic Impacts

The economic impact of AI-enabled cyber-attacks has become one of the most critical issues in today's global security environment. This section will examine the transformative impact of AI on cyber-attacks and its economic implications in light of the findings of the literature review. The reviewed studies show that AI technologies have made cyber-attacks more sophisticated, accessible, and widespread. These developments significantly impact a wide range of issues, from financial systems and critical infrastructure to intellectual property rights and the economics of attacks. The section provides a detailed analysis of these impacts, which is critical to understanding the economic dimension of AI-enabled cyber-attacks and assessing potential future threats.

Attacks on financial institutions, stock markets, and banking systems are likely to threaten stability.⁵⁹ AI-assisted attacks will make manipulating markets and disrupting money flows easier. The negative effects of attacks leaving profound impacts in a short period are reflected to a great extent. Another significant impact of AI-supported cyber-attacks is that

55 Julien Nocetti, "Contest and Conquest: Russia and Global Internet Governance", *International Affairs*, 9:1, 2015, p. 120.

56 Renee DiResta, "Computational Propaganda: If You Make It Trend, You Make It True", *Yale Law Journal*, 127:7, 2018, p. 2469.

57 Paul Scharre, *Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War*, WW Norton & Company, 2018, p. 242-243.

58 Charles A. Jordan, Exploring the Cybersecurity Skills Gap: A Qualitative Study of Recruitment and Retention from a Human Resource Management Perspective, *Northcentral University ProQuest Dissertation & Theses*, 29320493, 2022, p. 95.

59 Antoine Bouveret, "Cyber Risk for the Financial Sector: A Framework for Quantitative Assessment.", *IMF Working Paper* No. 2018/143, p. 17. <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/06/22/Cyber-Risk-for-the-Financial-Sector-A-Framework-for-Quantitative-Assessment-45924>, accessed 11.07.2024.

attacks on critical infrastructures such as energy networks and transportation infrastructures may have side effects such as damage to trade and increased logistics costs.⁶⁰ The sudden and rapid development of attacks will make economic recovery, stabilization, and trade balance challenging. Beyond the impact on production and the supply chain, attacks that compromise highly sensitive information, such as intellectual property theft and data breaches, may have more profound consequences in the long term.⁶¹ Such attacks can undermine companies' competitive advantage and slow their economic growth. As a result, all these broader impacts can hinder economic growth and lead to increased unemployment, which in turn undermines national and global economic stability.

When we look at the economic dimension of cyber-attacks, AI's development has made cyber-attacks more accessible and widespread. This has caused AI to reduce the cost of cyber-attacks further.⁶² Actions that previously required hacking skills can now be easily performed by anyone. AI-powered cyber-attack tools have become available on the dark web at cheap and accessible prices.⁶³ This has led to automation, providing a mechanism that requires less manpower and time to plan, execute, and manage attacks. This cost reduction has made these cyber-attacks more accessible to more people or groups. As a natural consequence, everyone can now become a cyber-attacker. In addition, cloud-based attack services have also evolved to be highly accessible.⁶⁴ These for-hire attacks have taken the form of a subscription-based service. Decreased costs for this type of attack have made it easier for various actors to carry out these attacks.⁶⁵ As a result, AI-enabled cyber-attacks pose a greater variety and volume of threats than traditional cyber-attacks. They also allow non-state actors and individual hackers to participate more effectively on the international stage.

To summarize, the economic consequences of AI-enabled cyber-attacks are far-reaching and significant. These implications, which range from risks to financial system stability to damage to critical infrastructure, theft of intellectual property, and reduced assault costs, pose a severe threat to national and global economic stability. The literature review demonstrates that AI has made cyber-attacks more sophisticated, accessible, and widespread. This issue highlights the limitations of standard cyber security measures and the necessity for new defense techniques. The decreased cost of attacks and the increased number of attack tools democratizes cyber threats, making international security more complicated and uncertain. Established power dynamics are challenged as non-state actors and individual hackers become more active in the international arena. The international community must evaluate its cybersecurity plans and collaboration procedures in such a situation. In this new climate, where economic security and cybersecurity are increasingly interwoven, countries and international organizations must take a more proactive and collaborative approach to AI-driven threats.

5. Imbalances between Countries

AI-backed cyber-attacks create a significant power asymmetry between developed and developing countries.⁶⁶ Differences in technological competence have led to chasms in the

60 Nir Kshetri, *Cybercrime and Cybersecurity in the Global South* (International Political Economy Series), 1st ed. Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 34-35.

61 James P. Farwell and Rafal Rohozinski, "The New Reality of Cyber War", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 54:4, 2012, p. 113.

62 Max Smeets, 2018, p. 20.

63 Joseph Nye, 2021, p. 7.

64 P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman, *Cybersecurity: What Everyone Needs to Know*, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 119-120.

65 Nir Kshetri, 2013, p. 70.

66 Adam Segal, "The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and Manipulate In The Digital

attack and defense capabilities of the countries. This section examines how differences in technological capabilities lead to gaps in countries' offensive and defensive capabilities and their implications for international relations.

The US and China stand out as pioneers in AI and cybersecurity. Both countries have become dominant powers in this field thanks to their human resources and research infrastructures.⁶⁷ In contrast, underdeveloped countries appear to be highly vulnerable to cyber-attacks. This situation can affect power dynamics in international relations and lead to imbalances.

As the leading countries in AI technologies and cybersecurity, the US and China's rivalry significantly shapes developments in this field. Both countries see AI as a critical tool to strengthen their cyber-attack and defense capabilities and invest heavily in this area. The US allocates significant budgets to AI-supported cyber defense programs through federal agencies. In particular, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) projects focus on using AI technologies to detect and prevent cyber-attacks.⁶⁸ In addition, American companies also play a pioneering role in this field, developing AI-enabled security solutions.

On the other hand, China also aims to play a global leadership role in this field through its strategic initiatives, such as the "Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Plan."⁶⁹ China conducts intensive research and development activities, especially in deep learning and machine learning, and uses AI to increase its cyber-attack and defense capabilities.

The rivalry between these two superpowers is also reflected in cyber security. Both sides try to utilize AI technologies to gain the upper hand in cyberspace. This rivalry brings the risk of a "cyber arms race."⁷⁰ Countries invest more in cyber programs to increase their deterrence capacity, which may increase mutual distrust.

Moreover, the geopolitical rivalry and power struggle between the US and China is also echoed in cyberspace. Both countries seek to undermine each other's cyber capabilities and maintain superiority. In this context, AI-enabled cyber-attacks and countermeasures become a strategic tool.⁷¹ On the other hand, this rivalry also affects other countries. Developing countries may become more vulnerable to AI-enabled cyber-attacks due to their technological backwardness. Therefore, technology transfer and capacity-building efforts led by the US and China are needed.⁷² This digital divide trend based on AI harbors risks of powerful states incorporating weaker states into their spheres of influence.⁷³ For a balanced international cyber security environment, technology transfer and capacity-building efforts are urgently required.⁷⁴

Age", *PublicAffairs*, New York, 2016, p. 96.

67 Tkacheva, Olesya, et al. "Internet Freedom and Political Space", *Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation*, 2013, p. 106.

68 About DARPA, <https://www.darpa.mil/about-us/about-darpa>, accessed 11.07.2024.

69 Graham Webster, Rogier Creemers, Elsa Kania and Paul Triolo, "China's 'New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan'", 2017, <https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/full-translation-chinas-new-generation-artificial-intelligence-development-plan-2017/>, accessed 29.07.2024.

70 Eric Gartzke, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth", *International Security*, 43:2, 2019, p. 56.

71 John R. Lindsay, "The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction", *International Security*, 39:3, 2015, p. 39.

72 Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin M. Jensen and Ryan C. Maness, *Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character Of Power And Coercion*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2020, p. 147.

73 Joseph Nye, "Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace", *International Security*, 41:3, 2017, p. 58.

74 Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin M. Jensen., & Ryan C. Maness, 2020, p. 128.

In a globalizing world, AI-backed cyber threats pose new risks to international security and relations. The superiority of developed countries in AI creates a deep “digital divide” threat on the North-South and West-East axis.⁷⁵ Major powers like the US, Russia, and China try to build a deterrent superiority in cyberspace by using their advanced AI research and qualified human resources advantages. In contrast, developing countries and small states are vulnerable due to inadequate technological infrastructures. This situation leaves them unprotected against AI-backed attacks.⁷⁶

Imbalances in cyberspace can also lead to the disruption of traditional power relations. Some technologically lagging actors can easily carry out effective cyber operations thanks to easily accessible AI tools.⁷⁷ This possibility can create new and unpredictable threats in the international system. AI-backed attacks can also lead to diplomatic crises, confidence crises, and even economic losses in target countries. International trade and financial flows are directly affected by these attacks.

Capacity-building through cooperation and technology transfer is vital for establishing a balanced and equitable global cyber security order.⁷⁸ Developed countries should support developing countries through personnel training and technology transfer. In this way, all states can achieve a minimum deterrence and defense capability in cyberspace. Otherwise, an uncontrolled cyber arms race and AI technologies becoming destabilizing tools will be inevitable.

As a result, the disparity between AI-powered cyber-attacks and defense capabilities poses new and complex challenges to international relations. While developed countries, particularly the US and China, have gained a significant advantage, developing countries become increasingly vulnerable. This situation may alter established power dynamics and create new security risks. The international community must close the technical gap immediately and create a more equal cybersecurity environment. Technology transfer, capacity-building, and international cooperation are essential for meeting these difficulties. Otherwise, an unrestrained cyber arms race and the use of AI technology as destabilizing instruments will be unavoidable.

6. Inadequacy of Defense Measures

The rapid penetration of AI technologies into the field of cyber-attacks has also affected known security mechanisms. This section examines how AI-enabled cyber-attacks transform the international security paradigm and its implications for the global balance of power. Traditional security approaches are insufficient against cyber-attacks.⁷⁹ Especially deep learning and machine learning algorithms offer attackers unpredictable and unusual opportunities.⁸⁰ Cybercriminals can use these technologies to bypass defense mechanisms and continuously adapt their attacks.⁸¹

75 Blessing Guamge et al., “The Emerging Threat of Ai-driven Cyber-attacks: A Review”, *Applied Artificial Intelligence*, 36:1, 2022, p. 3-4.

76 Ramanpreet Kaur et. al., “Artificial Intelligence for Cybersecurity: Literature Review and Future Research Directions”, *Information Fusion*, 97: 101804, 2023, p. 7-9.

77 Iram Bibi et al., “Deep AI-powered Cyber Threat Analysis in IIoT”, *IEEE Internet of Things Journal*, 2022, p. 7750.

78 Azza Bimantara, “The Normative Enactment of International Cybersecurity Capacity Building Assistance: A Comparative Analysis on Japanese and South Korean Practices”, *Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional*, 24:1, 2022, p. 111.

79 Blessing Guamge et al., “The Emerging Threat of Ai-driven Cyber-attacks: A Review”, *Applied Artificial Intelligence*, 2022, p. 9.

80 Ramanpreet Kaur et. al. 2023, p. 14.

81 Sherali Zeadally et. al., “Harnessing Artificial Intelligence Capabilities to Improve Cybersecurity”, *IEEE Access*, vol. 8, 2020, p. 23819.

In contrast, the use of AI in security solutions progresses very slowly. Barriers to progress include the complexity of AI, lack of human resources, cost, and other reasons that keep defenses weak. While attackers can quickly develop new attack vectors using AI tools, defense systems are slow to prepare updates against these attacks. This delay in defense gives attackers a serious advantage. Thus, there is a deep gap between AI-enabled attacks and the measures taken against them. In particular, the fact that AI-supported attacks are conducted by combining many different technologies makes it very difficult for defense systems to produce solutions and respond to them. Therefore, defense measures need to be effective against all these technologies.⁸² However, developing and implementing such comprehensive solutions is difficult and costly.

One final factor that complicates defense measures is the lack of coordination. Different organizations adopt different security solutions. These differences prevent systems from working in harmony, leading to defense weaknesses. The imbalance caused by all these factors in cyber security is defined as the “artificial intelligence arms race” and needs to be supported by tailored policies and cooperation to prevent a possible crisis.⁸³ Otherwise, AI vulnerabilities are likely to deepen and reach uncontrollable dimensions. Governments and the private sector should invest in integrating AI into defense systems and training qualified human resources.⁸⁴ Without such a collective effort, it seems impossible to effectively prevent today’s cyber threats.

Finally, the inadequacy of defense measures has profoundly impacted the international security environment in the face of AI-driven cyber-attacks. States have been forced to allocate more resources to cyber programs to increase their deterrence capacity against such attacks. However, this has further reinforced insecurity in the international arena.⁸⁵ Moreover, the uncertainties about the sources of AI-assisted attacks have fueled suspicions and misunderstandings between states.⁸⁶ All these efforts to strengthen defense systems and the environment’s infrastructure suitable for misunderstanding have become a source of significant problems in the international environment.

In conclusion, the current state of AI-enabled cyber-attacks has led to a critical transformation in the international security environment. Factors such as the inadequacy of traditional defense mechanisms, technological complexity, lack of qualified human resources, and coordination problems put the defense side at a disadvantage. Moreover, the uncertainty about the source of AI-assisted attacks paves the way for misunderstandings and potential conflicts in inter-state relations. Comprehensive and coordinated efforts are needed at both national and international levels to deal with this complex and dynamic threat environment.

7. Cybercrime and Economic Losses

Integrating AI technologies into cybercrime poses an increasing threat to the global economy. This section examines the economic impact of AI-enabled cybercrime from a multi-dimensional

82 Blessing Guamege et al., “The Emerging Threat of Ai-driven Cyber-attacks: A Review”, *Applied Artificial Intelligence*, 36:1, 2022, p. 12-15.

83 Iram Bibi et al., “Deep AI-powered Cyber Threat Analysis in IIoT”, *IEEE Internet of Things Journal*, 2022, p. 7751.

84 Charles A. Jordan, “Exploring the Cybersecurity Skills Gap: A Qualitative Study of Recruitment and Retention from a Human Resource Management Perspective”, Northcentral University ProQuest Dissertation & Theses, 2022, p. 59.

85 Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, “Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace”, *Security Studies*, 24:2, 2015, p. 331.

86 P. Caves Jr. and W. Seth Carus, “The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030”, Occasional Paper 10 National Defense University, 2014.

perspective. Critical sectors such as finance, energy, transportation, healthcare, and education have become targets of these next-generation threats, seriously jeopardizing the countries' economic stability and growth.⁸⁷ This section will discuss the impacts of AI-enabled cybercrime on various economic sectors in light of examples from past cases and potential future scenarios. It will also assess the cost of these threats to the global economy and their long-term implications for the economic security of countries. This analysis highlights the urgency and importance of the measures governments, the private sector, and the international community need to take against AI-enabled cyber threats.

While cyber-attacks cause serious economic damage to countries even before they merge with AI, the scale of these impacts will inevitably increase if combined with AI. For example, the WannaCry ransomware attack that shook the world in 2017 caused billions of dollars in damage to the global economy. The attack affected computers in more than 150 countries, shut down production facilities, and disrupted many others.⁸⁸ If an attack on a similar scale is supported by AI, the effects will be more extreme. Similarly, a cyber-attack on the Colonial Pipeline in 2021 seriously compromised the US oil and gasoline supply, leading to long queues in pumps and a rise in fuel prices. The attackers demanded \$4.4 million in ransom from the company, threatening the country's energy security.⁸⁹ These cybercrimes, carried out at highly critical points, may have the capacity to do much more harm when supported by AI.

The increasing impact of AI on cybercrime has led to a significant increase in cyber fraud cases, particularly in the banking and finance sectors. Fraud, phishing attacks, credit card fraud, and money transfer hacking have become more widespread than ever with the support of AI.⁹⁰ Such attacks undermine the reliability and stability of the financial system, leading to economic losses. In addition, attacks on critical infrastructures cause disruptions in many services, from energy production and transportation systems to hospitals and schools. Many types of attacks, such as stopping production lines and canceling operations, have become easier and more destructive with the effect of AI.⁹¹ This situation disrupts the economic activities and supply chains of countries.

Experts warn that AI-enabled cybercrime could cost the global economy more than \$1 trillion annually, equivalent to more than 1% of global net domestic product (GDP).⁹² In addition, large-scale data theft and infringement of intellectual property rights ruin research and development (R&D) investments⁹³. As a result of all these factors, the growth rate of both national and global economies slows down.

87 Ramanpreet Kaur et. al. 2023, "Artificial Intelligence for Cybersecurity: Literature Review and Future Research Directions", *Information Fusion*, 97:101804, 2023, p. 9.

88 Ramanpreet Kaur et. al. 2023, p. 11.

89 Sean Micheal Kerner, "Colonial Pipeline Hack Explained: Everything You Need to Know", 2022, <https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/feature/Colonial-Pipeline-hack-explained-Everything-you-need-to-know> , accessed 31.08.2024.

90 Terence Huang, "The Dark Alliance: Addressing the Rise of AI Financial Frauds and Cyber Scams", 2024, <https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mje/2024/02/14/the-dark-alliance-addressing-the-rise-of-ai-financial-frauds-and-cyber-scams/> accessed 31.08.2024.

91 Shaji George, et al., "Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure: Assessing Vulnerabilities Across Key Sectors", *Partners Universal International Innovation Journal (PUIIJ)*, 02:01, 2024, p. 57.

92 Steve Morgan, 2020, "Cyberwarfare in C-Suite", <https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypse-cybercrime-report-2016/> , accessed 31.08.2024.

93 Sherali Zeadally et. al., "Harnessing Artificial Intelligence Capabilities to Improve Cybersecurity", *IEEE Access*, 8, 2020, p. 23830.

In conclusion, the economic impact of AI-enabled cybercrime poses a serious threat on national and global scales. Attacks on critical sectors such as finance, energy, transportation, and healthcare jeopardize economic stability and growth. The WannaCry and Colonial Pipeline cases illustrate the potentially devastating impact of such attacks with the possible integration of AI technologies. The rise in cyber fraud cases undermines the credibility of the financial system, leading to economic losses. Economic actors need to be aware of and prepared for these next-generation threats. Only in this way will it be possible to minimize the economic impact of AI-driven cybercrime and protect sustainable economic growth.

8. Need for International Cooperation and New Rules

The rapid evolution of AI technologies has ushered in a new era of cybersecurity challenges that transcend national borders and traditional security paradigms. This section examines the pressing need for enhanced international cooperation and the establishment of new regulatory frameworks to address the complex threats posed by AI-backed cyber-attacks. It is important to consider how AI-backed attacks affect international security frameworks. We must recognize that in the face of cyber-attacks aided by AI, current international security frameworks are insufficient.⁹⁴ Cyber risks have not been included in traditional disarmament and control systems. For instance, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) does not mention cyber weapons.⁹⁵ However, on a positive note, chemical and biological hazards are a focal point of the UN disarmament agenda.⁹⁶ As a result, the world community is confronted with a legal vacuum regarding the constantly changing cyber threats.

It becomes urgently necessary to create new standards and guidelines. The uncertainties in the cyber globe can be resolved only via multilateral diplomatic efforts. If not, an unchecked cyber arms race will inevitably occur. It is crucial to create a specific legal framework for cyber security within the UN. Regional platforms also need to develop their joint defense mechanisms.

Reports prepared by the UN Group on the Peaceful Uses of Cyber Space (UN GGE) reflect international efforts on cybersecurity. The 2013 and 2015 reports have identified standards to be followed in cyberspace.⁹⁷ However, these norms are not binding. The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (2001), prepared by the Council of Europe, is the first binding treaty to define cybercrimes and provide international cooperation to combat these crimes.⁹⁸ However, this convention does not cover AI-supported cyber-attacks. NATO's Cyber Defense Policy (2014) aims to strengthen allies' cyber defense capabilities and enhance cooperation.⁹⁹ Nevertheless, this policy also does not focus on AI technologies. On the other hand, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members pledged to cooperate on cybersecurity in 2009.¹⁰⁰ However, this commitment is not binding and does not cover AI-supported attacks.

94 Irshaad Jada and Thembekele O. Mayayise, "The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Organisational Cyber Security: An Outcome Of A Systematic Literature Review", *Data and Information Management*, 8:2:100063, 2024, p. 8.

95 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), <https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/npt/>, accessed 20.07.2024.

96 "Securing Our Common Future", Office for Disarmament Affairs New York, 2018 An Agenda for Disarmament, www.un.org/disarmament/sg-agenda, accessed 20.07.2024.

97 Bart Hogeveen, "The UN norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace", International Cyber Policy Center, 2022, <https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/The-UN-norms-of-responsible-state-behaviour-in-cyberspace.pdf>, accessed 20.07.2024.

