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Abbas Çelik, Nevfel Boz, Khalid El-awaisi

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Abbas Çelik* Nevfel Boz ** Khalid El-awaisi***

* Lisansüstü Öğrencisi; Kudüs Çalışmaları, Ankara Sosyal Bilimler Üniversitesi, Ankara, Türkiye; abbascelik1@gmail.com; ORCID: 0000-0002-5862-4102.

** Doç. Dr.; Yeni Medya ve İletişim Bölümü, İletişim Fakültesi, Ankara Sosyal Bilimler Üniversitesi, Ankara, Türkiye; nevfelboz@gmail.com; ORCID: 0000-0001-6109-1610.

*** Doç. Dr.; İlahiyat Fakültesi, Ankara Sosyal Bilimler Üniversitesi, Ankara, Türkiye; halid.uveysi@asbu.edu.tr; ORCID: 0000-0001-9994-3305.

The Role of X "Twitter" in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict a Focus on MFA's Official Accounts

This research delves into the role of Twitter in the Israel-Palestine conflict, particularly focusing on the use of tweets by the Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates (MFA). The Israel-Palestine conflict, with its deep historical roots and multifaceted dimensions involving land, identity, and sovereignty, presents a unique case study for examining the influence of social media on conflict dynamics. This study aims to explore how Twitter, a platform crucial to modern political discourse and public opinion formation, is utilized by these official entities to propagate narratives, shape perceptions, and potentially influence diplomacy efforts. By analysing the content of tweets from these official accounts, the study seeks to understand how digital diplomacy through Twitter can act as a facilitator. It considers the broader sociopolitical context, including the influence of mainstream media and international actors, to provide a comprehensive view of X's role in the conflict. The research is guided by the primary question: How do the Twitter accounts of the Israeli and Palestinian Ministries of Foreign Affairs communicate to Twitter/X's users during the October 7 War?

Keywords: Social Media, Conflict, Palestine, Israel, Communication, Foreign Ministry.

Filistin-İsrail Çatışmasında Dışişleri Bakanlıklarının Resmi Hesaplarına Odaklanarak X'in "Twitter" Rolü

Bu araştırma, İsrail-Filistin çatışmasındaki Twitter'ın karmaşık rolünü detaylı bir şekilde incelemekte, özellikle İsrail Dışişleri Bakanlığı ve Filistin Dışişleri Bakanlığı ve Gurbetçiler tarafından kullanılan tweet kullanımına odaklanmaktadır. İsrail-Filistin çatışması, tarihsel kökenleri derin ve toprak, kimlik, egemenlik gibi çok boyutlu yönleri içeren bir durum olarak, sosyal medyanın çatışma dinamiklerine etkisini incelemek için eşsiz bir vaka çalışması sunmaktadır. Bu çalışma, modern politik söylem ve kamuoyu oluşumu için önemli bir platform olan Twitter'ın, söz konusu resmî kurumlar tarafından nasıl kullanıldığını, anlatıların nasıl yayıldığını, algıların nasıl şekillendirildiğini ve potansiyel olarak diplomasiyi nasıl etki edebildiğini araştırmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu resmi hesaplardan gelen tweetlerin içerik yapılarının analizi yoluyla, çalışma, Twitter aracılığıyla yürütülen dijital diplomasi faaliyetlerinin nasıl etki edebileceğini anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Araştırma, geniş sosyopolitik bağlamı, ana akım medyanın ve uluslararası aktörlerin etkisini de göz önünde bulundurarak, çatışmadaki X'in rolüne dair kapsamlı bir değerlendirme sunmaktadır. Araştırma, sosyal medya analizinin ortak zemin bulma potansiyeli ve İsrail ve Filistin Dışişleri Twitter hesaplarının anlatılarının şekillendirmedeki katkılarını sorgulayan soru ile yönlendirilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Medya, Çatışma, Filistin, İsrail, İletişim, Dışişleri Bakanlığı.

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The Role of X “Twitter” in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict a Focus on MFA’s Official Accounts*

1. Introduction

The Israel-Palestine conflict or Israeli occupation¹ remains one of the most complex and long-lasting geopolitical disputes in modern history, with roots dating back to the early 20th century (Bickerton & Klausner, 2015). The struggle over land, resources, national identity, and political sovereignty has spanned generations and shaped the political landscape of West Asia. Over time, this conflict has taken on religious, ethnic, and nationalist dimensions, with both Israelis and Palestinians asserting their right to self-determination and control over contested territories (Gelvin, 2014). Efforts to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict have faced numerous obstacles and setbacks, as well as an evolving landscape of political alliances and international pressures (Caplan, 2011). As social media increasingly becomes an integral part of our daily lives, it has consequently emerged as a powerful tool for shaping public opinion, mobilizing support, and fostering dialogues on global issues.

This study investigates the intricate role of Twitter in shaping narratives within the Israel-Palestine conflict context, primarily focusing on the Twitter accounts of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates one month period after “October 7 War”/ Tufan Al-Aqsa. By analyzing the content and frequency of tweets featuring these tweets and hashtags, hoping to shed light on the ways in which digital diplomacy is used. The overarching goal is to gain a comprehensive understanding of how Twitter functions as a platform for constructing and disseminating narratives in a highly contested geopolitical setting.

The primary aim of this research is to examine the impact of social media, specifically Twitter, on the Israel-Palestine conflict. It focuses on how the tweets and hashtags used by both official accounts may utilize narratives and public opinion to identify potential opportunities for using social media as a tool for digital diplomacy. By analyzing the content, sentiment, and the structure of social networks associated with these tweets, the study intends to uncover avenues through which Twitter serves as a platform for communicating both sides’ narrative.

To achieve these objectives, the research will be guided by the following question:

- How do the Twitter accounts of the Israeli and Palestinian Ministries of Foreign Affairs communicate to Twitter/ X’s users during the October 7 War?

2. Method

In this study, we adopt a constructivist paradigm. Given the complex, multifaceted, and subjective nature of the narratives surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict, a constructivist approach allows us to delve deeper into the intricacies of meaning-making and representation. From a constructivist perspective, reality isn’t fixed or singular. Instead, it’s socially constructed, meaning different individuals or groups may have varying interpretations of the same event or phenomenon based on their experiences, backgrounds, and contexts (Kratochwil, 1989). Unlike positivist research, where the researcher remains detached, the constructivist researcher is deeply involved in the process. They interpret the data in conjunction with their understanding, acknowledging their biases and perspectives. Knowledge isn’t discovered but constructed (Finnemore, 2003). In the context of this study, the narratives presented by the Israeli and Palestinian MFA’s on Twitter are not mere reflections of an objective reality they are crafted, strategic representations shaped by various factors, including political objectives, historical contexts, and anticipated audience reactions. Adopting a constructivist paradigm means qualitative data will play a significant role. Instead of merely counting tweets or measuring

* This article derived from a master thesis of first author titled “The Role of X (Twitter) in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: A Focus on MFA’s Official Accounts”.

¹ Israeli occupation or Israel-Palestine conflict are going to be used interchangeable in this research.

engagements, we will prioritize understanding the nuances, subtexts, and implied meanings in the narratives. Our analysis will be interpretive. We'll seek to comprehend the motivations behind specific tweets, the choice of language and the intended messages. Comparisons between the Israeli and the Palestinian MFA's will be made in light of their respective sociopolitical contexts. Given the subjective nature of our data, it's essential to ensure our interpretations are credible, transferable, and resonate with the broader realities of the Israel-Palestine conflict. While the constructivist paradigm embraces subjectivity, it's crucial to remain conscious of our biases and preconceptions. Reflexivity, or continuous self-reflection during the research process, will be vital. The choice of a constructivist paradigm underscores the study's commitment to understanding the depth, nuances, and complexities of the narratives propagated by the Israeli and Palestinian MFAs on Twitter. By acknowledging the constructed nature of these narratives and emphasizing interpretation and meaning-making, this research aims to provide a holistic, insightful, and culturally sensitive analysis of the Twitter-based diplomacy surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict.

3. Background of the Conflict

The origins of the conflict can be traced back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with the rise of nationalist movements among Jewish and Arab populations in the region (Smith, 2016). The establishment of the Zionist movement, which aimed to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine, played a significant role in shaping the course of the conflict (Herzl, 1896). As made-up Jewish immigration, known as Aliyah, to Palestine increased during the early 20th century, tensions between Jews and Muslims escalated, leading to a series of violent confrontations (Morris, 2001). During WWI announcement of Balfour Declaration (1917) and the British Mandate for Palestine (1922-1948), established following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, further exacerbated the conflict by attempting to balance the aspirations of both Jewish and Arab communities while maintaining British control over the territory (Segev, 2000). Since 1948, the Israel-Palestine conflict has been characterized by a series of wars, uprisings (known as intifadas), and ongoing disputes over borders, territories, and the rights of Palestinian refugees (Gelvin, 2014). Numerous peace initiatives, "zero sum game negotiations" have been proposed and attempted over the years, such as the Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1995, second one also known as Taba Agreement, and the Camp David Summit in 2000, but a comprehensive and lasting resolution to the conflict has remained elusive (Ross, 2004). Several key issues continue to fuel the conflict, including the status of Jerusalem as a contested holy city for Jews, Christians, and Muslims the borders of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state the rights and status of Palestinian refugees and security concerns related to terrorism, violence, and regional instability. Furthermore, the role of external actors, such as the United States, European Union, Iran and Arab states and Türkiye has had a significant impact on the dynamics of the conflict and the prospects for peace.

4. The Role of Social Media Shaping Narratives and Public Opinion

The advent of the internet and digitalization has brought about significant transformations across various sectors of society. Among these transformations, the rise of social media has dramatically changed the landscape of communication, public discourse, and information dissemination. Platforms such as Meta, Twitter, YouTube, and more recently, TikTok have fostered a new environment where individuals can share ideas, opinions, and experiences on a global scale. It's crucial to understand that these social media platforms are not just neutral mediums for communication they have an active role in shaping how we perceive and grasp the world. The way these platforms are designed, the algorithms they use to decide what content to show users, and the dynamics they foster among users all contribute to their role in shaping narrative's public opinion and discourse (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). Social media platforms, such as X, Meta and TikTok, have emerged as powerful tools for disseminating information, shaping public opinion, and influencing political discourse worldwide (Tufekci, 2017). In the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, social media has played an increasingly significant role in shaping the narratives and perceptions of both sides, often transcending geographic and political boundaries (Samuel-Azran & Yarchi, 2018, p. 10). Social media platforms have levelled the playing field in many ways.

They have given individuals and groups that were previously marginalized or overlooked in traditional media a platform to voice their opinions and perspectives. They have also made it possible for information to be disseminated and shared quickly and widely, often bypassing traditional gatekeepers of information such as news editors or government censors (Tufekci, 2017). The advent of the internet and the digital revolution has been among the most transformative developments of the modern era. This revolution, marked by rapid advancements in information technology and digital infrastructure, has profoundly impacted nearly every aspect of society, from business and education to culture and politics. Among the many changes spurred by the digital revolution, the rise of social media platforms represents a dramatic shift in the landscape of communication and public discourse (Castells, 2008).

5. Public Diplomacy Theory

Public diplomacy theory emphasizes the importance of communication in shaping international relations, focusing on how governments, non-state actors, and the public engage in dialogue and exchange information (Cull, 2008). In the digital age, Twitter has emerged as a significant platform for political discourse and public diplomacy, enabling various actors to communicate their perspectives and influence public opinion, both domestically and internationally. In the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, public diplomacy theory can be used to examine the strategies and tactics employed by different actors to influence public opinion and promote their respective narratives. Governments, political leaders, activists, and other stakeholders may use Twitter to advance their agendas, shape public perceptions, and garner support for their positions. By analyzing MFA official accounts, this research can shed light on the ways in which Twitter is used as a tool for public diplomacy in the conflict.

Soft power, a concept introduced by Joseph Nye (1990), is a key component of public diplomacy theory. Soft power refers to the ability of a country or actor to achieve desired outcomes through attraction and persuasion, rather than coercion or force. In the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, soft power can be exercised through the strategic use of Twitter to promote positive images, narratives, and values that appeal to the target audience. This can potentially help shape public opinion and create a more favorable environment for peacebuilding efforts. Digital diplomacy, an extension of public diplomacy, focuses on the use of digital technologies and social media platforms to conduct diplomatic activities. Digital diplomacy encompasses various activities, including public diplomacy, crisis communication, and engagement with diaspora communities. In the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, digital diplomacy can involve the use of X to engage with international audiences, disseminate information, and counter negative narratives. Understanding the role of digital diplomacy in the conflict can provide insights into the effectiveness of social media platforms in shaping the discourse and influencing public opinion.

In summary, public diplomacy theory provides a valuable framework for understanding the role of communication, particularly through social media platforms like X, in shaping the discourse surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict. By examining the use of MFAs official accounts through the lens of public diplomacy theory, this research can identify the strategies and tactics employed by different actors to influence public opinion and promote their respective narratives, potentially contributing to peacebuilding efforts.

6. Data Collection

The research, aiming to unravel the strategies and narratives pursued by two pivotal players in the conflict, the Israeli and Palestinian MFA (referred to as IsraelMFA and Pmofa). These institutions have actively embraced Twitter as a platform to communicate their stances, engage with global audiences, and respond to events in real-time. Dataset approach, comprising the "Inception Dataset", which includes only the count of the tweet counts from the inceptions of the respective accounts, "October 7 Dataset" which incorporates all tweet activities in posted languages in the determined timelines serves a multi-faceted purpose and lastly "October 7" which

incorporates tweets, meaning texts, between October 7, 2023, to November 8, 2023. The Inception Dataset, by offering a lens into the evolution of both MFAs' digital strategies since their Twitter inception, paves the way for understanding long-standing trends and shifts. It's akin to a window into the past, reflecting how historical events and diplomatic shifts have been portrayed and perceived in the digital space.

The establishment of both official accounts' dates to the 2009 for the Israel MFA and 2012 for the Palestine MFA. Therefore, within the "Inception" dataset we scraped tweet counts using Twitter academic API which reflects to the same date as the respective accounts' establishments.

Inception dataset has been chosen with specific intentions. In the last couple of years witnessed two boiling points seen in the conflict first one in 2021 May 6 to 21 and second is 5 August to 7 August 2022. Also, the world has seen numerous pivotal events during this period such as Russia-Ukraine war and natural disasters, policy alterations, geopolitical dynamics, and international interventions shaping the Israel-Palestine narrative also the establishment of the respective twitter accounts dating to that time. In contrast, October 7 Dataset encompasses one month, starting from October 7 and November 8, 2023, after one of the biggest stalemate point in the conflict. Analyzing tweets from this period provides an insight into the real-time reactions, strategies, and digital diplomacy nuances of both MFAs. By keeping the dataset volume manageable, we aim for an intricate, detailed exploration, enabling us to capture even the most nuanced of diplomatic gestures and shifts. The technical backbone of our endeavor is the combination of the R programming language and the **academictwitteR**, **httr**, **jsonlite**, **dplyr** libraries. These combinations were chosen due to its robustness and efficiency in handling vast amounts of Twitter data.

7. Discussion and Conclusion

In our pursuit to comprehend the intersection of digital diplomacy and social media narratives, this study examines the Twitter activities of the Israeli and Palestinian Ministries of Foreign Affairs. The discussion and conclusion section presents the outcomes derived from our comprehensive data collection and analysis. Twitter, evolving as a vital medium for instant information dissemination, is increasingly utilized by government agencies worldwide, including the Israeli and Palestinian MFAs. These entities leverage Twitter to craft narratives, engage international audiences, and express their positions. Our investigation offers insights into the tweets' frequency, timing, and context, word cloud, most frequent words, the discourse's nature, interaction patterns, and the broader strategies of digital diplomacy adopted by these official accounts.

Following Fig1.and 2. our primary objective is to present a detailed visual depiction of the tweeting patterns across a designated time frame. This encompasses the period from 2009, marking the inception of the IsraelMFA account, to 2023, and similarly from 2012, the year the Pmofa account was established, through to 2023. This analysis aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the evolution and trends in the Twitter activities of these respective accounts over these specified durations.




Figure 1. Pmofa Montly Tweet Count Over Time All Languages

Tweet counts of the Pmofa and IsraelMFA from 2012 and 2009 respectively till 2023 showcasing monthly tweet counts. Firstly, one can clearly observe that the number of tweets in 2014 Gaza War are higher than previous months therefore it responds on ground reality impacting the number of tweets. Therefore, there is a relationship between the tweet numbers and on ground conflict boiling point realities. Secondly, Pmofa for one month October 7 War or Tufan Al-Aqsa the official account tweeted 730 making it highest month in the account's history tweets including retweet and hashtags while IsraelMFA also sending highest number of tweets from the inception of the account 970 tweets. However, in the year 2010-month October observing absurd spike in the number of tweets in IsraelMFA we suppose that is simply glitch or data handling issue.




Figure 2. IsraelMFA Montly Tweet Count Over Time All Languages

In summary, these charts illustrate the daily tweeting patterns across different spans, revealing key periods of high activity and giving insights into the evolution of tweet frequency over the years. The reasons for these patterns could vary - ranging from changes in content strategy, platform engagement patterns, to broader societal or global events influencing the tweeting behavior.

Description: df [30 x 2]		
	word <chr>	n <int>
1	gaza	346
2	palestine	339
3	gaza_under_attack	338
4	israeli	275
5	غزة	218
6	israeliwarcimes	182
7	occupation	180
8	الاحتلال	179
9	warplanes	89
10	foreign	88
11	martyrs	85
12	affairs	82
13	civilians	80
14	expatriates	78
15	family	78
16	ministry	78
17	people	71
18	children	68
19	قصف	65
20	aggression	63
21	palestinian	63
22	house	60
23	bombing	59
24	الخارجية	59
25	hospital	54
26	مظاهرات	53
27	martyred	49
28	israel	48
29	minister	48
30	martyrdom	47

30 rows

Figure 3. Most Frequent Words of Pmofa between October 7th, 2023, and November 8th, 2023

Within the most frequent word chart representing the October 7 to November 8, 2023, period, the Pmofa's Twitter discourse is dominated by references to 'Palestine' and 'Palestinian,' underlining a focused narrative on national identity and self-representation. The frequent invocation of the term 'international' indicates an active engagement with the global community, seeking to underscore the international implications of the Palestinian situation. The repetition of terms such as 'people,' 'crimes,' 'rights,' 'occupation,' and 'law' suggests a strategic communication aimed at highlighting the legal and humanitarian concerns underpinning the Palestinian cause. This period's data points to a concerted effort to frame the Palestinian experience within the context of international law and human rights, possibly in reaction October 7 to ongoing genocide. Pmofa's Twitter activity illustrates a multifaceted narrative approach that employs digital diplomacy not only as a tool for communication but as an instrument for legal argumentation, international advocacy, and the pursuit of justice and human rights. This strategic narrative aims to influence international discourse, shape perceptions, and mobilize global support for the Palestinian cause. Through their digital presence, the Pmofa seeks to craft a compelling narrative that articulates the Palestinian experience, conveys the urgency of their claims, and demands recognition and action from the international community.

word	n
<chr>	<int>
hamas	399
israel	388
gaza	158
terrorists	143
israeli	126
terrorist	90
people	78
children	72
attacks	65
held	62
hostage	58
home	54
support	50
murdered	49
solidarity	49
civilians	47
daidsaranga	47
october	47
attack	46
terror	46
war	45
cotlerwunsh	44
condemn	41
stand	41
bring	40
kidnapped	40
women	40
innocent	39
israelis	37
rocket	36

Figure 4. Most Frequent Words of IsraelMFA between October 7th, 2023, and November 8th, 2023

Within “October 7 Dataset” Figure 4. the most frequent word chart of IsraelMFA reflects a word frequency analysis from a much shorter and more recent timeframe, roughly one month. The dominant terms such as 'Hamas', 'Israel', 'terrorist', and 'Gaza' indicate a period where the MFA's Twitter account was heavily focused on a specific conflict or series of events. The prominence of these terms suggests October 7 intensification of conflict-communication, possibly due to an escalation in hostilities or a significant security event. The language used seems to reflect a narrative that is more reactive and centered on the immediacy of conflict-related issues. The October 7 dataset from the Twitter activity of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveals a concentrated focus on specific thematic concerns. Terms with the highest frequency such as 'Hamas', 'Israel', and 'terrorist' suggest a discourse predominantly occupied with matters of national security and the state's geopolitical challenges. This focus is indicative of the Ministry's prioritization of security issues after the October 7 incidents within its digital communications strategy. The repetition of 'Gaza' alongside 'attacks' and 'rocket' points to a specific narrative related to the October 7 incidents in the conflict, likely reflecting the Ministry's response to incidents and escalations in the region. These terms, when analyzed together, underscore the Ministry's communication of resilience and defensive posture in the face of perceived threats. In contrast, the presence of words like 'solidarity', 'support', and 'civilians' implies an attempt to galvanize international sympathy and diplomatic backing, while also humanizing the conflict by highlighting its impact on non-combatants. The term 'children' further emphasizes this human element, potentially serving as a rhetorical device to invoke empathy and justify the state's security policies. The dataset also includes terms such as 'condemn' and 'innocent', which may function as part of a moral discourse that seeks to delineate clearly the perceived justness of Israel's stance in contrast to the actions of its adversaries. Additionally, the appearance of specific dates, such as 'October', denotes the periodic intensification of messaging in response to events, suggesting the Ministry's use of Twitter as a reactive tool for shaping real-time narratives.

Word clouds constitute a visualization of discourse frequency, offering a macroscopic lens into the thematic preoccupations within a set body of text related to the conflict. Word clouds are a form of text analysis visualization where lexical frequency is represented by variations in font size. This methodological tool provides an at-a-glance synthesis of large text corpora, enabling to distill prevalent themes or terminologies. The chromatic differentiation and spatial arrangement

in these clouds might signify thematic clusters or simply serve an aesthetic function. Notably, interconnecting lines suggest associative relationships or co-occurrences, hinting at narrative or thematic intertwinelements within the discourse.




Figure 5. Word cloud of Pmofa from 7th October 2023 to 8th November 2023

The largest nodes are 'Gaza under attack', 'Palestine', 'Israeli', and 'occupation', suggesting these are the most frequently mentioned terms within the dataset and central to the discourse. Terms such as 'attack', 'aggression', 'bomb', 'destruction', and 'warplane' are prominently featured, which likely indicates discussions around military actions and the consequences of conflict in the region. Words like 'death', 'martyr', 'health', 'hospital', and 'damage' suggest a focus on the human cost of the conflict, including discussions about casualties, medical issues, and the overall humanitarian situation. 'Family', 'shelter', 'home', 'neighborhood', and 'resident' indicate a narrative on the impact of the conflict on the domestic and social life of individuals and communities. The repeated appearance of 'Gaza', 'camp', and 'city', alongside 'occupation force' and 'settler', points to discussions around territorial control and the conditions in specific areas. 'Student', 'mother', 'individual', and 'girl' are terms that suggest a perspective on the broader societal effects of the conflict, possibly discussing the impact on various demographics. The use of 'Israeli government', 'occupation', and 'force' implies political discourse concerning governance, control, and the use of power in the region. The presence of Arabic alongside English terms may reflect the dataset's bilingual nature, potentially incorporating messages or reports from both Israeli and Palestinian sources.

actions. The Ministries appears to employ Twitter not just as a means of communication, but as a strategic instrument of digital diplomacy, aimed at influencing both domestic and international audiences. Given the time frames for most frequent word used, we can infer how the communication narrative of the MFA may have shifted in response to the October 7 War context. The Palestinian official Twitter account presented an intricate landscape. Despite the complexities of internal uncertainty and external diplomatic pressures, their digital activity was commendably robust. In terms of volume, their tweets close those of the Israeli account. However, the linguistic distribution presented an interesting pattern. English tweets were fewer in number compared to other languages. Given the diverse linguistic demographic of the global Muslim community, the decision to have a broader linguistic footprint, especially Arabic, made strategic sense. One of the pivotal findings was the linguistic, especially when comparing English tweets to those in other languages. The Israeli account's tweets in English seemed strategically aligned to cater to a global audience, ensuring the dissemination of their narrative on a more extensive scale. On the other hand, the Palestinian account's strategy seemed more regionally anchored, with a significant emphasis on non-English tweets i.e., Arabic. Across both accounts, the Twitter activity seemed to oscillate in tandem with significant geopolitical events, suggesting that digital diplomacy is not isolated but is intrinsically linked with on-ground realities. However, the nuanced differences in their strategies, ranging from frequency to linguistic choices, highlighted the distinct digital diplomacy blueprints employed by each MFA's Twitter account. Embracing the tenets of the constructivist paradigm, our analysis was conducted with a commitment to rigor, trustworthiness, and cultural sensitivity.

