Real-Effort Tasks in Laboratory Experiments

Öz

Laboratory experiments used in economics are differentiated in terms of many technical features. One of these technical features is whether the experiment involves a real-effort task. A real-effort task can be defined as a task in which the experiment participants work on a real job during the experiment, spend time and effort, determine their performance level and as a result earn a certain amount of money. This study aims to examine real-effort tasks that are frequently used in experimental economics studies, and to discuss potential problems that researchers may face when conducting experiments with real-effort tasks. Within the scope of this review, real-effort tasks commonly used in the literature are categorized under four groups: real-effort tasks based on mathematical operations, puzzles, slider task, and word encryption tasks. Choice of the real-effort task is important for an experimental study because it may lead to misinterpretation of the findings. As a result of the study, the learning effect, the boredom of the task and the abilities required by the task are seen as possible sources of measurement error. While the learning effect and boredom may cause problems especially in within-subject designs, it was found that differences in the abilities of participants may cause measurement errors especially in between-subject designs.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Laboratory Experiments
• Real-Effort Task
• Experimental Economics

Laboratuvar Deneylerinde Gerçek-Emek Görevleri

Öz

Ekonomi biliminde kullanılan laboratuvar deneyleri birçok teknik özellik bakımından birbirinden farklılaştırılmaktadır. Bu teknik özelliklerden biri de deneyin gerçek-emek görevi içerip içermediğidir. Gerçek-emek görevi, deney katılımcılarının deney esnasında gerçek bir iş üzerinde çalıştıkları, zaman ve emek harcadıkları ve bu şekilde performans seviyelerini belirledikleri, sonucunda belirli bir miktarda para kazandıkları görev olarak açıklanmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı deneysel ekonomi çalışmalarında sıklıkla kullanılan gerçek-emek görevlerini incelemek ve gerçek-emek görevi içeren deney yürütecek araştırmacıların karşılaşabilecekleri olası sorunları tartışmaktır. Bu inceleme kapsamında, literatürde sıkça kullanılan gerçek-emek görevleri dört başlık altında toplanmıştır: Matematiksel işlemlere dayalı gerçek-emek görevleri, bulmaca tarzındaki gerçek-emek görevleri, kaydırma çubuğu görevi ve kelime şifreleme görevi. Deney için hangi gerçek-emek görevinin seçildiği çalışmanın sonuçları açısından önemlidir zira sonuçların hatalı şekilde yorumlanmasına sebebiyet verebilme ihtimali vardır. Çalışma sonucunda, öğrenme etkisi, görevin sıkıcılığı ve görevin gerektirdiği yetenekler yaşanabilecek olası ölçme hatalarının kaynağı olarak görülmektedir. Öğrenme etkisi ve görevin sıkıcılığı özellikle denek-içi tasarımlarda problemlere sebebiyet verebilirken, yetenek farklılıklarının ise özellikle denekler-arası tasarımlarda ölçme hatalarına neden olabileceği bulgularına ulaşılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Laboratuvar Deneyleri
• Gerçek-Emek Görevi
• Deneysel Ekonomi

Kaynakça

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