A SOLUTION TO KIRKUK’S STATUS PROBLEM: AUTONOMY ENHANCED WITH POWER-SHARING

Yıl 2020, Cilt: 7 Sayı: 13, 193 - 218, 31.05.2020

Kürşad Güç

Öz

In this study, Kirkuk’s status problem is evaluated. The administrative status of Iraq's Kirkuk province has not been designated since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Therefore, Kirkuk is still one of the disputed territories within Iraq. Although the Iraqi Constitution, which entered into force in 2005, set a deadline for determining the status of disputed territories, including Kirkuk, with a deadline of 31 December 2007, the legal process has not yielded any results. Regardless of the legal process, the efforts to obtain Kirkuk through the use of force, as did the Kurds in 2014, have made the problem even more complicated instead of solving it. Thus, the problem has to be solved by a political agreement. In this context, this study advocates autonomy enhanced with a power-sharing model for Kirkuk. Accordingly, Kirkuk should first become an autonomous province within Iraq. Then the legislative, executive and judicial powers within this autonomous structure should be shared among Turkmen, Arabs, Kurds, and Assyrian Christians.

KERKÜK’ÜN STATÜ SORUNUNA BİR ÇÖZÜM: GÜÇ-PAYLAŞIMI İLE GÜÇLENDİRİLMİŞ ÖZERKLİK

Öz

Bu çalışma, Kerkük’ün statü problemini ele almaktadır. Irak’ın Kerkük vilayetinin idari statüsü, 2003 yılındaki Amerikan işgalinden bu yana belirlenebilmiş değil. Her ne kadar 2005’te yürürlüğe giren Irak Anayasası, Kerkük dâhil tartışmalı bölgelerin nihai statülerinin belirlenmesi için 2007 yılı sonuna kadar sonuçlanması beklenen bir süreci işaret etmiş olsa da vilayette yaşayan etnik gruplar arası anlaşmazlık neticesinde süreçten bir sonuç alınamamıştır. Bu nedenle Kerkük’ün idari statüsü halen daha belirsizliğini korumaktadır. Bu çalışma, Kerkük için etnik ve bölgesel çatışmaların çözüm yöntemleri ışığında bir çözüm önerisi geliştirmektedir. Kerkük’e benzer durumda olan çeşitli örnekler üzerinden şekillenen literatürde ön plana çıkan iki model, bu çalışmada Kerkük için uyarlanmıştır. Bu doğrultuda, Kerkük’ün öncelikle Irak içinde özerk bir il statüsü elde etmesi, daha sonra da bu özerk yapı içerisindeki yasama, yürütme ve yargı yetkilerinin Türkmenler, Araplar, Kürtler ve Asurîler arasında belirli oranlarda paylaştırılması savunulmaktadır. Böylece Kerkük’te yaşayan toplumların, Irak Merkezi Hükümeti’nin ya da Irak Bölgesel Kürt Yönetimi’nin kontrolüne girmeden Kerkük’ü kendi başlarına yönetmelerine imkân sağlanmış olacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Kirkuk, Iraq, Autonomy, Power-sharing, Special Status

Kaynakça

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