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DO SOCIAL MEDIA UNDERMINE STRUCTURES? RETHINKING THE STRUCTURE-AGENCY DEBATE

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ABSTRACT

The study reconsiders the structure-agency debate in a world dominated by internetisation and social media. To answer the question of whether social media weaken the structures embedded in societies, four phenomena are analysed: Dissemination and control of information are the main areas of conflict between actors and structures. The cyber public sphere has emerged as social media has become an important medium for shaping public opinion. Cyber activism, which has made important strides in moving political networks into the virtual world, has become an alternative to activism in the physical world. As individuals engage in human relations in virtual world just as in physical world, cyber identity has entered our lives. The study's main finding is that although structures have developed new strategies and instruments to monitor, control and regulate the cyber world; social media continues to be a ground that increases the capacity of agencies for actors against structures.

Keywords: International politics, Political philosophy, Structure, Agency, Social media, Cyber identity.

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INTRODUCTION

A prominent feature of the human experience in the twenty-first century is the technologisation and internetisation of everyday life. Human beings have been experiencing a dramatic change and being highly affected by smart technologies, ranging from tangible smart devices to intangible digital mechanisms such as applications, platforms and the cloud (Hassani et al., 2021: 2). It is evident that the technologisation and internetisation of political struggle and the dissemination of political discourse are of greater significance in the context of our topic. Social media is at the centre of this debate in terms of bringing political discourse into the cyber world and radically changing the nature of political struggle. It can be argued that the advent of social media represents a pivotal moment in the economic, social and political evolution of societies.

The examination of the extent to which agencies are able to challenge deeply rooted structures through social media provides a framework for understanding the impact of technological and digital developments on political struggles around the world. Therefore, the structure-agency debate is worthy of reconsideration in the context of social media. The advent of social media has introduced a novel form of discourse dissemination, severing the link between discourse and time and physical environment. Furthermore, social media has augmented the organisational capacity of agencies *vis-à-vis* structures. Finally, social media has diminished the advantage of hegemons in terms of ownership of means of communication.

The main research question is: "Do social media undermine structures given the changing nature of political struggle by agencies?" This research question leads to two further sub-questions: "How do social media change the nature of agentic power *vis-à-vis* structures?" and "How do social media affect structures *vis-à-vis* agencies?" In seeking answers to these questions, the research situates political struggle at its core, examining the tactics employed by agents to secure new positions within the context of political struggles and the counter-tactics deployed by the structures in response to the exercise of agential capacities within those struggles.

In order to address the objective of gaining insight into the impact of the rise of social media on the structures and agencies as well as on the relationship between them, the study will commence with an introduction to the historical structure-agency debate. This will be followed by discussions on the dissemination and control of information, the changing nature of the public sphere, the impact of social networks on structures, and the autonomisation of social identities from structures.

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METHOD

This paper employs a two-pronged methodology, comprising an inductive analysis based on disparate cases from various countries and a conceptual analysis. In the method of inductive reasoning, people generalise from a particular example or category to another, usually more inclusive one (Coley et al., 1999: 207). In the current study, the resistance capacity of agencies *vis-à-vis* deeper structures as well as authoritarian regimes is exemplified in a generalizable manner. Through the use of cases from different contexts, a more accurate answer to the question of whether or not structures are in decline will be sought.

Concepts, on the other hand, are cognitive tools that facilitate comprehension and interpretation of phenomena in the world. They provide a conceptual framework for thought and are contingent upon the processes of thought (Myburgh and Tammaro, 2013). By means of conceptual analysis, this study aims to draw a framework of thought to reason in depth about the concepts of structure and agency, which involve a deep philosophical debate. The objective of such philosophical debate is to present a projection of both present and future effects resulting from the utilisation of social media, based on an examination of its historical applications and outcomes.

UNDERSTANDING STRUCTURE-AGENCY DEBATE

The structure-agency issue has been the basic element of several deeply rooted and still unsolved discussions from the medieval confrontation between state and individual to current meta-theoretical disputes in political philosophy, epistemology and science (Carlsnaes, 1992: 245). Basically, issues such as the capacity of political actors to design their fate, the power of the structure to control the actor's life and the determination of an actor's destiny by external elements are the main concerns of the structure-agency debate (McAnulla, 2002: 271).

Structure is often associated with boundaries in a positive or negative sense. It is possible to trace the history of the term 'structure' back to the beginning of social analysis. It has always accompanied other terms of 'institution', 'organisation', 'function', 'value', 'norm', which are frequently used by sociologists in order to denominate the social -non-individualistic- features of human life (Glucksmann, 1974: 1). According to a definition put forward by Hay (2002: 94), the term 'structure' should mainly be understood "as the 'context' and corresponds to the setting within which social, political and economic events occur and acquire meaning". The social world arises from various relations and structures, which are political, economic, social, communicative, etc. Those social structures

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possess a comparatively enduring nature and are not reducible to the practises that they promote or to the actions that they lead. However, social practises and human activity become possible by those social structures (Joseph, 2002: 4). Berger's (1963: 92) following expressions emphasise builder/determiner features of society as a type of structure and underline the limits of human action:

'Finally, we are located in society not only in space but in time. Our society is a historical entity that extends temporally beyond any individual biography. Society antedates us and it will survive us. It was there before we were born and it will be there after we are dead. Our lives are but episodes in its majestic march through time. In sum, society is the walls of our imprisonment in history.'

The structure-centric perspective of Berger placed a greater emphasis on structures than on human reason and action. As Berger (1963: 121) purported, "the walls of our imprisonment were there before we appeared on the scene, but they are ever rebuilt by ourselves. We are betrayed into captivity with our own cooperation." Charon (2011: 42) further developed this structure-centric perspective by highlighting that as society penetrates humans by means of socialisation process, humans give consent for such an imprisonment and become what society desires. In essence, individuals are socialised to accept limitations imposed by society.

Social institutions, such as religion, patriarchy, family, and education, which shape social context, contribute to the constitution of a social structure that encourages or restrains individual agents. The positive role of Protestant ethics on the rise of capitalism provides a typical example of the facilitator roles of structures on agential capacity. Weber (1968: 630) posited that the asceticism espoused by Protestantism initially gave rise to a capitalist ethic, albeit inadvertently, as it opened the door to a career in business, particularly for those who were most devout and ethically rigorous. He further contended that Protestantism served as a significant motivator for individuals who sought salvation through their worldly endeavours. Consequently, the Protestant ethic posited that success in business was the logical consequence of a rational approach to life.

Political culture has also been accepted as a deeply rooted structure that determines the manner in which voters engage in political behaviour. Within this scope, Inglehart (1988: 1203) proposed that each society has a distinctive political culture, which is enduring but not fixed. He argued that each political culture exerts an influence on political outcomes, which in turn affect the survival of political institutions. As Almond and Verba (1989: 3) proposed, the formal elements of democracy, such as elected assemblies, political parties and universal suffrage, are not sufficient for the development of a democratic and participatory political system. In addition, a political culture that is compatible

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with this targeted democratic political system is necessary for the sustainability of this system.

Various structures draw boundaries for human behaviour and action within different contexts. Each of these structures considerably differs in terms of resources, and thusly the power that they actuate. The effect of a military structure, for instance, is perceived differently from the effect of linguistic structures (Sewell, 1992: 22). Moreover, the power of structures over humans also varies spatially and temporally. A human living in a Central African state feels the effect of global capitalism differently than a human living within the borders of European Union. On the other hand, overlooking the structures that are not historically human-made can lead to an incomplete understanding of the structure-agency relationship. Institutional rules are not the only factors that determine the structural characteristics of societies. For millions of years, humans survived in societies that did not have institutional rules. In parallel with human evolution, the agentic capacity of humans to shape their environment has gradually evolved. Thus, when seeking to understand how social structure and human agency have been shaped over time, the emphasis should be on the larger environment where people survive and evolve (Zhao, 2022: 5).

The other side of the equation is that of the agent. In the Cambridge English Dictionary, the word 'agency' refers to "the ability to take action or to choose what action to take" and the word 'agent' refers to "a person or thing that produces a particular effect or change." The influence capacity of a person or group becomes the core issue in this context. (McAnulla, 2002: 271). Power directly hinges on the idea that *agent* or *subject* gains a victory over its other – *object* or *structure*. Power is about agency. It is about having an effect on or influencing the structures that determine the possible options of others and shape contexts (Hay, 1995: 191). Thus, possessing power is tantamount to possessing the capacity of agency. On the other hand, Joseph (2008: 116) underlined that structures also possess "prior casual power over agents". That is, the very conditions that define and limit the acts of agents are provided by structures. What differs the power of agencies from the power of structures is the consciousness and intentionality of agencies.

It is possible to identify instances of women in highly patriarchal societies who have made significant contributions to world history. These include Jeannette Rankin from the USA, Benazir Bhutto from Pakistan, Indira Gandhi from India, Margaret Thatcher from the UK, Khaleda Zia from Bangladesh, Tansu Ciller from Türkiye, Angela Merkel from Germany and Claudia Sheinbaum from Mexico. These women were able to gain a reputation as charismatic political leaders in male-dominated political environments and to survive in those patriarchal political cultures. The achievements of these women demonstrate the capacity for 'agency' in a significant manner.

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The question of why some individuals possess greater agency than others becomes a significant point when comparing the agential power of different individuals in the same structural conditions. At this juncture, Sewell (1992: 20) posited that all humans are innately endowed with the capacity for agency, encompassing the faculties of intention, preference formation, and creative activity. However, she also underscored that this capacity is not merely a potentiality, but rather a highly generalized capacity that is bestowed upon them at birth. This capacity is analogous to the capacity of humans to use language. Agency is analogous to the capacity to speak a language, such as Urdu, Swahili, Arabic or French. It is determined by the resources and cultural schemas that emerge within a particular social environment. The manner in which agency is formed differs fundamentally and is shaped historically and culturally.

The difficulty in determining the boundaries of agencies is a key factor in the complexity of the structure-agency debate. The nature of an agency can vary considerably depending on the scale of the analysis. At the macro level, a nation-state can be regarded as an agency in relation to the global system. However, at the micro level, the same nation-state can be perceived as a structure with its vast organisational dimension and normative power *vis-à-vis* its citizens. From this perspective, as Hindess (1986: 115) emphasised, collectivities such as political parties, public agencies, private enterprises and religious organisations must be regarded as social actors, since they are all capable of formulating and reaching decisions. The distinguishing factor is that they can act as conscious actors. However, when their conscious behaviour comes together, an unconscious but spontaneous structure emerges. This structure is more than the sum of the individual actors.

AGENCIES VERSUS STRUCTURES IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA

A notable reflection of the structure-agency debate in the context of the digital age can be observed in the discourse surrounding the influence and reach of technological globalisation. This phenomenon is a consequence of technological advancement, internetisation and the growth of social media. The phenomenon of globalisation has been significantly advanced by the introduction of new technologies since the second quarter of the twentieth century. Furthermore, the advent of the Internet has been a pervasive phenomenon in the daily lives of individuals since the 1990s. However, its genesis can be traced back to a much earlier period (Gurak and Logie, 2003: 25).

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Table 1. *A summary of agencies and structures in the age of social media.*

	Agency	**Structure**
Information	Cheaper access to information. Easier access to information. Liberation of individuals from the influence of those (editors, regime media...) who reproduce embedded structural discourses.	Contingency upon the infrastructural and economical facilities provided by structures. Algorithms. Low-quality content.
Public Sphere	Easier and cheaper participation in the formation of public opinion. Public debate without temporal or spatial limitations. Making discursive impact over a wider area and over a longer period of time.	Censorship. Controlling behaviour targeting individuals on social media. Troll armies.
Political Networks	Easier organisational capacity. Political organisations independent from temporal or spatial limitations.	Illegalisation of political networks. Illegalisation of cyberactivism.
Cyber Identity	Independence from national identities. Breaking out of the structural barriers enclosed by national borders.	Authoritarian regimes monitoring and restricting cyber identities. Norm circles monitoring and restricting cyber identities. Society monitoring and restricting cyber identities.

Source: The author's elaboration

A study conducted by the International Telecommunication Union revealed that in 2019, 72% of households in urban areas and 37% in rural areas worldwide had access to the internet at home (ITU, 2020: 6). The transfer of information across the globe has become possible through the use of telephones, televisions,

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computers, satellites and aeroplanes. The modern world is being shaped on a daily basis by the intensity and speed with which knowledge is disseminated. As the transfer and diffusion of knowledge increase with the development of new technologies, the world becomes more akin to a 'global village' (Archibugi and Iammarino, 2002: 99). The consequence of this technologically advanced globalisation has been a profound alteration in the relationship between structures and agencies with the changing nature of political struggles and the dissemination of political discourse.

In order to find an appropriate answer for the question whether structures are declining or not, the first step becomes focusing on the situation of individuals (and/or organised individuals) *vis-à-vis* deeper structures with the rise of social media. The discussion will address the dissemination and control of information, the changing nature of the public sphere, the challenge to established structures posed by political networks and cyberactivism, and the independence of cyber identities from structures.

Dissemination and Control of Information

The changing nature of dissemination and control of information determines the position of actors *vis-à-vis* structures. Prior to the current prevalence of social media, the prevailing assumption was that it would provide unlimited access to information and remove all barriers to the dissemination of information. Indeed, it is important to acknowledge that the past three decades have witnessed a profound transformation in the accessibility of information. Today, as the globe becomes more digitalised and connected to each other, people tend to rely on search engines in order to find answers for their questions (Hassani et al., 2021: 3). It has become possible for the general public to communicate directly with experts on a wide range of subjects through the medium of social media. However, this process is not as easy and flawless as expected.

There is a disparity in the extent of internet usage across different socioeconomic groups. It can be argued that not everyone has an equal opportunity to access social media, and that the opportunity to access information on social media sites is not unlimited (Kruse et al., 2018: 64). This is attributable to the inadequacy of the infrastructure investments required to access social media, as well as the cost of utilising this infrastructure even if the internet infrastructure is sufficient. This results in the individuals' access to the social media being entirely contingent upon the infrastructural and economical facilities provided by structures.

As the number of individuals who connect to the internet to access news, information, entertainment, or conversation continues to grow, the influence of libraries, bookshops, traditional media including newspapers, television channels, and film industry, is gradually declining in society. On the one hand,

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this shift can potentially liberate individuals from the control of cultural elites, such as editors, publishers, professional commentators, and critics, who previously exercised significant influence over what people read and thought. However, the deluge of user-generated content unleashed by the new internet order may impede the production of quality journalism, sophisticated literature, music and film of artistic merit. Furthermore, the economic foundations of the organisations that train and employ these information professionals are also being eroded (Leadbeater, 2008: 2-3). Furthermore, the information sources of individuals on social media are not always objective. Highly influential profiles on social media frequently engage in partisan discourse, often resorting to innuendo and rumour (Jenkins, 2006: 217). Consequently, the impact of traditional sources of information, which can be structurally controlled through financial means and censorship, is waning, yet being supplanted by an inflation of low-quality or manipulated content. The prevalence of low-quality and manipulated content impedes the masses from attaining an advantageous state of consciousness with regard to the structures in question.

The dissemination of manipulated information and the propagation of false narratives constituted a pivotal aspect of Russia's actions during its aggression in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Russia's propaganda efforts were not limited to influencing the information environment in Ukraine; they also targeted the information environments of other countries (Kornieiev et al., 2022: 187). In certain instances, such as those pertaining to the conflicts in Georgia or Ukraine, it can be argued that the dissemination of accurate information outstrips that of misinformation or disinformation in terms of quantity. It becomes an imperative for individuals to exercise discernment when evaluating the veracity of information circulated on social media.

Algorithms, which can be defined as "the automated systems that social media platforms use to suggest content for users by making assumptions based on the groups, friends, topics and headlines a user has clicked on in the past" (Klepper, 2023), are surveillance, control and direction mechanisms that negate the arguments that social media will provide an environment of unlimited freedom. This ideological control is usually in the favouring of authoritarian, populist, right-wing governments or political organisations. The combination of algorithmic control mechanisms with legal censorship by authoritarian governments results in the creation of a digital environment in which alternative ideas are suppressed and gradually become invisible.

The longer users engage with YouTube's recommendations, the more they are exposed to content that is moderately conservative and increasingly narrow in its ideological scope. This phenomenon is observed across the full spectrum of users, regardless of their ideological orientation. (Brown et al., 2022). Similarly, a recent study about X (previously Twitter) has revealed that, in six out of the

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seven countries examined, the mainstream political right is amplified to a greater extent than the mainstream political left by algorithms used in social media. This finding is consistent with the trend observed in the United States, where algorithmic amplification has been shown to favour news sources that possess right-wing tendencies (Huszár et al., 2022). A content analysis of Facebook's news ecosystem revealed that sources favoured by conservative audiences were more prevalent than those favoured by liberal-leaning users (González-Bailón et al., 2023). Thus, it can be argued that the dominant discourse encountered in everyday life is characterised by authoritarian right-wing and populist approaches.

The Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal provides a salient example of the potential for algorithmic manipulation. In this incident, the personal information of 87 million Facebook users was used without permission by the Cambridge Analytica company. This data was subsequently employed to influence the 2016 US elections in favour of Donald Trump and the UK's EU referendum in favour of leaving the EU (Ozdemir, 2022: 25). In response to the growing concern over the potential for algorithmic manipulation by social media giants, numerous countries have enacted legislation to regulate and prevent such practices. For instance, in order to regulate the use of algorithms, China initiated the Regulations on the Administration of Internet Information Service Recommendation Algorithms on 1 March 2022 (FES, 2023). This regulatory framework compelled algorithmic recommendation services to enhance the transparency and interpretability of their algorithms (Kharitonova et al., 2023: 158). India has enacted comparable legislation, the Information Technology Rules 2021, with the objective of regulating the content filtering systems of social media companies (Kharitonova et al., 2023: 161).

Cyber Public Sphere

In the context of an evolving communication landscape characterised by increased density, complexity and participation, the collective action potential of networked individuals is enhanced by the expansion of access to information and heightened participation in public discourse (Shirky, 2011: 29). Public debates, as the expression of ideas on issues that are within the public concern involving diverging or opposing viewpoints that are voiced by people in the debate (Overland, 2018: 12), are significant activities of agents that possess the potential to construct the ideological basis for agential challenge against deeper structures embedded within societies.

Public debate takes place on the site of 'public sphere', which is defined as a space "made up of private people gathered together as a public and articulating the needs of society with the state" (Habermas, 1991 [1962]: 176). It is a domain of social interaction wherein a collective opinion can be formed. All citizens are

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entitled to access this sphere. When individuals engage in unrestricted dialogue, they act as a collective public body, protected by guarantees of freedom of assembly, association, and expression. These rights enable citizens to engage in deliberations about issues of general interest. The public sphere was previously constituted by various media platforms, including newspapers, magazines, radio, and television (Habermas, 1964, cited from Habermas et al., 1974 [1964]: 49). Today, on the other hand, it has undergone a significant expansion with the proliferation of the internet and social media in everyday life. People who have integrated social media to their daily life are no longer passive subjects of the propaganda of governments, political parties and mass media. They now possess the capacity to express alternative thought, challenge mainstream discourses, and disseminate their own perspectives (Loader and Mercea, 2011: 759). Furthermore, this public space is not constrained by temporal or spatial limitations. This independence precludes individuals from being constrained to a specific temporal and spatial framework, thereby enabling them to generate discourse that persists over an extended period and has a broader impact. As a result, the influence of social pressure on the individual may also be less likely to be the case.

Structures, on the other hand, regulate the online public sphere, either by limiting the scope of free public debate or by exerting strict control over it. The question of whether the structure in question performs this function consciously or unconsciously depends on the specific structure in question. Authoritarian/totalitarian regimes as conscious structures often strengthen structural hegemony[1] by limiting the boundaries of discourse on social media. Global capitalism as a more unconscious structure determine the mainstream agenda on social media by means of algorithms that prioritise the internalisation of consumer culture and sustainability of market economy.

It is possible to refute the determinist idea that social media are inherently democratic and that politics is dead. An individual's possession of an iPhone or access to a social networking site does not guarantee his/her participation in the process of public opinion formation. The first generation of digital democracy experiments have shown that a complex set of socio-cultural factors significantly influence the use of new media for public deliberation (Loader and Mercea, 2011: 760). Gender-based controlling behaviour towards women, for instance, limits women's participation in public debates and strengthens deeper structure of patriarchal society. The phenomenon of exposure to controlling behaviour may be observed in individuals who are perceived as marginal within their familial context, those engaged in the process of seeking employment, or those

[1] For a more detailed explanation about the term 'structural hegemony', refer to Joseph (2002; 2008).

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already employed. Those individuals monitored may perceive limitations on their freedom to utilise social media for the purpose of meaningful and unfettered exchange of ideas. Consequently, they may be disinclined to express their political proclivities candidly, apprehending the potential for online harassment and its ramifications for their employment status or familial and social relationships (Kruse et al., 2018: 65). It is not uncommon for a person to avoid offending his or her employer and to practice self-censorship when expressing opinions on social media.

Additionally, the prevalence of political echo-chambers constrains the range of discourse available to individuals in their daily lives. Those echo-chambers function to reinforce existing beliefs and preclude the consideration of contradictory perspectives within an individual. Indeed, individuals repeatedly encounter the same political opinions, leading to the belief that opposing viewpoints are erroneous without the consideration of their rationale. (Lutz et al., 2021: 1). Facebook is one of the social media platforms that is most conducive to the formation of echo chambers. As the study of Jiang et al. (2021) revealed, the phenomenon of political echo chambers is most prevalent in right-leaning communities, where users are subjected to a constant stream of information that is largely in alignment with their pre-existing views.

Facebook scans the content of each user's friends' posts, the content of the pages liked by the user, the content of the groups to which the user belongs, and the content of the user's own posts. This information is then used to create a news feed algorithm, which is based on an ever-changing and closely guarded formula. This algorithm ranks each post according to the likelihood that the user will find it valuable. As a result, each user will only see certain content (Oremus, 2016). Although WhatsApp is primarily a messaging/communication application, it can also be considered a social media tool due to the opportunities for followers to share posts and express opinions in large groups. Consequently, it is also an efficacious site for the construction of eco-chambers among disparate ideological groups, as it allows for the straightforward dissemination of texts, visuals, and audio files to individuals within a mobile-phone-based network.

One of the most significant challenges to the productive use of social media as a public sphere is the phenomenon of troll armies. These are characterised by the presence of fake users, who are often specifically recruited for the purpose of disrupting the news flow of social media. As a result, the formation of unreal or artificial public opinion on a range of topics is facilitated by those who employ trolls. The planned social media operations of these troll armies also render the authentic opinions and reactions of the general public invisible.

Troll networks and bot accounts, which impede the formation of an efficacious public sphere within the digital realm, are arguably most effectively deployed by

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Putin's Russia on a global scale. The 2016 US presidential election was a prime example of how Putin's troll network, as part of a sophisticated Russian-led information operation, created false public opinion and manipulated the cyber public sphere (Swed et al., 2024). Furthermore, the findings of an empirical study conducted by Geissler Bär et al. (2023: 7) indicate that pro-Russian propaganda on Twitter employed a specific set of hashtags, including #IStandWithPutin, #isupportrussia, *#Putin*, *#standforrussia*, *#StandWithPutin* and *#IndiaWithRussia* during the Russia-Ukraine war. This research also revealed that 20.28% of the accounts identified as using manipulative hashtags and propagating Russian narratives were automated bots.

Political Networks and Cyberactivism against Structures

The emergence of the Internet has facilitated the formation of networks, enabling individuals to establish connections and collaborate in novel ways. In addition to facilitating the formation of networks based on physical hubs and wires, it also enables the creation of networks between people and thusly, provides a valuable platform for the expression and advancement of diverse forms of social activism (Gurak and Logie, 2003: 25). The extremely open nature of the Internet, which allows for the connection of any individual with almost any other individual, presents innumerable possibilities for the facilitation of interpersonal collaboration (Leadbeater, 2008: 3-4). Over the past two decades, within this scope, a multitude of internet-organised protests, including those in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, have led to changes in authoritarian/totalitarian regimes and had a profound impact on global affairs.

The concept of 'cyberactivism' defined as "political activism on the Internet" (McCaughey and Ayers, 2003: 1), has become a pervasive phenomenon in contemporary society, representing a novel approach to raising awareness and expressing political opposition to established structures through the use of social media. Cyberactivism enables individuals to identify global, regional and local issues that require activist action and to develop a stance on them by acquiring information. Furthermore, the utilisation of cyber activism is of significance in facilitating the identification of individuals who share a similar sensitivity towards a particular issue, thereby enabling them to collaborate and organise collectively. Therefore, it is not necessary for a social movement to be physically unified in order to be organised. Thus, authoritarian regimes were confronted with an agential power that they could not contain within the borders of the country and could not control its physical environment.