98 "Convention on Cybercrime", European Treaty Series - No. 185, Council of Europe, Budapest, 23.9.2021. <https://rm.coe.int/1680081561>, accessed 20.07.2024.

99 "Cyber Defence", 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm#:~:text=At%20the%202014%20NATO%20Summit,5%20of%20NATO's%20founding%20treaty, accessed 20.07.2024.

100 "Shanghai Cooperation Organisation", <https://ccdcoe.org/organisations/sco/>, accessed 20.07.2024.

Existing international treaties and texts do not fully address the threats posed by AI-supported cyber-attacks in general terms. Therefore, new legal frameworks and binding agreements are needed to fill the gap.

Non-governmental actors must also be involved in this process. Dialogue and cooperation with leading technology companies and civil society organizations are vital. The rules governing the cyber world can only be defined with a multi-party approach. Without this kind of collective effort, the world will inevitably face one of the most significant global threats of the 21st century.¹⁰¹

There are necessary steps to be taken in international law and diplomacy. Existing disarmament and control regimes must be updated to cover cyber weapons and AI-supported attacks. In this context, the role of organizations such as the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is critical.¹⁰²

It is also imperative to take confidence-building measures among countries. Detection of the source of cyber-attacks, transparency, information sharing, joint exercises, and training are steps that will increase mutual trust.¹⁰³ These steps will also prevent misunderstandings and unintentional clashes.

As a result, AI-backed cyber-attacks threaten global security, requiring urgent and coordinated action by the international community. Creating new legal frameworks, taking confidence-building measures, and strengthening multilateral cooperation are the keys to dealing with this threat. Otherwise, the world could be dragged into an uncontrolled cyber arms race and instability.

Conclusion

AI-enabled cyber-attacks constitute one of the most important international security threats of the 21st century. These attacks have the potential to profoundly affect the offense-defense balance, security regimes, inter-state relations, and the global political economy. This study has comprehensively examined the potential impacts of AI-enabled cyber-attacks on international relations and global security. The research has revealed how these next-generation threats transform traditional security paradigms and create new challenges in the international system. The findings show that AI technologies have made cyber-attacks more sophisticated, accessible, and pervasive. These developments have significantly impacted a wide range of issues, from financial systems and critical infrastructure to intellectual property rights and the economics of attacks. In particular, the decreasing cost of AI-enabled cyber-attacks and the proliferation of attack tools democratize cyber threats and make the international security environment more complex and uncertain. The international community needs to take urgent and coordinated measures against this threat.

First, the international community should develop new regimes to limit AI-enabled cyber weapons. In this context, a “Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Cybersecurity” should be negotiated and adopted within the UN. This convention should define AI-enabled attacks, mechanisms for international cooperation to combat them, and norms to be observed.

101 “Cyber Capabilities and National Power Volume 2”, The International Institute For Strategic Studies, https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/2023/09/cyber-capabilities-and-national-power-vol-2/cyber-capabilities-and-national-power_volume-2.pdf, p.63., accessed 20.07.2024.

102 United Nations Meeting Coverages, Seventy-Eighth Session, 20th & 21st Meeting, 24 October 2023, <https://press.un.org/en/2023/gadis3725.doc.htm>, accessed 20.07.2024.

103 Paul Scharre, *Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War*, WW Norton & Company, 2018, p. 212-213.

Furthermore, an international mechanism should be established to oversee this convention's implementation and the parties' compliance.

The international community and institutions should carry out numerous responsibilities to address the threat of AI-enabled cyber-attacks to international peace and security. First, the UN should establish a new regime of disarmament and confidence-building measures in cyberspace. This regime should prohibit developing, producing, and using AI-based cyber weapons and include transparency mechanisms and oversight processes. A permanent Cyber Security Council should also be established within the UN, setting policies and regulations to prevent AI-based cyber-attacks. This Council would conduct disarmament negotiations and implement mechanisms of transparency and oversight. It would be funded by contributions from member states and employ specialized staff.

Second, joint cybersecurity centers should be established to increase cooperation between countries, especially for AI-based attacks, and information-sharing mechanisms should also be developed. The private sector should also be involved in these efforts, encouraging technology companies to comply with cybersecurity standards. Third, new diplomatic norms and codes of conduct should be established. For example, targeting critical infrastructure should be prohibited, and agreements should be reached on a proportionate response to attacks.

Fourth, the international community should invest in human and technical capacity-building in AI and cybersecurity. In particular, developed countries should provide developing countries with training and infrastructure support in these areas. Through this cooperation, the technological divide can be avoided, and the risks of power imbalances can be reduced. Finally, a sense of collective responsibility for maintaining international peace should be developed, and awareness-raising efforts should be carried out. It should be emphasized that AI should be managed and supervised following ethical and humanitarian values to contribute to human welfare.

When we look at the responsibilities of states in general, they should increase their investments in cyber security and strengthen cooperation in this field. Particularly, the focus should be on helping to build the capacities of developing countries. Activities such as technology transfer, personnel training, and joint exercises will strengthen the defense capabilities of developing countries. In addition, universities and educational institutions should conduct more programs to train qualified human resources in cyber security.

In addition, measures should be taken to increase transparency and trust between states. Detecting the source of cyber-attacks, information sharing, and joint exercises will increase mutual trust. These activities can help the states to avoid misunderstandings and unintentional conflicts. Furthermore, regional security organizations should develop joint cyber defense mechanisms and strengthen the capacities of member states. Also, dialogue and cooperation among governments, technology companies, and civil society organizations should be strengthened. Developments in AI and cybersecurity need to be addressed with a multi-stakeholder approach. Technology companies can have a vital role in addressing vulnerabilities and improving defense mechanisms. Civil society organizations can help raise public awareness and contribute to policy processes.

Finally, combating AI-enabled cyber-attacks should be treated as part of human security, not just as a technical issue. Cybersecurity policies should be designed to protect the rights and freedoms of societies and individuals. At the same time, principles such as gender equality and inclusiveness should be considered when formulating these policies.

As a result, the research reveals that current defense measures are insufficient against AI-powered cyber-attacks. Traditional security approaches are ineffective against this new generation of threats. This situation leads to a serious transformation in the international security environment and forces states to allocate more resources to increase their deterrence capacity. Moreover, another important finding of the study is that AI-enabled cyber-attacks create a significant power asymmetry among countries. While developed countries, especially the US and China, gain significant advantages, developing countries become increasingly vulnerable. This asymmetry has the potential to alter established power dynamics and create new security risks. Ultimately, our findings suggest that the international community needs to take urgent and coordinated actions against AI-enabled cyber threats. Creating new legal frameworks, adopting confidence-building measures, and strengthening multilateral cooperation are keys to tackling this threat. Otherwise, the world could be plunged into an uncontrolled cyber arms race and instability.

In conclusion, this study emphasizes that maintaining international peace and stability in the age of AI requires collective action and a sense of responsibility. Strengthened dialogue and cooperation among the international community, governments, technology companies, and civil society organizations is critical to tackling this complex threat. The study has taken a step forward in understanding the impact of AI-enabled cyber threats on international security and developing policy recommendations to address these threats. However, there is still a need for continued research and collaboration in this rapidly evolving field.

Conflict of Interest Statement:

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

REFERENCES

Published Works

- AJDER Henry PATRINI Giorgio CAVALLI Francesco and CULLEN Laurence (2019). "The State of Deepfakes: Landscape, Threats, and Impact", *Deeptrace*, 1-28.
- BIBI Iram and AKHUNZADA Adnan (2022). "Deep AI-powered Cyber Threat Analysis in IIoT", *IEEE Internet of Things Journal*, 9:10, 7748-7763.
- BIMANTARA Azza (2022). "The Normative Enactment of International Cybersecurity Capacity Building Assistance: A Comparative Analysis on Japanese and South Korean Practices", *Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional*, 24:1, 109-138.
- BUCHANAN Ben (2020). *The Cybersecurity Dilemma*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- CAVELTY Myriam Dunn and WENGER Andreas (2022). *Cyber Security Politics: Socio-Technological Transformations and Political Fragmentation*, 1st Edition, Routledge, New York.
- CAVES John P. Jr. and CARUS W. Seth (2021). *The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030*, Occasional Paper 10, National Defense University Press, Washington.
- CRESWELL John W. and CRESWELL David (2022). *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*, SAGE Publications, California.
- DAVIS Paul K. (2014). "Deterrence, Influence, Cyber-attack, and Cyberwar", *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, 47:2, 327-355.
- DiRESTA Renee (2018). "Computational Propaganda: If You Make It Trend, You Make It True", *Yale Law Journal*, 127:7, 2460-2483.

- FARWELL James P. and ROHOZINSKI Rafal (2011). "Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 53:1, 23-40.
- FOURNIER-TOMBS Eleonore BRUBAKER Rebecca and ALBRECHT Eduardo. (2023). "Artificial Intelligence-Powered Disinformation and Conflict", *United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, Policy Brief*, 1-12.
- GARTZKE Erik (2019). "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth", *International Security*, 43:2, 41-73.
- GARTZKE Erik and LINDSAY Jon R. (2015). "Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace", *Security Studies*, 24:2, 316-348.
- GEORGE Shaji BASKAR Dr T and SRİKAANTH Balaji. (2024). "Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure: Assessing Vulnerabilities Across Key Sectors", *Partners Universal International Innovation Journal*, 2:1, 54-63.
- GUEMME Blessing AZETA Ambrose and MISRA Sanjay. (2022). "The Emerging Threat of AI-driven Cyberattacks: A Review", *Applied Artificial Intelligence*, 36:1, 1-23.
- ILLIASHENKO Olga VYACHESLAV Kharchenko IEVGEN Babeshko FESENKO Herman and GIANDOMENICO Felicita Di. (2023). "Security-Informed Safety Analysis of Autonomous Transport Systems Considering AI-Powered Cyber-attacks and Protection", *Entropy*, 25:8, 1123-1145.
- JADA Irshaad and MAYAYISE Thembekele O. (2024). "The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Organisational Cyber Security: An Outcome of a Systematic Literature Review", *Data and Information Management*, 8:2, 100063.
- JOHNSON James (2019). "Artificial Intelligence & Future Warfare: Implications for International Security", *Defense and Security Analysis*, 35:2, 147-169.
- JORDAN Charles A. (2022). Exploring the Cybersecurity Skills Gap: A Qualitative Study of Recruitment and Retention from a Human Resource Management Perspective, *Northcentral University ProQuest Dissertation & Theses*, 29320493.
- KAUR Ramanpreet, GABRIJELČIČ Dušan and KLOBUČAR Tomaž (2023). "Artificial Intelligence for Cybersecurity: Literature Review and Future Research Directions", *Information Fusion*, 97, 1-15.
- KELLO Lucas (2017). *The Virtual Weapon and International Order*, Yale University Press, New Haven.
- KSHETRI Nir (2013). *Cybercrime and Cybersecurity in the Global South*, Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- LeCUN Yann BENGIO Yoshua and HINTON Geoffrey (2015). "Deep Learning", *Nature*, 521:7553, 436-444.
- LINDSAY John R. (2013). "Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare", *Security Studies*, 22:3, 365-404.
- LINDSAY John R. (2015). "The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction", *International Security*, 39:3, 7-47.
- MORGAN Susan (2018). "Fake News, Disinformation, Manipulation and Online Tactics to Undermine Democracy", *Journal of Cyber Policy*, 3:1, 39-43.
- NEUENDORF Kimberly A. (2020). "Content Analysis and Thematic Analysis", *Advanced Research Methods for Applied Psychology*, 1:2, 211-223.
- NOCETTI Julien (2015). "Contest and Conquest: Russia and Global Internet Governance", *International Affairs*, 91:1, 111-130.
- NYE Joseph (2017). "Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace", *International Security*, 41:3, 44-71.
- ROUHOLLAHI Zeinab (2021). "Towards artificial intelligence enabled financial crime detection", arXiv preprint arXiv:2105.10866, 1-15.
- SCHARRE Paul (2018). *Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War*, WW Norton & Company, New York.
- SEGAL Adam (2016). *The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and Manipulate in the Digital Age*, PublicAffairs, New York.
- SINGER P. W. and FRIEDMAN Allan (2014). *Cybersecurity: What Everyone Needs to Know*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- SMEETS Max (2018). "A Matter of Time: On the Transitory Nature of Cyberweapons", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 41:1-2, 6-32.
- TADDEO Mariarosaria McCUTCHEON Tom and FLORIDI Luciano (2019). "Trusting Artificial Intelligence in Cybersecurity Is a Double-Edged Sword", *Nature Machine Intelligence*, 1:12, 557-560.
- TKACHEVA Olesya vd. (2013). "Internet Freedom and Political Space", *RAND Corporation*, Santa Monica.
- VALERIANO Brandon JENSEN Benjamin M. and MANESS Ryan C. (2020). *Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion*, Oxford University Press, New York.

- ZEADALLY Sherali vd. (2020). "Harnessing Artificial Intelligence Capabilities to Improve Cybersecurity", *IEEE Access*, 8, 23817-23837.
- ZEGART Amy (2018). "Cheap Fights, Credible Threats: The Future of Armed Drones and Coercion", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 41:1-2, 6-48.

Internet Sources

- "About DARPA", <https://www.darpa.mil/about-us/about-darpa>, accessed 11.07.2024.
- BOUVERET Antoine (2018). *Cyber Risk for the Financial Sector: A Framework for Quantitative Assessment*, IMF Working Paper No. 2018/143, International Monetary Fund, Washington. <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/06/22/Cyber-Risk-for-the-Financial-Sector-A-Framework-for-Quantitative-Assessment-45924> accessed 11.07.2024.
- "Cyber Defence", https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm, accessed 20.06.2024.
- "Convention on Cybercrime", European Treaty Series - No. 185, Council of Europe, <https://rm.coe.int/1680081561>, accessed 20.06.2024.
- "Cyber Capabilities and National Power Volume 2", The International Institute For Strategic Studies, https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/2023/09/cyber-capabilities-and-national-power-vol-2/cyber-capabilities-and-national-power_volume-2.pdf, accessed 20.06.2024.
- HOGVEEN Bart (2022). "The UN norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace", International Cyber Policy Center, <https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/The-UN-norms-of-responsible-state-behaviour-in-cyberspace.pdf>, accessed 20.06.2024.
- HUANG Terence (2024). "The Dark Alliance: Addressing the Rise of AI Financial Frauds and Cyber Scams", <https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mje/2024/02/14/the-dark-alliance-addressing-the-rise-of-ai-financial-frauds-and-cyber-scams/>, accessed 31.08.2024.
- KENNEDY Allan (2023). "Ranked: Artificial Intelligence Startups, by Country", <https://www.visualcapitalist.com/sp/global-ai-investment/>, accessed 26.05.2024.
- KERNER Sean Micheal (2022). "Colonial Pipeline Hack Explained: Everything You Need to Know", <https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/feature/Colonial-Pipeline-hack-explained-Everything-you-need-to-know>, accessed 31.08.2024.
- MILMO Dan (2024). "Iran-backed hackers interrupt UAE TV streaming services with deepfake news", <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/feb/08/iran-backed-hackers-interrupt-uae-tv-streaming-services-with-deepfake-news>, accessed 26.05.2024.
- MORGAN Steve (2020). "Cyberwarfare in C-Suite", <https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypse-cybercrime-report-2016/>, accessed 31.08.2024.
- "Net Losses: Estimating the Global Cost of Cybercrime", Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://csiswebsiteprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/140609_rp_economic_impact_cybercrime_report.pdf, accessed 20.06.2024.
- OTTO Emily (2024). "Be-aware of AI-Enhanced Cyber-attacks", <https://cepa.org/article/beware-of-ai-enhanced-cyber-attacks/>, accessed 17.07.2024.
- "Securing Our Common Future", Office for Disarmament Affairs New York, 2018, www.un.org/disarmament/sg-agenda, accessed 20.06.2024.
- "Shanghai Cooperation Organisation", <https://ccdcoe.org/organisations/sco/>, accessed 20.06.2024.
- "Statista - Possible usage of ChatGPT for Cyber Crime Purposes", <https://www-statista-com.eu1.proxy.openathens.net/statistics/1378211/chatgpt-usage-cyber-crime-global/>, accessed 17.07.2024.
- "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)", <https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/npt/>, accessed 20.06.2024.
- TZIAKOURIS Giannis (2023). "The rise of AI-powered criminals: Identifying threats and opportunities", <https://blog.talosintelligence.com/the-rise-of-ai-powered-criminals/>, accessed 26.05.2024.
- United Nations Meeting Coverages, Seventy-Eighth Session, 20th & 21st Meeting, <https://press.un.org/en/2023/gadis3725.doc.htm>, accessed 20.06.2024.
- WEBSTER Graham CREEMERS Rogier KANÍA Elsa and TRIÓLO Paul (2017). "China's 'New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan'", <https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/full-translation-chinas-new-generation-artificial-intelligence-development-plan-2017/>, accessed 29.07.2024.
- ZAKI Adam (2024). "85% of Cybersecurity Leaders Say Recent Attacks Powered by AI: Weekly Stat", <https://www.cfo.com/news/cybersecurity-attacks-generative-ai-security-ransom/692176/>, accessed 17.07.2024.

Is a Theory of Cyberspace Dominance Possible? An Assessment from the Perspective of China's Cyber Sovereignty Approach

Bir Siber Uzay Hâkimiyet Teorisi Mümkün mü?

Çin'in Siber Egemenlik Yaklaşımı Perspektifinden Bir Değerlendirme

Aybala LALE
KAHRAMAN*

*Asst. Prof. Dr., Bursa Technical
University, Faculty of Humanities
and Social Sciences, Department
of International Relations, Bursa,
Türkiye
e-mail: aybala.lale@btu.edu.tr
ORCID: 0000-0003-3289-5403

Geliş Tarihi / Submitted:
18.05.2024

Kabul Tarihi / Accepted:
31.07.2024

Abstract

In today's rapidly digitalizing world, cybersecurity requires the protection of information and communication technologies as well as the infrastructure of countries. In this framework, some countries consider cyber sovereignty to be connected with cybersecurity as an approach that discloses the control and authority of states over their digital infrastructures. This study analyzes the cybersecurity policies and understanding of cyber sovereignty in China. In doing so, the possibility of theorizing dominance in cyberspace is discussed. In this context, the main purpose of this study is to examine the theoretical dimensions of cybersecurity and cyber sovereignty concepts and to analyze China's cybersecurity policies and cyber sovereignty approach. Cyberspace represents a new field of dominance in international relations. Rather than providing a definitive answer to whether cyber sovereignty is possible under international law, the focus should be on how cyber sovereignty can play a role in international power struggles and shape cybersecurity policies. In this context, the study's methodology consists of a brief introduction to cybersecurity, followed by an analysis of the research question of whether cyberspace dominance is possible and the concept of cyber sovereignty. Within the scope of the theoretical framework, a literature review of the relevant concepts was conducted, and China's cybersecurity policies and cyber sovereignty approach were analyzed as a case study. The documents, sources, and data discussed throughout the study demonstrate China's understanding of cyber sovereignty and how it is shaped on international platforms. The study concludes that if China sees cyberspace sovereignty as the key to becoming a global power in the international system, it must integrate all factors, including military, political, and economic factors, besides cybersecurity.

