Kamusal Karar Alma Süreci: Literatür İncelemesi

Yıl 2022, Sayı: 68, 133 - 157, 22.11.2022

Tülin Altun

Öz

Bu çalışmada kamusal karar alma modellerine ilişkin literatürün tarihsel süreçteki gelişimi incelenmiştir. İktisadi düşüncedeki, politik kurumlardaki, hükümetlerin politikalarındaki değişimler gibi koşulların bu modellere etkisi dikkate alınarak ilgili literatür üç ana başlıkta değerlendirilmiştir. Kamusal kararlarda etkinlik sonuçlarına odaklanan normatif modeller, erken dönem talep yönlü yaklaşımlar olarak ele alınmıştır. Politika yapıcıların davranışlarına odaklanan çalışmalar, Kamu Tercihi Teorisine bağlı olarak geliştirilen modeller bağlamında incelenmiştir. Kural ve kurumların etkisine odaklanan modeller, yasama ve yürütmenin yapısı, seçim kuralları, hükümet biçimleri, bütçe prosedürleri gibi kurumsal sınıflandırmalara göre incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Kamusal karar alma, Rasyonel kamusal tercihler, kamu tercihi, anayasal kural ve kurumlar, politik ekonomi

Kaynakça

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