However, the belief that social media provides unlimited access and equal participation for all means not recognising the social and political realities of contemporary society. A significant proportion of the global population lacks access to the Internet. Although many social media sites are free to join, the cost

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of a device and/or an Internet subscription can be prohibitive for individuals who wish to benefit from those social media sites. Although Facebook is the most popular social media site, only 43.3% of the world population can participate in it (Kruse et al., 2018: 64). In addition to individuals' economic competence being structurally determined, individuals who manage to overcome this economic competence barrier encounter the structural limits of organising on social media. Restrictions on access to certain social media platforms during times of public outcry, band throttling, censorship targeting activist discourse and authoritarian intervention in online organising are structural obstacles to agentic organising power. Thus, although the power and means of individuals to form oppositional blocs against deep structures has increased, structures develop new methods to suppress this agential organisational power.

China, which already has the largest online population in the world, achieved its first full internet connection in 1994 and established a highly sophisticated system of internet censorship from the 2000s onwards. The scope of censorship was not limited to news content, but extended to entertainment sites, which may not appear to be political in nature but provide opportunities for political humour, and to leisure sites, which allow people to meet each other and thus provide opportunities for political activism (Taneja, 2014: 298). The highly sophisticated mechanisms of censorship and prohibition of political action on the Internet have transformed China into what MacKinnon (2011) calls 'networked authoritarianism'. It can thus be argued that China represents a poor model for other authoritarian states in terms of the freedom of expression and political action permitted in cyberspace. Similarly, the Islamic Republic of exercised close supervision and imposed restrictions on online gatherings and networking opportunities, on the grounds that they might be perceived as anti-regime in nature (USDOS, 2017).

Independence of Cyber Identities from Structures

The traditional structure-agency debate concerned the relationship between the real-world identities of actors and structures. However, the advent of the internet created a new cyberspace that offered an alternative to physical space and gave rise to new types of identities, namely cyber identities. The term "cyber identity" is used to describe the totality of the meanings that are employed to represent our existence to others in the digital realm, as well as the ways in which these meanings are used to define our identity (Sancar, 2023). In this digital realm, a meticulous presentation of the self becomes crucial for us in order to achieve cyber-public acclaim. The 'self-presentation', accordingly, describes the manner in which an individual attempts to convey information about himself/herself or an image of himself/herself to other people (Baumeister and Hutton, 1987: 71).

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Cyber identity is usually a carefully designed and idealised identity that does not carry the defects of the real-world identity. These defects may be the disadvantages of the socio-economic class in which the person lives, or they may be the defects of the society or country in which the person lives. The cyber identity gradually becomes a universal identity that interacts with other cyber identities, transcending spatial and temporal constraints. This will undoubtedly result in the person moving away from the influence of the structures in which he/she participates with his/her real identity. A significant outcome of this is that the capacity of structures to dominate discourse in relation to individuals is diminished. Individuals in the cyber world can be fed from sources that transcend the borders of the country in terms of discourse, can act in partnership with social/political movements that cannot be intervened by the legal rules of the country, and can have a power of influence beyond the borders of the country.

Nevertheless, the emancipation of cyber identities from the structural constraints within national boundaries does not imply that they are entirely at liberty to act as they please. Firstly, the cyber identities are constrained by norm circles, which are social entities that possess normative power as well as casual power by means of which these circles create practices that affect their members. That is to say, members of a norm circle have a shared intention to uphold the norm. Each individual tends to endorse the norm to a greater extent when they are aware of the shared intention than they would otherwise (Elder-Vass, 2010: 123). In order to be accepted by the norm circle in which he/she seeks to participate, a cyber-identity must demonstrate a greater degree of adherence to the norms of this circle, or at the very least, provide evidence that he/she adheres to them more closely.

Moreover, society as a structure and the traditions of that society can also play a constraining role on cyber identities. The internet facilitates the monitoring of individuals by entities other than the state or corporations. This monitoring can occur not only from external sources, but also from one's own social network. Any indiscretion committed during one's youth could potentially be discovered and used against the individual in the future. This is due to the fact that social networking sites allow users to monitor each other's activities, creating a system of user-generated surveillance (Leadbeater, 2008: 2). This results in the practice of self-monitoring, whereby individuals are aware that each cyber identity they create leaves a digital footprint on the internet.

In Malaysia, the Islamic term 'fitnah' has been employed to justify digital authoritarianism and the curtailment of individuals' actions in cyberspace. The term 'fitnah', which has an Islamic connotation of sinfulness, is not only illegal but also considered wrong in the eyes of God (Shukri, 2023: 8). Consequently, individuals are prohibited from engaging in discourse on social media that is contrary to Malaysia's religious structure. They are also obliged to refrain from

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creating a cyber identity that is contrary to Malaysia's mainstream values, effectively practising self-censorship.

The Islamic Republic of Iran serves as another prototypical illustration of the reasons why individuals feel unease and engage in self-censorship when utilizing social media. In Iran, the online space is subject to rigorous state monitoring. For instance, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards have initiated a military exercise, designated “Eghtedare Sarallah”, which encompasses the surveillance of social media activities. Concurrently, the Iranian Cyber Police (FATA) has established a specialized unit to regulate computer games. All social media platforms in Iran are regularly requested by various Iranian authorities to provide users' information. Local social media counterparts offer no protection for users. Indeed, a survey of 904 Iranian internet users conducted in August 2015 revealed that users feel uncomfortable when using local social networks of Iran (Freedom House, 2016). Furthermore, Iranian authorities even oversee the online activities of Iranian nationals residing outside of Iran (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2014). In light of the potential for collaboration with the regime among certain individuals, it is likely that Iranians will resort to the use of pseudonyms on social media, refrain from engaging in activities that might reveal personal information, and avoid participating in extensive political discussions. Thus, it becomes difficult for cyber identities to exist freely in cyberspace independently of structures.

CONCLUSION

The objective of this study is to re-examine the structure-agency debate in the context of the process of technologicalisation, internetisation and the rise of social media. This debate, which traditionally occurs within a unified space and time, has been conducted in a cyber-universe that is independent of both space and time. On the one hand, actors have devised novel opposition strategies to circumvent the constraining influence of structures, while on the other hand, structures have implemented new strategies and instruments to monitor, control and regulate the cyberspace. It is not asserted here that structures, like actors, take conscious measures in all cases. However, the collective and cumulative actions of the constituent pillars constitute the conscious or unconscious behaviour of the structures.

One of the key advantages of social media for actors is that the rules and practices of structures regulating the flow of information become less effective in terms of access to information. Actors who have greater ease of access to information, at a faster and cheaper rate, can more easily reach the intellectual accumulation that will challenge the structures. Conversely, the excessive

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increase in the volume of information and the emergence of poor quality/false information cause the ease of access to information not to proceed in a linear line. In particular, the censorship employed by authoritarian regimes and the algorithms utilised by social media behemoths serve to render access to information more challenging.

The creation of a public sphere that is independent of time and space by social media enables actors to gain the capacity to form public opinion that will be valid in a much wider time and in a much wider area. This public sphere also provides a much freer environment that cannot be compared to the physical public sphere. In the process of creating social discourse, individuals have the ability to influence and be influenced not only by people physically close to them, but also by people from all over the world. Thus, the public sphere that necessitates monitoring and control for structures is considerably more extensive. Conversely, structures attempt to impede the cyber public sphere by limiting Internet access or imposing censorship, while simultaneously influencing the formation of public opinion within the cyber public sphere through the deployment of troll armies.

The advent of social media has presented a unique opportunity for political networks. On the one hand, the intellectual resources required for cyber activism have become more accessible, while on the other hand, it has become easier to identify individuals with similar sensitivities on shared issues. Furthermore, the ability to organise in cyberspace has become much more straightforward, as the Internet has made organisations less dependent on physical spaces. The recent Arab Spring is one of the most successful examples of organising through social media. Nevertheless, particularly authoritarian regimes are developing novel technical measures to regulate the use of social media for organising purposes. In certain countries, certain social media platforms are even prohibited.

Through their cyber identities, finally, individuals can engage in an array of political actions within the digital domain, transcending national borders. Nevertheless, structures and regimes possess technological means for the surveillance of cyber identities. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the nature of cyber identities differs from that of real-world identities in that they are less susceptible to the influence of authoritarian regimes and deeper structures within societies. Social media has created an environment in which actors can act, manufacture discourse, engage in political action, and be organised more autonomously than in the past. Although the structures are attempting to establish new control mechanisms, this will not be sustainable. It can be argued that with each passing day we will see an increase in the power of the agents against the structures.

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AS ONE OF THE MAIN REFERENCE OBJECTS OF POST-MODERN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES: ENERGY

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ABSTRACT

Energy is one of the issues that have remained at the forefront throughout history as one of the basic needs of great importance for humanity. For this reason, the energy phenomenon is one of the most important phenomena that must be secured in the international system. In this study, the energy phenomenon will be discussed in terms of security and the security of the phenomenon in question will be underlined, and the importance of energy in the international system will also be emphasized. Energy will be tried to be included in expanded security studies, to which a great contribution has been made especially by the Copenhagen School, by considering both its 4 A's (Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability and Affordability) and its supply, demand and transition dimensions. As a result of all these efforts, it is aimed to introduce the 'energy security' sector into the literature, where energy is discussed alone in the security dimension, independent of other energy sectors.

Keywords: Energy, Security, Securitization, Supply, Demand, Transition.

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INTRODUCTION

Security is a phenomenon that inherently contains various contradictions and can be described as one of the basic needs of human beings. While the contradictions within it can be explained in the context of the 'security dilemma' (Herz, 1950); The fact that it is one of the basic human needs can be explained in the context of Maslow's 'hierarchy of needs' (Maslow, 1943). With an inductive approach, if states are viewed as individuals of the international community; It is seen that the security situation and security relations of the individual within the society and the security situation and security relations of the state within the international system are similar. States, just like individuals, develop various relationships with other individuals/states in society in line with their security needs and interests. In short, security is one of the basic needs of the state as well as the individual. All states that have existed throughout human history have continued their existence by taking short or long-term security measures or producing security policies depending on the conditions they are in.

The phenomenon of security, which is of great importance for the discipline of international relations and is one of the main themes in almost every field of the discipline, is as old as human history. Because it is a basic need, security has been a concern since the earliest humans. Of course, many different ideas and theories have been developed in various fields on this long-standing human issue. It is possible to come across predictions, ideas and theories about security in all human-centered fields such as history, sociology, psychology and politics. Although the discipline of international relations is not as old as the phenomenon of security, it stands out as a discipline in which security has been discussed and discussed from many different perspectives on a historical level, due to its close ties with political science (Ringmar, 2019). It is possible to find traces of security in all theoretical approaches developed in the context of both political science and international relations. Although many different approaches to the phenomenon of security have been exhibited throughout history, security literature has been dominated by realist approaches based solely on military security for most of human history (Bakan and Sahin, 2018). Because the security of the state in the entire process from the first established states to today's unitary states; The human community that created it has been at the forefront in terms of the lands it rules and the shared values. It is in line with historical norms that armies established to protect all these and maintain stability are at the center of security approaches, or in modern terms, to come to the fore as the reference object of security (Baldwin, 1997).

When the security phenomenon is examined chronologically, it will be witnessed a significant cumulative progress that has constantly changed and developed throughout the historical process and reached today's level. Because the process from the protection of caves from external factors to the introduction of air defense systems contains a significant accumulation of knowledge. It is appropriate, and even necessary at some points, in the context of historical

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norms, for realist views to dominate a large part of this process. However, this does not have the power to change the fact that humanity, which develops over time and changes depending on this development, must approach old phenomena in new ways. As in every field, there have been developments and changes in the field of security, and liberal, critical and constructivist views have begun to find a place in the literature along with realist views and at almost the same level of influence (Acharya, 1994; Buzan and Weaver, 1998; Farrel, 2012). The development of the literature in this direction is also reflected in security practices. The Peace of Westphalia, the Age of Enlightenment and the French Revolution, which are important turning points in human history in terms of security, have led to important developments in security both theoretically and practically. Yorulmaz explained the impact of the critical turning points mentioned in his study on the perception of security as "sovereignty descending from the sky to the earth and the formation of a nation gaining value" (Yorulmaz, 2014: 103). This definition is an important indicator that the perception of security has reached a more concrete dimension. Birdisli took an important step and turned a cornerstone in the security studies literature by examining international security in three different periods: Primitive security period (1648 BC-AD), modern/systemic security period (1648-1990) and post-modern security period (after 1990). He emphasized the importance of hotspots and the changes in security perception from a different perspective (Birdisli, 2020).

The 20th century has been an extremely active period for security studies, both theoretically and practically. In this century, which can be seen as the intersection of the modern and post-modern periods in the periodic classification made by Birdisli, the two World Wars, the Cold War, the decolonization process, energy crises, economic crises, and the increase in environmental problems have become security issues that have serious consequences both nationally and internationally (Birdisli, 2020). The field of security studies, which emerged in America in 1945 with the aim of producing politically oriented knowledge and was called 'strategic studies' or 'national security studies' when it first emerged, in the first 10 years of its existence (1945-1955) saw that security issues were no longer only military-focused but also focused on other areas. It also paved the way for focused analysis. Later, with the influence of the theoretical policies developed on the military dimension of security and the mass response strategy put forward in 1954, security studies experienced its golden age between 1955 and 1965 (Wells, 1981; Walt, 1991). In this period when security studies have increased, the fact that the issues seen as security problems relate to a wide variety of areas has led to the criticism of the security approach centered on state and military security in different dimensions. Because in the modern security period, along with the understanding of security in which state-centered and military security is prioritized as the main reference object, new security approaches have also developed as different concepts have become the subject of security. Security problems, which increased in both quantity and quality

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especially in the 1970s, were effective in the concentration of social science disciplines in general and international relations discipline in particular on the field of security.

International security approaches developed within the scope of the discipline of international relations have increased significantly in terms of both quantity and quality towards the end of the modern security period. The transition to the post-modern security era has occurred with new and greater developments in the security studies literature. The most important of these developments is the inclusion of the concept of human security in the United Nations' Human Development Report The new security emphasis and approach in the report is a clear indicator of the new era that has begun in the context of security studies and practices (UNDP, 1994).

The developments experienced at the beginning of the new era in security studies, which started with the official conceptualization of "Human Security" at the international level, are of great importance in terms of conceptualization and concretization of security issues. During this period, the Copenhagen School came to the fore in terms of security studies. Founded in 1985 with the establishment of the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute to promote research on international security, the Copenhagen School has proven itself as a harbinger of the initiation of new ways of thinking beyond traditionalism on security and defense issues (Oliviera, 2020). Copenhagen School thinkers, who entered the new era of security studies with a new way of thinking, pioneered a major step forward in the security studies literature with the concept of 'securitization' they developed. This concept, developed under the leadership of Barry Buzan, Ole Weawer and Jap de Wilde, went down in history as the move that opened the door to a real 'new way of thinking' in terms of security studies (Collins, 2016).

With the introduction of the concept of securitization, the focus of security studies has expanded and new events and facts, specific to reference objects, have begun to become security issues in the theoretical context. This has paved the way for a significant development and expansion in security studies. One of the important steps of this expansion was the security sectors developed by Copenhagen School thinkers. Security sectors, which are revealed as economic, social, military, political and environmental security sectors, refer to reference objects that are securitized with a certain methodology. The methodology in question is that in every sector, certain threats threaten a reference object and the object in question becomes a security issue (Buzan et al., 1998).

Although the security sectors developed by the thinkers of the Copenhagen School have provided a significant expansion in terms of security studies, they have not been able to prevent the theoretical generalization of security issues at some points, as they contain certain generalizations. It is possible to say that there are thousands of potential reference objects in contemporary security studies. Therefore, since evaluating any phenomenon under one of the five

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sectors in the context of security studies may mean limiting the study in certain dimensions, evaluating each phenomenon in its own securitization process will be a good way both in terms of contemporary security studies literature and in terms of solving security issues. Because many issues associated with a single sector may actually be the subject of more than one security sector (Ballin et al., 2020). For this reason, it is necessary to consider each phenomenon as a separate security sector according to its position and importance in the international system. It is even possible to say that some phenomena are both related to all security sectors and have the potential to cover all of them. 'Energy' is one of these phenomena.

Energy, just like security, is one of the basic needs of humanity. Similar to security, this need must be met at an optimum level and continuously. From prehistoric times when animal and plant-derived substances were used to obtain energy; The period until the millennium, when atoms and molecules were used to obtain energy, is the product of cumulative knowledge and experience, as is the process in which the understanding of security changed and developed. For this reason, instead of considering the energy phenomenon as a branch of any of the other security sectors, it is necessary and important for security at both national and international levels to consider energy as a reference object and to evaluate it as a different security sector (Smill, 2004). In this study, inspired by the effort to create a different security sector under the name of 'Energy Security' by introducing the energy phenomenon into the securitization process, the securitization concept will be discussed in necessary details, the energy phenomenon will be explained in this context, and after the energy phenomenon is included in the securitization process, the 'Energy Security' sector will be mentioned in the international security studies literature. The necessity of its existence as a separate security sector will be discussed.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SECURITIZATION

The literary emphasis of Thomas Hobbes for security in Leviathan, one of the cult works of realism, is quite interesting. According to Hobbes, without security; There is no industry, no art, no literature, no society (Hobbes, 1946). Where there is none, there is only constant fear and danger of violent death; lonely, miserable and short human life can be mentioned. This is exactly the case at the international level. Geographies where there are no or minimal security problems are places with high welfare and quality lives compared to regions where security problems are constantly experienced and insecurity is greater than security. The 'North-South Gap', which stands out as one of the important concepts in the discipline of international relations, is one of the most important examples of this situation (Chisiridis et al., 2018). In this context, it is possible to say that one of the most important factors determining the living standards of the citizens of any country is security. The first priority in terms of security for each

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state is to ensure national security. The transfer of the concept of national security, which is defined (Osisanya, 2020) by the United Nations as the ability of a state to protect and defend its citizens, to the international level, refers to international security. Paul D. Williams' definition of security as "an important political tool used by governments to bring priority issues to the fore in the race for attention" (Williams, 2008) also supports this view.

Security policies are the most effective policies that any government in the world can use to ensure national support (Dedeoglu, 2008). When examined in the context of the basic elements of the nation state, it will be seen that the security phenomenon is of vital importance in order to preserve the unitary structure in every sense. The security policies of governments governing nation states gain importance in this context, as each state has the potential to internationalize the security policies in its domestic policy agenda according to the level of international effectiveness. At this point, the concept of securitization comes to the fore. This situation is not about the extent to which the issue falls within the context of security, but to what extent it can be securitized. Securitization has been defined by Copenhagen School theorists as "the process by which state actors in international relations and national politics transform issues from ordinary political issues into 'security' issues (Buzan et al., 1998). Securitization has paved the way for generating ideas by synthesizing realist and constructivist views in security studies (Williams, 2003). Thus, in the security studies literature, different objects were addressed as special security issues and the way was opened for the expansion of the literature.

As can be understood from its definition, securitization is an actor-context relationship that expresses a transformation process. Therefore, this process begins and ends with the execution of a certain methodology within a certain framework. In the process of securitization, there are two separate concepts: securitized and securitized. Securitizing actor; securitized refers to the context. The application of the securitization methodology, which starts with the acquisition of speech, is to take a non-political issue into the political area (politicized) and then turn it into a security issue. Or discursive advocacy, in which an actor claims that an object of reference is existentially threatened, envisions extraordinary measures to deal with this threat, and convinces the interlocutor that this threat is valid. It is the process by which it is dramatized as a topic of highest priority. If the state is considered as the securitizing actor in the securitization process, the issue in question is not on the state's agenda at the beginning of the process, in other words, the administration is not interested in the issue and this issue cannot be included in public discussions, this is the part where the issue is in the non-political area. When this issue, which is wanted to be securitized or should become a subject of security later on, starts to come to the fore in the public opinion, it begins to be managed within the standard political system, and now the politicized issue becomes a part of the public debate, so the government should now decide on this issue, allocate resources to

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this issue and put the issue into the governance mechanism. The politicized issue included in this mechanism is presented as a security issue through the act of securitization, at which point a securitizing actor presents the issue as a threat and the securitization process ends (Buzan et al., 1998).

The Copenhagen School, which introduced the securitization approach to the literature, supported the paradigm shift that started in the 1990s by introducing new security sectors. These sectors represent five separate security areas: military security, political security, social security, economic security and environmental security, which are put forward as analytical tools to identify different dynamics (Buzan et al., 1998). These security sectors, which were created by considering different reference objects in line with the methodology determined by the securitization theory, can be described as the first and most important steps of the post-modern security studies period.

With securitization theory and security sectors, the scope of classical security studies has expanded, and the analysis of new reference objects has brought a new vision to security studies. Security studies literature now overlaps more with the developments in practice, and the way for more reference objects to come to the fore due to these developments has been opened. These developments have allowed many different phenomena to become reference objects. However, although different objects are considered as the subject of security, the security sectors put forward by the Copenhagen School are perceived as the main framework of security studies, so the objects in question are put into the context of these security sectors. Although this situation is critical in determining the boundaries of security studies, it can be seen as a narrowing effect against studies that tend to expand. Therefore, it is understood from the fact that these objects are not included in the literature as separate security sectors that there are hesitations about considering the reference objects, which gained more importance especially in the period immediately after the Cold War and at the beginning of the 21st century, as separate security sectors.

In the context of international security issues, the phenomenon of ‘energy,’ which has experienced a consistently rising trend from the Industrial Revolution to the present, is one of the referent objects that should be recognized as a separate security sector in the security studies literature. However, it is often examined in association with other security sectors. When energy is evaluated in terms of its resources, usage patterns, application areas, and international policies, it becomes evident that it possesses a complex structure that cannot be fully addressed under the umbrella of any single security sector. Although it is most commonly linked with the economic security sector, considering energy as a distinct security sector would significantly contribute to both the literature in security studies and practical applications in the international energy market. This is due to the fact that energy, today, can be associated with all security sectors at various levels (Karatas, 2022).

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ENERGY SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF ITS BASIC ELEMENTS AND SECTORS

Energy security is defined by the International Energy Agency as "the uninterrupted availability of energy resources at an affordable price" (IEA, 2023). As can be understood from its definition, sustainability and economy are the main factors in energy security. However, the issue of energy security is not just about sustainability and economy. In their study, Cherp and Jewell evaluated the issue of energy security in a broad context by grounding it in the context of some elements. In the study by the questions: Security for whom? Security for which values? and Security against what threats? 4 basic elements of energy security were determined by making some evaluations and these are availability, affordability, accessibility and acceptability (Cherp and Jewell, 2014).

Each of the basic elements of energy security has its own and different levels of importance in terms of energy security. At this point, the comprehensiveness of the energy security concept emerges and its relationship with all other security sectors is seen. When examined in the context of its basic elements, it can be seen that energy security can be related to all other security sectors in different ways. This situation reveals the need to examine energy security in the context of different security sectors. The phenomenon of energy security, where each element affects it in different ways, should be examined in three separate sections: supply, demand and transit security sectors, in the context of these elements. A broad and beneficial vision of energy security is presented by explaining each element within the context of the sector it affects.

Availability ranks first among the essential elements of energy security. Because the primary input that must exist for the formation of any energy equation is the energy source. For this reason, the element of presence, which can be expressed as the existence of the energy source, is of great importance (Hatipoglu, 2019). Energy resources are of varying degrees of importance due to their existence in the region where they are located, with their forms and quantities. Regions where the presence of the most used energy resources in the international energy sector, such as oil, natural gas and coal, are also focal points for energy security. In this context, the connection of the presence factor with other elements of energy security emerges. Because without the existence of a source, it is not possible to reveal the relationship of the source in question with other elements. The availability element is of great importance as it can be directly associated with supply security, which is one of the sub-sectors of energy security. Since the existence and quantity of the resource is the main factor that directly affects its supply in the market, it can be said that supply security and availability are directly linked.

Affordability or affordability stands out as an important element of energy security in the context of capital and need. The main determinants of this element are resource availability and the value of these resources in the international

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energy market. Any relationship that arises at this point falls within the scope of energy security (Hatipoglu, 2019). In order for a physically existing resource to be integrated into the market, it must be supplied under market conditions and be at a level that can be purchased by demand authorities. The affordability element can be associated with both supply and demand sectors of energy security, as it is an element associated with both supplying and demanding authorities. Due to this feature, it is possible to see the affordability element as economy in many different sources.

Accessibility is the element of energy security that refers to the access between the source's origin and destination. One of the main reasons why the factor of accessibility is taken into account in energy security is the effect of access opportunities between supply and demand authorities on energy trade and therefore on energy prices. At this point, access opportunities that vary according to source forms become important (Kartal, 2022). The expansion of pipelines in oil and natural gas transportation, the production of high-capacity tankers or the transportation of energy resources by converting them into different forms can be listed as facilitating developments in terms of accessibility. All of the measures taken and developments regarding accessibility are directly related to energy transition security. Therefore, it can be said that an important criterion for the affordable level of supply of existing resources to the market is the provision of security of passage, both technically and socially.