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Appendix

Description: #f (30 × 2)		
word	n	<cut>
1	israel	93
2	israeli	91
3	gaza	60
4	hamas	48
5	u.s	45
6	united	43
7	gaza	32
8	israelis	27
9	state/dept/state	26
10	humanitarian	25
11	minister	25
12	people	25
13	security	25
14	conflict	23
15	civilians	23
16	met	22
17	terrorist	22
18	attacks	21
19	law	20
20	stand	20
21	citizens	18
22	peace	18
23	president	18
24	prime	17
25	world	16
26	department	15
27	israeli	15
28	press	15
29	support	15
30	region	14

Foreign Secretary of the United State of America

Description: #f (30 × 2)		
word	n	<cut>
1	israel	51
2	gaza	46
3	james/hevelly	44
4	british	43
5	nationals	35
6	relations	29
7	israel	28
8	foreign	25
9	aid	24
10	humanitarian	23
11	hamas	19
12	support	19
13	10 Downing Street	17
14	minister	17
15	secretary	17
16	civilians	16
17	aid/relief/summit	15
18	egypt	15
19	peace	14
20	crossing	13
21	enclave	13
22	israeli	13
23	prime	13
24	spoke	13
25	advice	12
26	global	12
27	safe	12
28	continue	11
29	leave	11
30	partners	11

Foreign Secretary of Britain

Description: #f (30 × 2)		
word	n	<cut>
1	france	90
2	humanitarian	54
3	gaza	53
4	minicolumna	52
5	support	34
6	international	32
7	israel	32
8	president	32
9	emmanuel/macron	30
10	france	28
11	minister	27
12	yesterday	25
13	france/nu	24
14	statement	22
15	civilians	19
16	meeting	19
17	peace	19
18	cooperation	18
19	visit	18
20	france/numame	17
21	october	17
22	world	17
23	security	16
24	situation	16
25	council	15
26	paris	15
27	people	15
28	terrorist	15
29	law	14
30	commitment	13

Foreign Secretary of France

Description: #f (30 × 2)		
word	n	<cut>
1	october	109
2	russian	108
3	rossia	106
4	sergey	97
5	foreign	96
6	levoy	81
7	president	80
8	zakharova	76
9	minister	69
10	putin	60
11	international	52
12	meeting	46
13	relations	45
14	vladimir	40
15	rossia's	37
16	maria	36
17	ukraine	34
18	ambassador	33
19	conflict	32
20	november	32
21	palestinian	32
22	israeli	31
23	cooperation	30
24	moscow	29
25	held	28
26	security	28
27	policy	27
28	russia/um	26
29	world	26
30	countries	25

Foreign Secretary of Russia

Foreign Secretary of Spain

Description: df [10 x 2]		
	word	n
1	minister	84
2	visit	56
3	mission	42
4	security	37
5	foreign	34
6	meeting	34
7	gata	28
8	council	27
9	humanitarian	23
10	bradlee	20
11	israel	19
12	crisis	18
13	discussed	17
14	mission	17
15	cooperation	16
16	held	16
17	peace	16
18	situation	15
19	based	13
20	secretary	13
21	trials	13
22	energy	12
23	ministers	12
24	presidency	12
25	strip	12
26	addressed	11
27	ambassador	11
28	international	11
29	president	11
30	role	11

30 rows

Foreign Secretary of South Africa

Description: df [10 x 2]		
	word	n
1	anwar/abrahim	54
2	malaysia	47
3	base	36
4	zambiyefficial	30
5	hart	27
6	putra	25
7	wisma	25
8	dan	23
9	yang	22
10	dan	19
11	ini	19
12	press	18
13	minister	17
14	release	17
15	dengan	16
16	palestin	15
17	willemputra	15
18	dir	14
19	october	14
20	congratulations	13
21	lawatan	13
22	metting	13
23	rakyat	13
24	kunjungan	12
25	ses	12
26	untuk	12
27	affairs	11
28	bilateralaffairs	11
29	exceeds	11
30	heartiest	11

30 rows

Foreign Secretary of Brasil

Foreign Secretary of Malaysia



ULISA: Uluslararası Çalışmalar Dergisi

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Ebru Demir*

* Dr. Öğr. Üyesi; Hukuk Fakültesi, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi, Ankara, Türkiye; ebrudemir@aybu.edu.tr; ORCID: 0000-0003-2529-3383.

İklim Değişikliği Alanında Güvenlik Konseyi Etkin Bir Rol Oynayabilir Mi? Fırsatlar ve Zorluklar

İklim değişikliği son yıllarda etkileri gözle görülür hale gelen önemli bir soruna dönüşmüştür. Ancak bu sorun ile nasıl kolektif bir şekilde mücadele edileceği hala belirsizliğini korumaktadır. Devletler her ne kadar iklim değişikliği ile mücadele için çeşitli sözleşmeler imzalamış olsalar da bu sözleşmelerin uygulamaya yansımaları yetersizdir. Bu durum, Birleşmiş Milletler'in ana organlarından biri olan Güvenlik Konseyi'nin iklim değişikliği alanında etkili bir aktör olup olamayacağı tartışmalarını beraberinde getirmiştir. Bilindiği üzere, Güvenlik Konseyi, bağlayıcı kararlar alabilme yetkisine sahiptir. Literatürde, bu kurumun iklim değişikliğine ilişkin konularda devletlerin isteksizliklerinin önüne geçebileceği şeklinde yorumlar mevcuttur. Bu makale, Güvenlik Konseyi'nin iklim değişikliği konusunda bir aktör olarak rol almasını yahut almamasını öne sürmemektedir. Makale, Güvenlik Konseyi'nin bu konuda rol almasının hukuki ve siyasi açıdan mümkün olup olmadığını objektif bir biçimde tartışmayı amaçlar. Literatürümüzde yeterince ilgi görmemiş bu konu, Güvenlik Konseyi'nin iklim değişikliği konusunda raporlar yayınlamaya başlaması ile birlikte daha da önemli hale gelmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Birleşmiş Milletler, Güvenlik Konseyi, İklim Değişikliği, Güvenlik Çalışmaları.

Can the Security Council Play an Effective Role in the Area of Climate Change? Opportunities and Challenges

Recently climate change has become a significant problem with its visible effects in our daily lives. How to combat this problem, however, remains uncertain. Although states have signed various conventions in order to fight climate change, the implementation of these conventions has been insufficient. The unwillingness of states has sparked debates about whether the United Nations Security Council could be an effective actor in the area of climate change. As is well-known, the Security Council has the authority to make binding decisions. The literature suggests that this institution could overcome the reluctance of states in terms of taking measures to combat climate change. This article does not advocate whether the Security Council should or should not play a role as an actor in climate change. The article aims to objectively discuss whether it is possible for the Security Council to take on a role in climate change. This issue, which has not received enough attention in our literature, has become even more significant with the recent reports published by the Security Council on climate change.

Keywords: United Nations, Security Council, Climate Change, Security Studies.

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İklim Değişikliği Alanında Güvenlik Konseyi Etkin Bir Rol Oynayabilir Mi? Fırsatlar ve Zorluklar

1. Giriş

İklim değişikliği son yıllarda uluslararası kamuoyu tarafından en çok tartışılan konulardan biri olmuştur. Bunun farklı nedenleri olduğu ileri sürülebilir. İlk olarak, iklim değişikliği alanında sivil toplum kuruluşlarının ve öne çıkan iklim aktivistlerinin (İsveçli Greta Thunberg gibi) yürüttükleri kampanyaların iklim konusunda toplumlar nezdinde önemli bir farkındalık yarattığı belirtilmelidir. Sivil toplum kuruluşları gerek yürüttükleri kampanyalar ile gerek ise ulusal (örneğin Urgenda Foundation/Hollanda) ve bölgesel insan hakları mahkemeleri önüne taşıdıkları (örneğin Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz ve Diğerleri/İsviçre) davalar ile iklim konusunu gündemde tutmayı başarmaktadırlar. İkinci olarak, iklim değişikliği konusunun son yıllarda en çok tartışılan konulardan biri olmasının nedeni, bu sorunun etkilerinin günlük hayatta gözle görülür hale gelmesidir. İklim değişikliği kaynaklı sıcak hava dalgaları, dünyanın pek çok bölgesinde etkili olmaya başlamıştır. Yapılan çalışmalar, Amerika'nın en kalabalık elli şehrinde 1960'lı yıllara kıyasla sıcak hava dalga süresinin 49 gün daha uzun sürdüğünü göstermiştir. (Horton and Lakhani, 2023). Avrupa'da sıcak hava dalgalarının sebep olduğu ölüm oranlarında büyük bir artış olduğu bilinmektedir. (Rott, 2023) Afrika kıtası ise iklim krizinden en fazla etkilenen kıtalardan biri olmuştur. 2024 yılının mart ayında Mali'de sıcaklığın 48 dereceye çıkması ile sıcaklığa bağlı yüzlerce ölüm gerçekleşmiştir. (McGrath, 2024) Kuraklık nedeniyle büyük oranlarda mahsul kaybı yaşayan Afrika'da 2050 yılına kadar toplamda 200 milyon insanın aşırı yoksulluk ve açlık ile karşı karşıya kalacağı tahmin edilmektedir. (Adom, 2024)

İklim konusunun uluslararası kamuoyunda daha çok dikkat çekmesini sağlayan önemli etmenlerden biri de deniz seviyesindeki yükselme nedeniyle su altında kalma tehlikesiyle karşı karşıya olan devletlerin Uluslararası Adalet Divanı önündeki adalet arayışlarıdır. Bilindiği üzere, iklim değişikliği nedeniyle ortaya çıkması muhtemel tehlikelerden biri de deniz seviyelerindeki yükselmedir. Avrupa'daki ülkeler de dahil olmak üzere dünya üzerindeki birçok devlet önümüzdeki yıllarda bu problem ile yüzleşmek zorunda kalacaktır. Yükseltisi deniz seviyesinde olan ada devletleri ise deniz seviyesinin yükselmesi ile sahip oldukları toprakları tamamen kaybetme tehlikesiyle karşı karşıya kalacaklardır. Mart 2023'te Vanuatu liderliğinde Pasifik'te yer alan ada devletleri, Birleşmiş Milletlerin ana organlarından olan Uluslararası Adalet Divanı'ndan "devletlerin iklim krizinin etkileri karşısında savunmasız olan devletlere yönelik sorumluluklarına" ilişkin danışma görüşü talebinde bulunmuştur. (Birnbaum, 2023) Bu talep, uluslararası kamuoyunda büyük bir yankı uyandırmış ve Uluslararası Adalet Divanı'nın görüşünün yaratacağı etkiler tartışılmaya başlanmıştır.

2. İklim Değişikliği Bir Güvenlik Sorunu Mu?

İklim değişikliği konusu son yıllarda "güvenlik çalışmaları (security studies)" kapsamında değerlendirilmeye başlamıştır. (Peters, 2018, s. 209) Politik söylemlerin de bu yönde ilerlediği görülmektedir. Örneğin, İngiltere'de 2006 ile 2007 yılları arasında Dışişleri Bakanı olarak görev yapmış Margaret Beckett, iklim değişikliğinin İngiliz dış politikasının odaklandığı temel alanlardan biri olduğunu belirtmiştir. (Climate Diplomacy, 2006) 2013 yılındaki G8 toplantısında, iklim değişikliğinin, "güvenlik konusundaki zafiyetleri daha da artıran bir konu" olduğu ifade edilmiştir. (IISD, 2013) Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulu da iklim değişikliği konusunu "tehdit çarpanı (threat multiplier)" olarak değerlendirmiştir. 2009 yılında Birleşmiş Milletler eski Genel Sekreteri Ban Ki-Moon'un ele aldığı rapora göre, çevresel faktörler, "çatışma dinamiklerini daha da şiddetlendirme riski taşımakta" ve "sosyal, politik ve ekonomik faktörlerle etkileşime geçerek silahlı çatışmaların doğrudan itici gücü" olabilmektedirler. (Genel Sekreter Raporu, 2009, paragraf 67)

Ban Ki-Moon, raporunda iklim değişikliğinin beş şekilde tehdit çarpanı olarak kendini gösterdiğini belirtmiştir. İlk olarak, iklim değişikliğinin insan haklarına olan etkisinin altı çizilmiştir. İklim değişikliğinin doğrudan yaşam hakkına, gıda hakkına, su hakkına ve barınma

hakkına bir engel oluşturduğu ifade edilmiştir. Temel hak ve özgürlüklere erişimde yaşanan problemlerin, sosyal, politik ve ekonomik gerilimleri tırmandıracağı açıktır. İkinci olarak, iklim değişikliğinin devletlerin gelişme ve ilerlemelerine önemli bir engel oluşturacağı vurgulanmıştır. Bu durumun uzun vadede politik istikrarsızlığa ve yoksulluğa yol açması kaçınılmazdır. Üçüncü olarak, iklim değişikliği düzensiz göç hareketlerine sebep olacaktır ve bu da halihazırda kısıtlı olan kaynaklar üzerinde daha fazla bir rekabet yaratacaktır. Dördüncü olarak, deniz seviyesindeki yükselme nedeniyle ada devletlerinin mevcudiyetleri tehlike altına girecektir. Bu devletlerin vatandaşları, vatansız kalmak gibi yahut göç gibi zor koşullarla baş başa kalacaklardır. Beşinci ve son olarak, iklim değişikliği devletler arasında kaynaklara yönelik bir mücadele yaratacaktır. Örneğin, tüm devletlerin ortak kullanımında olan alanlar (örneğin, açık denizler) üzerinde bir mücadele başlayacağı tahmin edilmektedir. (Genel Sekreter Raporu, 2009, paragraf 14-18) Benzer şekilde, Kuzey Kutbu'ndaki petrol ve doğalgaz için Kanada, Rusya, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Norveç arasında son yıllarda yaşanan güç mücadelesi buna yerinde bir örnek olabilir.

Somut birkaç örnek ile iklim konusunun silahlı çatışmalar için nasıl "tehdit çarpanı" olarak rol oynadığını daha açık bir şekilde gözlemleyebiliriz. Hükümetlerarası İklim Değişikliği Paneli'nin (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) verilerine göre, iklim değişikliği nedeniyle önümüzdeki yıllarda dünya üzerinde fazla sayıda kasırga ortaya çıkacaktır. (IPCC, 2007) Bu veriler ışığında, Birleşmiş Milletler Çevre Programı eski direktörü Achim Steiner, kasırgaların yol açabileceği güvenlik sorunlarını daha iyi anlamak için Honduras örneğine bakmamızın yeterli olduğunu söylemiştir. (Güvenlik Konseyi, 2011, s. 5) 1998 yılında Honduras'ta gerçekleşen Mitch Kasırgası, ülkenin altyapısının yaklaşık yüzde 70'ini tahrip etmiş, binlerce kişi hayatını kaybederken milyonlarca kişi ise evsiz kalmıştır. (Solís, 2022) Steiner'a göre, iklim değişikliği üzerine Hükümetlerarası İklim Değişikliği Paneli'nin tahminlerinin gerçekleşmesi halinde, doğal afetlerin ölçeği ve sayısı artacak ve bu da birçok devlet için güvenlik sorunu yaratacaktır. (Güvenlik Konseyi, 2011, s. 5)

Burada altı çizilmesi gereken önemli bir nokta da iklim değişikliğinin düzensiz göç hareketleri nedeniyle çatışma yaratma potansiyelidir. İklim değişikliğinin nasıl ve hangi yollarla silahlı çatışmalara yol açabileceği değerlendirilirken, göç hareketlerine önemli bir ağırlık verilmiştir. Aynı ülke içerisinde yahut farklı ülkeler arasında gerçekleşecek göçlerin, etnik, politik ve ekonomik farklılıkları su yüzüne çıkaracağı öne sürülmüştür. (Burrows ve Kinney, 2016) Nitekim, iklim değişikliği ve silahlı çatışma literatüründe, pek çok araştırmacının göç hareketleri üzerine yoğunlaştığını gözlemleriz. (Reuveny, 2007; Brzoska ve Fröhlich, 2016; Thalheimer ve Webersik, 2020)

Trina Ng'ye göre (2010, s. 286), Darfur örneği de bize kaynak kıtlığının nasıl hızlı bir şekilde silahlı çatışmaya dönüşebileceğini göstermektedir. Darfur, 1980'li yılların başına kadar tarım ve hayvancılıkla geçimini sürdüren bir nüfusa sahipti. Kuraklık sonucunda hayvancılık ile uğraşan nüfus bu geleneksel yaşam tarzını sürdüremeyeceğini fark ederek ülke içinde göç etmek zorunda kaldı. (Ng, 2010, s. 286) Ülke içerisinde ortaya çıkan düzensiz göç hareketleri etnik gruplar arasında kutuplaşma ve sonrasında da silahlı çatışma yarattı. (Ng, 2010, s. 286) Birleşmiş Milletler eski Genel Sekreteri Ban Ki-Moon, Darfur'daki çatışmayı "dünyanın ilk iklim değişikliği çatışması" olarak nitelendirmiştir. (Popovski, 2017) Her ne kadar Darfur'daki çatışmanın etnisite başta olmak üzere pek çok nedeni bulunsa da çatışmanın ekolojik boyutu çoğu zaman dikkatlerden kaçmaktadır. (Abouyoub, 2012, s. 150) Darfur'da son yıllarda yoğun olarak meydana gelen kuraklık ve bunun sonucunda da toprak kaybı ve mahsul üretiminde düşme, etnik ve politik gerilimleri şiddet boyutuna taşımıştır. (Mazo, 2009, s. 84)

Suriye savaşında da iklimin önemli olduğunu ileri sürebiliriz. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Hükümeti 2015 yılına ait Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisinde ve Savunma Bakanlığı 2014 yılına ait "İklim Değişikliği Uyum Yol Haritasında (Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap) güvenliği etkileyen faktörleri ele almışlardır. (van der Linden, 2017, s. 121) Her iki belgede de 2011'de Suriye'de başlayan çatışmanın kısmen 2007-2010 yılları arasında iklim değişikliği kaynaklı kuraklıktan kaynaklandığı tespit edilmiştir. İki belgede de aşırı kuraklığın yarattığı politik ve sosyal

gerilimlerin altı çizilmiştir. (van der Linden, 2017, s.122) İklim değişikliğinin silahlı çatışmalarda “tehdit çarpanı” olduğu yukarıdaki örneklerden de gözlemlenebilmektedir.

Jane McAdam ve Ben Saul’a göre (2010, s. 360) iklim değişikliği konusunda “insan güvenliği” merkezli bakılması bu alanda uluslararası iş birliklerinin önünü açacak ve ilgili uluslararası aktörleri harekete geçirecektir. Uluslararası insan hakları hukukunun yıllar içindeki gelişimi ile insan ve insan güvenliği uluslararası hukukun merkezine oturmuştur. Günümüzde uluslararası kamuoyu, insan güvenliğini sağlamayı bir sorumluluk olarak görmektedir. (von Tigerstrom, 2007, s. 8) Dolayısıyla, kamuoyunun dikkatinin, eriyen buzulların üzerindeki kutup aylarından, kuraklık nedeniyle hayatını kaybetme riskiyle karşı karşıya kalan insanlara çevrilmesi, uluslararası kamuoyunu daha güçlü bir şekilde harekete geçirme kuvvetine sahiptir.

Öte yandan, iklim değişikliğinin bir güvenlik meselesi haline getirilmesine yönelik itirazlar da bulunmaktadır. Örneğin, Simon Dalby’ye göre (2013, s. 34), güvenlik çalışmaları yalnızca politik istikrarsızlıklar ile ilgilenmekte, iklim konusu bir kriz seviyesine ulaşana kadar ortaya çıkan karbondioksit emisyonlarını göz ardı etmektedir. Maria Julia Trombetta’ya göre ise (2008, s. 593), iklim ve çevre problemleri güvenlik alanına taşınmakta, ancak gelişmiş devletlerin bu problemlerin ortaya çıkmasında oynadıkları rol önemsenmemektedir. Ayrıca güvenlik alanında yetkilendirilmiş aktörlere (örneğin Güvenlik Konseyi) iklim değişikliği ile mücadelede önemli roller verilerek, bu aktörler meşrulaştırılmaktadır. (Trombetta, 2008, s. 593) Güvenlik Konseyinin adil ve demokratik olmayan yapısı düşünüldüğünde, bu organın iklim adaleti (climate justice) için bir “kurtarıcı” gibi sunulması soru işaretleri doğurmaktadır. Güvenlik Konseyinin çevre ve iklim değişikliğine ilişkin konularda endişeli görünerek “çevresel sorumluluğa sahip olduğu imajı ile göz boyamasına (greenwashing) izin vermemek gerekir. Sonuç olarak incelediğimiz bu organın, demokratik ilkelere uygun hareket etmeyen ve adil ve eşitlikçi bir temele dayanmayan problemleri bir yapı olduğu unutulmamalıdır.

3. İklim Değişikliği ve Güvenlik Konseyi

Uluslararası hukukun ulusal hukuktan ayrıldığı noktalardan birisi kanun yapıcılar (devletler) ile kanun uygulayıcıların (devletler) aynı olmasıdır. Uluslararası hukuk rejiminin “Aşıl topuğu”, devletlerin arasındaki uyuşmazlıkları çözecek ve bu uyuşmazlıkları çözmek için yükümlülükler getirecek bir kurumun yokluğudur. (Werksman, 1996, s. xvi) Bunun pratikte doğurduğu pek çok sonuç bulunmaktadır. İklim değişikliği alanında bu durumun doğurduğu sonuç, devletlerin kendilerini bağlayıcı herhangi bir sözleşme ortaya koymaktan kaçınmaları olmuştur. Uluslararası çevre hukukunun gelişimi daha çok bağlayıcı olmayan yumuşak hukuk (soft law) kaynakları üzerinden ilerlemektedir. Devletler ekonomik kalkınmaya, çevrenin zararına olacak şekilde, öncelik verebilmektedirler. Çevreyi de merkeze alan sürdürülebilir bir kalkınma sağlayıp sağlamama konusunda devletler geniş bir takdir yetkisine sahiptirler.

