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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL EVOLUTION: ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS

Yıl 2007, Cilt: 57 Sayı: 2, 27 - 48, 26.01.2012

Öz

Recent game theoretical studies illustrate that mutual trust among people is
what a society needs to be able to sustain a market order on a long-term basis and
at reasonable transaction costs. In this context, social norms play a crucial role in
the evolution of the economic structure, On the other hand, the evolution of the
market structure and other economic institutions means something more than
simply a change in the ways of allocation of goods and resources and has a
profound effect on social norms and values that form our preferences. In this
paper, by drawing on the game theory literature, we first explore the role played
by social norms and generalized morality in the expansion of markets. Secondly,
by using the endogenous preferences model, we discuss how these social norms
can be influenced by the evolution of the economic structure. The last part of the
paper is a case study on conversion to Islam in Sub Saharan Africa, in which we
test the relevance of our theoretical arguments.

Kaynakça

  • Ames Ruth and Gerald Marweli. 1981. "Economists Free Ride. Does Anyone Else?" Journal of Public Economics 15: 295-310.
  • Axelrod, Robert. 1997. The Complexity of Cooperation. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
  • Bowles, Samuel. 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions." Journal of Economic Literature, 36: 75-111.
  • Bowles, Samuel. 2000. "Individual Interactions, Group Conflicts and the Evolution of Preferences" in Social Dynamics, Steven Durlauf and Peyton Young (ed), Cambridge: M I T Press.
  • Boyd, Robert and Peter J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 48
  • Buchanan, James M . 1975. The Limits of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,.
  • Clarke, Peter B. 1982. West Africa and Islam. London: Arnoid.
  • Dasgupta, Partha. 1988. "Trust as a Commodity", in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, Gambetta, D (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackweil.
  • Ensminger, Jean. 1997. "Transaction Costs and Islam: Explaining Conversion in Africa", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 153: 4-29.
  • Frank, Robert H . 1988. Passions within Reason. New York and London: W W . Norton.
  • Frank, Robert H., Thomas D. Gilovich and Dennis T. Regan. 1993. "Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 7:159-171.
  • Frank, Robert H., Thomas D. Gilovich and Dennis T. Regan. 1996. "Do Economists Make Bad Citizens?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 10: 177-186.
  • Hobbes, Thomas. 1949. De Cive or the Citizen. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc.
  • Horton, Robin. 1971. "African Conversion", Africa 41: 85-108.
  • Horton, Robin. 1975. "On the Rationality of Conversion", Africa 45: 220-235.
  • Iannaccone, Laurence. 1992, "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Rİding İn Cults, Communes and Other Collectives." Journal of Political Economy 100: 271-91.
  • Iannaccone, Laurence. 1998. "Introduction to Economics of Religion." Journal of Economic Literature 36:1465-1496,
  • Kuran, Timur. 1995. Private Truths, Public Lies: Social Consequences of Preference Falsification. Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press.
  • Kuran, Timur. 1997, "Islam and Underdevelopment: A n Old Puzzle Revisited." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 153: 41-71.
  • Last, Murray. 1979. "Some Economic Aspects of Conversion in Hausaland." in Conversion to Islam. N . Levtzton (ed), New York: Holmes & Meier, 236-246.
  • North, Douglass C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York and London: WW. Norton.
  • Perinbam, Marie B. 1980. "The Julas in Western Sudanese History: Long distance Traders and Developers of Resources", in West African Culture Dynamics: Archaeological and Historical Perspectives, B.K. Swartz, Jr. and Raymond E. Dummett (ed),The Hague: Mouton, 455-76.
  • Platteau, Jean-Phi 11 İpe. "Behind the Market Stage Where Real Societies Exist-Part I I : The Role of Moral Norms." Journal of Development Studies, 30: 753-817.
  • Trimingham, John S. 1962, History of Islam in West Africa. Oxford University Press, London.
  • Weber, Max. [1922] 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley: University of California Press.
  • Yezer, Anthony M . , Robert Goldfarb, and Paul J Poppen. 1996. "Does Studying Economics Discourage Cooperation? Watch What We Do, Not What We Say or How We Play." Journal, of Economic Perspectives 10: 1776-186.

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL EVOLUTION: ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS

Yıl 2007, Cilt: 57 Sayı: 2, 27 - 48, 26.01.2012

Öz

Son dönemdeki oyun teorisi çalışmaları toplumun düşük İşlem maliyetli bir
piyasa düzenini uzun vadede sürdürebilmek için bireyler arasındaki karşılıklı
güven ilişkisine ihtiyaç duyduğuna işaret eder. Bu bağlamda, sosyal normlar
iktisadi yapının evriminde belirleyicidirler, Diğer yandan, piyasanın ve diğer
iktisadi kurumların dönüşümü sadece malların ve kaynakların tahsisinden öte
tercihlerimizi şekillendiren sosyal normlar ve değerler üzerinde belirleyici rol
oynar. Bu makalede, oyun teorisi literatürü üzerinden örneklerle, öncelikle sosyal
normlarin ve genel ahlak yapısının piyasalarin gelişmesindeki rolünü
inceleyeceğiz. İkinci olarak, endojen tercihler modeli üzerinden sosyal normlarin
iktisadi yapının evrim sürecinde nasıl değişebileceğini tartışacağız. Son bölümde
ise Salıara Altı Afrikasmda Müslümanlığa geçiş süreci üzerine yapılan çalışmalar
üzerinden teorik argümanlarımızın geçerliliğini sınayacağız.

