On Provable Security of Cryptographic Schemes

Year 2013, Volume: 2 Issue: 2, 44 - 56, 28.06.2013

Turgut Hanoymak

Abstract

Provable security is an important issue in modern cryptography because it satisfies the security of the encryption schemes in a theoretical way via a reduction method. Typically, a mathematically hard problem M is reduced to breaking the scheme S that is wanted to be proven secure. Existence of such a reduction implies that the problem of breaking the scheme S is as hard as M. This reduction results in a contradiction by arguing that if there exists a polynomial time algorithm A breaking S, then one consructs a polynomial time algorithm B to solve M by using A as a subroutine. Besides, to prove the security of a cryptographic scheme, it is necessarry to define the goals and the capabilities of the adversary. In this paper, we review security models in terms of the adversarial goals and the adversarial capabilities. We define what security actually means to decide whether a scheme is secure. We review the definition of provably security by means of several games between the challenger and the adversary in some security models, namely the standard model and the random oracle model. We state the main differences between these two models and observe the advantage of the success probability of the adversary in breaking the cryptographic schemes. We investigate the security of some public key encryption schemes such as RSA, ElGamal, Cramer-Shoup and discuss under which circumstances they satisfy which security notions.

Keywords

—provable security, security notions, public key encryption, standard model, random oracle model

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