Acceptability, or social acceptability in different sources, which is among the basic elements of energy security, expresses the social and somewhat political side of the energy issue (Kartal, 2022). While each of the actors in the global energy market is in commercial relations, they also have social and political relations. This situation is also reflected in the items traded at some points. Support or opposition for political and social reasons creates an element of acceptability in terms of energy resources. This element can be associated with all sectors of energy security. Because any of the supply, demand and transition situations sequentially involved in energy resource exchange has the potential to be affected by acceptability. In a situation of social acceptability between two states, these two states may be supplying and demanding the resource, or it may be one or more states on the route. Therefore, the acceptability factor is of great importance in energy security.

This is how the basic elements and sectors of energy security emerge in terms of the relations arising from energy resources in the global energy market. The inclusivity of the issue of energy security, which is of particular importance in the context of each element and sector, and its place on the agenda of the international system increase in direct proportion to the increase in resource use. Therefore, energy security should be considered as a separate security sector. It is necessary and important that energy security, which can be associated with all five security sectors in the security studies literature in different ways, emerges as the sixth one by dividing mitosis from these five structures, and that the

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security studies literature is expanded in this direction. This is only possible by securitizing the phenomenon of 'energy'.

A NEW SECURITY SECTOR: ENERGY SECURITY

Security studies have started to develop seriously on the theoretical level, especially since the middle of the 20th century. The handling of classical approaches in line with modern needs and the beginning of new contributions to the theory have greatly advanced the security studies that accelerated in this period, especially at the international level. The development of international security approaches in parallel with general security paradigms has contributed significantly to the literature. The developments that took place in the second half of the 20th century allowed the security concept to be restructured. The international system built on the basis of liberal values and each of the institutions within this system have come to the fore as important elements that support the emergence of security approaches based on a separate theme.

The cold war that continued in the second half of the 20th century and each of the developments that occurred as a result of it stand out as proof that a total security approach has lost its functionality at the international level. At this point, the contribution of expanded security studies is undeniable. Expanding security studies under the leadership of the Copenhagen School, the concept of 'human security', which began to gain importance in the first half of the 90s, and other security sectors subsequently introduced to the literature are concrete evidence of the expansion in security studies (Jolly and Ray, 2006).

The Berlin Wall, which collapsed in 1989, was an important turning point in international relations and therefore international security. This destruction has opened the door to new beginnings at the international level. Along with the Berlin wall, many facts have taken their place in the dusty pages of history. From the perspective of security studies, it is possible to define this as the rejection of classical approaches and the rise of modern approaches. In the 90s, when the approaches of realism and liberalism at both the state and institution levels were modernized with new approaches such as structuralism and constructivism, the paradigm shift created by security studies and the practical reflections of these studies in the context of international security took place in extremely harsh and definitive lines (Merand et al., 2011).

The developments in the context of security studies and the benefits of the innovations resulting from these developments in terms of literature are indisputable. The contribution of these innovations to international security practices should also be underlined. However, in the current situation, it is seen that some basic issues in the context of international security are still not examined, although they need to be examined on a separate level, both in the literature and in practice, or even if they are examined, it is understood that the

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necessary attention has not been paid yet. It is necessary and important to consider these issues as a stand-alone security sector in the context of international security and to examine them independently, both in terms of literature and in practical terms. In order to solve any issue before it becomes a security problem, it is critical to take a proactive approach to the relevant issue and find solutions to possible problems before they occur. In today's international system, one of the most important issues that is the subject of security but has not yet been discussed properly is 'Energy'.

Although energy is examined in the context of security in conjunction with other sectors, especially the economic security sector, it stands out as one of the fundamental issues that need to be researched and examined as a security sector on its own. Energy is one of the most basic needs in today's world. The consequences of any problem in meeting this need have been experienced in past developments, are being experienced today, and seem likely to be experienced in the future. It is important and necessary for the phenomenon of 'energy' to be included in the literature as a separate security sector in order to prevent these problems from occurring by taking a proactive approach or at least to overcome the problems that occur with the least damage.

It can be seen in the literature that the energy phenomenon is subject to security in different contexts. The fact that some aspects of economy, politics and military security are directly related to energy is one of the important factors leading to this situation. However, this situation prevents the energy phenomenon from being securitized alone and treated as a separate security sector, especially in the security studies literature. Although energy is an important part of the economy, an important tool of politics and an important resource of the military, the issue of energy security should also be underlined. When the historical process is examined chronologically, it is seen that energy has an increasing place in the international system with its security dimension day by day. Therefore, the literature should be designed in a way that can interpret the developments in practice. This design is only possible if the energy phenomenon is handled and interpreted as a separate security sector.

The initial step in this study, motivated by the aim to establish energy as a new security sector and introduce 'Energy Security' to the literature as the sixth security sector alongside the five defined by Copenhagen School scholars, will involve incorporating energy into the securitization spectrum. Although energy is materially significant, historical developments have also contributed to shaping the energy security sector. The securitization spectrum expresses the methodology when putting securitization theory into practice. Securitization provides a space for understanding how and why a particular public issue becomes a security issue. Any public issue can be placed across a broad spectrum, from nonpoliticized to politicized to securitized (Mis, 2014). Energy also stands out as a critical phenomenon that should be placed in a unique

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position in the context of security due to its historical adventure and material importance.

Securitization of energy represents a historical process. Namely, the energy resources used to meet basic needs until the age of enlightenment and the subsequent industrial revolution, although they were used in many different areas, have become more needed resources due to the invention of steam machines, the start of mass production processes in the industrial field and the sudden increase in energy needs. Beyond the increase in need, the inadequacy of existing resources was also clearly felt during this period. At this point, both the race to possess existing resources and efforts to diversify resources have accelerated. Imperial powers, which were in a relentless colonial race for coal deposits in various geographies of the world until Edwin Drake's discovery in Pennsylvania in 1859, now found a new resource to compete to possess with Drake's discovery of oil. The discovery of oil is an important turning point both industrially, economically and politically. This discovery is of great importance for the world energy market as it is a rapid response to the increasing energy need and creates a more effective resource alternative. The discovery of oil is of great importance not only as an alternative energy source, but also because it can be used as a raw material in industrial production. The discovery of oil, which is one of the most important turning points for the energy sector, stands out as a major turning point in the industry. Because oil is both a high potential energy source and the raw material of the industry, it has been and continues to be of great importance for the overall market.

When we look at the discovery of oil from the perspective of energy security, it will be seen that it falls in the middle of the chronology of securitization. While the concept of energy security really entered the agenda in the 18th century, oil was discovered and entered the market in the 19th century, and the race for oil continued harder and in relatively larger areas than the previous dominant resource, coal. From the perspective of securitization, it is possible to say that the energy phenomenon, which was previously outside the political sphere, gradually became politicized with the struggle for coal resources due to the increasing energy need with the industrial revolution, and became a phenomenon fully in the political sphere with the discovery of oil. Following this stage, all the developments in terms of energy phenomenon can be expressed as the process that takes place in the security field of energy and the securitization spectrum is completed. The fact that the struggle that increased with the discovery of oil was added to the ongoing struggles in different areas has caused many turmoils and conflicts in both economic and political areas around the world. It is possible to find traces of the race to possess energy resources in almost all of the world wars that started at the beginning of the 20th century and caused a depression of almost half a century, and in almost all of the large and small problems that occurred during these wars.

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The periods when energy resources were used indirectly as a policy tool in the global equation started with the industrial revolution, where the importance of these resources increased. In these periods, when realism had a dominant effect on global politics, resource assets came to the fore as one of the most important power centers in the hands of states. During these periods, the concept of energy security gradually developed in the background and finally, with the 1973-74 OPEC oil crisis, it fell like a bomb on the agenda. The oil crisis and the events that followed deeply shook the actors of the international system and a new security issue was underlined with thick lines. It is revealed that a new phenomenon has emerged in terms of security studies that started in the second half of the 1940s and went through its golden age just before the oil crisis, or that the energy phenomenon, which is not new but manifested as a stand-alone security incident for the first time, should now be accepted as a security issue. has come out. However, despite all these developments, the issue of energy security has not been discussed separately, neither within the discipline of security studies nor in studies on international security. In the post-World Wars period, when international security expanded in the context of threats and actors, even after the Cold War, energy security was not considered as a separate security issue, although many crises, large and small, were experienced. Although the Copenhagen School's expansionist contribution to the literature in the 1990s and the new security sectors it introduced provided an opportunity to evaluate and examine energy security within different sectors, energy security has now reached a scope and depth that cannot be fully addressed under the economic, military, or political security sectors.

ENERGY SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES

Central Asia is a region of immense geopolitical significance, primarily due to its vast reserves of natural resources, particularly oil, natural gas, and coal. Countries like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan possess considerable energy wealth, which plays a critical role in their economies. Despite these riches, these nations face numerous challenges in achieving energy security. Their dependence on foreign markets and transit routes, aging infrastructure, and the geopolitical competition for influence in the region significantly affect their energy security landscape. The state of energy security in Central Asian countries, focusing on key factors such as resource abundance, geopolitical dynamics, infrastructural deficiencies, domestic supply challenges, renewable energy potential, and regional cooperation.

Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are among the most resource-rich countries in the world. Kazakhstan, for instance, holds approximately 30 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, making it the largest oil producer in Central Asia. The country's Kashagan, Tengiz, and Karachaganak oil fields are some of the most productive in the world. Besides oil, Kazakhstan also possesses significant

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natural gas resources, much of which is exported to neighboring countries such as China and Russia. Turkmenistan, home to the world's fourth-largest natural gas reserves, is a key player in global energy markets. The Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline, which runs through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, has become one of the most crucial pipelines for Turkmenistan's gas exports, with China as its primary customer. Uzbekistan, while not as energy-rich as Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan, also holds considerable natural gas reserves, which play a pivotal role in its economy. The country exports natural gas to Russia, China, and other regional neighbors (Dorian, 2006).

Despite this wealth, the economies of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are heavily reliant on energy exports, which make them highly vulnerable to fluctuations in global energy prices. The 2014 collapse in oil prices and the more recent disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the risks of over-dependence on oil and gas exports. Moreover, the landlocked nature of Central Asian countries exacerbates their vulnerability, as they must rely on transit routes through neighboring states like Russia and China, which could disrupt energy flows due to geopolitical tensions. Geopolitical factors significantly influence the energy security of Central Asian countries. Historically, Russia has been the dominant player in the region's energy infrastructure, controlling key oil and gas pipelines that transport Central Asian resources to international markets. For instance, Russia manages the Central Asia-Center (CAC) gas pipeline system, which delivers Turkmen and Uzbek gas to Europe via Russia. This gives Moscow substantial leverage over the energy policies of Central Asian states (Grigoriev et al., 2011).

However, the growing presence of China has changed the regional power dynamics. Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has made significant investments in Central Asia's energy sector, particularly in building oil and gas pipelines. The Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline is a prime example of China's increasing influence, as it transports natural gas from Turkmenistan to China. Consequently, Turkmenistan now relies almost exclusively on China for its gas exports, diminishing its dependence on Russia but creating a new vulnerability vis-à-vis Beijing (Yenikeyyef, 2011).

While China's involvement has provided Central Asian countries with alternative markets, it has also raised concerns about excessive reliance on China. For example, Turkmenistan's overdependence on China for gas exports means that Beijing holds considerable influence over Turkmenistan's energy policies. This shift has made it necessary for Central Asian countries to carefully manage their relationships with both Russia and China, aiming to diversify their energy markets and assert greater control over their energy resources. The European Union (EU) also views Central Asia as a potential alternative to Russian energy supplies, especially natural gas. The EU's support for the Southern Gas Corridor, designed to transport gas from the Caspian region to Europe, reflects its interest in diversifying its energy sources. However,

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unresolved disputes, such as those related to the legal status of the Caspian Sea, have slowed the progress of such initiatives, limiting Central Asia's energy export options to Europe (Peyrouse et al., 2012).

Another critical issue impacting Central Asia's energy security is its aging and inefficient energy infrastructure. Much of the region's infrastructure dates back to the Soviet era, particularly in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and is in dire need of modernization. Outdated pipelines, refineries, and power plants suffer from inefficiencies and frequent breakdowns, leading to substantial energy losses and periodic shortages, particularly during peak demand. Turkmenistan, for example, has a highly centralized but outdated natural gas infrastructure, resulting in inefficiencies in the production, transmission, and distribution of gas. Uzbekistan also faces similar problems, struggling to meet rising domestic demand for electricity and gas due to an underdeveloped and poorly maintained energy grid. Frequent blackouts and gas shortages have been common in Uzbekistan, underscoring the need for significant infrastructure upgrades. Kazakhstan has made more progress in modernizing its energy infrastructure, particularly in the oil sector, where foreign investment has played a key role. Major international oil companies such as Chevron and ExxonMobil have invested in Kazakhstan's oil fields, helping to develop more advanced extraction and transportation technologies. However, challenges remain in the natural gas and electricity sectors, where infrastructure investment has lagged behind (Kumar and Chatnani, 2018). To improve energy security, Central Asian countries must invest in modernizing their energy infrastructure. By reducing inefficiencies, modernized infrastructure can ensure more reliable domestic energy supplies and maintain stable energy exports.

Central Asia's energy resources have historically been geared towards exports, often at the expense of meeting domestic energy needs. Both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have prioritized energy exports to generate revenue, which has led to underinvestment in domestic energy infrastructure. As a result, energy shortages are common, particularly in the winter when demand for heating spikes. Uzbekistan has recognized the need to balance export priorities with domestic energy security. The government has initiated reforms aimed at increasing energy efficiency, modernizing power plants, and expanding renewable energy production to meet rising domestic demand. Additionally, plans to expand gas storage capacity are underway, which will help the country manage energy supply during peak periods. Kazakhstan also faces challenges in meeting its domestic electricity demand, despite being a leading coal producer. The country's outdated power plants and transmission lines have contributed to electricity shortages. To address this, Kazakhstan has set ambitious renewable energy targets, aiming to diversify its energy mix by increasing the share of renewables such as wind and solar power (Zakhidov, 2008).

As the world transitions towards renewable energy and a decarbonized future, Central Asia has begun exploring its own renewable energy potential. The region

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is particularly well-suited for solar and wind energy development. Kazakhstan, for example, is actively pursuing renewable energy goals, with plans to generate 50% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2050. The country has attracted foreign investment for several large-scale renewable projects as part of its broader Green Economy Concept, launched in 2013. However, the energy transition faces several obstacles. Central Asian economies remain heavily reliant on fossil fuels, especially coal and natural gas, making it difficult to shift toward renewables without significant investment. Moreover, the regulatory frameworks in countries like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are not yet fully developed to support renewable energy initiatives. In addition, the global transition away from fossil fuels could impact Central Asia's energy-export-driven economies. As demand for coal, oil, and gas declines globally, Central Asian countries may struggle to find new markets for their resources. This poses long-term economic challenges, particularly for nations like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, whose economies are heavily dependent on energy exports (Rassoulinezhad et al., 2022).

Improving energy security in Central Asia also depends on regional cooperation. The region's energy networks are interconnected, with countries depending on each other for electricity and gas supplies. Despite this, political tensions and historical rivalries have hindered efforts to promote deeper regional energy integration. International organizations, such as the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program, have attempted to foster greater collaboration. CAREC has supported initiatives aimed at improving energy infrastructure, enhancing energy efficiency, and promoting cross-border electricity trade. However, significant challenges remain, and much progress is still needed to fully integrate the region's energy systems (Mekhdiev, 2018).

The energy security landscape in Central Asia is shaped by its resource abundance, geopolitical positioning, infrastructural deficiencies, and growing need for renewable energy. While countries like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are key players in global energy markets, their long-term energy security depends on modernizing infrastructure, reducing reliance on exports, and embracing renewable energy. Moreover, regional cooperation and strategic management of relationships with global powers such as Russia and China will be crucial for maintaining energy security in this evolving geopolitical landscape.

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CONCLUSION

Energy security has become an issue that requires more thought and effort for the international system, especially due to recent developments. It is obvious that the energy phenomenon, which has started to become a security issue since the early 1800s, has now reached the maturity level that can be a security issue on its own. Therefore, energy security issues should be examined and analyzed within a certain framework and within a certain systematic.

This situation is just like mitosis division of a biological cell. Mitosis, which enables reproduction in single-celled organisms and growth and development in multi-celled organisms, is one of the important examples that can explain the need for energy security to emerge as a new security sector. If the international system is considered as a complex multicellular biological structure, the security phenomenon can be evaluated as a fabric of this structure. There are many different cells similar to each other in this tissue. These cells are structures formed by mitosis of the original cell. Each cell forming the tissue in question creates the tissue by appearing as different cells, containing the same heredity as the original cell, but containing the same codes. If the security phenomenon is considered as the first cell of the tissue, the tissue also develops with the growth and development of the international system, or in other words, the biological structure in which the tissue is located.

As a result, the share of the security phenomenon within the international system is increasing day by day as the system develops both in theory and in practice. In other words, the security fabric is developing day by day. This development can be seen as a result of the growth and development of each cell that makes up the tissue. The expansionary contribution of expanded security studies to the security fabric of the international system represents the last mitotic division. However, developments since the last division have increased the density in the most recently emerged security-based cell, and the cytoplasm of the cell in question has reached a level where it cannot handle this density. For this reason, another mitotic division must take place in the field of security, first in theory and then in practice, and with this division, the way for the healthy growth of both the security fabric and the international system structure must be paved. This will only be possible by introducing ‘Energy Security’ as a new security sector and analyzing energy issues alone within a new framework.

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Research Article

AN ANALYSIS ON THE 2015 TÜRKİYE AND RUSSIA AIRCRAFT CRISIS: COMPELLENCE, DETERRENCE AND BALANCING

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ABSTRACT

It is possible to state that as a discipline, international security studies have developed within the framework of the realist paradigm and during the period of the Cold War. It is established that the field of security studies, which places a particular emphasis on the role of military power and states in international politics, is consequently designated as strategic studies. In this context, studies on coercion strategies have been implemented focusing on states' power. On the other hand, power distribution and balance of power in the system along with the ascend of neorealism have been underlined. In this study, the aircraft crisis taking approximately nine months between Turkish-Russian relationship has been examined utilizing both coercion (deterrence and compellence) and balancing strategies. The objective of the study is to clarify the agreement between Türkiye and Russia from the perspective of aforementioned strategies, perception of actors and cost-benefit calculations. In this qualitative case study, the process tracing method was used to reveal the cause-and-effect relationship between variables in a clear and definitive manner. In addition, document analysis technique was used to collect the data. It is concluded that given the estimated exorbitant costs to both parties at the conclusion of the crisis, the parties involved reached an agreement to conclude the crisis.

Keywords: 2015 Aircraft crisis, Compellence, Deterrence, Balancing, International relations, International security, Türkiye, Russia.

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INTRODUCTION

States are the main actors of the international relations according to the realist paradigm and military power relations have been prioritized. States try to survive in anarchic international environment and the key determent of their policy is power. Viewed from this perspective, power relations have been focalized due to the long severity of realism with the impact of international relations discipline evolving through the Cold War. Initial studies are mostly strategic analyses in the form of historical and military interpretations. In this regard, compelling strategies such as deterrence and compellence have been emphasized. Realist paradigm has gained a more scientific view together with neorealism, manifestation of Kenneth Waltz, and it has been claimed that power distribution is the variant that influences actors' actions. Within this scope, explanations upon power balance and balancing strategies have theoretically escalated. In this study, aircraft crisis dated 2015 between Türkiye and Russia was discussed from the perspective of deterrence, coercion and balancing concepts.

However, it is seen that there is a table necessitating a wide cost-benefit calculation within the capacity and capabilities of actors. Russia whose aircraft was downed had to be careful with its response not to cause dire results while having the risk of losing deterrence. Likewise, Türkiye is a state having the internal and external balancing capacity and capabilities. In other words, Türkiye is a significant member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as being an actor with the increasing military power and the one empowering it with its own capabilities. In this context, intensified coercion by Russia towards Türkiye could bring about unaffordable costs for Russia.

In other respects, Türkiye is subjected to the impact of security deficiency of Syria even in the country, reencountering with the most significant power in the region would explicitly restrict its strategies. Additionally, the circumstances brought with the ascending period out of control could cause unaffordable costs to face for Türkiye as well. Yet, after about nine-month lasting crisis, it is evident that the parties ended the disagreement as they could not afford the costs within diverse aspects. In this respect, this study presents cost-benefit calculations actors did or could encounter within the perspective of deterrence, compellence and balancing concepts and tries to clarify the resolution of the crisis between these two countries. In addition to these main concepts preferred for the analysis, process tracing method was used in this qualitative case study. The process tracing method, which is frequently used in qualitative case studies in international relations (Gokce, 2022: 51; Suleymanoglu-Kurum, 2021; Ucagac, 2022: 16), is useful for determining how or why cases change within a certain process and the independent variables affecting this process. Process tracing transforms a historical narrative into a scientific explanation expressed in theoretical forms (George and Bennett, 2005: 386; Ucagac, 2022: 17; Balci, 2024: 14). For this reason, the process tracing method was preferred in order to present the 2015 airplane crisis case in a more

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clear and understandable way. In order to collect the data, the document analysis technique used in qualitative studies was used. In this context, sources such as scientific publications, expert opinions, reports of research centers, news articles were scanned.

In the light of all these, the study consists of three parts. Conceptual frame of the study is presented in the first part. Russia's and Türkiye's perception about the crisis and strategies are presented in the second and third parts respectively.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In the discipline of international relations, according to neorealism, states are the unique actors of international policy. These actors are unitary and rational agents. The fact that states are unitary means that they are not affected by their inner system. Stated in other words, no matter how diversified interest groups (political parties, nongovernmental organizations, individuals, groups) are, states are forms not affected by them (Balci, 2014: 124-125), which means a state is a unit. The implication of this unity is related to states' enacting actions. As these actors are units, it cannot be imagined that diverse interest groups are efficient during the period of enacting. Rationality of states tells that they will make the optimum decision, aware of all the options (Ari, 2009: 213). The hypothesis of a rational state has two indications. First; states are aware of their interests and prioritize as such. Second indication means the accountability of the cost-benefit brought by a possible action by states. Namely, states are actors doing cost-benefit analysis (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2014: 75-76).

The fundamental motivation of rational enacting is the necessity to retain presence of states and self-help in anarchic international system. In other words, states enact in a surrounding where they can trust no one while retaining their perpetuity and security. Within the framework of these action(s), states maintain decision-making processes and evaluate their options. With a wider perspective, rationality implies they are aware of the outer surrounding and also contemplate as the best way they manage to survive. In this context, states try to measure how their own actions affect the other states' actions. In the emerged table, various strategy options are encountered. While choosing among these strategies, evaluation for the probability of success along with costs and benefits are implemented. Also, states focus not only on the present but also the long-term consequences at the time of selection (Mearsheimer, 2009: 244).

In the aspect of benefit and success, wrong choices of the states do not refute the argument of being rational. Likewise, they enact with only the available data on hand. In this respect, since states do not generally have sufficient knowledge, they occasionally make wrong decisions (Mearsheimer, 2009: 244). Hence, the information states have about a particular topic implies their perception. At this point, difference between understanding and perception occurs. Understanding is

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to know about a phenomenon or an incident with all the aspects whereas perception is the consequence of the act of thinking with missing information. As a matter of fact, security dilemma, often mentioned in realist paradigm, emerges as a result of perception, namely missing information (Balci, 2023: 69). Naturally, wrong cost-benefit calculation occurs and wrong decisions might be made.

During the rational decision-making process, it can be said to adopt a set of strategies afterwards evaluation of entire options and cost-benefit calculation made. After all, the relation between rationality and strategy concepts emerges at this point. Yet, strategy is mainly about actors' choice and requires precise comprehension of the danger and opportunities involved in the confronted incident, so this is one of the qualities of aforementioned rational actor. Besides, in the strategy as well as their choice, an actor is supposed to account for the possible steps of the opposite party against their choice. Consequently, the abstract of strategy is mutual commitment of selections (Freedman and Raghavan, 2008: 217). In light of these, actors' possible ways to select in terms of mutual actions (especially in case of a crisis or opponency) can be defined as strategic options. These options can be roughly classified as consensual strategy, controlling strategy and coercive strategy (Bingol, 2021: 14).

Consensual strategy implies adaptation of strategic options together with others without threat or use of force. Controlling force, on the other hand, involves use of force so as to limit any actor's strategic option. Finally, coercive strategy is the deliberate and intentional use of clear force to influence one another's strategic options (Freedman and Raghavan, 2008: 217). It means clear threat and obvious intention. For instance, it cannot be named as coercive strategy if Russia does not have an intention and a clear objective of threat towards Türkiye, even if Türkiye perceives a threat by Russia. Additionally, actual use can be a matter to make the other party feel the severity of the force even if threat of force is fundamental in coercive strategy, which can be divided into two subcategories as deterrence and compellence in terms of their objectives (Freedman and Raghavan, 2008: 217).

