İç Savaşın Yıprattığı ve Kurumları Çökmüş Bir Ülke İçin DTÖ’ye Katılımın Faydaları

Abstract

Suriye’nin etkin bir hükümete, işleyen kurumlara ve istikrarlı bir ekonomiye sahip olma yolunda karşı karşıya olduğu zorluklar son derece fazladır ve bunların tamamını kapsamlı bir şekilde kavramak neredeyse imkânsızdır. Yeni rejimin liderleri devlet yönetimi konusunda sınırlı bir deneyime sahiptir. Ülkenin hem kentsel hem de kırsal bölgelerinde güvenliğin sağlanmasına yönelik mücadeleler hâlen devam etmekte olup hukukun üstünlüğü ise henüz tam anlamıyla tesis edilememiştir. Bunun yanı sıra gelecekte kurulması öngörülen merkezi hükümetin meşruiyetine karşı çıkan muhalif gruplar ve doğrudan ayaklanmalar ülke genelinde yaygın durumdadır. Uluslararası kuruluşların desteği, dayanıklı bir hükümetin kurulması ve bu hükümetin uluslararası alanda tanınması açısından temel bir ön koşuldur. Böyle bir tanınma, Suriye›nin yeni liderlerinin karşı karşıya oldukları karmaşık sorunlarla daha etkin şekilde mücadele edebilmesini sağlayacaktır. Bu bağlamda, uluslararası ticaretin yönetiminde geniş yetkilere sahip olan ve 166 üye devleti bulunan temel uluslararası kuruluş niteliğindeki Dünya Ticaret Örgütü’ne (DTÖ) katılım, yeni hükümet açısından bu karmaşık sorunların en azından bir kısmını aşmak için önemli bir fırsat sunmaktadır. Bu çalışma, Suriye’nin DTÖ’ye katılımının sağlayacağı faydaların üç temel boyutta ele alınabileceğini öngörmektedir. İlk olarak, dünya ticaretinin yaklaşık %98›ini düzenleyen ve üyelik yapısı bakımından Birleşmiş Milletler’i takip eden en kapsamlı uluslararası örgüt olan DTÖ’nün konumu dikkate alındığında katılım sürecinin kendisi yeni hükümete uluslararası meşruiyet, tanınma ve de jure (hukuken tanınmış) statü kazandıracaktır. İkinci olarak, DTÖ Anlaşması›nın XII. Maddesi kapsamında yürütülen ayrıntılı üyelik süreci, aday ülkenin mali ve ekonomik alandaki ulusal idari kurumlarının etkin biçimde işleyebilmesi için gerekli hukuki ve kurumsal çerçevenin oluşturulmasını güvence altına almaktadır. Son olarak DTÖ’ye katılım, yeni hükümetin merkezi otoriteyi güçlendirme kapasitesini artıracak ve böylece ulusal uzlaşma sürecindeki güç dengesinin merkezi yönetimin çıkarları doğrultusunda şekillenmesine katkıda bulunacaktır. Çalışma, yeni yönetimin bu faydaları elde edebilmek için aşması gereken zorlukları değerlendirdikten sonra Suriye’nin yeni hükümetinin DTÖ’ye katılım müzakerelerine vakit kaybetmeksizin başlaması gerektiği yönündeki öneriyle sona ermektedir.

Keywords

• Suriye
• DTÖ
• Katılım
• İç Savaş
• Çalışma Grubu Raporları

Benefits of WTO Accession for a Civil War-Torn Country with Tattered Institutions

Abstract

Challenges Syria is facing in its path towards having an effective government with working institutions and a stable economy abound and can hardly be comprehended in full. Leaders of new regime have limited experience of statecraft, urban as well as rural areas of the country teem with bandits and armed gangs, while rule of law appears to be lacking. Furthermore, rivals and direct uprisings against the legitimacy of the prospective central government are ubiquitous. Support from international organizations is a prerequisite for a resilient government and its extraterritorial recognition which would empower the new leaders of Syria in dealing with the complexities ahead. In this respect an accession to World Trade Organization (WTO), the main international institution with 166 member states with an expansive mandate over the governance of international trade represents a tremendous opportunity for the new government to overcome at least some of these complexities. This study envisages the benefits of Syria’s accession of WTO to be threefold. First the Organization’s intensive Article XII membership procedure ensures that a prospective member would have legal and structural framework prerequisite for the effective functioning of financial and economic national administrative institutions. Second, given the position of WTO governing 98 per cent of world trade with a membership roster consisting of an overwhelming majority of international society seconded only to the United Nations, the accession procedure itself would provide international legitimacy, recognition and de jure character to the new government. Finally the accession to WTO would enhance the new government’s ability to enter into foreign relations and arrangements with an improved standing particularly for international trade and commerce. Legal framework established under WTO provides fundamental protection against trade-restrictive measures of other States, while allowing the conclusion of preferential arrangements responding development, financial and trade needs of developing countries. The study concludes with a proposition that the new government of Syria should start accession negotiations without any delay.