Keywords: Cyberspace, Cybersecurity, Cyber Sovereignty, Cyberspace Dominance Theory, Chinese Cyber Sovereignty

Öz

Günümüzün hızla dijitalleşen dünyasında siber güvenlik, ülkelerin altyapılarının yanı sıra bilgi ve iletişim teknolojilerinin de korunmasını gerektirmektedir. Bu çerçevede siber egemenlik, devletlerin dijital altyapıları üzerindeki kontrol ve otoritesini ortaya koyan bir yaklaşım olarak bazı ülkeler tarafından siber güvenlik ile ilişkilendirilmektedir. Bu çalışma, Çin'deki siber güvenlik politikalarını ve siber egemenlik anlayışını derinlemesine analiz etmektedir. Bunu yaparken, siber uzayda hakimiyeti teorileştirme olasılığı tartışılmaktadır. Bu kapsamda çalışmanın temel amacı, siber güvenlik ve siber egemenlik kavramlarının teorik boyutlarının incelenmesi ve Çin'in siber güvenlik politikaları ve siber egemenlik yaklaşımının analiz edilmesidir. Siber uzayın uluslararası ilişkilerde yeni bir hâkimiyet alanını temsil ettiği düşünülmektedir. Siber egemenliğin uluslararası hukuk kapsamında mümkün olup olmadığına dair kesin bir cevap vermek yerine, siber egemenliğin uluslararası güç mücadelelerinde nasıl bir rol oynayabileceğine ve siber güvenlik politikalarını nasıl şekillendirebileceğine odaklanılmaktadır. Bu bağlamda çalışmanın metodolojisi, siber güvenliğe kısa bir girişin ardından siber uzay hâkimiyetinin mümkün olup olmadığı araştırma sorusunun ve siber egemenlik kavramının analizinden oluşmaktadır. Teorik çerçeve kapsamında ilgili kavramlara ilişkin literatür taraması yapılmış, Çin'in siber güvenlik politikaları ve siber egemenlik yaklaşımı vaka çalışması olarak analiz edilmiştir. Çalışma boyunca ele alınan belge, kaynak ve veriler, Çin'in siber egemenlik anlayışını ve bu anlayışın uluslararası platformlarda nasıl şekillendiğini göstermektedir. Çin, siber egemenliği uluslararası sistemde küresel bir güç olmanın anahtarları olarak görüyorsa, siber güvenliğin yanı sıra asker, siyasi, ekonomik faktörler dâhil olmak üzere tüm faktörleri entegre etmelidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Siber Uzay, Siber Güvenlik, Siber Egemenlik, Siber Uzay Hâkimiyet Teorisi, Çin Siber Egemenliği

Introduction

Recently, geopolitical theories have concentrated on possibly including cyberspace as a fifth security domain in addition to land, air, sea, and space. The rise of cyberspace as a force field with penetrating qualities poses practical challenges for the discipline of International Relations.¹ The need to develop cybersecurity technologies becomes more prominent as new information threats emerge. Developing cybersecurity technologies that can resist cyber-attacks is vital, especially at the national level.² In this respect, cybersecurity enables the emergence of technological innovations and initiatives crucial for state security, such as information and patent generation.³

Cyberspace is a complex and dynamic field that has increasingly gained importance. Via the development of information and communication technologies, this field has become a fundamental element in inter-state relations and international security. Shaping relations between states in the context of cyberspace brings concepts such as cybersecurity, cyber warfare, cyber-attack, and cyber sovereignty into discussion. Because all cyber-related issues have risen to a level that might bring states into conflict, the use of cyberspace by states and other actors for aggressive purposes escalates conflicts and destabilizes societies. This situation threatens international peace and security. The catastrophic scenarios such as “digital Pearl Harbors” have not yet materialized; however, the uncontrolled spread of many attacks across the globe demonstrates the potential destructive threat and systemic risks of conflicts in cyberspace.⁴ This situation makes cybersecurity a new security parameter. The concept of sovereignty in cyberspace stands out as a central issue for the management and control of this field. Nonetheless, the rapid expansion and complexity of this digital environment pose new problems and challenges in international relations, with the states unable to reach a consensus regarding cyberspace sovereignty and dominance.

In international relations, the power struggle is also impacted by developing technologies and spills over to cyberspace in its changing and renewed form. The 21st century's main agenda, the global power struggle between the United States (US) and China, continues in cyberspace. There is a consensus that the US and China are competing to turn the global cyber order in their favor.⁵ In addition to owning critical components of cyber resources such as infrastructures, networks, and servers, the US has positioned itself as the leading cyber power shaping the multi-stakeholders in the Internet governance regime.⁶ Issues of sovereignty and security in cyberspace divide the world into two poles, just like the ideological struggle in the 20th century. On the one hand, there are liberal ideas defending the principle of freedom in cyberspace; on the other hand, there are views defending the

1 Breno Pauli Medeiros and Luiz Rogério Franco Goldoni, “The Fundamental Conceptual Trinity of Cyberspace”, *Contexto Internacional*, 42:1, 2020, p. 45.

2 Yuliia Kyrdoda, Giacomo Marzi et.al., “Cybersecurity Technology: An Analysis of the Topic from 2011 to 2021”, Daim, Tuğrul U. Daim & Marina Dabić (eds.), *Cybersecurity, Applied Innovation and Technology Management*, Springer, Cham, 2023, p. 36.

3 Mürsel Doğrul, Haydar Yalçın and Tugrul U. Daim, “Cybersecurity Technology: A Landscape Analysis”, Tuğrul U. Daim & Marina Dabić (eds.), *Cybersecurity, Applied Innovation and Technology Management*, Springer, Cham, 2023.

4 Frédéric Douzet and Aude Gery, “Cyberspace is Used, First and Foremost, to Wage Wars: Proliferation, Security and Stability in Cyberspace”, *Journal of Cyber Policy*, 6:1, 2021, p. 97.

5 Chien-Huei Wu, “Sovereignty Fever: The Territorial Turn of Global Cyber Order”, *Zeitschrift Für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht Und Völkerrecht/Zeitschrift Für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht Und Völkerrecht*, 81:3, 2021, p. 654.

6 John Kerry, Secretary of State, “An Open and Secure Internet: We Must Have Both”, VOAnews, 2015, <https://www.voanews.com/a/text-of-john-kerrys-remarks-in-seoul-on-open-and-secure-internet/2776139.html>, accessed 13.07.2024.

sovereignty of states in cyberspace. In this context, China's proposed concept of Internet sovereignty is of interest not only to authoritarian regimes but also to liberal democracies.⁷ This makes Internet sovereignty worthy of discussion.

China has strengthened its presence in cyberspace via various documents and actions as a rising power. It has recently gained power in cyberspace and become a crucial international player. Hence, China's cybersecurity policies and claims of dominance in cyberspace are of great importance in terms of international relations and the development of global cybersecurity. In 2010, when China published its first White Paper on the Internet, it characterized the topics of usage, management, and construction of the Internet as an issue that concerns national economic prosperity and development, state security and social harmony, state sovereignty and dignity, and the basic interests of the people.⁸ While China defends the idea that the Internet is within the jurisdiction of the Chinese government, these ideas of China are in sharp contrast with the paradigm of the international cyber order. In this context, this study intends to investigate China's cybersecurity policies and the idea of cyber sovereignty to question if it is possible to construct a theory of cyberspace sovereignty and its potential global implications. The problem of the study is to comprehend the applicability of the concept of sovereignty in cyberspace and its role in the international system. In this context, it is imperative to reveal how traditional understandings of sovereignty have changed in cyberspace and how China has adopted this new understanding of sovereignty.

1. Theoretical Framework

1.1. The Concept of Cybersecurity

The word "cyber" was first referred to in 1982 in the science fiction novel "Neuromancer" by William Gibson.⁹ The author narrates the story of a hacker infiltrating a computer system called the Matrix.¹⁰ By fictionalizing the digital age very early, the author has helped to shape cyberspace in the minds. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) defines the word cyber as "*the complex environment resulting from the interaction of people, software, and services on the Internet by means of technology devices and networks connected to it, which does not exist in any physical form*".¹¹ Cyber, a concept related to computers and computer networks, constitutes cyberspace, which has come into existence as the "fifth area of struggle" in International Relations literature. Singer and Friedman describe cyberspace as "*the realm of computer networks (and the users behind them) in which information is stored, shared, and transmitted online*".¹² It is necessary to pay special attention to the expression "the realm of users" in this definition. Apart from all kinds of virtual and physical elements (code, programs, fiber optic cables, hardware, etc.) making up the content of cyberspace, the most crucial factor that creates cyberspace is the human being. Technological opportunities developing with human intelligence cannot be thought of independently of humans. For this reason, a complex and multi-dimensional system dominates the background of cyberspace.

Cyberspace has become a battlefield where all kinds of conflicts might occur, and cyber-crimes are committed. The control of information and telecommunications infrastructure, and the ability to respond to cyber-attacks and ensure cybersecurity have

7 Chien-Huei Wu, "Sovereignty Fever: The Territorial Turn of Global Cyber Order", p. 657.

8 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, "The Internet in China", June 8, 2010, Beijing, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7093508.htm, accessed 20.01.2024.

9 Etymonline, "Cyber-", <https://www.etymonline.com/word/cyber->, accessed 25.01.2024.

10 P. W. Singer and Allan Friedman, *Siber Güvenlik ve Siber Savaş*, Buzdağı Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2018.

11 Alexander Klimburg, *National Cyber Security Framework Manual*, NATO CCD COE Publication, Tallinn, 2012, p. 8.

12 Singer and Friedman, *Cyber Security and Cyber Warfare*, p. 29.

become important elements of power among actors. In this framework, the importance of the concept of cybersecurity has increased continuously. Cybersecurity revolves around technical or social fields and problems such as computer science, economics, engineering, information systems, criminology, management, psychology, sociology, and international relations, and, thus, it needs to be interpreted via various disciplines.¹³ Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines cybersecurity as “*measures taken to protect a computer or computer system (as on the Internet) against unauthorized access or attack*”.¹⁴ The definition of cybersecurity by the International Telecommunication Union (2008) is as follows:

*“Cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance, and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user’s assets. Organization and user’s assets include connected computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunications systems, and the totality of transmitted and/or stored information in the cyber environment. Cybersecurity strives to ensure the attention and maintenance of the security properties of the organization and user’s assets against relevant security risks in the cyber environment.”*¹⁵

Thus, there is no agreed definition of cybersecurity. Nevertheless, there are some perspectives in the literature that are defined by the dominant powers of cyberspace. For instance, the US government report titled “2024 Report on The Cybersecurity Posture of The United States”, has brought the term “cybersecurity posture” into the agenda. This concept means “*the ability to identify, protect against, detect, respond to, and recover from an intrusion in an information system, the compromise of which could constitute a cyber-attack or a cyber campaign of significant consequence*”.¹⁶ According to the United Nations (UN), cybersecurity means; “*the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance, and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user’s assets*”.¹⁷ Even though there are different interpretations, the goals of cybersecurity are certain. The three objectives defined as “CIA Triad” are confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Confidentiality refers to the storage of data. It includes the protection of secrets and personal data, as well as technical tools such as encryption and access control. Integrity implies that the system and the data within it cannot be changed unless there is authorization. Availability is the ability to use the system as expected.¹⁸ Measures to improve the confidentiality or integrity of information might sometimes negatively influence accessibility. When accessibility is improved, confidentiality and integrity might be compromised.¹⁹

13 V. Kavitha and S. Pretha, “Cyber Security Issues and Challenges—A Review”, *IJCSMC*, 8:11, 2019, p. 1.

14 Merriam-Webster, “Cybersecurity,” n.d., <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cybersecurity>, accessed 21.05.2024.

15 International Telecommunications Union (2008), “ITU-T X.1205: series X: Data Networks, Open System Communications and Security: Telecommunications Security: Overview of Cybersecurity”, <https://www.itu.int/rec/t-rec-x.1205-200804-i>, accessed 20.05.2024.

16 The White House, 2024 Report on The Cybersecurity Posture of The United States, 20, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2024-Report-on-the-Cybersecurity-Posture-of-the-United-States.pdf>, accessed 14.07.2024.

17 United Nations, *Cybersecurity in the United Nations System Organizations Report of the Joint Inspection Unit*, JIU/REP/2021/3, 2021, p. 7.

18 Singer and Friedman, *Cyber Security and Cyber Warfare*, p. 57.

19 Hakan Hekim and Oğuzhan Başbüyük, “Siber Suçlar ve Türkiye’nin Siber Güvenlik Politikaları”, *Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Terörizm Dergisi*, 4:2, 2013, p. 137.

Like the actors of international relations, cyberspace actors are composed of states and non-state actors. Nonetheless, actors' motivations in cyberspace may differ, and many actors remain undetected because of their ability to remain anonymous and conceal their identities.²⁰ This issue makes it challenging to ensure cybersecurity. According to realists, states are the primary actors in international relations, but in cyberspace, the phenomenon of "state sovereignty" is impossible. Instead, non-traditional actors such as multi-national corporations, hackers, or intergovernmental organizations play a crucial role in cybersecurity problems. Thus, the environment dominating cyberspace is complex and uncertain.

Cybersecurity, defined as "*the security of the environment formed by physical and non-physical components and characterized by the use of computers and other networked devices*", ensures security in a certain capacity.²¹ This is because the widespread increase in communication technologies has brought the production of digital data, and the security of data not only of companies, institutions, or political structures but also of individuals has gained importance. Furthermore, the most fundamental element that makes cybersecurity a conceptual approach is the possibility that attacks or moves in the cyber domain can also impact the physical domain. Therefore, cybersecurity terminology also encompasses national security concepts.²²

Today, as technology improves, there is an increase in the types of cyber threats encountered, although a decrease is expected. The definition and content of cyber-attack types (such as malware, spyware, viruses, worms, phishing attacks, DDoS and APT attacks, botnets, and artificial intelligence attacks) are beyond the scope of the study.²³ Nevertheless, cyber-attacks, which might disrupt and impact computer systems, networks, and all hardware, have become an asymmetric element in the inter-state struggle, especially in cyberspace. After all, cyber-attacks cost little and are relatively easy to carry out. However, it is necessary to distinguish cyber-attacks from traditional attacks. Instead of using kinetic power (bomb, fist, etc.), digital tools are implemented. The attack is targeted at information, not directly causing physical damage to its target.²⁴ The shift of power away from the sphere of influence of governments is one of the significant power shifts of the 21st century.²⁵ Great powers are unlikely to dominate cyberspace like they have dominated other areas of struggle (land, air, sea, and space). States with more significant resources also have more cyber vulnerabilities.²⁶ Hence, the power difference between states that have a great power status in the international system and states that are developing or underdeveloped might show the opposite direction in cyberspace.

1.2. Theorizing Experiment on Cyberspace Sovereignty

Chinese President Xi Jinping's use of the phrase "respect for cyber sovereignty"²⁷ at the World Internet Conference in 2014 coincides with a similar period in which the principle of

20 Edwin Grohe, "The Cyber Dimensions of the Syrian Civil War: Implications for Future Conflict", *The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory*, 14:7, 2015, p. 15.

21 Jamie Collier, "Cyber Security Assemblies: A Framework for Understanding the Dynamic and Contested Nature of Security Provision", *Politics and Governance*, 6:2, 2018, p. 14.

22 Salih Bıçakçı, "Siber Güvenlik ve Savunma", *Güvenlik Yazıları Serisi*, 42, 2019, p. 1.

23 For access to detailed and technical information about the types of cyber-attacks; Şeref Sağıroğlu and Mustafa Alkan, *Siber Güvenlik ve Savunma*, Grafiker Yayınları, Ankara, 2018.

24 Singer and Friedman, *Cyber Security and Cyber Warfare*, p. 101.

25 Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power*, Public Affairs Press, New York, 2010.

26 Joseph S. Nye, "Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security?", *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 5:4, 2011, p. 20.

27 Binxing Fang, *Cyberspace Sovereignty Reflections on Building a Community of Common Future in Cyberspace*, Science Press & Springer, Singapore, 2018, p. v.

“cyber sovereignty” gained importance in global governance. Though the concept of cyber sovereignty may seem vague as a concept expressing the power and independence of states in cyberspace, the fact that the concept of sovereignty is clearly defined makes it possible for the concept of cyber sovereignty to gain meaning.²⁸ The understanding that states have sovereignty over their own territory and internal affairs has brought the principle of equality to the forefront and raised the issue of “sovereign equality of states”. On the one hand, cyber sovereignty,²⁹ as a concept regarding the determination of ownership of rights over networks and space in which networks are involved, is independent of a territory. Thus, while the transboundary nature of cyberspace challenges the concept of sovereignty, the question of how sovereignty is possible in cyberspace remains uncertain. Researchers who claim that cyberspace is a field that is not subject to sovereignty highlight that cyberspace should have its own legal regulations instead of sovereignty. The absence of borders in cyberspace deprives the sovereign state of the ability to exercise power over a defined population and territory. Accordingly, cyberspace needs to develop its own regulatory system.³⁰ The affirmation by the UN General Assembly in 2015 that states must respect international law and the principles of sovereignty in the use of information and communication technologies, including cyberspace,³¹ has made cyberspace visible as a new type and sphere of sovereignty.

Xinhuanet interprets cyber sovereignty as follows: “*internally, cyber sovereignty refers to independent development, supervision, and management of a state's own Internet affairs; and externally, cyber sovereignty refers to preventing a state's Internet from external invasion and attack.*”³² Fang, on the other hand, defines sovereignty in cyberspace as follows:

*“Cyberspace sovereignty is a natural extension of state sovereignty in the cyberspace hosted by the ICT infrastructure located in the territory of a state; Thus, a state has jurisdiction (right to interface in data operation) over ICT activities (in respect of cyber roles and operations) present in cyberspace, ICT systems per se (in respect of facilities), and data carried by the ICT systems (virtual assets).”*³³

Franzese suggests that state sovereignty might be possible in cyberspace owing to the physical infrastructures necessary for cyberspace and that this sovereignty should be considered an extension of the principle of territorial sovereignty.³⁴ Jensen also argues that cyberspace sovereignty is achievable when nations acknowledge each other's sovereignty and the right to advance their cyber capabilities independently.³⁵ On the one hand, the contradiction between the concept of cyber sovereignty and the spirit of the Internet stems from the fact that the Internet comprises unlimited interactions and connections.³⁶ Thus, it is difficult for countries to establish their own cyberspace. Winston Churchill's remark on the

28 Marie and Patrice Robin, “Cyber Sovereignty”, ETH Zürich, 2018, <https://www.researchcollection.ethz.ch/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/314398/Cyber-Reports-2018-01.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, accessed 17.05.2024.

29 Fang, *Cyberspace Sovereignty Reflections on Building a Community of Common Future in Cyberspace*, p. 77.

30 John P. Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace”, Davos, 1996, <https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence>, 16.05.2024; Lawrence Lessig, *Code: Version 2.0*, Basic Books, New York, 2006.

31 United Nations General Assembly, *Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security*, No. 15-12404, United Nations, July 2015.

32 Xinhuanet, “What Is ‘Cyber Sovereignty’?”, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-07/10/c_126736910.htm, accessed 23.02.2024.

33 Fang, *Cyberspace Reflections on Building a Community of Common Future in Cyberspace*, p. 83.

34 Patrick W. Franzese, “Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Can it Exist?”, *Air Force Law Review*, 64, pp. 1-42.

35 Eric Talbot Jensen, “Cyber Sovereignty: The Way Ahead”, *Tex. Int. Law J.*, 50, 2015.

36 Hao Yeli, “A Three-Perspective Theory of Cyber Sovereignty”, *PRISM*, 7:2, 2017, p. 109.

Iron Curtain may come to mind if an analogy explains this situation. The term “iron curtain” refers to the non-physical borders that divided Europe at the end of World War II, and it has evolved into a process in which some countries want to create digital iron curtains to protect their sovereignty and control public opinion.³⁷

Considering the connotations of the concept of sovereignty, the fact that the Internet occupies a vast global area makes it difficult to apply the concept to cyberspace because it is an area that no one owns or controls. This issue is guided by thoughts about where the space dominated by states in cyberspace begins and ends. Heinegg claims that “*the integration of physical components of cyber infrastructure located on a state’s territory into the global domain of cyberspace is not a waiver of territorial sovereignty*”.³⁸ With such an approach, states have all kinds of rights over the cyber infrastructure in their areas of sovereignty. On the other hand, how actors define cyberspace boundaries is also linked to the type of cyber threats directed against the relevant country.

Another problem lies in the contradiction between the concept of cyber sovereignty and human rights. The notion of the Internet facilitating freedom of expression and the possibility of cyber sovereignty restricting the free flow of information does not match.³⁹ State sovereignty in cyberspace, which is envisioned as a space of freedom, has been brought to the forefront by cyber-attacks that are thought/alleged to be state-sponsored. The 2007 Estonia cyber-attack, the 2008 Georgia cyber-attack, and the 2010 Stuxnet attack on Iran paved the way for the emergence of cybersecurity as an essential security issue.⁴⁰ It is evident that this situation leads states to establish sovereignty and dominance in cyberspace.

Even though there is no comprehensive and binding legal text containing cyberspace, efforts in this direction might shed light on the issue. The Tallinn Manual is one of the documents including an assessment of cyber-attacks under the principle of non-use of force. The sentence “*a State must not conduct cyber operations that violate the sovereignty of another State*”⁴¹ in Rule 4 of the said document assesses cyber operations in the context of sovereignty. The interpretation of this rule revolves around two bases when assessing the compatibility of cyber actions with international law: The extent to which the territorial integrity of the target state has been violated and whether this violation inherently involves interference or usurpation of governmental functions. Rule 4, which also expresses that states have internal and external sovereignty, legitimizes sovereignty in cyberspace by considering cyber operations preventing/ignoring another state from exercising its sovereign rights as a violation of such sovereignty.⁴² Still, this rule does not disclose which cyber operations make the violation of sovereignty possible.

