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Power Versus the Sovereign Equality of States: The Veto, the P-5 and United Nations Security Council Reforms

Year 2013, Volume: 18 Issue: 4, 117 - 138, 01.01.2013

Abstract

The United Nations Security Council is at the centre of the international security system. However, even after several decades the Council has had only minimal changes in its basic structure and composition, despite the fact that the international environment has changed considerably. The opportunity provided by the end of the Cold War to revitalise the Council was coupled by increasing number of voices calling for reform of this extraordinary organisation. But reform has proved to be a very difficult thing to accomplish in the case of the Security Council. This paper looks at the issue of Security Council reform from the prism of the right of veto and the perspectives of the permanent members. It argues that although the attitude of the P-5 is not favourable for reform, it is not the only stumbling block in its way. The lack of consensus among the rest of the world has also a role in prolonging this issue over decades

References

  • David L. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World, New York, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 5.
  • Robert S. Snyder, “Reforming the Security Council for the Post-Cold War World”, International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 1997), pp. 8-9.
  • Yehuda Z. Blum, “Proposals for UN Security Council Reform”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 99, No. 3 (July 2005), p. 636. 4 Ibid.
  • Dimitris Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform, New York, Routledge, 2005, pp. 13-15. 6 Ibid., p. 19.
  • Edward C. Luck, “Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress”, International Relations Studies and the United Nations, Occasional Papers No.1 (2003), pp. 7-10.
  • Draft Resolution Doc. A/34/L.57 and Add.1, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/ Security_Council/Razali_Reform_Paper.pdf [last visited 10 October 2013].
  • Bardo Fassbender, “All Illusions Shattered: Looking Back on a Decade of Failed Attempts to Reform the UN Security Council”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 7 (2003), p. 187.
  • Jonas V. Frieseleben, “Reform of the Security Council”, in Managing Change at the United Nations, New York, Center for UN Reform Education, 2008, pp. 3-4.
  • According to Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, “the term enemy state… applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter”.
  • Shashi Tharor, “Security Council Reform: Past, Present, and Future”, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2011), p. 398.
  • General Assembly, Draft Resolution A/59/L.64, pp. 2-3, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/ images/pdfs/Security_Council/0706g4resolution.pdf [last visited 11 November 2013].
  • Frieseleben, “Reform of the Security Council”, p. 3.
  • General Assembly, Draft Resolution A/59/L.68, pp. 2-3, at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/ doc/UNDOC/LTD/N05/434/76/PDF/N0543476.pdf?OpenElement [last visited 12 August 2013].
  • Frieseleben, “Reform of the Security Council”, p. 3.
  • African Union, The Common African Position on the Reform of the United Nations: ‘The Ezulwini Consensus, Addis Ababa, African Union, 2005, pp. 9-10, at http://responsibilitytoprotect. org/files/AU_Ezulwini%20Consensus.pdf [last visited 13 July 2013].
  • Stands for Committee of Ten, African Permanent Representatives.
  • Shafa Gasimova, “The Security Council’s Endless Enlargement Debate”, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (2012), p. 272.
  • Lydia Swart, “Reform of the Security Council: September 2007- May 2013”, p. 41, at http:// www.centerforunreform.org/node/423 [last visited 26 October 2013]. 21 Ibid.
  • The name of the group comes from the number of the draft resolution, A/61/L.69, these countries presented in the General Assembly which culminated in the shifting of the issue of Security Council reform from the open-ended working group to the intergovernmental negotiations. L stands for limited distribution and 69 is the number allocated to this document by the conference services.