DETERRENCE AND COMPELLENCE

The early studies on deterrence, especially within the scope of nuclear weapons began to be implemented during the Cold War (Harrison et al., 2017: 20-21; Gundogdu, 2016: 2-7; Quackenbush, 2010: 741; Morgan, 2012: 8). Compellence means deterring the opponent from taking military action. This deterrence is accomplished threatening the opponent to encounter a possible cost-benefit risk more severe than the possible benefit in case of action (Snyder, 1961: 3, 40; Schelling, 1980: 195; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001: 360; Gundogdu, 2016: 7). Compellence is a strategy intended to get an enemy or an opponent to take an action or deter them from taking an action (Schelling, 1980: 195; Snyder, 1961:

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40; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001: 360; Freedman and Raghavan, 2008: 217-218). In coercion, the other party is asked to take an action (Schaub, 2004: 389).

After giving the definition of deterrence and compellence concepts, the difference between these concepts can be discussed. In deterrence strategy, deterrent actor states what the unintended action is with clear threats and checks whether this clearly defined unintended action will or will not be taken by the other actor. Therefore, the deterrent one takes action after the other actor has implemented the unintended action in question. In other words, deterrence implies a retaliation after the other actor has performed unintended action (Freedman and Raghavan, 2008: 218). This point clarifies the clearest difference between deterrence and compellence. In fact, punishment in the form of retaliation can last until the other actor (compelled) has taken the intended action in compellence strategy (Freedman and Raghavan, 2008: 218). That is, while the opponent should not initiate an (unintended) action in deterrence, conversely, the opponent should initiate an (intended) action in compellence. An intended action (in compellence) can be terminating a previous action or initiating an action as in the way the coercive requires (see Table 1; Schelling, 1980: 195; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001: 360; Snyder, 1961: 40).

In brief, deterrence requires the opponent avoid action whereas compellence asks them to take action (Schaub, 2004: 389). In this sense, move order is the basic diversity (Schelling, 1980: 195). Another matter is that the force of the deterrent is shown proactively in deterrence, on one hand, limited use of force is on point with compellence. On the other hand, there is no time limitation in deterrence; however, a date is set to stop the action in compellence (Freedman and Raghavan, 2008: 218; Bingol, 2021: 17). Thus, in deterrence, continuation is a matter with the presence of an unintended action. In compellence, conversely, a time limitation is needed since an action according to the coercive actor's strategic estimates is required. To exemplify, compellence can be as embargo placement or additional embargo or applying other enforcements under the circumstance that intended action has not been taken by the given time (Bingol, 2021: 17; Pape, 1992: 423).

Likewise, in deterrence, a responsive threat to apply these enforcements proactively can be presented. One another significant matter is relevant with the severity of compellence strategy usage. No matter how hard the punishment imposed upon the opponent is, some reservations can emerge for the intended action. First of all, punishment may not terminate when intended action initiated and, if applicable, current precedence may be lost. Meanwhile, another reservation may be the loss of compelled actor's reputation for obeying the compellent. Within these aspects, compellence is thought to be harder than deterrence, a set of guarantees need to be assured to reverse the threat and stop the punishment (Freedman and Raghavan, 2008: 218; Schaub, 2004).

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Table 1. *Difference between Deterrent and Coercive Strategies*

Strategy	Compellent's Expectancy
Deterrence	Nonfulfillment of the unintended action by the opponent-inertia-maintaining the status
Compellence	Fulfillment of the intended action by the opponent -going into action- changing the current or actual state

Source: The table has been prepared by the authors

Even though deterrence and compellence strategies can differ definitively, in case of a crisis or disagreement, transitivity of both or encountering both of them is a possible matter. For instance, Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 emerged with the incident where Union of Soviet Socialist Republics began deploying missiles on Cuba's land in the first months of 1962. The President of The United States of America, (USA) Kennedy, declared that they would intervene Cuba in case of a threat for the USA and other countries of the continent (Sander, 2010: 324-325). Along with this, demand of the USA was to stop the placement of missiles. As is seen, a demand for stopping an initiated action and a threat to terminate it are in question. In this context, the USA's strategy is compellence (Freedman and Raghavan, 2008: 218).

On the other hand, it was learned that some other parts to fire the missiles were needed from Soviet Russia, with the evidence of Cuban missile installation air views. The USA determined a new strategy with this concern. According to this strategy, the new parts of missiles the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) would send caused Cuba to be blockaded over the sea. Blockade was implemented on October, 22 and the USSR was threatened to have their ships sunk on the route to Cuba if they violated the blockade (Sander, 2010: 325). What the USA demanded from the USSR was not to attempt breaking the blockade. In a word, the action had not been launched yet. Thereby, the USA's strategy can be considered deterrence. Also, nuclear deterrence is in question here (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001: 360). Likewise, the USSR stated they would respond when the USA fulfilled the threats in question. Within this framework, during the period of the crisis, mutual compellence and deterrence can be remarked (Freedman and Raghavan, 2008: 218).

A new phase was observed between the opposite parties as the crisis turned out to be reasonably dangerous: negotiation and mutual guarantees. The leader of the USSR, Krushchev sent Kennedy a letter on October, 27. Krushchev wrote they would dismantle the missiles in Cuba provided that the USA dismantled Jupiter

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missiles planted in Türkiye. In addition, while territorial integrity and security of Türkiye was ensured, the same guarantee was asked from the USA for Cuba (Sander, 2010: 325-326). In the compellence strategy maintained mutually by the opponents against each other to obtain effective and successful compellence, credibility of the threat and guarantees are in question.

Lastly, from another perspective, these demands of Krushchev can be evaluated within the perspective of compellence strategy. Notably, a scenario can be imagined, in which the basic beginning of the crisis or the USSR strategy goes back the placement of Jupiter missiles in Türkiye. Indeed, the USA deployed the Jupiter missiles in Türkiye in order to enhance the deterrent force against the USSR. Within this frame, the USSR's deployment missiles in Cuba are an action of balancing, similarly, the USA's demand for dismantling the Jupiter missiles in Türkiye is an action compellence. It can be said that the USA, not bearing the cost of this compellence, came into agreement along with the guarantees the USSR assured.

On the other hand, common aspects of deterrence and compellence can be mentioned. As both of them are compellence strategies, they may be the same in terms of instruments. Thus, in both of them, military, economic and political threats can be utilized. The difference in here is the use of force in compellence. On the other hand, since a force not used yet in deterrence is a matter, credibility of deterrent threat has been emphasized in literature (Harrison et al., 2017: 20; Ari, 2009: 526). And yet, the emphasis is on balance in deterrence, and if the scales are heavy on one actor, solving the problem using force can become more attractive (Huth et al., 1993: 612). Along with this, these two matters (deterrence and capacity balance) are also valid for compellence. For as much as compelled party may regard the limited force as bearable, they may not believe other threats will be implemented or may see the war as a solution. Finally, as seen in 1962 Cuban Missiles Crisis, both of the strategies can involve commitments and guarantees for other party's factor of performing (or not performing) the expected action.

BALANCING

While arguing deterrence and compellence, credibility of threat was mentioned. The credibility of threat is bound to the capability of the other party to intimidate. This is related to the power of the actor. Additionally, states act with the purpose of balancing the threat or power, using these strategies. In this context, the power of the actor consists of either its own power or the capacity achieved with alliances. In this regard, balancing strategy occurs. In other words, deterrence and compellence can accompany balancing. Likewise, power distribution (system structure) determines the states' actions in anarchic international system. In this context, these strategies can intertwine within the process. However, during the Cold War, these concepts entered the international relations literature, the USA's

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deterrent strategy against the USSR, aimed to balance the USSR (or prevent the USSR unbalance) and maintain the status quo. In this frame, aforementioned 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis can be again an instance here. One another case is the emerging occasion with Congress of Vienna in 1815. After the defeat of Napoleon, the power balancing (European adjustment) formed with Congress of Vienna is also an instrument of deterrence strategy against an actor breaking the status quo (Ari, 2009: 525; Balci and Bayram, 2024: 1414). In other words, the balance of power system operates on the principle of deterrence (Morgan, 2012: 86).

Another instance can be given as deterrence; the alliance an actor is in and presenting to other (potential enemy) actors or the compelling opportunity presented by the power acquired by this alliance. Yet, the capabilities the alliance presented may not be as trustworthy as deterrent or coercive. For example, the credibility for the USA's support of deterrent decreased after 1962 Missile Crisis (Ari, 2009: 527). In this context, for a state to ensure its security or survive (in anarchic international surrounding) in terms of compellence strategies, the most rational option is to increase its own capacity of power (Ari, 2009: 527). In light of all these, some balancing can be included closely related to deterrence and compellence. When balancing is concerned, the first to recall is the 'Balance of Power Theory'. The theory of Kenneth Waltz (1979) in his book named "Theory of International Politics" brought significant changes to realism and international politics studies. Waltz searched the reason of similar actions of the states with diverse ideology, political structure or identities (Ari, 2018: 138). With a great abstraction and reduction, he excluded the unaccountable characteristics of the states and reformed realism more scientifically. From this point of view, he stated that states' similar actions rooted in the structure of anarchic international system. System's structure defines the power distribution between the units in the system. Within this context, balance of power is provided with relatively even power distribution between the units. In this frame, according to this theory continuing with a simple thesis; one or more states tries to balance a power arising as to break status quo (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2014: 52). Thus, relatively even power distribution is provided again and security of all units is ensured (Muscato, n.d.). To the point of Waltz, the balance of power in the system tends to be self-obtained (Ari, 2018: 138). However, the choice of the states may not always be balancing. Sometimes states may prefer bandwagoning the arising power (Walt, 1985: 8).

On the contrary, Stephen Walt introduced Balance of Threat Theory implying Balance of Power Theory does not correspond with the cases (Balci, 2023: 70). According to this theory, Waltz claimed the statemen's claims of power balance neglected other factors while they prefer possible threats and alliances. Although power, in states' estimates, (for instance in balancing and bandwagoning) is an important factor, it is not the only factor (Walt, 1985: 8). Within this context, states' demand for balancing is in question; still states balance not the power but the threat (Walt, 1985, 1987). Even if the opinions of both the thinkers differ in the issue of balancing, the significance of balancing in international politics was underlined.

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In the context of this study, internal balancing, external balancing, negative balancing, positive balancing and offshore balancing concepts will be included. Internal balancing is a type of balancing where the state enhances its capacity and initiates balance upon it. External balancing, conversely, is a type of balancing done involving other states' capacity (alliance formation) under the circumstances of its own insufficient capacity (Waltz, 1979: 168). Within this scope, it is obvious for the states to do so to increase their capacity in both of the balancing types (Balci, 2023: 70; He, 2012: 159).

Moreover, positive balancing includes internal and external balancing. Negative balancing is contrarily a type of balancing preferred to weaken the capacity of the opponent instead of increasing the state's own capacity. Negative balancing can be done using economic and political instruments as well as military ones (Ozluk, 2017: 234-235; Steff and Khoo, 2014: 227-228; He, 2012). Lastly, offshore balancing was introduced by offensive representors of realism like Walt, Mearsheimer, Posen and Layne in neorealism (Ozluk, 2017: 240). This balancing type emerged upon the ideas about international system and evolved into multipolarity, and great powers began to appear from other regions while also coasting heavily to keep military entity in any region for being hegemon (or maintaining hegemon) over the world (Ozluk, 2017: 240-244; Layne, 1997: 112-113). Within this scope, it was aimed to proceed balancing through the alliances instead of keeping military entity against the rising power in a region (Wang, 2013). In this point, while the great power focuses on being hegemon in its own region, it is going to hinder a hegemonic power to emerge in other regions (Balci, 2014: 139). In other words, the powers in the region will balance one another and if not required, physical war will be avoided (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2016; Rahman, 2018). Thus, while the domination in the region continues, great costs will not have to be endured.

THE PERCEPTION AND STRATEGIC APPROACH OF RUSSIA

With the support of Russia for Assad regime in civil war in Syria, the destiny of the regime and the war changed. That is, the military entity of Russia in Syria and the support for Syrian regime can be defined as controlling strategy. Yet, military actions of Russia in Syria limited the other actors' strategic selections. Russia became the actor whose pressure was felt the most in the region. In this context, it is possible to say that Russia has an apparent deterrence on account of its military force. Because of that, the fact that Türkiye fell the Russian bombardment aircraft on November 24, 2015 could be understood as it might cause the risk of decreasing Russia's deterrence as well as a perception of threat from the perspective of Russia. Cost-benefit calculation and developing a strategy were required. In fact, it was probable for a responsive retaliation to bring about unaffordable costs for Russia.

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In response to Türkiye's actions, several factors could be considered in Russia's strategic calculations from their perspective:

1) The fact that Türkiye shot down the Russian aircraft can decrease the deterrence of Russia. In face of the decreasing deterrent, other actors' actions against Russia can be in question. As such an image is desired to be avoided, an action against Türkiye is required.
2) If the action performed against Türkiye is a retaliation involving severe force, escalation between opponents can happen and this bears the risk of war.
3) Such a risk of war can lead to unaffordable costs for Russia. There are some reasons of this. First reason is strong military force; internal balancing capability of Türkiye is high. Secondly, as Türkiye is a member of NATO, external balancing capability of Türkiye is high. Also, due to Crimean annexation, the fact that NATO-Russia relations are tense could be a remarkable factor. One another reason is strengthening strategic opportunities of the USA opposing Russia in Syria. That is, from the perspective of the USA, Russia's presence in Syria (and Crimean annexation) could be interpreted as the will of Russia for being the rising hegemon in the region. Within this scope, balancing of this rising hegemon with the least cost consists a significant place in the USA strategy. In this context, retaliation, high level of threat and compellence to be applied against Türkiye can bring Türkiye closer to the USA. This can as well significantly restrict strategic opportunities of Russia by reinforcing offshore strategy of the USA.

Within the light of all these, Russia eventually decided to end the disagreement so that the threat imposed at this point would not proceed to bear unaffordable costs for itself. In the process, Russia's expectation of apology and other actions were in the direction that Türkiye will never perform such an action and Russian deterrence will be proved against other actors. As mentioned above, within the framework of three points and deterrence, compellence and balancing concepts, the work of the process can be defined. After the aircraft crash incident, Russia escalated the crisis in a controllable level. For instance, the decisions and discourses made within the first 24 hours by Russia is a combination of deterrence, compellence and balancing strategies. These decisions are (BBC News Türkçe, 2015a):

1) Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov canceled the visit and stated that Türkiye is not a secure country and hence, recommended Russian citizens not to visit Türkiye. After that, Russian tourist agents began to cancel Türkiye travels.
2) S-300 Air defence missiles were sent to weaponize in the northwest of Syria where the aircraft crashed. Also, it was said that additional S-300s would be sent to Russian air force base in Syria by Russian Ministry of Defense.
3) Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu expressed that fighter aircrafts would accompany the bombardment aircrafts (with air-to-air gunnery range)

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to operate in Turkish border after the bombardment aircraft crashed and operations in Turkish border would continue.

4) The bill of law counting on punishment of the ones denying the so-called Armenian genocide was brought to Russian assembly. One of the opponent politics, Aleksey Navalny, supported the bill of law and stated that this bill would hurt Türkiye.
5) A decision regarding the ban on buying poultry meat from Türkiye valid after December 1 was taken. It was stated that the decision was taken not because of political reasons but because Türkiye had low food safety standards.

In the press conference held on November 25, Russia Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mariya Zakharova expressed that action of Türkiye would influence all the areas in relations. Also, Zakharova stated that Russian actions were about fight against terrorism and hence, the aircraft crash incident was related to Russian fight against terrorism. In this context, it was declared that Russia would continue fighting terrorism and search for supporters of terrorism (Yeni Asya, 2015). Here, in an undertone, there is an implication that Türkiye is a country disrupting the fight against terrorism in the region. Thus, this implication became clearer in the discourse of Lavrov on November 25. Similar with Zakharova (Ibid), Lavrov expressed the action of Turkish side to be purposeful, said that terrorists made preparations of Syrian actions in Türkiye and this must be known by all the opponents. In addition, Lavrov declared that they would be able to apply to UN for an investigation on how the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) got the support and how petrol trade was done (Haberrus, 2015; Agha, 2021: 440). Again, in the press conference held on November 25, he claimed that Türkiye supported radical Islamic organizations in Syria and protected ISIS due to the petrol trade Türkiye was conducting with this organisation (BBC News Türkçe, 2015b).

On November, 26 it was published that 39 businesspeople would be deported and trailer trucks carrying goods from Türkiye were stopped at the Russian border. On November 27, Russian Prime Minister Yuri Ushakov expressed that Erdogan demanded to make a phone call to Putin but Putin would not accept it until Türkiye had apologized. On November 28, Putin imposed sanctions, summarized as stopping export of some foodstuff, restricting Türkiye travels, ending visa liberalization, bringing restrictions to Turkish companies and imposing a firm hand on Turkish trucks and ships in Black Sea (BBC News Türkçe, 2015b; Uras, 2015). Even though Erdogan said on November 28 that Paris Climate Conference was an opportunity to change the way of mutual relations, Dmitri Peskov expressed that Putin would not join such a meeting on November 30. After the leader summit of the conference on November 30, Putin declared that the reason for Türkiye to crash the Russian aircraft was to ensure the petrol trade made with ISIS and other terrorist organizations (BBC News Türkçe, 2015b). On December 1, the Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev approved the list of stuff banned to be imported from Türkiye. The sanction to be in effect from January, 1 2016 includes fruit and vegetables such as tomato, orange, apple, onion (Anadolu

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Ajansı, 2016; BBC News Türkçe, 2015b). Additionally, Russian Tour Operations Association explained that all Russian Travel Agencies canceled their tours directed to Türkiye (BBC News Türkçe, 2015b; Sputnik Türkiye, 2015a).

On December 2, Russian Vice-Minister of Defence Anatoly Antonov claimed that Türkiye was the greatest buyer of the petrol stolen from Syria and Iraq (Euronews, 2015b; BBC News Türkçe, 2015b; Tsvetkova and Kelly, 2015). On the other hand, an expectancy about resetting the relationship between Türkiye and Russia emerged. That is because Lavrov's visitation to Southern Cyprus Turkish Republic on December 2 and stating after the meeting with SCTR Foreign Minister Yannis Kasulidis that he would not refuse the request of his Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu and would be able to meet with him at OSCE Summit to be held in Belgrade on December 2, 2015 (Aljazeera Türk, 2015; Sputnik Türkiye, 2015b; Hürriyet Daily News, 2015). Lavrov making a statement after the meeting expressed that he did not hear something new from his Turkish counterpart and Türkiye was still maintaining its stance. Also, he stated what was expected from Türkiye was quite clear (Milliyet, 2015). A strong implication of an expected apology.

On December 3 during his Annual Address to the Nation, Putin announced that sanctions towards Türkiye would not only remain with trade and Türkiye would be regretful with the action in question. In addition, Putin reclaimed his accusations towards Türkiye on petrol trade and relationships with terrorist organization. However, lack of military threat was getting attention (BBC News Türkçe, 2015c; Euronews, 2015a; Guardian, 2015). Finally, the most important side of the strategy applied to Türkiye was to close Syrian air base of Russia for Türkiye. Türkiye had to cut its support on the international coalition made up for fighting terrorism with the leadership of the USA. In this context, closing the air base of Russia remained the thesis, regarding Türkiye as being the secure region isolated from ISIS, out of possibility (Yetkin, 2015; Ersen, 2017: 92; Bali, 2022: 99). Also, the fact that Türkiye would not be able to give air support for the operations to be carried out on land significantly restricted Syria strategy of Türkiye.

In this respect, another significant concern for Türkiye has been terrorism. The presence of terrorist organizations at the border of Türkiye has been regarded as a major problem in terms of both regional and internal security of Türkiye. For instance, due to the terrorist attack took place in Suruç, close to Syria border on July 2015 by ISIS, more than 30 people lost their lives. Shortly after this attack, PKK launched further attacks within the borders of Türkiye. Along with this, Democratic Union Party/People's Defence Units (PYD/YPG), located in Syria and extensions of PKK also increased the scale of the threat. In fact, Türkiye described these organizations' goal of extending to the east of Euphrates as red line. Russia maintained relationships with these organizations before the aircraft crash as well closer relations from November 24, 2015 and onwards. Accordingly, Russia

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reinforced its formal visits with PYD/YPG and PYD/YPG was allowed to set up an Office in Moscow in February 2016 (Ersen, 2017: 89-90).

The strategy of Russia against Türkiye can be said to be a coercive process having economic, military and political aspects. Although the disagreement between the opponents continued until the letter Erdogan sent to Putin on June 27, 2016, what has been told up to this point is enough for the general pattern of the crisis. Yet, the attitude of Russia towards Türkiye lasted within the frame of what has been stated. However, it should be noted that Russia began to soften its attitude before the letter sent by Türkiye. For example, in the formal visit of Greece in the end of May 2016, Putin made significant explanations about Türkiye. Putin expressed that they wanted to heal the relations with Türkiye and demanded only apology and compensation of damage. Also, Putin, emphasizing the steps taken for reasonable improvement of Turkish-Russian relations before the crisis for ages, pointed that they would never wish to fight against Türkiye and Turkish-Russian national fellowship. Putin stated that they had not damaged the positive relations and emphasized that Türkiye needed to take action, noting that there were various channels for communication (Aljazeera Türk, 2016a). Perhaps these words could be regarded as a signal to convey the letter sent in 2016 by Turkish decision-makers on July 27, 2016. Additionally, it should also be noted that what Putin described there was negative impacts of the sanctions imposed in April 2016 against Türkiye on Russia and cost of living raised (Sabah, 2016). Considering the tension already experienced with NATO and the USA's sanction on Russia as well, not compelling Türkiye too much can be seen as a rational method.

Lastly, politics of Russia against Türkiye can be evaluated in terms of deterrence, compellence and balancing strategies. This evaluation will help comprehending how Russia decided to end the disagreement. Initially, the most important problem for Russia was the damage on its image and the risk of losing its deterrence. In this context, sending S-300s to the region and additional missiles to the present bases, declaration of air-to-air escorts to bombardment aircrafts and ongoing operations at the border of Türkiye, and closure of Syria air base for Türkiye can be evaluated as deterrent strategy of Russia towards Türkiye privately and generally other actors in the region. In addition, these actions can be said to be positive balancing in order to increase military fortification. At the same time, bill of law on so called Armenian genocide can be regarded as a deterrent act.

Apart from the deterrence strategy, it can be said that Russia is trying to make a negative balancing. In fact, high internal balancing ability of Türkiye due to its own military capacity and its high external balancing ability due to being a NATO member could have caused Russia to face unaffordable costs to bear. In addition, although they have different point of views, compelling Türkiye too much or leaving it in a high-level security dilemma could force Türkiye to establish closer ties with the US. In this context, the USA's offshore balancing capability could have increased and Russia's rise in the region could have been prevented.

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Emphasizing that what is expected from Türkiye is an apology and there is no desire to fight Türkiye can be evaluated within this framework. However, Russia also tried to limit Türkiye's external balancing capabilities (NATO factor). For instance, claims that Türkiye cooperates with terrorist organizations such as ISIS, that it disrupts the fight against terrorism in the region, and that it is not a safe country can be considered as negative balancing behaviors aimed at preventing Türkiye from receiving international support.

On the other hand, it is seen that Russia used economic tools in its strategy of coercion. It is also seen that the aforementioned economic sanctions were the decisions taken through legal processes within the framework of the principle of irreversibility in coercion. Indeed, this is to raise the credibility of the coercion. After the use of limited (economic) force, statements that punishment will not be limited to economic sanctions are also included in the strategy of coercion. In other words, giving the perception that the costs would increase for Türkiye, an attempt was made to ensure that the compelled party (Türkiye) would take the action desired by the coercive party (Russia). Indeed, the coercion carried out through these economic sanctions had significant impacts. The trade volume between Türkiye and Russia decreased to approximately 25 billion dollars by the end of 2015 due to the economic problems experienced by Russia, including the factors brought about by the annexation of Crimea. The trade volume in 2014 was 31 billion. However, the trade volume between the two countries decreased to 8 billion dollars in the first six months of 2016 with the sanctions imposed after the aircraft crisis (Ersen, 2017: 92; Demir, 2015: 1). Consequently, it is thought that the sanctions would cause a loss of 9-10 billion dollars in the Turkish economy (NTV, 2016).

