Mevduat sigortası ve asimetrik enformasyon

Abstract

Bu makalede mevduat sigorta sistemi hakkında bilgi verilerek sistemle ilgili asimetrik enformasyon problemlerinden ters seçim ve ahlaki riziko problemleri ele alınmıştır

Keywords

• mevduat sigortası, asimetrik enformasyon, ters seçim, ahlaki riziko

Deposit insurance and asymmetric information

Abstract

This article, aims to provide general information about deposit insurance system. Following this introduction, asymmetric information problems of adverse selection and moral hazard related with deposit insurance system will be discussed

Keywords

• deposit insurance, asymmetric information, adverse selection, moral hazard

References

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