  • Since the beginning of the issue of Security Council reform in the post-Cold War era, the focus of negotiations concerning reform was the open-ended working on the question of equitable representation on and increase in membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council (known as the Working Group) which was meant to provide an official forum for the discussions pertaining to the Security Council reform. However, in 2007 the issue was shifted to Intergovernmental Negotiations upon the request of General Assembly draft resolution A/61/L.69.
  • Swart, “Reform of the Security Council”, p. 46. 25 Ibid.
  • United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations”, at http://www.un.org/en/documents/ charter/index.shtml [last visited 28 April 2013].
  • Hans Koechler, The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council: Examining a Normative Contradiction in the UN Charter and its Consequences for the International Relations, Vienna, International Progress Organization, 1991, p. 18. 28 Ibid.
  • Sahar Okhovat, “The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Its Reform”, Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, Working Paper No. 15/1 (December 2011), p. 11.
  • Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 86.
  • Brian Cox, “United Nations Security Council Reform: Collected Proposals and Possible Consequences”, South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business, Vol. 6, No.1 (Fall 2009), p. 98.
  • Tom Ruys and Jan Wouters, “Security Council Reform: A New Veto for a New Century?”, Tijdschrift voor Militair Recht en Oorlogsrecht / Revue de Droit Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre, Vol. 44, No. 1-2 (2006), p. 142.
  • Gasimova, “The Security Council’s Endless Enlargement Debate”, pp. 274-275.
  • Frieseleben, “Reform of the Security Council”, p. 3.
  • Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform, p. 6.
  • Frieseleben, “Reform of the Security Council”, p. 3.
  • Vaughan Lowe, et. al. (ed.), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 135.
  • Gasimova, “The Security Council’s Endless Enlargement Debate”, pp. 282-283.
  • Fassbender, “All Illusions Shattered”, pp. 211-212.
  • Gasimova, “The Security Council’s Endless Enlargement Debate”, p. 273.
  • African Union, The Common African Position on the Reform of the United Nations, pp. 9-10.
  • Alischa Kugel, “Reform of the Security Council- A New Approach”, Dialogue on Globalization, FES Briefing Paper 12 (September 2009), p. 4.
  • Swart, “Reform of the Security Council”, p. 49.
  • Mary Ellen O’Connell, “The United Nations Security Council and the Authorization of Force: Renewing the Council through Law Reform”, Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper Series No. 31 (April 2005), p. 4.
  • Cox, “United Nations Security Council Reform”, p. 94. 46 Ibid.
  • Gasimova, “The Security Council’s Endless Enlargement Debate”, p. 275.
  • Kara C. MacDonald and Stewart M. Patrick, “UN Security Council Enlargement and US Interests”, Council on Foreign Relations, Special Report No. 59 (December 2010), p. 13.
  • Global Policy Forum, “Changing Patterns in the Use of Veto in the Security Council”, at http:// www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Changing_Patterns_in_the_Use_of_the_Veto_as_of_ August_2012.pdf [last visited 22 July 2013].
  • Alexander Nikitin, “Russia as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung International Policy Analysis, November 2012, p. 14.
  • Ibid., pp. 11-12. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid., p. 14.
  • Cox, “United Nations Security Council Reform”, pp. 97-98.
  • Swart, “Reform of the Security Council”, p. 50.
  • J. Mohan Malik, “Security Council Reform: China Signals its Veto”, World Policy Journal, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring 2005), p. 20.
  • Blum, “Proposals for UN Security Council Reform”, p. 636.
  • Cox, “United Nations Security Council Reform”, pp. 97.
  • France at the United Nations, “Security Council Reform”, at http://www.franceonu.org/ france-at-the-united-nations/thematic-files/un-reform/security-council-reform/article/ security-council-reform [last visited 2 June 2013].
  • Letter from the Permanent Representatives of United Kingdom and France to the Ambassador Zahir Tanin, at http://www.franceonu.org/IMG/pdf_Reforme_CSNU_-_Position_FR_ UK_-_EN.pdf [last visited 2 June 2013].
Year 2013, Volume: 18 Issue: 4, 117 - 138, 01.01.2013