Devletler, yalnızca uluslararası barış ve güvenlik söz konusu olduğunda kendilerini bağlayıcı karar alabilecek bir kuruluşun varlığını kabul etmişlerdir. İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nın hemen ardından 26 Haziran 1945 tarihinde devletler Birleşmiş Milletler Sözleşmesi ile Güvenlik Konseyine yalnızca uluslararası barış ve güvenliği ilgilendiren konularda bağlayıcı karar alabilme yetkisi tanımışlardır. Peki bu durumda, iklim değişikliğinin yarattığı ve gelecekte yaratacağı etkiler uluslararası barış ve güvenlik ile ilişkilendirilebilir mi? İklim değişikliğinin tehlikelerinin daha iyi gözlemlenebilmesi ile birlikte son yıllarda, iklim değişikliğinin uluslararası barış ve güvenliği ilgilendiren bir mesele olduğu ileri sürülmüştür. Özellikle, Güvenlik Konseyinin de iklim değişikliği hususunda raporlar yayınlaması ile birlikte “iklim değişikliği-uluslararası barış ve güvenlik” ilişkisi, sosyal bilimler alanında çalışan pek çok araştırmacı tarafından daha yakından incelenmeye başlamıştır. Bu bölümde Güvenlik Konseyinin iklim değişikliği alanında karar alma yetkisi bulunup bulunmadığı tartışılacaktır. Ayrıca makalede, Güvenlik Konseyinin iklim konusunda aktif bir rol üstlenmesinin olası etkileri ve yaratacağı problemler de ele alınacaktır.

Birleşmiş Milletler Sözleşmesi'nin 39. Maddesi Güvenlik Konseyini şu şekilde yetkilendirmiştir:

“Güvenlik Konseyi, barışın tehdit edildiğini, bozulduğunu ya da bir saldırı eylemi olduğunu saptar; uluslararası barış ve güvenliğin korunması ya da yeniden tesisi için tavsiyelerde bulunur veya 41. ve 42. Maddeler uyarınca hangi önlemler alınacağını kararlaştırır.” (Birleşmiş Milletler Sözleşmesi, 1945)

Maddede belirtildiği üzere, Güvenlik Konseyi, barışın “tehdit” yahut “ihlal” edildiğine veya “saldırı eylemi”nin mevcut olduğuna karar verdiği durumlarda eyleme geçebilmektedir. Maddedeki ifadeler incelendiğinde, iklim değişikliği ile “barışın ihlal edilmesi” yahut “saldırı eyleminin gerçekleşmesi” durumları arasında ilişki kurmak yerine, iklim değişikliği ile “barışın tehdit edildiği” durumlar arasında “daha kolaylıkla” bir ilişki kurulabileceği görülür. (Cousins, 2013, s. 197) İklim değişikliğinin günlük yaşamı kesintiye uğratan etkileri (aşırı hava olayları) düşünüldüğünde yahut insan hayatını riske atabilecek sonuçları göz önüne alındığında (deniz seviyelerinde yükselme, kuraklık), iklim değişikliğinin uluslararası barış ve güvenliğe bir tehdit oluşturduğu ileri sürülebilir.

39. Madde, Güvenlik Konseyinin yetkilendirildiği durumları tek tek sıralama yöntemi izlememiştir. Bunun yerine, hangi durumların bu madde kapsamında değerlendirileceğine karar verme yetkisini Güvenlik Konseyine bırakmıştır. Dolayısıyla, Güvenlik Konseyinin bu konudaki takdir yetkisi oldukça geniştir. Nitekim Güvenlik Konseyi, Soğuk Savaş ve özellikle de 11 Eylül saldırıları sonrasında yetkisinin kapsamını genişletmiş ve geleneksel anlamda “barış ve güvenlik” kavramlarının dışına çıkarak bu kavramları daha geniş yorumlamaya başlamıştır. Örneğin, Güvenlik Konseyi 17 Temmuz 2000’de ilk kez HIV/AIDS hastalığının bir “güvenlik” meselesi olduğunu ileri sürdüğü bir kararname yayınlamıştır. (Güvenlik Konseyi, Kararname 1308) Birleşmiş Milletler Sözleşmesi’ne taraf olan tüm devletleri HIV/AIDS’in önlenmesi için iş birliğine çağıran Güvenlik Konseyi, devletlerin eğitimden sağlığa pek çok alanda bu konuyla ilgili farkındalık yaratmalarını istemiştir. (Güvenlik Konseyi, Kararname 1308) Güvenlik Konseyinin bir hastalığı “güvenlik meselesi” olarak değerlendirmesi bazı araştırmacılar tarafından şüpheyle karşılanırken (McInnes, 2006), bazı araştırmacılar tarafından ise takdir görmüştür. (Poku, 2013) Benzer şekilde, Güvenlik Konseyi 11 Eylül saldırıları sonrası “terörizm”i de uluslararası barış ve güvenlik kapsamında değerlendirmeye başlamıştır. (Güvenlik Konseyi, Kararname 1373) Bu durum, Güvenlik Konseyinin Birleşmiş Milletler Sözleşmesi tarafından kendisine tanınan yetkilerin dışına çıktığı şeklinde yorumlanmıştır. (Happold, 2003)

Güvenlik Konseyi çevreye ilişkin konuları ilk kez 1990’lı yıllarda kendi gündemine dahil etmiştir. Örneğin, Irak’ın Kuveyt’i işgali üzerine Güvenlik Konseyi 687 sayılı kararnamayı yayınlamıştır. Bu kararnamede, Kuveyt’in işgali sırasında Irak’ın sebep olduğu çevreye yönelik zararın Irak Hükûmeti tarafından karşılanması gerektiği belirtilmiştir. (Güvenlik Konseyi, Kararname 687, paragraf 16) 1992 yılında ise ilk kez açık bir şekilde ekolojik dengenin korunması uluslararası barış ve güvenlik ile ilişkili görülmüştür. Güvenlik Konseyi Başkanı’nın yayınlamış olduğu 1992 yılına ait notta, “devletler arasında savaş ve askeri çatışma olmamasının, uluslararası barış ve güvenliğin sağlanması anlamına gelmeyeceği” belirtilmiştir. (Güvenlik Konseyi, Başkan Notu, 1992) Notta, ekonomik, sosyal ve/veya ekolojik istikrarsızlığın uluslararası barış ve güvenliği tehdit edebileceği vurgulanmıştır. (Güvenlik Konseyi, Başkan Notu, 1992)

Güvenlik Konseyinin çevreye ilişkin konulara 1990’lı yıllardan itibaren ilgi gösterdiği açıktır. Peki iklim değişikliği konusu tam olarak ne zaman ve nasıl Güvenlik Konseyinin gündemine girmiştir? İklim değişikliğinin birçok aktör tarafından uluslararası barış ve güvenlik ile ilişkilendirilmesi, bu iki kavram arasındaki ilişkinin başlangıcı olarak değerlendirilebilir. Örneğin, 2006 yılında Birleşmiş Milletler eski Genel Sekreteri Kofi Annan, konuşması sırasında iklim değişikliğinin barış ve güvenliğe bir tehdit oluşturduğunu belirtmiştir. (Annan, 2006) Annan’a göre, yağış düzenlerindeki değişiklik dünyadaki mevcut kaynaklar üzerinde rekabet yaratacağı ve bu da istikrarsızlaştırıcı durumlara ve düzensiz göç hareketlerine neden olacaktır. (Annan, 2006)

Buna benzer şekilde, Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Kurulu da iklim değişikliği ile uluslararası barış ve güvenliği ilişkilendirdiği bir kararname kabul etmiştir. Kararnamede Genel Kurul, ilgili tüm Birleşmiş Milletler organlarını iklim değişikliği sorununa ilişkin adım atmaya çağırmıştır. (Genel Kurul, Kararname 63/281) Genel Kurul, Birleşmiş Milletler Sözleşmesi'nin birinci maddesinin de bu kararnamede altını çizmiştir. Birinci madde Birleşmiş Milletlerin amaç ve ilkelerinin yer aldığı bir maddedir. Genel Kurulun bu maddeyi hatırlatarak kararnameyi düzenlemesi, Genel Kurulun iklim değişikliği ile mücadele konusunu Birleşmiş Milletlerin temel amaç ve prensiplerinden ayrı tutmadığı şeklinde yorumlanabilir.

Güvenlik Konseyi ise ilk kez 2007 yılında iklim değişikliğini resmi olarak gündemine almış ve periyodik olarak bu konuda raporlar yayınlamaya başlamıştır. Bu raporlar, Güvenlik Konseyine üye devletlerin "iklim değişikliği- uluslararası barış ve güvenlik" ilişkisi hakkındaki fikirlerini içermektedir. Bilindiği üzere Güvenlik Konseyinin beş daimî (İngiltere, Fransa, Rusya, Çin ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri) ve on (dönüşümlü bir şekilde seçilen) geçici üyesi bulunur. Bir sonraki bölümde Güvenlik Konseyinin iklim değişikliği konusunda gerçekleştirdiği toplantıların raporları incelenecek ve Güvenlik Konseyine üye devletlerin iklim değişikliği konusundaki tutumları analiz edilecektir.

4. Güvenlik Konseyi'nin İklim Değişikliğine İlişkin Raporları

Güvenlik Konseyi iklim değişikliği konusunda toplantılar gerçekleştirmeye ve böylece bu konuyu düzenli olarak gündeminde tutmaya başlamıştır. İlki 2007'de gerçekleştirilen bu toplantılarda ele alınan hususlar bu bölümde tartışılacaktır. Her ne kadar Güvenlik Konseyinin iklim değişikliği alanında yetkili olduğunu ileri süren devletler bulunsu da bunun aksini iddia eden devletler de mevcuttur. Dolayısıyla konuya ilişkin farklı bakış açıları bulunmaktadır. Önümüzdeki yıllarda Güvenlik Konseyinin iklim değişikliği ile ilgili nasıl bir plan ve program izleyeceğini öngörebilme açısından bu raporlar önem taşımaktadır.

2007 yılındaki toplantı İngiltere'nin çağrısı ile düzenlenmiştir. Birçok devlet Güvenlik Konseyinin iklim konusundaki bu adımını desteklemiştir. Örneğin, Papua Yeni Gine temsilcisi, deniz seviyesindeki yükselme sonucu yok olma tehlikesi yaşayan bir ülke olarak iklim konusunun kendileri için çok önemli olduğunu vurgulamıştır. Papua Yeni Gine temsilcisi "küçük ada halklarının karşı karşıya kaldıkları tehlikenin, silah ve bomba tehdidi altındaki halkların karşı karşıya kaldıkları tehlikelerden daha önemsiz olmadığını" ifade etmiştir. (Güvenlik Konseyi, 2007, s. 28) Toplantıda, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin iklim krizine ve bu krizin çözümüne bakışı ise dikkat çekicidir. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, ulusal bazda iklim değişikliği ile mücadele için ne gibi adımlar attığını açıklamıştır. İklim kriziyle mücadele için, Brezilya ve Çin ile yaptığı iş birliklerinden bahsetmiştir. (Güvenlik Konseyi, 2007, s. 10) Yine ulusal bazda emisyon oranlarını 2002 ile 2012 yılları arasında yüzde 18 azaltma hedefi olduğunu altını çizmiştir. (Güvenlik Konseyi, 2007, s. 11) Güvenlik Konseyi'nin daimî üyelerinden biri olan Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin, rapordaki ifadelerinden hareketle, iklim konusunda Güvenlik Konseyini yetkilendirmekten kaçındığı söylenebilir.

Nitekim, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin iklim değişikliği alanındaki önemli sözleşmelere taraf olmayı reddettiğinin burada altını çizmek gerekir. 1992 tarihli Birleşmiş Milletler İklim Değişikliği Çerçeve Sözleşmesi'nin hedeflerini gerçekleştirmek için düzenlenmiş olan Kyoto Protokolü'ne Amerika Birleşik Devletleri taraf değildir. İklim değişikliği konusunda bağlayıcı tek sözleşme olan ve 191 devletin taraf olduğu 1997 tarihli Kyoto Protokolü'nü Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ısrarlı bir şekilde imzalamayı reddetmiştir. Kyoto Protokolü'nün "süper-güç" Amerika Birleşik Devletleri tarafından imzalanmamasının, bu sözleşmenin uygulanmasında problemler doğuracağı iddia edilmiştir. (Purvis, 2004) Birleşmiş Milletler örgütüne taraf en güçlü devletlerden birinin Kyoto Protokolü'nü imzalamayı reddi, sözleşmenin geçerliliğinin ve etkililiğinin sorgulanmasına yol açmıştır. (Purvis, 2004) Uygulamaya bakıldığında, Kyoto Protokolü'nün bağlayıcı hedeflerinin devletler tarafından sıkı sıkıya dikkate alındığı söylenememektedir. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin bir sözleşmeye taraf olması devletler nezdinde sözleşmenin önemli olduğuna dair bir intiba yaratmaktadır ve bu da sözleşmelerin uygulanmasını kolaylaştırmaktadır.

Güvenlik Konseyi toplantısı, iklim konusunda Güvenlik Konseyinin aktif bir rol almasına şüpheyle yaklaşan devletlerin de mevcut olduğunu bize göstermektedir. Güvenlik Konseyine şüphe ile yaklaşılmasının temel nedeni, Güvenlik Konseyinin devletlerin egemenliğine müdahale yetkisini elinde bulundurmasıdır. (Sanwal, 2013, s. 698) Bu organın iklim değişikliği alanında da yetkilendirilmesi, devletlerin egemenliklerine müdahale edebilme kapasitesinin de genişletilmesi anlamına gelmektedir. Örneğin, Güney Afrika Cumhuriyeti temsilcisi, “iklim değişikliğinin henüz uluslararası barış ve güvenliği tehdit edecek bir durum olmadığını” belirtmiştir. (Güvenlik Konseyi, 2007) Ayrıca, temsilciye göre, iklim konusunda daha temsili ve demokratik bir organ olan Genel Kurulun etkin bir rol oynaması daha yerinde olacaktır; çünkü Güvenlik Konseyi tüm devletleri temsil eden bir organ değildir. (Güvenlik Konseyi, 2007, s. 16) Rusya temsilcisi de iklim konusunun “sürdürülebilir kalkınma” meselesi olduğunu ve bu konunun sürdürülebilir kalkınma alanında uzmanlaşmış Birleşmiş Milletler organları ve uzman kuruluşları tarafından ele alınması gerektiğini belirtmiştir. (Güvenlik Konseyi, 2007, s. 17)

Namibya ise daha açık bir şekilde Güvenlik Konseyine ilişkin şüphelerini dile getirmiştir. Namibya temsilcisi, geleneksel anlamdaki barış ve güvenlik dışındaki konuların Güvenlik Konseyi tarafından ele alınmaması gerektiğini ifade etmiştir. Temsilciye göre, iklim değişikliğinin uluslararası barış ve güvenliğe yönelik herhangi bir tehdit oluşturması durumunda, yalnızca Birleşmiş Milletlerin çevre alanında yetkili ve etkin kuruluşları harekete geçmelidirler. (Güvenlik Konseyi, 2007, s. 31) Pakistan temsilcisi de iklim konusundaki uluslararası sözleşmelerin (Birleşmiş Milletler İklim Değişikliği Çerçeve Sözleşmesi, Kyoto Protokolü gibi) hiçbirinin Güvenlik Konseyi’ne herhangi bir yetki tanımadığını altını çizer. (Güvenlik Konseyi, 2007, s. 24) Pakistan temsilcisine göre, Güvenlik Konseyi bu alanda, Birleşmiş Milletler Sözleşmesi dahil, hiçbir sözleşme tarafından yetkilendirilmemiştir ve dolayısıyla iklim konusunda bu organın herhangi bir rol oynaması doğru değildir. (Güvenlik Konseyi, 2007, s. 24) Özetle, iklim değişikliği konusunda Güvenlik Konseyinin bir rol oynayıp oynamasına dair devletler nezdinde önemli fikir ayrılıkları mevcuttur. (Peters, 2018, s. 202)

2011 yılında, bu kez Almanya’nın konuyla ilgili bir toplantı talebi üzerine, Güvenlik Konseyi iklim değişikliği ve uluslararası barış ve güvenlik” ilişkisini görüşmek için bir kez daha toplanmıştır. Toplantıda, 2007’deki toplantıya benzer şekilde, Güvenlik Konseyinin iklim konusunda aktif bir rol oynayıp oynamasına ilişkin olarak farklı görüşler ortaya çıkmıştır. Örneğin Nijerya temsilcisi, iklim değişikliğinin kendi ülkesindeki etkilerini dile getirmiştir. Nijerya’da kuraklığın mahsul üretimine ağır bir darbe vurduğunu ve bunun sonucunda da gıda güvenliği problemi yaşandığını belirtmiş ve Güvenlik Konseyinden iklim krizi konusunda aktif bir rol oynamasını talep etmiştir. (Güvenlik Konseyi, 2011, s. 10) El Salvador Cumhuriyeti temsilcisi de benzer şekilde, Güvenlik Konseyi’nin iklim değişikliğini uluslararası barış ve güvenliğe bir tehdit olarak tanımasının ve bunun sonucunda da gerekli önlemleri almasının çok önemli ve gerekli olduğunu ifade etmiştir. (Güvenlik Konseyi, 2011, s. 29)

Öte yandan, Portekiz temsilcisi ise Güvenlik Konseyinin iklim değişikliği hususunu tartışmak için uygun bir platform olarak kabul edilemeyeceğini belirtmiştir. (Güvenlik Konseyi, 2011, s. 20) Mısır da Güvenlik Konseyine şüphe ile yaklaşan devletlerden biridir. Mısır temsilcisi, Güvenlik Konseyinin Genel Kurul’un yetki alanına giren konuları mütemediyen ele alarak bu organın görev ve yetki alanına “tecavüz ettiğini” ve bu durumun da Mısır’ı endişelendirdiğini belirtmiştir. Mısır temsilcisi, Güvenlik Konseyinden “Birleşmiş Milletler Sözleşmesi tarafından kendisine tanınmış yetkilerin dışına çıkmamasını” talep etmiştir. (Güvenlik Konseyi, 2011, s. 26) Hindistan ise konuya teknik bir açıdan yaklaşmış ve Güvenlik Konseyine tanınmış yetkilerin gıda güvenliği gibi yahut ada devletlerin deniz seviyesi altında kalması gibi tehlikelere yönelik olarak işlevsiz kalacağını ifade etmiştir. Birleşmiş Milletlerin Güvenlik Konseyine tanıdığı yetkiler şu şekildedir:

“Madde 41. Güvenlik Konseyi, kararlarını yürütmek için silahlı kuvvet kullanımını içermeyen ne gibi önlemler alınması gerektiğini kararlaştırabilir ve Birleşmiş Milletler üyelerini bu önlemleri uygulamaya çağırabilir. Bu önlemler, ekonomik ilişkilerin ve demiryolu, deniz, hava, posta, telgraf, radyo ve diğer iletişim ve ulaştırma araçlarının tümüyle ya da bir bölümüyle kesintiye uğratılmasını, diplomatik ilişkilerin kesilmesini içerebilir.

Madde 42. Güvenlik Konseyi, 41. maddede öngörülen önlemlerin yetersiz kalacağı ya da kaldığı kanısına varırsa, uluslararası barış ve güvenliğin korunması ya da yeniden tesisi için, hava, deniz ya da kara kuvvetleri aracılığıyla, gerekli saydığı her türlü girişimde bulunabilir. Bu girişimler, gösterileri, ablukayı ve Birleşmiş Milletler üyelerinin hava, deniz ya da kara kuvvetlerince yapılacak başka operasyonları içerebilir.” (Birleşmiş Milletler Sözleşmesi, 1945)

Görüldüğü üzere, 41. madde silahlı kuvvet içermeyen önlemleri kapsamaktadır. Diplomatik ilişkilerin kesilmesi gibi yahut ekonomik ilişkilerin durdurulması gibi önlemleri içerir. 42. madde ise Güvenlik Konseyine silahlı kuvvet kullanımı yetkisinin verildiği maddedir. 41. ve 42. maddelerdeki yetkilerin, Hindistan temsilcisinin de ifade ettiği üzere, iklim değişikliği ile mücadele konusunda etkili olacaklarını ileri sürmek mümkün görünmemektedir.

5. Uygulamada Karşılaşılabilecek Zorluklar

Her ne kadar Güvenlik Konseyinin iklim değişikliği konusunda düzenli raporlar düzenlediğini gözlemlese de pratikte Güvenlik Konseyinin Birleşmiş Milletler Sözleşmesi'nden kaynaklanan yetkilerini kullanmasının önünde engeller bulunabilir. Öncelikle, yukarıda Güney Afrika Cumhuriyet temsilcisinin de belirttiği üzere, iklim değişikliğinin uluslararası barış ve güvenliği tehdit eden bir noktaya ulaşıp ulaşmadığı tartışmaya açıktır. Lucile Maertens (2021, s. 655) bu konuda Güvenlik Konseyinin doğrudan bir ihlalin yahut tehdidin gerçekleşmesini beklemekle yükümlü olmadığını ve önleyici tedbirlere başvurabileceğini ifade etmiştir. Nitekim, 1992 yılında Birleşmiş Milletler eski Genel Sekreteri Boutros Boutros-Ghali'nin yayınlamış olduğu “Barış için bir Gündem: Önleyici Diplomasi, Barış İnşası ve Barışı Koruma (An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping)” isimli rapordan beri Güvenlik Konseyine önleyici önlemler alma yetkisi tanınmış bulunmaktadır. Rapora göre, Güvenlik Konseyi önleyici bir önlem olarak askeri konuşlandırmaya (42. Maddeden kaynaklanan yetki) başvurabilecektir. (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992, paragraf 31) Bu durum, Soğuk Savaş ve özellikle de 11 Eylül saldırıları sonrasında Güvenlik Konseyinin yetkilerinin genişlemesinin bir örneği olarak değerlendirilebilir. Birleşmiş Milletler Sözleşmesi'nin yorumlanmasıyla Güvenlik Konseyine verilen yetkiler Soğuk Savaş sonrası genişletilmiştir. Dolayısıyla, iklim değişikliği konusunda Güvenlik Konseyi önleyici önlemlere başvuracağını belirterek Güney Afrika Cumhuriyeti'nin dile getirmiş olduğu eleştirilerin önüne geçebilir.

