Democracy, Democratization, Institutions, and Inequality: Nobel-Winning Insights from Daron Acemoglu and His Collaborators

Year 2026, Volume: 15 Issue: 1, 161 - 178, 29.01.2026

Ali Resul Usul

https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.1665472

Abstract

This paper explores the seminal contributions of Daron Acemoglu and his collaborators to the understanding of democracy, democratization, institutions, and inequality, as recognized by the 2024 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. It delves into the stability and erosion of democratic institutions, emphasizing the interplay between historical legacies, class structures, and strategic political interactions. The analysis synthesizes insights from rational-choice theory, historical institutionalism, and comparative political economy, highlighting the critical role of both formal and informal institutions in shaping political outcomes. Key concepts such as critical junctures, path dependence, and the dynamic balance between state capacity and societal power—termed the “Red Queen effect”—are examined to explain the persistence and transformation of political regimes. The paper also addresses the implications of economic inequality for democratic stability and the continuous process of adaptation required to maintain inclusive institutions. By integrating theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence, this work provides a comprehensive framework for understanding the complex dynamics of democratization and offers policy recommendations for strengthening democratic resilience in the face of contemporary challenges.

Keywords

Democracy , Institutions , Inequality , Path Dependence , Critical Junctures , Acemoglu

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