The Paradox of Power Asymmetry: When and Why Do Weaker States Challenge US Hegemony?

Abstract

Little is known about how, among weaker states, incentives to challenge
the status quo are related to the expected response of the US as the system’s
hegemon. In contrast to conventional wisdom that suggests militarized
punishment can deter potential challengers, it is argued that weak but strongly
motivated challengers can interpret the hegemon’s military intervention against
adversaries as a window of opportunity to launch their own actions. Empirical
results using Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) and binary time-series cross-section (BTSCS) models reveal that weaker states possess incentives to
challenge the international status quo when the hegemon is preoccupied with
prior foreign policy commitments, most notably war. In other words, weaker
states dissatisfied with the status quo are more likely to challenge the hegemon
when it is preoccupied with prior military commitments. They do so because
war involvement distracts the hegemon, drains its capabilities and resolve, and
opens up a window of opportunity for weaker states to issue challenges. In
addition, weaker states that have an alliance portfolio dissimilar to that of the
hegemon are more likely than others to initiate Militarized Interstate Disputes.
Theoretically, this paper provides microfoundations to answer the question of
why weaker parties instigate asymmetric conflicts when it might seem irrational
to do so.

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