LİBERALİZMDEN NEO-LİBERALİZME GEÇİŞTE DEVLETİN VE EKONOMİK AKTÖRLERİN OYNADIKLARI ROLLERİN İŞLETME STRATEJİLERİNE ETKİLERİ: ABD İŞLETMELERİ BAĞLAMINDA BİR TEORİK TARTIŞMA

Year 2020, Volume: 22 Issue: 2, 220 - 228, 29.12.2020

Hüseyin Çağatay Karabıyık Prof. Dr. Ahmet Diken

https://doi.org/10.33707/akuiibfd.749314

Abstract

İnsanlık tarihine yön veren güçler ilk çalışmalardan günümüze değin çoğunlukla siyaset, ekonomi ve hukuk erkleri çerçevesinde değerlendirilmiştir. Bu yaklaşım üzerine sistematik yazınlar İbn-i Haldun’un 1332 yılında kaleme aldığı Mukaddime (2004) eserine kadar gitmektedir. Ekonomi tarihi boyunca da bu erklerin birbirleri arasındaki etkileşim gerek teori gerekse pratikte tartışılmaya devam edilmiştir. Ancak önce Liberalizm ve ardından Neo-Liberalizmin egemenliği görülen ekonomik dünyada siyasi ve ekonomik aktörlerin etkileşimi önemli değişimlere uğramıştır.

Bu çalışma Liberalizmden Neo-Liberalizme geçiş döneminde ekonomik aktörlerin siyaset üzerindeki etkilerinin hukukileşmesini teorik tartışma çerçevesinde incelemiştir. Bu incelemeler ise Birleşik Devletler’deki PAC uygulaması bağlamında değerlendirilmiştir. PAC, siyaset ve ekonomi ilişkisinin günümüzde geldiği nokta olarak görülmektedir. Bu çalışmada değişimlerin aynı doğrultuda devam etmesi halinde bu ilişkilerin hangi yönde ilerleyeceği ekonomik rekabet bağlamında tartışılmıştır. Bu bağlamda öncelikle hükümet ile ekonomi etkileşimi ve ABD’de PAC uygulamalarının gelişim süreci ile teorik arka plan oluşturulmuştur. Sonuç bölümünde ise işletmelerin ve ekonomik rekabetin geleceği mikro ve makroekonomik açıdan değerlendirilmiştir.

Keywords

Politik İktisat, Siyaset, Ekonomi, Devlet Müdahalesi, Liberalizm, Neo-Liberalizm, PAC

THE EFFECTS OF ROLES OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ACTORS ON BUSINESS STRATEGIES IN THE TRANSITION FROM LIBERALISM TO NEO-LIBERALISM: A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION IN THE CONTEXT OF US BUSINESS

Abstract

The forces that have shaped the human history have been evaluated mostly within the framework of politics, economy and legal forces since the first studies. The systematic studies about these approaches go back to “Mukaddime” that was written by İbn-i Haldun in 1332. The interaction between these forces has been discussed in both theory and practice in the history of economics. However, in the economic world dominated by Liberalism and then Neo-Liberalism, the interaction of political and economic actors has undergone significant changes.

This study examines the legalization of the effects of economic actors on politics in the period of transition from Liberalism to Neo-Liberalism within the framework of theoretical discussion. These discussions were evaluated in the context of the PAC implementation in the United States. PACs are seen as the present situation of interaction between politics and economy. In this study, it is discussed in the context of economic competition in which these relations will go on if the practices continue in the same direction. In this context, first of all, the theoretical background was created with the government-economy interaction and the development process of PAC applications in the USA. In the conclusion part, the future of businesses and economic competition is evaluated from a micro and macroeconomic perspective.

Keywords

Political Economy, Politics, Economy, Goverment Interventionalism, Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, PACs

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