ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND GLOBALIZATION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBALIZATION LEVEL OF TARGET STATE ON SANCTIONS EFFICACY

Year 2019, , 41 - 54, 30.03.2019

Murad Duzcu

https://doi.org/10.17261/Pressacademia.2019.1027

Abstract

Purpose - When do states resist the threat of sanctions or comply with the demands of the political unit imposing sanctions? This article

argues that if the target has a high globalization index, it conforms to the demands of the sender. Therefore, the article examines the

impact of target’s globalization level on the initiation and success of economic sanctions as a frequently used foreign policy tool.

Methodology - In combination of two datasets, (for sanctions cases, Hufbauer et al, 2007; and for globalization index Raab et al, 2007), this

article, uses 72 sanctions cases from Hufbauer et al. (2007) dataset to examine some indicators of sanctions efficacy. A probit model is used

to analyze the hypotheses.

Findings - The findings of the empirical models presented in the article, reveal a positive relationship between the efficacy of economic

sanctions and the high level of globalization in target state. Thus, as targets become globalized, the efficacy of sanctions increases.

Empirical evidence has been found in the models as the relationship between sanctions success and globalization has been indicated, since

cultural globalization index is used as an indicator of regime type and, most importantly, due to the presumed relationship between

winning coalitions and cultural globalization.

Conclusion - It has been found that cultural globalization leads to political change that causes transitional political systems to emerge for

such states. Referring to the selectorate theory, it is claimed that the winning coalition is possibly wider and the scope of this coalition can

be determined without identifying a regime type for the target. In addition, cultural globalization leads to social change that may affect

public opinion. As such the audience costs are higher in culturally globalized targets because it requires a publicly accepted foreign policy

behavior.

Keywords

Economic sanctions, globalization, sanctions efficacy, compliance, human rights, financial sanctions

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