KAPANIŞ SONRASI BİRLEŞME VE DEVRALMA UYUŞMAZLIKLARINDA TAHKİM VE HEDEF ŞİRKET YÖNETİCİLERİNİN TANIK OLARAK GİZLİLİK YÜKÜMLÜLÜĞÜ

Year 2024, Volume: 2 Issue: 2, 172 - 196, 24.01.2025

Sıla Karakoç Göksu

https://doi.org/10.69800/blr.1596885

Abstract

Birleşme ve devralmalarda ("M&A"), hedef şirket üst düzey yöneticilerinin kapanış sonrası ortaya çıkan tahkim uyuşmazlıklarında satıcı hissedarlara karşı gizlilik yükümlülüğü altında olmalarına karşın, tahkim yargılamasında alıcı taraf adına fiili tanık olarak yer aldıkları durumların ne tür sonuçlar doğuracağı oldukça önem arz etmektedir. Bu makale, işbu hususu hem satıcı hissedarlar hem de hakem heyetinin perspektifinden ele alıp analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Hedef şirketin üst düzey yöneticilerinin M&A sürecine ilişkin detaylara ilk elden hakim olmaları, kapanış sonrası M&A uyuşmazlıklarına dahil olmalarını kritik hale getirmektedir. Bu bağlamda, satıcı hissedarlar, işbu yöneticilerin çıkarlarının kapanıştan sonra alıcı tarafla daha uyumlu hale gelebileceğini öngörerek, bu kişilerle işlem esnasında veya öncesinde gizlilik sözleşmesi yapmayı öngörebilmektedir. Tahkim sürecinin başlamasıyla birlikte ise satıcı hissedarlar, bu tanıkların alıcı tarafla olan yakın ilişkisine veya satıcılara karşı gizlilik yükümlülüklerine dayanarak tanık ifadelerinin hakem heyetince değerlendirilmeye alınmamasını talep edebilecektir. Hakem heyeti, öncelikle tanığın gizlilik yükümlülükleri doğrultusunda beyanlarının hariç tutulup tutulamayacağına ilişkin karar verme yetkisini değerlendirir. Bu tespitin ardından, tanık beyanlarının hangi koşullar altında geçersiz sayılmasının uygun olacağı hususunun belirlenmesi gerekecektir. Hakem heyeti, bu hususta karar verirken tanığın ifadesini ve bu ifadenin içeriğini gözden geçirmeyi talep edebilir. Şayet sunulan delil hem konuyla doğrudan ilgili hem de tanığın gizlilik yükümlülükleri kapsamına giriyorsa, hakem heyeti, tarafların rekabet halindeki menfaatlerini dikkatlice değerlendirerek bir sonuca ulaşabilecektir. Taraflar için daha tutarlı bir çerçeve ve öngörülebilir sonuçlar sağlamak adına, bu makale, hakem heyetinin hedef şirketin üst düzey yöneticilerinin tanık olarak dinlenmesi sırasında satıcı hissedarlara ait gizli bilgilerin açıklanmasına ilişkin bir karar verirken, "work-product doctrine" (iş-ürün doktrini) gibi yerleşik kurallara başvurmasını önermektedir. Bu bağlamda, hakem heyetinin, i) alıcının kendi davasını desteklemek için işbu açıklanması beklenen gizli bilgilere duyduğu ihtiyacın önemini ve ii) bu bilgilerin alıcı tarafından aşırı bir zorluk olmaksızın başka yollarla elde edilip edilemeyeceği hususunu değerlendirerek bir sonuca ulaşabileceği savunulmaktadır.

Keywords

Kapanış, Birleşme Devralmalar, Tahkim, Gizlilik Yükümlülüğü, Tanık

ARBITRATION OF POST-CLOSING M&A DISPUTES AND CONFIDENTIALITY OBLIGATIONS OF TARGET MANAGEMENT AS FACTUAL WITNESSES: SECRETS TO KEEP OR SECRETS TO TELL?

Abstract

This article examines senior management’s role in post-closing mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) arbitrations, where they testify as factual witnesses for the acquirer of the target company and have a standstill confidentiality obligation to the selling shareholders. This article will analyze this phenomenon from the viewpoints of both selling shareholders and the arbitral tribunals. The involvement of the top management of the target in any post-closing M&A disputes would be crucial, given their first-hand knowledge of the transaction. Hence, the selling shareholders may take some ex-ante measures, by concluding a separate confidentiality agreement with these individuals, whose interests have been shifted upon closing and became more aligned with the acquirer. Once any proceeding commences, the selling shareholders may request the exclusion of the witness statement, either relying on the close relationship between the witness and the acquirer or the confidentiality obligation of the witness to the selling shareholders. The arbitral tribunal begins by assessing whether it possesses the authority to exclude the witness based on the individual's prior confidentiality obligations. Following this determination, the arbitral tribunal evaluates whether exclusion is appropriate under the specific circumstances of the case. In reaching its decision, the arbitral tribunal may review the content of the witness's statement. If the evidence is deemed relevant and falls within the scope of the witness's confidentiality obligations, the tribunal must carefully balance the competing interests of the parties involved. To establish a coherent framework and more predictable results for both parties and their counsels, this article suggests recourse to more established rules as in work-product doctrine, under which the tribunal should evaluate in deciding the disclosure of the confidential information by the top management as factual witnesses, whether the acquirer has i) a substantial need for the confidential information to present its case and ii) whether the acquirer lacks any ability to obtain the information by other means without undue hardship.

Keywords

Post-Closing M&A, Arbitration, Confidentiality Obligation, Factual Witness

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