POST-MODERNITY, MULTICULTURALISM AND EX-IMPERIAL HINTERLAND: HABSBURG AND OTTOMAN LEGACIES REVISITED

Year 1997, Volume: 2 Issue: 4, 0 - 0, 01.12.1997

Ali Fuat Borovalı

Abstract

The end of the Cold War has brought in its wake a conceptual uncertainty as to which way the ‘world’ ought to go. This always seems to happen, though in different modes, when a major war is terminated. The First World War had its Versailles and World War II had its Yalta and Potsdam, intimating the kind of order, rightful or not, to come. Of course, the Cold War was not a war in the literal sense, so it is not surprising that its termination was somewhat unorthodox. It did not end with a bang but a whimper, as it were. The current travails in defining the ‘new world order’ seem somehow to be the product of a war which never happened. Since the systemic imperatives of the post-Cold War era are rather loose and under-determining, the range of options as to which way the world should be going gets wider—a more varied menu of possible worlds. This kind of systemic structure combined with the currents of post-modernity makes the world even less of a predictable place. Post-modernity, the defining zeitgeist of the present, can only help exacerbate the uncertainty inherent in the post-Cold War era.1 The two forces, conceptual and structural, combine to make the world more resistant to any imposition of a new order. There is simply no compelling idea of a particular order. Subsequently, the scene is ripe for various forms of historiographic revisionism.

References

• 1 Post-modernity, in the present context, is primarily meant to convey a lingering sense of “diminishing marginal returns” expected from the grand project of modernity. As such, it does not represent a wholesale disillusionment, calling for its abandonment, but seeks to incorporate its undeniable achievements, breakthroughs and benefits into any philosophical or cultural stance that might emerge out of the revisionist critique, and thus supersede modernity.
• 2 Rieff, David (1994), ‘Case for Empire’, Harper’s Magazine, January, p.16. See also, ‘Notes on the Ottoman Legacy’, Subjective Reasoning, issue No. 7.
• 3 Ibid.
• 4 The painstaking way in which the Ottomans approached matters of religious denominational autonomy is reflected by the mundane administration of the Holy Sepulchre Church in Jerusalem and how it was negotiated and re-negotiated over the centuries. Raymond Cohen’s manuscript ‘Negotiating Reality: International Relations and the Metaphor of the Holy Sepulchre’ (paper presented to the International Studies Association (ISA) Conference in 31 March-2 April 1994,Washington D.C) highlights the point in remarkable fashion.
• 5 Sokollu’s visionary project linking the Don and Volga by a canal so as to gain access into the Caspian from the Black Sea in the late sixteenth century is a case attesting to his illustrious reputation.
• 6 It is hardly surprising to see that Austrians are interested in the issues raised in this paper, as evidenced by the content of Peace and the Sciences (March 1993), published by the International Institute for Peace, Vienna. Articles such as ‘The Danube Regional Model: Conflict Preventing and Curing Role’ featuring a multi-confessional co-authorship (Edita Stojic, Mustafa Imanovic, Slobodan Pajovic) and ‘Post- modern Plurality in Cultures’ by Hans Joachim Turk are cases in point.
• 7 The Economist, 18 November 1995.
• 8 Social-Democrat, newspaper columnist, singer, song writer and international peace activist, Livaneli has managed to diversify his eclectic resumé even further by standing as mayoral candidate in Istanbul (he was unsuccessful).
• 9 See his article ‘Neo-Ottoman or Ottoman Hinterland? ’Sabah, 16 June 1992. In a later article, ‘Rainbow Identity’, Sabah, 20 July 1994, Livaneli argues that the cosmopolitan nature of the Ottoman Empire was predicated upon the down-playing or down-sizing of ‘Turkishness’.
• 10 See his article ‘Turgut Özal: The Ottoman of the 21st Century’, Sabah, 28 April 1992. Çandar recalls Özal as saying that his two favourite state models in history were the Ottoman State and the United States of America.
• 11 Interestingly enough, the current president of the Republic, Süleyman Demirel, has also been voicing his concerns regarding internal stability within parameters suggested by that question. See article by Fatih Çekirge, ‘From Demirel, a Re-definition of Citizenship’, Sabah, 20 March 1994.
• 12 Quoted from ‘Turkey: Land of Hope’, Sabah, 11 July 1992.
• 13 Rouleau, Eric (1993), ‘Challenges to Turkey’, Foreign Affairs, November-December. It might be noted in this regard that the Kemalist conception of nationalism is also imbued with a spirit of cosmopolitanism, particularly when compared to the Ziya Gökalp thesis which draws heavily on the Islamic compenent in defining Turkish nationalism. These and related issues have been examined in my unpublished doctoral dissertation, ‘Kemalist Tradition, Political Change and the Turkish Military’ Queen’s University, Canada, 1985).
• 14. Le Point, 30 January-5 February 1993.
• 15 Even Graham Fuller’s analysis (his acclaimed scholarship on Turkey notwithstanding) remains somewhat impressionistic, thus re-confirming the complexity of the issue. See his monograph Turkey Faces East: New Orientations Toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union, RAND Publication, 1992.
• 16 International Herald Tribune, 4 January 1996.
• 17 Ibid.
• 18 It is particularly interesting to note that the 500th anniversary of Sultan Süleyman’s birth (1494) was commemorated in Hungary, in September 1994, through a joint Hungarian-Turkish enterprise—another indication of the existing potential for sharing common historical legacy. A bronze bust of the Sultan was unveiled in Zigetvar at the spot where he died. See the article by Fatih Çekirge, ‘The Ottoman at the European Community’, Sabah, 6 September 1994. The Ottoman thus referred to is President Demirel.
• 19 International Herald Tribune, 11 July 1994.