Role of an Agent in (un)Keeping the Multiethnic State Together: The Case of the Secession of Kosovo

Year 2015, Volume: 14 Issue: 2, 1 - 15, 05.01.2016

Mirsad Krijestorac

Abstract

This paper proposes an explanation for the
Kosovo secession from Serbia/Yugoslavia. This is achieved by disaggregating the
‘reality’ of the state through the process tracing method, which compares the
cases of the Tito and Milošević triangles of accommodation practices. The focus
is on the games of survival practiced at the middle levels of political life,
around the local state policy implementer and the consequences of his removal.
This paper examines not only why, but how the secession of Kosovo occurred when
it did. It shows that the strength of authoritarianism or the regime-oppression
capability is not what held the Serbia and Kosovo together; rather, it was the
policies of accommodations which one leader did better than the other

Keywords

Multiethnic state, separation, Kosovo, Serbia, Yugoslavia, triangle of accommodation

References

• In a recent case, the first of its kind, the International Court of Justice ruled that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate international law. The Court issued its opinion in response to the request of the UN and many point that its ruling could have important consequences for the existing world order of states and other separatist movements.
• Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States. State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988)
• Although ethnic Albanian majority inhabitants call it Kosova, in this paper it will be referred t as Kosovo since that is how it is usually referred to by the international treaties and agreements. For example see United Nations Peacemaker. ”Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo (Rambouillet Accords)” February 23, 1999. Accessed December 11, 2013, http://peacemaker.un.org/kosovo-rambouilletagreement99
• Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups. (Harvard, U.K.: Harvard University Press, 2006) 12.
• Dragoljub R. Živojinović, “Islam in the Balkans: Origins and Contemporary Implications.” Mediterranean Quarterly 3, no. 4 (1992): 51-65.
• Robert J. Pranger, “The Milosevic and Islamization Factors: Writing Contemporary History in the Balkans.” Mediterranean Quarterly 22 (2011), no. 1: 1-14.
• To explain Milošević’s Serbian nationalist mobilization against their Bosnian and Albanian neighbors, Pranger (2011, 5-6) concludes: “It should not have been surprising to outside observers that, with the breakup of Yugoslavia and the rise of a drive for independent statehood among Bosnia’s Muslims, Serbs throughout the Balkans, most notably in Serbia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, should have yet again rushed to the barricades against another rising tide of Islam.” The previous instance, for Pranger was probably the Ottoman conquest of the region several centuries earlier. In that sense Pranger is implicitly making a parallel of Bosniak and Albanian demands for national states same as the Ottoman conquest, even though both Bosniak and the majority of Albanians are autochthonous Muslims populations of the Balkans for last several centuries living in their own territories, with own independent cultural and political aspirations.
• More recently Norwegian terrorist Breivik (2011) in his manifesto on almost 50 pages also wrote about the same ‘Islamic danger’ to Europe and often invoked forces created and led by Milošević as his forerunners. For more see Anders Behring Brevik, "2083: A European Declaration of Independence." The Internet Archive. (2011). Accessed June 11, 2012, https://archive.org/details/2083_A_European_Declaration_of_Independence
• Živojinović, as quoted by Pranger, Milosevic and Islamization, 7.
• Besides the episode of Milošević’s burial, there are many other instances to show that Milošević was not popular in Serbia, particularly among Serbian nationalists, and that his support was obtained primarily through a strong authoritarian hand. Several attempts to assassinate Serbian über-nationalist Vuk Drašković, ordered by Milošević, could attest to that [for more see B92. “Ex- state security officials guilty in assassination case” June 19, 2012. Accessed Jun 19, 2012, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes-article.php?yyyy=2012&mm=06&dd=19&nav_id=80845. Finally, Milošević even ordered the killing of his own ideological father, Serbian communist leader Ivan Stambolić, who was forced to dig his own grave on Fruška Gora before he was executed with a bullet in his head by the Serbian special police [for more see Gabriel Partos, “Analysis: Stambolić murder trial.” February 23, 2004. Accessed August 25, 2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3511823.stm. Stambolić is the former Yugoslav leader who was often credited with the resurgence of nationalism among Serbian communists, which Milošević joined as well, yet primarily for pragmatic reasons. For more see Nebojša Vladisavljević, "Institutional power and the rise of Milošević." Nationalities Papers 32, no. 1 (2004): 183-205.