Institutional and Economic Determinants of Denominational Fractionalism and Schism

Yıl 2017, Cilt: 25 Sayı: 33, 127 - 144, 31.07.2017

Mehmet Karacuka Martin Leroch

https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.289377

Öz

In this paper we present an economic approach contributing to the explanation of religious schism, a topic mostly dealt with in the fields of sociology and psychology so far. The main idea is to see religious groups as networks. These networks may serve as a device for exchanging information about and via other members. A modernizing economy is characterized by an increasing number of transactions with an increasing number of partners, leading to increasing transaction costs. It might be profitable for groups to split up in this economic environment in order to economize on these transaction costs. In our view, religious movements with stricter enforcement of their behavioural norms are growing in size, while such with rather liberal attitudes toward their norm enforcement face a loss of members. Historical and empirical results supporting our line of argument are presented. We find that the level of income and education attainment increase the fractionalization ratio in the states. Another interesting point in our empirical results regarding population size is that the number of entrepreneurs is positively correlated with the fractionalization ratio. The number of employees gives a negative coefficient, implying that this group prefers to be part of bigger groups due to their conformist behaviour.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Religion, Social Norms, Social Capital, Social Networks

Mezhepsel Bölünme ve Çeşitliliklerin Kurumsal ve İktisadi Belirleyicileri

Öz

Bu çalışma özellikle psikoloji ve sosyoloji tarafından incelenmekte olan dinsel bölünme konusuna iktisadi bir açıklama getirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışmanın temel argümanı dinsel grupların aynı zamanda üyeler arasında bir sosyal ağ olarak görülmesidir. Bu ağlar, üyeler arasında ve üyelerle ilgili bilgi paylaşımını kolaylaştırmaktadır. Modern ekonomi işlemlerin ve işlem yapılan tarafların hızla arttığı bununla beraber işlem maliyetlerinin de yükseldiği bir seyir izlemektedir. İşlem maliyetlerinde minimizasyon için bu grupların bölünmesi daha rasyonel olabilmektedir. Günümüzde daha katı dinsel grupların daah popular olması ve gevşek grupların üye kaybetmesinin bir açıklaması da budur. Tarihsel ve ampirik bulgular bu hipotezi desteklemektedir. Çalışmanın bulgularına göre gelir ve eğitim düzeyi ile birlikte dinsel bölümlenme artmaktadır. Ayrıca girişimci sayısındaki artışla da bu bölünmenin arttığı görülmektedir. Çalışan sayısı ile bölünme arasında bulunun negative ilişki ise çalışanların daha çok büyük grupları tercih ettiğine işaret etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Din, Sosyal Normlar, Sosyal Sermaye, Sosyal Ağlar

Kaynakça

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