Halka Açık Şirketlerin Kendi Paylarını Edinimi

Öz

Ekseriyetle son çeyrek yüzyılda en az temettü dağıtımı kadar önem kazanan ve uygulaması yaygınlaşan pay geri alım programları fiyat kazanç, mali rantabilite ve benzeri finansal faydalarından ötürü oldukça ön plana çıkmıştır. Pay geri alımları aynı zamanda düşmanca devralma ve manipülasyonlar yoluyla şirketlerin kendi iradeleri haricinde dışarıdan yönetilmesine karşı en etkili çözümlerden biri olarak da anılmaktadır. Şirketlerin bu tehlikeler henüz gerçekleşmeden uygulamaya koyabilecekleri çeşitli kurumsal savunma mekanizmaları vardır fakat bu çalışma bu yollardan yalnızca en etkili alternatiflerden birisi olarak görülen zehir hapı seçeneğini irdelemektedir. Anglo-Sakson temelli bir müessese olan pay geri alımları genellikle pay sahiplerinin kısa vadeciliğine ve analistlerin tahminlerine ilişkin endişelerin bastırılması için öngörülen bir yoldur. Bu anlayış, sermayenin korunması gayesiyle pay geri alımlarının eksik değerlenmiş hisselerin şirketçe iktisap edilmesi olarak ifade edilebilir. Ancak Avrupa’daki hakim görüş, şirketlerin kendi paylarını münhasıran ticari kaygılara ediniminin sermayenin korunması ilkesine aykırılık teşkil ettiğidir. Bu çalışma bahsi geçen hususlar ışığında, pay geri alımlarının şirket malvarlığının korunması için mi yoksa yönetimsel iyimserlik kisvesi altında temsile ilişkin aksaklıkların üzerinin örtülmesi için mi daha çok zaruret arz ettiği hususunu kavramsallaştırmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Payların Geri Edinimi
• Düşmanca Devralma
• Zehir Hapı
• Sermayenin Korunması
• Yönetimsel İyimserlik

Stock Buybacks in Public Companies

Öz

Stock buyback programmes have been at least as important as dividend payments for almost a quarter of a century given their positive effect on financial metrics such as the price-to-earnings and return on equity ratios. Stock buyback is considered one of the most effective remedies against hostile takeovers and manipulations. Although there are several pre-bid corporate defense mechanisms – the paper only covers the option of poison pills - at company's acquisition of its own shares is increasingly seen as an efficient alternative to those. An Anglo-Saxon-centric concept of stock buybacks is commonly used to address concerns regarding shareholder short-termism and analyst forecasts. This stream of thought predominantly deems the buyback of undervaluaed stocks significant for capital maintenance as opposed to the dominant European view that repurchasing shares for commercial reasons may run counter to capital maintenance. This study, accordingly, conceptualises whether a stock buyback is indispensable in protecting a company’s assets or used for mitigating agency problems through signalling managerial optimism.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Stock Buybacks
• Hostile Takeovers
• Poison Pills
• Capital Maintenance
• Managerial Optimism

Kaynakça

1. Alihan Aydın, Anonim Ortaklıkların Kendi Paylarını Edinmesi (Arıkan Yayıncılık 2008)
2. Allen He, ‘Buybacks: Look Before You Leap’ (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, 26 July 2021) last accessed 9 August 2021
3. Andreas Engert, ‘Life Without Legal Capital: Lessons from American Law’ in Marcus Lutter (ed), Legal Capital in Europe (De Gruyter Recht, 2006)
4. Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52(2) The Journal of Finance 737-83
5. Andrew Oringer and Michael Segal, ‘Winding Down Employee Stock Ownership Plans’ (2017) Transactions & Business 33-41
6. Anita Anand, ‘Regulating Issuer Bids: The Case of the Dutch Auction’ (2000) 45 McGill Law Journal 133-54
7. Aziza Kasumov and Siddharth Venkataramakrishnan, ‘US Companies prepare share buyback bonanza as Outlook clears’ (Financial Times, 12 May 2021) last accessed 9 August 2021
8. Bayless Manning & James Hanks, Legal Capital (Foundation Press, 2013)