İklim değişikliğinin Güvenlik Konseyi tarafından nasıl ele alınacağına günün sonunda Güvenlik Konseyi üyeleri karar vereceklerdir. (Penny, 2007, s. 62) Judith Nora Hardt'ın belirttiği üzere (2021, s. 6), “güvenlik” konusu üzerinde uzlaşmaya varılmış sabit bir konu değildir. Bu nedenle, dünyanın herhangi bir yerinde iklim kaynaklı bir krizin uluslararası barış ve güvenliği tehdit edip etmediği Güvenlik Konseyine üye olan devletlerin takdirine kalacaktır. Bu durumda, alınacak kararın politik çıkarlar doğrultusunda alınacağını tahmin etmek zor değildir. Bu konuyla ilgili Eski Yugoslavya Uluslararası Ceza Mahkemesi'nin (EYUCM) önemli bir tespiti bulunmaktadır. Bilindiği üzere, EYUCM 1992-1995 yılları arasında eski Yugoslavya bölgesinde gerçekleşen savaş suçlarını tespit etmek ve yargılamak için kurulmuştur. EYUCM, Tadić davasında, Güvenlik Konseyi'nin “barışın tehdit edildiğine yönelik kararları”nın politik kararlar olduğunu belirtmiştir. (EYUCM, Tadić, 1997)

Nitekim, Güvenlik Konseyinin özellikle barışın tehdit edildiğini tespit ettiği konularda genellikle politik davrandığını gösteren somut örnekler de vardır. Örneğin, 1966 yılında Güney Rodezya'da hükûmetin devrilmesi, Güvenlik Konseyi tarafından kınanmıştır. Güvenlik Konseyi 232 sayılı kararname ile Güney Rodezya'daki durumun uluslararası barış ve güvenliği tehdit ettiğine karar vermiştir. (Güvenlik Konseyi, Kararname 232, paragraf 1) Benzer şekilde, 1977 yılında Güvenlik Konseyi Güney Afrika'ya silah ambargosu getirmiştir. Güvenlik Konseyine göre, Güney Afrika'da mevcut olan apartheid rejiminin elinde güçlü silahlar bulundurulması, uluslararası barış ve güvenliği tehdit etmektedir. (Güvenlik Konseyi, Kararname 418, paragraf 1)

İklim değişikliği konusunda Güvenlik Konseyinin karşısına çıkabilecek bir diğer zorluk, sorumlu devletin tespitidir. Bu sorun iklim değişikliği alanında karşılaştığımız genel bir sorundur. Çevre kirliliği konusunda, kirliliğe doğrudan yahut dolaylı olarak sebep olan aktörleri bulmak

mümkün iken, iklim değişikliğine sebep olan aktörlerin tespiti zor bir meseledir. Kuraklığa tam olarak hangi devletin neden olduğu yahut aşırı sıcak hava dalgalarının ortaya çıkmasında hangi devletin ne ölçüde sorumluluğu bulunduğu tartışmaya açıktır. İklim değişikliği devletlerin ve devlet dışı aktörlerin yüzyıllar boyunca kümülatif olarak katkıda buldukları bir problemdir. Dolayısıyla, Güvenlik Konseyinin iklim değişikliğine sebep olduğunu öne sürerek tek bir devleti hedef alması adil bir durum olmayacaktır. Harry van der Linden'e göre (2017, s. 125), tüm devletler kolektif bir şekilde sorumlu tutularak bu sorun çözülebilir.

Ayrıca, Harry van der Linden'e göre (2017, s. 125), günümüzde sera gazı emisyonlarının hangi devlet kaynaklı olduğunu ve dolayısıyla sorumluluğun hangi devlete ait olduğunu tespit etmek güçtür. Örneğin, Çin, Hindistan, Vietnam, Bangladeş gibi ülkelerde emek ve maliyet ucuz olduğundan birçok büyük markanın fabrikalarını bu ülkelere taşıdığını görürüz. Böyle bir durumda, sorumluluğun hangi ülkede olacağı tartışmaya açık bir konudur. Bu da Güvenlik Konseyinin 41. ve 42. maddede belirtilen önlemleri tam olarak hangi devletler için kullanacağı problemini yaratmaktadır. Özetle, Güvenlik Konseyinin iklim değişikliği konusunda önlemler almasının önünde birtakım teknik problemler bulunmaktadır.

6. Sonuç

İklim değişikliği tüm dünyayı ilgilendiren güncel bir problemdir. Bu problem 2007 yılından beri Güvenlik Konseyi tarafından da tartışılmaya başlanmıştır. Güvenlik Konseyinin iklim değişikliği konusunu gündemine alması, bu organın iklim değişikliği ile mücadelede etkin bir aktör olarak rol oynayıp oynayamayacağı sorusunu doğurmuştur. Eldeki çalışma, literatürümüzde yeterince çalışılmamış olan bu konuyu ele almıştır. Çalışma, Güvenlik Konseyinin iklim değişikliği alanında rol oynamasını yahut rol oynamamasını iler sürmek gibi bir amaç taşımamaktadır. Çalışma, Güvenlik Konseyi'nin bu alanda rol oynamasının hukuki ve politik açılardan mümkün olup olmadığını incelemiştir. Güvenlik Konseyinin iklim değişikliği alanında yayınlamış olduğu raporlar, Güvenlik Konseyi üyelerinin konuya yaklaşımlarını yansıtmaları açısından çalışmada analiz edilmiştir.

İklim değişikliği, aşırı hava olaylarına, deniz seviyesinde yükselmeye, kuraklığa sebep olmaktadır. Ada devletlerin deniz seviyesindeki yükselme sonucu yok olma tehlikesiyle karşı karşıya kalmaları yahut kuraklık sonucu ortaya çıkan düzensiz göç hareketleri, iklim değişikliğinin aynı zamanda bir uluslararası güvenlik meselesi de olduğunu göstermektedir. Nitekim, Birleşmiş Milletler Sözleşmesi tarafından uluslararası barış ve güvenliği sağlamak ile yetkilendirilmiş Güvenlik Konseyi iklim konusunu gündemine taşımış ve bu konuda periyodik toplantılar gerçekleştirmeye başlamıştır. Ancak, Güvenlik Konseyinin kararlarının politik çıkarlardan bağımsız olmaması ve Güvenlik Konseyinin daimî üyelerinin (özellikle Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Rusya) Güvenlik Konseyinin bu konuda adım atmasına yönelik çekincelerinin bulunması, bu organın iklim adaleti sağlamaadaki rolünü kısıtlamaktadır.

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Harun Talha Ayanoglu*

* Ulusal Chengchi Üniversitesi, Taipei, Tayvan; htayanoglu@hotmail.com; ORCID: 0000-0002-8194-8703.

Internationalization of Terrorism and its Implications in the Philippines

Terrorism, once a localized threat, experienced a paradigmatic shift with the 9/11 Attacks, evolving into a global security menace. Al Qaeda, the orchestrator of 9/11, not only introduced unconventional tactics but also pioneered a strategically and hierarchically flexible form of terrorism. The global war on terror lasting two decades assured nothing but tactical victories. Despite the fall of prominent terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the threat endures in diverse forms globally. The return of foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq further exacerbated the security challenges with implications extending not only to Western countries but also to Southeast Asia. This article aims to conceptualize and analyze the internationalization of terrorism. It explores the evolution of this phenomenon, emphasizing the methodology of religiously motivated international terrorism that transcends national borders. The implications are scrutinized within the context of the Battle of Marawi in the Philippines, a nation grappling with identity-building challenges, longstanding Islamist insurgency, and state control issues.

Keywords: International Terrorism, the Philippines, Jihad, Southeast Asia.

Uluslararasılaşan Terörizm ve Filipinler'deki Etkileri

Uzun bir süre yerel bir tehdit olarak kabul edilen terörizm, 11 Eylül Saldırılarıyla birlikte paradigmatic bir değişim yaşadı ve küresel bir güvenlik tehdidine dönüştü. 11 Eylül saldırılarının arkasındaki El Kaide yalnızca yeni taktikler uygulamakla kalmayıp, stratejik ve hiyerarşik olarak daha esnek bir terörizm formuna da öncülük etti. Bu nedenle, 20 yıl süren teröre karşı küresel taktiksel zaferlerden başka bir sonuç getirmedi. El Kaide ve IŞİD gibi grupların Irak ve Suriye'deki yenilgilerine rağmen terör tehdidi dünya çapında çeşitli şekillerde varlığını devam ettirdi. Yabancı savaşçıların Suriye ve Irak'tan geri dönüşü, yalnızca Batı ülkelerini değil aynı zamanda Güneydoğu Asya'yı da kapsayacak şekilde güvenlik sorunlarını derinleştirdi. Bu makale terörizmin uluslararasılaşmasını kavramsallaştırmayı ve analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu doğrultuda bu makale, ulusal sınırları aşan dini motivasyonlu uluslararası terörizmin metodolojisini vurgulayarak bu olgunun evrimini araştırmaktadır. Bunun etkileri, ulusal kimlik inşasında başarısız olan, uzun yıllardır İslamcı silahlı ayaklanmalarla mücadele eden ve ülke üzerinde etkin devlet kontrolünü sağlayamayan Filipinler'de, Marawi Savaşı özelinde incelenecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası Terörizm, Filipinler, Cihat, Güneydoğu Asya.

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Internationalization of Terrorism and its Implications in the Philippines

1. Introduction

The 9/11 attacks were one of the most significant milestones in terrorism because they represented an unconventional shift in many aspects. The masterminds of these attacks, perpetrators, and way of execution were so unconventional that no one had ever witnessed them before. When Philip Heymann (2000) praised the US commercial airline security, he could never predict anyone would use aircrafts as cruise missiles. The shift in terrorism orchestrated by Al Qaeda was not only at the tactical level but also at a strategic level. As a response to US-led global war on terrorism (GWOT), Al Qaeda reformed itself in an organizationally less strict and more flexible manner. To sustain the global terror campaign, Al Qaeda leadership intended to underscore the importance of methodology to mobilize people around the world. In this way, they made global Jihadi networks strategically undefeatable (Riedel, 2013). This argument was also consolidated by the US President Obama. On the day bin Laden was killed, he addressed the international community and underscored the continuing threat posed by Al Qaeda's affiliates across the world (Phillips, 2011).

The cost of GWOT lasting two decades was 8 trillion USD and more than 900.000 deaths (Kimball, 2023). To neutralize Al Qaeda leadership and eradicate the Jihadi networks, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and partly Pakistan have turned to a battlefield. Nevertheless, international terrorism shaped by Jihadi thoughts persisted in different forms and regions. On the 15th anniversary of GWOT, ISIS controlled a massive land in Iraq and Syria. Furthermore, this new form of terrorism orchestrated by ISIS was not only strong in Syria and Iraq but also, through self-radicalized individuals and homegrown terrorists, it extended its reach beyond the combat zone in the Middle East. In other words, terrorism has become more international and serious than ever before.

The fall of ISIS in Syria and Iraq has thrown another national security threat to the Europeans and Americans; returnees (Capone et al., 2023). To a recent report, between 2013 and 2019 53.000 men, women, and minors from 80 countries went to Syria and Iraq. Although most were from the Middle East, numerous Western citizens have been to the region (Mehra et al., 2023). These returnees were well-trained and well-indoctrinated; therefore, they may pose severe threats to the national security in their homelands. While the world was concerned about the returning fighters and their potential to inflict violence in Western countries, in 2017, the foreign fighters issue showed up in the Philippines. Abu Sayyaf (ASG) and Maute Groups along with hundreds of foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq, raided the city of Marawi. Heavy fighting between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the ASG-Maute front marked that decades-old Muslim-Christian conflict in the Southern Philippines has become a hotspot of international terrorism in the region.

Internationalization of terrorism was voiced by Former US President Bush, as he pointed to Southeast Asia as the second front of the GWOT in 2001 (Gershman, 2002). Although his statement sparked criticism, today international terrorism is a pressing challenge in global security. To assess this issue, this article primarily intends to conceptualize the internationalization of terrorism based on its methodological dimension. Secondly, it aims to analyze the implications of the internationalization of terrorism in Southeast Asia in the case of the Battle of Marawi. The Philippines provides a fruitful context for this study to assess the internationalization of terrorism as the country has failed national identity-building attempts, decades-old unresolved Islamist insurgency problems, and weak control of the state over the archipelagic country (Quimpo, 2016; Cruz de Castro, 2019).

2. Internationalization of Terrorism

International terrorism has transformed the global security landscape, with Al Qaeda playing a pivotal role in this evolution. This section explores how Al Qaeda's strategic adaptations have influenced the internationalization of terrorism. Examining the key shifts in Al Qaeda's

strategy is essential to comprehend international terrorism that shape the way terrorism transcends borders today and the challenges it poses to global security.

Although international terrorism has been in the literature since the 1980s, this concept has been semantically transformed since then. International terrorism in the US Air Force report prepared by Brian M. Jenkins was referred to as simply “cross-border terrorism” (Jenkins, 1985, p. 4). In parallel with the changes in terrorist tactics and technological advancements, the contemporary interpretation of international terrorism has emerged. By extension, globalization served as a substantial factor influencing the interpretation and scope of international terrorism. Keohane and Nye argued that globalization has not only expanded the global movement of capital, people, goods, and services but also ideas and crimes (Keohane & Nye, 2000). Thus, one may argue in addition to technological advancements, globalization has also played a pivotal role in the internationalization of terrorism.

David Rapoport’s (2002) categorization of different waves of terrorism is a useful tool to understand the evolution of terrorism. He pointed out that terrorism may take different forms, organizational schemes, and ideological backgrounds in line with the global political atmosphere, and categorized terrorism into four major waves; the Anarchist, New-Left, Anti-Colonial, and finally the religious waves. In 2002, Rapoport predicted that the security paradigm in the following decade would be substantially shaped by a religious wave (Rapoport, 2002). In the wake of 9/11, international terrorism became associated with radical Islamist groups, particularly bin Laden-led Al Qaeda. In this sense, Al Qaeda represented the final wave of terrorism in Rapoport’s formulation. Nevertheless, Al Qaeda was neither the first nor the only radical Islamist armed group resorting to terrorist tactics. What set Al Qaeda distinguished from other groups by resorting to all available means to launch and maintain the Jihadi fight (Scheuer, 2003). Bin Laden not only established a religiously motivated armed group but also created a methodology by revitalizing and reshaping the Islamic concept of Jihad. Another key figure, Abu Musab al-Suri later refined and reinforced the emphasis on the Jihadi methodology. As a result, Al Qaeda evolved beyond being a terror group; it became a methodology for Muslims who were discontent and in a rage against the existing system (Al-Suri, 2014). Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda strategists, cognizant of the impermanence of people and organizations, aimed to create an abstract notion of Jihad that united Muslims beyond political borders. With this franchise-like method, Al Qaeda has extended its reach and fortified its ties with established like-minded terrorist organizations (ICG, 2003; Fishman, 2008). This symbiotic relationship was beneficial for both parties because Al Qaeda could reach anywhere that normally it cannot, while local groups could extract financial and technical assistance, and attract more recruits by leveraging the Al Qaeda brand.

Emphasizing the methodological dimension helped overcome ideological barriers between different Jihadist groups and helped Al Qaeda evolve over three successive generations (Watts, 2013). The first generation, Al Qaeda 1.0, was founded in 1988 by bin Laden and Abdallah Azzam and lasted until 1996 when the second generation started. Throughout this generation, Al Qaeda has sought the reviving the Jihadi thoughts in Muslims’ minds and has reemphasized the ultimate goal; Sharia-based world order. Although Al Qaeda was not the first and only armed organization with religious motives, it was different than others at the strategic level. For example, to reach their ultimate goal, Al Qaeda intended to attack the far enemy—the USA, whereas other religiously motivated groups were targeting the near enemy, their governments (Byman, 2015). In 1996, bin Laden officially declared war against the USA with the “Declaration of War Against Americans Occupying the Land of Two Holy Places” (bin Laden, 1996), and Al Qaeda 2.0 commenced. Two years after the war declaration Al Qaeda exercised simultaneous attacks on US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. These attacks demonstrated how international and severe the new threat was. Al Qaeda 2.0 commenced together with these attacks and lasted until Operation Iraqi Freedom. Until 2003, Al Qaeda fought for its safe havens in Afghanistan and Iraq, but the American invasion was the demise of Al Qaeda 2.0. As Al Qaeda’s supremacy over other Jihadi groups faded, local Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, Al Shabab, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and the Taliban began to rise. Under these circumstances, targeting the far enemy was not a feasible option for Al Qaeda, and Abu Musab al-Suri came up with a new strategy. In this new

strategy, hybrid warfare with individual fighters was promoted. The far enemy was no longer the top priority, rather near enemies were at the crosshair, as they were considered the proxies of the far enemy (Al-Suri, 2007). In addition, al-Suri was well aware that the world had changed after the Cold War, and they could not rely on the support from another state any longer. Therefore, effective use of the Internet and decentralization were the dominant features of this transitional period and represented another strategic shift in international terrorism. This convalescence lasted until 2011, the year of huge blazes in the Middle East and North Africa due to spillover effects of Arab Uprisings, and also bin Laden's death (Zimmerman, 2021).

The emerging global atmosphere together with the Arab Spring has created an opening for Al Qaeda-led international terrorist networks to thrive (Jones, 2012). The demonstrations were praised as the demise of fundamentalist opposition—due to the demand for democracy and liberalism (Holbrook, 2012). Nevertheless, the real consequences were quite challenging, because the fall of authoritarian governments, unfinished democratic revolutions, as well as ongoing conflicts have created a security vacuum for Al Qaeda and its regional associates to flourish. People participating in demonstrations were mostly ordinary citizens and had no long-term political revolutionary agenda. On the other hand, fundamentalist opposition had a decades-old revolutionary agenda and unsurprisingly they could be able to hijack ordinary people's revolution at the proper time (Coffey, 2015). In such a turbulent political atmosphere, Al Qaeda 3.0 was born and has risen on five main pillars. The first pillar was Zawahiri-led Al Qaeda Central (AQC)/Al Qaeda al Um/Al Qaeda Core/Al Qaeda Senior Leadership (AQSL) in charge of shaping Global Jihadi ideology. The second pillar consisted of affiliated groups like Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in Iraq (later ISIS), Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Shabab, Abu Sayyaf Group, and Boko Haram. The third pillar was largely allied groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Laskar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). Although these groups pursued similar Jihadi goals, they had relatively less association with Al Qaeda. The fourth pillar was allied networks, including remnants of the foreign Jihadi groups. The last pillar has consisted of inspired individuals such as those conducting terror attacks in Europe or the US (Munnich, 2014). This five-pillar structure was an important milestone in the process of internationalization of terrorism.

Al Qaeda strategists were aware that in the absence of attacking the far enemy, they would not advance in their Jihadi campaign, and they coped with this issue by reintroducing self-radicalized individuals. This was another serious contribution by al-Suri to further reinforce the internationalization of terrorism. In line with Ayman al-Zawahiri's vision in the early 2000s, the leader of Al Qaeda after bin Laden, al-Suri has promoted investments, particularly in online media. In this way, Al Qaeda could seek new pathways to fulfill their missions, without physical camps. By using online media effectively, Al Qaeda no longer needed to plan and execute attacks on near or far enemies by itself. Muslims all around the world were called to wage their Jihad individually wherever they were. The Earth was considered a Jihad Front and all Muslims would join because there is no border in the "World of Allah" (Al-Suri, 2014, pp. 182-190). Al-Suri's emphasis on using modern means to convey messages was further consolidated during the Syrian War, some Jihadi websites mentioned that "half of the Jihad is media" (Cockburn, 2015, p. 127). By exercising this strategy, Jihadi groups accessed recently converted Muslims in the Western world to influence them. Online radicalization made these people undetectable by security agencies. The rationale is seen in Crone and Harrow's description of homegrown: "self-recruited, self-trained, self-radicalized, and self-started" (Crone & Harrow, 2011, p. 522).

The threat posed by Al Qaeda 3.0, notoriously known as ISIS, was far more diversified and destructive (Nelson, 2011, p. 23). Effective usage of online means and self-radicalized individuals emanated an ultimate terror environment in the world between 2014-2017. What was more concerning than the number of terror attacks mounted across the US and Europe, was the perpetrators' profile; they were not on the radar of security agencies as they had never been to any overseas terror camps or affiliated with any organizations. Consequently, terrorism has become fully international as nowhere was immune to Jihadist infiltration. In the collapse of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, these global Jihadi networks sought new places to flourish, and Southeast Asia could be one of the best places.

3. Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Terrorist violence has shaped the regional security landscape in Southeast Asia for decades. Particularly in Thailand and the Philippines, due to failed attempts to integrate ethno-religious minorities into their societies, insurgent groups have repeatedly resorted to terrorist tactics (Majul, 1999; Milligan, 2001; Mishra, 2023). In addition, Indonesia and Malaysia also have serious imminent threats of domestic and transnational terrorism (Acharya, 2015, pp. 140-141). Shortly after the 9/11 attacks and the declaration of the GWOT, former US President George Bush named Southeast Asia as the second front of the war, due to the "Talibanization of Southeast Asia" (Acharya, 2015, p. 24).

Acharya (2015), on the other hand, argued that there has been no risk of state-sponsored terrorism in the region which may draw the US attention. According to him, in Southeast Asia, it was not possible to discuss the single, comprehensive Jihadi ideology due to ethnic, tribal, and even religious—in terms of practice and philosophy—diversity, contrary to Middle Eastern counterparts. Also, since Islamist movements in the region have been tolerated for a long time, these movements have not considered formal politics as a zero-sum game and they tended to reach an understanding with governments (Gershman, 2002, p. 65). Hence, countries with Muslim populations in the region, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia, were reluctant to support global efforts to eradicate terrorism. These countries preferred to use the term "domestic political violence with local implications" instead of the regional implications of international terrorism because local terror groups were neither capable of conducting large-scale attacks nor pledged allegiance to Global Jihad (Acharya, 2015, pp. 30-31).

On the other hand, Southeast Asian radical groups primarily have targeted near enemies to replace corrupted regimes with the Islamic government, instead of pursuing global political ends. Their focus was primarily on long-held regional sociopolitical crises, such as the Christian-Muslim conflict in the Philippines and Buddhist-Muslim antagonism in Thailand (Acharya, 2015, p. 42). However, some radical groups were pursuing transnational goals. For example, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) aimed to establish an Islamic State in the region stretching from Southern Thailand to Australia through the Jihadi struggle (Gershman, 2002).

These differences between Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian Islamist terror groups may stem from the different Islamization processes that these regions experienced. Clifford Geertz emphasized the conqueror-merchant dichotomy on diversified understandings of Islamic tradition and different socio-political developments. According to him, because the Middle East was the birthplace of Islam and believers had to fight the existing order to replace itself, and therefore Muslim conquerors have shaped the sociopolitical landscape. On the other hand, Southeast Asia's Islamization has been achieved largely through trade, naturally Muslim merchants have been more influential in shaping politics and society (Geertz, 1968). Furthermore, radical groups in both regions have been influenced by different Islamic scholars who had different thoughts on how to achieve Islamic order. In the Middle East, Jihadi scholars and pioneers such as Ibn Taymiyyah, Sayd Qutb, and Abdullah Azzam have been respected more. In Southeast Asia, Pakistani Islamic scholar and pioneer, Abul A'la al-Maududi has been praised and followed in terms of political struggle in an Islamic way. According to al-Maududi, the founding father of JI and the ideologue of Ikhwanul Muslimin, Islam is not the sum of rituals and spiritual values and cannot be shuttered into the walls of mosques (al-Maududi, 1979, pp. 37-39). Since Islam is an order rather than worship, believers have to launch a revolutionary struggle. However, this struggle does not necessarily have to be war by conventional means, instead, as he used the term struggle, it can also be pursued in peaceful terms within formal politics, such as participating in elections via political parties (al-Maududi, 1980).

Islamist armed groups engaging in political violence through terror tactics in the region have not pursued monolithic, Global Jihadi targets. Instead, they have pursued political ends such as independence or autonomy within the boundaries of their countries. However, its transnational links and capabilities distinguished JI from other regional Islamist armed groups. The origins of JI can be traced back to Darul Islam, a group intended to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia

(Banlaoi, 2009). During the 1990s, JI preferred to create its networks in Afghanistan and the Philippines, since both countries were partially weak, and their Muslim regions were ungoverned. In parallel with its transnational ideas and missions, JI organized four territorially based commands, Mantiqi cells. Mantiqi I was responsible for providing funding and senior leadership and was located in Singapore and Malaysia; Indonesia-based Mantiqi II was in charge of recruitments; Mantiqi III was responsible for sourcing weapons and explosives and located in Sulawesi, Sabah, and Mindanao; and Mantiqi IV was located in Australia and was responsible for establishing sub-cells and affiliated individuals in the country (Harris-Hogan & Zammit, 2014, p. 319). JI associates were in close contact with all Southeast Asian Islamist armed groups, especially MILF in the Philippines. Both groups benefitted from these mutual relations; JI associates or fugitive members could find shelter whereas MILF was improving its tactics from guerilla warfare to hybrid warfare (Acharya, 2015, pp. 32-37).