Abstract

References

  • David L. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World, New York, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 5.
  • Robert S. Snyder, “Reforming the Security Council for the Post-Cold War World”, International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 1997), pp. 8-9.
  • Yehuda Z. Blum, “Proposals for UN Security Council Reform”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 99, No. 3 (July 2005), p. 636. 4 Ibid.
  • Dimitris Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform, New York, Routledge, 2005, pp. 13-15. 6 Ibid., p. 19.
  • Edward C. Luck, “Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress”, International Relations Studies and the United Nations, Occasional Papers No.1 (2003), pp. 7-10.
  • Draft Resolution Doc. A/34/L.57 and Add.1, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/ Security_Council/Razali_Reform_Paper.pdf [last visited 10 October 2013].
  • Bardo Fassbender, “All Illusions Shattered: Looking Back on a Decade of Failed Attempts to Reform the UN Security Council”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 7 (2003), p. 187.
  • Jonas V. Frieseleben, “Reform of the Security Council”, in Managing Change at the United Nations, New York, Center for UN Reform Education, 2008, pp. 3-4.
  • According to Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, “the term enemy state… applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter”.
  • Shashi Tharor, “Security Council Reform: Past, Present, and Future”, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2011), p. 398.
  • General Assembly, Draft Resolution A/59/L.64, pp. 2-3, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/ images/pdfs/Security_Council/0706g4resolution.pdf [last visited 11 November 2013].
  • Frieseleben, “Reform of the Security Council”, p. 3.
  • General Assembly, Draft Resolution A/59/L.68, pp. 2-3, at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/ doc/UNDOC/LTD/N05/434/76/PDF/N0543476.pdf?OpenElement [last visited 12 August 2013].
  • Frieseleben, “Reform of the Security Council”, p. 3.
  • African Union, The Common African Position on the Reform of the United Nations: ‘The Ezulwini Consensus, Addis Ababa, African Union, 2005, pp. 9-10, at http://responsibilitytoprotect. org/files/AU_Ezulwini%20Consensus.pdf [last visited 13 July 2013].
  • Stands for Committee of Ten, African Permanent Representatives.
  • Shafa Gasimova, “The Security Council’s Endless Enlargement Debate”, Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (2012), p. 272.
  • Lydia Swart, “Reform of the Security Council: September 2007- May 2013”, p. 41, at http:// www.centerforunreform.org/node/423 [last visited 26 October 2013]. 21 Ibid.
  • The name of the group comes from the number of the draft resolution, A/61/L.69, these countries presented in the General Assembly which culminated in the shifting of the issue of Security Council reform from the open-ended working group to the intergovernmental negotiations. L stands for limited distribution and 69 is the number allocated to this document by the conference services.
  • Since the beginning of the issue of Security Council reform in the post-Cold War era, the focus of negotiations concerning reform was the open-ended working on the question of equitable representation on and increase in membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council (known as the Working Group) which was meant to provide an official forum for the discussions pertaining to the Security Council reform. However, in 2007 the issue was shifted to Intergovernmental Negotiations upon the request of General Assembly draft resolution A/61/L.69.
  • Swart, “Reform of the Security Council”, p. 46. 25 Ibid.
  • United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations”, at http://www.un.org/en/documents/ charter/index.shtml [last visited 28 April 2013].
  • Hans Koechler, The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council: Examining a Normative Contradiction in the UN Charter and its Consequences for the International Relations, Vienna, International Progress Organization, 1991, p. 18. 28 Ibid.
  • Sahar Okhovat, “The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Its Reform”, Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, Working Paper No. 15/1 (December 2011), p. 11.
  • Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 86.
  • Brian Cox, “United Nations Security Council Reform: Collected Proposals and Possible Consequences”, South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business, Vol. 6, No.1 (Fall 2009), p. 98.
  • Tom Ruys and Jan Wouters, “Security Council Reform: A New Veto for a New Century?”, Tijdschrift voor Militair Recht en Oorlogsrecht / Revue de Droit Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre, Vol. 44, No. 1-2 (2006), p. 142.
  • Gasimova, “The Security Council’s Endless Enlargement Debate”, pp. 274-275.
  • Frieseleben, “Reform of the Security Council”, p. 3.
  • Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform, p. 6.
  • Frieseleben, “Reform of the Security Council”, p. 3.
  • Vaughan Lowe, et. al. (ed.), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 135.
  • Gasimova, “The Security Council’s Endless Enlargement Debate”, pp. 282-283.
  • Fassbender, “All Illusions Shattered”, pp. 211-212.
  • Gasimova, “The Security Council’s Endless Enlargement Debate”, p. 273.
  • African Union, The Common African Position on the Reform of the United Nations, pp. 9-10.
  • Alischa Kugel, “Reform of the Security Council- A New Approach”, Dialogue on Globalization, FES Briefing Paper 12 (September 2009), p. 4.
  • Swart, “Reform of the Security Council”, p. 49.
  • Mary Ellen O’Connell, “The United Nations Security Council and the Authorization of Force: Renewing the Council through Law Reform”, Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper Series No. 31 (April 2005), p. 4.
  • Cox, “United Nations Security Council Reform”, p. 94. 46 Ibid.
  • Gasimova, “The Security Council’s Endless Enlargement Debate”, p. 275.
  • Kara C. MacDonald and Stewart M. Patrick, “UN Security Council Enlargement and US Interests”, Council on Foreign Relations, Special Report No. 59 (December 2010), p. 13.
  • Global Policy Forum, “Changing Patterns in the Use of Veto in the Security Council”, at http:// www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Changing_Patterns_in_the_Use_of_the_Veto_as_of_ August_2012.pdf [last visited 22 July 2013].
  • Alexander Nikitin, “Russia as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung International Policy Analysis, November 2012, p. 14.
  • Ibid., pp. 11-12. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid., p. 14.
  • Cox, “United Nations Security Council Reform”, pp. 97-98.
  • Swart, “Reform of the Security Council”, p. 50.
  • J. Mohan Malik, “Security Council Reform: China Signals its Veto”, World Policy Journal, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring 2005), p. 20.
  • Blum, “Proposals for UN Security Council Reform”, p. 636.
  • Cox, “United Nations Security Council Reform”, pp. 97.
  • France at the United Nations, “Security Council Reform”, at http://www.franceonu.org/ france-at-the-united-nations/thematic-files/un-reform/security-council-reform/article/ security-council-reform [last visited 2 June 2013].
  • Letter from the Permanent Representatives of United Kingdom and France to the Ambassador Zahir Tanin, at http://www.franceonu.org/IMG/pdf_Reforme_CSNU_-_Position_FR_ UK_-_EN.pdf [last visited 2 June 2013].
There are 52 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language English
Journal Section Articles
Authors