Moreover, the provisions of the Tallinn Manual on the relationship between cyber operations and sovereignty are in line with the 1970 “Declaration on Principles of International Law Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States” and the 1975 “Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act” in terms of sovereignty principles. Nonetheless, the

37 Eldar Haber and Lev Topor, “Sovereignty, Cyberspace, and the Emergence of Internet Bubbles”, *Journal of Advanced Military Studies*, 14:1, 2023, pp. 144-145.

38 Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, “Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace”, *International Law Studies*, 89:123, 2013, p. 126.

39 Hao, *Ibid*, p.110.

40 Tuba Eldem, “Uluslararası Siber Güvenlik Normları ve Sorumlu Siber Egemenlik”, *Istanbul Hukuk Mecmuası*, 79:1, 2021, p. 350.

41 Michael N. Schmitt, *Tallinn Manual 2.0 On the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2017, p. 17.

42 *Ibid*, p. 17.

said document does not outline a clear framework for applying sovereignty principles in the cyber context.⁴³ The document also focuses on *jus ad bellum* principles and requires a more comprehensive view of cyber sovereignty.

According to a 2011 document published by the US government titled “International Strategy For Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World”, the following activities violate territorial sovereignty: “exploitation of networks, attacks on networks, and other hostile acts in cyberspace that threaten peace and stability, civil liberties, and privacy”.⁴⁴ In this context, it is evident that the US has developed a governmental perspective preferring to use force against cyber actions, if necessary, and now considers cyberspace within the scope of the principle of sovereignty. The Chinese government also emphasizes that no violation of sovereignty in cyberspace will be tolerated. According to China, states should exercise jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure, resources, and data in their territory and have the right to protect themselves against attacks. Stating that the use of technology is possible, especially in the context of “interference in internal affairs”, China has repeatedly underlined that states should participate in Internet governance equally.⁴⁵

Following all these discussions, the perspective of this study will be to seek an answer to the question: “Is a theory of cyberspace dominance possible?”. The insufficiency of international law in explaining cyberspace and cyber action fields and its inability to produce binding texts suggests whether discussing sovereignty in cyberspace from the perspective of geopolitical theories is possible. Though the concept of geopolitics refers to the visible and known areas such as land, sea, air, and space, it is possible that cyberspace-related approaches may emerge as a fifth area of dominance within the context of their potential to affect the tangible space. As a field outside geopolitics but with the potential to have geopolitical effects, cyberspace exists as a field where sovereignty and dominance are suggested. In an era in which scientific and technological developments have been shaping International Relations and all other disciplines, it may be necessary to open the phrase “whoever dominates cyberspace dominates the world” for discussion. However, the relationship of cyberspace, which is a virtual space, with global domination is a complex and multi-dimensional one. The dependence of technologies worldwide on digital infrastructures seems to disclose the superiority of those who rule cyberspace. States seeking to counter this phenomenon have been developing approaches that consider cyberspace dominance in terms of global dominance. Nonetheless, the understanding of power in cyberspace is distinct from the classical understanding of power, and countries with asymmetric power also stand out. In this context, a perspective on the control and dominance of cyberspace is planned, with the example of China in the conclusion section of the study.

43 Dmitry V. Krasikov and Nadezhda N. Lipkina, “Sovereignty in Cyberspace: A Scholarly and Practical Discussion”, *Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research*, 498, 2020, pp. 157-158.

44 The White House, *International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World*, Washington, 2011.

45 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, “China's Positions on International Rules-making in Cyberspace”, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjw_663304/zzjg_663340/jks_665232/kjlc_665236/qtw_665250/202110/t20211020_9594981.html, accessed 01.10.2024.

2. China's Cybersecurity Policies

About one-fifth of the 5.4 billion Internet users worldwide live in China. China's Internet users increased by 24.8 million⁴⁶ and reached 1.05 billion in December 2023.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, an evaluation of the period from the country's foundation in 1949 to its period of reform and opening to the outside world points out that the only goal was to maintain sovereignty and preserve the regime. At this point, it is observed that China has achieved a significant position in information technologies.

From the early stages of China's digitalization, the government has taken on a regulatory role for online platforms. As early as 1994, before China was fully connected to the Internet, the State Council issued regulations on information system security, designating the Ministry of Post and Communications (MPS) to handle the matter. MPS published special regulations on Internet security in 1997, banning hacking, data corruption, and spread of malware.⁴⁸ The Chinese government recognizes the opportunities for economic growth, prosperity, and investment that the Internet brings but controls it in anticipation of political crises. Therefore, the content of all information sources is highly censored by the Government.⁴⁹

As of the late 1990s, China has pursued a policy of "informatization" [*xinxihua* 信息化], which covers using digital technology in all major areas of economic and social life and government operations.⁵⁰ Until 2014, China's main body responsible for cybersecurity policy was the CCP State Informatization Leading Group (SILG), established in 2001 to guide national information technology development.⁵¹ Thus, by moving digital policy to the highest priority level, the "cyber power strategy" (*wangluo qiang- guo zhanlue* 网络强国战略) has been encouraged to be created.⁵² In 2003, China published a national strategy document on cybersecurity called Document 27. Initially classified, Document 27 envisaged an active defense, addressing issues such as protecting critical infrastructures, strong encryption, better coordination, and financing.⁵³

China's White Paper titled "Jointly Build a Community with a Shared Future in Cyberspace" sets out the country's vision for global Internet development and management. The document underlines that the Internet has transformed the world into an interconnected structure and states that China supports a people-oriented approach and inclusive global governance. The White Paper also mentions China's efforts for international cooperation to enhance Internet access for developing countries and fight against poverty, as well as international cooperation to create a safer cyberspace. The document calls for joint efforts to build a just and stable digital world.⁵⁴

46 Lai Lin Thomala, "Number of Internet users in China 2013-2023", 2024, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/265140/number-of-internet-users-in-china/>, accessed 15.09.2024.

47 Simon Kemp, "Digital 2023: China", 2023, <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2023-china>, accessed 20.09.2024.

48 State Council, "Provisional Management Regulations for the International Connection of Computer Information Networks of the People's Republic of China", Feb 1, 1996, <https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/1996/02/01/provisional-management-regulations-for-the-international-connection-of-computer-information-networks-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/>, accessed 12.10.2024.

49 Anne S. Y. Cheung, "The Business of Governance: China's Legislation on Content Regulation in Cyberspace", *International Law and Politics*, 38:1, 2006, p. 2-3.

50 Weizhi Qu, *China's Path to Information*, Cengage Learning Asia, Singapore, 2010.

51 Jon R. Lindsay, "The Impact of China on Cybersecurity", *International Security*, 39:3, 2014/15, p. 17.

52 Rogier Creemers, "Cybersecurity Law and Regulation in China: Securing the Smart State", *China Law and Society Review*, 6, 2021, p. 112.

53 Mikk Raud, "China and Cyber: Attitudes, Strategies, Organizations", NATO CCD COE, Tallinn, 2016, p. 11.

54 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, June 8, 2010.

As of 2011, online security concerns have become more urgent, primarily through the proliferation of mobile devices and the emergence of the online platform and social media industry.⁵⁵ In 2014, in a tense environment created by the Edward Snowden incident, the Cybersecurity and Informatization Leading Group (CILG) was established, chaired by Xi Jinping. CILG contributes to Xi's effort to contain the Party discipline and respond to foreign cyber threats.⁵⁶ In the 2016 Outline of National Information Development Strategy, the Chinese authorities emphasized the importance of establishing a powerful cyber-nation, stating that there is a pressing need for it and that there should be no delay in addressing it.⁵⁷ In the same year, Xi Jinping made a speech at the "National Work Conference on Cybersecurity and Informatization" and defined cybersecurity as a "holistic" concept organically integrated into broader national security concerns, as "dynamic" requiring flexibility in management, as "open" emphasizing the need for foreign interaction and exchange, as "relative" indicating the need for priority setting rather than comprehensive perfection, and as "shared" requiring cooperation with non-state actors.⁵⁸ President Xi Jinping also emphasized the critical and immediate need for Internet security and informatization, equating these dual objectives to the essential elements of a bird's wings or an engine's wheels. The Chinese president also stated that there is no national security without Internet safety and that there can be no modernization without information.⁵⁹

Stating that cybersecurity is inseparable from national security,⁶⁰ Beijing continues to develop national/international cybersecurity strategies and cooperation. Nonetheless, the government's lack of transparency hinders the coordination of cyber policies. Drafted in 2015 and published in 2016, the "Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China" is a binding text on cybersecurity policies. The holistic approach that Xi talks about is clearly seen in this document.

*"Cyberspace security (hereafter named cybersecurity) concerns the common interest of humankind, concerns global peace and development, and concerns the national security of all countries. Safeguarding our country's cybersecurity is an important measure to move forward the strategic arrangement of comprehensively constructing a moderately prosperous society, comprehensively deepening reform, comprehensively governing the country according to the law, and comprehensively and strictly governing the Party in a coordinated manner and is an important guarantee to realize the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation."*⁶¹

Article I of this law mentions objectives such as ensuring cybersecurity, protecting cyberspace sovereignty, public interest, and national security, and protecting the legal rights and interests of citizens, legal entities, and other organizations.⁶² Adopting the principle

55 Creemers, "Cybersecurity Law and Regulation in China: Securing the Smart State", p. 116.

56 Lindsay, "The Impact of China on Cybersecurity", p. 17.

57 The Central Committee of the Communist Party, "The 13th Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China (2016-2020)", 2016.

58 Xi Jinping, "Speech at the Work Conference for Cybersecurity and Informatization", April 19, 2016, <https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2016/04/19/speech-at-the-work-conference-for-cybersecurity-and-informatization/>, accessed 04.10.2024.

59 Xinhua, "Xi Jinping Leads Internet Security Group," February 27, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-02/27/c_133148273.htm, accessed 04.10.2024.

60 Creemers, "Cybersecurity Law and Regulation in China: Securing the Smart State", p. 112.


61 Cyberspace Administration of China, "《国家网络空间安全战略》全文", 27 Dec 2016, http://www.cac.gov.cn/2016-12/27/c_1120195926.htm, accessed 02.05.2024.

62 The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, "Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China", July 11, 2016, <http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?LookType=3&Lib=law&Id=22826&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=&paycode=>, accessed 10.09.2024.

of national security of China’s National Security Law, the Cybersecurity Law recognizes cyberspace sovereignty as the highest priority. Regulations achieve this goal by protecting the security of critical information infrastructure, network operations, and online information. In addition, the Chinese government cooperates with international efforts to aid the development of the Internet economy while safeguarding national cyberspace sovereignty. These legal objectives reflect a multi-dimensional cybersecurity perspective covering security and development interests.⁶³

Though China has a centralized one-party government, in practice, it has a regionally and functionally fragmented structure. The Politburo, the highest-ranking organ of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is mainly headed by members of the Standing Committee and supported by “Small Groups of Pioneers” who work on an issue-by-issue basis to determine essential policies. The State Council manages the country’s vast bureaucracy, implements policies, and regulates state-owned enterprises. On the one hand, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) depends on the party rather than the state and is a powerful political force in its own right. China’s provincial governments enjoy considerable autonomy while competing with each other to win support and patronage from the CCP’s top leaders. China’s cybersecurity policy is shaped within this complex and non-transparent structure, and rapid technological developments in cyberspace progress much faster than policy coordination.⁶⁴ The following table shows China’s national cybersecurity structure.

Table 1. China’s National Cybersecurity System⁶⁵



Many other State Council entities have minor roles

63 Aimin Qi, Guosong Shao et al., “Assessing China’s Cybersecurity Law”, *Computer Law & Security Review*, 34, 2018, p. 1344.

64 Jon R. Lindsay, “Introduction: China and Cybersecurity: Controversy and Context”, Jon R. Lindsay, Tai Ming Cheung & Derek S. Reveron (eds.), *China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy and Politics in The Digital Domain*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, p. 7.

65 *Ibid.*, p. 9.

Many institutions affiliated with the State Council in China are responsible for implementing policies and regulating information technologies. The PLA possesses significant military and intelligence cyber capabilities, depends on the CCP, not the state, and has civilian regulatory responsibilities. Expenditures in China's information security industry have increased from \$527 million in 2003 to \$2.8 billion in 2011.⁶⁶ As of 2024, China, recently making science and technology a budget priority, aims to spend \$51.5 billion in this field.⁶⁷ That is to say, information operations are one of the elements that the PLA considers vital for high-tech wars. In this context, the general strategic principle has been defined as "active defense".⁶⁸

Protecting the Internet from harmful activities directed against national security or individual, social, or commercial interests is the primary goal for China. The privacy and security of citizens, the ability to compete fairly and efficiently in the economic order, and the preservation of social norms are essential goals of Chinese cybersecurity.⁶⁹ Actions designed to disrupt cyber-based infrastructure, disseminate information or images potentially damaging to society, governance, or the economy (such as pornography or misinformation), espionage, theft of private commercial data, as well as undermine the state's capacity to defend itself have led China to characterize cybersecurity as a national/international issue.⁷⁰ Accordingly, China continues to develop its own information technology (IT) industry and tries to remain isolated from international information technologies. China, maintaining a dominant position in the IT sector via its large state-owned enterprises, has been trying to protect the local market from external influences while developing its own standards in the field of software and hardware. For this reason, China's *sine qua non* of cybersecurity is to build an independent information technology.⁷¹ On the one hand, the concept of information security in China attaches importance to Internet content beyond its technical security. However, the Western understanding of cybersecurity focuses more on technical threats. Because information security is a part of social stability in the country, China encourages efforts to strengthen censorship and surveillance infrastructure. Instead of defending against economic cybercrime and technical abuse by foreign intelligence services, China tends to mount a more consistent defense against perceived threats such as "terrorism, separatism, and extremism".⁷²

3. China's Approach to Cyber Sovereignty and its International Implications

While China has an understanding of cyber sovereignty, which was initially developed by Western actors, it has continued tailoring it to its views on sovereignty and rejected US hegemony in the international system and other discourses on the global international environment. Therefore, China's understanding of cyber sovereignty is hybrid. Although the

66 Lindsay, *The Impact of China on Cybersecurity*, p. 18.

67 Dannie Peng, "China Makes Science and Tech a Budget Priority with 10% Jump in Spending During Two Sessions", March 6, 2024, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3254290/china-makes-science-and-tech-budget-priority-10-jump-spending>, accessed 03.08.2024.

68 Lindsay, "The Impact of China on Cybersecurity", p. 31.

69 Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Views on Cybersecurity in Foreign Relations", *China Leadership Monitor*, 42, 2013, p. 3.

70 Zhong Sheng, "填补网络空间 '规则空白'", *People's Daily*, July 12, 2013, <http://www.people.com.cn/24hour/n/2013/0709/c25408-22123842.html>, accessed 09.10.2024.

71 Hauke Johannes Gierow, "Cyber Security in China: Internet Security, Protectionism and Competitiveness: New Challenges to Western Businesses", *China Monitor*, 22, 2015.

72 Lindsay, "Introduction: China and Cybersecurity: Controversy and Context", p. 11.

previous understanding influences the country, China has been shaped in accordance with its own internal discourses.⁷³

Cyber sovereignty was included in a high-profile document for the first time in the 2010 White Paper, which is a summary of China's attitude towards the Internet.⁷⁴ Within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and together with Russia, China has promoted reforms for Internet governance. In these reforms, the regulatory principle of "Internet sovereignty" is agreed on issues such as avoiding any unwanted interference in the information space of any state and regulating the Internet via an international forum such as the UN International Telecommunication Union. China and Russia proposed these two issues to the UN in September 2011 under the title of the "International Code of Conduct for Information Security".⁷⁵ This document is the first comprehensive and systematic proposal in this field and offers recommendations for creating international cyberspace rules.⁷⁶ The principles set out in this document are as follows: the non-use of information and communication technologies to apply hostile activities or acts of aggression and to threaten international peace and security, the affirmation by all States of their right and responsibility to defend their information spaces and network structures, critical information and network infrastructures against threats, disturbances, attacks, and sabotage under relevant laws and regulations, the establishment of multilateral, transparent, and democratic international governance of the Internet, the principle of respect for the rights and freedoms in the information and networking sphere to the extent that they comply with relevant national laws and regulations, the assistance to developing countries to improve their information and networking technologies, cooperating to combat network crime.⁷⁷

At the Budapest Conference on Cyber Issues held in 2012, China suggested five principles to enhance international cooperation in cyberspace, reflecting "The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence". The first of these, sovereignty, has been defined as the right of each state to "*formulate its policies and laws in light of its history, traditions, culture, language, and customs*".⁷⁸ These principles show China's clear stance on global Internet governance. That is, sovereign nations should contribute equally to Internet governance by adhering to the principle of respect for the cyber sovereignty of other nations, the principle of cyber sovereign equality, the principle of non-interference in cyberspace, and the principle that all nations benefit each other in cyberspace.⁷⁹ Xi Jinping argues that this norm is derived from the sovereign equality principle covered in the UN Charter. Moreover, he defines the norm as not establishing hegemony but as providing non-interference and respect for each country's cyberspace management model and Internet policies.⁸⁰ All these discourses are related to the Chinese political discourses of the period, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese Dream, and the Community of Common Destiny.

73 Aleš Karmazin, "China's Promotion of Cyber Sovereignty Beyond the West", Šárka Kolmašová & Ricardo Reboredo (eds.), *Norm Diffusion Beyond the West Agents and Sources of Leverage*, Springer, Switzerland, 2023, pp. 61-62.

74 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, June 8, 2010.

75 Lindsay, "The Impact of China on Cybersecurity", p. 38.

76 People.cn, "填补网络空间"规则空白", July 9, 2013, <http://www.people.com.cn/24hour/n/2013/0709/c25408-22123842.html>, accessed 03.09.2024.

77 Fang, *Sovereignty Reflections on Building a Community of Common Future in Cyberspace*, p. 187.

78 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement at Budapest Conference on Cyber Issues", October 4, 2012, <http://www.chinesemission-vienna.at/eng/zgbd/t977627.htm>, accessed 10.08.2024.

79 Fang, *Cyberspace Sovereignty Reflections on Building a Community of Common Future in Cyberspace*, p. v.

80 Xi Jinping, "在第二届世界互联网大会开幕式上的讲话", February 7, 2016, <https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2015/12/16/speech-at-the-2nd-world-internet-conference-opening-ceremony/>, accessed 14.10.2024.

“The principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations is one of the basic norms in contemporary international relations. It covers all aspects of state-to-state relations, including cyberspace. We should respect the right of individual countries to independently choose their own path of cyber development, model of cyber regulation, and Internet public policies and participate in international cyberspace governance on an equal footing. No country should pursue cyber hegemony, interfere in other countries’ internal affairs, or engage in, connect, or support cyber activities that undermine other countries’ national security.”⁸¹

In the above excerpt, which is a section from Xi Jinping’s speech at the Second World Internet Conference in 2015, emphasis is put on the principle of sovereign equality, especially as a concept originating from the Westphalian system. Most importantly, this emphasis is made with an understanding that includes cyberspace, reminding the principles of peaceful coexistence with the term “cyber hegemony”. Accordingly, applying the principle of cyber sovereignty to cyberspace shows that each country has the right to independently determine its own cyber development and regulation.

Lindsay claims that China’s concept of cyber sovereignty has two main principles: First, it is to prevent the entry of unwanted influences into a country’s “information space”, thereby preventing citizens from being exposed to ideas and opinions that the regime depicts as harmful. Second, Internet management should be shifted to an international forum such as the UN.⁸² China is heavily dependent on technology, just like other states. This situation makes the government concerned about the developments created by the Internet and the flow of information. China regards uncontrolled information as a threat to the regime. For this reason, while benefiting from the economic benefits of the Internet, it also maintains political control.⁸³ Thus, China’s understanding of cyber sovereignty is basically defensive and reactive. The main goal is to maintain control over processes that may jeopardize the leadership position of the Chinese Communist Party. This understanding brings the stance of the party-state monopolizing the ability to regulate and dominate the online world and rejects all kinds of external interference.⁸⁴ The Chinese-type understanding of cyber sovereignty underlines cybersecurity by tightening control and management mechanisms over the Internet and content because the size of the country makes it difficult to control information.