THE PERCEPTION AND STRATEGIC APPROACH OF TÜRKİYE

It is possible to say that Russia was the coercive party during the crisis emerged after the Russian aircraft crash. Türkiye was careful not to face the risk of escalating the crisis in the face of Russia's coercive strategy and thought that communication could be established and the problem could be resolved. While it is obvious that Russia's current support for the Syrian regime limits Türkiye's strategic opportunities, it is possible to think that further tensions will not be in Türkiye's favor. In this context, it can be said that Türkiye tried to gain time while giving controlled responses to Russia's acts (Bali, 2022: 121; Agha, 2021: 443; Ozel, 2016). Thus, it is understood that Turkish decision-makers expected the effect of compellence to decrease and tried to find a solution. There are some factors included in the calculations of Türkiye's strategy in response to Russia's strategy of coercion. In other words, the crisis could have been viewed from Türkiye's perspective as follows:

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1) Russia's coercive strategy of economic sanctions and military activities and the balancing strategies accompanying them could significantly hinder Türkiye's fight against terrorist organizations threatening its domestic and regional security interests.
2) As a result of an escalation, a possible war with Russia could bring about costs that Türkiye cannot bear.
3) Doubts about how reliable the deterrence provided by the USA and NATO may negatively affect external balancing.
4) Türkiye's isolation in the region may deepen with Russia's anti-Türkiye actions.

5) Apologizing to Russia could cause Türkiye to lose its deterrent power in protecting its borders. Furthermore, complying with the demands of the coercive (Russia) (apologizing) could create the perception that the compelled actor (Türkiye) will lose credibility or be humiliated.

Within this context, it can be said that Türkiye's strategy was not to apologize, not to respond harshly to Russia but to seek ways of balancing, and to refute Russia's accusations.

In this regard, it was stated that first of all, the nationality of the aircraft was unknown, the airspace violation continued despite the warning and therefore the aircraft was shot down. In other words, it was emphasized that Russia was not deliberately targeted and that Türkiye's action was a limited act of self-defense (Guner, 2017: 52; BBC News Türkçe, 2015b). Actually, on November 26, the President of the Republic of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, stated that they would not apologize to anyone for protecting their borders, but that if they had known it was a Russian aircraft, they could have acted differently and that they were open to dialogue. Moreover, Erdogan particularly rejected Russia's accusations about a connection between ISIS and Türkiye and stated that Russia had to prove these claims. Erdogan even made a sharp statement saying if this relationship is proven, he will resign, but if they cannot, Putin should resign (BBC News Türkçe, 2015b; Euronews, 2015b; Business Times, 2015).

Similarly, at the AK Party Group Meeting on November 25, the Prime Minister of the time, Ahmet Davutoğlu, underlined in his statements that the aircraft was shot down as a result of a border violation, that the nationality of the aircraft was unknown, and that Russia had already been warned many times about its air violations before this incident. The Prime Minister also emphasized that Russia was a friend of Türkiye, that they did not want to experience tension and that they gave great importance to communication. Furthermore, it was stated in the speech that the developments were announced to the UN Secretary General and the members of the Security Council in a letter and that the permanent members of the Security Council were informed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Habertürk, 2015). Davutoglu also stated in his article in the Times that Türkiye shot down an unknown aircraft based on its sovereign rights and in accordance with

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international law, and that no state was targeted. Finally, Davutoglu wrote that Russia should focus on a mutual fight against ISIS and that they would work to reduce tensions (BBC News Türkçe, 2015d).

Erdogan referred to a Russian citizen in the oil trade with ISIS in Russia's statements about its relationship with ISIS. On the other hand, after the OSCE Summit, Çavuşoğlu stated that neither side wanted tension, that they expected Russia to review its decisions and leave its baseless allegations, and that Türkiye did not respond with sanctions against Russia and waited patiently (Milliyet, 2015). In the ongoing process, in response to Russia's harsh speech, sanctions and demand for an apology, statements parallel to the above statements were made by both the President and the Prime Minister. Türkiye also drew attention to the need to reduce tensions and find a solution through healthy communication instead of escalating the crisis with baseless accusations (BBC News Türkçe, 2015b). On the other hand, as a result of Russia closing Syrian air base to Türkiye and increasing threats along the border, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) were put on the border line on the highest level of alert (CNN Türk; Bali, 2022: 99). After the Syrian Civil War, Türkiye faced a wave of migration and the threat to Türkiye's domestic and regional security from terrorist organizations in Syria. Indeed, the humanitarian crisis occurring after the Civil War deeply affected Türkiye, sharing the longest border with Syria (Sehitoglu, 2024: 104).

The Trench Operations launched against the PKK in the Southeast in August 2015, the terrorist attack by ISIS in Suruç and the wave of migrants brought the establishment of a safe zone in northern Syria to the agenda. However, Russia's coercive actions emerged as an obstacle to this strategy. Also, the fact that Russia increased relations with the PYD/YPG was another factor increasing the scale of the threat (Ersen, 2017: 89-90). Furthermore, economic sanctions, Türkiye's isolation in the region and having different security priorities with the USA made Türkiye more willing to find a solution. In other words, Türkiye's security priorities changed within the framework of the threats it perceives (Ozan, 2017). In this context, similar to Putin's statements towards the end of May 2016 that he was more moderate, a development in May initiated a process in which security perceptions on the Turkish front differed and more significant steps were taken for a solution. After Davutoglu left his position as Prime Minister in early May 2016, Binali Yildirim became Prime Minister on May 22. Yildirim expressed the new government's foreign and security perspective as "increasing friends, decreasing enemies" (Ozan, 2017: 43). These statements showed themselves in the solution of the crisis with Russia, affecting Türkiye's security concerns the most, in other words, the biggest obstacle to solving the security problems originating from Syria.

As stated above, after the formation of the Yildirim government, Putin stated that they wanted to improve relations with Türkiye in Greece, that they never considered war which they expected a step from Türkiye and that there were many

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ways to communicate. It was also stated above that Russia was also negatively affected by its sanctions. This picture provided Türkiye with the motivation to take steps towards a solution with Russia and also provided the opportunity to take the steps taken in the direction it wanted. Attempts at reconciliation between the parties began in April (2016). Many actors, including Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, were involved in the process. Following intense diplomatic traffic, on June 24, 2016, İbrahim Kalın and former state minister Cavit Çağlar delivered the letter to Putin (via Ushakov) in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meetings. It is stated that the letter included the expression "sorry" instead of an apology. Before Kalın left, Ushakov called Kalın and said that Putin had welcomed the letter and that they would make a statement on June 27. After a draft was sent to Türkiye on June 27, Putin gathered his ministers and announced that normalization had begun on June 29 in front of the cameras (Yetkin, 2016). On June 30, Putin signed a decree canceling sanctions against Türkiye and the sanctions were gradually lifted (Aljazeera Türk, 2016b; Bali, 2022: 115; Abay, 2016).

As a result, there has been a crisis between Türkiye and Russia for about nine months. While Türkiye resisted the costs arising from Russia's coercive strategy, it also tried to falsify its accusations and show its legitimacy. Although there were disagreements with NATO and the USA, Türkiye was emphasized as a NATO member and its external balancing ability against Russia was shown. In addition, it is possible to say that this behavior was Türkiye's deterrence strategy in terms of showing its capacity against possible uses of force against it. Apart from these, actions and statements that would escalate the crisis were avoided by not implementing counter-sanctions and by searching for communication channels. Thus, it was not faced with costs that were hard to bear. On the other hand, the reason why Türkiye wanted to end the crisis with Russia was not only the possible and current costs of what happened with Russia. For example, although Türkiye referred to the NATO alliance, it had different priorities in Syria with the USA, the alliance's biggest actor. During the Cold War, it was relatively easier to direct relations between Türkiye and the USA as the "common threat" was the same. Yet, *"With the new security environment emerging with the collapse of the USSR in the international system after the Cold War, new threats have also emerged"* (Sehitoglu, 2023: 234). In other words, both the new threats emerging after the Cold War (and the disappearance of the old threat) and the Syrian Civil War led Türkiye to focus on imminent threats and the USA to focus on an offshore balancing strategy.

These two different paths essentially posed a deep threat to Türkiye's security, as the USA supported and worked with the PYD/YPG, an extension of the PKK. In addition, Russia's closure of Syria's air base to Türkiye has increased the scale of the threat and insecurity. Upon these two situations considered together, Türkiye's following the USA (bandwagoning) could also bring heavy costs to Türkiye. On the other hand, Türkiye improving relations with Russia and pursuing an openly

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anti-US strategy could also bring great costs. Türkiye preferred improving its relations with Russia and pursuing a balanced relationship with the USA as much as possible. Although it is outside the scope of this study, Türkiye-Russia relations developing after the crisis created crises in US-Türkiye relations. However, Türkiye has seen these crises as bearable in its priority list and has built its strategy on such a balance (Balci, 2018).

CONCLUSION

Considering that the behavior of states is determined by the distribution of power among the actors and their perception of threats, as a result of any change in these two or when they do not want changes to occur; states determine some strategies in order to ensure their security or maximize their interests in the new situation. These strategies include deterrence, compellence and balancing, the concepts discussed in this study. These strategies can be used together in any crisis process. These strategies, preferred by states assumed to be rational, emerge as a result of how states perceive the situation and evaluate all options within the framework of this perception and the information at hand. In other words, in the rational decision-making process where all options are evaluated, a cost-benefit calculation is made and a decision is reached on which of the mentioned strategies to use. The rational actor's ability to assess the dangers and opportunities that the crisis or incident poses or may pose is a must for moving to the strategy stage. Moreover, in this process, the actor takes into account not only their own preferences but also the likely preferences of the other party. This point expresses the relationship between the phenomena of rationality and strategy.

Deterrence, for which early work was done during the Cold War, refers to discouraging the opponent from taking an action. Deterrence is realized when the opposing actor perceives that they cannot bear the cost if the threat is realized. In other words, what is essential in deterrence is to prevent the other party from taking an action. Coercion, on the other hand, refers to the opponent terminating the action it has initiated or initiating an action that the coercer wants. In other words, in coercion, it is essential to make the opponent initiate an action. In both of these strategies, the credibility of the threat is important, and that credibility is directly proportional to the power of the actor.

When it comes to power and threat, the balancing strategy stands out. In other words, actors may want to balance power or threat and thus have autonomy and security in their behavior. The balancing strategies that states may prefer can be roughly listed as internal balancing, external balancing, negative balancing, positive balancing and offshore balancing. Rational states decide which of these they prefer based on cost-benefit calculations.

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From the perspective of rationality and the aforementioned strategies, Türkiye and Russia's strategies against each other in the 2015 airplane crisis, which was intertwined with complex security problems, seem to make sense.

The aim of the strategies emerging at the end of the comprehensive cost-benefit analysis process is to maximize their interests as much as possible and to avoid too high costs to afford. The crisis between Türkiye and Russia lasting approximately nine months after the incident of the aircraft was a clear case of such strategies. Russia implemented coercive strategies against Türkiye through military, economic and political means. In addition, in order to increase the scale of coercion and to prevent Türkiye from doing what was not wanted and to force to do what was wanted; efforts were made to eliminate Türkiye's balancing capabilities against Russia.

Indeed, the coercive strategies directed at Türkiye brought significant costs. However, what was wanted from Türkiye was not exactly achieved. In other words, Türkiye bore the costs and responded to Russia's coercive policies targeting its balancing capabilities with its own strategies. The resistance Türkiye showed also imposed costs on Russia, and a perception arose that additional costs could be imposed if it went further. However, Türkiye's security perspective also changed. Türkiye did not want to eliminate imminent threats and position Russia as the enemy that could be the most important obstacle for the country in this context. For this reason, Türkiye continued to call for an end to the crisis while avoiding behaviors that would escalate the crisis. As a result, it was observed that both of the actors preferred to meet on relative benefit(s) rather than bearing the costs.

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Research Article

AN OVERVIEW OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND CO2 EMISSIONS IN IRAN'S RESIDENTIAL SECTOR: ENERGY TRANSITION AND SUBSIDY POLICIES

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ABSTRACT

The transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources has become a critical global issue, particularly in response to climate change. This study aims to analyse the trends in energy consumption and CO2 emissions within Iran's household sector. The findings reveal a significant increase in energy consumption in Iran between 2001 and 2019. Despite the household sector's heavy reliance on fossil fuels, a shift in fuel consumption patterns can be observed, with a transition from oil to natural gas starting in 2008. Electricity generation in Iran is also predominantly fossil fuel-based, with natural gas playing a major role. This underscores the urgent need to reinforce renewable energy sources to mitigate CO2 emissions from the household sector. Another key factor influencing energy consumption in Iran is the country's extensive energy subsidies. The disparity in fuel prices compared to neighbouring countries has also led to fuel smuggling. However, the results show that the two-phase subsidy reform plan implemented in 2010 and 2013 did not lead to a reduction in energy consumption. Therefore, further reforms are needed to improve energy equity and reduce CO2 emissions in the household sector.

Keywords: Energy consumption, Subsidy, Household sector, Energy transition, Iran.

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INTRODUCTION

Fossil fuels, which are finite and unevenly distributed across regions, currently dominate the global energy system and are a major contributor to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, the growing global energy demand, concerns about energy security, the climate crisis, and the increasingly favorable economics of renewable energy (RE) have shifted attention towards RE as a sustainable alternative. Renewable energy sources offer a viable solution to reducing carbon emissions and ensuring a more balanced and secure energy future (Ghorbani et al., 2020). The rising CO_2 emissions, coupled with population growth and increasing GDP, are expected to elevate the concentration of pollutants in the household sector across Iran's provinces (Ata et al., 2022). The latter poses a serious threat to the essentials of life by reducing access to water, food, healthcare, and land, while also triggering environmental disruptions and abrupt climate changes. Therefore, it is crucial to lower CO_2 emissions by cutting down on fossil fuel use (Mirzaei and Bekri, 2017).

The main objectives of energy subsidies are to promote industrial growth and facilitate rural development (Gangopadhyay et al., 2005; Petkova and Stanek, 2013). The critical role that primary fuels and electricity play in driving both economic and social development gives many governments strong justification for subsidizing energy prices and closely regulating the domestic energy sector. Keeping energy prices low, especially for electricity and petroleum products, enables lower-income groups to access modern energy sources more affordably (Fattouh and El-Katiri, 2013).

According to (IEA, 2021), Iran ranks among the largest providers of energy subsidies worldwide. Over the past decade, these subsidies have fluctuated between $30 billion and $137 billion. The IEA's estimate uses a price-gap method, meaning this significant variation is primarily due to changes in international fossil fuel prices. In 2020, subsidies for electricity, natural gas, and oil products amounted to $12.5 billion, $12.2 billion, and $5.0 billion, respectively, with the power sector emerging as the largest recipient of these subsidies. Despite this, Iran possesses substantial renewable energy potential, particularly in solar and wind energy (Ghorbani et al., 2020).

For precise energy system modeling, energy modelers, planners, and decision-makers must take into account a range of factors, including technical, social, and economic considerations. The challenge of making sustainable and green energy management decisions is often heightened by the uncertainties in energy system components, which vary across different countries due to their diverse energy structures (Giannakidis et al., 2015; Mohammadi et al., 2018). Taking into account the features of energy systems in oil-rich nations such as Iran, it is crucial to develop an energy model that promotes sustainability. This model would illustrate a pathway for transitioning from an unsustainable energy system to one that is more sustainable (Alamdari et al., 2012).

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Although Iran has significant potential in both fossil and renewable energy sources, it is encountering several issues in its energy sector, particularly in power generation. A major challenge on this point is its heavy reliance on fossil fuels, with renewable resources contributing only about 5% to electricity generation (TAVANIR, 2015).

Iran it ranks among the countries with the highest CO_2 emissions globally, largely due to fossil fuel consumption, low energy prices, and the prevalence of inefficient vehicles and appliances. The residential sector is one of the largest consumers of energy in Iran. Additionally, the diverse climate and social conditions across different regions lead to significant variations in energy consumption throughout the country. This research aims to examine the trends in energy consumption and CO_2 emissions in Iran, as well as to understand the impact of subsidy reform and energy transition efforts on reducing CO_2 emissions in the residential sector.

Many researches have studied the effect of subsidy and energy transition in the world and Iran (Noorollahi et al., 2021). In oil-rich countries like Iran, enhancing energy efficiency, particularly in electricity generation, plays a crucial role in achieving CO_2 reduction targets. These efforts not only improve the national energy system's economic performance but also benefit the global community by creating a more efficient energy system. Furthermore, by reducing the total primary energy supply in such countries, the international energy market can experience an increase in supply, which in turn helps alleviate pressure on global oil and gas prices.

The study simulated predicts that total energy consumption will reach 2,150 units by 2025, up from 1,910 in 2010, reflecting a 4.3% annual growth rate. CO_2 emissions are expected to rise to 985 million tons by 2025, showing a yearly increase of about 5%. Policy scenarios focused on reducing energy intensity indicate that CO_2 emissions could drop by 12.14% with a 5% energy intensity reduction and by 17.8% with a 10% reduction by 2025, compared to 2010 levels. These findings provide valuable insights into Iran's future energy consumption and CO_2 emission trends (Mirzaei and Bekri, 2017).

Another study empirical findings from the static method indicate that household CO_2 emissions increase in relation to Heating Degree Days (HDD), Cooling Degree Days (CDD), precipitation levels, oil and gas consumption, household income, household size, and building stock. On the other hand, factors such as educational attainment, a dummy variable representing the removal of energy subsidies, and oil prices have the most significant negative impact on household CO_2 emissions (Ata et al., 2023).

The study compares cost-optimal transition pathways under subsidy removal scenarios with actual energy system developments over the study period. It finds that subsidy reform could have reduced total cumulative electricity consumption

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by 22% and increased the renewable energy share in power generation from 5% to 15%. Additionally, the reform combined with a cost-optimal generation strategy would have saved $69 billion and prevented 944 million tons of CO_2 emissions. The analysis highlights that a five-year delay in subsidy removal results in an additional 100 million tons of CO_2 emissions. The paper concludes with key lessons for future energy modeling (Aryanpur et al., 2022).

In another study findings show that energy subsidy reforms can lower overall electricity demand by 16% and reduce cumulative CO_2 emissions by 31%. Scenario analysis indicates that early and gradual subsidy removal makes renewable energy technologies and energy efficiency plans more cost-competitive. In contrast, a delayed and rapid removal poses a risk of locking in less efficient energy systems. The results suggest that prioritizing early reform is more important than the speed of removal. The paper also explores the broader policy implications of these findings beyond Iran (Aryanpur et al., 2022).

The empirical analysis shows that, in the long run, economic growth and inflation hinder Iran's energy transition, while higher CO_2 emissions and currency appreciation accelerate it. In the short run, exchange rate improvements positively affect energy transition, but other factors have negative effects. The study recommends reducing budget dependence on oil revenues and implementing short-term decarbonization policies (Esfahani and Rasoulinezhad, 2020).

This article conducts various trend analyses on electricity production and consumption, focusing on key global players in climate change and policy. China has become a leading trend-setter in climate action, showing upward trends in its energy economy, while the U.S. and EU remain crucial actors. The analyses reveal shifts in electricity generation, with renewables playing an increasing role and oil-based production declining. Furthermore, nuclear energy's prominence appears to have passed its peak, as turning points are evident in its trends (Kaivo-Oja et al., 2016).

All research highlights the importance of subsidy reform in Iran's energy sector and the shift to renewable energy to enhance efficiency and reduce CO_2 emissions. Building on the existing literature, this study aims to examine the trends in energy consumption and CO_2 emissions, while assessing the impact of subsidies and energy transition on reducing emissions. Additionally, the research evaluates policies related to subsidies and energy consumption in Iran's household sector.

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METHODOLOGY

Trend Analysis Models

To identify trends in the time series, the Mann-Kendall (MK) test is used in conjunction with Sen's Slope estimator developed by (Mann, 1945), were employed. The MK test is nonparametric, making it resilient to outliers and effective in detecting trends in data series. In this test, the null hypothesis (H_0) posits that no trend exists in the series, whereas the alternative hypothesis (H_a) indicates that a trend is present. The test statistic S can be calculated as follows:

$$S = \sum_{j=1}^{n-1} \sum_{k=j+1}^{n} Sign\ (\mathrm{y}\,k - \mathrm{y}\,i) \qquad (1)$$

Where, n = total observations, yK and yJ represent the data point where k > j.

Data

Data for all Iranian provinces were sourced Based on data from the Statistical Yearbook published by the Statistical Centre of Iran and the Energy Balance Sheets provided by the Ministry of Energy of Iran, covering the interval from 2001 to 2019. Energy consumption data is reported as follows: oil is measured in thousand liters, natural gas in cubic meters (m^3), electricity consumption in kilowatt-hours (kWh), and CO2 emissions in tons.

RESULTS

Trend of Energy and CO_2 Emissions

The trend analysis results in Figure 1 and Appendices 1 to 4 show that different fuels consumption and CO_2 emissions Sen's slope and P-value among provinces of Iran. Figure 1 A and Appendix 1 represent oil usage which indicates negative Sen's slope values for all provinces. Hormozgan is the only province that is not significant concerning its Sen's slope. Notably, Sistan and Baluchestan and Hormozgan are the only provinces with a positive trend, showing a Sen's slope value of 12,312, 1557.9091, respectively. Most of provinces showed reduction in oil use. However, some provinces represent dramatical reduction during study period according Appendix 1, Tehran soley with Sen's slope -129504, recorded a tremendous decrease. With Kendall's tau at -0.9883 ($p<0.0001$). Provinces such as Khorasan, Mazandaran, and both Eastern and Western Azerbaijan are in the second group of reduction based on map A in Figure 31 and Appendix 3 with Sen's slope -53470.54, -60913.52, -49553.87 and -64596.8, respectively.

In terms of gas usage, according to Figure 1 (B) and Appendix 2, all provinces show a positive trend, with Tehran having the highest Sen's slope value at around 417. While some provinces exhibit a positive trend, the amounts are extremely low, including Sistan and Baluchestan, Hormozgan, Chaharmahal and

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Bakhtiari, Bushehr, and Ilam with Sen's slope 0.7214, 0.40, 23.6, 6.95, 19.12, respectively.

As illustrated in Figure 1 (B), all provinces show a positive and significant trend regarding electricity consumption. Khuzestan and Tehran have the highest Sen's slope values, 846 and 808, respectively (see Appendix 3). Meanwhile, Ardebil, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Semnan, and Zanjan have the lowest Sen's slope values, recorded at 28, 18, 27, and 27, respectively.

CO_2 emissions have increased significantly in all provinces, except for Isfahan, which does not exhibit a significant trend. Among the provinces, Tehran, Khorasan, Mazandaran, and Western Azerbaijan have the highest Sen's slope values, with growth amounts of 456,905, 315,775, 306,495, and 297,754, respectively (see Appendix 4 and Figure 1 (D)). In contrast, Hormozgan and SistaRen and Baluchestan have the lowest increases in Sen's slope, with values of 1,894 and 1,082, respectively.

Figure 1. *Man-Kendall trend and Sen's slope distribution of oil use (A), gas use (B), electricity use (C) and CO_2 emissions (D), among provinces of Iran*



Source: Prepared by Author based on analysis of data from the Ministry of Energy of Iran

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Changes in Energy Consumption and CO_2 Emissions from 2001 to 2019

Figure 2 presents changes in CO_2 emissions and energy expenditure (oil, gas, and electricity) across the provinces of Iran from 2000 to 2019. The first graph illustrates changes in electricity usage, with the most significant fluctuations occurring in Kohgiluyeh, Khuzestan, Hormozgan, Bushehr, and Sistan and Baluchestan. In contrast, the provinces with the least change are Hamedan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, and Ardebil. The second graph in Figure 2 shows changes in CO_2 emissions, revealing extreme variations in Ilam, Sistan and Baluchestan, Bushehr and Hormozgan. Conversely, the minimal changes are observed in the provinces of Tehran, Semnan, Qom, Golestan, Gilan, Hamedan, and Isfahan.

Figure 2. *Changes % between 2001 and 2019 of Iran provinces for some energy variables: Percentage Change= (Value in 2022−Value in 2000/ Value in 2000)×100*



Source: Prepared by Author based on data from the Ministry of Energy of Iran

Gas usage demonstrates the most significant changes in Sistan and Baluchestan, Yazd, Western Azerbaijan, Hormozgan, Ilam, Bushehr, and Kermanshah. On the other hand, Semnan, Qom, Gilan, Golestan, and Tehran exhibit the lowest changes in gas consumption during the study period. The last graph depicts changes in oil consumption from 2001 to 2019 among the provinces of Iran. All provinces show negative changes, except for Sistan and Baluchestan and Hormozgan, which still represent a significant amount of oil usage. These two

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provinces also exhibit substantial changes in CO_2 emissions during the study period.

