Kamu Eğitim Yatırımı, Ekonomik Büyüme ve Refah: Tercih Heterojenliği Altında Ekonomi-Politik Bir Analiz

Yıl 2024, , 887 - 908, 24.05.2024

Nusret Doru

https://doi.org/10.25295/fsecon.1415936

Öz

Bu çalışma, kamu eğitim politikasının siyasi yönünü ve bunun ekonomik büyüme ve refah üzerindeki etkisini nesiller arası fedakarlık çerçevesinde incelemektedir. Çalışma, altruistik örtüşen nesillere sahip içsel bir büyüme modelini göz önünde bulunduruyor. Uzun vadeli ekonomik genişlemeyi teşvik etmedeki önemli rolü nedeniyle, kamu eğitimine yapılan yatırımları verimli hükümet müdahalesinin etkili bir aracı olarak değerlendiriyoruz. Bununla birlikte, kamu eğitim yatırımları, nesiller arası yeniden dağıtımına ilişkin etkilerinden dolayı siyasi tartışmaların konusu olmuştur. Demokratik olarak seçilmiş hükümetlerin siyasi güçlerini koruma eğilimlerinin de desteğiyle, belirli bireylerin veya birey gruplarının tercihleri, eğitime yapılan kamu yatırımı düzeyinin belirlenmesine ilişkin siyasi süreçte daha baskın hale gelmektedir. Özellikle hükümetler ortalama seçmenin veya genel olarak mevcut neslin tercihleriyle daha fazla ilgilenirler, çünkü bu bireyler seçmen olarak bir sonraki hükümeti belirleme yeteneğine sahipler. Bu gerçek, hükümetlerin bu insanların arzuları karşısında taraflı davranmalarına yol açmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, bu tür politik düşünceler ekonomiyi optimal ekonomik büyüme yolundan saptırmakta ve gelecek nesillerin refahını azaltmaktadır. Bu etki, çocuklarına karşı daha düşük seviyede özgecilik sergileyen bireylerin, eğitim için kamu fonlarının tahsisi konusunda siyasi karar alma sürecinde daha etkili bir pozisyona sahip olmaları durumunda daha da belirgin hale gelmektedir. Teorik analizlerimiz, tarafsız bir sosyal planlamacı tarafından alınan kararlara kıyasla, doğası gereği taraflı olan ve demokratik olarak seçilmiş hükümetler tarafından alınan politika kararlarının ekonomik büyüme ve refah üzerindeki etkilerini göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

İçsel Büyüme, Refah, Yeniden Dağıtma, Kamu Politikası, Eğitim, Beşeri Sermaye, Ortalama Seçmen

Public Education Investment, Economic Growth and Welfare: A Political Economy Analysis with Preference Heterogeneity

Öz

This study examines the politics of public education policy and its impact on economic growth and welfare under intergenerational altruism. The study considers an endogenous growth model with altruistic overlapping generations. Due to its significant role in promoting long-term economic expansion, we consider investment in public education to be an effective tool of productive government intervention. Nonetheless, public educational investment has been the subject of political disputes owing to its inherent intergenerational redistributive implications. Backed by the tendency of democratically elected governments to maintain their political power, the preferences of some particular individuals or group of individuals become more dominant in the political process of determining the level of public investment in education. In particular, governments are more concerned with the preferences of the median voter, or the current generation at large, because they, as electors, have the ability to determine the next government. This reality leads governments to exhibit a bias toward the desires of these people. As a result, such political considerations divert the economy from its optimal path of economic growth and reduce the welfare of future generations. This effect becomes more pronounced when individuals with lower levels of altruism toward their offspring assume a more influential position in the political decision-making process over the allocation of public funds for education. Our theoretical analyses demonstrate the implications for economic growth and welfare resulting from policy decisions made by democratically elected governments with inherent biases, as opposed to decisions made by an unbiased social planner.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Endogenous Growth, Welfare, Redistribution, Public Policy, Education, Human Capital, Median Voter

Etik Beyan

Bu çalışmanın tüm hazırlanma süreçlerinde etik kurallara uyulduğunu yazarlar beyan eder. Aksi bir durumun tespiti halinde Fiscaoeconomia Dergisinin hiçbir sorumluluğu olmayıp, tüm sorumluluk çalışmanın yazarlarına aittir.

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