The Relative Gains theorem and the stalling United Nations Security Council membership reform

Volume: 11 Number: 4 August 1, 2012
  • Nikola Pijovic
EN

The Relative Gains theorem and the stalling United Nations Security Council membership reform

Abstract

The United Nations Security Council is the heart of our current global security order. This executive board of fifteen countries is the central transnational organ which discusses and sanctions global breaches of international peace and security. However, over the past two decades, and especially since the late 2004 United Nations high-level panel report on UN reform, there have been growing calls for the Security Council's reform. Reform is often perceived as necessary because the current structure of the Council, and especially its five permanent seats is seen as out of date and not in touch with contemporary geo-political realities, and representation on the Council is seen as largely undemocratic. However, in the background of all efforts to reform the SC are considerations of power and prestige. Ranging from the current permanent five members to the candidate states who fancy themselves worthy of Security Council permanent membership, most actors involved seem guided in their decision making processes by considerations of relative gains and balance of power. This is why applying the realist, or neorealist, theorem of relative gains may be insightful in analyzing the power-plays related to SC reform. The paper first offers a brief overview of the applicable theoretical framework for examining SC reform, and then outlines a background to the actual proposals for that reform. This is followed by a discussion of how perceptions of relative gains are influencing SC membership reform debates, and how these perceptions translate into concrete action of undermining membership aspirations.

Keywords

References

  1. African Union 2005. THE COMMON AFRICAN POSITION ON THE PROPOSED REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS: “THE EZULWINI CONSENSUS”, Addis Ababa.
  2. Blum, Yehuda Z. 2005. “Proposals for UN Security Council Reform.” The American Journal of International Law 99 (3) (July): 632-649.
  3. Bone, James 2005. “Payback for Germany in wrangle over UN top seat.” The Times (17 June). China Daily 2009, “Italy seeks support on UN Security Council reform.” 6 February.
  4. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2005. “Südkoreas Präsident beurteilt UN-Reformpläne skeptisch.” 14 April.
  5. Grieco, Joseph M. 1988. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism.” International Organization 42 (3): 485-507.
  6. Hurd, Ian. 2008. “Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform.” Global Governance 14 (2) (April): 199-217.
  7. Ikenberry, G. John, and Thomas Wright 2008. Rising Powers and Global Institutions, New York: A Century Foundation Report.
  8. Kahn, Joseph 2005a. “If 22 Million Chinese Prevail at UN, Japan won’t.” The New York Times (1 April).

Details

Primary Language

English

Subjects

-

Journal Section

-

Authors

Nikola Pijovic This is me

Publication Date

August 1, 2012

Submission Date

November 7, 2015

Acceptance Date

-

Published in Issue

Year 2012 Volume: 11 Number: 4

APA
Pijovic, N. (2012). The Relative Gains theorem and the stalling United Nations Security Council membership reform. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 11(4), 32-41. https://izlik.org/JA37BL99EF
AMA
1.Pijovic N. The Relative Gains theorem and the stalling United Nations Security Council membership reform. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations. 2012;11(4):32-41. https://izlik.org/JA37BL99EF
Chicago
Pijovic, Nikola. 2012. “The Relative Gains Theorem and the Stalling United Nations Security Council Membership Reform”. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 11 (4): 32-41. https://izlik.org/JA37BL99EF.
EndNote
Pijovic N (August 1, 2012) The Relative Gains theorem and the stalling United Nations Security Council membership reform. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 11 4 32–41.
IEEE
[1]N. Pijovic, “The Relative Gains theorem and the stalling United Nations Security Council membership reform”, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 32–41, Aug. 2012, [Online]. Available: https://izlik.org/JA37BL99EF
ISNAD
Pijovic, Nikola. “The Relative Gains Theorem and the Stalling United Nations Security Council Membership Reform”. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 11/4 (August 1, 2012): 32-41. https://izlik.org/JA37BL99EF.
JAMA
1.Pijovic N. The Relative Gains theorem and the stalling United Nations Security Council membership reform. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations. 2012;11:32–41.
MLA
Pijovic, Nikola. “The Relative Gains Theorem and the Stalling United Nations Security Council Membership Reform”. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, vol. 11, no. 4, Aug. 2012, pp. 32-41, https://izlik.org/JA37BL99EF.
Vancouver
1.Nikola Pijovic. The Relative Gains theorem and the stalling United Nations Security Council membership reform. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations [Internet]. 2012 Aug. 1;11(4):32-41. Available from: https://izlik.org/JA37BL99EF