Hegemony and Sanctions: The Significance Relationship Between US Hegemony and US Economic Sanctions in the Cold War

Year 2022, , 383 - 421, 01.06.2022

Akın Sağıroğlu

https://doi.org/10.53376/ap.2022.14

Abstract

Economic sanctions are preferred by states as a coercive foreign policy tool. During the Cold War, the United States of America (US) frequently used economic sanctions. In addition, the economic sanctions imposed by the US differ from the economic sanctions applied by other states in terms of quality and quantity. In this context, the study is aimed at “Is there a significant difference between the hegemony of the US and the economic sanctions applied by the US during the Cold War?” focused on the question. In the study, categorical variables were created to analyse a statistically significant relationship between US hegemony and economic sanctions. In the direction of these categorical variables, cross-tabulation and chi-square independence test analysis were applied to 230 economic sanctions imposed by the US on target countries during the Cold War (1945-1990). A statistically significant relationship emerged between the hegemony periods of the US and the foreign policy objectives of the economic sanctions, the nature of the sanctions and the target regions. In addition, a statistically significant relationship was determined between the nature of the sanctions and the scales of the target region and target country.

Keywords

Cold War, US Hegemony, US Economic Sanctions, US Hegemony Periods, Cross-Tabulation Analysis, Chi-square Test

Hegemonya ve Yaptırım: Soğuk Savaş Dönemi’nde ABD Hegemonyası ile ABD’nin Ekonomik Yaptırımları Arasındaki Anlamlı İlişki

Abstract

Ekonomik yaptırımlar, devletler tarafından zorlayıcı bir dış politika aracı olarak tercih edilmektedir. Soğuk Savaş Dönemi’nde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ekonomik yaptırımları sıklıkla kullanmıştır. Bununla birlikte ABD’nin uyguladığı ekonomik yaptırımlar diğer devletlerin uyguladığı ekonomik yaptırımlardan nitelik ve nicelik bakımından ayrışmaktadır. Bu bağlamda çalışma, “Soğuk Savaş Dönemi’nde, ABD hegemonyası ile ABD’nin uyguladığı ekonomik yaptırımlar arasında anlamlı farklılaşma var mı?” sorusuna odaklanmıştır. Çalışmada, ABD hegemonyası ile ekonomik yaptırımlar arasında istatistiki açıdan anlamlı bir ilişkinin analizi için kategorik değişkenler oluşturulmuştur. Bu kategorik değişkenler doğrultusunda ABD’nin Soğuk Savaş Dönemi’nde (1945-1990) hedef ülkelere uyguladığı 230 ekonomik yaptırıma çapraz tablo ve ki-kare bağımsızlık testi analizi uygulanmıştır. ABD’nin hegemonya dönemleri ile ekonomik yaptırımların dış politika amaçları, yaptırımların niteliği ve hedef bölgeler arasında istatistiki açıdan anlamlı ilişki ortaya çıkmıştır. Ayrıca yaptırımların niteliği ile hedef bölge ve hedef ülke ölçekleri arasında da istatistiki açıdan anlamlı bir ilişki tespit edilmiştir.

Keywords

Soğuk Savaş, ABD Hegemonyası, ABD Ekonomik Yaptırımları, ABD Hegemonya Dönemleri, Çapraz Tablo Analizi, Ki-kare Testi