Energy Transition from 2001 to 2019 in Iran

Over the past two decades, Iran has seen a significant rise in fossil fuel consumption in the household sector. In the early 2000s, oil was a major fuel source, especially in rural areas and small cities, and remained the primary fuel until 2008. With the expansion of natural gas pipelines and infrastructure, oil consumption sharply declined as households transitioned to natural gas. Figure 3 illustrates the fuel mix from 2013 to 2021, showing a dominant reliance on natural gas and a steady reduction in oil use, while electricity consumption has continued to rise. Since electricity generation in Iran is largely dependent on natural gas and oil, it is crucial to accelerate the adoption of renewable energy for power production, given Iran's vast renewable energy potential. In the early 2000s, the household and transportation sectors together contributed around 50% of CO2 emissions in Iran due to the extensive use of oil. To mitigate these emissions, the government initially focused on increasing natural gas consumption in the household sector, followed by the transportation sector. However, significant subsidies on fossil fuels and the low cost of energy in Iran led both the public and the government to overlook the transition to renewable energy sources. The government also refrained from redirecting subsidies from fossil fuels to renewables in order to maintain low energy prices for low-income households across the country.

In 2010 and 2013, the government implemented two phases of a subsidy reform plan aimed at reducing inequality in energy consumption among different social classes. As part of the reform, the government provided cash payments to households, with nearly 100% of the population receiving these payments during the first phase. The primary goal was to enhance economic equality for low-income families while addressing energy consumption patterns.

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Figure 3. *Share of different fuels in household sector from 2013 to 2021*



Source: Ministry of Energy of Iran, 2021

An Overview of Renewable Energy in Iran

Iran holds the fourth-largest oil reserves and the second-largest natural gas reserves globally. Despite its abundant hydrocarbon resources, the country has recently shown significant interest in expanding its renewable energy sector. Under the Paris Agreement, Iran committed to reducing CO_2 emissions by 4% through domestic investments of $17.5 million, or by 12% with international investments totaling $35 billion. As part of this commitment, Iran aimed to generate 7% of its electricity from renewable energy sources by 2020 (Khatinoglu, 2016). As shown in Figure 4, the share of renewable electricity generation in Iran from 2000 to 2021 is dominated by hydropower, followed by wind and solar PV. Solar power began contributing to electricity generation only after 2015, reflecting its relatively recent introduction and steady growth as awareness of climate change increases and peak load electricity shortages prompt a shift towards solar energy to reduce reliance on fossil fuel power plants, which still generate over 90% of Iran's electricity. Wind energy, which saw a significant rise after 2006, continues to grow at a steady pace.

Iran is among the world's wealthiest nations in terms of energy resources, boasting vast reserves of fossil fuels like oil and natural gas, along with significant potential for renewable energy, particularly wind power (Bahrami and

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Abbaszadeh, 2013). In Iran, solar energy holds the highest potential among renewable sources. According to Bahrami et al. (2013), the total installed photovoltaic power in the country increased significantly, being approximately five times greater in 2010 compared to 2004, reaching a capacity of 67 MW (Bahrami and Abbaszadeh, 2013).

Developing renewable energy requires aligning long-term policies with evaluation programs and technical feasibility. The government should establish a comprehensive policy informed by environmental knowledge and clear goals, supported by strategic planning and incentive systems to drive legislation and project implementation. Additionally, technical experts should promote renewable energy by offering recommendations and innovations based on relevant technologies and applications across different sectors to support policy and economic development (Noorollahi et al., 2021).

Figure 4. *Evolution of renewable electricity generation by source in Iran since 2000, (World Energy Outlook 2021 – Analysis - IEA, 2021)*



Source: World Energy Outlook 2021, IEA, 2021

Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of renewable and clean power plants across Iran's provinces in 2019. Qazvin, Yazd, and Fars have the highest concentrations of renewable energy sources, particularly wind and solar farms. Conversely, provinces such as Bushehr, Alborz, Lorestan, Ilam, and North Khorasan have a smaller share of renewable energy. The most notable wind farm in Iran is the Manjil Wind Farm, located in Gilan Province, recognized as the country's first large-scale wind project. Additionally, Khorasan Razavi is home to another significant wind farm, making it the second largest in Iran. In terms of solar energy, the most prominent solar farms are found in Fars and Yazd provinces.

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Figure 5. *Capacity of installed renewable and clean plant powers in each province of Iran*



Source: Ministry of Energy of Iran, 2021

DISCUSSION

Our results show that during the study period, Iran's energy transition from oil to gas consumption has intensified, particularly after 2010. Although the share of renewables in final energy consumption remains low, it has been increasing over the past decade. The government is currently implementing new projects to achieve a 7% share of renewables in electricity generation by 2025. Despite Iran's vast potential for renewable energy, the country's abundant fossil fuel resources pose challenges to shifting towards cleaner energy. The availability of cheap fossil fuels, coupled with high energy subsidies, has led to increased consumption and higher CO2 emissions.

Recently, climate change concerns and global geopolitical crises have highlighted energy as a key factor influencing international relations. However, sanctions have hindered the growth of renewable energy in Iran, forcing the country to sell crude oil at low prices. Many countries are also reluctant to purchase Iranian oil or gas, further exacerbating the situation. As a result, these challenges contribute to rising CO2 emissions in Iran, particularly within the household sector.

Iran began implementing an energy reform plan in 2010, which has led to a reduction in energy consumption in residential sector, as indicated by trend analysis, and contributed to mitigating CO2 emissions in the household sector. Previous research supports these findings, highlighting the impact of the reforms on energy efficiency and emission reductions (Aryanpur et al., 2022; Noorollahi et al., 2021).

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In Iran, rising demand and consumption intensity necessitate capacity building for electricity generation, making renewable energy a fast and clean solution due to its wide availability. However, challenges persist in developing renewable energy, as many projects lack economic viability. Effective plans and policies are needed to attract and encourage investment. Enhancing energy efficiency and system productivity, optimizing processes, and establishing research and development centres are essential steps to boost the economy and improve the appeal of renewable energy sources (Noorollahi et al., 2021). Bitcoin mining in Iran has seen significant growth, accounting for nearly 4% of global Bitcoin mining activities in April 2020 (University of Cambridge, 2020), with estimates suggesting this share could rise to as much as 17% by May 2021. Iranian Bitcoin miners consume around 20 terawatt-hours (TWh) of energy annually (Tassev, 2021), compared to a global consumption of 117 TWh as of May 2021 (Digiconomist, 2021). It is estimated that over 86% of the electricity used for Bitcoin mining in Iran is acquired illegally (Tassev, 2021). Our study shows that massive energy subsidies are a key factor driving increased consumption. One consequence of this is the use of cheap household energy for activities like Bitcoin mining, which has a significant negative impact on the environment. This activity places immense pressure on the power grid, leading to electricity shortages in the household sector due to the strain on the network.

CONCLUSION

The study, which examines energy consumption and CO_2 emissions trends in Iran from 2001 to 2019, focuses on two key issues during this period: the subsidy reform and the energy transition in the household sector. The findings indicate a significant decrease in oil consumption across most provinces, with the exception of Sistan and Baluchestan and Hormozgan, where access to infrastructure is limited, and these regions are classified as low-income. In contrast, gas consumption showed a marked increase in all provinces, particularly after 2008. Electricity consumption also followed an upward trend across all provinces, with full access to electricity being extended to all villages and cities throughout Iran. CO_2 emissions were found to have increased primarily in major cities and provinces, including Tehran, Khorasan Razavi, and Azerbaijan. The two-phase energy subsidy reform was not successful in practice. However, the transition from oil to natural gas helped prevent a further increase in CO2 emissions from Iran's household sector. Moving forward, effective subsidy reform combined with a stronger focus on transitioning to renewable energy are two key strategies for achieving sustainability and reducing CO_2 emissions in Iran. Despite this progress, Iran still faces considerable challenges in its electricity transition, especially in generating electricity from renewable sources. Given Iran's vast potential for renewable energy, it is crucial to prioritize the integration of renewables in the electricity sector and accelerate the

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transition, especially as household appliance usage and electricity consumption continue to rise.

The research relied on data that is not yet officially published, with much of the information sourced from academic papers and websites. These sources highlight several recent issues in the household sector, such as the growing use of household electricity for bitcoin mining and the impact of international sanctions, which hinder efforts to reduce CO2 emissions. In response, the Iranian government has recently implemented some measures to promote renewable energy in the household sector. One such initiative is the provision of solar panels to vulnerable families, aimed at mitigating the effects of inflation and encouraging the adoption of solar power and other renewable energy sources.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1. *Mann-Kendall's test for Oil consumption in provinces of Iran*

Series\Test	Kendall's tau	p-value	Sen's slope
AZ1	-0.9649	**< 0.0001**	-49553.8782
AZ2	-0.9649	**< 0.0001**	-64596.8000
Ardabil	-0.9298	**< 0.0001**	-13152.3463
Esfahan	-0.7661	**< 0.0001**	-33821.4000
Ilam	-0.6140	**0.0003**	-7919.1917
Bushehr	-0.3216	0.0589	-2186.2630
Tehran	-0.9883	**< 0.0001**	-129504.2000
Chaharmahal	-0.8830	**< 0.0001**	-8517.5714
Khorasan	-0.7427	**< 0.0001**	-53470.5466
Khozestan	-0.5556	**0.0010**	-6710.6978
Zanjan	-0.5673	**0.0008**	-10253.2231
Semnan	-0.9766	**< 0.0001**	-5178.6404
Sistan	0.5789	**0.0006**	12312.6364
Fars	-0.7778	**< 0.0001**	-21121.9333
Qazvin	-0.9181	**< 0.0001**	-12930.6429
Qom	-0.8246	**< 0.0001**	-19027.8095
Kurdestan	-0.8129	**< 0.0001**	-26146.5000
Kerman	-0.7895	**< 0.0001**	-25109.0000
Kermanshah	-0.8129	**< 0.0001**	-23100.6667
Kohgiloyeh	-0.5088	**0.0026**	-3153.0000
Golestan	-0.8830	**< 0.0001**	-10760.6643
Gilan	-0.9532	**< 0.0001**	-29132.5833
Lorestan	-0.9532	**< 0.0001**	-16197.7568
Mazandaran	-1.0000	**< 0.0001**	-60913.5264
Markazi	-0.6608	**< 0.0001**	-17831.6667
Hormozgan	0.0877	0.6243	1557.9091
Hamedan	-0.9415	**< 0.0001**	-16611.1668
Yazd	-0.9298	**< 0.0001**	-21571.7143

Appendix 2. *Mann-Kendall's test for Gas consumption in provinces of Iran*

Series\Test	Kendall's tau	p-value	Sen's slope
AZ1	0.7895	**< 0.0001**	139.4551
AZ2	0.9181	**< 0.0001**	137.1800
Ardabil	0.9181	**< 0.0001**	37.6372

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Esfahan	0.6725	**< 0.0001**	101.7333
Ilam	1.0000	**< 0.0001**	19.1200
Bushehr	0.9766	**< 0.0001**	6.9571
Tehran	0.8363	**< 0.0001**	417.6000
Chaharmahal	0.7076	**< 0.0001**	23.6000
Khorasan	0.9298	**< 0.0001**	197.7559
Khozestan	0.9181	**< 0.0001**	44.8160
Zanjan	0.9298	**< 0.0001**	31.5000
Semnan	0.8480	**< 0.0001**	13.9571
Sistan	0.7836	**< 0.0001**	0.7214
Fars	0.9649	**< 0.0001**	88.4500
Qazvin	0.9064	**< 0.0001**	36.5667
Qom	0.8480	**< 0.0001**	21.0667
Kurdestan	0.9298	**< 0.0001**	70.9483
Kerman	0.9766	**< 0.0001**	53.4901
Kermanshah	0.9384	**< 0.0001**	67.5000
Kohgiloyeh	0.9736	**< 0.0001**	17.0000
Golestan	0.9415	**< 0.0001**	44.1857
Gilan	0.8713	**< 0.0001**	78.5990
Lorestan	0.8713	**< 0.0001**	39.3659
Mazandaran	0.9181	**< 0.0001**	156.5545
Markazi	0.7310	**< 0.0001**	36.8083
Hormozgan	0.8790	**< 0.0001**	0.4000
Hamedan	0.8129	**< 0.0001**	48.8000
Yazd	0.9064	**< 0.0001**	42.7357

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Appendix 3. *Mann-Kendall's test for electricity consumption in provinces of Iran*

Series\Test	Kendall's tau	p-value	Sen's slope
AZ1	0.8129	**< 0.0001**	106.4000
AZ2	0.8480	**< 0.0001**	80.2000
Ardabil	0.8480	**< 0.0001**	28.6357
Esfahan	0.9181	**< 0.0001**	199.2267
Ilam	0.9181	**< 0.0001**	38.9333
Bushehr	0.9298	**< 0.0001**	247.3333
Tehran	0.9532	**< 0.0001**	808.4143
Chaharmahal	0.7661	**< 0.0001**	18.6813
Khorasan	0.9298	**< 0.0001**	269.6214
Khozestan	0.9532	**< 0.0001**	846.6000
Zanjan	0.8012	**< 0.0001**	27.9286
Semnan	0.9064	**< 0.0001**	27.7400
Sistan	0.9532	**< 0.0001**	206.4355
Fars	0.9415	**< 0.0001**	268.5357
Qazvin	0.8363	**< 0.0001**	42.0846
Qom	0.9766	**< 0.0001**	71.9000
Kurdestan	0.9181	**< 0.0001**	38.9286
Kerman	0.8363	**< 0.0001**	167.5857
Kermanshah	0.8596	**< 0.0001**	68.1685
Kohgiloyeh	0.9298	**< 0.0001**	50.3500
Golestan	0.9181	**< 0.0001**	83.3000
Gilan	0.9415	**< 0.0001**	118.4172
Lorestan	0.9181	**< 0.0001**	59.0700
Mazandaran	0.9415	**< 0.0001**	197.1615
Markazi	0.8480	**< 0.0001**	42.4813
Hormozgan	0.9883	**< 0.0001**	333.9800
Hamedan	0.9064	**< 0.0001**	42.6500
Yazd	0.9532	**< 0.0001**	54.2231

Appendix 4. *Mann-Kendall's test for CO_2 emissions in provinces of Iran*

Series\Test	Kendall's tau	p-value	Sen's slope
AZ1	0.5556	**0.0010**	220825.1472
AZ2	0.8129	**< 0.0001**	297754.8859
Ardabil	0.7544	**< 0.0001**	65195.1877

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Esfahan	0.2047	0.2342	78752.6167
Ilam	1.0000	**< 0.0001**	46302.3196
Bushehr	0.9766	**< 0.0001**	17486.6134
Tehran	0.4269	**0.0118**	456905.7097
Chaharmahal	0.4035	**0.0174**	32434.3143
Khorasan	0.7778	**< 0.0001**	315775.4362
Khozestan	0.8713	**< 0.0001**	91042.1844
Zanjan	0.8363	**< 0.0001**	50672.2083
Semnan	0.4152	**0.0143**	11383.6185
Sistan	0.7895	**< 0.0001**	1894.8985
Fars	0.8713	**< 0.0001**	151674.9600
Qazvin	0.6959	**< 0.0001**	52080.1784
Qom	0.4620	**0.0064**	16985.7429
Kurdestan	0.9181	**< 0.0001**	144157.6788
Kerman	0.9064	**< 0.0001**	113013.6034
Kermanshah	0.8363	**< 0.0001**	137918.8803
Kohgiloyeh	0.9298	**< 0.0001**	34582.8086
Golestan	0.7895	**< 0.0001**	72101.8502
Gilan	0.7778	**< 0.0001**	125214.9549
Lorestan	0.6491	**0.0001**	73113.7527
Mazandaran	0.8596	**< 0.0001**	306495.7643
Markazi	0.3567	**0.0358**	42085.8403
Hormozgan	0.9532	**< 0.0001**	1082.9977
Hamedan	0.5789	**0.0006**	65288.9440
Yazd	0.8129	**< 0.0001**	92546.5639

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CAN THE KAZAKH LANGUAGE BECOME A FUNDAMENTAL FACTOR IN THE NATION-BUILDING OF KAZAKHSTAN?

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ABSTRACT

Nation-building is not a one-day process and must be planned for the medium and long term. In nation-building, there are several aspects on which it is based, and the language used is one of the main ones. Countries were created on the principles of language, culture, and territorial affiliation. Therefore, the further formation of the nation for Kazakhstan is a very pressing issue today. This article examines the issue of nation-building in Kazakhstan using such a key tool as language. Thus, the article examines the research question: is the Kazakh language capable of becoming a full-fledged basis for building a nation in Kazakhstan today? The study used the results of a sociological and expert survey, which were conducted as part of the order of the Language Policy Committee of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2023. The survey showed the level of proficiency and use of the Kazakh language among the Kazakh population, broken down by regions and ethnic groups. An expert survey identified the reasons for the weak distribution and use of the Kazakh language, and expert recommendations were provided. All these data were summarized and analysed in this article.

Keywords: Memory, Historical memory, Cultural memory, Nation-building, National identity.

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INTRODUCTION

Language is widely recognized as a critical tool in the process of nation-building, serving both as a means of communication and as an essential element in constructing social identity (Pathan et al., 2018). The role of language in nation-building is pivotal, as it contributes not only to facilitating everyday interactions but also to fostering a sense of collective belonging and unity among citizens (Pardesi et al., 2020). Language is fundamentally intertwined with the idea of nation-building, a concept that scholars have explored in depth. The connection between language and nation-building is emphasized by various studies, which highlight how language serves to bind individuals into a collective national identity, a point reinforced by numerous scholars (Heng, 2017; John, 2015; Ngwenya, 2011; Tajuddin et al., 2019). Alesina and Reich (2015) further define nation-building as a complex process aimed at forming a cohesive state where citizens share common goals, preferences, and values. These shared interests foster a sense of unity, preventing separation and division within the country. At the heart of this process is the concept of national identity, which is often closely linked to the use of a common language (Wright, 2004). In this sense, language functions not merely as a means of communication, but also as a powerful tool for shaping and solidifying the concept of the nation-state (Pardesi et al., 2020).

Moreover, language also serves another critical function: the projection and articulation of diverse cultural identities. It allows individuals to identify themselves within their respective communities and differentiate themselves from others (Tajuddin et al., 2019). This dual role of language, as both a tool of communication and a marker of identity, makes it a central component in the formation of a unified national culture. Scholars have consistently pointed to the importance of developing a shared language and culture in the context of nation-building. For instance, Noel (2017) emphasizes that the construction of a “one language, one culture” framework is crucial for the success of nation-building efforts. Because language is so central to cultural identity, it plays an essential role in highlighting the distinctions between different cultural groups (Ogwudile, 2014). Consequently, language becomes a critical instrument for both cultural integration and assimilation, as it helps merge different cultural identities into a single national framework (Tajuddin et al., 2019). Additionally, language plays a key role in promoting cultural unification, aiding in the emergence of a national language ideology. This ideology, which seeks to create a unifying language for the entire population, is often referred to as standard language ideology (Gijsbert, 2019). Scholars argue that the rise of nations and nationalism is directly tied to larger political, social, and cultural transformations (Hobsbawm, 1990; Bayar, 2011). These nation-building processes, including language policies, are typically carried out through top-down approaches, with governments playing an active role in promoting the language of the dominant ethnic group in all areas of public life (Kulbayeva, 2018). Governments often implement policies aimed at integrating

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the indigenous language into various spheres, from education to administration, in order to strengthen national unity (Ibrahim, 2020).

The importance of language in nation-building is also reflected in the way different theoretical schools of nationalism approach the subject. According to Wright (2000), the four main schools of thought on nationalism – primordialists, perennialists, modernists, and postmodernists – each assign a different level of importance to language in the process of nation-building. Primordialists and perennialists tend to view language as an inherent and enduring aspect of national identity, while modernists and postmodernists see it as a constructed element that can be manipulated for political purposes. Regardless of the theoretical perspective, however, there is a consensus among scholars that language remains a central tool in nation-building (Safran, 1999). Language planning, therefore, becomes not only a cultural and educational issue but also a political one. As Caviedes (2003) notes, language planning often has significant political implications, as it determines which groups have access to power and resources and which are excluded. Since language serves as a primary tool for participation, it can either facilitate inclusion or contribute to exclusion, thereby altering the balance of power among different groups within the state (Caviedes, 2003). The success of a nation's aspirations to become a cohesive state, therefore, often hinges on the language that its citizens can speak, read, and write (Gellner, 1994). A historical example of this can be seen in 19th-century Europe, where the push for political independence was frequently accompanied by the promotion of a common national language (Safran, 2005). Similarly, in the United States, English played a central role in the creation of the “melting pot” phenomenon, wherein people from diverse ethnic backgrounds came together under a shared national ideology, often referred to as the "American Dream” (Dupré, 2012).

However, the role of language in nation-building is not always straightforward, as can be seen in the cases of Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, yet a significant portion of the population, particularly in the eastern regions, does not speak or fully understand Ukrainian, the official state language (Kamusella, 2001). A similar situation can be observed in Kazakhstan. According to Article 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kazakh language is the official state language, but Russian continues to play a dominant role in many spheres of public life, particularly as the language of interethnic communication (Altynbekova, 2015). This linguistic reality is largely a legacy of the Soviet period when Russian overshadowed local languages in the political, educational, and cultural domains. As a result, many post-Soviet successor states, including Kazakhstan, have made efforts to reduce the symbolic and instrumental dominance of the Russian language as part of their nation-building projects (Agadjaniana, 2022). These efforts are emblematic of a broader trend in post-colonial and post-imperial states, where language is often used as a tool for restructuring national identity and asserting independence.

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In light of these observations, it becomes clear that nation-building is an essential task for leaders in multi-ethnic and pluralistic societies, and language plays a central role in this process. Okeke et al. (2021) argue that language serves as the foundation of national unity, providing the means through which diverse populations can come together to form a single, cohesive nation. The connection between language and nation-building is not a modern phenomenon but can be traced back to the emergence of numerous new nation-states throughout history (Adelola, 2023). Given the importance of language in fostering national unity, this paper seeks to explore the specific case of Kazakhstan, asking the critical research question: Is the Kazakh language capable of serving as the foundation for nation-building in contemporary Kazakhstan? To answer this question, the paper examines sociological data on the distribution and usage of the Kazakh language, with the goal of determining whether its current status is sufficient to support the formation of a unified national identity.

While the role of language in nation-building is widely acknowledged across different historical and political contexts, the case of Kazakhstan presents unique challenges and opportunities. As the country continues to navigate its post-Soviet identity, the question of whether the Kazakh language can serve as the unifying force necessary for nation-building remains crucial. Through an examination of sociological research, this paper aims to shed light on the potential of the Kazakh language to fulfill this role, contributing to a broader understanding of the relationship between language and nation-building in multi-ethnic states.

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

This article is based on the results of a survey commissioned by the Committee on Language Policy under the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2023. The objective of this research was to evaluate the current state of language use and policies in Kazakhstan, focusing on various aspects of societal and professional life. The findings from this study are made publicly accessible and have been published on the official website of the Committee on Language Policy. This article draws on data obtained from previous sociological and analytical studies, providing insights into the state of language usage across different demographic, professional, and ethnic groups in the country.

The study was carried out across all regions of Kazakhstan and included a comprehensive range of population groups. It involved individuals aged 18 and above, employees working in sectors related to economics and finance, and participants from two focus groups, as well as a series of expert interviews. This wide-ranging approach ensured a diverse sample that represents the complexity of Kazakhstani society. A total of 4,000 respondents participated in the survey, all aged 18 years or older, and were selected using a stratified sampling method. The

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selection process took into consideration factors such as gender, age, educational background, and geographic location, allowing the researchers to capture a representative cross-section of Kazakhstan's population.

The survey was conducted in every region of Kazakhstan, ensuring national coverage. Respondents were categorized into urban and rural populations, with 2429 participants from urban areas and 1571 from rural regions. The sample's gender distribution was fairly balanced, with 48.2% male respondents (a total of 1929 individuals) and 51.8% female respondents (2071 individuals). This gender balance is reflective of the national demographic structure, ensuring that both perspectives are well represented in the data.

The age distribution of respondents was designed to reflect the various life stages and generational cohorts within the population. The breakdown is as follows: 27.5% of respondents were aged between 18 and 29, representing younger adults, including students and early-career professionals. The largest age group, accounting for 33.7% of the sample, consisted of individuals aged 30 to 45, which typically includes mid-career professionals and working adults. Meanwhile, 30.6% of respondents were aged between 46 and 60, a group likely to consist of established professionals and near-retirees. Finally, 8.2% of respondents were aged 61 years and older, capturing the perspectives of retirees and the elderly.

Ethnic diversity is a notable feature of the Kazakhstani population, and the survey sample reflected this diversity. Kazakhs, who make up the majority population in Kazakhstan, accounted for 68.3% of respondents. Russians, the second-largest ethnic group in the country, represented 18.1% of participants. Smaller ethnic groups were also included in the study, with 2.9% of respondents identifying as Uzbek, 3.8% as Ukrainian, and 6.9% as members of other ethnic groups. This diversity allowed the study to explore how language use and preferences vary across different ethnic communities, which is particularly important in a multilingual society like Kazakhstan.

