SSCB’de Plan-Bürokrasi Çatışması: Sovyet Tipi Firma Örgütlenmesi

Year 2022, Volume: 7 Issue: 1, 33 - 57, 30.06.2022

Kerim Eser Afşar , Emircan Yıldırım , Özgür Saraç

https://doi.org/10.25229/beta.1092152

Abstract

SSCB’nin çöküş sürecinin merkezi planlama ve bürokrasi kapsamında tartışıldığı bu çalışma, Sovyet tipi firma örgütlenmesine odaklanmıştır. Literatürde merkezi planlamayla bürokrasi genellikle birlikte çalışan bir alan olarak ele alınmış, bu iki ayrı yapı arasındaki nüanslar çoğunlukla ihmal edilmiştir. Bu da bürokratik yapıdan kaynaklı sorunların hatalı biçimde merkezi planlamaya mal edilmesine yol açmıştır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, SSCB’deki bürokratik mekanizmalarla merkezi planlama olguları arasındaki çatışmayı/ayrımı vurgulamaktır. Birincil kaynakları ele alan literatürden türetilen teorik argümanlardan elde edilen temel bulgu şudur: etkinsizliğin nedeni merkezi planlama değildir. Çöküşü hazırlayan koşullar, ağırlıklı olarak siyasi saiklerle oluşan bürokratik amaçların merkezi planlarla olan çatışmasından ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu tezden yola çıkan çalışma, SSCB’nin merkezi planlama hiyerarşisindeki en küçük karar birimi olan firmaların yönetim ilkelerini analiz ederek bürokrasi ve merkezi planlama arasındaki çelişkiyi ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır.

Keywords

Sosyalist Planlama, Bürokratik Örgütlenme, Sovyet Tipi Firma, Teknokrasi, Kara Borsa.

Plan-Bureaucracy Conflict in the USSR: Soviet Type Firm Organization

Abstract

This study, in which the collapse of the USSR is discussed within the scope of central planning and bureaucracy, focuses on Soviet type firm organization. In the literature, central planning and bureaucracy are generally considered as fields that work together, and the nuances between these two separate structures are mostly neglected. This has led to the erroneous attribution of problems arising from the bureaucratic structure to central planning. The aim of this study is to emphasize the conflict/difference between bureaucratic mechanisms and central planning phenomena in the USSR. The main finding from the theoretical arguments derived from the literature based on primary sources is that central planning is not the cause of inefficiency. The conditions that prepared the collapse emerged from the conflict of bureaucratic aims, mainly political motives, with central plans. Starting from this thesis, the study aims to reveal the contradiction between bureaucracy and central planning by analyzing the management principles of firms, which are the smallest decision units in the central planning hierarchy of the USSR.

Keywords

Socialist Planning, Bureaucratic Organisation, Soviet Type Firm, Technocracy, Black Market.

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