WEAK STATES, STRONG NONSTATE ACTORS: THEORY OF COMPETITIVE CONTROL IN NORTHERN SYRIA

Yıl 2016, Cilt: 8 Sayı: 1, 58 - 78, 01.07.2016

Akın Ünver

Öz

State weakening in Syria unearthed long-dormant processes of disenfranchisement, contributing to the regime’s loss of territory in the north-eastern half of the country. Out of this state weakening, two major armed non-state groups emerged: Democratic Union Party PYD and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria ISIS . Both groups have uprooted the control tools and actors of the central authority, taking on an increasingly state-like dual role of security provision and day-to-day administration. How non-state armed groups emerge in the wake of state weakening is best conceptualized by David Kilcullen, who introduced the concept of ‘theory of competitive control’ to identify how challengers to state authority need to prove their capacity in administration. Kilcullen further argues that when states fail, whichever non-state actor emerges most capable of providing administration will convert the loyalties of the local population over time. This perspective is important to understand why Rojava and ISIS are long-term phenomena and will be impossible to eliminate through military-only methods

Anahtar Kelimeler

State failure, non-state actors, ISIS, PYD, Syria

KUZEY SURİYE’DE ‘REKABETÇİ KONTROL’ TEORİSİ

Öz

Suriye’de devlet zayıflaması, uzun süredir sessiz bir şekilde devam eden mahrumiyetleri gün ışığına çıkartarak rejimin, ülkenin kuzey-doğusunda güç kaybetmesine sebep oldu. Bu devlet zayıflamasından iki ana devlet-dışı aktör ortaya çıktı: PYD ve IŞİD. İki grup da, ortaya çıktıkları bölgelerde merkezi hükümetin kontrol mekanizmalarını devralarak bir nevi devlet-vari bir idari performans sergilemiş ve bölgelerin günlük idaresini ele almıştır. Devlet-dışı aktörlerin belli bölgelerde nasıl devlet faaliyeti yürüttüğü ve yerel halkın desteğini bu idari performans ile kazandığı konusunda en yeni kavramsallaştırmalardan biri David Kilcullen’ın ‘rekabetçi kontrol teorisi’dir. Bu teoriye göre devletler zayıfladığında hangi devlet-dışı aktör idari altyapıyı oluşturacak şekilde bölge halkının taleplerini ve ihtiyaçlarını karşılarsa, o bölgenin aidiyeti bir süre sonra bu gruba dönük olacaktır. Bu teori hem PYD/YPG hem de IŞİD gibi grupların neden sadece askeri yöntemlerle yenilemeyeceğini de açıklamaktadır

