Measuring the Simultaneous Quantity Game in OMEL Spot Electricity Market

Yıl 2015, Cilt: 5 Sayı: 1, 305 - 320, 01.03.2015

Victor Moutinho António Carrizo Moreira Jorge H. Mota

Öz

In the electricity spot market the various competitive levels, as well as their subsequent changes in the market equilibrium, are justified by the simultaneous quantity game between electricity generators. It is expected that the dominant market players employ differentiated strategic behaviours, thus, permitting the quantification of such differentiated effects on the use of market power. The various competitive levels, as well as their subsequent changes in the market equilibrium, are justified by the simultaneous quantity game. The results show that the quantities purchased in the spot market for sale in open market influence prices, i.e., when there is an imbalance in the estimated long-term relationship, prices themselves move in order to recover the state of equilibrium, which reveals that, in the long-term, the OMEL Price is weakly exogenous to the cointegration vector, whereas quantities purchased for sale in open market move towards the reestablishment of the long-term equilibrium

Anahtar Kelimeler

Market Conduct, Collusion, Electricity Spot Market, Market power