Perception and Continuity: Active Non-Alignment in Turkish Foreign Policy

Abstract

This study analyses Turkish foreign policy between 2010 and 2025, asking whether this period marks a strategic rupture or reflects continuity with the longstanding Westernisation trajectory. Employing the emerging framework of Active Non-Alignment (ANA), the study examines how Turkey’s redefinition of strategic interests and alignments reflects shifting global and regional dynamics. The findings suggest that while institutional and ontological ties to the West persist, Turkish foreign policy demonstrates a perceptual shift characterised by strategic autonomy, diversified partnerships, and issue-based pragmatism. By applying ANA to this evolving policy orientation, the study offers both a reinterpretation of Turkish foreign policy continuity and a theoretical contribution to the emerging literature on alternative alignment strategies in global politics.

Keywords

• Active Non-Alignment
• Turkish foreign policy
• continuity
• Westernisation

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