Anahtar Kelimeler

devlet başarısızlığı, devlet-dışı aktörler, IŞİD, PYD, Suriye

Kaynakça

• Al-Tamimi, A. J. (2015) “The Evolution in Islamic State Administration: The Documentary Evidence”, Perspective on Terrorism. [http://www.me- forum.org/5515/isis-administration-evolution] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Biehl, J. (2015) “Rojava’s Threefold Economy”. KurdishQuestion.Com [http:// kurdishquestion.com/oldsite/index.php/kurdistan/west-kurdistan/ rojava-s-threefold-economy.html](Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Bunker, R. (2014). “Global Security Upheaval: Armed Nonstate Groups Usurping State Stability Functions”. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 25(5-6), 1065-1067.
• Charter of the Social Contract in Rojava (Syria), available online: [http://www. kurdishinstitute.be/charter-of-the-social-contract/] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Coles, I. (2015) “Despair, hardship as Iraq cuts off wages in Islamic State cities”. Reuters. [http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-cri- sis-iraq-salaries-idUSKCN0RW0V620151002] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Dearden, L. (2016) “Isis ‘bans all Christians from leaving Raqqa’ as mili- tary operations against group intensify in Syria”. The Independent. [http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis- bans-all-christians-from-leaving-raqqa-as-military-operations-aga- inst-group-intensify-in-syria-a6962331.html] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Demirjian, K. (2015) “Congress wants to strengthen financial sanctions aga- inst ISIS”. The Washington Post. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/powerpost/wp/2015/12/24/congress-wants-to-strengthen-fi- nancial-sanctions-against-isis/] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Evans, G. and M. Sahnoun (2002). “The responsibility to protect”. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, no. 6. pp. 1-16
• Evran, S. (2014) “Dr. Yusuf: Rojava’s Economic Model is a Communal Model”. Fırat News Agency (ANF). Available at: [https://rojavare- port.wordpress.com/2014/04/14/dr-yusuf-rojavas-economic-mo- del-is-a-communal-model/] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Gartenstein-Ross, D. (2015) “How many fighters does the Islamic State re- ally have?”. War on the Rocks. [http://warontherocks.com/2015/02/ how-many-fighters-does-the-islamic-state-really-have/] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Goldberg, J. (2015) “US Mandates ISIS embed deeper into civilian po- pulations”. National Review. [http://www.nationalreview.com/ corner/420230/us-mandates-isis-embed-deeper-civilian-populati- ons-jonah-goldberg] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Jones, S. and E. Solomon (2015) “ISIS Inc: Jihadis fund war machine but squ- eeze citizens”. Financial Times. [http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/2e- f519a6-a23d-11e5-bc70-7ff6d4fd203a.html#axzz4C2haXZPo] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Kilcullen, D. (2015) Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Gu- errilla. Oxford University
• Lamb, R. D. (2008) “Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens – Fi- nal Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project.” Prepared for the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy by the Office of the De- puty Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, as quoted in: D. Fisher and C. Mercado (2014) “Competitive Control: How to Evaluate the Threats Posed by Ungoverned Spaces”, Small Wars Journal.
• Massey, C. (2016) “A new co-operative economy: Democratic confederal- ism in Rojava and Bakur”. Institute for Solidarity Economics. [http:// solidarityeconomics.org/2016/06/07/a-new-co-operative-econo- my-democratic-confederalism-in-rojava-and-bakur/] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Maur, R. and J. Staal (eds.) (2015) “Stateless Democracy”. New World Academy. Reader #5. [http://newworldsummit.eu/wp-content/ uploads/2015/06/NWA5-Stateless-Democracy.pdf] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Osiander, A. (2001). “Sovereignty, international relations, and the Westpha- lian myth”. International organization, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 251-287.
• Pagliery, J. (2015) “Insider the $2 billion ISIS war machine”. CNN Money. [http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/06/news/isis-funding/index.htm- l?category=home-international] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Perry, T. (2015) “Syrian Kurds’ spending plans reflect rising ambition”. Reu- ters. [http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-kurds-i- dUSKCN0Q21BK20150728] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Podder, S. (2013). “Non-State Armed Groups and Stability: Reconsidering Legitimacy and Inclusion”. Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 16-39
• Ross, C. (2015) “The Kurds’ Democratic Experiment”. New York Times. [http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/opinion/the-kurds-democ- ratic-experiment.html] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Rothberg, R. (2003) “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States” in Robert Rothberg (ed.) When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton University Press
• Schlichte, K. (2009) In the Shadow of Violence: The Politics of Armed Groups, University of Chicago Press
• Solomon, E. (2014) “Amid Syria’s violence, Kurds carve out autonomy”. Reu- ters. [http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-kurdistan-specialre- port-idUSBREA0L17320140122 (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Solomon, E. and S. Jones (2015) “ISIS Inc: Loot and taxes keep jihadi eco- nomy churning”. Financial Times [http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/ aee89a00-9ff1-11e5-beba-5e33e2b79e46.html#axzz4C2haXZPo] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Talmon, Y. (1972). “Family and Community in the Kibbutz”. Harvard Uni- versity Press.
• Thompson, N. and A. Shubert. “The anatomy of ISIS: How the ‘Islamic Sta- te’ is run, from oil to beheadings”. CNN International Edition. 14 January 2015. [http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/18/world/meast/ isis-syria-iraq-hierarchy/] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Trevisani, T. (2007). “After the Kolkhoz: rural elites in competition”. Central Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 85-104.
• Van Wilgenburg, W. (2016) “This is a new Syria, not a new Kurdistan”. Middle East Eye. [http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-kur- ds-syria-rojava-1925945786] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Vinci, A. (2008) “Anarchy, Failed States, and Armed Groups: Reconsidering Conventional Analysis”, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 52, Issue 2, pp. 295–314
• Weber, M. (1921) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft
• Yıldız, G. (2014) “Kobani, PKK ve barış süreci için neden önem- li?”. BBC Türkçe. [http://www.bbc.com/turkce/ozeldosya- lar/2014/10/141001_kobani_baris_surec]
• Yousef, A. (2015) “The Social Economy in Rojava”. Kurdishquestion. com. [http://kurdishquestion.com/oldsite/index.php/kurdistan/ west-kurdistan/the-social-economy-in-rojava/917-the-social-eco- nomy-in-rojava.html] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• Zelin, A. (2016) “The Islamic State’s Territorial Methodology”. Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Research Note No. 29 [http://www. washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNo- te29-Zelin.pdf] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• “Canton Based Democratic Autonomy of Rojava”. Kurdistan National Cong- ress (KNK). May 2014. [https://peaceinkurdistancampaign.files. wordpress.com/2011/11/rojava-info-may-2014.pdf] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• “Kurdish National Council in Syria condemns federalism declaration by Kur- dish rival” ARA News. 19 March 2016. [http://aranews.net/2016/03/ kurdish-national-council-syria-condemns-federalism-declarati- on-kurdish-rival/] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• “Under Kurdish Rule: Abuses in PYD-run Enclaves of Syria”. Human Rights Watch. 19 June 2014. [https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/06/19/un- der-kurdish-rule/abuses-pyd-run-enclaves-syria] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)
• “Ungoverned Territories: Unique Front in the War on Terrorism”. RAND Pro- ject Air Force Reseach Brief #233, 2007. [http://www.rand.org/pubs/ research_briefs/RB233/index1.html] (Accessed: 19 June 2016)