In terms of JI-Al Qaeda relations, it was an undeniable fact that JI was not an integral part of Al Qaeda (Ramakrishna & Seng Tan, 2003). However, both of them set targets of creating an Islamic state, and this common goal was enough for Al Qaeda to support JI as its regional franchise. The analogy proposed by the International Crisis Group may help to understand the relation between the two; similar to that of an NGO with a funding agency. The NGO exists as a completely independent entity but submits proposals to the funding agency and gets a grant when the proposal is accepted. In these circumstances, Al Qaeda may help fund specific JI programs, but it neither directs nor controls JI (ICG, 2003).

The Philippines stands out in the region with its long-standing exposure to terrorist violence. As described by an American diplomat, "chronic insurgency is the most visible symptom of the state failure in Mindanao" (Collier, 2006, p. 30). Terrorist safe-heavens in the southern Philippines remain the weakest link in the entire regional counter-terrorism chain (p. 34). MNLF and MILF have been seeking autonomy in Mindanao for a long time. Also, in the same territories, radical Islamist groups which have been inspired by Global Jihadi ideas, are advocating the creation of the Islamic State. At this point, it is essential to ask what made the Philippines fertile ground for these radical groups.

4. What Made Philippines Fertile Ground?

Some regions are fertile grounds for terrorist groups to establish their cells, plan their operations, and if possible, train their recruits. The Philippines was one of the most fertile grounds for international terror networks in the region thanks to its geographical conditions, religion, and identity-based rifts, intensive and excessive clientelist political culture based on clan-family emphasis, and also relatively weak state control. Although the Muslim region in the country could be prosperous in many aspects, such as natural resources and located outside of tropical typhoon zone, much of its capacities have failed to be realized due to the centuries-old Muslim-Christian tension (Turner et al., 1992). Therefore, Muslim-populated regions have been the center of the worst poverty, health, and education levels in the entire Philippines. Manila's failure to meet people's basic needs has created a backdoor for radical groups and ideologies to exploit people's frustration (Gershman, 2002).

The root causes of the Muslim-Christian tension date back to the Spanish colonial administration in the 16th century. Muslims in the region launched resistance against Spanish rule, as a response to their Christianization and subjugation policies (Majul, 1999).

Despite Spanish expansion toward the Muslim region, effective administrative control over the region could not be achieved (Milligan, 2001, p. 437). Following the end of Spanish colonialism, Filipino Muslims have not given up their resistance, rather they fought against American colonial rule and Japanese occupation until the end of WWII. To achieve economic and social development in Mindanao, American rule in the Philippines encouraged Christian Filipinos to immigrate to Mindanao, which led Muslims to consider it as an assimilation plan (McKenna, 1998). Since the government, after independence, has maintained the same migration policies, the balance of the population has drastically changed, and this was one of the reasons why there are

ongoing inter-communal conflicts in the region. In addition to this, Manila's attempts to integrate Muslims into society through public schools have failed and deepened the ethno-religious rift. The members of the Muslim community were highly reluctant to enroll their children in public schools due to the suspicion about the intentions of the government. Instead, they established their own schools and educated their children in line with their religion, culture, and identity. As a result, the *madaris*, religious schools were established by Muslims, and this choice was the representation of rejection of the Filipino identity (Milligan, 2001, p. 443). On the other hand, according to Milligan, the main reason why Manila governments have not been able to exercise effective control in Muslim regions since the independence was not only the ethnoreligious rift (Milligan, 2001) but the privatization of security (Bates, 2010).

5. Privatization of Security and Filipino Society

Under normal circumstances, the state provides security and insurance of property rights through its credible capacity for deterrence and retaliation (Bates, 2010, p. 45). Effective exercise of the threat of retaliation brings about peace and prosperity. However, before the modern state agrarian societies had another insurance mechanism, families. In family and kinship-based societies people relied on their families as the source of security and protection. In other words, in agrarian societies, coercion and the use of violence were privately supplied. Nevertheless, the privatization of security comes with a cost; potential retaliation. In an environment where security is privately supplied and there is no, as John J. Mearsheimer said, "nightwatchman", use of force might trigger the other families' retaliation (Mearsheimer, 2010). Since this security mechanism provides fragile peace, the state of peace may easily be disrupted (Bates, 2010, p. 47). Thus, people in these societies often prefer to live in poverty to avoid others' attention (p. 48). In sum, poverty becomes the price of peace in such societies, where security is privately supplied.

One of the main reasons why the privatization of security in the Philippines is regional fragmentation and political disputes have been part of the Philippines' history. The archipelagic landscape caused considerable isolation among different groups and reduced the opportunities to interact between different communities. In this regard, Banlaoi argued that these waters only serve as channels of transportation facilitating inter-island commerce and migration, rather than transmitters of national unity and conveyors of national consciousness (Banlaoi, 2010, p. 31). Fragmentation in Filipino society may be observed within the same ethnoreligious communities. For example, although southern provinces are home to Muslim minorities, the number of Islamist groups in the region demonstrates a profound conflict of interest among them. Apart from the largest groups such as MNLF and MILF, more groups are fighting for various purposes. They are also divided into ISIS-linked and non-ISIS-linked. ASG, Tanum Group, ASG's Urban, Ansar al-Khilafah Philippines, (IS-Maguindanao), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters-BIFF (IS-Zamboanga), Maute Group (IS-Ranao) are affiliated with ISIS. On the other hand, ASG-Jolo, Abu Sofia Group, and Rajah Solaiman Movement are not affiliated with ISIS (McKirdy & Watson, 2017). In addition to those, according to AFP, there are two main factions within ASG: Basilan-based and Sulu-based. Basilan-based faction of the ASG consists of the following groups: Ampul, Apting, Danggitil, Hapilon, Isnilon, Jainuddin, Janjalani, Kaw Jaljalis, Salagin, Masiraji Sali. Sulu-based faction comes into existence in a combination of these groups; Robot, Amil, Asiri, Badja, Bauddin, Hayudini, Hadji Radzpal, Irijani, Jamal, Kalim, Landi, Mali, Saabdula, Sahiron, Sali, Sahiron, Shariff (Banlaoi, 2010, pp. 60-61). In other words, fragmentation in the country is not limited to Muslims-Christian's rift, also among Muslim groups there are profound disagreements, as evidenced by the number of different factions of the same group. This divided socio-political atmosphere of the Philippines and Mindanao's geographical and political isolation provides fertile grounds for radical thoughts. Therefore, disagreements between political and armed factions have entailed separately conducted bombings, kidnapping, and other sorts of criminal activities in the region.

Privatization of security in the Philippines naturally made patron-client relations one of the main characteristics of the sociopolitical landscape. In this regard, the president is controlling the allocation of resources in line with clientelist patterns (Banlaoi, 2010). Manila governments had to compromise with local land elites and different ethnic and religious groups who had their

own militias and business interests. Although the country has a long free election experience, local landlords are still key players in domestic politics (White, 2009, p. 8). Privatization of security along with patron-client relation patterns in the political realm naturally curbs the Manila government's effective controls over its territories. When independence was declared in 1946, the state apparatuses in the country were divided among dominant social classes, powerful clans, land elites, and wealthy businessmen, in addition, Marxist and Islamist separatists have been challenging the legitimacy of the state of the Philippines (Rivera, 1994). Hutchcroft called this shattered socioeconomic and political system in the Philippines booty capitalism where private interests are pursued using public resources, and economic and political oligarchs possess the state apparatuses, and this undoubtedly affects national security (Hutchcroft, 1998).

6. Terrorism in the Philippines

Given the fragmented socioeconomic and political characteristics of the Philippines, the Philippines has never been immune to non-state violence in the form of terrorism throughout its history. Unlike other neighboring states, the Philippines faces a dual terrorist threat. The first one is Marxist terrorism led by the Communist Party of the Philippines pursuing the Marxist People's War and the second one is separatist/autonomist religiously motivated terrorism in the southern part of the country. It is important to note that Islamist terrorist groups in the Philippines have significantly distinguished themselves from their Middle Eastern counterparts. Until the mid-2010s Islamists in the Philippines, and even in the region, have not been fueled and inspired by global Jihadi thoughts. Instead, ethnoreligious incentives stemming from their minority status under the Catholic state motivated the armed resistance (Chalk et al., 2009).

The armed resistance in Southern Philippines commenced when Nur Misuari founded the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) with the purpose of self-determination in 1972. It lasted until 1996 when the Davao Consensus provided the proclamation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (Chalk et al., 2009, p. 34). The Davao Consensus also represented the first strategic split within the Islamist movement. The establishment of the ARMM meant a shift from seeking independence to autonomy in the Muslim south, thus some local Islamist groups expressed their discontent, which led to the shattering of the Islamist movement. As a result, three competing blocs emerged and pursued different goals with different strategies and tactics. MNLF was already in the process of engaging the formal Filipino politics, while the other two refused to integrate into the existing order. The second group was the Salamat Hashim-led MILF claiming to be the vanguard of the Islamic movement in Mindanao. Although its discourse was more religiously determined than MNLF's, MILF gradually softened its stance and involved in peace talks for autonomy. The last one was the ASG which rejected any solution or deal outside of the establishment of the Islamic State in Mindanao (p. 35). Although since 2002 MILF and ASG relations have been developing (Vaughn et al., 2009), MILF has stated its rigid opposition to transnational radical groups and has portrayed itself as a tolerant entity that is ready to coexist with members of other religious faiths (Abuza, 2003, p. 91).

On the other hand, MILF's potential was important for Al Qaeda. To exploit the Philippines' ethnoreligiously divided political environment, bin Laden sent his brother-in-law Jamal Khalifa to the Philippines, to create Islamic charity foundations that were employed in fundraising for Muslim insurgents in the country. Once he reinforced Jihadi networks and conscious in the region, he began providing assistance to MILF which was particularly chosen among other Islamist groups, because MNLF was too mainstream and engaged in peace talks and ASG was too weak and found antipathetic even by some Muslims (Abuza, 2003, p. 95). By extension, Al Qaeda's financial and material support was excessively critical for MILF, because Libya's support has been diminishing at that time due to Gaddafi's plan to increase Libya's international reputation. Despite such close relations, later MILF has denied that its members have been trained by Al Qaeda. In addition to relations with Al Qaeda, under the leadership of Salamat Hashim, MILF-JI links have been created through the approval of the relocation of JI camps from Afghanistan to Mindanao in 1994 (Collier, 2006, p. 31).

MILF has strayed into Al Qaeda-led Global Jihad with Hashim Salamat, largely because of failed peace talks. When the peace talks between the Muslim groups and the government were prolonged, the violence spiral intensified. Similarly, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, leader of the MILF, underscored the fact that failed peace talks are the main culprits of the rise of radical groups. When peace talks were going in the right direction they remained less connected to Al Qaeda (Acharya, 2015, pp. 85-86; Gotinga, 2017). As evidenced in historical records of the violence, as long as peace talks and deals present fruitful results for both sides, the trend in violence is reduced and fewer people are radicalized (GTD, 2020). Prolonged negotiations between Manila and Muslim groups increase the risk of violence metastasizing or even it may cause the re-radicalization of parties as was observed in MNLF's taking on a more Islamist stance. Pennekamp (2016) predicted that ISIS may benefit from the breakaway factions' allegiances in the Philippines, and ASG's latest attempt to declare an Islamic State in Marawi confirmed his prediction.

7. Battle of Marawi

The battle of Marawi was one of the most striking reminders of the internationalization of terrorism in Southeast Asia. For decades, Islamist armed groups in the Philippines have distinguished themselves from international terror networks at the strategic level, despite some temporary tactical alignments. However, prolonged and often failed peace talks have created optimal conditions for groups seeking radical solutions to the Muslim minority question in the country. In addition, the fall of ISIS in the Middle East pushed global Jihadi networks to seek new safe havens. With this regard, the Southern Philippines has emerged as the nexus of local radical Islamist groups seeking support from global Jihadi networks and ISIS eyeing new bases. The siege of Marawi was the incarnation of this emerging nexus.

Clashes between government forces and ISIS-affiliated groups ASG and the Maute started on May 23, 2017, as a response to the AFP's offense. The target of the military operation was to capture Isnilon Hapilon, the leader of ISIS-linked ASG. However, Hapilon was protected by Abdullah and Omar Maute who reportedly had thousands of well-trained fighters reinforced by foreign fighters coming from Yemen, Malaysia, Chechnya, and Indonesia. The Catholic church, the city prison, schools, and main bridges were destroyed, and residents were taken hostage on the same day. This outrage eventually entailed the declaration of martial law in the Island of Mindanao, and an all-out war that brought along the involvement of air and land forces (Betteridge-Moes, 2017). In the interviews, combatant members of the armed forces stated that ASG fighters were as well armed as the army during the siege (McKirby & Watson, 2017). ASG fighters in Marawi allegedly used identical tactics as ISIS had used in Syria. This has proved that following the fall of ISIS in Syria, the influx of well-armed, well-trained, well-motivated foreign fighters seeking a new battlefield have been encouraged to go to the Philippines due to optimal conditions for Jihad. Geographically divided, politically isolated, and religiously fragmented conditions of the Philippines have fostered both local and foreign fighters to transfer weapons and ammunitions, recruits, and bomb-making devices, as well as the ideology of Global Jihad to the region (Hart, 2018). Although this was not the first Islamist armed groups' attempt to take over a city (in In 2014, Zamboanga City was targeted and sieged by 400 militants for 20 days. see Liljas, 2016), the battle of Marawi has set a milestone in the radicalism problem in the Philippines (Chao, 2017).

The clashes have demonstrated the incapability of AFP in urban warfare. Intense months-long clashes have resulted in the deaths of 920 insurgent fighters, 165 members of the AFP, and at least 45 civilians. The estimated cost of the conflict was around 1.1 billion USD for only rebuilding the city of Marawi (Betteridge-Moes, 2017), excluding the expenses of the military forces during the battle as well as humanitarian costs. As the AFP and the government struggled to suppress the radical Islamist uprising in Marawi, it caused deep and urgent concerns across the region. Thus, regional powers—the US, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and China—to an extent assisted the Philippines such as technical and material support, intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance, joint patrol missions in the Sulu Sea, and evacuating civilians (Cook, 2017).

On the other hand, this siege was not unexpected for many. In an interview, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, the leader of MILF stated that the attacks on Marawi should not have been surprising because pro-ISIS groups have already been publishing propaganda documents about their plans of declaring a caliphate in the Philippines (Gottinga, 2017). Another interview made by Steve Chao proved that ISIS' activities were known by local people. One of the child fighters of ISIS in Marawi, Abdul, claimed that local religious schoolteachers have taken them to ISIS camps as school field trips, although his school later denied any sort of links with ISIS. There were also many foreign recruits in those training camps as the interviewee stated (Chao, 2017).

The correlation between rising radicalism and government failure in peace talks was underlined by Aga Khan Sharif the leader of the Muslim community in Marawi. He asserted that the Maute brothers, since he knew them while they were children, were harmless, what triggered them was the failure of the government. According to him, prolonged and failed peace talks left no choice to the Maute brothers but to join ISIS (Chao, 2017). People of Marawi claimed that if historical injustices against the disadvantaged Muslim communities in the Philippines are not solved, the crisis will persist (Aljazeera, 2017). The reason behind this statement is not unfounded. Six of the 11 largest Islamist groups in the Philippines; ASG, Tanum, ASG's Urban, Ansharul Khilafah Philippines, BIFF, and Maute officially pledged allegiance to ISIS after peace talks failed and formed an umbrella group named Daulah Islamiyah Wilayatul Mashriq, the Eastern Province of Islamic State (McKirdy & Watson, 2017).

Another dimension of the Battle of Marawi which was expected to be over within a few weeks is related to a humanitarian crisis. During the clashes, hundreds of thousands of people were forced to be displaced from their homes to temporary camps out of Marawi. According to news sources, within these temporary camps, contagious waterborne diseases are spread due to the lack of medical care and supplies, as well as the outnumbered residents (Alindogan, 2017; Taylor, 2017). Even after one and a half years, the humanitarian situation was still not promising; as the report prepared by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) demonstrated that the recovery process is ongoing and over 73,000 people remain displaced (UNOCHA, 2018). According to the recent Mindanao Displacement Bulletin, from January to September 2023, there were 317,250 displaced people for various reasons (UNHCR, 2023), and the majority of them were victims of armed conflicts.

8. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

In association with advancements in transportation and communication, terrorism has evolved in a more international direction. Contrary to the past, where terrorist organizations thrived and organized under the sponsorship of competing states, new international terrorism operates beyond the borders of state sponsorship. Since the cost of terrorism sponsorship increased following the end of the Cold War, modern terrorists, particularly those religiously motivated, have begun relying on cell-based, decentralized organizational structures. These self-reliant terrorists operate globally, attacking both their host countries and others, transcending traditional boundaries.

In other words, the internationalization of terrorism extends beyond the internationally organized terrorist groups. Rather, it hinges on terrorist groups' propensity to conduct attacks on international targets, irrespective of their organizational framework. Although some terrorist organizations may establish branches in multiple countries under different guises, they may not be acknowledged as international terrorist organizations. This understanding underscores the global scope of these groups' activities and targets.

The infiltration of ISIS-led international terror networks into the Southern Philippines pointed out a significant dimension of international terrorism. Although local groups like ASG and Maute have not demonstrated a willingness to organize beyond regional borders, long-paused peace talks and enduring sociopolitical tensions in the Southern Philippines have created optimal conditions for international terror networks to infiltrate the region. In this sense, the internationalization of terrorism in the Philippines' context exemplifies how global terror

networks, leveraging existing local grievances and vulnerabilities, penetrate the region to pursue their political agenda.

Fukuyama underscored the correlation between sociopolitical instability, state fragility, and terrorism, contending that instability fosters terrorism (Fukuyama, 2004). The Arab Spring served as a stark reminder that fragile states and sociopolitical crises paved the way for a new wave of terrorism mastered by ISIS. With the collapse of ISIS dominance in Iraq and Syria, Southeast Asia emerged as a potential new safe haven for international terror networks to advance their objectives. Particularly the Philippines stands out in this regard due to several factors such as weak state control, corruption, economic challenges, and failed nation-building efforts. Additionally, social divisions along religious, linguistic, and ethnic lines exacerbate tensions, particularly in Mindanao, where Muslim minorities identify more closely with their distinct cultural identity as Bangsamoro or Moro rather than as Filipino. This fragile combination creates fertile ground for exploitation by international terror networks, potentially triggering ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic conflicts in the region (Banlaoi, 2010). Hence, the siege of Marawi presented that the infiltration and proliferation of extremist thoughts and groups in the region pose destructive security threats.

The Southeast Asian franchises of ISIS may have faltered in their attempts to establish an Islamic State, yet the siege of Marawi underscored their significant influence. This conflict stands for a crucial turning point in the internationalization of terrorism within the Philippines. Firstly, local groups, spurred by ISIS involvement, found a common cause and reinforced it with material and training support. This collaboration furthered their objectives of establishing an Islamic State under the ISIS banner. Secondly, by pledging allegiance to ISIS, these local groups extended their reach globally, effectively becoming affiliated entities of the jihadist network. In addition, the involvement of American support during the Marawi siege, alongside enhanced counterterrorism cooperation, demonstrated the heightened international attention garnered by these groups. Despite the apparent containment of immediate threats posed by factions like Maute and ASG after the recapture of Marawi, the international spotlight on the siege could inadvertently fuel fresh recruitment drives. Given the Philippines' fractured societal landscape and porous borders, the ongoing trend of terrorism internationalization suggests a persistent influx of foreign terrorists into the region. While the Philippine Armed Forces have made significant advancements in training, equipment, and deployment, the evolving nature of terrorism and the proliferation of threats may curb their capacity to address all challenges effectively. Terrorism's ability to adapt to local dynamics was evident in Marawi, where it facilitated the unity of disparate Islamist factions. The struggle against international terrorism in Southeast Asia remains an ongoing and multifaceted endeavor. By implementing these policy recommendations, the Philippines can enhance its resilience against the evolving threat of international terrorism and contribute to regional and global security.

To address the destructive effects of internationalized terrorism in the Philippines, several policy measures are recommended. The protracted Christian-Muslim conflict and disputes must be urgently addressed. Failure to resolve these conflicts could lead to a permanent establishment of jihadi networks in the region. To restore and strengthen order in the region, the Manila government should promote inter-communal dialogue, peacebuilding programs, and socioeconomic development plans to foster mutual understanding and cooperation. Restoring the governmental capacity in conflict-stricken areas is essential to address the lack of basic services. Hence, to handle asymmetric threats like terrorism, it is a must to provide adequate training and equipment to local security forces and to enhance intelligence-sharing capacities.

Given the societal aspect of the conflict, executing community-based programs countering the spread of radical ideologies is crucial. These programs should be planned to involve local leaders, scholars, and non-governmental organizations in promoting narratives of peaceful coexistence. These plans should be as inclusive and comprehensive as possible so that successful integration of former combatants, including returning fighters from Syria and Iraq. Without psychological support, vocational training, and opportunities for productive engagement in society, re-radicalization will likely remain a significant threat to sustainable peace. On the

international front, strengthening regional cooperation with Southeast Asian neighbors and international partners to cope with the internationalized nature of terrorism is necessary.

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Mohammad Yousef*

* Doktora adayı; Hukuk Fakültesi, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi; mhm.yousef90@gmail.com; ORCID: 0000-0001-7201-483X.

The International Responsibility of Israel for its Settlement Operations in the Palestinian-Occupied Territories

States bear international responsibility for wrongful acts committed by their authorities, institutions, representatives, or individuals, violating international obligations. Israel's construction of settlements in occupied Palestinian territories constitutes an internationally wrongful act, incurring international responsibility for damages and necessitating compensation. This article sheds light on the ongoing Israeli settlement operations in Palestinian-occupied territories, analyzing Israel's behavior in the framework of international law, including customary law, and the Fourth Geneva Convention. Moreover, It studies triggering Israel's international responsibility, the consequences of settlement operations, and the obligation to halt activities, emphasizing compensation for Palestinian communities. Finally, it addresses collective responsibility and the international community's role in legally intervening to cease Israeli settlement operations.

Keywords: International Responsibility, International Law, Israel, Palestine, Occupied Territories.

İsrail'in İşgal Altındaki Filistin Topraklarındaki Yerleşim Faaliyetlerine İlişkin Uluslararası Sorumluluğu

Devletler, yetkilileri, kurumları, temsilcileri veya bireyleri tarafından uluslararası yükümlülükleri ihlal ederek işlenen haksız fiillerden dolayı uluslararası sorumluluk taşımaktadır. İsrail'in işgal altındaki Filistin topraklarında yerleşim yerleri inşa etmesi, uluslararası hukuka aykırı bir eylem teşkil etmekte olup, zararlar konusunda uluslararası sorumluluk doğurmakta ve tazminat gerektirmektedir. Bu makale, Filistinde işgal altındaki bölgelerde devam eden İsrail yerleşim operasyonlarına ışık tutup, İsrail'in davranışını, Uluslararası teamül hukuku ve Dördüncü Cenevre Sözleşmesi dâhil olmak üzere uluslararası hukuk çerçevesinde analiz etmektedir. Ayrıca İsrail'in uluslararası sorumluluğunu tetikleme, yerleşim operasyonlarının sonuçları ve Filistin topluluklarına tazminat verilmesine vurgu yaparak yerleşim faaliyetleri durdurma zorunluluğunu da incelemektedir. Son olarak, kolektif sorumluluğa ve uluslararası toplumun İsrail'in yerleşim operasyonlarını durdurmaya yasal olarak müdahale etmedeki rolüne değinmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası Sorumluluk, Uluslararası Hukuk, İsrail, Filistin, İşgal Altındaki Topraklar.