References

• Afesorgbor, Sylvanus Kwaku ve Renuka Mahadevan (2016), “The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Income Inequality of Target States”, World Development, 83 (January 2015) (Elsevier Ltd): 1–11.
• Agnew, John A. (2005), Hegemony (Philadelphia: Temple University Press).
• Alexander, Kern (2009), Economic Sanctions, Law and Public Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
• Allen, Susan Hannah (2005), “The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure”, International Interactions, 32 (2): 117–138.
• Allen, Susan Hannah (2008), “The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52 (6): 916–944.
• Bacevich, Andrew J. (2003), American Empire, The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy Fifth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).
• Bakan, D. ve T. Büyükbese (2004), “Çalısanların İs Güvencesi ve Genel İş Davranışları İlişkisi: Bir Alan Çalışması”, Erciyes Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, 23: 35–59.
• Baldwin, David A. (1971), “The Power of Positive Sanctions”, World Politics, 24 (1): 19–38.
• Baldwin, David A. (1985), Economic Statecraft (New Jersey: Princeton University Press).
• Baldwin, David A. (2000a), “Success And Failure In Foreign Policy”, Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci, 3: 167–82.
• Baldwin, David A. (2000b), “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice”, International Security, 24 (3): 80–107.
• Barber, James (1979), “Economic Sanctions As a Policy Instrument”, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs), 55 (3): 367–384.
• Barry, Michèle (2000), “Effect of the U.S. Embargo and Economic Decline on Health in Cuba”, Annals of Internal Medicine, 132 (2): 151–154.
• Bartlett, Bruce (1985), “What’s Wrong With Trade Sanctions”, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 64.
• Blanchard, Jean-Marc F. ve Norrin M. Ripsman (2008), “A Political Theory of Economic Statecraft”, Foreign Policy Analysis, 4 (4): 371–398.
• Brooks, Risa A. (2002), “Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When?”, Security Studies, 11 (4): 1–50.
• Brooks, Stephen D., G. John Ikenberry ve William C. Wohlforth (2012), “Don’t Come Home, America”, International Security, Winter, 37 (3): 7–51.
• Butt, Ahsan I. (2013), “Anarchy and Hierarchy in International Relations: Examining South America’s War-Prone Decade, 1932-41”, International Organization, 67 (3): 575–607.
• Carneiro, Cristiane de Andrade Lucena (2014), “Economic Sanctions and Human Rights: An Analysis of Competing Enforcement Strategies in Latin America”, Revista Brasileira de Politica Internacional, 57 (1): 197–215.
• Chapnick, Adam (1999), “The Middle Power”, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 7 (2): 73–82.
• Clifton, T, Morgan Navin, A Bapat ve Yoshiharu Kobayashi (2013), “Threat and Imposition of Sanctions Data 4.0”, https://sanctions.web.unc.edu/ (20.02.2021).
• Clifton, T, Morgan Navin, A Bapat ve Yoshiharu Kobayashi (2014), “Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) Data Page”, https://sanctions.web.unc.edu/ (20.02.2021).
• Combs, Jerald A. (2018), “Embargoes and Sanctions - Cold War Sanctions”, https://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Embargoes-and-Sanctions-Cold-war-sanctions.html. (20.02.2021).
• Correlates of War Project (2021), “National Material Capabilities Data Documentation, Version 6”, https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities. (19.01.2021).
• Cox, Michael (1990), “From the Truman Doctrine to the Second Superpower Detente: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War”, Journal of Peace Research, 27 (1): 25–41.
• Cox, Robert W. ve Timothy Sinclair (2016), Dünya Düzenine Yaklaşımlar Çev: Çınar, Emrah ve Semih Çelik (Der.) (İstanbul: Uluslararası İlişkiler Kütüphanesi).
• Davis, Lance ve Stanley Engerman (2003), “Sanctions: Neither War nor Peace”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17 (Spring): 187–197.
• Derian, Patricia M. (1979), “Human Rights and American Foreign Policy”, Universal Human Rights, 1 (1): 3–9.
• Dobson, Alan P. (2002), US Economic Statecraft for Survival 1933–1991 (London: Routledge).
• Drezner, Daniel W. (1999), The Sanctions Paradox, Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