9. Bernard McCabe, ‘The Desirability of a Share Buy-Back Power’ (1991) 3(1) Bond Law Review 1991.
10. Bolko Hohaus, ‘Share Buybacks and Employee Stock Options’ (2016) 16(4) CESifo Forum 79-81
11. Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores Inc [2014] 573 US 682 California Corporations Code
12. Chuck Schumer and Bernie Sanders, ‘Schumer and Sanders: Limit Corporate Stock Buybacks’ (The New York Times, 3 February 2019) last accessed 9 August 2021
13. Churella v Pioneer State Mutual Insurance Co [2003] 671 NW2d 125
14. Clayton Christensen, ‘The Ongoing Process of Building a Theory of Disruption’ (2006) 23 The Journal of Product Innovation Management 39-55
15. Companies Act 2006, c 46, part 18, Ch 1, Section 658(1)
16. Dan Dalton and others, ‘The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its Mitigation’ (2007) 1(1) The Academy of Management Annals 1-64
17. David Harvey, ‘Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction’ (2007) 610(1) The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 21-44
18. David Hunkar, ‘Average holding period for U.S. Stocks is Just 5-1/2 months in 2020’ (Top Foreign Stocks, 4 August 2020) last accessed 9 August 2021
19. Davis - Louisville Gas and Electric Co [1928] 16 Del Ch 157
20. Delaware General Corporation Law (Title 8 Chapter 1 of the Delaware Code)
21. Deloitte, ‘The rise of newly empowered retail investors: How they’re changing customer expectations and investing dynamics’ (2021) last accessed 9 August 2021
22. Diane Denis and John McConnell, ‘International Corporate Governance’ (Purdue CIBER Working Papers No. 17, 2001) 1-2 last accessed 9 August 2021
23. Dimitris Andriosopoulos and Meziane Lasfer, ‘The Market Valuation of Share Repurchases in Europe’ (2015) 55(C) Journal of Banking and Finance 327-39
24. Dingual Sunder, ‘The Controversial ‘Poison Pill’ Takeover Defense: How valid are the arguments in support of it?’ (2013) 23 NMIMS Management Review 48-49
25. Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to certain aspects of company law [2017] OJ L 169/46
26. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co [1919] 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668
27. Edward Yardeni and Joseph Abbott, Stock Buybacks: The True Story (YRI Press 2019)
28. Ellis Ferran, Principles of Corporate Finance Law (OUP 2008)
29. Erwin Esser Nemmers, ‘The Power of a Corporation to Purchase Its Own Stock’ (1942) 1942(2) Wisconsin Law Review 161-97
30. Fatih Erdem, ‘Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance’ (2021) 70 Annales de la Faculté de Droit d’Istanbul 1-18
31. Fatih Erdem, The Suppression of Innovation: Testing the Open Nature of Article 102 TFEU (Onikilevha, 2021)
32. Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, ‘A Comparative Theory of Corporate Governance’ (Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper No. 03-27, December 2002) last accessed 9 August 2021
33. Gary Caton and Jeremy Goh, ‘Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights, and Shareholder Rights Plans: Poison, Placebo or Prescription?’ (2008) 42(2) The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 381-400
34. Gordon Smith, ‘The Shareholder Primacy Norm’ (1998) 23(2) The Journal of Corporation Law 277-8
35. Guhan Subramanian, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of Peoplesoft’s (Defective) Poison Pill’ (Harvard Law School Discussion Paper No. 568, 2006)
36. Guhan Subramanian, ‘Bargaining in the shadow of takeover defenses’ (2003) 113(3) The Yale Law Journal 621-86
37. Gustavo Grullon and David Ikenberry, ‘What do we know about stock repurchases?’ (2000) 13 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 31-51
38. Gustavo Grullon and Roni Michaely, ‘Dividends, Share Repurchases, and the Substitution Hypothesis’ (Rice University and Cornell University working paper, 2000)
39. Hartridge v. Rockwell [1828] R. M. Charlton 260
40. Ioannis Chasiotis, Andreas Georgantopoulos and Nikolaos Eriotis, ‘Determinants of Share Repurchases a Quantile Regression Approach’ (2021) 10(1) Economics and Business Letters
41. Irving Levy, ‘Purchase by a Corporation of Its Own Stock’ (1930) 15(1) Minnesota Law Review 1512-1551
42. James Ang, Rebel Cole and James Lin, ‘Agency Costs and Ownership structure’ (2000) 55(1) Journal of Finance 1-39