Keywords

• Syria
• WTO
• Accession
• Civil War
• Working Party Reports

References

1. Agreement on Agriculture (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/
2. Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/
3. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/
4. Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/
5. Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/
6. Agreement on Preshipment Inspection (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/
7. Agreement on Rules of Origin (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/
8. Agreement on Safeguards (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/

9. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/
10. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/
11. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/
12. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (15 April 1994) LT/ UR/A-1A/
13. Agreement on Trade Facilitation (22 February 217) LT/UR/A-1A/
14. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1C/
15. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/
16. Barfield, Claude, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of World Trade Organization (2001)
17. Charnovitz, Steve ‘Mapping the Law of WTO Accession’ in Merit E. Janow et al. (eds), The WTO Dispute Settlement, Governance, and Developing Countries (Juris Publishing, 2008) 1083-125.
18. Cattaneo, Oliver & Primo Braga, Carlos A., ‘Everything You Always Wanted to Know About WTO Accession’ (2009) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper.
19. COM(2005)476 Final (Brussels, 12/04/05)
20. De Leon, Josefita Pardo& Al-Akhali, Rafat ‘Domestic Framework for Making and Enforcing Policies’ in Uri Dadush & Chiedu Osakwe (eds), WTO Accession and Trade Multilateralism: Case Studies and Lessons from the WTO at Twenty (WTO, 2015), 729-40.
21. Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (28 November 1979) BISD 33S/21
22. Evenett, Simon J.& Primo Braga, Carlos A., ‘WTO Accession: Moving the Goalposts?’ in “Newfarmer, Richard (ed), Trade, Doha, and Development : A Window into the Issues. (2006, World Bank) 231-45.
23. Ferrantino, Michael J. ‘Policy Anchors: Do Free Trade Agreements Serve As Vehicles for Developing Country Policy Reform?’ (2006) US ITC Office of Economics Working Paper No:2006-04-A
24. Finger, J. Michael& Schuler, Philip ‘Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments’ (2000) 23/4 The World Economy 511.
25. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A
26. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/
27. General Agreement on Trade in Services (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1B/
28. General interpretative note to Annex 1A LT/UR/A-1A
29. Golub, Stephen S. ‘Openness to Foreign Direct Investment in Services: An International Comparative Analysis’ (2009) 32/8 The World Economy 1245.
30. Guzman, Andrew T. et al., International Trade Law (3rd edn, Wolter Kluwer 2016).
31. Haddad, Mona et al., ‘The Structural Reform Implications of WTO Accession’ in Uri Dadush & Chiedu Osakwe (eds), WTO Accession and Trade Multilateralism: Case Studies and Lessons from the WTO at Twenty (WTO, 2015) 81-121.
32. Hoekman, Bernard & Roy, Jayanta ‘Benefiting from WTO Accession and Membership’ in Bernard Hoekman & Jamel Zarrouk (eds), Catching Up with the Competition: Trade Opportunities and Challenges for Arab Countries (University of Michigan Press, 2010), 307-24.
33. Hong, Zhao ‘China’s Accession to The WTO and Its Rule of Law’ (2016) 6 Journal of WTO and China 40.
34. Hsiao, Monica ‘China and the GATT: Two Theories of Political Economy Explaining China’s Desire for Membership in the GATT’ (1994) 12/2 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 431.
35. International Crisis Group, ‘After the Aid Axe: Charting a Path to Self-reliance in Afghanistan’ (2025) Crisis Group Asia Report No: 350.
36. Irwin, Douglas A. et al., The Genesis of GATT (Cambridge 2008).
37. Lehne, Jens, Crisis at the WTO: Is the Blocking of Appointments to the WTO Appellate Body by the United States Legally Justified? (Sui Generis, 2019).
38. Low, Patrick, Afghanistan: A Retrospective on Five Years of WTO Membership, (ITC, 2021).
39. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, (15 April 1994) 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144.
40. Marrakesh Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/
41. Michalopoulos, Constantine ‘WTO Accession’ in Bernard Hoekman et al. (eds.), Development, Trade, and The WTO: A Handbook (World Bank 2002) 61-71.
42. Moïsé, Evdokia, ‘The Costs and Challenges of Implementing Trade Facilitation Measures’, (2013) OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 157.
43. Osakwe, Chiedu & Dadush, Uri ‘Accession. Protocols As Building Blocks’ in Uri Dadush & Chiedu Osakwe (eds), WTO Accession and Trade Multilateralism: Case Studies and Lessons from the WTO at Twenty (WTO, 2015) 909-16.
44. Pauwelyn, Joost ‘WTO Dispute Settlement Post 2019: What to Expect?’, (2019) 22 JIEL, 297.
45. Reiter, Joakim ‘Managing The Challenge of Acceding Post-Conflict States’ in Uri Dadush & Chiedu Osakwe (eds), WTO Accession and Trade Multilateralism: Case Studies and Lessons from the WTO at Twenty (WTO, 2015) 608-20.
46. Qin, Ya ‘China and GATT: Accession Instead of Resumption’ (1993) 27 J. World Trade 77, 79-80.
47. Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/
48. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A2/
49. Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A
50. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A
51. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A
52. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A
53. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-1A
54. Williams, Peter J., A Handbook on Accession to the WTO, (Cambridge, 2008).
55. WTO Annual Report 2025, (WTO, 2025).
56. (10/09/1986) L/6023
57. (30/03/1987) C/M/207
58. (31/07/1989) C/M/234
59. (4/11/1991) C/M/252
60. (17/03/1992) SPEC(88)13/Add.11
61. (27/10/1992) C/M/259
62. (19/11/1992) L/7120
63. (14/07/1993) C/M/26
64. (21/07/1993) C/M/265
65. (12/11/1993) C/M/267
66. (24/01/1994) C/M/268
67. (10/03/1994) SR 49/71
68. (22/03/1994) C/M/270
69. (28/03/1994) L/7423
70. (28/02/1995) WT/GC/M/1
71. (17/08/1995) WT/GC/M/5
72. (01/11/1995) WT/ACC/RUS/4
73. (13/12/1995) WT/GC/M/8
74. (25/05/1996) WT/GC/M/11
75. (30/05/1996) WT/ACC/RUS/9/Add.1
76. (30/07/1996) WT/GC/M/12
77. (23/09/1996) WT/ACC/KAZ/3
78. (14/10/1996) WT/ACC/RUS/13/Add.1
79. (11/03/1997) WT/ACC/RUS/17
80. (02/12/1997) WT/ACC/RUS/23
81. (16/03/1998) WT/GC/M/26
82. (13/07/1998) WT/ACC/CHN/15
83. (31/07/1998) WT/ACC/KGZ/26
84. (30/09/1998) WT/GC/M/29
85. (09/04/1999) WT/ACC/EST/28
86. (22/06/1999) WT/ACC/KHM/2
87. (31/08/1999) WT/ACC/GEO/31
88. (21/03/2000) WT/AACC/CHN/17
89. (14/06/2000) WT/AACC/SPEC/CHN/1
90. (29/06/2000) WT/ACC/HRV/59
91. (14/07/2000) WT/ACC/ALB/51
92. (14/09/2000) W/GC/M/57
93. (07/11/2000) WT/ACC/LTU/52
94. (11/01/2001) WT/ACC/MOL/37
95. (01/10/2001 WT/ACC/CHN/49
96. (28/03/2002) WT/ACC/SPEC/RUS/25
97. (26/11/2002) WT/ACC/ARM/23
98. (27/01/2004) WT/ACC/TJK/6
99. (02/03/2005) WT/ACC/TJK/11
100. (07/04/2005) WT/GC/M/92
101. (02/12/2005) WT/ACC/TON/17
102. (01/11/2005) WT/ACC/SAU/61
103. (29/03/2006) WT/ACC/TJK/13
104. (27/10/2006) WT/ACC/VNM/48
105. (15/11/2007) WT/GC/M/110
106. (06/12/2007) WT/ACC/CPV/30
107. (25/01/2008) WT/ACC/UKR/152
108. (25/06/2008) WT/ACC/KAZ/67
109. (07/08/2008) WT/ACC/TJK/15
110. (04/06/2010) WT/ACC/TJK/17
111. (20/04/2011) WT/ACC/LBR/3
112. (05/12/2011) WT/ACC/CGR/38
113. (01/11/2011) WT/ACC/SAM/30
114. (17/11/2011) WT/ACC/RUS/70
115. (11/05/2011) WT/ACC/VUT/17
116. (01/10/2012) WT/ACC/LAO/45
117. (06/11/2012) WT/ACC/TJK/30,
118. (04/10/2013) WT/ACC/YEM/42
119. (05/11/2014) WT/ACC/SYC/64
120. (23/06/2015) WT/ACC/KAZ/93
121. (09/10/2015) WT/ACC/LBR/23
122. (13/11/2015) WT/ACC/AFG/36, WT/MIN(15)/6
123. (21/02/2017) WT/GC/M/165
124. (14/10/2022) WT/ACC/COM/38
125. (18/01/2024) WT/ACC/COM/51
126. accessed 26 January 2026
127. accessed 26 January 2026
128. accessed 26 January 2026
129. accessed 26 January 2026
130. accessed 26 January 2026
131. accessed 26 January 2026
132. accessed 26 January 2026
133. accessed 26 January 2026
134. accessed 26 January 2026
135. accessed 28 June 2026
136. accessed 28 June 2026
137. accessed 28 June 2026
138. accessed 28 June 2026
139. accessed 26 January 2026
140. accessed 09 February 2026
141. accessed 26 January 2026