International diplomacy and domestic developments have shaped China’s active approach to cybersecurity and cyber sovereignty. Against the Western approach of “Internet freedom”, China has opened the discussion of the unlimited authority of countries on the Internet. China especially considered the Tallinn Manual, mentioned in the first part of the study, a strengthening of Western control over the legal regulation of cyberspace.⁸⁵ Furthermore, in addition to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have also been influential in negotiations related to cybersecurity. They have shaped the governance of the digital space based on respect for sovereignty and non-interference in their internal affairs. They also agree that international information security and digital sovereignty should be recognized as a new principle of international law and that the UN Member States support the Russian-proposed “UN Convention on International Information Security” and “Future UN Convention against

81 Fang, *Cyberspace Sovereignty Reflections on Building a Community of Common Future in Cyberspace*, p. 173.

82 Lindsay, “The Impact of China on Cybersecurity”.

83 Brigid Grauman, *Cyber-security: The Vexed Question of Global Rules*, Report by Security & Defense Agenda, 2012, p. 55.

84 Creemers, “Cybersecurity Law and Regulation in China: Securing the Smart State”, p. 129.

85 Milton L. Mueller, “Against Sovereignty in Cyberspace”, *International Studies Review*, 22:4, 2020, pp. 779-801.

the Criminal Misuse of ICTs". The essence of both documents is based on respect for the principle of state sovereignty in the digital environment. As a fundamental principle of international information security cooperation, it is particularly emphasized that each state has the right to determine norms and mechanisms to manage its information and cultural space under its national legislation.⁸⁶ From the perspective of the European Union (EU), international policies in cyberspace should be formulated through existing governance procedures, and a multi-stakeholder approach should be adopted. On the other hand, China argues that all governments should equally participate in international rulemaking in cyberspace rather than the status quo. According to China, this is the only way to protect the national interests and sovereignty of developing countries.⁸⁷

So, how does China assess cyber sovereignty within the framework of international law? The document "China's Views on the Application of the Principle of Sovereignty in Cyberspace", published by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, underlines that state sovereignty is legally binding under international law. This has been interpreted as follows: If a state encroaches on the inherent superiority and external independence of another state based on its national sovereignty, ICT infrastructure, organizations, activities, and data and information located on its territory, this constitutes an unjust act under international law. According to the document, "*relevant actions could include unauthorized infiltration of network systems in the territory or jurisdiction of another state, causing disruption or damage to the related infrastructure, or undermining a state's exclusive sovereign rights in cyberspace. An ICT activity may simultaneously violate the principles of sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and prohibition of the use of force*".⁸⁸

While China has made references to the concept of cyber sovereignty in all these assessments and platforms, the formalization and theorization of the concept have not yet been realized. As China's primary goal is to balance the US hegemony in cyberspace, it is necessary to institutionalize cyber sovereignty.⁸⁹ Nonetheless, China's definition and principles of cyber sovereignty stand out as a problem that mainly addresses anti-regime threats. The phenomenon of cyber sovereignty is at the heart of China's cybersecurity policies. In this context, it is a mystery if China desires to seize the leadership of cyberspace with its contribution to the idea of cyber sovereignty. Perhaps China's only goal is to ensure that it has great power and weight in cyberspace.

Conclusion

In the 21st century, countries are in a technological dilemma. The rise of information and communication technologies at an unpredictable pace makes it possible to access, use, change, or destroy them. At this point, cybersecurity has emerged as a crucial concept. On the other hand, cyber sovereignty refers to a state's full authority and control within its own cyber infrastructure. The *sine qua non* factor for some states ensuring cybersecurity is the provision and maintenance of cyber sovereignty.

The documents, sources, and data discussed throughout the study point out China's understanding of cyber sovereignty and how this understanding is shaped on international

86 Alexander Ignatov, "BRICS Agenda for Digital Sovereignty", February 14, 2024, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/02/14/brics-agenda-for-digital-sovereignty/>, accessed 20.08.2024.

87 Cai Cuihong, "Global Cyber Governance: China's Contribution and Approach", *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, 4:1, 2018, pp. 55-76.

88 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "China's Views on the Application of the Principle of Sovereignty in Cyberspace", p. 3.

89 Karmazin, "China's Promotion of Cyber Sovereignty Beyond the West", p. 73.

platforms. China's approach also shows how cybersecurity has evolved in different ways and shaped the dynamics of the balance of power between states because its approach to cyber sovereignty is considered equal to cybersecurity and a part of national security. At the same time, China wants to have a say through its efforts to guide the global governance of cyberspace. Setting almost digital boundaries in this regard, China wants to achieve a strategic position in cyberspace competition within the framework of the principle of sovereign equality in cyberspace, based on the principles of the UN.

The fact that cyberspace cannot be regulated in an agreed manner within the framework of international law raises the question of the applicability of a theory of cyberspace dominance considering cyber sovereignty. Chinese and Russian recommendations on cyberspace governance in international platforms such as the UN demonstrate the need for institutionalization. The affirmation obtained from the UN General Assembly in 2015 on the subject of compliance with international law and sovereignty principles, including cyberspace, results from a parallel approach to the views of China and Russia.

This study does not seek an answer to whether cyber sovereignty is clearly possible. Instead, it focuses on how the concept of cyber sovereignty will play a role in the power struggle in the international system and how it will shape cybersecurity policies. Cyber sovereignty has the potential to transform the traditional understanding of sovereignty. Nevertheless, there are uncertainties regarding its effects and applicability in the international system. In this context, seeking control and dominance of cyberspace discloses a new geopolitical area of struggle in international relations. Instead of dominating cyberspace as a necessity of a system that has evolved to multi-dimensionality, standard international norms and policies should be shaped. The selection of China as a dominant example in the study points out that establishing dominance in cyberspace is a dynamic and multi-dimensional process.

More specifically, is a Chinese-led cyberspace dominance theory conceivable? While success in efforts to control cyberspace does not make it possible to achieve direct world domination, it can potentially increase China's influence in the international arena. China might develop more cybersecurity policies, conduct cyber investments, fight cyber threats, and encourage cyber diplomacy. Nonetheless, the unlikely prospect of cyberspace dominance must be integrated with military, political, economic, diplomatic, and other factors regarding the race for global leadership.

Conflict of Interest Statement:

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

References

Published Works

- AIMIN Qia and GUOSONG Shao (2018). "Assessing China's Cybersecurity Law", *Computer Law & Security Review*, 34, 1342-1354.
- BIÇAKCI Salih. (2019). "Siber Güvenlik ve Savunma", *Güvenlik Yazıları Serisi*, 42, 1-8.
- Central Committee of The Communist Party (2016). The 13th Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China (2016–2020).
- CHEUNG Anne S.Y. (2006). "The Business of Governance: China's Legislation on Content Regulation in Cyberspace", *International Law and Politics*, 38:1, 1-37.
- COLLIER Jamie (2018). "Cyber Security Assemblages: A Framework for Understanding the Dynamic and Contested Nature of Security Provision", *Politics and Governance*, 6:2, 13-21.
- CREEMERS Rogier (2021). "Cybersecurity Law and Regulation in China: Securing the Smart State", *China Law and Society Review*, 6, 111-145.
- CUIHONG Cai (2018). "Global Cyber Governance: China's Contribution and Approach", *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, 4:1, 55-76.
- DOĞRUL Mürsel YALÇIN Haydar and DAİM Tuğrul U. (2023). "Cybersecurity Technology: A Landscape Analysis", Tuğrul U. Daim & Marina Dabić (eds.), *Cybersecurity, Applied Innovation and Technology Management*, Springer, Cham.
- DOUZET Frédéric and GERY Aude (2021). "Cyberspace Is Used, First and Foremost, to Wage Wars: Proliferation, Security and Stability in Cyberspace", *Journal of Cyber Policy*, 6:1, 96-113.
- ELDEM Tuba (2021). "Uluslararası Siber Güvenlik Normları ve Sorumlu Siber Egemenlik", *İstanbul Hukuk Mecmuası*, 79:1, 347-378.
- FANG Binxing (2018). *Cyberspace Sovereignty Reflections on Building a Community of Common Future in Cyberspace*, Science Press & Springer, Singapore.
- FRANZESE Patrick W. (2009). "Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Can It Exist?", *Air Force Law Review*, 1-42.
- GIEROW Hauke Johannes (2015). "Cyber Security in China: Internet Security, Protectionism and Competitiveness: New Challenges to Western Businesses", *China Monitor*, 22.
- GRAUMAN Brigid (2012). "Cyber-Security: The vexed question of global rules, An independent report of cyber-preparedness around the World", *Security & Defense Agenda (SDA)*.
- GROHE Edwin (2015). "The Cyber Dimensions of the Syrian Civil War: Implications for Future Conflict", *The John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory*, 14:7, 1-25.
- HABER Eldar and TOPOR Lev (2023). "Sovereignty, Cyberspace, and the Emergence of Internet Bubbles", *Journal of Advanced Military Studies*, 14:1, 144-165.
- HEKİM Hakan and BAŞIBÜYÜK Oğuzhan (2013). "Siber Suçlar ve Türkiye'nin Siber Güvenlik Politikaları", *Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Terörizm Dergisi*, 4:2, 135-158.
- JENSEN Eric Talbot (2015). "Cyber Sovereignty: The Way Ahead", *Tex. Int. Law J.*, 276-304.
- KARMAZIN Aleš (2023). "China's Promotion of Cyber Sovereignty Beyond the West", R. R. Šárka Kolmašová (eds.), *Norm Diffusion Beyond the West Agents and Sources of Leverage*, Springer, Switzerland, 61-78.
- KAVITHA V. and PRETHA S. (2019). "Cyber Security Issues and Challenges-A Review", *IJCSMC*, 8:11, 1-6.
- KLIMBURG Alexander (2012). *National Cyber Security Framework Manual*, NATO CCD COE Publication, Tallinn.
- KYRDODA Yuliia MARZÌ Giacomo DABIC Marina and DAİM Tuğrul U. (2023). "Cybersecurity Technology: An Analysis of the Topic from 2011 to 2021", Daim, Tuğrul U. Daim & Marina Dabić (eds.), *Cybersecurity, Applied Innovation and Technology Management*, Springer, Cham.
- LESSIG Lawrence (2006). *Code: Version 2.0*, Basic Books, New York.
- LINDSAY Jon R. (2014/15). "The Impact of China on Cybersecurity", *International Security*, 3:3, 7-47.
- LINDSAY Jon R. (2015). "Introduction: China and Cybersecurity: Controversy and Context", Jon R. Lindsay, Tai Ming Cheung & Derek S. Reveron (eds.), *China and Cybersecurity Espionage, Strategy and Politics in The Digital Domain*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1-26.
- MEDEIROS Breno Pauli and GOLDONÍ Luiz Rogério Franco (2020). "The Fundamental Conceptual Trinity of Cyberspace", *Contexto Internacional*, 42:1, 31-54.
- MUELLER Milton L. (2020). "Against Sovereignty in Cyberspace", *International Studies Review*, 22:4, 779-801.
- NYE Joseph S. (2010). *The Future of Power*, Public Affairs Press, New York.

- NYE Joseph S. (2011). "Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security?", *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 5:4,18-38.
- RAUD Mikk (2016). *China and Cyber: Attitudes, Strategies, Organizations*, NATO CCD COE, Tallinn.
- SAĞIROĞLU Şeref and ALKAN Mustafa (2018). *Siber Güvenlik ve Savunma*, Grafiker Yayınları, Ankara.
- SCHMITT Michael N. (2017). *Tallinn Manual 2.0 On the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- SINGER P.W. and FRIEDMAN Allan. (2018). *Siber Güvenlik ve Siber Savaş* (trans. A. Atav), Buzdağı Yayınevi, Ankara.
- SWAINE Michael D. (2013). Chinese Views on Cybersecurity in Foreign Relations, *China Leadership Monitor*.
- The White House (2011). *International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World*, Washington.
- United Nations General Assembly (July 2015). *Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security*, United Nations.
- United Nations (2021). Cybersecurity in the United Nations system organizations Report of the Joint Inspection Unit, JIU/REP/2021/3.
- VON HEINEGG and WOLFF Heintschel (2013). "Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace", *International Law Studies*, 89:123, 123-156.
- WU Chien-Huei (2021). "Sovereignty Fever: The Territorial Turn of Global Cyber Order", *Zeitschrift Für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht Und Völkerrecht/Zeitschrift Für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht Und Völkerrecht*, 81:3, 651-676.
- QU Weizhi (2010). *China's Path to Informatization*, Cengage Learning Asia, Singapore.
- YELI Hao (2017). "A Three-Perspective Theory of Cyber Sovereignty", *PRISM*, 7:2, 108-115.

Internet Sources

- BAEZNER Marie and ROBIN Patrice (2018). "Cyberspace Sovereignty", https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/314613/20180907_MB_TA_Cybersovereignty_V2_rev.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed 17.05.2024.
- BARLOW John P. (1996). "A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace", <https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence>, accessed 16.05.2024.
- Cyberspace Administration of China. "《国家网络空间安全战略》全文", 2016, December 27, https://www.cac.gov.cn/2016-12/27/c_1120195926.htm, accessed 02.05.2024.
- Etymonline (n.d.). "Cyber-", <https://www.etymonline.com/word/cyber->, accessed 25.01.2024.
- IGNATOV Alexander. "BRICS Agenda for Digital Sovereignty", 2024, February 14, <https://modern diplomacy.eu/2024/02/14/brics-agenda-for-digital-sovereignty/>, accessed 20.08.2024.
- Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. "The Internet in China", 2010, June 8, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7093508.htm, accessed 20.01.2024.
- International Telecommunications Union (2008), "ITU-T X.1205: series X: Data Networks, Open System Communications and Security: Telecommunications Security: Overview of Cybersecurity", <https://www.itu.int/rec/t-rec-x.1205-200804-i>, accessed 20.05.2024.
- JINPING Xi. "在第二届世界互联网大会开幕式上的讲话", 2016, February 7, <https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2015/12/16/speech-at-the-2nd-world-internet-conference-opening-ceremony/>, accessed 14.10.2024.
- JINPING Xi. "Speech at the Work Conference for Cybersecurity and Informatization", 2016, April 19, <https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2016/04/19/speech-at-the-work-conference-for-cybersecurity-and-informatization/>, accessed 04.10.2024.
- KEMP Simon (2023). "Digital 2023: China", <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2023-china>
- KERRY John. Secretary of State, "An Open and Secure Internet: We Must Have Both", VOAnews, 2015, 18 May, <https://www.voanews.com/a/text-of-john-kerrys-remarks-in-seoul-on-open-and-secure-internet/2776139.html>, accessed 13.07.2024.
- Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). "Cybersecurity", <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cybersecurity>
- Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cybersecurity>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Statement at Budapest Conference on Cyber Issues", 2012, October 4, <http://www.chinesemission-vienna.at/eng/zgbd/t977627.htm>, accessed 22.01.2024.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. (n.d.). "China's Views on the Application of the Principle of Sovereignty in Cyberspace", <https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Chinese-Position-Paper-on-the-Application-of-the-Principle-of-Sovereignty-ENG.pdf>

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The People's Republic of China. (2021). "China's Positions on International Rules-making in Cyberspace", https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/jks_665232/kjlc_665236/qtwt_665250/202110/t20211020_9594981.html, accessed 01.10.2024.
- PENG Dannie (2024). "China Makes Science and Tech a Budget Priority with 10% Jump in Spending During 'Two Sessions'", <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3254290/china-makes-science-and-tech-budget-priority-10-jump-spending>, accessed 03.08.2024.
- PEOPLE.CN. "填补网络空间 "规则空白", 2013, July 9, <http://www.people.com.cn/24hour/n/2013/0709/c25408-22123842.html>, accessed 03.09.2024.
- SHENG Zhong (2013). "填补网络空间 "规则空白", <http://www.people.com.cn/24hour/n/2013/0709/c25408-22123842.html>, accessed 09.10.2024.
- Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. "Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China", 2017, July 11, <http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?LookType=3&Lib=law&Id=22826&SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=&paycode=>, accessed 10.09.2024.
- STATE COUNCIL. "Provisional Management Regulations for the International Connection of Computer Information Networks of the People's Republic of China", 1996, February 1, <https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/1996/02/01/provisional-management-regulations-for-the-international-connection-of-computer-information-networks-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/>, accessed 12.10.2024.
- The White House (2024). "2024 Report on The Cybersecurity Posture of The United States", <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2024-Report-on-the-Cybersecurity-Posture-of-the-United-States.pdf>, accessed 14.07.2024.
- THOMALA Lai Lin (2024). "Number of Internet Users in China from 2013 to 2023", <https://www.statista.com/statistics/265140/number-of-internet-users-in-china/>, accessed 15.09.2024.
- XINHUA.NET. "Xi Jinping Leads Internet Security Group", 2014, February 27, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-02/27/c_133148273.htm, accessed 04.10.2024.
- XINHUA.NET (2014). "What is Cyber Sovereignty?", http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-07/10/c_126736910.htm, accessed 23.02.2024.

Technology, Organization, and the Militarization of Intelligence: The Turkish Experience*

Teknoloji, Organizasyon ve İstihbaratın Askerileşmesi: Türkiye Örneği

Tolga ÖKTEN**

* This article is based on the author's doctoral thesis, which is currently in progress.

** Lecturer, National Defence University Atatürk Strategic Studies and Graduate Institute (ATASAREN) Intelligence Studies Department, İstanbul, Türkiye, e-mail: tokten@msu.edu.tr
ORCID:0000-0002-6102-7704

Abstract

Advances in targeting technology have increasingly militarized intelligence agencies, positioning them at the forefront of unconventional conflicts such as counterterrorism. The National Intelligence Agency (MİT)'s role in counterterrorism can be studied within this context. Accordingly, this article aims to examine the underlying factors that have contributed to the militarization of intelligence activities, focusing on MİT. This transformation has been elucidated through the variables of technology and organization. The transformation was initiated by the advent of drone technology and reinforced by the introduction of novel organizational structures and mission statements. During this period, a new conceptualization of intelligence emerged, whereby intelligence and operations were unified under a single mission definition and tactical intelligence priorities assumed a greater significance. The technological and organizational transformation also impacted the MİT, which underwent a process of increasing militarization after 2019 and became a pivotal actor in Türkiye's counterterrorism operations against PKK/KCK.

Keywords: Counterterrorism, Technology, Organization, Intelligence, Operation

Öz

Hedefleme teknolojisindeki gelişmeler istihbarat teşkilatlarını giderek artan bir şekilde askerileştirerek terörle mücadele gibi konvansiyonel olmayan çatışmaların merkezine yerleştirmiştir. Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı'nın terörle mücadele amaçlı olarak gerçekleştirdiği faaliyetler de bu kapsamda incelenebilecektir. Bu makalenin amacı da genel çerçevede istihbarat faaliyetinin özelde ise Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı'nın askerileşme sürecinin arkasındaki dinamiklerin tartışılmasıdır. Bu dönüşüm teknoloji ve organizasyon değişkenleri kullanılarak açıklanacaktır. Dönüşüm SİHA teknolojisi tarafından tetiklenmiş, yeni organizasyon yapıları ve görev tanımları ile tamamlanmıştır. Bu süreçte istihbarat ve operasyonun aynı görev tanımları altında toplandığı ve taktik istihbarat önceliklerinin önem kazandığı yeni bir istihbarat anlayışının oluştuğu görülmektedir. Bu dönüşüm Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı'nı da etkilemiş, kurum 2019 sonrasında giderek askerileşerek Türkiye'nin PKK/KCK'ya yönelik olarak yürüttüğü terörle mücadele operasyonlarının merkezi bir aktörü haline gelmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Terörle Mücadele, Teknoloji, Organizasyon, İstihbarat, Harekat

Geliş Tarihi / Submitted:
29.06.2024

Kabul Tarihi / Accepted:
19.08.2024

Introduction

Technology affects how wars are fought. This also applies to counterterrorism, which can be defined as unconventional warfare against clandestine armed cell formations. The advent of new technologies has led to significant shifts in the methods and actors involved in counterterrorism. In this new era, the organizational transformation triggered by technology has resulted in intelligence agencies assuming an operational role in counterterrorism. This transformation is referred to as the militarization of intelligence. The advancement of intelligence and firepower technologies has triggered an organizational adaptation and has led to an increasing militarization of the intelligence role in counterterrorism.

