Abstract
Although it has been generally considered that evidential arguments are the only
appropriate way to believe that God exists, it has been argued that there are also nonevidential
arguments/reasons for belief in God. William James’s “The Will to Believe”
is one of the most signifi cant non-evidential reasons in favour of religious belief.
James criticises Clifford’s views and asserts that we have the right to believe even if
the evidence is inconclusive. According to Clifford, it is wrong to believe any proposition
on insuffi cient evidence. James’s primary goal is to show that Cliffordian evidentialism is irrational because it prevents us from acknowledging certain kinds of truth.
And James argues that our passional/non-epistemic nature can determine what we
believe when an option is a genuine option which means live, forced, and momentous
options and cannot be decided on intellectual/epistemic grounds. The argument briefl y
enables us to say that “Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an
option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature
be decided on intellectual grounds”. In this essay, I will discuss James’s “The Will to
Believe” and some objections which have been directed to it. First, I will argue that
our passional nature is not a reliable guide to truth and that many confl icting religious
beliefs can be justifi ed on this ground. And second, I will argue that although James
accuses Clifford’s evidentialism of preventing us from acknowledging certain kinds of
truth, his argument is equally vulnerable to a similar objection.
Abstract
Bu çalışmada, James’in inanma iradesi argümanı ve ona yöneltilen bazı itirazlar
üzerinde durulmaktadır. James’in argümanı, kişinin, epistemik açıdan meseleye karar
veremediği ancak karşı karşıya kaldığı inanç seçeneğinin hakiki bir tercih ifade ettiği
durumlarda, tutkusal doğasına dayanarak inanabilmesine olanak sağlar. İlk itiraz
olarak, tutkusal doğanın doğruluk konusunda güçlü bir rehber olmadığı ve bu açıdan
argümana dayanarak birbiriyle çelişen birçok dini inancın haklı çıkartılabileceği ileri
sürülmektedir. İkinci olarak, James’in, bizi bazı doğruları onaylamaktan alıkoyduğu
için Clifford’ın delilciliğini suçlarken, aslında kendi argümanında da aynı şeyi yaptığı
iddia edilmektedir.
Details
| Journal Section | Articles |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Publication Date | June 20, 2016 |
| Published in Issue | Year 2016 Volume: 19 Issue: 48 (20-06-2016) |