The educational background of the respondents was another key factor in the study, as it plays a significant role in shaping language use and preferences. The survey categorized respondents according to their highest level of educational attainment. Approximately 37.1% of participants had completed secondary education, representing those who had completed the general education curriculum. A further 35.4% had attained vocational education, indicating individuals with specialized training in various trades and professions. Higher education and postgraduate qualifications were reported by 27.4% of respondents, a group likely to occupy professional, managerial, or academic roles. This broad range of educational backgrounds allowed the study to assess how language policies and usage patterns might intersect with educational achievement.

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The socio-professional status of respondents was also an important variable in the study. The research identified five predominant categories of employment: self-employed individuals, who made up 14.0% of the sample; employees in the private sector, who represented 13.9%; business owners with hired employees, comprising 13.8%; freelancers or individuals engaged in contract work, who made up 11.0%; and civil servants, who accounted for 8.6% of respondents. This range of professional backgrounds provides insight into how language is used in various sectors of the economy, particularly in relation to economic activities and employment contexts.

The study also considered non-working individuals. Pensioners, who represent a significant segment of the population due to Kazakhstan's aging demographic, accounted for 5.7% of respondents. Students, representing the younger generation still in the process of completing their education, made up 2.7% of the sample. Housewives, who may not be formally employed but play a crucial role in household management, accounted for 1.3% of respondents. Additionally, 0.7% of respondents reported being unable to work due to disability, providing valuable perspectives from a demographic that is often underrepresented in such studies.

The survey sought to capture a wide range of information from respondents, covering aspects related to language use, preferences, and proficiency in the Kazakhstani context. Questions posed to respondents included their language of daily communication, their attitudes toward state language policies, and their opinions on the role of the Kazakh language in public and professional life. Experts who participated in the study were also asked to provide their insights on the implementation of language policies, the effectiveness of current regulations, and potential areas for improvement.

Additionally, the focus groups provided qualitative data, offering a deeper understanding of the public's attitudes towards multilingualism, the role of Russian and other minority languages in Kazakhstani society, and the challenges associated with promoting the Kazakh language. This combination of quantitative and qualitative data allows for a comprehensive analysis of language policy issues in Kazakhstan.

In conclusion, this article presents a detailed examination of the current state of language policy in Kazakhstan, based on a robust sociological and analytical study. The findings provide valuable insights into the diverse linguistic landscape of the country, highlighting the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead in promoting the Kazakh language while respecting the multilingual fabric of the nation. Further discussion on the study's results, including the perspectives of both respondents and experts, is presented in the following sections.

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RESEARCH RESULTS

A sociological study was conducted to identify the situation in the development of language in Kazakhstan, determine the level and scope of application of the language. Expert opinions and recommendations for further development of the language situation were obtained.

Table 1. *Which language do you consider your native? (%)*

City	Kazakh	Russian	Other languages
Abay region	78.6	16.2	5.2
Akmola region	51.8	32.2	15.9
Aktobe region	79.7	14.1	6.3
Almaty region	72.0	10.2	17.8
Atyrau region	76.5	5.3	18.2
West-Kazakhstan region	76.4	18.8	4.9
Jambyl region	72.8	9.4	17.9
Zhetisu region	74.6	13.6	11.9
Karaganda region	52.2	35.1	12.7
Kostanay region	41.5	40.5	18.0
Kyzylorda region	95.7	1.8	2.4
Mangistau region	93.7	2.8	3.5
Pavlodar region	53.0	35.1	11.9
North-Kazakhstan region	35.2	49.2	15.6
Turkestan region	76.1	1.8	22.1
Ulytau region	75.6	14.1	10.3
East Kazakhstan region	60.8	35.1	4.1
Astana city	78.8	12.3	8.8
Almaty city	60.0	24.2	15.8
Shymkent city	68.5	7.9	23.6

Source: Committee on Language Policy of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan

The results showed that predominantly the population of the southern and western regions consider the Kazakh language their native language, and the northern ones - Russian. The reason for this is the ethnic composition that has historically developed in these regions. So, in Kyzylorda (95.7%), Mangistau (93.7%), Aktobe (79.7%). Whereas in Kostanay (41.5%) and North Kazakhstan (35.2%) regions. On the contrary, the native language is Russian in the North Kazakhstan region – 49.2% of respondents (Table 1). There are demographic reasons for this, which have developed in Kazakhstan since the Soviet period.

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Moreover, according to the official website of the Bureau of National Statistics of the Agency for Strategic Planning and Reforms of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2024), Kazakhs in the population are the majority, while the survey shows that only 81.0% of the population speak the state language, 48.7% have a good command of the state language, only 18.5% speak and read the state language fluently. At the same time, those who do not speak the Kazakh language amounted to 19.0%.

Table 2. *Please rate your level of proficiency in the state, Russian, English languages and the language of your ethnic group (%)*

Language	Don't speak at all	Understand Certain phrases	Understand well, but I don' t speak	Understand and can explain myself	Cannot write poorly	Speak fluently	Language proficiency
Kazakh language	7.4	11.6	6.8	7.0	18.5	48.7	81.0
Russian language	0.5	8.9	7.2	20.3	11.2	51.8	90.6
English language	35.8	35.2	12.8	10.2	1.0	5.0	29.0
The language of your ethnic group	-	3.4	12.4	5.2	8.5	70.6	96.7
Fluent in three languages	28.1	42.9	12.8	5.0	5.2	6.0	29.0

Source: Committee on Language Policy of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Sociological research shows an interesting fact is that while the majority of Kazakhs in the country speak the Kazakh language less than Russian (90.6%). 9.4% of the population do not speak Russian (Table 2). There is a unique situation in Kazakhstan, where the vast majority of the population knows Russian, and a very small part knows Kazakh, which is also a consequence of the policy of the Soviet government.

Table 3. *Knowledge of the Kazakh language by region (%)*

Aktobe region	40.6	34.9	7.8	11.5	5.2
Almaty region	35.5	32.6	10.2	10.5	11.2
Atyrau region	27.3	30.3	13.6	9.1	19.7
West-Kazakhstan region	46.5	31.9	8.3	10.4	2.8

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Jambyl region	30.8	33.0	12.1	9.4	14.7
Zhetisu region	44.1	35.6	6.8	9.3	4.2
Karaganda region	30.3	31.6	11.0	14.5	12.7
Kostanay region	29.0	33.5	11.5	12.0	14.0
Kyzylorda region	58.5	22.6	6.7	9.1	3.0
Mangistau region	43.7	21.8	9.9	7.0	17.6
Pavlodar region	33.9	32.1	12.5	16.7	4.8
North-Kazakhstan region	15.6	33.6	16.4	16.4	18.0
Turkestan region	33.2	37.9	9.2	9.2	10.5
Ulytau region	42.3	34.6	10.3	11.5	1.3
East Kazakhstan region	29.7	33.8	12.2	10.1	14.2
Astana city	37.7	32.7	10.0	9.2	10.4
Almaty city	34.2	30.1	16.0	9.7	10.0
Shymkent city	37.5	32.9	10.6	6.9	12.0

Source: Committee on Language Policy of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Accordingly, in everyday life, residents of the western, southern and central regions speak only Kazakh, and in the northern part of the country they use Kazakh less often (Table 3). The sociological study once again shows the imbalance in the settlement of the population, which affects the formation of a united nation.

Table 4. *Please rate your level of proficiency in the state, Russian, English and the language of one's ethnic group (%)*

Answer options	Kazakhs	Russians	Other
I don't speak at all	0.1	12.8	36.8
I understand certain phrases	0.5	44.7	22.7
I understand well, but I don't speak	2.5	17.4	15.1
I understand and can explain myself	1.6	18.6	18.6
I speak and read fluently, but I write poorly	25.7	2.2	4.1
I speak fluently	69.5	4.3	2.8

Source: Committee on Language Policy of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan

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Sociological research has shown that the majority of representatives of the Kazakh ethnic group speak the state language; on the contrary, representatives of the Russian and other ethnic groups do not speak the Kazakh language – 12.8% and 36.8%, respectively. At the same time, only 18.6% of both ethnic Russians and representatives of other nationalities understand and can explain themselves, which is a very low level (Table 4).

Table 5. *Russian language proficiency (%)*

Answer options	Kazakhs	Russians	Other
I don't speak at all	0.7	-	0.2
I understand certain phrases	13.3	1.1	1.8
I understand well, but I don't speak	8.9	1.4	2.0
I understand and can explain myself	24.8	14.2	5.9
I speak and read fluently, but I write poorly	12.4	8.0	9.6
I speak fluently	39.9	75.3	80.5

Source: Committee on Language Policy of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan

On the contrary, representatives of all ethnic groups of Kazakhstan speak Russian well. For example, 75.3% of Russians and 80.5% of representatives of other ethnic groups are fluent in Russian (Table 5). Another example showed by sociological research is that in Kazakhstan, the majority of the population speaks more Russian than Kazakh.

Table 6. *Average language proficiency level for 2020-2023 (%)*

Language proficiency level	2020	2021	2022	2023	Average value for 2020-2023
Kazakh language	90.0	91.0	92.0	81.0	88.5
Russian language	90.0	90.2	90.4	90.6	90.3
English language	27.0	28.0	28.5	29.0	28.1
The language of ethnic group	97.1	97.2	97.1	96.7	97.0
Fluent in three languages	20.0	27.0	27.9	29.0	25.9

Source: Committee on Language Policy of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan

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A comparative sociological analysis of the level of language development in 2020-2023 showed that the level of proficiency in the Kazakh language decreased in 2023 compared to previous years, while proficiency in Russian and English increased (Table 6).

Table 7. *What language do you use in your daily life? (%)*

Public spheres	Years	Only in Kazakh	More in Kazakh	Equally in Kazakh and Russian	More in Russian	Only in Russian	Other
In shopping centers, shops, markets	2022	8.8	13.2	36.2	26.0	15.9	-
	2023	6.6	27.6	39.8	11.6	14.5	-
In public transport	2022	9.3	11.9	39.9	20.8	18.3	-
	2023	3.6	29.3	31.8	20.5	14.9	
In intercity transport (buses, trains, planes)	2022	7.6	9.3	39.8	21.0	21.3	1.1
	2023	5.1	28.4	32.9	14.9	18.3	0.3
In educational institutions	2022	9.1	29.3	31.8	14.2	15.4	0.3
	2023	6.2	28.9	35.6	13.3	15.9	0.1
In healthcare facilities	2022	10.8	16.9	38.0	15.6	18.8	-
	2023	5.3	29.1	36.0	17.2	12.5	
In akimats, state self-government bodies	2022	13.1	16.5	36.6	15.2	18.8	-
	2023	14.0	32.1	25.9	14.7	13.4	-
In banks	2022	9.6	15.5	37.3	17.8	19.8	0.1
	2023	9.7	30.8	29.2	15.6	14.8	-
In public service centers	2022	12.3	16.9	35.0	17.3	18.6	
	2023	13.5	29.7	25.2	15.6	16.1	
In cinemas, theaters, museums	2022	6.4	12.7	38.3	20.3	22.4	
	2023	12.1	24.4	32.9	25.1	5.4	
In the police	2022	9.5	16.5	39.7	15.8	18.6	-
	2023	7.8	30.5	31.2	14.9	15.7	
In CAO	2022	7.6	12.7	41.7	17.1	21.0	0.1
	2023	11.3	25.6	33.5	13.3	16.3	-
In cafes, restaurants	2022	6.2	11.3	37.9	20.6	24.2	-
	2023	7.9	27.5	26.6	18.0	20.1	-
At work	2022	8.6	14.4	41.0	16.1	19.7	0.3
	2023	10.8	26.7	33.3	19.9	9.4	-

Source: Committee on Language Policy of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan

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The Kazakh language is used mainly in government institutions, and Russian in the private sector. Both languages are used equally in shopping centers, shops, markets, health care and education institutions (Table 7). As the study shows, the Kazakh language is used in narrow areas, while Russian is used in all spheres of public relations.

Table 8. *Name the main reason using Kazakh/Russian/other languages in everyday life, by region (%)*

City	I don't speak other languages	My surroundings speak only Kazakh	My surroundings speak only Russian	This is convenient for me	My environment speaks Kazakh and Russian
Abay region	-	73.4	13.6	9.7	3.2
Akmola region	5.5	33.5	61.0	-	-
Aktobe region	1.0	65.6	22.9	7.8	2.6
Almaty region	3.0	53.6	36.8	4.9	1.6
Atyrau region	5.3	40.9	53.8	-	-
West-Kazakhstan region	-	70.8	16.7	9.0	3.5
Jambyl region	4.0	44.2	48.7	2.7	0.4
Zhetisu region	0.8	72.0	14.4	9.3	3.4
Karaganda region	3.5	45.6	46.9	3.1	0.9
Kostanay region	3.5	51.0	39.5	4.5	1.5
Kyzylorda region	1.2	63.4	26.2	6.7	2.4
Mangistau region	4.2	42.3	48.6	3.5	1.4
Pavlodar region	2.4	56.0	32.7	6.5	2.4
North-Kazakhstan region	4.9	33.6	61.5	-	-
Turkestan region	2.9	52.9	38.4	4.2	1.6
Ulytau region	-	71.8	14.1	11.5	2.6
East Kazakhstan region	4.1	45.9	45.3	3.4	1.4
Astana city	2.3	57.3	32.7	5.8	1.9
Almaty city	3.2	48.3	43.1	4.1	1.3
Shymkent city	3.2	49.5	31.5	3.7	12.0

Source: Committee on Language Policy of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan

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At the same time, the population began to speak more Kazakh in everyday life, the number of people whose environment spoke only the state language increased by 32.2% compared to 2022 (20.5% in 2022, 52.7% in 2023) (Table 8).

Table 9. *For what reasons are you planning to leave the country? (%)*

Answer options	Quantity	%
Ignorance of the state language	72	17.2
Poor prospects for socio-economic development	52	12.4
Unhealthy environment, environmental problems	-	
Unsatisfactory social status and minimal social guarantees	86	20.6
The threat of religious extremism and terrorism	6	1.4
Problems of learning the Kazakh language	62	14.8
Desire to travel to your historical homeland	37	8.9
Constant difficulties in solving the housing problem	223	53.3
Threat of discrimination based on language	27	6.5
Poor medical care	3	0.7
Difficulties in obtaining quality education for children	37	8.9
Desire to change the situation, environment, climate	190	45.5
Solving problems in your personal life	82	19.6
Threat of Religious Harassment	53	12.7
Threat of harassment based on ethnicity	-	
Career	53	12.7
Children's future	42	10.0
High standard of living in another country	57	13.6
Prospects for improving social status	-	-
Reunions with relatives		-

Source: Committee on Language Policy of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Sociological research has shown that the ongoing state language policy is not the reason for migration from Kazakhstan. According to respondents, the main reasons for migration are housing problems and the desire to change the situation, environment, and climate. Only 17.5% of the population consider the reason for migration to be ignorance of the state language (Table 9).

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Table 10. *For what reasons are you planning to leave the country? by ethnic group*

Answer options		Kazakhs	Russians	Other
Ignorance of the state language	Quantity	32	18	22
	%	27	15	9,4
Poor prospects for socio-economic development	Quantity	27	15	10
	%	4.8	5.6	4.3
Unhealthy environment, environmental problems	Quantity	0	0	0
	%	0	0	0
Unsatisfactory social status and minimal social guarantees	Quantity	46	23	17
	%	8.1	8.6	7.2
The threat of religious extremism and terrorism	Quantity	4	1	1
	%	0.7	0.4	0.4
Problems of learning the Kazakh language	Quantity	50	7	5
	%	8.8	2.6	2.1
Desire to travel to your historical homeland	Quantity	30	5	2
	%	5.3	1.9	0.9
Constant difficulties in solving the housing problem	Quantity	114	56	53
	%	20.2	21.1	22.6
Threat of discrimination based on language	Quantity	18	6	3
	%	3.2	2.3	1.3
Poor medical care	Quantity	1	0	2
	%	0.2	0	0.9
Difficulties in obtaining quality education for children	Quantity	29	6	2
	%	5.1	2.3	0.9
Desire to change the situation, environment, climate	Quantity	70	64	56
	%	12.4	24.1	23.8
Solving problems in your personal life	Quantity	35	25	22
	%	6.2	9.4	9.4
Threat of Religious Harassment	Quantity	34	2	1
	%	6.0	0.8	0.4
Threat of harassment based on ethnicity	Quantity	0	0	0
	%	0	0	0
Career	Quantity	16	18	19
	%	2.8	6.8	8.1
Children's future	Quantity	39	2	1
	%	6.9	0.8	0.4
High standard of living in another country	Quantity	20	18	19
	%	3.5	6.8	8.1
Prospects for improving social status	Quantity	0	0	0
	%	0	0	0
Reunions with relatives	Quantity	0	0	0
	%	0	0	0

Source: Committee on Language Policy of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan

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If you look in the context of ethnic groups, then representatives of the Russian ethnic group believe that the main reasons for representatives of Russian and other ethnic groups moving from the country include the desire to change the situation, the environment, the climate – 24.1% (Table 10).

Table 11. *What language do you use for obtaining information on Internet resources? by region (%)*

City	Kazakh	Russian	English	Kazakh and Russian
Abay region	51.1	26.3	-	22.6
Akmola region	17.1	77.4	5.5	-
Aktobe region	43.9	37.4	1.2	17.5
Almaty region	32.9	53.4	3.2	10.6
Atyrau region	17.4	77.3	5.3	-
West-Kazakhstan region	48.0	30.4	-	21.6
Jambyl Region	25.5	64.8	4.2	5.6
Zhetisu region	49.5	29.1	1.0	20.4
Karaganda region	26.0	63.5	3.7	6.8
Kostanay region	30.9	57.4	3.7	8.0
Kyzylorda Region	40.5	42.6	1.4	15.5
Mangistau region	24.8	65.7	4.4	5.1
Pavlodar region	35.5	49.7	2.6	12.3
North-Kazakhstan region	16.4	78.7	4.9	-
Turkestan region	32.4	54.6	3.1	9.9
Ulytau region	50.0	25.8	-	24.2
East Kazakhstan region	27.3	62.2	4.2	6.3
Astana city	36.0	49.0	2.5	12.6
Almaty city	28.4	60.0	3.4	8.2
Shymkent city	30.0	58.6	3.4	7.9

Source: Committee on Language Policy of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan

There is also a correlation with ethnic composition in the choice of language when receiving information. Thus, information from the Internet in Russian is received mainly by residents of the North Kazakhstan (78.7%) and Akmola (77.4%) regions. Residents of the Ulytau (24.2%) and Abay (22.6%) regions most often receive information in Kazakh and Russian. There is also a correlation with ethnic composition in the choice of language when receiving information. Thus, information from the Internet in Russian is received mainly by residents of the North Kazakhstan (78.7%) and Akmola (77.4%) regions. Residents of the Ulytau (24.2%) and Abay (22.6%) regions most often receive information in Kazakh and Russian (Table 11).

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Table 12. *What changes, in your opinion, should be included in the current Law on Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan? (%)*

Answer options	%
The current law reflects the language needs of the population as fully as possible and does not need to be changed	28
The role and functions of the Kazakh language should be expanded as much as possible, thus we will create conditions under which all groups of the population will be fully proficient in the state language	52
It is necessary to give social status to the English language, this will contribute to its greater use in Kazakh realities	8,0
I think changes are needed taking into account the introduction of trilingual education, that is, Kazakh, Russian and English languages should be equivalent and equal in rights	12
Other	-

Source: Committee on Language Policy of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Half of the experts surveyed (52%) believe that the role and functions of the Kazakh language should be expanded as much as possible; a third of experts (28%) believe that the current law reflects the language needs of the population as fully as possible and does not need to be changed. Other experts believe (12%) that changes are needed taking into account the introduction of trilingual education, that is, Kazakh, Russian and English languages should be equivalent and equal (Table 12).

Table 13. *In your opinion, what kind of linguistic communicative environment has developed in Kazakhstan today? (%)*

Answer options	%
Bilingualism, equal use of both Russian and Kazakh languages	48.0
Dominance of the Kazakh language	8.0
Dominance of the Russian language	32.0
Even use of Kazakh and Russian languages and minor use of English	12.0
Other	-

Source: Committee on Language Policy of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Experts note that bilingualism has developed in Kazakhstan, in which Russian and Kazakh languages are used equally (48%), a third of experts believe (32%) that the Russian language dominates. Other experts believe that there is an even use of the Kazakh and Russian languages and a slight use of English (12%) (Table 13).

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Table 14. *What problems in your opinion, hinder the development of the state language in the country? (%)*

Answer options	%
Lack of quality textbooks, teaching aids and scientific literature in schools, colleges and universities	34.0
Inadequate teaching of the Kazakh language, problems of methodology and low quality of teaching literature	6.0
Low level of Kazakh-language content in all professional fields or its absence in general	22.0
An example of linguistic neglect by the managerial elite	6.0
Equal language capabilities for using the Russian language in official practice	8.0
Low quality of television and radio programs, magazines, films produced in the state language	6.0
Lack of adequate social prospects for the individual	14.0
Changes in the language sphere, for example, changing the alphabet, etc.	4.0
Poor teaching of the Kazakh language in Russian schools	-

Source: Committee on Language Policy of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan

The development of the Kazakh language is hampered by a number of reasons, according to experts. Thus, 34% of experts believe that in secondary, secondary specialized and higher educational institutions there is a lack of quality textbooks, teaching aids and scientific literature, 22.0% of experts noted the low level of Kazakh-language content in all professional fields or its absence in general.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The research findings presented in the introductory section underscore the pivotal role of language as a fundamental tool in nation-building efforts. In the case of Kazakhstan, where the Kazakh ethnic group constitutes the state-forming majority, the initiation of a comprehensive nation-building process is likely to face significant challenges. This article examines the complexities of language dynamics within the multi-ethnic context of Kazakhstan, drawing on the results of a sociological survey conducted in 2023.

One of the primary challenges to nation-building in Kazakhstan stems from the historical and regional ethnic distribution of the population. The northeastern regions of the country have long been predominantly populated by ethnic Russians and other Slavic groups, who traditionally communicate in Russian. As a result, Kazakh is more widely spoken in the southern, western, and central regions of

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Kazakhstan. This regional linguistic division complicates the broader process of nation-building, as linguistic and ethnic heterogeneity can contribute to societal fragmentation. Scholars have noted that such ethnic and linguistic diversity can serve as a "source of democratic instability and regional self-confidence," (Adelola, 2023), highlighting the potential risks associated with managing multi-ethnic and multilingual societies.

The study's findings indicate that despite the official promotion of bilingualism, Russian remains the dominant language in interethnic communication. While Kazakhs increasingly acquire proficiency in Russian, other ethnic groups, in turn, rely almost exclusively on Russian for communication, both among themselves and with Kazakhs. This linguistic imbalance is particularly notable in everyday and professional contexts, where Kazakh remains confined primarily to use among ethnic Kazakhs, while Russian serves as the lingua franca among different ethnic communities.

This linguistic dynamic complicates nation-building efforts, as it undermines the goal of promoting the Kazakh language as a unifying tool for interethnic communication. Instead, the Kazakh language continues to face challenges in penetrating other ethnic groups, who show limited motivation to learn and use it.

Another significant challenge highlighted by the research is the overwhelming consumption of media and information in Russian by both Kazakhs and other ethnic groups. The study suggests that Kazakh-language content is either insufficient in volume or fails to attract the interest of the population. As a result, Russian media remains the dominant source of information, entertainment, and educational materials. This trend has further contributed to the entrenchment of Russian as the primary language of communication in many aspects of daily life, including the dissemination of knowledge and culture.

Experts consulted in the study emphasized that one of the key obstacles to the development of the Kazakh language lies in the insufficient availability of high-quality educational resources, particularly textbooks and scientific literature. Moreover, the lack of comprehensive Kazakh-language content across various professional fields has impeded the language's advancement. Despite these challenges, there are indications that the situation is gradually improving. The publication of technical and scientific literature in Kazakh is increasing, and in certain academic disciplines, Kazakh is being used alongside Russian and other languages (Koptleuova, 2021). This shift reflects the growing importance of Kazakh in educational and professional contexts.

The demographic composition of Kazakhstan is undergoing significant changes, which are likely to have long-term implications for language policy. According to the 2021 national census, Kazakhs now make up 70.4% of the population, while Russians account for 15.5%. Over the past three decades, three notable trends have emerged in the educational system:

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The proportion of students attending Kazakh-language schools has increased substantially, from 32.3% to 66.0%. The number of students enrolled in schools that teach in minority languages (such as Uyghur, Uzbek, and Tajik) or foreign languages (such as English and Turkish) has also grown, rising from 2.6% to 4.5%. The number of Russian-language schools has decreased sharply, from 66.0% to 29.5%. These trends suggest that the role of Russian as a language of instruction is gradually declining across all levels of education. For the first time since 2007, the number of students receiving their education in Kazakh has exceeded those studying in Russian. This shift is especially evident in higher education, where the dominance of Russian has been steadily eroding since 2009 (Suleimenova, 2023; Smagulova, 2021).