The concept of transformation of intelligence is examined in the literature from a variety of perspectives, including technological and organizational dimensions.¹ The majority of these studies concentrate on the operations of the United States (US) intelligence agency and the military special forces against al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations in the aftermath of 9/11.² Conversely, it is evident that this transformation, which commenced in the US following the events of 9/11, has significant ramifications for Türkiye and has also influenced the operations conducted by the National Intelligence Agency (*Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı - MİT*) in the context of counterterrorism. Despite their prominence in the media, MİT's military activities remain a relatively understudied topic in academic literature. Accordingly, this article primarily addresses the underlying dynamics of the militarization of intelligence and its impact on MİT. In this context, the study's primary objective is to establish a theoretical framework for understanding the transformation of intelligence, with a particular focus on the role of technology and organizational structures. In terms of technology, the objective is to examine the interrelationship between diverse collection and firepower instruments employed in counterterrorism and the nexus between technology and the human dimensions of targeting. In the organizational dimension, the objective is to direct attention towards and engage with the ongoing debate surrounding intelligence - operations and tactical intelligence - strategic intelligence duality. In light of the considerations mentioned above, the issue of the transformation of MİT is elucidated within the theoretical framework presented herewith.


The article proceeds from an examination of the general to an examination of the specific. In this context, the initial section defines the military model in counterterrorism and reviews the relevant literature on the role of intelligence in counterterrorism. The second section analyzes the first subcomponent of the military model, namely the technological dimension. It examines the targeting tools used by intelligence agencies, exemplifying the technology-intelligence nexus. These tools, which integrate technology and human elements, are pivotal to the targeting operations conducted by intelligence agencies in the context of

1 William Lahnehan, "Is a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs Occurring?", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 20:1, 2007; Deborah Barger, *Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs*, RAND, California, 2005; Michael Herman, "Where Hath Our Intelligence Been? The Revolution in Military Affairs?", *The RUSI Journal*, 143:6, 1998; Amy Zegart, *Spying Blind The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2007; Stephen Marrin, "Evaluating CIA's Analytic Performance - Reflections of a Former Analyst", *Orbis*, 57:2, 2013; Eric Denécé, "The Revolution in Intelligence Affairs: 1989-2003", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 27:1, 2014; John Ferris, "Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution in Military Intelligence?", *Intelligence and National Security*, 19:2, 2004; Bruce Berkowitz, "Intelligence and the War on Terrorism", *Orbis*, 46:2, 2002; Michael Warner, "Reflections on Technology and Intelligence Systems", *Intelligence and National Security*, 27:1, 2012.

2 See Duane Clarridge, *A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA*, Scribner, New York, 1997; Christopher Fuller, *See It/Shoot It The Secret History of the CIA's Lethal Drone Program*, Yale University Press, London, 2017; Stanley McChrystal, *My Share of the Task A Memoir*, Penguin Books, London, 2013; Jeremy Seahill, *Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield*, Nation Books, New York, 2013; Richard Shultz, *Military Innovation in War: It Takes a Learning Organization A Case Study of Task Force 714 in Iraq*, The JSOU Press, Florida, 2016.

counterterrorism operations. The most prominent of these tools are drones, even though they are not the only ones. The utilization of disparate intelligence collection tools is predicated upon a conceptual framework that is analogous to a combined arms approach. This section provides an overview of the technical aspects of intelligence-based operations. The third section addresses the second dimension of the militarization of intelligence, namely the organizational transformation. The existing literature focuses on the technological aspects of transformation. Although technology is the catalyst for this transformation process, it is not the sole determining factor. It is imperative that technology become integrated into the process of organizational transformation, which can be achieved by implementing a novel organizational structure. This organizational transformation can be defined as the increasing importance of tactical intelligence and the dissolution of the distinction between intelligence and operations. This section discusses these two effects (Chart-1). The final section examines the transformation of MİT in the context of counterterrorism operations against PKK/KCK.. After the technological innovations of 2019, MİT has undergone a significant organizational transformation, becoming a prominent operational actor in counterterrorism. Following the incorporation of drone technology into its organizational structure, it has become evident that MİT has assumed a more prominent role in counterterrorism operations, with tactical target priorities becoming a significant mission within its remit. Despite the considerable attention devoted to the transformation of MİT and its new role in counterterrorism in the media, there remains a paucity of qualified academic work on this subject.³ This is primarily due to the distinctive nature of the profession itself. The lack of transparency and secrecy inherent to this field of study creates critical constraint, leading to an absence of academic studies in the literature. This section seeks to identify MİT's transformation process by analyzing open sources.

Chart -1: Dimensions of Militarization of Counterterrorism Intelligence⁴



³ For some recent work see Ahmet Ateş, Understanding the Change in Intelligence Organizations: An Institutional Framework, *Doctoral Dissertation*, University of Delaware, Newark, 2020; Polat Safi, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı 1826-2023*, Kronik, İstanbul, 2023.

⁴ Chart is prepared by the author.

1. Military Model in Counterterrorism

The prevailing perspective in terrorism studies is that counterterrorism should be defined as a form of organized crime control rather than a military operation. The responsibility for countering criminal organizations lies with law enforcement agencies, which are a part of the criminal justice system. This model suggests that the methods employed in the fight against organized crime can be applied to counterterrorism. The primary objective of this model is to apprehend the perpetrators, prosecute them in a court of law, and allow the judicial system to determine the appropriate sentence. The problem is that terrorist organizations, due to their distinctive characteristics, frequently become a threat that is beyond the scope of law enforcement. In the context of counterterrorism, the question of how to apprehend cells that utilize sophisticated weaponry and are based in remote and inaccessible locations becomes a significant challenge for law enforcement. The distinction between criminal and terrorist organizations gives rise to the view that the struggle transcends the criminal law model and assumes a military dimension. This is also the case regarding the activities against armed gangs, such as the cartels in Mexico or the G9 gang in Haiti. These armed groups can be considered the counterparts of terrorist organizations in different geographical contexts, and their capacities have long exceeded the limits of the criminal justice model based on law enforcement.

The second model is designated the military model.⁵ The term military, is not merely a rhetorical device but directly informs the rules of engagement. In this scenario, a distinction is drawn between legitimate targets and civilians, and the situation is characterized as a low-intensity conflict, rather than a fight against organized crime. Given the nature of the threat, in contrast to the criminal justice model, this model anticipates that an intervention is to be conducted with the utmost force, rather than minimum necessary, and with the objective of neutralize rather than arrest.⁶

The military model was a prevalent strategy employed by powers such as France and the United Kingdom throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. In the 20th century, this model was not confined to former colonial territories; the US governments also preferred this model in response to threats from overseas organizations. In the 1980s, in response to the series of attacks on American citizens and military personnel in Europe and the Middle East, the Reagan administration shifted its counterterrorism strategy into a military model, declared a “war on terrorism” and initiated intelligence-led military operations against Middle Eastern-based organizations. In the 2000s, the wave of attacks reached the US, prompting the Bush administration to declare a “global war on terrorism” in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Military

5 For the difference between the criminal justice model and the military model see Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qaeda*. RAND, California, 2008; Ronald Crelinsten, Alex Schmid, “Western Responses to Terrorism A Twenty-five Year Balance Sheet”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 4:4, 1992; Khusrav Gaibulloev and Todd Sandler, “An Empirical Analysis of Alternative Ways that Terrorist Groups End”, *Public Choice*, 160, 2014; Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*, Routledge, London, 2011; Leonard Weinberg, *The End of Terrorism?*, Routledge, London, 2012; Paul Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 2001.

6 This study is concerned with the strategic and tactical dimensions of counterterrorism. Indeed, deploying of military techniques in counterterrorism is not merely a strategic and tactical concern, but also a matter of legal significance. In this context, there have been significant studies examining the issue from the perspective of international humanitarian law (*jus in bello*). It should be noted that the legal dimension of the transformation of counterterrorism has been excluded from this study, given the limitations of the research. For more information see International Committee of the Red Cross, “What is International Humanitarian Law?”, 2004, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf accessed 28.04.2024; Derek Jinks, “September 11 and the Laws of War”, *The Yale Journal of International Law*, 28:1, 2003; Sadi Çaycı, “Countering Terrorism and the Law of Armed Conflict: the Turkish Experience”, *International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations*, 8, 2002; Michael Walzer, “Just & Unjust Targeted Killing & Drone Warfare”, *Daedalus*, 145:4, 2016..

operations included the killing of American citizens such as Awlaki by intelligence agencies and special forces using drones without any trial.⁷

In the 21st century, the most significant factor contributing to the militarization of counterterrorism is the advancement of targeting technology. The advent of intelligence and operational technologies facilitating the identification and neutralization of targets in a specified timeframe and location has precipitated a transformation in the actors and strategies employed in counterterrorism. Intelligence agencies are among the institutions that have been most significantly affected in this new era. However, this novel scenario has not been adequately addressed in the extant terrorism literature. While intelligence is accorded significant attention in terrorism literature⁸, it is typically categorized as a force multiplier, assisting law enforcement within the criminal justice model. Intelligence is also under-analyzed in the studies defining counterterrorism as a military model. Even in studies that consider intelligence as a discrete variable, the dimensions of collection and analysis are examined, yet the operational aspect of intelligence is absent.⁹ Accordingly, the remainder of this article focuses on the operational role of intelligence agencies in counterterrorism, aiming to fill this gap in the existing literature. The new role and the militarization of intelligence are characterized by two key variables: technology and organization. The following section examines the technological dimension.

2. Technology - Intelligence Nexus

Scholarly studies on the relationship between technology and warfare can be traced back to the mid-20th century, a relatively recent period in historical terms. It is widely acknowledged that two fundamental sources, namely British historians and Soviet military circles, played a pivotal role in these studies. The debate subsequently gained traction in the US during the 1990s. These studies concentrated on precision targeting technology and its operational and strategic implications. The primary objective of precision targeting is to enhance intelligence capabilities. The advent of sophisticated intelligence technologies has enabled modern firepower to become the primary instrument in counterterrorism operations. Accordingly, military doctrine based on numerical superiority has been largely eliminated in counterterrorism operations. This doctrine has been superseded by electronic area denial and intelligence-led targeting operations. In particular, the advances in targeting technology and drones have had a profound effect on targeting activities. The advent of new intelligence technologies and their associated doctrinal implications has also precipitated a transformation of intelligence agencies, introducing novel capabilities and tasks. New technologies have significantly impacted technical intelligence, encompassing IMINT and SIGINT, and HUMINT activities.¹⁰

7 It is essential to distinguish between the military model and the utilization of military forces for law enforcement purposes during a state of emergency. In numerous countries, infantry units are deployed to establish territorial control in urban areas during periods of elevated risk. First implemented in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, this measure was subsequently adopted by France and Belgium in response to the growing threat posed by ISIS between 2015 and 2016.

8 In the course of his interviews with experts in the field, Schmid identified intelligence as the most crucial variable in counterterrorism, both at the domestic and international levels. Alex Schmid, "Introduction", Alex Schmid (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, Routledge, London, 2011; p. 29, 31; Furthermore, there are those who posit that counterterrorism can be defined as a form of warfare between intelligence agencies and terrorist organizations. See Wilkinson, *Terrorism Versus Democracy*, p. 103; Neal Pollard and John Sullivan, "Counterterrorism and Intelligence", Robert Dover, Michael Goodman & Claudia Hillebrand (eds.), *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies*, Routledge, London, 2014, p. 245.

9 See Cenker Korhan Demir, *Sebeplerinden Mücadele Yöntemlerine Etik Ayrılıkçı Terörizm: PIRA, ETA, PKK*, Nobel Kitap, Ankara, 2017; Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, pp. 73-123.

10 Targeting activity is not limited to firepower. The role of cyber intelligence activity in targeting cells and lone

2.1. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)

It can be posited that IMINT plays a unique role in the targeting process. The rationale behind this is that, with precision weapons, any target that can be seen can be hit.¹¹ The most prevalent form of IMINT technology is the one that employs drones for reconnaissance purposes. It can also be argued that drone-based IMINT technology represents a pivotal shift in the evolution of intelligence agencies. Targeting potential targets has traditionally been the domain of manned air platforms belonging to the air forces. However, with the advent of widespread drone usage, intelligence agencies have increasingly assumed responsibility for this task.

Drones offer a several advantages. First and foremost, they present a more cost-effective alternative by eliminating the necessity for costly platforms and highly trained pilots. Compared to traditional air platforms, unmanned platforms exhibit significantly reduced costs in terms of unit price and expenditure on flight, maintenance, logistics and pilot training. The uninterrupted flow of information thus represents a significant force multiplier during the fixing of a target in a specific time and location. It is important to note that drones are employed not only for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) purposes but also as a means of firepower. In this regard, they have assumed a significant role in integrating of intelligence and operational functions. Indeed, the objective of the US-based drone program is to equip intelligence agencies with firepower capacity.¹²

In this context, the war declared against al-Qaeda can be seen as a milestone in the militarization of both counterterrorism and intelligence agencies. In a novel application of drone technology, an intelligence agency has employed these drones as a firepower element for the first time, diverging from the traditional use of such technology by military organizations. In this context, the initial drone strike was conducted on 7 October 2001, marking the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom. However, the intended target, Taliban leader Mullah Omar, was not killed.

2.2. Signal Intelligence (SIGINT)

Targeting is typically used in conjunction with IMINT technology, with these two terms being used synonymously.¹³ For this reason, SIGINT, which offers critical technical intelligence capability, has remained relatively obscure.¹⁴ The prevailing view is that SIGINT is employed to detect intangible assets, such as verbal information, instead of tangible assets. In other words, it is used to identify messages rather than objects. Accordingly, the objective is to comprehend abstract intentions rather than concrete capabilities. Consequently, in contrast to IMINT, it is believed that SIGINT lacks the capability to fix targets at a precise time and location. Instead, it is employed to decipher the message traffic between cells. Conversely, this instrument constitutes an essential component of the targeting sequence. In particular, signals based on GPS are widely used to detect cells.

SIGINT has become a significant force multiplier in locating targets, particularly in situations where the deployment of human assets is not feasible and visual contact cannot

actors, particularly in urban settings, has become increasingly prominent. In this context, technical targeting is not limited to IMINT or SIGINT, but also encompasses social media intelligence (SOCMINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) and digital network analysis.

11 S. J. Dudzinsky and James Digby, *The Strategic and Tactical Implications of New Weapon Technologies*, RAND, California, 1976.

12 Fuller, *See It/Shoot It*, pp.104-114.

13 Glenn Goodman, "ISR Now Synonymous with Operations", *Journal of Electronic Defense*, 30:7, 2007, p. 19.

14 Herman, "Where Hath Our Intelligence Been", p. 67.

be guaranteed. In countries such as Somalia and Yemen, where intelligence capabilities are more constrained than in Afghanistan and Iraq, drone operations are focused on targeting signals rather than images. In such scenarios, obtaining visual confirmation of the target is impossible, therefore the mobile phone signal is directly targeted. This approach, often the subject of criticism due to the risk of collateral damage, was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on many occasions over a sustained period.¹⁵

2.3. Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

As previously stated, targeting is typically equated with technical intelligence, specifically the IMINT activity in the literature. It can be argued that HUMINT activity represents a counter thesis to technocentric approaches as evidenced in the literature on counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency. This counterargument posits that cell formations and insurgencies are social networks and that is why we need human-centric approaches, rather than technological. However, it is currently not feasible to segregate the roles of humans and technology in intelligence-led targeting operations. Integrating technical and human collection assets with computer-based analysis technology has become increasingly prevalent. In this context, technical intelligence and firepower elements represent merely the tip of the iceberg of targeting operations.

Finding targets represents a significant challenge at the outset of the targeting process. Because, clandestine cells adapt to technological advancements and attempt to reduce their visual and aural exposure through cover, concealment, and dispersion. Consequently, they modify their techniques with regarding force and space, intending to disrupt the chain of destruction by obstructing sensors. Furthermore, in addition to reducing their visibility by dispersing into smaller groups, they also utilize locations such as urban areas, mountainous regions and forests to minimize their footprint. Furthermore, they restrict their electronic communication and favor courier activities to diminish their visibility, both in the physical and virtual domains. Thus, HUMINT remains a significant force multiplier in intelligence gathering. It is, therefore, essential for intelligence to be conducted with a joint operational mindset. It is essential to support the weaknesses inherent to each intelligence collection method by utilizing alternative techniques. Furthermore, the assets employed should be diversified.

Considering the factors mentioned above, it can be reasonably deduced that something that can be seen (visual or aural) can be hit; equally, if a target cannot be seen it cannot be hit. Consequently, the human factor assumes greater significance in relation to targets that are not only physically but also electronically invisible. In the event that the cells evade the technical sensors, it would be prudent to utilize human assets to leverage technical capabilities to gain access to the cells. In order to collect a signal or image, it is necessary to take risks and approach the targets. Such activities may include the use of portable GPS devices for geolocation, photo documentation, eavesdropping, or other forms of technical surveillance. It is therefore erroneous to assume that signals and imagery intelligence are always conducted from a secure location distant from the target. Even when operations are conducted with the use of sophisticated technical intelligence, the use or involvement of a source is often necessary, playing pivotal role in obtaining images or signals from a position in close proximity to the target. In contrast to the analysis and synthesis of vast quantities of data gathered by instruments such as satellites and aircraft, human assets operate in a narrow

¹⁵ Josh Begley, "A Visual Glossary Decoding the Language of Covert Warfare", October 15 2015 <https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/a-visual-glossary/>, accessed 03.05.2020

area closer to the targets. Without a human asset with the requisite capabilities, technical personnel must carry out the activity at their own risk.¹⁶ In this context, the roles of technical and human sources of information gathering have become increasingly intertwined.

3. Organizational Transformation

So far, the impact of technology on intelligence and operations has been explained. It is clear that the combination of intelligence and firepower on a single platform has rendered drones an indispensable instrument in unconventional military operations, particularly in counterterrorism. However, it is imperative to consider technology in the broader intellectual and organizational transformation landscape, rather than in isolation. Accordingly, transformation encompasses not only technological change but also the development of new subsystems, tactical innovations and organizational adaptation.¹⁷ The advent of new technologies has created a significant opportunity for transformation, but this will only be possible with a corresponding shift in mindset and organizational structure. In this context, the organizational transformation can be summarized as the dissolution of the wall between intelligence and operations, and a shift away from the conventional roles of intelligence agencies toward focusing on tactical intelligence priorities.

3.1. Merging Intelligence and Operations

The most crucial aspect of organizational transformation is the integration of intelligence and operations under a unified agency. This organizational model represents a departure from the conventional intelligence structure which postulates the existence of a wall between the domains of intelligence and operations. In the traditional understanding of intelligence, the primary objective is to collect and analyze of information. It anticipates potential threats and opportunities within the system, analyzes them, and disseminates the findings. In consequence, the principal beneficiaries of intelligence are politicians, diplomats, law enforcement agencies and the military. Each of these entities has distinct priorities, objectives, and instruments, while employing their requisite information in a particular manner. In counterterrorism, the primary instrument of intelligence agencies is information, not violence. This distinction is reflected in the respective roles of intelligence and military operations. Intelligence officers are gatherers while military personnel are hunters.¹⁸

However, in the new model, the primary consumer of intelligence in counterterrorism activities has become the intelligence agency itself. In other words, intelligence agencies are now both the producers and consumers of information. As a result, the wall between intelligence and operations, which had different mission definitions, has become blurred. Consequently, both terms have become synonymous. This has the effect of removing the friction caused by the execution of each stage of the cycle by different units and preventing interruptions in the targeting process. The new structure, operating as a network, integrates intelligence and operational tasks, enabling the targeting cycle to operate at a high speed. In the new model, intelligence is responsible for identifying targets and initiating action. Now intelligence both finds the target and pulls the trigger. This means that intelligence

16 For example, it is known that CTC's HUMINT assets were instrumental in the identification of Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and Anwar al-Awlaki's location in Yemen.

17 Andrew Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer the Pattern of Military Revolutions", *The National Interest*, 37, 1994, p. 30

18 Amy Zegart, "The CIA Spent 20 Years on the Front Lines of the War on Terror. It's Time For That to Change", November 2021, <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/09/11/9-11-america-spycraft-510880?s=03>, accessed 11.09.2023.

organizations are not just gatherers anymore but also hunters.¹⁹ This transformation has resulted in the militarization of intelligence, with intelligence personnel assuming the role of “modern generals waging a secret war”.²⁰

Indeed, the most crucial element of unconventional warfare was always to combine intelligence and operations. This organizational structure was also used in *pacification* operations in the 19th and 20th centuries. In that era, armies combined intelligence with their operations. In the 19th century, the French opted to emulate the *gaza* method of local tribes in Algeria. The military operations were designated as *razzias* and comprised units of 50 to 600 cavalymen, in addition to units designated *bureaux arabes*, comprising local personnel, whose role was to gather intelligence.²¹ Similar steps were taken during the revolts in the Ottoman lands and in 1902, a new group was set up to counter separatist bands in the Balkans. These counter bands were called *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* in 1912.²² A similar thing happened in Anatolia. Local *Hamidiye* regiments were set up to fight Armenian bands in Eastern Anatolia.