43. James Miller and John McConnell, ‘Open-Market Share Repurchase Programs and Bid-Ask Spreads on the NYSE: Implications for Corporate Payout Policy’ (1995) 30(3) Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 365-82
44. James van Horne, Financial Management and Policy (Pearson, 2001)
45. John Matheson and Brent Olson, ‘Corporate Cooperation, Relationship Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law’ (1994) 78 Minnesota Law Review 1443-91
46. John Pearce, ‘Hostile takeover defenses that maximize shareholder wealth’ (2004) 47(5) Business Horizons 15-24
47. Jonathan Rickford, ‘Legal Approaches to Restricting Distributions to Shareholders: Balance Sheet Tests and Solvency Tests’ (2006) 7 European Business Organization Law Review 139
48. Joseph Bower and Clayton Christensen, ‘Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave’ (1995) 73 Harvard Business Review 43-53
49. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Routledge 2003)
50. Josue Cox, Daniel Greenwald and Sydney Ludvigson, ‘What explains the Covid-19 stock market?’ (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 27784, 2020) last accessed 9 August 2021
51. Julian Velasco, ‘Just Do It: An Antidote to the Poison Pill’ (2003) 52 Emory Law Journal 849-908
52. Justin Pettit, ‘Is a share buyback right for your company?’ (2001) 79(4) Harvard Business Review 141
53. Katherine Fowlkes, ‘Poison pills and their effect on shareholder return’ (TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2019) last accessed 9 August 2021
54. Kent Baker, Gary Powell ve Theodore Veit, ‘Why companies use open-market repurchases: A managerial perspective’ (2003) 43(3) The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 483-504
55. Larry Dann and Harry DeAngelo, ‘Standstill agreements, privately negotiated stock repurchases, and the market for corporate control’ (1983) 11(1-4) Journal of Financial Economics 275-300
56. Liyu Zeng and Priscilla Luk, ‘Examining share repurchasing and the S&P buyback indices in the U.S. market’ (S&P Dow Jones Indices, March 2020) last accessed 9 August 2021
57. Louise Gullifer and Jennifer Peyne, Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy (Bloomsbury, 2015)
58. Luca Enriques and Jonathan Macey, ‘Creditors versus Capital Formation: The Case against the European Legal Capital Rules’ (2001) 86(6) Cornell Law Review
59. Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell, ‘What matters in Corporate Governance?’ (2009) 22(2) Review of Financial Studies 783-827
60. Martin Lipton, ‘Discussion Memorandum: Warrant Dividend Plan’ (1982)
61. Mathias Siems and Amedeo De Cesari, ‘The Law and Finance of Share Repurchases in Europe’ (2012) 12 Journal of Corparete Law Studies 33-36
62. Meni Abudy, ‘Retail Investors’ Trading and Stock Market Liquidity’, (2020) 54 The North American Journal of Economics and Finance 3
63. Meri Boshkoska, ‘The Agency Problem: Measuring for Its Overcoming’ (2015) 10(1) International Journal of Business and Management 205-6
64. Michael Jensen and William Meckling, ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure’ (1976) 3(4) Journal of Financial Economics 310-1
65. Michael Jensen, ‘Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers’ (1986) 76 The American Economic Review 323-9
66. Michael McGinley, ‘Standing at the Crossroads: An Integrated Approach to the ESOP Repurchase Obligation’ (2011), 2011(Winter) Insights 12-18
67. Michael Ryngaert and Ralph Scholten, ‘Have Changing Takeover Defense Rules and Strategies Entrenched Management and Damaged Shareholders?’ The Case of Defeated Takeover Bids’ (2010) 16(1) Journal of Corporate Finance 16-37
68. Michael Ryngaert, ‘The effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth’ (1988) 20(1) Journal of Financial Economics 377-417
69. Milton Friedman, ‘A Friedman Doctrine: The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’ (The New York Times Magazine, 13 September 1970) last accessed 9 August 2021; Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press 1962) Model Business Corporation Act (2016)
70. Morris Danielson and Jonathan Karpoff, ‘Do pills poison operating performance?’ (2009) 12 Journal of Corporate Finance 536-59
71. Nancy Meade and Dan Davidson, ‘The Use of “Shark Repellents” to Prevent Corporate Takeovers: An Ethical Perspective’ (1993) 12(2) Journal of Business Ethics 83-92 New York Business Corporation Law
