The Denial of the Idea of Personal Identity as a Result of Hume’s Skepticism

Year 2018, Volume: 8 Issue: 2, 505 - 519, 30.12.2018

Nurten Öztanrıkulu Özel

https://doi.org/10.18491/beytulhikme.510498

Abstract

The problem of personal problem in philosophy is mostly handled as an identity or a “self” problem. When handled with the identity problem, personal identity means the identification of a person in a certain time point with a person at another time point. When handled together with the “self” problem; however, personal identity is considered a part of a substantive and metaphysical investigation. Hume’s philosophy includes both aspects of the discussions of personal identity in an opposing manner. In the present study, Hume’s thoughts on the problem of personal identity will be examined. Firstly, the meaning of the idea of the self in his epistemology based on perception will be dealt with. Then, identity will be searched. It will be claimed that the thing that formed the theses of Hume about self and identity is his skepticism; and that Hume reinforces his thoughts on metaphysics with this investigation. In addition, it will be defended that in order to better understand the personal identity, it is necessary to consider his views on the nature of belief. 

Keywords

Hume, personal identity, self, identity, bundle theory, skepticism

References

• Baxter, D. L. M. (1998). Hume’s Labyrinth Concerning the Idea of Personal Identity. Hume Studies, XXIV (2), 203-234.
• Capaldi, N. (1975). David Hume: The Newtonian Philosopher. Boston: Twayne Publishers.
• Capaldi, N. (1995). Hume’s Theory of the Self. David Hume: Critical Assessment, vol. III. (Ed. S. Tweyman). London & New York: Routledge, 627-641.
• Hume, D. (1960). A Treatise of Human Nature. (Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge). London: Oxford University Press.
• Iannone, A. P. (2001). Dictionary of World Philosophy. London & New York: Routledge.
• Pears, D. (1993). Hume on Personal Identity. Hume Studies. XIX (2), 289-300.
• Penelhum, T. (1975). Hume’s Theory of the Self Revisited. Dialogue. 14, 389-409.
• Robison, W. L. (1995). Hume on Personal Identity. David Hume: Critical Assessment, vol. III. (Ed. S. Tweyman). London & New York: Routledge, 687-704.
• Sokolowski, R. (1968). Fiction and lllusion in David Hume’s Philosophy. The Modern Schoolman 45, XIV, 189-225.
• Stroud, B. (1977). Hume. London and New York: Routledge.
• Swain, C. G. (2006). Personal Identity and the Skeptical System of Philosophy. The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s Treatise. (Ed. Saul Traiger). London: Blackwell Publishing, 133-150.
• Thiel, U.(2011). The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press.