It is reasonable to posit that the methodologies employed during the 19th century will prove to be illuminating in the present era. The most significant practice that emerged at this juncture was the unification of intelligence and operations under a single administrative structure. In Africa, the French adopted a hybrid organizational structure combining intelligence and operations two hundred years ago. The reason is that the transformation of intelligence into operations represents the most significant bottleneck, particularly in targets with dynamic characteristics. Separating intelligence and operations into distinct organizational entities or units gives rise to several challenges, including difficulties in planning, communication and the potential for turf wars. Integrating the various stages of target acquisition within a unified framework reduces response time and the assurance that the critical window of opportunity, which is of particular significance in counterterrorism, is not overlooked.

In this context, in the 21st century, it was the American intelligence community that initially implemented this specific organizational structure. The initial exemplar of this category of organizational transformation is the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), established within the CIA. The CTC was a hybrid mission center/fusion center that combined intelligence and operations. This novel hybrid structure has been referred to as an “agency within an agency”²³ and hailed as a revolutionary development.²⁴ The rationale behind these assertions is that the novel structure has situated beyond the conventional boundaries of American intelligence culture. Similarly, the American school of intelligence had espoused a strict separation between collection and analysis, under the prevailing understanding that these two functions should be kept distinct. The CTC, in contrast, sought to transcend these

19 The motto was employed by Maureen Baginski, the head of the NSA SIGINT division, before 9/11.

20 Quoted from Mark Mazzetti and Nicholas Schou, “Outing The CIA’s ‘Undertaker’”, 2016, Newsweek, <https://www.newsweek.com/cia-michael-dandrea-new-york-times-mark-mazzetti-drones-pakistan-al-qaeda-war-475180>, accessed 07.05.2020.

21 Thomas Rid, “Razzia: A Turning Point in Modern Strategy”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21:4, 2009, p. 618, 627-628.

22 Zeynel Levent, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’dan Kuva-yı Milliye’ye Gayrinizami Harp (1913-1922)*, *Doctoral Dissertation*, Ankara University, Ankara, 2019, p.105

23 Greg Miller and Julie Tate, “CIA Shifts Focus to Killing Targets,” *Washington Post*, 1 September 2011. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-shifts-focus-to-killing-targets/2011/08/30/gIQA7MZGvJ_print.html, accessed 11.09.2022

24 Clarridge, *A Spy for All Seasons*, pp. 323-329.

boundaries, striving to foster interconnectivity between the domains of collection, analysis, and action.²⁵ However, the prioritization of tactical priorities required a significant change in threat assessments. Although the unit was established in 1986, until the 9/11 attacks it was seen as a second-grade position for the staff. After the attacks, hundreds of people from other units were assigned to the CTC and it became the heart of the agency.²⁶ The attacks shifted priorities from producing skilled analysis to support foreign policy decisions to eliminating Al Qaeda cells.

3.2. *The Growing Dominance of Tactical Intelligence*

The second dimension of organizational transformation is the growing dominance of tactical intelligence priorities. The technology-triggered transformation has been most keenly felt in the shift towards tactical priorities, particularly in the context of targeting. The advent of tactical intelligence gives rise to a second source of friction in counterterrorism intelligence: the debate between tactical and strategic intelligence.²⁷ Prior to proceeding, distinguishing between the terms of tactical and strategic priorities is essential.

The distinction between the tactical and strategic levels of intelligence is not contingent on the collection tool employed, but instead on the characteristics of the end product. The objective of strategic intelligence activity is to provide decision-makers in political and bureaucratic spheres with information that is accurate, comprehensive, important and timely. Such information may be disseminated in various spheres, including military, diplomatic, and economic. It functions as a warning and advisory instrument for global and regional developments and threats to national power elements. The question that occupies our attention is about what the future holds. However, the question at the heart of tactical priorities is one of immediate concern: what is happening now? The objective is not to comprehend the prospective threats and opportunities and thereby forestall any inadvertent actions on the part of decision-makers. Instead, it is to initiate operations. An activity that does not result in the implementation of an operation is regarded as a futile exercise. In this process, the customer of intelligence is not the decision-maker, but rather the intelligence organization itself. The information obtained can be shared and coordinated with other shareholders (e.g. to support diplomatic and financial negotiations, military and law enforcement operations), but this is a relationship established at the lower level. Consequently, as we progress from tactical to strategic intelligence, the duration of the activity increases, decision-making durations expand, and a greater number of stakeholders are included in the equation, including

25 Clarridge, *A Spy for All Seasons*, p. 323; Notably, this transformation is not limited to the intelligence agencies. Similarly, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), the US Armed Forces' counterterrorism unit, has established structures that combine intelligence and operations, as did its 19th century predecessors. In other words, while the CTC has become increasingly militarized, JSOC has increased its intelligence gathering activities. Special Forces Task Forces (TF) have been deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen as autonomous actors in counterterrorism operations. TF units serve a dual function, operating both as operational cells and as intelligence collection and analysis units. See Leigh Neville and Ramiro Bujeiro, *Special Operations, Forces in Afghanistan*, Osprey, 2008.

26 Mark Mazzetti, *The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth*, Penguin Press, New York, 2013, p.11.

27 In the orthodox American literature, strategic intelligence is also referred to as high-level positive foreign policy intelligence. Combat intelligence and other threats to domestic security are not part of strategic intelligence activity. Combat intelligence is put under the responsibility of military departments, and the responsibility for countering domestic threats, including counterintelligence and counterterrorism, falls within the purview of law enforcement agencies. See Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, Archon Books, Connecticut, 1965; For an overview of the typologies employed for the classification of intelligence priorities see also Peter Krause, "The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence: A Two-Level Framework to Transform a Deceptive Debate", *Security Studies*, 22:2, 2013, p. 272.

political and bureaucratic decision-makers at different levels, and regional or subject matter experts such as academics. Furthermore, strategic intelligence prioritizes dissemination over operation and is conducted close to decision-makers. In contrast, tactical intelligence focuses on the operational phase, necessitating a minimum proximity to the target (Table 1).

Table 1. Comparison of Tactical - Strategic Target Priorities

	Tactical Priorities	Strategic Priorities
Client	Practitioners	Decision Makers
Matter of Expertise	Occupational	Area – Subject
Shareholders	Narrow	Broad
Time Span	Short	Medium - Long
Product	Current	Estimative
Level of Analysis	Close to the Target	Close to Decision Makers
Focus	Operation	Dissemination

To illustrate, the advancement of Iran’s nuclear weapon program represents a strategic priority, whereas the identification of the Iranian military attaché’s activities constitutes a tactical priority. While the collection tools (human and technical) may be identical, the nature of the end product differs. This is also applicable to counterterrorism intelligence. It would be erroneous to assume that organizations are merely armed cells operating at the tactical level. In counterterrorism, strategic intelligence encompasses a multitude of strategic intelligence priorities, including the political and strategic directives of the leading cadre, the political, military, and economic relations with states and other organizations, and the tendencies of popular support. Furthermore, negotiations with terrorist organizations constitute a strategic intelligence subject. The responsibility for strategic intelligence priorities in counterterrorism remains within the relevant intelligence agencies. This responsibility is shared among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Armed Forces abroad, and the Ministry of the Interior at home. On the contrary, the principal objective of tactical counterterrorism intelligence is to neutralize the capacity of terrorist organizations to attack by locating armed cells and mapping the network.²⁸

The integration of modern firepower technology into the organizational structure of intelligence services has led to a change in their priorities. Intelligence services have been given the authority to kill because they can now do so without the need for anyone else. In this context, the role of intelligence agencies has evolved beyond that of being mere political consultants for decision-makers or force multipliers in counterterrorism. However, the growing significance of tactical counterterrorism intelligence has prompted a series of debates. Intelligence agencies, have been criticized for deviating from their core mandate of gathering strategic foreign policy intelligence. The CIA has also faced these criticisms. It is therefore asserted that the personnel recruited to the CIA over the past two decades have been primarily confined to military bases in conflict zones, and have consequently failed to gain the skills and experience (spycraft) that would be required in countries outside these zones. It is also asserted that the CIA has relegated the analysis of strategic intelligence priorities to a secondary position. CIA failed to fulfill its duty of warning against several

28 The discrepancy in intelligence priorities is characterized by an emphasis on the direct pursuit of Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, at the tactical level, as opposed to an investigation into the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda at the strategic level. See Nada Bakos, *The Targeter: My Life in the CIA, Hunting Terrorists, and Challenging the White House*, Little Brown & Company, 2019.

significant developments, including the Arab Spring, the attack against the US Embassy in Benghazi, the evolution of Al-Qaeda in Iraq into ISIS and its subsequent occupation of Mosul. A comparable incident also occurred in France. *The Direction du Renseignement Militaire* (DRM), the French military intelligence organization, was accused of providing the government with misleading information regarding the likelihood of a Russian invasion of Ukraine. The head of the DRM stated that the organization's role was to provide support for military operations, rather than to predict political intentions, thereby covertly indicating that the collection and analysis of tactical intelligence was of greater importance to them.

4. The Transformation of MİT

Thus far in this article, the technological and organizational variables underpinning the militarization of intelligence have been elucidated. These variables also highlight the growing involvement of MİT in counterterrorism. Indeed, the transformation initiated by technological advancement has significantly impacted not only MİT but also Türkiye's counterterrorism strategy in general. Technological advancements have had a substantial effect on Türkiye's counterterrorism operations against the clandestine cells of the PKK/KCK.²⁹ Before the advent of intelligence and operational technologies, military operations against clandestine cells in rural areas were based on the doctrine of area denial, relying on numerical superiority. In this classical search and destroy strategy, the necessity for labor-intensive maneuvers to visually identify, fix and neutralize targets remained.

In alignment with this overarching strategic framework, MİT has transformed, shifting its operational approach from a gatherer to a hunter in counterterrorism. The process of militarization at MİT was driven by two key factors: an increase in investment in new technologies and a transformation of the organizational structure. The introduction of drone technology and organizational changes, such as the integration of intelligence and operations, coupled with the growing significance of tactical intelligence, have contributed to the militarization of intelligence in Türkiye. This section analyzes the transformation process. The principal limitation of this study is that the information presented is only partially reflected in open sources. Due to the nature of the activity in question, information not reflected in open sources cannot be used. Nevertheless, significant conclusions can be drawn from the available data.

Firstly, the impetus for the militarization of MİT is the advent of drone technology. However, as previously stated, this represents merely the initial phase of a broader process. It is not the technology itself that is of primary importance, but how it is employed. In light of the considerations mentioned above, it can be concluded that the decision to provide intelligence agencies with drones and to permit the militarization of intelligence was a bold yet prudent one. It is noteworthy to point out that Türkiye has a history of employing drones in counterterrorism operations. The use of drones for technical intelligence purposes by the Turkish Armed Forces commenced in 1994 with the acquisition of the GNAT-750 model. This resulted in Türkiye becoming one of the few countries worldwide to utilize drones. However, it became evident that the organizational structure necessary for utilizing this technical capacity was not in place then. That is why the systems were initially deployed in the Thrace region for artillery forward observation. It was not until 1997 that the systems were deployed in Batman against the PKK/KCK. Conversely, the cessation of PKK/KCK activities from 1999 onwards resulted in the cessation of additional drone procurement projects, thus preventing

²⁹ The armed wing of the PKK/KCK is the People's Defence Forces (Hêzên Parastina Gel – HPG). In this article, the acronym PKK/KCK is used.

the modernization of Türkiye's drone capacity. After the PKK/KCK resumed its attacks in 2004, Türkiye attempted to procure additional drones. However, the imported systems proved to be less effective than desired.³⁰

The enhancement of Türkiye's drone capabilities has reached a significant milestone with the incorporation of domestically manufactured drones into the inventory, particularly the Aselsan ANKA and Baykar TB-2 models. The TB-2 were models initially delivered in November 2014, while the armed versions were delivered in October 2017. It can be argued that these instruments have influenced the new counterterrorism doctrine heavily. Despite the lack of precise data on the number of Türkiye's armed drones, it can be reasonably inferred that the country currently has over 300 operational drones.³¹ Considering the fact that Türkiye had less than 100 drones in 2018, the marginal difference is noteworthy.

As evidenced by publicly accessible sources, drones were incorporated into the inventory of MİT in 2019.³² This information also coincides with the commencement of the organization's operations against the PKK/KCK. According to open sources, the first operation conducted by MİT against the listed organization members is dated 23 March 2019. Subsequently, there has been a notable increase in the number of MİT's intelligence-led targeting operations against PKK/KCK targets abroad. This can also be elucidated through an examination of the Ministry of the Interior's list of neutralized members of the PKK/KCK organization. A review of the open source data reveals that MİT drones neutralized 22 of the 45 targets neutralized abroad between January 2019 and December 2024 (Graph-1). In addition, 14 individuals out of the total of 44 names on the red list (both in Türkiye and abroad) were targeted by MİT within the same time period (Graph 2).³³ As evidenced by the graphs, starting in 2022, MİT assumed the role of the primary actor in targeting operations abroad.³⁴ In 2023, these figures reached their peak. According to a press release by MİT, 201 PKK/KCK members were neutralized in 181 operations in 2023, with the many of these operations supported by drones. Furthermore, 45 energy infrastructure facilities, weapons and ammunition depots utilized by the PKK/KCK were destroyed.³⁵

30 İbrahim Sünnetçi, "İHA'lar ve Türkiye'nin İnsansız Havadan İstihbarat Çalışmaları", *Savunma ve Havaçılık Dergisi*, 132, 2009.

31 In the open-source information, it is indicated that as of January 2023, Türkiye had approximately 150 Bayraktar TB2s and approximately 12 Akıncı drones. Additionally, it is noted that the production number of ANKA drones exceeded 100 by February 2024. Furthermore, it has been suggested that five Aksungur aircraft were deployed in 2022. See "Selçuk Bayraktar Açıkladı: İhraç edilen SİHA'lar Türkiye'yi Hedef Alabilir Mi?", January 3 2023, <https://www.savunmasanayist.com/selcuk-bayraktar-acikladi-ihrac-edilen-sihalar-turkiyeyi-hedef-alabilir-mi/>, accessed 11.09.2023; "ANKA S/İHA'da Kritik Eşik... Üretim Sayısı 100'ü Geçti", 27 February 2024, <https://m5dergi.com/savunma-haberleri/anka-s-ihada-kritik-esik-uretim-sayisi-100u-gecti/>, accessed 11.07.2024. It can be reasonably assumed that these figures will be considerably higher by the end of 2024. Additionally, the total number of drones produced at Baykar facilities as of June 2023 is reported to be 580. Given that approximately 300 TB2 and Akıncı are produced annually, it can be predicted that the number of drones produced will exceed 1000 by the end of 2024. However, there is currently no clear information available on the number of these vehicles that have been exported, nor on the number that have been involved in accidents or breakdowns.

32 "MİT silahlı insansız hava aracı TB2 aldı", 25 June 2019, <https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/mitten-yeni-hamle-bayraktar-tb2-envantere-girdi-3496164>, accessed 11.06.2024

33 Only the names with open source information available are analyzed.


34 It is important to note that a significant number of additional members of the PKK/KCK, who were not included in this list, have been neutralized by MİT. Despite the abundant information available from open sources, only those members included in the list have been taken into consideration here.

35 "MİT Operasyonları, Terör Örgütü PKK'nın Sözde Sorumlularını Hedef Aldı", 30 August 2012, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/mit-operasyonlari-teror-orgutu-pkknin-sozde-sorumlularini-hedef-aldi/3085510>, accessed 10.12.2023.

Graph 1. Neutralized PKK/KCK Members Abroad³⁶



Graph 2. Neutralized PKK/KCK Members of the Red List³⁷



Furthermore, the capacity of the Turkish Air Forces has been employed in this process. It is worthy of note that between 2019 and 2021, a total of another nine targets identified by MIT in Northern Iraq were struck by the Air Forces. However, no evidence found in open sources that the Air Forces neutralized any target in the list between 2022 and 2024. This situation can be interpreted as the developments in drone technology (including introducing of new drone models, satellite control systems and ammunition) have augmented MIT's capacity to conduct independent operations.

³⁶ The graphic was prepared by the author by using Ministry of the Interior's list of neutralized terrorists list and open sources.

³⁷ The graphic was prepared by the author by using Ministry of the Interior's list of neutralized terrorists list and open sources.

The critical juncture in the transformation of MİT is 2019, the year in which started to use drones for operational purposes. As previously stated, however, this represents merely the tip of the iceberg. Beneath the surface lies a mental and organizational transformation. The organizational transformation of the agency had two significant implications for MİT's counterterrorism operations. As mentioned above, these are the growing significance of tactical intelligence priorities and the integration of intelligence and operations under a unified mission.

Firstly, in the traditional understanding, MİT, essentially a civilian intelligence organization, has been tasked with two primary functions: providing qualified tactical intelligence to operational units and providing strategic intelligence to decision makers. In the context of military intelligence, strategic priorities have traditionally been regarded as of being greater importance than tactical ones. The main rationale is that the agency has consistently been the primary entity engaged in strategic intelligence operations, encompassing not only foreign policy but also counterterrorism issue. In addition, as the focus of tactical priorities is not on assisting those in the decision-making process, resulting the fact that that receive less attention than strategic intelligence. Furthermore, the activities associated with tactical intelligence have historically been perceived as analogous to police work and, thus have been regarded with a certain degree of disdain. Therefore, it is unsurprising that MİT attaches more importance to strategic intelligence. In this manner, the motto "*the intelligence officer's weapon is his/her pen*" reflected this distinction. However, tactical intelligence products may lack the sophistication of their strategic counterparts, yet they are instrumental in the sustained effort to degrade and ultimately defeat terrorist organizations.

The second, and arguably more significant reason is that the intelligence gathered in counterterrorism could not be effectively transformed into operations then. Thus, MİT was a giant in intelligence but a dwarf in operations. Consequently, counterintelligence and foreign intelligence activities, which constitute agency's remaining responsibilities were regarded as the primary focus. The involvement of the police, gendarmerie, and armed forces in counterterrorism operations, coupled with the fact that these institutions possess operational capabilities, resulted in a notable asymmetry in the roles and responsibilities of the agency. MİT was traditionally regarded as an auxiliary actor in targeting operations. Even the question of whether MİT should be involved in counterterrorism intelligence was raised. This lack of clarity has been a persistent challenge for MİT in its role as a provider of counterterrorism intelligence. The operational dependence of MİT on other institutions has resulted in many challenges, including turf wars, bottlenecks, loss of time and an asymmetry of authority.

The new technologies have enabled MİT to address the imbalance in tactical priorities. As a result, MİT underwent a transformation, becoming increasingly militarized and assuming a prominent role in the tactical priorities of counterterrorism. At this juncture, the second pillar of the organizational transformation, namely the integration of intelligence and operations, assumes particular significance. MİT formed new units and established new mission statements aligned with its organizational formation. This is why the transformation in question is not merely mechanical, but also mental. In this context, MİT utilizes its own personnel for the drone fleet and recruits drone pilots.³⁸ MİT has also recruited personnel from Special Forces units, to conduct military operations abroad.³⁹

38 MİT's official web site, 30 September 2012, https://www.mit.gov.tr/ozgectmis-gonder_iha-sistemleripilotu_6.html, accessed 11.05.2024.

39 "MİT'ten 'operasyonel' transfer!", 30 September 2012, <https://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/780974-mitten-operasyonel-transfer>, accessed 11.09.2023.

In conclusion, while MİT possesses considerable capabilities in intelligence collection for counterterrorism, its lack of operational authority and capacity has resulted in a notable asymmetry vis-à-vis its counterparts. The operational symmetry recently provided by drones has enabled MİT to translate its strength in intelligence gathering to the field, thereby enhancing its operational capabilities. This signifies that MİT has transitioned from its conventional role of collector and auxiliary to its newly assumed role of autonomous drone operations. In other words, in counterterrorism, the weapon of the intelligence officer has become not only the pen but also the drone, representing a significant shift in the nature of the tools at their disposal. Combining modern firepower with traditional tactical intelligence activities has transformed MİT into a highly effective actor in counterterrorism. In the present era, and for the first time in the history of the Republic of Türkiye, MİT has become a principal actor in targeted operations abroad.

Conclusion

In the 21st century, intelligence agencies have assumed a prominent role in armed conflicts. They are particularly active in unconventional conflicts, such as counterterrorism. The article examines this new mission in the context of technological and organizational variables. It proposes that the organizational transformation prompted by technological advancement has resulted in the militarization of intelligence agencies and a shift in their role in counterterrorism.