• Drezner, Daniel W. (2000), “Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?”, International Organization, 54 (1): 73–102.
• Drezner, Daniel W. (2011), “Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice”, International Studies Review, 13 (1): 96–108.
• Dueck, Colin (2015), The Obama Doctrine (New York: Oxford University Press).
• Early, Bryan R. (2012), “Alliances and Trade with Sanctioned States: A Study of U.S. Economic Sanctions, 1950-2000”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56 (3): 547–572.
• Elliott, Kimberly Ann (1998), “The Sanctions Glass, Half Full or Completely Empty?”, International Security, 23 (1): 50–65.
• Elliott, Kimberly Ann ve Peter P. Uimonen (1993), “The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions with Application to the Case of Iraq”, Japan and The World Economy, 5 (4): 403–409.
• Escribà-Folch, Abel ve Joseph Wright (2010), “Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers”, International Studies Quarterly, 54 (2): 335–359.
• Eyler, Robert (2007), Economic Sanctions International Policy and Political Economy at Work (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
• Fischhendler, Itay, Lior Herman ve Nir Maoz (2017), “The Political Economy of Energy Sanctions: Insights from a Global Outlook 1938–2017”, Energy Research and Social Science, 34 (May): 62–71.
• Forsythe, David P. (1980), “American Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality”, Universal Human Rights, 2 (3): 35.
• Francis, Tyler A. ve Thomas K. Duncan (2016), “The Cuban Experiment: A 50+Year Embargo as a Failed Means of Promoting Economic and Political Development”, SSRN Electronic Journal, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2773693.
• Freeman, Nick J. (1993), “United States’s Economic Sanctions against Vietnam”, The Columbia Journal of World Business, 28 (2): 12–22.
• Gaddis, John Lewis (2005), Strategies of Containment, A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, Revised Ed. (London: Oxford University Press).
• Gadzey, Anthony Tuo-Kofi (1994), The Political Economy of Power Hegemony and Economic Liberalization (Macmillan Press).
• Gal, Yitzhak ve Yair Minzili (2011), The Economic Impact of International Sanctions on Iran The Eleventh Annual Herzliya Conference). http://meysameffati.ir/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/YitzhakGalYairMinzili.pdf.
• Galtung, Johan (1967), “On the Effect of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia”, World Politics, 19 (3): 378–416.
• Gilpin, Robert G. (1981), War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
• Grunberg, Isabelle (1990), Exploring the “Myth” of Hegemonic Stability International Organization, Gutmann, Jerg, Florian; Neuenkirch, Matthias; Neumeier ve Armin Steinbach (2018), “Economic Sanctions and Human Rights: Quantifying the Legal Proportionality Principle”, SSRN Electronic Journal, ILE Working Paper Series, No. 12).
• Gutmann, Jerg, Matthias Neuenkirch ve Florian Neumeier (2020), “Precision-Guided or Blunt? The Effects of US Economic Sanctions on Human Rights”, Public Choice, 185 (1–2): 161–182.
• Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. ve Heidi M. McNamara (2019), “United States Human Rights Policy: The Corporate Lobby”, Human Rights Quarterly, 41 (1): 115–142.
• Hernández-Truyol, Berta (2009), “Embargo or Blockade? The Legal and Moral Dimensions of the U.S. Economic Sanctions on Cuba”, Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev., 4 : 53.
• Heupel, Monika (2013), “With Power Comes Responsibility: Human Rights Protection in United Nations Sanctions Policy”, European Journal of International Relations, 19 (4): 773–796.
• Hillebrand, Evan ve Jeremy Bervoets (2013), “Economic Sanctions and The Sanctions Paradox : A Post-Sample Validation of Daniel Drezner ’ s Conflict Expectations”, University of Kentucky, (1985): 1–44.
• Hook, Steven W. ve John Spanier (2013), Amerikan Dış Politikası, İkinci Dünya Savaşı’ndan Günümüze çev: Özge Zihnioğlu (Ed.) (İstanbul: İnkilap).
• Huber, Daniela (2015), Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan).
• Hufbauer, Gary Clyde ve Barbara Oegg (2003), “Economic Sanctions: Public Goals and Private Compensation”, Chicago Journal of International Law, 4 (2): 9–10.
• Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott ve Barbara Oegg (2007), Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, Third Ed. (Washington: Peterson Institute For International Economics).
• Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott ve Julia Muir (2012), “Case Studies in Economic Sanctions and Terrorism Post-2000 Sanctions Episodes”, (May): 1–13.
• https://piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/papers/sanctions-timeline-post-2000.pdf (20.02.2021).
• Huntington, Samuel P. (1991), The Third Wave, Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press).
• Ichimasa, Sukeyuki (2017), “Nuclear Nonproliferation and Economic Sanctions : Can Non-Military Sanctions Stop Nuclear Proliferation ?”, NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, 19 (2): 59–80.
• Ikenberry, G. John ve Charles Kupchan (1990), “Socialization and Hegemonic Power”, International Organization, 44 (3): 283–315.
• Jacobson, Michael (2008), “Sanctions against Iran: A Promising Struggle”, Washington Quarterly, 31 (3): 69–88.
• Jiang, Yang (2019), “Sanctions Are an Important Tool in China’s North Korea Diplomacy: Concerns over Nukes Have Been Growing in Beijing”, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/sanctions-are-an-important-tool-in-chinas-north-korea-diplomacy (20.02.2021).
• Jones, Lee ve Clara Portela (2014), “Evaluating the “Success” of International Economic Sanctions: Multiple Goals, Interpretive Methods and Critique”, Centre for the Study of Global Security and Development working paper 3, https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/1671 (20.02.2021).
• Kaempfer, William H. ve Anton D. Lowenberg (2007), “The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions”, Handbook of Defense Economics, 2 (06): 867–911.
• Kaempfer, William H., Anton D. Lowenberg ve William Mertens (2004), “International Economic Sanctions”, Economics and Politics, 16 (1): 29–51.
• Kennedy, Paul (1987), The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House).
• Keohane, Robert O. (1984), After Hegemony (New Jersey: Princeton University Press).
• Kindleberger, Charles P. (1973), The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley: California University Press).
• Kokabisaghi, Fatemeh (2018), “Assessment of the Effects of Economic Sanctions on Iranians’ Right to Health by Using Human Rights Impact Assessment Tool: A Systematic Review”, International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 7 (5): 374–393.
• Kozhanov, Nikolay A (2011), “U.S. Economic Sanctions against Iran”, Middle East Policy, 18 (3): 144-160.
• Krasner, Stephen D. (1976), “State Power and the Structure of International Trade”, World Politics, 28 (3): 317–347.
• Lee, Karin ve Julia Choi (2008), “U.S. Sanctions and Treasury Department Actions Against North Korea from 1955 to October 2007”, North Korean Review, 4 (1): 7–25.
• Levkowitz, Alon ve Ran Shauli (2019), “The Cost of Sanctions on North Korea”, BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1.
• MacDonald, Paul K. ve Joseph M. Parent (2011), “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”, International Security, Spring, 17 (4): 7–44.
• Macro Trends (2022), “U.S. GDP Growth Rate 1961-2022”,. https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/USA/united-states/gdp-growth-rate (26.03.2022).
• Mansfield, Edward D. (1995), “International Institutions and Economic Sanctions”, World Politics, 47 (4): 575–605.
• Markakis, Dionysis (2016), US Democracy Promotion in the Middle East (New York: Routledge).
• Mastanduno, Michael (2003), “Incomplete Hegemony: The United States and Security Order in Asia”, Alagappa M. (Der.), Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University Press): 141–170.
• Mearsheimer, John J. (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (W. W. Norton & Company).
• Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin Bapat ve Yoshiharu Kobayashi (2014), “Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES Dataset”, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 31 (5): 541–558.
• Neuenkirch, Matthias ve Florian Neumeier (2015), “The Impact of UN and US Economic Sanctions on GDP Growth”, European Journal of Political Economy, 40: 110–125.
