The Public Use of Intelligence: A Strategic Analysis of Intelligence Sharing in the Russia-Ukraine War

Abstract

Intelligence is generally gathered secretly and used to inform policymakers, decision-makers, and, when necessary, the domestic public, in accordance with the “need-to-know” principle. However, in the run-up to the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine and during the initial stages of the war, the United Kingdom and the United States, in addition to their usual methods of using intelligence, publicly disclosed intelligence, particularly to influence international public opinion. The United Kingdom and the United States have used intelligence as leverage to both warn about the intentions of the Russian Federation and to deter the Russian Federation from military action against Ukraine. This study argues that while the public disclosure of intelligence represents a significant evolutionary step in how intelligence assets are used, it is rooted in a longer historical legacy. This study explores why states choose to use intelligence to influence international public opinion, what they aim to achieve by doing so, the advantages and disadvantages of disclosing classified information to the public, and the use of intelligence during the Ukraine crisis. In conclusion, it has been stated that intelligence, as used to inform the public, is not merely a product to be presented to policymakers and decision-makers, but a tool used to achieve strategic effects in crisis scenarios. In this context, it has been emphasized that it can be used to influence public opinion, deter adversaries from their intentions, combat disinformation, and shape foreign policy discourse. On the other hand, it has been concluded that this is not a risk-free policy, given its drawbacks.

Keywords

• Intelligence
• Public Intelligence
• Russian Federation
• Ukraine
• Russian-Ukrainian War

İstihbaratın Kamusal Kullanımı: Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı'nda İstihbarat Paylaşımının Stratejik Analizi

Abstract

İstihbarat genellikle gizli olarak toplanır ve “bilmesi gereken” ilkesine uygun olarak politika yapıcıların, karar alıcıların ve gerektiğinde de iç kamuoyunu bilgilendirmek için kullanılır. Ancak Rusya Federasyonu’nun Ukrayna'yı işgaline giden süreçte ve savaşın ilk aşamalarında, Birleşik Krallık ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, olağan istihbaratı kullanma yöntemlerine ilave olarak, özellikle dış kamuoyunu etkilemek için istihbaratı kamuoyuna açıklamışlardır. Birleşik Krallık ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, hem Rusya Federasyonu’nun niyeti hakkında uyarıda bulunmak hem de Rusya Federasyonu’nu Ukrayna’ya karşı askeri harekâttan caydırmak amacıyla istihbaratı bir kaldıraç olarak kullanmıştır. Bu çalışma, istihbaratın kamuya açıklanmasının, istihbarat varlıklarını kullanma biçiminde önemli bir evrimsel adım olmakla birlikte, daha uzun bir tarihsel mirasa dayandığını savunmuştur. Devletlerin neden dış kamuoyunu etkilemek için istihbaratı kullanmayı seçtiklerini, bunu yaparak neyi başarmayı amaçladıklarını, gizli bilgilerin kamuya açıklanmasının faydalarını ve mahzurlarını, Ukrayna krizi sırasında istihbarat kullanımı incelenerek ortaya konmuştur. Sonuç olarak, şimdiye kadar bilgilendirmek için kullanılan istihbaratın, sadece politika yapıcılara, karar alıcılara sunulacak bir ürün olarak değil, kriz senaryosunda stratejik etkiler elde etmek için kullanılan bir araç olduğu belirtilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, kamuoyunu etkilemede, hasım tarafı niyetinden caydırmada, dezenformasyonla mücadelede ve dış politika söylemini şekillendirmede kullanılabileceği hususu vurgulanmıştır. Diğer yandan, bu hususun mahzurları da belirtilerek risksiz bir politika olmadığı sonucuna varılmıştır.

Keywords

• İstihbarat
• Kamu İstihbaratı
• Rusya Federasyonu
• Ukrayna
• Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı

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