Fakiha Mahmood This is me

Publication Date January 1, 2013
Published in Issue Year 2013 Volume: 18 Issue: 4

Cite

APA Mahmood, F. (2013). Power Versus the Sovereign Equality of States: The Veto, the P-5 and United Nations Security Council Reforms. PERCEPTIONS: Journal of International Affairs, 18(4), 117-138.
AMA Mahmood F. Power Versus the Sovereign Equality of States: The Veto, the P-5 and United Nations Security Council Reforms. PERCEPTIONS. January 2013;18(4):117-138.
Chicago Mahmood, Fakiha. “Power Versus the Sovereign Equality of States: The Veto, the P-5 and United Nations Security Council Reforms”. PERCEPTIONS: Journal of International Affairs 18, no. 4 (January 2013): 117-38.
EndNote Mahmood F (January 1, 2013) Power Versus the Sovereign Equality of States: The Veto, the P-5 and United Nations Security Council Reforms. PERCEPTIONS: Journal of International Affairs 18 4 117–138.
IEEE F. Mahmood, “Power Versus the Sovereign Equality of States: The Veto, the P-5 and United Nations Security Council Reforms”, PERCEPTIONS, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 117–138, 2013.
ISNAD Mahmood, Fakiha. “Power Versus the Sovereign Equality of States: The Veto, the P-5 and United Nations Security Council Reforms”. PERCEPTIONS: Journal of International Affairs 18/4 (January 2013), 117-138.
JAMA Mahmood F. Power Versus the Sovereign Equality of States: The Veto, the P-5 and United Nations Security Council Reforms. PERCEPTIONS. 2013;18:117–138.
MLA Mahmood, Fakiha. “Power Versus the Sovereign Equality of States: The Veto, the P-5 and United Nations Security Council Reforms”. PERCEPTIONS: Journal of International Affairs, vol. 18, no. 4, 2013, pp. 117-38.
Vancouver Mahmood F. Power Versus the Sovereign Equality of States: The Veto, the P-5 and United Nations Security Council Reforms. PERCEPTIONS. 2013;18(4):117-38.