R&D EXPENDITURES AND EARNINGS TARGETS: EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE

Yıl 2015, Cilt: 2 Sayı: 2, 0 - 0, 29.06.2015

Rihab Guidara Younes Boujelbene

Öz

Research and development (R&D) investments reduce current-period earnings while the benefits associated with the investments occur in the future. This problem implies an earnings management tool to boost short-term performance. While there is much evidence regarding managerial discretion through R&D capitalization, empirical studies that directly examine managerial discretion through R&D expenditure adjusting have not been widely provided in the European context. This paper seeks to determine if earnings targets influence R&D investment by encouraging R&D cuts after IFRS adoption. Focusing on a French setting, where companies invest heavily in R&D, results show that managers tend to cut the R&D expenditures in order to achieve earnings target. Studying two earnings management incentives: avoidance of losses (positive earnings target) and earnings decreases (positive earning growths target), findings support thresholds assumption and provide evidence on real earnings management through R&D expensing. This empirical research contributes to the literature by providing further evidence that post-FRS, R&D cut is a strategic decision influenced by earnings management to boost performance.

Kaynakça

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