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The International Responsibility of Israel for its Settlement Operations in the Palestinian-Occupied Territories

1. Introduction

The importance of the research lies in its novelty and uniqueness. It addresses a contemporary issue that has not been legally discussed or explored before: Israel's international responsibility for its settlements in the Palestinian-occupied territories (POT). The paper examines and emphasizes the consequences of raising the issue of Israel's international responsibility for its illegal settlements in the POT within the framework of international law. This is primarily based on the International Law Commission's (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001 and the relevant international treaties and conventions.

Research Questions:

Main Question

1-Does Israel bear international responsibility because of its settlement operations in the Palestinian-occupied territories (POT)?

Sub-Questions

1- What are the ways to trigger international responsibility against Israel regarding its settlements in Palestinian-occupied territories (POT)?

2-What are the consequences for Israel after proving its international responsibility for the settlement operations?

3-Are the Israeli settlements considered a violation of a peremptory rule of general international law? What are the implications?

Research Hypothesis

Israel commits an internationally wrongful act by establishing illegal settlements in the Palestinian-occupied territories and bears international responsibility accordingly.

2. Research Methodology

The paper follows a descriptive, analytical, and legal methodology. It describes and examines the legal status of Israeli settlements in the Palestinian-occupied territories in light of international law and legal instruments. Subsequently, it analyzes the relationship between Israeli settlement operations and international responsibility by highlighting the consequences of these actions within the framework of the ILC'S articles on responsibility of states for international wrongful act 2001.

The history of Jewish settlement in Palestine, which began before the establishment of the Israeli occupation state and continued after it, confirms that the expansionist mentality and the theory of occupying all Palestinian lands is an age-old project that has been adopted by successive Israeli governments and confirmed in Israel—the nation-state of the Jewish People—through a law passed by the Knesset in 2018. (The Colonization & Wall Resistance Commission, 2018). The law considers settlements a national value. Article 7 of this law states that 'The State views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value and shall act to encourage and promote its establishment and strengthening.' From the Israeli perspective, the establishment of Israeli settlements along the borders of occupied Palestine is a preventive and defensive measure against potential attacks from neighboring Arab countries or resistance movements targeting vital centers in the Israeli depth. In the case of a ground attack by another state, these settlements serve a defensive function, preventing the attacking forces from penetrating deep into the occupied

territories, or they can delay and impede the advance of the attacking forces until Israeli support forces reach the area. On the other hand, the process of moving Jews to Palestine and settlement expansion in the occupied territories serves as an Israeli pressure card in peace negotiations, potentially hastening the establishment of peace and normalization of relations with Israel. Israeli settlement activity in Palestine violates Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and several United Nations resolutions, the latest being Security Council Resolution 2334 issued in December 2016. This resolution affirmed the illegality of Israeli settlements built on the occupied lands after the 1967 war. Furthermore, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967, Michael Lynk, has called on the international community to designate the creation of Israeli settlements as a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (OHCHR, 2021).

The illegality of Israeli settlements is a widely accepted issue in modern international law, and the United Nations has consistently declared that the Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory are a 'flagrant violation' under international law (OHCHR, 2021). Israel does not abide by the law of occupation, which does not authorize the occupying power to be the ruler of the lands it has occupied but rather considers it bound by the temporary administration of these lands throughout the occupation period (OHCHR, 2021). International humanitarian law, the primary regulator for the actions of the occupying power during the occupation, seeks to limit the powers of the occupying state and imposes many obligations and pledges regarding providing protection to the inhabitants of the occupied territories and preserving their rights and human dignity. The continuation of the Israeli settlement in the occupied territories has serious consequences, represented in the consolidation of the idea of occupation. Additionally, there are negative humanitarian effects on the Palestinians, highlighted by their displacement from their lands and the settling of Jewish settlers in their place. This is supplementary to depriving Palestinians of their right to self-determination, which was guaranteed to them by the relevant rules of international law and by the United Nations Charter. Every state is internationally responsible for the violations committed by its institutions and individuals at the international level. It must bear the responsibility arising from the violation of law and compensate the affected country for the losses resulting from its wrongful act. Israel's construction of settlements on the occupied territories is considered an illegal act under international law, classified as an international violation that results in international responsibility. This article discusses, in the first section, the conditions for triggering Israel's international responsibility. Moreover, it examines the applicability of the international responsibility terms to Israel concerning its settlement operations in the occupied territories. Finally, it studies the consequences of establishing Israel's international responsibility and the forms of reparations.

3. The Ways of Triggering International Responsibility for Israel Concerning its Settlement Operations in Occupied Territories

To bring up the issue of international responsibility, a violation of the rules of international law must be established through the commission of an internationally prohibited act. International responsibility does not vary based on the nature of the perpetrators of the crime, whether they are associated with bodies of public law, such as legislative, executive, and judicial authorities, or bodies of the military and members of the armed forces, civilians, and ordinary people (International Law Commission, 2001, p. 2).

3.1. Elements of an Internationally Wrongful Act by a State

According to Article 2 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, "There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct, consisting of an action or omission:

- (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and
- (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State" (International Law

Commission, 2001, p. 2).

3.1.1. Committing a Wrongful Act Under International Law

International responsibility arises from committing a wrongful act that violates states' obligations under international law. The breach of these international obligations is considered a wrongful act, whether it is positive (act) or negative (omission) (El-Wadeya, 2009, p. 140), following Article 4 of the ILC's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (El-Wadeya, 2009, p. 141):

- The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial, or any other functions, regardless of its position in the State, and irrespective of its character as an organ of the unitary or territorial government of the State.
- An organ includes any person or entity that has that status under the domestic law of the State.

3.1.2. The International Responsibility of Israel for the Actions of its Legislative Authority

The Primary Function of legislative authority is to enact regulations and laws. When these laws conflict with international decisions and laws, they are deemed illegal, and the state bears responsibility for the consequences of issuing such laws and decisions, as outlined in Article 4 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for an Internationally Wrongful Act. Israel is issuing domestic laws and regulations as a means to annex outposts and large areas of the occupied territories, bringing them under its control. Examples of Israel's true intentions to override international law include the Jerusalem Annexation Law of 1980 (The Knesset, 1980) and the Syrian Golan Heights Law of 1981 (The Knesset, 1981). In 2017, Israel annexed 20 settlements to the lands under its control through the retrospective application of the law and within the framework of supporting and financing settlement projects. Additionally, Israel enacted three new laws, with 18 bills currently under consideration for similar purposes. (The Colonization & Wall Resistance Commission, 2018, P.12).

- The first law: The Judea and Samaria Settlement Regulation Law (West Bank)

The purpose of this law is to regularize the legal status of settlements constructed without obtaining a license from the competent authorities. The law is retroactively applied to such settlements, aiming to prevent the demolition of illegal structures built on Palestinian properties. Lastly, the law seeks to streamline and facilitate the processes of confiscating land and property from Palestinian owners (The Colonization & Wall Resistance Commission, 2018, P.12).

The second law: extending the validity of the emergency law in the West Bank and giving the Israeli courts jurisdiction over Palestinians and settlers in the West Bank and Jerusalem, "in other words, annexing the West Bank to Israel." (The Colonization & Wall Resistance Commission, 2018, P.13).

This law aims to expand the area of Jerusalem museums to encompass more lands under the sovereignty of the Israeli occupation. Consequently, given that both the 1980 Jerusalem Annexation Law and the 1981 Syrian Golan Heights Law were deemed illegal according to Security Council Resolutions 478 and 497, and were not recognized by the international community, Israel has committed an internationally wrongful act through its legislative authority. This authority attributes all its actions of issuing laws and regulations to the occupying power, thereby incurring international responsibility for this wrongful act. Moreover, the issuance of numerous resolutions by the United Nations in 1979 and 1980 affirms the illegality of constructing settlements in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Syrian Golan Heights. These constructions are considered a flagrant violation of international laws and treaties (Roberts, 1990, PP. 34-103).

3.2. The International Responsibility of Israel for the Actions of its Executive Authority

The actions of the executive authority encompass all the practices and actions carried out by the President of the Republic, ministers, the prime minister, police agencies, government employees, officers, army commanders, and various military and police formations (El-Far, 2008, p. 332).

Article 4 of the International Law Commission's Articles on Responsibility of States for an Internationally Wrongful Act 2001, which addresses the actions of state agencies, states:

"The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that state under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial, or any other functions, regardless of its position in the organization of the State and its character as an organ of the central government or a territorial unit of the state" (International Law Commission, 2001, p. 2).

The state bears international responsibility for the illegal practices of its executive authority that violate the regulations of international law. This responsibility is incurred when these practices are committed by the state's authority (International Law Commission, 2001, p. 2).

The Sasson Report (UN, 2005) highlighted the flagrant violations of law by Israeli officials and institutions. More than 100 outposts were constructed with funding from the occupying power, complete with full infrastructure, including permanent residential buildings, roads, and electricity lines. This report noted that many outposts were erected on privately owned Palestinian lands, financed by Israel's Ministry of Housing. The Ministry of Housing provided the necessary budget for these constructions, while the land allocations were authorized by officials in the Ministry of Defense and granted to the quasi-official Jewish Agency (Lein, 2002, p. 21).

Amnesty International reports indicate that the illegal settlements and outposts established by the Israeli Government in the West Bank are primary contributors to groundwater pollution and the contamination of water sources. This issue is largely attributed to the lack of adequate sewage networks and waste management facilities in most settlements and outposts (Amnesty International, 2009). Consequently, the Israeli executive authority's support for constructing settlements and outposts in the occupied territories, along with providing the necessary financial backing, constitutes a blatant breach of international laws and treaties. This breach leads to Israel incurring international liability for these violations. Furthermore, Israel is responsible for offering compensation for the damage resulting from the contamination of water sources in the West Bank.

3.3. The International Responsibility of Israel for the Actions of its Judicial Apparatus

The independence of the judiciary is one of the most important principles guaranteed by constitutions, domestic laws, and international law. However, this does not absolve states from international responsibility for the decisions and regulations issued by their national courts. Israel continues to advance its policy of supporting new settlements in the occupied territories by legalizing outposts through the retroactive application of law. Since 2011, the Israeli occupation authorities have completed the process of legalizing outposts that lacked construction permits from the authorities. They legitimized these outposts by applying retroactive laws under their domestic legislation (Yesh Din-Volunteers for Human Rights, 2015). Approximately a quarter of the outposts in the occupied Palestinian territories were included in this retroactive application of the law and were legitimized by the occupation authorities. This ongoing process supports the general settlement policy, which ultimately aims to seize the remaining occupied Palestinian lands and place them under Israeli sovereignty (Yesh Din-Volunteers for Human Rights, 2015). Israel's objective is to circumvent international laws and decisions that prevent the construction of settlements and impose international responsibility. The Israeli authorities continue to legitimize illegal outposts by retroactively applying their domestic laws (UN/GA, 2016). The Israeli Supreme Court, as the highest judicial authority in Israel, ruled in the case of Kawasme and others (Israel

High Court, 1980) that Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention cannot be considered completely customary. Consequently, the removal of Palestinian residents from Hebron and Hlul is not deemed a violation of Israeli domestic laws. In the same ruling, the Israeli Supreme Court clarified that Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention applies primarily to mass expulsions in a manner similar to Nazi practices. Furthermore, in the case of Nazal and others in 1985 (Israel High Court, 1985), the Israeli Supreme Court reiterated that Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention is not part of customary international law. Therefore, decisions to expel Palestinian residents from their lands are not considered violations of Israeli domestic laws.

Indeed, the judgments issued by Israeli courts reveal a complex interplay between international regulations and Israel's selective application of them. While Israel has accepted various international treaties and agreements, its implementation often appears tailored to protect its interests and justify specific actions. When it comes to violations against Palestinians in the occupied territories—such as expulsions from their lands, construction of settlements on those lands, and the replacement of indigenous Palestinian populations with settlers—these actions disrupt international decisions and treaties. The disregard for customary and implementation norms raises significant questions about Israel's international responsibility. The rules and regulations issued by Israel's judicial bodies and domestic courts, particularly when they violate international norms, carry implications beyond national borders. Israel's accountability extends beyond its own legal system, impacting the broader international community.

3.4. The Wrongful Act Must Violate an International Commitment to Which the State is Bound to

To invoke the international responsibility of a state, merely committing a wrongful act is insufficient; the act must also constitute a breach of an international commitment (Abu el-Wafa, 2016, p. 697). Membership in an international treaty or its ratification imposes a series of duties and obligations that the state agrees to uphold. The state is bound to ensure that its executive, legislative, and judicial authorities do not violate these commitments. According to the Charter of the United Nations and the Geneva Conventions, the actions of Israel, as represented by its executive, legislative, and judicial branches, are deemed violations of Palestinian rights and of international laws and treaties, thereby incurring international responsibility (El-Wadeya, 2009, p. 144).

3.5. The Applicability of the International Responsibility Terms to Israel

According to Article 4 of the ILC's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Act:

- The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial, or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the Central Government or a territorial unit of the State.

- An organ includes any person or entity that has that status under the internal law of the State. Based on the general principles of state international responsibility for wrongful acts, the acts committed by Israel in the occupied territories are considered violations of international regulations and laws, making Israel responsible for the damage caused to the Palestinian people as a result of its settlement activities in the occupied territories. Moreover, the Israeli occupation government bears full responsibility for the wrongful acts committed by its representatives and institutions in the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities. The question that arises here is whether Israel bears international responsibility for the unlawful acts that violate international regulations, committed by its settlers, individually and collectively, against the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Article 5 of the ILC's articles on the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts addresses the conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority. Specifically, it states that if a person or entity, not considered an organ of the State under

Article 4, is empowered by the State's law to exercise elements of governmental authority, their actions shall be considered acts of the State under international law, provided they are acting in that capacity in the particular instance. Regarding the settlement issue, it has long been a point of contention among various Israeli political parties, including the Labor Party and the Likud Party. These parties consistently strive to provide services and facilities to support settlement operations. For instance, they enhance security for settlers by constructing secondary roads and establishing military bases within settlements—often exceeding the number of settlers themselves. Additionally, lands adjacent to settlements are sometimes confiscated and used as buffer zones to ensure settlers' safety (Amnesty, 2001). Settlers, subject to Israeli criminal law and jurisdiction, wield military powers. They form armed militias, conduct security patrols on roads, and even arrest Palestinian civilians. Unfortunately, these actions occur without legal accountability before the Israeli judiciary (Independent Commission for Human Rights, 2001).

The settlers, who were illegally brought in by successive Israeli governments, constitute armed groups and militias that violate the rights of the Palestinian people and threaten their security. The effects arising from these violations, such as the illegal presence of settlers in these settlements, entail international responsibility for Israel, and these violations are considered war crimes in and of themselves (Darawi, 2009, p. 86). Israel is internationally responsible for the illegal actions of its settlers against the Palestinians and for its repeated failure to take the necessary measures to prevent these violations.

4. The Consequences of Establishing Israel's International Responsibility

By establishing Israel's international responsibility for the violations committed by its various legislative, judicial, and executive authorities, as well as its officials, representatives, and employees—including police and army officers—it becomes accountable for both material and moral damages resulting from these acts. This accountability imposes two primary obligations on Israel: first, to cease the violations and offensive actions against the Palestinian people; and second, to provide compensation for the losses suffered by Palestinians due to the settlement process and settler violations.

4.1. Commitment to Desist from Committing an Act Contrary to International Law and not to Repeat it

By acknowledging Israel's international responsibility for violations committed by its public legal entities and its legislative, executive, and judicial authorities, Israel must fulfill its international obligations to cease these unlawful acts that contravene international regulations and conventions. This includes Israel's commitment to halt violations of international law enacted by its legislative authority, which involves repealing laws that bolster settlement operations. Notable examples include the Jerusalem Annexation Law of 1980 and the Syrian Golan Heights Law of 1981. Through the enactment of these laws, Israel attempted to incorporate outposts and additional occupied territories into areas under its sovereignty (El-Wadeya, 2009, p. 146). The United Nations has deemed these laws null and void, without any legal effect, as they contravene United Nations resolutions and the principles of international law (Hindawi, 1998, p. 268).

Israel has the responsibility to halt violations of international law committed by its executive authority, represented by the president, the prime minister, ministers, other government employees, police agencies, and army officers. As previously mentioned, the Israeli executive bodies support settlement operations in the occupied territories and provide the necessary financial and logistical support for the outposts, in clear and flagrant violation of international regulations and obligations. This support entails Israel's international responsibility, including liability for all damage to Palestinian water resources and the contamination of groundwater in the West Bank. According to the Sasson Report, the wastewater emanating from the settlements and outposts triggers the international responsibility of the Israeli occupation government.

Israel is committed to halting violations of international law endorsed by its judiciary, which supports settlement operations by legitimizing illegal settlements through retroactive law enforcement. The rulings issued by Israeli courts appear biased and are based on selective interpretations of international treaties that align with Israel's interests and support its settlement agenda. Regarding regulations and international treaties that prohibit the expulsion of residents from their lands, Israeli courts do not regard them as part of customary international law, nor do they acknowledge an obligation to enforce them. This stance places international responsibility on Israel for the legitimization of settlements and outposts by its judicial system. It also obligates Israel to cease all such violations by its various judicial, legislative, and executive authorities, as they contravene its international obligations and international law (El-Wadeya, 2009, p. 146).

4.2. Reparation

One of the most crucial outcomes of triggering international responsibility is the obligation to compensate for losses resulting from violations. According to Article 34 of the ILC's Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, which addresses the forms of reparation: "Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation, and satisfaction, either singly or in combination.

4.3. Restitution

Based on Article 35 of the ICC's Statute on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, a state responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation that existed before the wrongful act was committed, provided and to the extent that restitution:

(a) is not materially impossible.

(b) does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation.

Regarding the restitution raised from Israel's international responsibility for its settlements in occupied territories, there are different forms of restitution

4.3.1. The Material Forms of Restitution

Israel must give back all property and lands that were unlawfully seized as a result of settlement operations. This includes the profits made from the exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territories, as well as historical monuments and cultural sites. Additionally, one of the material forms of reparation is Israel's commitment to dismantle the settlements built in the occupied territories.

4.3.2. The Legal Forms of Restitution

The legal forms of the response are as follows: Israel has a commitment to repeal all laws, regulations, and provisions that violate international law (Metwally & Ghannem, 2002, p. 211), such as the law of annexing Jerusalem. This law places the city under Israeli rule, violating the United Nations Charter and international law (UN/GA, 1980-1981). Additionally, the Absentees' Property Law of 1950 and the Land Acquisition Law of 1952 are domestic laws that Israel has used to confiscate Palestinian properties and use them for building settlements (Amer, 1997, p. 341).

4.4. Compensation

When it is impossible to reestablish the situation to its previous state before the wrongful act was committed, or if the compensation is not commensurate with the extent of the damages resulting from the wrongful act, the responsible state is obliged to pay a certain amount of money to compensate and redress the losses incurred from the wrongful act. This amount should not be less than the actual losses (El-Far, 2008, p. 339), including both direct and indirect losses, as well as material and moral damages

4.4.1. Compensation for Material Damages Resulting from Direct Loss

Each state shall pay compensation for material damage resulting from the direct loss of wrongful acts committed by its authorities, agencies, or individuals (Sarhan, 1969, p. 413). Professor Abdulaziz Sarhan restricted the effects of the international responsibility of states to compensating for material damage only (Article 91 of Protocol I of the Geneva Convention). Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1977 affirmed the issue of compensation for material damages resulting from the international responsibility of a state that violated international conventions.

The Security Council, in its Resolution 687 issued in 1991, stated that Iraq is responsible under international law for all damage and losses to Kuwaiti natural resources, as well as damage to other countries resulting from the illegal occupation and invasion of Kuwait. Iraq bears international responsibility for these acts, which are deemed illegitimate under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (Zemmali, 1997, p. 98). Therefore, by analogy with the Security Council resolution, Israel is obligated to compensate for material damage resulting from the loss of Palestinian property, the destruction of residential homes, and the siege and restriction of movement due to its occupation of their lands and the establishment of illegal settlements on them (Independent Commission for Human Rights, 2001). Since moral compensation for this loss is not sufficient, financial compensation is required.

4.4.2. Compensation for Material Damages Resulting from Indirect Loss

Since the international judiciary adopted the standard of proximate cause as a basis for compensation for indirect losses borne by the state, when the damage is a natural and foreseeable result of its wrongful act and not linked to an external factor, Israel is internationally responsible for compensating for the indirect damages suffered by the Palestinians and the occupied territories due to settlement operations. According to the Sasson Report, the damage to Palestinian water resources and groundwater in the West Bank is a result of Israeli outposts, which places international responsibility on the occupying power and obliges it to compensate for the indirect damage caused to Palestinian natural resources. Owing to its settlements, Israel is obligated to compensate for the moral damage it has inflicted on the Palestinian people, such as the general closure policy and military surveillance that disrupts cities and restricts travel and population movement, as occurs in the West Bank, especially after the construction of the Apartheid Wall. The wall's main purpose was to connect settlements built on the West Bank with other occupied lands under occupation authority. Furthermore, communication between Palestinian families living inside and outside the borders of this wall is deteriorating and becoming more complicated, negatively impacting the morale of the Palestinians (Karam, 2017, pp. 887-910). Israel must also compensate for the disruption of Palestinian communities caused by their settlements and military outposts. For instance, Palestinian families have been forced apart by the apartheid walls, making communication and basic life functions extremely difficult for Palestinians (Karam, 2017, pp. 887-910).

4.5. Satisfaction

States, courts, and international judicial bodies have long resorted to satisfaction as a remedy or a form of reparation (in the broadest sense) in relation to breaching international obligations. This practice is particularly related to the moral or legal harm that directly affects the state. Based on Article 37 of the ILC's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, it states the following:

- The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or compensation.
- Satisfaction may consist of an acknowledgment of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology, or another appropriate modality.
- Satisfaction shall not be out of proportion to the injury and may not take a form humiliating to the responsible State.

The Israeli settlement policy in the occupied territories has resulted in grave moral damage to the Palestinian people. This harm cannot be repaired through restitution or compensation alone. The violations include attacks on human dignity, demoralization of the population, and the severing of social relations between Palestinian families. Additionally, there is geographical separation between Palestinian areas, and Palestinians face humiliation at military checkpoints while going about their daily lives. All of these practices obligate Israel to provide satisfaction to the Palestinian people (El-Wadeya, 2009, p. 151).

5. Israel's International Responsibility for Serious Breaches of its Obligations Under a Peremptory Norm of General International Law, and Their Consequences

The Israeli settlements in occupied territories must breach a jus cogens rule to be considered a serious breach. Article 40 of the ILC's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts states, "applies to the international responsibility resulting from a serious breach by a state of an obligation arising under a rule of peremptory norms of general international law." The article further provides that "A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible state to fulfill the obligation." In the following discussion, Israeli settlements will be addressed as a serious breach of the general rules of international law and the consequences thereof.

