Introduction to Value-Relevant and Normative Tradition in Philosophy of the Social Sciences

Year 2014, , 15 - 27, 30.12.2014

Ruhi Can Alkın , Ramazan Yelken

https://doi.org/10.18491/bijop.96819

Cited By: 1

Abstract

Methodology, which is one of the most important areas subjected by philosophy of the social sciences, determines the epistemological and ontological position of scientific practice. At this point, the current study proposes to critically analyze positivist epistemology in the social scientific practice while shedding light on the inevitable character of interpretivist methodology for this area. More specifically, study will illustrate the values and normative tradition in specific to research subjects and actors of social sciences. In doing so, study will assert that naturalistic approach, which focuses on cause and effect relations when examining social phenomena, will be shown as an inappropriate tradition in the social sciences in comparison to interpretivist methodology. On the other hand, understanding of “social science for the sake of society” instead of the idea of “social science for the sake of social science” will be examined.

Keywords

Philosophy of the social sciences, ontology, epistemology, positivism, interpretivism.

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