Free Will and Artificial Intelligence

Öz

Abstract: Free will is one of the main challenges against artificial intelligence. Free will is considered to be one of the unique characteristics of human being which cannot be represented in any artificial intelligent system. Free will is a special issue in the philosophy of mind. There are two main approaches to free will; namely, compatibilism and incompatibilism. We construct two main compatibilist arguments in order to overcome this challenge and these arguments show that the deterministic and computational structure of machine intelligence does not empirically prevent artificial intelligence from possessing free will. In addition to that, we claim that the agentive action is the only condition for the occurrence and analysis of free will. And these occurrence and analysis conditions can be modelled and simulated in machine intelligence. Therefore, AI can possess the tools through which it can realize its autonomous free choices. Simply stating, AI can have a free will.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• artificial intelligence,compatibilism,free will,determinism,computational decision

Özgür İrade ve Yapay Zeka

Öz

Öz: Özgür istenç yapay zekaya dair en temel karşı çıkış noktalardan birisidir. Özgür istenç insan olmanın ve insanı diğer canlılardan ayırt etmenin biricik unsuru olarak görülmektedir. Zihin felsefesi içerisinde özel bir konu olan özgür istenç problemine dair iki faklı yaklaşım bulunmaktadır. Bu yaklaşımlar bağdaşırcılık ve bağdaşmazcılıktır. Bu yazıda iki farklı bağdaşıklık uslamlaması üzerinden makinelerin belirlenimli ve berimsel yapılarının onların özgür istence sahip olabilmesi için bir engel çıkartmadığı gösterilmektedir. Buna ek olarak, eyleyici edimlerin özgür istencin çözümlenmesi ve ortaya çıkabilmesi için en temel koşul olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Bu çözümlemeler ve ortaya çıkışlar makine zekasında modellenebilinir. Bu modelleme aynı zamanda zihin felsefesinin bir konusu olarak özgür istenç problemine başka bir açıdan bakabilmemizi sağlayacaktır. Sonuç olarak, yapay zeka özgür kararlar alabilecek bir yapıya kavuşabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• yapay zeka,bağdaşırcılık,özgür istenç,belirlenimcilik,bilgisayımsal karar

Kaynakça

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