5.1. The Responsibility Should Arise from a Breach of a Peremptory Norm (Jus Cogens) of General International Law

The territories that Israel occupied after the Six-Day War in 1967 are considered occupied territories by the international community and international law. Since these occupied territories are governed by international humanitarian law, the occupying power is obligated not to intervene and make changes to the legal and regulatory status of this land. One of the main responsibilities of the occupying power in the occupied territories is to preserve the demographics of the local population. "Prohibiting the forced expulsion or transfer of the local population from their lands to outside it and the prohibition of the occupying power from transferring and resettling its inhabitants in the lands it occupied" (The Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949). Unfortunately, Israeli settlement operations in the occupied territories have led to the transfer of Jewish settlers into these areas and forced Palestinian citizens to leave their lands, evacuating them abroad in violation of international treaties and obligations.

The International Court of Justice affirmed that the basic rules of international humanitarian law are based on the essence that they are inviolable and are considered peremptory rules of international law (ICJ, 1960, pp. 90-102). Therefore, given that the

International Court of Justice has considered the basic rules of international humanitarian law as peremptory, Israel, through its settlement activity in the occupied territories, has violated a peremptory rule of international law. Moreover, the occupying state's transfer of its settlers to the occupied lands and the expulsion of the Palestinians, the original inhabitants of these lands, is a violation of the Palestinians' right to self-determination on their lands (Aminzadeh & Siah Rostam, 2010, pp. 35-48). Self-determination is considered part of the peremptory norms of international law, based on the International Law Commission's interpretation of Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969; therefore, Israel again violates one of the peremptory rules of international law.

5.2. The Breach Must be Serious

According to Article 40 of the ILC's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, a breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible state to fulfill the obligation. Given that Israeli settlement operations in the occupied territories have continued unabated and even more systematically since the date of occupation, the Israeli settlement activity in the occupied lands can be considered a serious violation based on Israel's systematic breach of its duties and obligations with respect to decisions and international treaties.

5.3. The Particular Consequences of a Serious Breach of a Peremptory Rule of General International Law

According to article 41 of the ILC's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Act states:

- States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach within the meaning of Article 40.
- No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of Article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.
- This article is without prejudice to the other consequences referred to in this part and to such further consequences that a breach to which this chapter applies may entail under international law.

Article 41 clarifies in its first section that in the event of a serious violation, states must cooperate to bring an end to such a violation. The second section imposes a dual negative obligation on other countries: firstly, not to recognize the legitimacy of the situation resulting from the serious breach, and secondly, to abstain from assisting in maintaining this situation

Given that Israel, through its settlement operations in the occupied territories, violates jus cogens rules of international law, states must cooperate to take legal measures to end settlement operations in the occupied territories. They must not legitimately recognize the situation resulting from settlements, such as the Israeli annexation of the occupied territories and the legalization of settlement operations on Palestinian lands and private property. Additionally, states should refrain from providing any assistance to the occupying power that would enable it to maintain its settlements and continue its settlement activity. This includes avoiding trade exchanges, import and export of goods to and from settlements, or providing services that could contribute to the continuation of settlements. The United Nations Security Council, in its Resolution No. 2334 issued in 2016, called on states and the international community to deal with settlements in a legal form consistent with the spirit of Article 42 of the international responsibility proposition (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Furthermore, it urges all countries to cooperate in finding legal measures that would end settlement operations and prevent any assistance to the occupying power in maintaining and building settlements.

6. Conclusion

Israeli settlement operations conflict with Israel's international obligations and commitments. These acts violate a wide range of human rights in the Palestinian-occupied territories. The Israeli settlements are considered the main obstacle to the establishment of a Palestinian state. The policy of Israel, as the occupying power, is manifested in expelling Palestinian citizens from their lands, bringing in Jewish settlers in their place, and building settlements for them on Palestinian lands. These acts violate customary international law, the Fourth Geneva Convention, and the Additional Protocol of 1977. Furthermore, Israeli settlements are considered a war crime according to UN expert (Michael Lynk, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Palestinian territories).

Israel has obligations under international law to halt settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territories and to compensate the Palestinian communities residing there for the direct and indirect, material and moral damages caused by the Israeli settlements. This includes restoring the situation to its state prior to the settlements, ensuring satisfaction and reparation.

Although Israeli settlements violate international humanitarian law and the Palestinians' right to self-determination—rights that are deemed peremptory norms (*jus cogens*) that cannot be violated and are accepted by the international community of states as norms allowing no derogation—Israel continues to disregard this and persists with its settlement operations and expansionist policies.

The international community is obligated under Article 41 of the ILC's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts to take measures, including not recognizing the legality of Israeli settlements and not providing any support to help the occupying state maintain its settlements or continue its settlement activity. Countries and the international community must cooperate to take legal measures to end settlement operations in the Palestinian occupied territories.

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Abdul Rezak Bilgin*

* Ankara Üniversitesi, Ankara, Türkiye; abdulrezakbilgin@hotmail.com; ORCID: 0000-0003-4122-6148.

A New and Complicated Threat to European Security: China

China has been pursuing a foreign policy aimed at becoming a global hegemonic power, and its rising penetration and sway are reshaping the globe. Beijing is a progressively active international actor with improving military, economic, and technological capabilities. Relations between Europe and China are more complex than ever before. China has increasingly been a threat to European security, and there has been a conflict between Beijing's foreign policy purposes and European security. China's ideals and priorities do not overlap with Europe's own, and so Europe does not longer view China as a possible responsible stakeholder, but rather as the champion of a competing set of values and institutions. China and Europe have incompatible identities, and Beijing has been encouraging an alternative perspective on a liberal international order. China's autocratic state-capitalism model presents inspiration to adversaries of a democratic, liberal, West-led international order. This study argues that China poses both a material and an ideational threat to European security. The main objective of the article is to demonstrate the material and ideational dimensions of China's threat to European security through empirical evidence by utilizing the explanatory power of realism and constructivism theories. The article adopts the case-study method for understanding complex phenomena and providing detailed descriptions and analyses based on qualitative data and research.

Keywords: Europe, China, Security, Threat.

Avrupa Güvenliğine Yönelik Yeni ve Karmaşık Bir Tehdit: Çin

Çin, küresel hegemonik bir güç olmayı hedefleyen dış politika izlemekte ve artan nüfuzu ile dünyayı yeniden şekillendirmektedir. Pekin, gelişen askeri, ekonomik ve teknolojik kabiliyetleriyle giderek daha aktif bir uluslararası aktör haline gelmektedir. Avrupa ve Çin arasındaki ilişkiler her zamankinden daha karmaşık bir hal almaktadır. Çin, Avrupa'nın güvenliği için giderek artan bir tehdit haline gelmekte ve Pekin'in dış politika amaçları ile Avrupa'nın güvenliği arasında bir çatışma yaşanmaktadır. Çin'in idealleri ve öncelikleri Avrupa'ninkilerle örtüşmemekte ve bu nedenle Avrupa artık Çin'i olası sorumlu bir paydaş olarak değil, rakip bir değerler ve kurumlar dizisinin savunucusu olarak görmektedir. Çin ve Avrupa uyumsuz kimliklere sahiptir ve Pekin liberal uluslararası düzene alternatif bir bakış açısını teşvik etmektedir. Çin'in otokratik devlet-kapitalizmi modeli, demokratik, liberal, Batı liderliğindeki uluslararası düzen karşıtlarına ilham kaynağı olmaktadır. Bu çalışma, Çin'in Avrupa güvenliği için hem maddi hem de düşünsel bir tehdit oluşturduğunu savunmaktadır. Makalenin temel amacı, realizm ve inşacılık (constructivism) teorilerinin açıklayıcı gücünü kullanarak Çin'in Avrupa güvenliğine yönelik tehdidinin maddi ve düşünsel boyutlarını ampirik kanıtlarla ortaya koymaktır. Makale, karmaşık olguları anlamak, nitel verilere ve araştırmalara dayalı ayrıntılı açıklamalar ve analizler sunmak için vaka çalışması yöntemini benimsemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa, Çin, Güvenlik, Tehdit.

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A New and Complicated Threat to European Security: China

1. Introduction

During the previous twenty years, China has become a major economic partner for European countries. Following Beijing's participation in the World Trade Organization in 2001, trade relations between China and Europe significantly gained momentum. Europe once considered Beijing's competitiveness as an economic occasion, but now views it as a danger to security (Ghiretti, 2023). Relations between Europe and China are more complex than ever before. There has been a conflict between Beijing's foreign policy purposes and European security. Targets of China are not compatible with European interests, and it has been forming a threat to the Western-centric liberal hegemonic order. China has been encouraging an alternative perspective on a liberal international layout. Beijing's rising economic, military, and political power is highly likely to constitute an intentional menace to Europe.

This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature, both theoretically and empirically, by providing a comprehensive analysis of the case. The primary contribution of the article is that it serves as a sound theory-informed examining how different IR paradigms make sense of China as an object of threat to European security. Empirically, it aims to discover China's threat to European security by focusing on the economic, military, and technological dimensions of the threat. While existing works often focus on the material dimension of the threat, this study discusses the relevant case through both material and ideational dimensions. This article will also try to fill the relevant gap in the existing literature. My research question is "does China pose a security threat to Europe? Why and how?". I argue that China is both a material and an ideational threat to European security. I intend to illuminate the material dimension of the Chinese threat to European security by applying offensive structural realism and shed light on the ideational dimension of the Chinese threat by using constructivism.

The main objective of the article is to demonstrate the material and ideational dimensions of China's threat to European security through empirical evidence by utilizing the explanatory power of offensive structural realism and constructivism theories. The article adopts the case-study method for understanding complex phenomena and providing detailed descriptions and analyses based on qualitative data and research. Qualitative data were derived from official documents from China and Europe, policy papers, official statements, academic books, journal articles, and news articles. In this paper, first of all, it will be tackled with offensive structural realism and constructivism. Secondly, material and ideational aspects of the Chinese threat to European security will be discussed by using the relevant theoretical framework.

Different theories set forth different explanations regarding China's threat to European security, and they make different sense of China as an object of threat. I argue that the explanatory power of offensive structural realism enables a better understanding and explanation of the material dimension of China's threat to European security. On the other hand, constructivism, focusing on norms, identity, social construction, ideas, meanings, and beliefs, presents a stronger explanation for the ideational dimension of the relevant threat.

2. Offensive Structural Realism and Material Dimension of the Chinese Threat to European Security

In his seminal book "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics", John Mearsheimer suggests that in an anarchic international system, states may use their power to damage others. Under this environment, relative capabilities are of predominant significance, and security necessitates obtaining as much power in comparison to other states as possible (Mearsheimer, 2001). As can be seen in the following parts, China has been increasing its economic, military, and technological power to the detriment of Europe. As an authoritarian global power, China has been shifting the balance of power in world politics at the expense of the West. By using its growing economic, military, and technological power, China has been damaging Europe by way of cyber attacks, the

South China Sea issue, technology theft, controlling the supply chain of critical materials, and providing support to Russia in the Ukraine war.

Mearsheimer's offensive realism has five suppositions: the international system is anarchic; major powers are capable of some offensive warfare, and they can harm one another; states can never be sure regarding others' intentions; survival is the principal aim; major powers are rational actors. Great powers can depend only on themselves for their security. The maximization of relative power is the best way for states to entrench their survival (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 30-36). The anarchic architecture of the international system does not offer any options to China and Europe but the maximization their relative power. Like other states, European states cannot make sure of the intentions of global hegemon China. The final aim of China is to have a hegemonic place in the global system to sustain its security.

The structure and design of the international system largely explain the behavior of states. States live in an anarchic system and under that structure, those states have no recourse to a higher authority in the event of problems. If a state is weak in the international system, a powerful state can take advantage of it. Being as strong as possible is the optimum situation for every state within the international system, as it is the most viable option for survival. The international system's framework is what leads to governments acting aggressively and competing for security (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 30-42). It can be maintained that in the last two decades, while the relative power of Europe has been decreasing, the relative power of China has significantly increased. China started to benefit from the weakening position of Europe on a global scale. China, trying to become as powerful as possible in every field, has become a threat to the security of Europe in the economic, military, and technological fields.

The nature of anarchic system compels states to pay great attention to the balance of power (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 30-42.). The rise of China has triggered a shift in the global balance of power (Chatham House, 2019). In the global system, the power center has been shifting from the West to the Asia-Pacific. As China's material power has been growing, it poses a significant threat to European security and the West-led liberal international order. At least in the past two decades, the balance of power between China and Europe has changed to the detriment of Europe.

Mearsheimer emphasizes that states work particularly hard to increase their percentage of global power. They search for ways to shift the balance of power by gaining more power to the detriment of possible competitors. States use a range of strategies -military, diplomatic, and economic- to change the balance of power for their own benefit. Even if doing so provokes mistrust or even hostility from other powers. When interacting with one another, great powers frequently adopt a zero-sum perspective (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 34) In this context, it can be argued that there is a zero-sum game between China and Europe. China's gain in power is Europe's loss. It seems that China, like other great powers, tries to maximize its share of global power. One of its fundamental aims is to alter the balance of power in its favor, and to some extent, it has succeeded in shifting the power balance.

Mearsheimer maintains that security necessitates obtaining as much power in comparison to other countries as possible. Growing capabilities might develop a country's security without inciting a retaliatory reaction. Revisionists' careful scheduling, potential targets' buck-passing, and knowledge asymmetries all contribute to the so-called hegemon's success (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 417). Josep Borrell acknowledged that the EU has been naive regarding China (Guillot, 2020). As we see in the China example, the West has been quite late in taking action in order to contain China and stop or slow down its rise as a threat. Until it gains sufficient power, China will refrain from fully demonstrating its military, economic, and technological capabilities.

In his book called "War and Change in World Politics", Robert Gilpin argues that "the fundamental nature of international relations has not changed over millennia. International relations continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in

a state of anarchy.” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 7). States prefer to engage in conflict since the international system is formed by and for the spearheading state in the system, shifts in power elicit confrontation over system leadership (Gilpin, 1988, p. 591–613). The current international system was constructed by the USA and the West after the Cold War. This international order has not met the expectations of a rising China. The changing balance of power in favor of China makes confrontation between Europe and China inevitable.

According to Mearsheimer, “... hegemony is the best way for any state to guarantee its own survival” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 4). It seems that China is in pursuit of global hegemony. As Mearsheimer specified, if China keeps growing economically, that will convert that economic might into military might. China cannot rise peacefully (Mearsheimer, 2005). In this regard, the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept underlines that “The PRC is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal and is developing increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, without increasing transparency or engaging in good faith in arms control or risk reduction” (NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, 2022).

Realism assumes that capability is the main indicator of a threat. Intention and capability constitute two principal factors that shape threat perception. Realism supposes that shifts in the relative balance of power leads to security concerns. It argues that asymmetries of power alone may form perceptions of threat (Walt, 1990). In this context, it can be maintained that the significantly growing military, economic, and technological capabilities of China have been triggering a threat perception in Europe. The changing balance of power in favour of Beijing has elicited security apprehension in Europe. The next section delves into how China’s economic, military and technological power can be examined as threat to European security within the framework of structural realism.

2.1. China as an Economic Threat to European Security

China is referred to as a “state-permeated market economy” by certain authors. In China, official control extends to large enterprises. The government controls trade in company shares and limits the free flow of cash. For the sake of economic expansion, the state is a major player in the development of capitalism (Nölke, Brink, Claar & May, 2015, p. 538–567). Some governments in Europe consider Beijing’s economic clout a potential threat to their national security and a source of hybrid threats. The Chinese government at times utilizes its economic penetration to endorse foreign policy aims. The close relationship between the Chinese government and business in China allows the state to put foreign economic pressure on other countries without imposing formal sanctions (Putten, 2022, p. 5-10). Europe, which is dependent on China, is vulnerable to Beijing, which exploits its economic impact for political aims. Although China and Europe operate in the capitalist economic system, Beijing has adopted state capitalism, which predicates solid state and government control over Chinese companies doing business in Europe. The control of Chinese companies by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) carries considerable security risks for Europe.

Economic coercion has been one of China’s instruments. China has been leveraging its economic power to impact other states’ behaviour and decisions (Ghiretti, 2023). One critical is that when China has targeted Lithuania with a trade embargo following its construction of closer economic ties with Taiwan (Lau, Lynch, & Barigazzi, 2022). In the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, Beijing tried to hamper the sale of two navy submarines to Taiwan by the Netherlands. Primarily, China threatened to block access to the Chinese market for Dutch companies (Putten, 2022, p. 10).

Some Chinese policies pose challenges to the rule-based international order. In 2016, regarding the South China Sea conflict, Beijing dismissed the arbitral tribunal's judiciary power established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, despite being a party to it. The Arbitral Tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines (Besch, Bond, & Schuette, 2020, p. 6-7). This example explicitly reveals that China does not recognize international law and norms when they contradict Beijing's interests and its irredentist policies in the South China Sea, which has quite critical waterways for the European supply chain.

The South China Sea has been a vital passageway for European foreign trade. It has been militarized by China, and it has constructed artificial islands and airbases to support its allegations (Deni, 2021). Roughly 40 percent of the EU's international trade goes through the South China Sea. Until now, France, Germany, and the Netherlands have sent naval vessels to the South China Sea to defend their freedom of navigation or for military exercises, frequently in collaboration with the UK, US, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand (Wieringen, 2023). The 2016 European Union Global Strategy underscores that "In East and Southeast Asia, we will uphold freedom of navigation, stand firm on the respect for international law, including the Law of the Sea and its arbitration procedures, and encourage the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. We will help build maritime capacities and support an ASEAN-led regional security architecture" (European Union Global Strategy, 2016, p. 38).

The economic interaction of Europe with China can entail strategic dependency. It is a high possibility that China would abuse this dependency in order to prevent Europe from taking initiative and measures concerning violations of human rights in China, cultural imperialism, assimilation, and repression policies in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong. Its control of the South China Sea and Europe's dependence on China for many products give China a great trump card that it can always use.

The economic dependency of Europe on China tends to have national security outcomes. 98 percent of Europe's supplies of rare earths come from China. Those critical raw materials are necessary for Europe's most sophisticated weapons, electric cars, batteries, solar panels, etc (Amaro, 2023). Beijing poses security and investment risks to Europe's strategic sectors, and their reliance on the Chinese market expose them vulnerable (Dempsey, 2023). Following the Covid-19 epidemic, Europe has suffered from supply chain disruptions and viewed how overdependency on China threatened its economic security (Ghiretti, 2023).

Josep Borrell argued that Beijing's pressure on Taiwan and its show of force against Taipei might directly impact the security and prosperity of Europe by emphasizing the importance of Taiwan for European needs in terms of semiconductors, supply chains and critical value chain (The European External Action Service (EEAS), 2021). Europe-China economic relations have national security ramifications. Europe's vital infrastructure and supply chains, particularly chips, port facilities, semiconductors, and 5G networks that are progressively controlled by China, reveal the fragility of Europe vis-à-vis China, and constitute a security threat to Europe in terms of intelligence gathering and economic security (Gramer, & Iyengar, 2022). Chinese law necessitates that firms from China cooperate with state secret services (The Group of the European People's Party (EPP Group), 2021).

According to the Netherlands' intelligence agency, China is the biggest danger to Dutch economic security. It has drawn attention to commercial espionage and covert investments. The agency has underlined that Beijing's military aims are driving the initiative to acquire Dutch and Western technologies. It has argued that "China uses both legitimate investments, corporate takeovers and academic cooperation, as well as illegal (digital) espionage, insiders, covert investments and illegal export. Dutch companies, knowledge institutions and scientists are regularly victims of this (Reuters, 2023).

Beijing's involvement in European ports such as Italy, Spain, Greece, the Netherlands, and Belgium has significantly augmented over the past decade (The House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2022). China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO) purchased a majority share in Greece's

largest port, Piraeus Port, in 2016 (Amaro, 2022). Chinese control of some major European ports constitutes both an economic and military security problem. Some military planners argue that such ports may not be accessible in the short term if troops had to be transported via them in a crisis (Besch, Bond, & Schuette, 2020, p. 10-11). Beijing's investment in European infrastructure such as ports, telecommunications networks, and shipping terminals enable a suitable opportunity for intelligence gathering for China. It will likely weaponize its ownership of infrastructure in Europe to achieve its goals (Deni, 2021).

Chinese telecom companies constructing Europe's 5G infrastructure and getting majority shares in key European ports pose a geopolitical and intelligence threat and vulnerability to Europe (Gramer, & Iyengar, 2022). As offensive structural realism argues, great powers can depend only on themselves for their security. European reliance on China in the fields of technology, communications, and artificial intelligence poses a vital threat to European security.

Europe progressively depends on Beijing for final products (Besch, Bond, & Schuette, 2020, p. 10). China poses a significant potential to use its economic penetration for political potency that would undermine the sovereignty of European countries (Putten, 2022, p. 8). UK PM Rishi Sunak claimed that China was the largest state-based threat to UK economic security (The Independent, 2022). China has been consolidating its economy at the cost of the competitiveness of European industrialized countries. It has been widening global sway while limiting the impact of European countries (Putten, 2022, p. 8).

2.2. China as a Military Threat to European Security

NATO has 30 members in Europe. In other words, they are military allies of the US, which is the most significant rival and even threat to China. When China and the USA or NATO confront in the Asia-Pacific region, Europe is highly likely to become one of China's main targets. In such a situation, Beijing could employ its economic leverage to cause harm to European NATO members. If a war emerges between Washington and Beijing, it is highly likely that NATO members of Europe will support their NATO ally, and China-Europe economic relations will be negatively affected. This would elicit a disruption of supply chain in Europe and endanger the security of supply.

It seems that the EU-NATO strategic partnership has a high probability of turning Europe into a target for China. Dated January 10, 2023, the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation designates bilateral relations as "strategic partnership". This declaration touches upon authoritarian actors and China as follows: "Authoritarian actors challenge our interests, values and democratic principles using multiple means – political, economic, technological and military" (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2023).

Adopted during the June 29, 2022, NATO meeting in Madrid, the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept underlines that "The People's Republic of China's (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values. The PRC employs a broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up. The PRC's malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target Allies and harm Alliance security" (NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, 2022).

Chinese students with ties to military scientific research establishments have been conducting research at European universities (Besch, Bond, & Schuette, 2020, p. 14). Beijing undercuts Europe's military abilities by taking intellectual property connected to the military and giving it to the country's defense industry while Beijing improves new weapons (Deni, 2021). As offensive realism suggests, if China keeps growing economically, that will convert that economic might into military might. China has been determinedly developing its military capabilities and increasing its military expenditure (The World Bank Group). The rising momentum of China's military expenditures in the last decade is shown below.

Military expenditure by China, in current US\$ m. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2023).

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
164070	182109	196538	198538	210443	232530	240332	257973	285930	291958	296438

The militarization of the South China Sea, the construction of artificial islands, and the building of airbases by China to support its illegal territorial allegations pose a military security threat to Europe. As explained above, the South China Sea has been a vital passageway for European foreign trade, and the interests of Europe require the protection of free and safe shipping there.

According to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, China aims to dominate vital infrastructure, strategic minerals, supply chains, important industrial and technological domains. It builds strategic dependencies and expands its power by using its economic might. “It strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains. The deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests” (NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, 2022).