The technological aspect of the transformation encompasses the use of targeting intelligence tools and advanced firepower technology. The advent of drone technology has precipitated a shift in the role of intelligence agencies, positioning them at the forefront of combat operations. Prior to this advent, intelligence agencies were regarded as a means of collection and analysis, and the final stage of the process, which is to take action, was under the purview of executive agencies such as the military or law enforcement. However, drones have allowed intelligence agencies to possess their own firepower capabilities at a relatively low cost. Consequently, the phases of intelligence and operations, which were previously conducted by disparate units or organizations, have been consolidated under a unified command structure, thereby increasing the frequency of operations against cells to an unprecedented degree. Thus, intelligence agencies like MİT have become increasingly militarized, assuming not only the role of collector but also that of hunter.

Nevertheless, the transformation of MİT is not solely a technological transformation. Although technology is the catalyst for the militarization of intelligence, it is merely the initial aspect of a much larger phenomenon. The organizational transformation combining intelligence and operations within the scope of militarized tactical priorities represents the submerged portion of the iceberg. This novel organizational structure unites case officers, target analysts, special forces, local armed groups, host nation militaries, and cutting-edge technology to address tactical target priorities in counterterrorism. In counterterrorism, the primary objective of tactical intelligence is the neutralization of clandestine cells. Under the tactical intelligence priorities, mentioned before, the conventional structure entails the analysis of information procured from disparate sources by intelligence agencies, which is subsequently conveyed to the executive authorities responsible for the operation. This can be seen as creating a virtual organizational wall between the domains of intelligence and operations. The principal rationale for separating intelligence and operations is civilian intelligence agencies' lack of operational capacity. However, the advent of drone technology has progressively militarized tactical intelligence priorities, closing the gap between

intelligence and operations. This development has also resulted novel hybrid organizational structures integrating intelligence and operations.

Accordingly, the article examines the militarization of MİT in the context of MİT's drone program against the PKK/KCK in Iraq and Syria. After 2019, MİT has become a significant instrument in counterterrorism activities in these regions. This transformation of MİT is initiated by technological advancement but ultimately achieved through organizational adaptation. In this context, the military activities of MİT offer a rich field of research potential for those engaged in the study of intelligence and terrorism. In light of Türkiye's engagement with non-state actors exhibiting diverse characteristics across numerous conflict zones, the activities of MİT present a compelling avenue for scholarly inquiry. Furthermore, it is the police and gendarmerie units responsible for providing counterterrorism intelligence in Türkiye could be subjected to a similar analysis.

However, the confidentiality of intelligence activities precludes the availability of sufficient information from publicly accessible sources. Thus, the most significant challenge has been to obtain precise and pertinent information about the military activities of MİT. It is reasonable to conclude that it is not feasible to utilize information not made publicly available by official authorities in open sources for the purposes of this study. Consequently, this study analyses MİT's military activities in counterterrorism by examining press releases and the Ministry of the Interior's list of neutralized members of the PKK/KCK in Iraq and Syria. As further information becomes available, it will be possible to conduct more detailed studies on this subject, and future studies may examine not only the military aspects of the issue, but also its legal and political dimensions.

Conflict of Interest Statement:

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

References

Published Work

- ATEŞ Ahmet (2020). *Understanding the Change in Intelligence Organizations: An Institutional Framework*, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Delaware, Delaware.
- BAKOS Nada (2019). *The Targeter: My Life in the CIA, Hunting Terrorists, and Challenging the White House*, Little, Brown & Company, Boston.
- BARGER Deborah (2005). *Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs*, RAND, California.
- BERKOWITZ Bruce (2002). "Intelligence and the War on Terrorism", *Orbis*, 46:2, 289-300.
- CLARRIDGE Duane (1997). *A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA*, Scribner, New York.
- CRELINSTEN Ronald, SCHMID Alex (1992). "Western Responses to Terrorism A Twenty-five Year Balance Sheet", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 4:4, 307-340.
- ÇAYCI Sadi (2002). "Countering Terrorism and the Law of Armed Conflict: The Turkish Experience", *International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations*, 8, 333-348.
- DEMİR Cenker Korhan (2017). *Sebeplerinden Mücadele Yöntemlerine Etnik Ayrılıkçı Terörizm: PIRA, ETA, PKK*, Nobel Kitap, Ankara.
- DENÉCÉ Eric (2014). "The Revolution in Intelligence Affairs: 1989–2003", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 27:1, 27-41.

- DUDZINSKY S. J. and DIGBY James (1976). *The Strategic and Tactical Implications of New Weapon Technologies*, RAND, California.
- FERRIS John (2004). "Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution in Military Intelligence?", *Intelligence and National Security*, 19:2, 199-225.
- FULLER Christopher (2017). *See It/Shoot It The Secret History of the CIA's Lethal Drone Program*, Yale University Press, London.
- GAIBULLOEV Khusrav and SANDLER Todd (2014). "An Empirical Analysis of Alternative Ways that Terrorist Groups End", *Public Choice*, 160, 25-44.
- GOODMAN Glenn (2007). "ISR Now Synonymous with Operations", *Journal of Electronic Defense*, 30:7, 19-20.
- HERMAN Michael (1998). "Where Hath Our Intelligence Been? The Revolution in Military Affairs", *The RUSI Journal*, 143:6, 62-68.
- JINKS Derek (2003). "September 11 and the Laws of War", *The Yale Journal of International Law*, 28:1, 1-49.
- JONES Seth and LIBICKY Martin (2008). *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qaeda*. RAND, California.
- KENT Sherman (1965). *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, Archon Books, Connecticut
- KRAUSE Peter (2013). "The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence: A Two-Level Framework to Transform a Deceptive Debate", *Security Studies*, 22:2, 259-294.
- KREPINEVICH Andrew (1994). "Cavalry to Computer the Pattern of Military Revolutions", *The National Interest*, 37, 30-42.
- LAHNEMAN William (2007). "Is a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs Occurring?", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 20:1, 1-17.
- LEVENT Zeynel (2019). *Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa'dan Kuva-yı Milliye'ye Gayrinizami Harp (1913-1922) Doctoral Dissertation*, Ankara University, Ankara
- MARRIN Stephen (2013). "Evaluating CIA's Analytic Performance- Reflections of a Former Analyst", *Orbis*, 57:2, 325-339.
- MAZZETTI Mark (2013). *The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth*, Penguin Press, New York.
- MCCHRYSTAL Stanley (2013). *My Share of the Task A Memoir*, Penguin Books, London,
- NEVILLE Leigh and BUJEIRO Ramiro (2008). *Special Operations, Forces in Afghanistan*, Osprey.
- PILLAR Paul (2001). *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, The Brookings Institution, Washington.
- POLLARD Neal and SULLIVAN John (2014). "Counterterrorism and Intelligence", Robert Dover, Michael Goodman & Claudia Hillebrand (eds.), *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies*, Routledge, London.
- RID Thomas (2009). "Razzia: A Turning Point in Modern Strategy", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21:4, 617-635.
- SAFI, Polat (2023). *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı 1826-2023*, Kronik, İstanbul
- SCAHILL Jeremy (2013). *Dirty Wars: The World is a Battlefield*, Nation Books, New York.
- SCHMID Alex (2011). "Introduction", Alex Schmid (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, Routledge, London, 1-39.
- SHULTZ Richard (2016). *Military Innovation in War: It Takes a Learning Organization A Case Study of Task Force 714 in Iraq*, The JSOU Press, Florida.
- STRACHAN Hew (2013). *The Direction of War Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- SÜNNETÇİ İbrahim (2009). "İHA'lar ve Türkiye'nin İnsansız Havadan İstihbarat Çalışmaları." *Savunma ve Havacılık Dergisi*, 132, 75-80.
- WALZER Michael (2016). "Just & Unjust Targeted Killing & Drone Warfare", *Daedalus*, 145:4, 12-24.
- WARNER Michael (2012). "Reflections on Technology and Intelligence Systems", *Intelligence and National Security*, 27:1, 133-153.
- WEINBERG Leonard (2012). *The End of Terrorism?*, Routledge, London.
- WILKINSON Paul (2011). *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*, Routledge, London.
- ZEGART Amy (2007). *Spying Blind The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Internet Sources

- “MİT operasyonları, terör örgütü PKK'nın sözde sorumlularını hedef aldı”, www.aa.com.tr, accessed 10.12.2023.
- “MİT'ten ‘operasyonel’ transfer!”, www.haberturk.com, accessed 11.09.2023.
- “Selçuk Bayraktar Açıkladı: İhraç edilen SİHA'lar Türkiye'yi Hedef Alabilir Mi?”, www.savunmasanayist.com, accessed 11.09.2023.
- “ANKA S/İHA'da kritik eşik... Üretim Sayısı 100'ü Geçti”, www.m5dergi.com, accessed 11.07.2024.
- “MİT silahlı insansız hava aracı TB2 aldı”, www.yenisafak.com, accessed 11.06.2024.
- BEGLEY Josh. “A Visual Glossary Decoding the Language of Covert Warfare”, 15 October 2015, <https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/a-visual-glossary/>, accessed 03.05.2020.
- International Committee of the Red Cross. “What is International Humanitarian Law?”, 2004, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf, accessed 28.04.2024.
- MILLER Greg and TATE Julie. “Cia Shifts Focus to Killing Targets,” *Washington Post*, 1 September 2011. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-shifts-focus-to-killing-targets/2011/08/30/giqa7mzgvj_print.html, accessed 11.09.2022.
- MAZZETTI Mark and SCHOU Nicholas. “Outing The CIA's ‘Undertaker’”, *Newsweek*, <https://www.newsweek.com/cia-michael-dandrea-new-york-times-mark-mazzetti-drones-pakistan-al-qaeda-war-475180>, accessed 07.05.2020.
- MİT's Official Web Site. https://www.mit.gov.tr/ozgecmis-gonder_iha-sistemleripilotu_6.html, accessed 11.05.2024.
- ZEGART Amy, “The CIA Spent 20 Years on the Front Lines of the War on Terror. It's Time for That to Change”, November 2021, <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/09/11/9-11-america-spycraft-510880?s=03>, accessed 11.09.2023.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

Articles submitted to the *Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi* shall not be previously published and shall be authentic in a way that it will contribute to literature of the relevant field. Articles, which are descriptive, expect for the stated parameters in the “Publication Ethics and Evaluation Process” or which are repetitive in their field, will not be taken into evaluation. Articles based on presentations submitted in scientific meetings may be accepted for evaluation, provided that they have not been published in the proceedings of the meetings and that the authors inform the editors so.

The ethical principles and publication policy of the *Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi* have been prepared in accordance with the guidelines and policies published by the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE). Detailed information on publication principles, relations with authors and relations with referees can be found under the relevant sections on the website of our journal.

If the articles submitted via <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/guvenlikstrj> comply with the formatting principles presented below and is found to eligible in terms of subject/field, they are assigned to (at least two) referees who are experts in the field for review and evaluation. The authors may re-submit their articles, which are rejected by the Publication Committee, after they revise their work in accordance with the reports of reviewers. If the article is considered to be ill-revised, it is rejected and the process is over. If the article is considered to be revised properly, it is taken as a newly submitted article into the reviewing process. The reports of the referees are of advisory nature and the decision to publish is taken by the Editorial Board.

Authors, who send articles in a foreign language to the Journal, are obliged to get their work proof-read by a native speaker academic who is considered as an expert on their field and to provide an evidence of this proof-reading.

Opinions expressed in the articles published in the Journal are the personal scientific evaluations of the authors and are not, in any way, the institutional views or opinions of their own organizations/institutes or of the Atatürk Strategic Studies and Graduate Institute or the Turkish National Defence University. The authors whose articles have been published in the *Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi* are considered as natural peer-reviewers of the Journal and they are obliged to perform a peer-review at least once upon the request of the Editors.

Formatting Principles for Articles

1. The publication language of *JGüvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi* is Turkish. However, articles written in English, German, and French may also be published. The texts submitted shall be clear and understandable and be in line with scientific criteria in terms of language and expression.
2. The article submitted shall have minimum of 6000 words and maximum of 10,000 words including abstract, summary, bibliography, and footnotes. The articles which are below the minimum or above the maximum counts of words are returned to the authors without being evaluated.
3. The articles shall be submitted with the abstract no longer than 200 words and five keywords. The abstract shall include purpose, method, hypothesis/question, and findings of the article and present the conclusion reached in the article shortly. While writing the abstract, the author shall comply to the rule of “one short and two long sentences”. (In the articles written in German or French, abstracts and keywords in Turkish and English shall be added, as well as the abstract and keywords in the original language of the article.) The article shall also have a summary 750-1000 words at the end of the text. The summary shall include the points and arguments, which are considered to emphasize and the general outline of the article, in addition to the points pointed out in the abstract. In the articles written in Turkish, the aforementioned extensive summary shall be in English. For articles written in English, extensive summary shall be written in Turkish. The articles written in German or France, the extensive summary shall be written in both English and Turkish.
4. Articles submitted to the *JGüvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi* shall be written using the program Microsoft

Word in 11 font size in the text and 9 font size in the footnotes. Paragraph properties of the text shall be aligned and line spacing of 1.5 line and paragraph properties of the footnotes shall be aligned and line spacing of 1 line. The page numbers shall be at the bottom of the page.

5. Name of the author shall be placed under the title of the article; their title, place of duty and e-mail address shall be indicated in the footnote with (*) in 9 font size. Footnotes for other explanations shall be provided in numbers at the bottom of the page. The article shall have two-level subheadings and these subheadings shall written bold and numbered (except for introduction and conclusion).

6. Citations in the text shall be shown with double quotes (“...”) and citations with more than three lines shall be written as a new paragraph as a inward, singled spaced and aligned paragraph. Citations within citations shall be shown with a single quote (‘...’). The words to be emphasized within the text shall not be written in bold or underlined but shall be written with double quotes (“...”).

7. The citations shall be made according to guidelines presented below. Articles, which do not comply with these guidelines, will be rejected directly.

8. Multiple references for the same publication shall be made by fully complying the guidelines below in the first reference and then by using the surname and the shortened name of the study. For multiple references in subsequent footnotes, the phrase “ibid” shall be used.

9. The citations in the shall be written as follows:

9.1. Books: name and surname of the author, name of the book, (volume number, if any), (translator, if any), publishing house, place of publication, date of publication, and page number shall be given in order in accordance with the following examples.

1 Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, Free Press, New York, 1964, p. 210.

2 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, FSG Adult, 1st edition, New York, 2008, p. 92.

3 Mustafa Aydın, Mitat Çelikpala et al., *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Çatışmadan Güvenliğe*, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2015, p. 79.

4 Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, p. 155.

5 Ibid, p. 156.

9.2. Articles: name and surname of the author, “name of the article” (translator, if any), name of the periodical, date of publication, number and volume, page number of the reference shall be given in order in accordance with the following examples. For the reference to the encyclopedia articles, same rules apply.

Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29:5, 2006, p. 910.

Özlem Durgun and Mustafa Caner Timur, “Savunma Harcamaları ve Ekonomik Büyüme İlişkisi: Türkiye Analizi”, *Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 54, 2017, p. 119.

Lütfi Sürücü, Fehiman Eminer and Murat Sağbaş, “The Relationship of Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth Examples of Turkey and China (2000-2020)”, *Journal of Security Strategies*, 18:41, 2022, p. 175.

In the articles with four or more authors, the names are abbreviated after the first author, as “Gültekin Yıldız et al.”.

9.3. Chapters/articles in edited books and proceedings books:

Engin Avcı, “Ceza Adalet Sistemi Çerçevesinde Şiddet İçeren Radikalleşmeyle Mücadele: Terörist Rehabilitasyonu ve Yeniden Topluma Kazandırma”, Gökhan Sarı & Cenker Korhan Demir (eds.), *Uluslararası Güvenlik Kongresi, Kuram, Yöntem, Uygulama*, Jandarma ve Sahil Güvenlik Akademisi Yayınları, Ankara, 2019, s. 433.

9.4. Online articles:

George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, *Foreign Affairs Magazine*, July 1947, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct>, accessed 21.11.2019.

Kaan Kılıç, “Türk Hava Sanayinin Gelişiminde Polonyalıların Etkisi”, <https://savasarastirmalari.com/turk-hava-sanayinin-gelisiminde-polonyalin-etkisi/>, accessed 21.05.2022.

“War in Ukraine”, www.internetkaynak.com, accessed 10.05.2022.

9.5. Theses/dissertations: no italics shall be used for the titles of the unpublished theses/dissertations. Name and surname of the author, title of the thesis/dissertation, degree of the thesis/dissertation, institution or institute to which it was submitted, place and date, page number shall be given in accordance with the following example.

Tolga Öz, Reverse Logistics and Applications in the Defense Industry, Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Dokuz Eylül University, İzmir, Turkey, 2007, p.60.

10. Attachments shall be presented at the end of the text and brief information as to the content and source of the document shall be presented at the bottom of it. Tables and figures (including graphics) may be presented within the text of the article as well as in the attachments. If they are to be presented within the text of article, tables, figures, and graphics shall be numbered in their own order (such as Table 1, Figure 2, etc). The number of the table or figure and the introductory title regarding the content of it shall be given at the bottom of the table or figure centered. If citations are made for tables, figures, graphics and pictures, the sources of the citations shall be given with a footnote.

11. Resources shall be sorted alphabetically in a bibliography at the end of the article. Internet sources shall be added at the end of the bibliography. The entries of the bibliography shall be written by putting the surname of the author first (IN CAPITAL LETTERS) and then name of the author; then all the other information of the sources shall be included as done in the references.

REFERENCES SAMPLE:

REFERENCES

Archival Sources (If available)

The referencing rules of the relevant archive should be taken into account.

Published Works

Book

YILDIZ Gültekin (2021). *Osmanlı Devleti’nde Askeri İstihbarat*, Yeditepe Yayınları, İstanbul.
SCHELLING Thomas C. (2008). *Arms and Influence*, Yale University Press, Revised edition, New Haven.

YILDIZ Gültekin (ed.) (2017). *Osmanlı Askeri Tarihi: Kara, Deniz ve Hava Kuvvetleri 1792 – 1918*, Timaş Yayınları, İstanbul.

MEARSHEIMER John J. and WALT Stephen M. (2008). *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, FSG Adult, New York.

SCHMITT Carl (2018). *Kara ve Deniz*, (trans. Gültekin Yıldız), Vakıfbank Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul.

Book Chapter

İNALCIK Halil (2002). “Barbaros’tan İnebahtı (Leponto)’ya Akdeniz”, Bülent Arı (ed.), *Türk Denizcilik Tarihi*, T.C. Başbakanlık Denizcilik Müsteşarlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 141-154.

BALZACQ Thierry and DOMBROWSKI Peter J. (2019). “Introduction Comparing Grand Strategies in the Modern World”, Thierry Balzacq, Peter J Dombrowski ve Simon Reich (eds.), *Comparative Grand Strategy: A Framework and Cases*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019. 1-21.

Article

GRISSOM Adam (2006). “The Future of Military Innovation Studies”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29:5, 905-934.

ARQUILLA John ve FREDRICKSEN Hal (1995). “Graphing’ an Optimal Grand Strategy”, *Military Operations Research*, 1:3, 3-17.

KALELİOĞLU Uğur Berk (2022). “Alman Askeri Sosyolojisi: Gelişim, Kurumsallaşma ve Sınırlılıklar”, *Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi*, 18:41, 201-224.

Doctoral Dissertation/Master’s Thesis

ATEŞ Barış (2014). Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Askeri Değişim: NATO Orduları ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Üzerine Karşılaştırmalı Bir Analiz, *Doctoral Dissertation*, Gazi Üniversitesi, Ankara.

KİBAROĞLU Mustafa (1996). The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime at The Crossroads: Strengthening or Uncertainty, *Doctoral Dissertation*, Bilkent Üniversitesi, Ankara.

Web Page

KENNAN George F. (1947). “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, *Foreign Affairs Magazine*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct>, erişim 21.10.2023.

CHARAP Samuel ve PRIEBE Miranda. “Avoiding a Long War: U.S. Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict”, RAND Report, Ocak 2023, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PEA2500/PEA2510-1/RAND_PEA2510-1.pdf, erişim 21.10.2023.

KILIÇ Kaan. “Türk Hava Sanayinin Gelişiminde Polonyalıların Etkisi”, <https://savasarastirmalari.com/turk-hava-sanayinin-gelisiminde-polonyanin-etkisi/>, erişim 21.05.2022.

“War in Ukraine”, www.internetkaynak.com, erişim 10.05.2022.