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis of the sociological survey results, it is evident that, in the short term, the prospects for successful nation-building through the promotion of the Kazakh language remain limited. The concentration of ethnic Russians and other non-Kazakh groups in the northeastern regions of the country, combined with their reliance on Russian for interethnic communication, presents a significant barrier to the widespread adoption of Kazakh. Despite efforts to promote bilingualism, the dominance of the Russian language persists, largely due to the continued use of Russian by non-Kazakh ethnic groups and the growing proficiency of Kazakhs in Russian.

At the same time, there are signs of gradual progress. The number of individuals using Kazakh as their primary language of communication is increasing, and the growing proportion of Kazakhs in the population is likely to accelerate the spread of the language. If current demographic trends continue, the Kazakh language may eventually gain dominance in more spheres of public and professional life.

However, at present, the Kazakh language has not yet achieved the level of distribution necessary to serve as the foundation for a unified nation-building project in Kazakhstan. The government must address key challenges, including the development of high-quality educational resources, the production of engaging Kazakh-language media content, and the promotion of Kazakh as a language of interethnic communication, if it is to achieve its long-term nation-building goals.

In conclusion, while the Kazakh language's influence is increasing, significant obstacles remain to its full integration into all spheres of life in Kazakhstan. A comprehensive and sustained policy effort is required to ensure that the Kazakh language can fulfill its intended role as a central element of national identity and cohesion.

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BOOK REVIEW

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Book Review

ASIA AFTER EUROPE: IMAGINING A CONTINENT IN THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY

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Sugata Bose. Asia after Europe: Imagining a Continent in the Long Twentieth Century. Harvard University Press, 2024, pp. 288.

For one to get the gist of Sugata Bose's book, one should go to page one where the second line of the second paragraph features the memorable phrase: 'Asia is one'. Twice again throughout the book the Author's heroes repeat the same phrase on pages 71 and 116, which 'throughlines' the whole book by crafting the eternal leitmotif of the unified Asia. Sugata Bose's book is a carefully crafted and eloquently woven historical account of the hardships endured and opportunities taken and lost by the region of Asia over the 'long twentieth century.' The Author's choice of writing style is a conscious step aside from the typical academic prose with its dry fact-checking-oriented language towards a more reader-friendly literary style.

The book is a history of conversations - both political and cultural - between the representatives of the Asian society, 'some well-known, others rescued from undeserved oblivion'. The cast of Sugata Bose's book, which featured the Japanese art critic Okakura Tenshin, the Bengali poet, artist, and philosopher Rabindranath Tagore, the Indian political ethicist and an ardent anti-colonialist Mahatma Gandhi, Chinese intellectual and political figures exemplified by Sun Yat-Sen, Chiang Kai-Shek, Mao Zedong, and many others, spent years traversing the 'oriental' lands in search of the 'Asian soul.' The 'Asia after Europe,' however, does not offer a typical 'oriental vs occidental' type of narrative, but an attempt to take a look at Asia from the perspectives of Asians, hence the focus on connections rather than comparisons.

The first chapter unfolds the historical context of Asia's rapid decline following the commencement of the colonial era in the nineteenth century. The author explores how European-led imperialist aspirations not only manipulated both intra- and inter-Asian connectivity but also replaced pre-colonial layered sovereignty and a shared unity with the rigid structures of unitary sovereignty and borders. The psychological and intellectual fallout from this decline sent a series

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of shockwaves throughout the whole region as the Opium Wars casted a 'long shadow on the connected destiny of Asia'.

The second chapter examines the emergence of a multitude of various forms of Asian universalism, especially in the intellectual discourses of the early twentieth century. The chapter features the travels of Japanese art and critic Okakura Tenshin to India where he sought to invite Indian Swami Vivekananda, and later his disciple Sister Nivedita, to visit Japan in an attempt to promote the shared cultural unity. Okakura's pioneering success was in uniting the different forms of artistic techniques and approaches across Asia, and by that, showing Asia as a united living organism devoid of rigid boundaries established by 'Eur-American' colonial propaganda.

The third chapter focuses on the brief interwar years and the role of Asian youth movements in promoting revolutionary change. The Author explores how prominent intellectual figures like Benoy Kumar Sarkar formulated the vision of the concept of 'young Asia,' which inspired a whole new generation of Asians to stand up against Western imperial domination. The youth movements in India, China, and Japan exemplified a broader search for a modern 'free' Asia that could harness both its cultural heritage and the tools of modernity to challenge the European hegemony over Asia by demanding a 'justice that is to be interpreted by itself on the achievement of its own heroes'.

Chapter 4 delves into the history of intellectual debates and diverse visions of Asian unity that emerged during the early twentieth century. The Author deliberates on the tenets of the clash between cultural universalism, political activism, and spiritual idealism that shaped the broader discourse on what grounds Asia should oppose Western imperial colonial dominance in the region. The chapter puts a great emphasis on the fluid complexity of the intellectual landscape where several ideologies clashed, exemplified by Mahatma Gandhi who championed non-violent resistance and a more cosmopolitan-oriented spiritual form of solidarity, while Japan advocated for a more aggressive and militarized form of Asian unity. Here, the poet and philosopher Rabindranath Tagore expressed his disturbance with Japan adopting the way of the 'Western civilization of the rule of the might', while 'retaining characteristics of the Oriental civilization of the rule of the right'.

Chapter 5 explains how the implication of the Great Depression of the 1930s exacerbated the economic conditions of the colonized and semi-colonized nations of Asia and ultimately intensified the political unrest that gave rise to radical political ideologies. In short, the collapse of the international markets resulted in a withdrawal of Western investments from Asia, which severely impacted export-reliant nations, including Japan, China, and India. Eventually, the worsened economic conditions elevated the level of discontent with the colonial rule and sharpened anti-colonial sentiment across the whole region. The majority of political leaders started viewing the capitalist system as inefficient, which catalyzed the rise of communism in China, the spread of fascist ideology in Japan, and the socialist movement in India, which however, led to a heightened sense of intra-Asian solidarity.

Chapter 6 focuses on the World War II and its aftermath. It underscores the dev-

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astating impact the War brought to Asia reflected by the large-scale famines and loss of life. The Author goes at length in depicting the Bengal famine of 1943, which vividly exposed the failures of both the colonial system and national government in preventing mass starvation. Sugata Bose also shows how the impact of the War galvanized anti-colonial sentiment across Asia with figures like Mahatma Gandhi doubling their efforts in challenging colonial dominance. Nevertheless, despite the success in opposing colonial rule, the Author also reveals how the conflicting interests of China, India, and Japan fractured the prospects for Pan-Asian solidarity.

Chapter 7 is a pursuit to depict the tensions and contradictions that emerged in post-colonial Asia. The rise of nationalism and the state-building efforts of several new countries challenged the ideas of Pan-Asianism. Although the Bandung Conference was successful in bringing the Asian and African countries together to battle the remaining instances of imperialist rule and promote cooperation in the global south, the nature of the cooperation was not devoid of fragility with the Sino-India border conflict as an example. The rise of authoritarian tendencies and military rule in several countries also hindered the advance of Pan-Asianism and complicated efforts to build common solidarity in the era of Cold War geopolitics.

In the concluding chapter, the Author reflects on the current challenges faced by the Asian countries as the region continues to navigate its post-colonial discourse. Sugata Bose addresses the economic, political, and cultural transformations that took place in the mid-twentieth century and highlights the prospect of future cooperation between Asian countries. The Author believes that Asian countries are still capable of reconnecting and fostering meaningful solidarity between each other by addressing the issues of internal inequalities both economic and cultural and promoting democratic governance.

Overall, Sugata Bose's book might be a 'grail' for both general readers and academics interested in understanding the nature of the intra- and inter-Asian relations during the twentieth century. The book offers a detailed account of the reasons behind the choices made by the prominent figure of the Asian world, and what's the most important – the account taken from the Asian perceptive.

Eurasian Research Journal

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An article to be published in ***Eurasian Research Journal*** should not have been previously published or accepted for publication elsewhere. Papers presented at a conference or symposium may be accepted for publication if this is clearly indicated.

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Articles submitted to *Eurasian Research Journal* are first reviewed by the Editorial Board in terms of the journal's editorial principles. Those found unsuitable are returned to their authors for revision. Academic objectivity and scientific quality are considered of paramount importance. Submissions found suitable are referred to two referees working in relevant fields. The names of the referees are kept confidential and referee reports are archived for five years. If one of the referee reports is positive and the other negative, the article may be forwarded to a third referee for further assessment or alternatively, the Editorial Board may make a final decision based on the nature of the two reports. The authors are responsible for revising their articles in line with the criticism and suggestions made by the referees and the Editorial Board. If they disagree with any issues, they may make an objection by providing clearly-stated reasons. Submissions which are not accepted for publication are not returned to their authors.

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The language of the journal is English.

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Members of the Editorial Board of the Eurasian Research Journal adhere to the principles and norms of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE), as well as the Ethical Principles for the publication of Elsevier journals.

Publication ethics establish the norms, principles, and standards of ethical behavior for editors, reviewers, and authors, measures to identify conflicts of interest, unethical behavior, instructions for retraction, correction, and refutation of an article.

All participants in the publication process, in particular, each author, scientific editor, reviewer, executive secretary, members of the editorial board of the ERJ must unconditionally adhere to the principles, norms, and standards of publication ethics. Compliance with ethical principles is important both to ensure and maintain the quality of a scientific journal and to create trust and respect between the participants in the publication process.

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The editorial board of a learned journal is solely and independently responsible for deciding which of the articles submitted to the journal should be published. The editor shall ensure that the peer review process is fair, unbiased, and timely. Research articles must typically be reviewed by at least two external and independent reviewers, and where necessary the editor should seek additional opinions.

The editor shall select reviewers who have suitable expertise in the relevant field, taking account of the need for appropriate, inclusive and diverse representation. The editor shall follow best practices to avoid the selection of fraudulent peer reviewers. The editor shall review all disclosures of potential conflicts of interest and suggestions for self-citation made by reviewers to determine whether there is any potential for bias.

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The editor shall establish, along with the publisher, a transparent mechanism for appeal against editorial decisions.

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The editor must not attempt to influence the journal's ranking by artificially increasing any journal metric. In particular, the editor shall not require that references to that (or any other) journal's articles be included except for genuine scholarly reasons and authors should not be required to include references to the editor's own articles or products and services in which the editor has an interest.

Confidentiality

The editor must protect the confidentiality of all material submitted to the journal and all communications with reviewers unless otherwise agreed with the relevant authors and reviewers.

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Unpublished materials disclosed in a submitted manuscript must not be used in an editor's own research without the express written consent of the author. Privileged information or ideas obtained through peer review must be kept confidential and not used for personal advantage.

Declaration of competing interests

Any potential editorial conflicts of interest should be declared to the publisher in writing prior to the appointment of the editor and then updated if and when new conflicts arise. The publisher may publish such declarations in the journal.

The editor must not be involved in decisions about papers which s/he has written him/herself or have been written by family members or colleagues or which relate to products or services in which the editor has an interest. Further, any such submission must be subject to all of the journal's usual procedures, peer review must be handled independently of the relevant author/editor and their research groups, and there should be a clear statement to this effect on any such paper that is published.

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Authors of reports of original research should present an accurate account of the work performed as well as an objective discussion of its significance. Underlying data should be represented accurately in the paper. A paper should contain sufficient detail and references to permit others to replicate the work. Fraudulent or knowingly inaccurate statements constitute unethical behavior and are unacceptable.

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Authors may be asked to provide the research data supporting their paper for editorial review and/or to comply with the open data requirements of the journal. Authors should be prepared to provide public access to such data, if practicable, and should be prepared to retain such data for a reasonable number of years after publication. Authors may refer to their journal's Guide for Authors for further details.

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The authors should ensure that they have written entirely original works, and if the authors have used the work and/or words of others, that this has been appropriately cited or quoted and permission has been obtained where necessary.

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Authorship should be limited to those who have made a significant contribution to the conception, design, execution, or interpretation of the reported study. All those who have made substantial contributions should be listed as co-authors.

Where there are others who have participated in certain substantive aspects of the paper (e.g. language editing or medical writing), they should be recognized in the acknowledgments section.

The corresponding author should ensure that all appropriate co-authors and no inappropriate co-authors are included in the paper and that all co-authors have seen and approved the final version of the paper and have agreed to its submission for publication.

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All authors should disclose in their manuscript any financial and personal relationships with other people or organizations that could be viewed as inappropriately influencing (bias) their work.

All sources of financial support for the conduct of the research and/or preparation of the article should be disclosed, as should the role of the sponsor(s), if any, in study design; in the collection, analysis and interpretation of data; in the writing of the report; and in the decision to submit the article for publication. If the funding source(s) had no such involvement then this should be stated.

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It is not acceptable to enhance, obscure, move, remove, or introduce a specific feature within an image. Adjustments of brightness, contrast, or color balance are acceptable if and as long as they do not obscure or eliminate any information present in the original. Manipulating images for improved clarity is accepted, but manipulation for other purposes could be seen as scientific ethical abuse and will be dealt with accordingly.

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Please follow the steps listed below in order to register in the system:

1. Click the "Manuscript Handling System". Select "New User" and register in the system by filling in your title, name, surname and other information.

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3. If you would like to serve as a reviewer for our journal, click "Yes" for the relevant question found at the bottom of the screen. Then "Save" your answer.

4. In case of a mulfunction of the system or you simply cannot submit the article through the system for any reason, you can send your article directly to erj@eurasian-research.org after making it comply with the style guidelines below.

Please follow the steps listed below to submit an article:

1. Log into the system by entering your user name and password. Then click "Author" on the upper menu.

2. Click "New Submission".

3. Fill in all the required information concerning your submission and then upload the word file of your article to the system. **Make sure** that the word file you upload **does not** include an author name.

4. Once you make sure that all the required areas have been filled in, click "Send".

5. After submitting your article, make sure you see this statement on the screen: "Your data have been successfully entered."

6. Check to see if your article has been submitted from "My Submissions".

NOTES:

1. You will receive automatically generated emails when your article has been received and at every stage of the evaluation process.

2. Enter the information on your area of research even if you are not an Associate Professor or have not received tenure. It is essential that you fill in this information since articles are assigned to reviewers by using this information.

3. Please email info@eurasian-research.org regarding any queries regarding the system.

Publication fees

There are no submission fees, publication fees or page charges for this journal.

Style Guidelines

The following rules should be observed while preparing an article for submission to *Eurasıan Research Journal*:

1. Title of the article: The title should suit the content and express it in the best way, and should be written in **bold** letters. The title should consist of no more than 10-12 words.

2. Name(s) and address(es) of the author(s): The name(s) and surname(s) of the author(s) should be written in **bold** characters, and addresses should be in normal font and italicized; the institution(s) the author(s) is/are affiliated with, their contact and e-mail addresses should also be specified.

3. Abstract: The article should include an abstract in English at the beginning. The abstract should explain the topic clearly and concisely in a minimum of 75 and a maximum of 150 words. The abstract should not include references to sources, figures and charts. Keywords of 5 to 8 words should be placed at the end of the abstract. There should be a single space between the body of the abstract and the keywords. The keywords should be comprehensive and suitable to the content of the article. The English and Russian versions of the title, abstract and keywords should be placed at the end of the article. In case the Russian abstract is not submitted, it will be added later by the journal.

4. Body Text: The body of the article should be typed on A4 (29/7x21cm) paper on MS Word in Size 12 Times New Roman or a similar font using 1,5 line spacing. Margins of 2,5 cm should be left on all sides and the pages should be numbered. Articles should not exceed 8.000 words excluding the abstract and bibliography. Passages that need to be emphasized in the text should not be bold but italicized. Double emphases like using both italics and quotation marks should be avoided.

5. Section Titles: The article may contain main and sub-titles to enable a smoother flow of information. The main titles (main sections, bibliography and appedices) should be fully capitalized while the sub-titles should have only their first letters capitalized and should be written in bold characters.

6. Tables and Figures: Tables should have numbers and captions. In tables vertical lines should not be used. Horizontal lines should be used only to separate the subtitles within the table. The table number should be written at the top, fully aligned to the left, and should not be in italics. The caption should be written in italics, and the first letter of each word in the caption should be capitalized. Tables should be placed where they are most appropriate in the text. Figures should be prepared in line with black-and-white printing. The numbers and captions of the figures should be centered right below the figures. The figure numbers should be written in italics followed by a full-stop. The caption should immediately follow the number. The caption should not be written in italics, and the first letter of each word should be capitalized. Below is an example table.

Table 1. *Information Concerning Publications in Eurasian Research Journal*

Publication type	**Number of publication**	**Number of pages**			**Number of references**		
		N	X	SS	N	X	SS
Article	96	2,042	21.3	7.5	2,646	27.6	15.8
Book review	4	30	7.5	4.4	31	7.8	8.3
Total	100	2,072	20.7	7.9	2,677	26.8	16.1

Source: Statistical Country Profiles

7. Pictures: Pictures should be attached to the articles scanned in high-resolution print quality. The same rules for figures and tables apply in naming pictures.

The number of pages for figures, tables and pictures should not exceed 10 pages (one-third of the article). Authors having the necessary technical equipment and software may themselves insert their figures, drawings and pictures into the text provided these are ready for printing.

Below is an example of a picture.

Picture 1. *Ancient Rune script*



Source: en.wiktionary.org

8. Quotations and Citations: Direct quotations should be placed in quotation marks. Quotations shorter than 2.5 lines should be placed within the flowing text. If the quotation is longer that 2.5 lines, it should be turned into a block quote with a 1.5 cm indentation on the right and left, and the font size should be 1 point smaller. Footnotes and endnotes should be avoided as much as possible. They should only be used for essential explanations and should be numbered automatically.

Citations within the text should be given in parentheses as follows:

(Koprulu 1944: 15)

When sources with several authors are cited, the surname of the first author is given and 'et. al' is added.

(Gokay et al. 2002: 18)

If the text already includes the name of the author, only the date should be given:

In this respect, Tanpinar (1976: 131) says …

In sources and manuscripts with no publication date, only the surname of the author should be written; in encyclopedias and other sources without authors, only the name of the source should be written.

While quoting from a quotation, the original source should also be specified:

Koprulu (1926, qtd. in Celik 1998).

Personal interviews should be cited within the text by giving the surnames and dates; they should also be cited in the bibliography. Internet references should always include date of access and be cited in the bibliography.

www.turkedebiyatiisimlersozlugu.com [Accessed: 15.12.2014]

9. Transliteration of Ukrainian to English

Transliteration from the Ukrainian to the Latin alphabet should follow the system officially approved by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers in 2010 (https://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/ungegn/docs/26th-gegn-docs/WP/WP21_Roma_system_Ukraine%20_

engl._.pdf). When transliterating place names, Ukrainian names are preferred to Russian equivalents: for example, Mykolaiv rather than Nikolaev, Kyiv rather than Kiev. However, for historical references to Ukrainian cities, it may be appropriate to use Russian names if they were in wide use at the time.

Please, use UK English in your manuscript.

10. References: References should be placed at the end of the text, the surnames of authors in alphabetical order. The work cited should be entered with the surname of the author placed at the beginning:

Example:

Isen, Mustafa (2010). *Tezkireden Biyografiye*. Istanbul: Kapi Yay.

Koprulu, Mehmet Fuat (1961). *Azeri Edebiyatinin Tekamulu*. Istanbul: MEB Yay.

If a source has two authors, the surname of the first author should be placed first; it is not functional to place the surname of the other authors first in alphabetical order.

Example:

Taner, Refika and Asim Bezirci (1981). *Edebiyatimizda Secme Hikayeler*. Basvuru Kitaplari. Istanbul: Gozlem Yay.

If a source has more than three authors, the surname and name of the first author should be written, and the other authors should be indicated by et.al.

Example:

Akyuz, Kenan et al. (1958). *Fuzuli Turkce Divan*. Ankara: Is Bankasi Yay.

The titles of books and journals should be italicized; article titles and book chapters should be placed in quotation marks. Page numbers need not be indicated for books. Shorter works like journals, encyclopedia entries and book chapters, however, require the indication of page numbers.

Example:

Berk, Ilhan (1997). *Poetika*. Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yay.

Demir, Nurettin (2012). “Turkcede Evidensiyel”. *Eurasıan Research Journal*, *Turk Dunyasi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 62(2): 97-117. doi: https://doi.org/10.53277/2519-2442-2021.2-01.

Translator’s, compiler’s and editor’s names (if there are any) should follow the author and title of the work:

Example:

Shaw, Stanford (1982). *Osmanli Imparatorlugu*. Trans. Mehmet Harmanci. Istanbul: Sermet Matb.

If several references by the same author need to be cited, then the name and surname of the author need not be repeated for subsequent entries following the first entry. A long dash may be used instead. Several references by the same author should be listed according to the alphabetical order of work titles.

Example:

Develi, Hayati (2002). *Evliya Celebi Seyahatnamesine Gore 17. Yuzyil Osmanli Turkcesinde Ses Benzesmesi ve Uyumlar.* Ankara: TDK Yay.

_____ (2003). *XVIII. Yuzyil İstanbul Hayatina Dair Risale-i Garibe.* Istanbul: Kitabevi.

If **more than one work by the same author of the same date** need to be cited, they should be indicated by (a, b).

Example:

Develi, Hayati (2002a). *Evliya Celebi Seyahatnamesine Gore 17. Yuzyil Osmanli Turkcesinde Ses Benzesmesi ve Uyumlar.* Ankara: TDK Yay.

Develi, Hayati (2002b). *XVIII. Yuzyil Istanbul Hayatina Dair Risale-i Garibe.* Istanbul: Kitabevi

For **encylopedia entries**, if the author of the encylopedia entry is known, the author's surname and name are written first. These are followed by the date of the entry, the title of the entry in quotation marks, the full name of the encyclopedia, its volume number, place of publication, publisher and page numbers:

Example:

Ipekten, Haluk (1991). "Azmi-zâde Mustafa Haleti". *İslam Ansiklopedisi*. C. 4. Istanbul: Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi Yay. 348-349.

For **theses and dissertations**, the following order should be followed: surname and name of the author, date, full title of thesis in italics, thesis type, city where the university is located, and the name of the university:

Example:

Karakaya, Burcu (2012). *Garibi'nin Yusuf u Zuleyha'si: Inceleme-Tenkitli Metin-Dizin*. Master's Thesis. Kirsehir: Ahi Evran Universitesi.

Handwritten manuscripts should be cited in the following way: Author. Title of Work. Library. Collection. Catalogue number. sheet.

Example:

Asım. *Zeyl-i Zubdetu'l-Es'ar*. Millet Kutuphanesi. A. Emiri Efendi. No. 1326. vr. 45a.

To cite **a study found on the Internet**, the following order should be followed: Author surname, Author name. "Title of message". Internet address. (Date of Access)

Example:

Turkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankasi. "Gecinme Endeksi (Ucretliler)" Elektronik Veri Dagitim Sistemi. http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr/ (Accessed: 04.02.2009).

An article accepted for publication but not yet published can be cited in the following way:

Example:

Atilim, Murat ve Ekin Tokat (2008). "Forecasting Oil Price Movements with Crack Spread Futures". *Energy Economics*. In print (doi:10.1016/ j.eneco.2008.07.008).

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMITTING BOOK REVIEWS

Apart from Academic Articles, the Eurasian Research Journal (ERJ) publishes Book Reviews. Usually, there are two Book Reviews published in each issue of the journal. The following rules should be observed while preparing a Book Review for submission to the ERJ:

1. The topic of the book should match with the scope of the ERJ.

2. Only reviews on recently published books are accepted. The book that is to be to reviewed must be published within less than a year before the intended date of the publication of ERJ.

3. A Book Review should contain a concise description, critical view, and/or evaluation of the meaning and significance of a book. A normal Book Review should contain approximately 800-1000 words.

4. Name(s) and address(es) of the author(s): The name(s) and surname(s) of the author(s) should be written in bold characters, and addresses should be in normal font and italicized; the institution(s) the author(s) is/are affiliated with, their contact and e-mail addresses should also be specified.

5. The text of a Book Review should be typed on A4 (29/7x21cm) paper on MS Word in Size 12 Times New Roman or a similar font using 1.5 line spacing. Margins of 2.5 cm should be left on all sides and the pages should be numbered.

6. Tables and Figures should not be used in a Book Review.

7. All Author(s) should refrain from using contractions, first or second person viewpoints, incomplete sentences, ambiguous terminology, and slang, informal style as well as wordy phrases.

8. Author(s) are recommended to proofread and copyedit their Book Review prior to submitting.

Book Reviews should be submitted using the Manuscript Handling System option at http://erj.eurasian-research.org/yonetim/login/index.php