72. Nigel Stacey, Sian Williams and SJ Beaumont, ‘Are poison pills finally coming to the UK?’ (Financier Worldwide, February 2021) last accessed 9 August 2021
73. Nos. 86-1601, 86-1608 United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp. [1986] 794 F.2d 250, 259 Obligationenrecht
74. Patrick Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Restructurings (John Wiley and Sons 2007)
75. Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii and Andrew Metrick, ‘Corporate Governance and Equity Prices’ (2003) 118 Quantitative Journal of Economics 107-55
76. Paul Hribar, Nicole Jenkins and Bruce Johnson, ‘Stock repurchases as an earnings management device’ (2006) 41(1-2) Journal of Accounting and Economics 3-27
77. Paul Malatesta and Ralph Walkling, ‘Poison pill securities: stockholder wealth, profitability, and ownership structure’ (1988) 20(1) Journal of Financial Economics 347-76
78. Peter Oh, ‘The Dutch Auction Myth’ (2007) 42 Wake Forest Law Review 853-910
79. Phil Oakley, How to Pick Quality Shares: A three-step process for selecting profitable stocks (Harriman House, 2017) Pushkala Aripaka, ‘Apollo formally ends bidding war for Britain’s William Hill’ (Reuters, 12 November 2020) last accessed 9 August 2021
80. Rammohan Yallapragada, ‘Stock Buybacks: Good or bad for investors?’ (2014) 12(2) Journal of Business and Economics Research 196; P La Monica, ‘Love, but verify these buybacks’ (2005) 34(8) Money 6-8
81. Rammohan Yallapragada, ‘Stock Buybacks: Good or bad for investors?’ (2014) 12(2) Journal of Business and Economic Research 193, 196
82. Randall Heron and Erik Lie, ‘On the use of poison pills and defensive payous by takeover targets’ (2006) 79(4) The Journal of Business 1783-1808
83. Richard Booth, ‘Capital Requirements in United States Corporation Law’ (Villanova University School of Law Working Paper Series, 102 last accessed 9 August 2021
84. Richard Booth, Capital Requirements in United States Corporation Law in Marcus Lutter (ed), Legal Capital in Europe (De Gruyter Recht, 2006) 620-45
85. Richard Dowen, James Johnson and Gerard Jensen, ‘Poison Pills and Corporate Governance’ (1994) 4 Applied Financial Economics 305-13
86. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. 78a-78kk) §9(a)(2), 10(b)
87. Simon Hitzelberger, ‘What effect do poison pills have on shareholder value’ (2017) last accessed 9 August 2021
88. Sirio Aramonte, ‘Mind the buybacks, beware of the leverage’ (BIS Quarterly Review, September 2020) last accessed 9 August 2021
89. Standard and Poor’s, ‘S&P 500 Stock Buybacks Up 117% in 2010; Share Repurchases Increase fort he 6th Quarter in a Row’ (Cision PR Newswire, 23 March 2011) last accessed 9 August 2021
90. Stephen Bainbridge, ‘In defense of the shareholder wealth maximization norm: A reply to Professor Green’ (1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law Review 1423-1447
91. Steven Bragg, Merger and Acquisitions: A Condensed Practitioner’s Guide (John Wiley and Sons 2009) 36
92. Steven Young and Jing Yang, ‘Stock Repurchases and Executive Compensation Contract Desing: The role of earnings per share performace conditions’ (2011) 86(2) The Accounting Review 703-33
93. Tatyana Sokolyk, ‘The Effects of Antitakeover Provisions on Acquisition Targets’ (2011) 17 Journal of Corporate Finance 612-27
94. Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co [1831] 5 Ohio 162
95. The German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz)
96. Theo Vermaelen, ‘Common Stock Repurchases and Market Signalling’ (1981) 9 Journal of Financial Economics 139-83
97. Theo Vermaelen, ‘Share Repurchases’ (2005) 1(3) Foundations and Trends in Finance 214; Obligationenrecht
98. Tilman Bezzenberger, Erwerb Eigener Aktien Durch die AG (Verlag 2002)
99. Trevor and Another v Whitworth and Another House of Lords [1887] 12 App. Cas. 409 UK City Code on Takeovers and Mergers
100. Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co [1985] 493 A2d 946 (Del 1985)
101. Urs Peyer and Anil Shivdasani, ‘Leverage and Internal Capital Markets: Evidence from Leveraged Recapitalizations’ (2001) 59(3) Journal of Financial Economics 477-515
102. William Bratton and Joseph McCahery, ‘Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation’ (1995) 73(5) North Carolina Law Review 1861-1948
103. Wolfgang Schön, ‘The Future of Legal Capital’ (2015) 5 European Business Organization Law Review