Kaynakça

  • Ames Ruth and Gerald Marweli. 1981. "Economists Free Ride. Does Anyone Else?" Journal of Public Economics 15: 295-310.
  • Axelrod, Robert. 1997. The Complexity of Cooperation. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
  • Bowles, Samuel. 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions." Journal of Economic Literature, 36: 75-111.
  • Bowles, Samuel. 2000. "Individual Interactions, Group Conflicts and the Evolution of Preferences" in Social Dynamics, Steven Durlauf and Peyton Young (ed), Cambridge: M I T Press.
  • Boyd, Robert and Peter J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 48
  • Buchanan, James M . 1975. The Limits of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,.
  • Clarke, Peter B. 1982. West Africa and Islam. London: Arnoid.
  • Dasgupta, Partha. 1988. "Trust as a Commodity", in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, Gambetta, D (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackweil.
  • Ensminger, Jean. 1997. "Transaction Costs and Islam: Explaining Conversion in Africa", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 153: 4-29.
  • Frank, Robert H . 1988. Passions within Reason. New York and London: W W . Norton.
  • Frank, Robert H., Thomas D. Gilovich and Dennis T. Regan. 1993. "Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 7:159-171.
  • Frank, Robert H., Thomas D. Gilovich and Dennis T. Regan. 1996. "Do Economists Make Bad Citizens?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 10: 177-186.
  • Hobbes, Thomas. 1949. De Cive or the Citizen. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc.
  • Horton, Robin. 1971. "African Conversion", Africa 41: 85-108.
  • Horton, Robin. 1975. "On the Rationality of Conversion", Africa 45: 220-235.
  • Iannaccone, Laurence. 1992, "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Rİding İn Cults, Communes and Other Collectives." Journal of Political Economy 100: 271-91.
  • Iannaccone, Laurence. 1998. "Introduction to Economics of Religion." Journal of Economic Literature 36:1465-1496,
  • Kuran, Timur. 1995. Private Truths, Public Lies: Social Consequences of Preference Falsification. Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press.
  • Kuran, Timur. 1997, "Islam and Underdevelopment: A n Old Puzzle Revisited." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 153: 41-71.
  • Last, Murray. 1979. "Some Economic Aspects of Conversion in Hausaland." in Conversion to Islam. N . Levtzton (ed), New York: Holmes & Meier, 236-246.
  • North, Douglass C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York and London: WW. Norton.
  • Perinbam, Marie B. 1980. "The Julas in Western Sudanese History: Long distance Traders and Developers of Resources", in West African Culture Dynamics: Archaeological and Historical Perspectives, B.K. Swartz, Jr. and Raymond E. Dummett (ed),The Hague: Mouton, 455-76.
  • Platteau, Jean-Phi 11 İpe. "Behind the Market Stage Where Real Societies Exist-Part I I : The Role of Moral Norms." Journal of Development Studies, 30: 753-817.
  • Trimingham, John S. 1962, History of Islam in West Africa. Oxford University Press, London.
  • Weber, Max. [1922] 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley: University of California Press.
  • Yezer, Anthony M . , Robert Goldfarb, and Paul J Poppen. 1996. "Does Studying Economics Discourage Cooperation? Watch What We Do, Not What We Say or How We Play." Journal, of Economic Perspectives 10: 1776-186.
Toplam 26 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil İngilizce
Konular İşletme
Bölüm Makaleler
Yazarlar

Murat Birdal Bu kişi benim

Yayımlanma Tarihi 26 Ocak 2012
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2007 Cilt: 57 Sayı: 2

Kaynak Göster

APA Birdal, M. (2012). ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL EVOLUTION: ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS. İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası, 57(2), 27-48.
AMA Birdal M. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL EVOLUTION: ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS. İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası. Ocak 2012;57(2):27-48.
Chicago Birdal, Murat. “ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL EVOLUTION: ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS”. İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası 57, sy. 2 (Ocak 2012): 27-48.
EndNote Birdal M (01 Ocak 2012) ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL EVOLUTION: ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS. İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası 57 2 27–48.
IEEE M. Birdal, “ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL EVOLUTION: ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS”, İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası, c. 57, sy. 2, ss. 27–48, 2012.
ISNAD Birdal, Murat. “ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL EVOLUTION: ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS”. İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası 57/2 (Ocak 2012), 27-48.
JAMA Birdal M. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL EVOLUTION: ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS. İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası. 2012;57:27–48.
MLA Birdal, Murat. “ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL EVOLUTION: ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS”. İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası, c. 57, sy. 2, 2012, ss. 27-48.
Vancouver Birdal M. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL EVOLUTION: ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS. İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası. 2012;57(2):27-48.