• Newnham, Randall E. (2000), “More Flies with Honey: Positive Economic Linkages in German Ostpolitik from Bismarck to Kohl”, International Studies Quarterly, 44 (1): 73–96.
• Newnham, Randall E. (2008), ““Coalition of the Bribed and Bullied?” U.S. Economic Linkage and the Iraq War Coalition”, International Studies Perspectives, 9 (2): 183–200.
• Norrlof, Carla (2010), America’s Global Advantage, US Hegemony and International Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
• Norrlof, Carla (2017), “Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Unipolarity: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations of Hegemonic Order Studies”, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.552.
• Pape, Robert A. (1997), “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work”, International Security, 22 (2): 90–136.
• Pape, Robert A. (1998), “Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work”, 22 (2): 66–77.
• Peksen, Dursun (2011), “Economic Sanctions and Human Security: The Public Health Effect of Economic Sanctions”, Foreign Policy Analysis, 7 (3): 237–251.
• Posen, R. Barry (2003), “Command of the Commons, The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony”, International Security, 28 (1): 5–46.
• Rosenberg, Elizabeth, Zachary K. Goldman, Daniel W. Drezner ve Julia Solomon-Strauss (2016), The New Tools of Economic Warfare: Effects and Effectiveness of Contemporary U.S. Financial Sanctions (New York, US: Center for a New American Security).
• Schenoni, Luis L. (2019), “Hegemony”, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies: 1–23. DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.509.
• Schenoni, Luis L. ve Scott Mainwaring (2018), “US Hegemony and Regime Change in Latin America”, Democratization, 26 (2): 1–19.
• Schoultz, Lars (1981), “U. S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Aid Distributions”, Comparative Politics, 13 (2): 149.
• Shambaugh IV, George E. (1996), “Dominance, Dependence, and Political Power: Tethering Technology in the 1980s and Today”, International Studies Quarterly, 40 (4): 559–588.
• SIPRI (2021), “Military Expenditure by Country as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 1949-2020”, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex (26.03.2022).
• Swielande, Tanguy Struye De (2019), “Middle Powers: A Comprehensive Definition and Typology” Swielande, Tanguy Struye De, Dorothée Vandamme, David Walton vd. (Der.), Rethinking Middle Powers in the Asian Century (London: Routledge): 19-31.
• Trading Economics (2022), “United States - Military Expenditure (% Of GDP) 2021”, https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/military-expenditure-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html (26.03.2022).
• Tsebelis, George (1990), “Are Sanctions Effective?: A Game-Theoretic Analysis”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34 (1): 3–28.
• Tulchin, Joseph S. (2016), Latin America in International Politics Challenging US Hegemony (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers).
• United Stated, Genaral Accountaing Office (1992), Economic Sanctions: Effectiveness as Tools of Foreign Policy (Washington).
• Van Den Berg, Lauren (2010), “Economic Sanctions An Effective Tool of Foreign Policy Statecraft?”, Queen’s Policy Review, 1 (1): 3–17.
• Wallensteen, Peter (2013), “A Century of Economic Sanctions: A Field Revisited”, Peace Research: Theory and Practice, (1): 183–205.
• Webb, Clayton (2018), “Power Politics or Public Pandering? An Empirical Investigation of Economic Sanctions and Presidential Approval”, International Interactions, 44 (3): 491–509.
• Webb, Michael C. ve Stephen D. Krasner (1989), “Hegemonic Stability Theory : An Empirical Assessment”, Review of International Studies, 15 (April): 183–198.
• Wiarda, J. Howard (2011), American Foreign Policy in Regions of Conflict (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan).
• Wilkinson, David (2008), “Hêgemonía: Hegemony, Classical and Modern”, Journal of World-Systems Research, XIV (2): 119–141.
• World Bank (2021), “Military Expenditure (% of GDP) 2021”,. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?name_desc=false&type=shaded&view=map&year=1978 (26.03.2022).