How Did a Safeguard for Disadvantaged Groups Turn Into the Weapon of Oppression?: Normative Distortion of the article 216 of the Turkish Penal Code

Abstract

This study deals with the fallacious use of the Article 216 of the Turkish Penal Code. This norm, which was created to protect vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in a society, has turned into a legal tool to oppress those who should be under protection. An examination to the causes of this situation calls for a holistic reflection on diverse subjects such as; the universalist-cultural relativist controversy on human rights, concepts of indeterminacy of norms and hate speech in international and domestic law. The status of freedom of speech in terms of the said article will be tackled at the end of this study, which will lead to a relatively new concept: the normative distortion.

Keywords

• Turkish penal code,normative distortion,freedom of speech,hate speech

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