ORTHODOXY AND THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE CHURCH IN RUSSIAN POLITICS

Year 1999, Volume: 4 Issue: 4, 0 - 0, 01.12.1999

C Cem Oğuz

Abstract

Despite her heavy political agenda, Madeleine Albright's first stop after arriving at Vnukovo Airport from London in February 1997 was the Danilovsky Monastery, where she had a brief meeting with Patriarch Aleksiy II of the Russian Orthodox Church.1 Albright's visit to the Russian Patriarch was unusual for a political trip, but diplomats noted that it was not surprising since the Orthodox Church has become an increasingly influential social force in Russia since the collapse of communism. The Russian Orthodox Church, indeed, is remarkable for the level of support it enjoys across the country. In a survey conducted throughout Central and Eastern Europe in 1996 to find out the level of confidence people had in state institutions, 72 per cent of respondents in Russia expressed great confidence in the Church, and this was the highest percentage in the former Soviet bloc.2 Searching for new social and moral values in an era of ideological crisis, it is not surprising that many Russians turned to religion. The rampant pessimism3 ordinary Russians have been feeling due to the worsening socio-economic conditions has helped revitalise the institution of religion. Although it is essential to note that identification with an Orthodox outlook does not necessarily imply a belief in God,4 the number of Russians who associate themselves with an Orthodox identity and self-expression is rising. According to another survey, even in Moscow, the centre of the Soviet establishment, 67 per cent of the respondents classified themselves as believers.5 The astonishing question, however, is how the Russian Orthodox Church has become one of the major players in Russian politics and could so rapidly develop popular prestige even among the ideologically diverse political circles. The history of the Church in Russia is in strong contradiction with this actual phenomenon. The servility of the Church and its exploitation by the tsarist autocracy directly stemming from the Church reforms of Peter the Great, then its subjugation under the oppressively atheistic rule of the Soviet communists make it hardly believable that the rise of the Church in the political arena is caused simply by the religious appetite of ordinary Russians. Thus, the central question to which this research addresses itself is what kind of political and social factors are responsible for this ambitious revival of the Church in Russia. It is an attempt at clarifying the vague alliance between Russian politicians and the Church leadership.