China-Russia cooperation seems to pose a threat to European security. Deepening and growing China-Russia economic relations have ensured economic lifelines for Russia’s heavily sanctioned economy. According to the senior European diplomat: “What may be finally helping Europe wake up to the China threat is Beijing helping Moscow and giving it more diplomatic cover to carry out the war” (Gramer, & Iyengar, 2022). In Russia’s Ukraine invasion, China supports Russia in order to undermine European security.

China and its businesses have been supplying Russia with critical components such as machine tools, micro-electronics, and optics so that Moscow can produce more weapons for the Ukraine war (The BBC, 2024). China is providing Russia with significant assistance in expanding its defense industrial base. It is contributing a lot of machine tools, drones and turbojet engines, as well as technologies for microelectronics, nitrocellulose, cruise missiles, and cruise missile defense. China’s assistance is significantly affecting Russia’s capacity to carry out its attack on Ukraine. China is assisting Russia in enhancing its satellite and other space-based capabilities for use in that country (Atwood, 2024). As the conflict in Ukraine rages on, China and Russia are strengthening and expanding their security and commercial cooperation (Al Jazeera Media Network, 2022).

It can be argued that the reasons listed above—the COVID-19 crisis and China’s support for Russia in the Ukraine war—have increased Europe’s threat perception towards China. This situation has approximated Europe and the USA one another. On the other hand, it seems that, contrary to the Europe-USA equation, China has been deepening its economic, political, and military relations with Russia. It appears that this polarization may become far more apparent in the forthcoming years. As offensive realism asserts, what really matters the most is the balance of power.

2.3. China as a Technological Threat to European Security

In 2015, China launched the “Made in China 2025” (MIC2025) programme. In accordance with this scheme, Beijing aims to acquire high-technology firms outside China and transmit their intellectual property to mainland. In this context, in 2016, the robot-maker company Kuka from Germany, the microchip company Silex and the semiconductor firm Norstel from Sweden, and in 2017, British chip designer Imagination Technology from the UK were purchased by Chinese manufacturers (Besch, Bond, & Schuette, 2020, p. 10). A Chinese owned manufacturer Nexperia tried to purchase the UK’s biggest chipmaker Newport Wafer Fab (House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2022).

Beijing poses obvious security risks to Europe, especially in terms of critical infrastructure and the significant dependency of Europe's digital network on Chinese technology. The Chinese government can be allowed access to any private company's data in China under its law. Chinese equipment is highly likely to permeate telecommunications and infrastructure networks in European NATO members (Pallanch, & Zhang, 2021). Cyberattacks from China on European industry, military, academic, and government institutions have been massive (Deni, 2021). Beijing has been a substantial source of cyberattacks aimed at data collecting (Putten, 2022, p. 11). According to cybersecurity firm Proofpoints, Chinese cyber espionage group Mustang Panda which is believed to be operating for the sake of the Chinese government has been targeting European diplomats. It previously has targeted telecommunications companies in Europe (Arghire, 2022).

Britain's PM Rishi Sunak considered China the biggest danger to both national and international security. He argued that Beijing "*was stealing our technology and infiltrating our universities*" and supports Russia by purchasing Russian oil (Al Jazeera Media Network, 2022). Josep Borrell has underlined the importance of hindering sensitive technology from being used by China for military aims (Borrell, 2023). China's threat to Taiwan also constitutes a security threat for Europe's semiconductor needs derived from Taiwan. It seems that China may blackmail Europe by exploiting its control over critical industries and global supply chains. Beijing is highly likely to use its global leadership in artificial intelligence, 5G, quantum computing, UHV power, satellites, and drones as leverage and a threat instrument against Europe (Hickman, 2022).

Europe's overreliance on Chinese technology and investment elicits fragility and vulnerability for Europe against China. Chinese compulsive economic practices and the threats of spyware embedded in its technology have increased security concerns in Europe (Gramer and Iyengar, 2022). Many European countries have taken action in recent years to de facto prohibit or limit Chinese telecoms from using their 5G networks (Wieringen, 2023). Britain has prohibited Chinese-made security cameras from sensitive state buildings (Al Jazeera Media Network, 2022). Britain and France have prohibited TikTok, which is owned by the Chinese firm ByteDance, from official devices. Their security concern was that it might endanger sensitive user data, and put it into the hands of the Chinese government. There have been allegations that the application was transmitting users' data to servers (Maheshwari and Holpuch, 2023).

The Chinese telecommunication company Huawei and its role in 5G infrastructure in Europe could pave the way for Chinese intelligence penetration and espionage (Besch, Bond, & Schuette, 2020, p. 12). Britain has prohibited the buying of new Huawei 5G devices after 2020 and ordered all Huawei 5G kits to be removed from British networks by 2027 (The House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2023). Britain and Germany have prevented Chinese firms from buying semiconductor manufacturing facilities in their countries, citing domestic security apprehensions (Gramer and Iyengar, 2022).

Security concerns in Europe have been growing as a result of the TikTok's ties to China and worries about the privacy and security of the Chinese-owned video-sharing app. The Danish Defense Ministry forbade personnel from installing TikTok on their work phones and instructed those who had already done so to do so as soon as possible. Invoking concerns about data security, the Dutch central government forbade the use of TikTok and similar apps on work phones. The Norwegian parliament outlawed Tiktok on work devices (Chan, 2020).

3. Constructivism and Ideational Dimension of the Chinese Threat to European Security

Constructivist theory operates under the premise that security is a social construction. Ideational elements are pivotal to the construction and practices of security in international relations. For constructivists, security has different meanings in different contexts, and identity and norms are fundamental to security studies. According to the constructivist approach, threat perception is connected to both identity politics and the legitimacy of some actors within the framework of shared norms (McDonald, 2008, p. 61-67).

Ideational powers such as identity, ideas, and political ideology can be a national security threat, trigger threat perception, and influence state policy. For targeted states, this nonmilitary power could undercut their internal political stability and regime survival. Ideational powers have the possibility of subverting the legitimacy of regimes in targeted states and leading to social turmoil in those countries (Rubin, 2014, p. 5-19).

The main focus of constructivism is the impact of ideational factors and the social construction of international relations. According to Matt McDonald, "... constructivists argue that the world is constituted socially through intersubjective interaction; that agents and structures are mutually constituted; and that ideational factors such as norms, identity and ideas generally are central to the constitution and dynamics of world politics" (McDonald, 2008, p. 59-60). It can be claimed that China's authoritarian political system is one of the main determinants determining Europe's perception of China. China's authoritarianism and Europe's democracy considerably affect intersubjective interaction in this relationship.

Constructivists argue that threats are not objective, and they are social constructions. In this framework, ideas and identities may become security issues. For constructivists, identity and the social actions of countries play a pivotal role in world politics (Rubin, 2014, p. 15). McDonald underlines that "... conceptions of who we are and what we value encourage particular ways of thinking about where threats to those values might come from, what form they might take and how they might be dealt with" (McDonald, 2008, p. 64). As an ideational component, threats to liberal democratic values come from authoritarian states, and threats to authoritarianism come from democratic countries. In other words, for European democracies the main threats stem from countries like China, for the Chinese Communist Party, threats spring from democracies like European states.

As constructivism argues, identities are formed by mutual interactions. It will be useful to remember the example given by Alexander Wendt regarding the social construction of reality. He asserts that "500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons" (Wendt, 1995, p. 73). In this context, it appears that mutual perception and intersubjectivity shape interactions between China and Europe. In the framework of historical and cultural experience, national identity assists determine the content of a state's interests (McDonald, 2008, p. 62). There is a causal relationship between identity and interests (Wendt, 1999; Katzenstein, 1996). In other words, the liberal-democratic identity of Europe sets the framework of its interests, while the authoritarian identity of China ascertains its interests. Accordingly, their identities and interests are contradictory. Different identities mean different interests.

While China is a one-party state, the European political system has been forming multi-party and pluralist democracies. China and Europe have different social systems, religions, cultures, and histories. China is "other" for Europe, and Europe is "other" for China. China has experienced European imperialism in its history, and European colonialism has been living in the memories of Chinese people.

With the defeat in the First Opium War between Britain and China (1839-1842), the "Century of Humiliation" (1839-1949) began for Chinese people. In the 19th century, Chinese territory was exposed to Western imperialism. Many Chinese cities underwent the European invasion. China was coerced to give concessions such as extraterritoriality to British, American, and French subjects in China (Schiavenza, 2013). For China, the century of humiliation meant the loss of national pride and territorial sovereignty, internal instability, invasions, imposed unequal treaties, and a corrupted society due to the opium trade. The Western countries demoted China to a semi-colonial status, along with Japan, in the era of the century of humiliation (1839-1949). The century of humiliation as a collective memory, narrative, and discourse has been one of the principal sources of modern Chinese nationalism.

The century of humiliation discourse has been a crucial element of modern China's principal narrative. It has been seen by Chinese to offer a historical experience of how powerful Western countries appear to treat China. In the period of the humiliation century, China was obliged to open and assign control over a range of ports (Kaufman, 2011). The past has had a significant impact on China's worldview (French, Johnson, Jenne, Crossley, Kapp & Meyer-Fong, 2017). China's foreign policy is still heavily influenced by the trauma it endured at the hands of foreign countries. 110 years old humiliation century witnessed military defeats, unequal treaties, invasions, and land concessions such as Hong Kong and Macau for China in the face of Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Russia, and Japan (Williams, 2016).

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has ruled the country since 1949. China's foreign economic policies and domestic structure are largely shaped by the CCP rule. China's state and society are dominated by the CCP, which is intolerable to anyone who disagrees with it (Dumbaugh & Martin, 2009). There is not a civil society in China (Huang & Yang, 2002). As a one-party state, China is a type of textbook version of a contemporary totalitarian state (Bond, Godement, Maull, & Stanzel, 2022, p. 26). According to the constitution of China, "The People's Republic of China is a socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants" (The National People's Congress (NPC), 2019). Different and contrary political ideologies comprise a basis for China and Europe. China's treatment of protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and Uyghurs in Eastern Turkistan for decades evidently reveals the nature and character of the Chinese autocratic regime.

In 2017, internment camps were established by the CCP rule for assimilating the Uyghur minority, committing cultural genocide, and committing crimes against humanity by way of so-called re-education. "By 2020 these held at least one million Uyghurs (of around 12 million in Xinjiang). In addition, a system of electronic and personal surveillance has been established throughout the region, Uyghurs are forced to move to other parts of China as labourers" (Bond, Godement, Maull, & Stanzel, 2022, p. 28). The June 9, 2022, resolution of the European Parliament about the human rights situation in Xinjiang underscores massive and structural human rights violations, systematic, brutal, and arbitrary repression, family division, political indoctrination, and mass deportations, limitations on freedom of religion and cultural devastation, and widespread monitoring in the Uyghur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang. It also emphasizes widespread forced sterilization and forced labor schemes supported by the government, excessive and arbitrary prison sentences, the practice of arbitrary detention without accusation, and trial. It underscores that birth prevention precautions and the separation of Uyghur children from their families are tantamount to crimes against humanity and pose a grave risk of genocide (The European Parliament, 2022). In 2021, due to abuses of human rights in Xinjiang, the European Union levied sanctions on four people and one Chinese government institution, China retaliated with counter sanctions against four EU institutions and ten individuals (Bond, Godement, Maull, & Stanzel, 2022, p. 28).

Since European identity is inherent in liberal and democratic values, Beijing's foreign policy undercuts European interests (Putten, 2022, p. 8). China's priorities and values do not overlap with Europe's own. Europe does no longer view China as a possible 'responsible stake holder', but rather as the champion of a competing set of values and institutions (Besch, Bond, & Schuette, 2020, p. 1-4). The most salient ideational dimension of international relations is norms and rules for constructivists (McDonald, 2008, p. 63). China has not been meeting the shared expectations of Europe in terms of the South China Sea issue, the Taiwan dispute, economic coercion and human rights abuses, and minority rights. The growing and rising autocratic China has been a model and prototype for illiberal authoritarian regimes around the world. It has been gradually weakening democracies around the globe.

Constructivism suggests that specific meaning to be given to different actors and their purposes in the context of an array of social, cultural, and historic factors (McDonald, 2008, p. 61). From the standpoint of constructivists, identity occupies a pivotal place in the construction of security. Identity is one of the main determinants in designating a state as a friend or enemy (Hopf, 1998, p. 171-200) The Chinese political system and practices in the international arena constitute a threat to the European democratic order. China's autocratic state-capitalism model presents inspiration to adversaries of a democratic, liberal West-led international order.

Hong Kong Security Law undermines Hong Kong's long-established autonomy and freedoms by way of silencing opposition, carrying out mass arrests of pro-democracy activists, targeting journalists and academics (The Group of the European People's Party (EPP Group), 2021) Beijing's hardness in the East and South China Seas poses a challenge to Europe's democratic allies in that area. The rule-based international system that Europe seeks to protect is threatened by Beijing's illegitimate territorial claims in the South China Sea (Besch, Bond, & Schuette, 2020, p. 1, 17).

The world's spearheading autocracy China has been exporting its anti-democratic rules, norms, procedures and practices to other countries (Abramowitz, 2017). China has sold surveillance technologies like facial recognition to authoritarian governments. In this way, it exports its own authoritarian standards for controlling masses by way of surveillance (Besch, Bond, & Schuette, 2020, p. 15). Michael Beckley and Hal Brands suggest that "If Woodrow Wilson and his followers wanted to make the world safe for democracy, the PRC's rulers want to do the same for autocracy... The PRC is a brutally illiberal regime... "democracy prevention" is very much at the heart of Chinese strategy today" (Beckley & Brands, 2022).

International factors can exert a substantial impact on the prospects for transitions to authoritarianism. When authoritarian China becomes a global hegemon, it can be suggested that this situation will encourage autocracies and weaken democracies. The economic, technological, and military rise of China is a source of inspiration for all non-democratic states aiming for development. The Chinese model of development reinforces the thesis that democracy, freedom of expression, and the rule of law are not necessary for development. China shows the world that development and technological improvement are possible without democracy. Chinese experience put forward that democracy is not an integral and inseparable part of economic growth and development. Rising and growing China has been creating a driving force and motives for democratic backsliding and the reversal of democratization processes.

The liberal world order and global democracy form a menace to China's form of government. Liberal democracies undermine the legitimacy of autocratic regimes by creating a model and an example in terms of the rule of law, freedom of speech, free press, and respect for human rights for people who live under autocratic regimes. Just as Chinese autocracy poses a threat to European democracy, European democracy poses a threat to the Chinese autocratic political system. China's autocracy based on one-party rule shapes its foreign policy behavior by supporting autocracies against the threat it perceives from democracies.

Liberal democracies and China have different ideologies and social systems. A liberal world order is intrinsically worrisome for the CCP and their rule in China. A hegemonic democracy poses a threat to the Chinese regime. In this regard, for example, China sees Taiwan's democracy as a threat to its autocratic regime. Economically wealthy and politically democratic Taiwan refutes the CCP's allegations that Chinese culture is inharmonious with democracy. So, it has been trying to destabilize Taiwan (Beckley & Brands, 2022). Moreover, China subverted Hong Kong's democracy.

Democratic emulations and inspirations have a high possibility of undermining the Chinese Communist Party and its autocratic rule. While democracies pose an ideational threat to the authoritarian Chinese regime, autocratic China also poses an ideational threat to democracies. Ideational threats are as substantial as material ones. Rising and growing China does not only set an economic model for autocratic and hybrid regimes but also a political model. As the second

most powerful state in the world, authoritarian China generates an alternative to democratic states. Just as the US and the EU promote their own political system, China does the same and supports its own political model around the world. Like democracies, autocracies also learn from each other. Autocracies learn suppression methods, anti-democratic instruments, propaganda, and manipulation ways from each other.

All authoritarian regimes have an extent legitimacy dilemma. An authoritarian state has not the consent and approval of the governed, so it can never feel secure about its rule. Moreover, a world dominated by liberal democracies creates insecurity for autocrats, and they can never feel safe because of the spillover possibility of liberal democratic values and ideas. Strong and vibrant democracies will tempt the people of states ruled by tyrants. Authoritarian regimes often topple in waves, and popular uprisings in one state inspire upheavals in others such as the Arab Uprising and a democratic domino effect across Central and Eastern Europe in the following 1989. A democratic revolution anywhere is a threat to autocratic regimes everywhere (Beckley & Brands, 2022).

Samuel Huntington draws attention to the “snowballing” phenomenon. Change in one country stimulates change in other countries (Huntington, 1991). The snowballing effect is valid for not only democratization waves but also democratic backsliding and shifting back to authoritarian government. Not only democratization sets a model for other countries, but also autocracy, the reversal of democratization waves, and democratic backsliding constitute an example for others. If democracies are dysfunctional and autocracies are extensive, the CCP’s internal power will be increased. In this situation, the Chinese people will not emulate and inspire the unsuccessful democracies. The CCP considers political liberalism as an infectious disease against the regime and its people (Beckley & Brands, 2022).

It can be argued that European governments assumed that the economically growing and enriching China would be far more integrated into liberal international order and global capitalism. It seems that they predicted that enriching and strengthening the middle class in China would force the CCP to liberalize the political system towards a pluralist democratic system. It tends to be seen that until now, democracy demands, and liberal tendencies have not improved in the thriving Chinese middle class. It is difficult to say that authoritarian inclinations have decreased in China in the last three decades. The opposite way around, due to technological advancements, the authoritarian CCP has solidified its position by way of surveillance devices and technologies, as seen in Hong Kong and Eastern Turkistan. Furthermore, it can be maintained that Europe could not foresee that China would reach such a technologically advanced level.

Alice Politi argues that perceptions of both “self” and “other” in the mutual interaction have also shifted. Their changing perceptions of themselves and of their counterparts have had a significant effect in deciding their actions in the reciprocal connection. The main reason behind shifting China’s perception of Europe is the rise and strengthening of Beijing. The principal cause behind changing Chinese perception toward Europe is due to it views itself stronger than Europe. She argues that “For China, the awareness of having become a global power has led it to become more assertive in wanting to operate on its own terms, rather than adapting to European expectations” (Politi, 2023, p. 687, 676).

China prefers autocracy-dominated global order. So, China has been one of the main supporters of authoritarian regimes in the world. In this context “The CCP provides fellow autocracies with guns, money, and protection from UN censure while slapping foreign human-rights advocates with sanctions. Chinese officials offer their authoritarian brethren riot-control gear and advice on building a surveillance state...” (Beckley & Brands, 2022). The top 15 countries to which China sold the most weapons in the period 2013-2023 are as follows (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). In brackets, their rank in the democracy index is shown (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2023): Pakistan (118), Bangladesh (75), Algeria (110), Myanmar (166), Thailand (63), Venezuela (142), Saudi Arabia (150), Nigeria (104), Indonesia (56), Turkmenistan (161), Cameroon (138), Morocco (93), Sudan (158), the UAE (125), Tanzania (86).

When Beijing holds leadership posts in international organizations, it uses its power in an illiberal direction. For instance, China, as head of the International Civil Aviation Organization, protected the ferocious Lukashenka rule from condemnation when Belarus contravened international law by forcing down a plane carrying a wanted opponent in 2021. Beijing's global reach is more penetrating and widespread than that of any other autocracy in the world. As the second strongest country in the world, China has a wide range of instruments in order to silence free speech beyond its borders. A vast number of democratic countries have recently encountered China's economic wrath (Beckley & Brands, 2022).

China represents a digital authoritarianism with its ability to data collection, artificial intelligence, biometric, speech, and facial recognition technologies. Chinese digital technology let the CCP to have surveillance tools and control society by way of modern digital means and propaganda instruments. Invisible algorithms, social control tools, surveillance technologies, and censoring devices are integral parts of the Chinese authoritarian regime, and China exports these technologies to other oppressive, brutal autocratic regimes. Chinese companies sell surveillance systems to a vast number of countries, and in this manner, China exports its digital authoritarianism (Beckley & Brands, 2022).

4. Conclusion

As it is seen in this paper, different international relations theories disparately comprehend the Chinese threat to European security. While realism rather focuses on the material dimension of the threat, constructivism concentrates on the ideational dimension of the threat and emphasizes identity, ideas, meaning, and social construction of the Chinese threat.

Offensive structural realism argues that the main aim of states in the international system is to secure their own survival. Since there is no higher authority and other states could pose a threat. States cannot rely on others for their security. In this self-help world, states act according to their own self-interest. States may never be sure what other states have in mind under an anarchic international system. States become extremely motivated to gain maximum power as a result. Being extremely strong is the best method to survive in the global system. In this context, China is in pursuit of global hegemony. There is a zero-sum game between China and Europe.

Relations between Europe and China are more complex than ever before. China has increasingly been a threat to European security and interests. There has been a conflict between Beijing's foreign policy purposes and European security. China has been forming a threat to the Western-centric liberal hegemonic order. China's targets are not compatible with European interests. A strong Chinese leadership is actively working to undermine and weaken democracies while also creating a secure environment for autocracies.

Constructivism considers security as a context-specific social construction. According to the constructivist assumption, security is assigned meaning within contexts. Ideas and political ideologies can threaten states and their regime's legitimacy and facilitate social unrest in the targeted country. China is an "other" for Europe in terms of ethnicity, religion, history, culture, and political system. China's priorities and values do not overlap with Europe's own. China has increasingly been a threat to European interests. China and Europe have incompatible identities and aims. There is a close relationship between interests and identities of countries. Different identities constitute different interests and shape state behavior.

Historical experiences are integral parts of identities. Like many states, China was exposed to European imperialism in its history. It can be argued that the narrative of "the century of humiliation" has played a significant role in the construction of modern Chinese identity. Historical experiences are one of the main components shaping national collective memory and identity. The century of humiliation has been existing in the collective memory of Chinese people.

Europe's reliance on Chinese companies for critical infrastructure subsumes security risks for the European economic, military, and information sectors. China is able to damage European economic security by using its economic leverage as a strategic tool. Chinese investments in

sensitive sectors of Europe pose a threat to the economic and information security of the continent. It is highly probable that European reliance on China might be used against Europe. The overdependency of European companies on Beijing constitutes a significant vulnerability to European economic security. It is highly likely that China could use its economic leverage to bring European countries to its knees. Dependency has been weaponizing by China.

Europe's vital infrastructure and supply chains, particularly semiconductors, chips, port facilities, and 5G networks that are progressively controlled by China, reveal the fragility of Europe vis-a-vis China, and constitute a security threat to Europe in terms of intelligence gathering and economic security. The Chinese government utilizes its economic penetration to endorse foreign policy aims. Economic coercion has been one of China's instruments. China has been leveraging its economic power to impact other states' behavior and decisions. Some Chinese policies pose challenges to the rule-based international order.

The interests of Europe require protection of free and safe shipping in the South China Sea. By stealing defense-related intellectual property and sharing it with its defense sector, Beijing undermines Europe's military prowess while simultaneously developing new weaponry. Moreover, Beijing's aid and support for Moscow are highly likely to undercut European security. One of the most important effects of the Chinese threat to Europe on world politics is the further development of transatlantic relations to balance China. On the other hand, it appears that Beijing-Moscow relations will deepen in order to maintain the balance of power.

The growth of China, which has a different economic model and set of values and is essentially altering the architecture of global power, is a significant element influencing the change in EU-China ties. China does not wish to be a taker of Western norms, thanks to its increasing aggressiveness in the military, economy, and politics. Rather, it attempts to modify international rules to suit its interests as a global actor.

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