Denk İhtilafında Delile Dayalı Argüman

Year 2021, Volume: 24 Issue: 61, 281 - 296, 15.12.2021

Elif Kütükcü

https://doi.org/10.15745/da.990404

Abstract

Son yıllarda epistemolojide tartışılan önemli konulardan biri ihtilaf problemidir. İhtilaf problemi ise özelde denk ihtilafı üzerinden tartışılmaktadır. Epistemik olarak bize denk birinin bizimle aynı şeyi düşünmediğinin farkına vardığımızda, rasyonel olarak inancımızla ilgili nasıl bir tutum sergilememiz gerektiği bu problemin ana sorusudur. Bu soruya uzlaşmacılık, kararlılık, toplam kanıt görüşü ve gerekçelendirmeci görüş olmak üzere verilen dört ana cevap vardır. Bu makalede analitik bir yol izleyerek önce söz konusu görüşleri kısaca inceleyip onların problemi çözmekte yetersiz kaldığını ortaya koyacağım. Daha sonra denk ihtilafı probleminin çözümünde ihtilafın karmaşıklığı ve denklerin durumu gibi bir çok faktör etkili olduğundan ihtilafın çözümünün olgu bazlı olması gerektiğini savunacağım. Ve son olarak, denk ihtilafı problemine verilmiş cevapların eksikliklerini içermeyen ve kendi cevabım olan denk ihtilafında delile dayalı argümanı ortaya koyup, onu olgu örnekleri ile açıklayacağım.

Keywords

İhtilaf, Denk İhtilafı, Kararlılık, Uzlaşmacılık, Delil

The Evidence-Based Argument in Peer Disagreement

Abstract

The problem of disagreement is one of the most important issues that have been debated in epistemology in recent years, and in particular the peer disagreement. The main question of this problem is what kind of attitude we should rationally adopt when we realize that someone who is an epistemic peer to us does not think the same. There are four main responses to this question: conciliationism, steadfastness, total evidence view, and justificationist view. According to conciliationism, when there is a peer disagreement, the parties should give equal weight to each other's beliefs, lower their confidence in their own beliefs or suspend their judgments on the issue in question. According to the steadfastness view, when there is a peer disagreement, one can continue to maintain one's own belief, and this is rational. In the total evidence view, one's total evidence in disagreement with an epistemic peer; consists of his own belief, the belief of his peer, and the evidence on which their belief before the disagreement is based. For this reason, according to Kelly, who is the owner of this view, it may be reasonable to place more weight on one's own belief if the original evidence supports his belief more than that of the peer. According to the justificationist view, the degree of your prior justification for the proposition in disagreement determines your response to it; namely, if you have a high degree prior justification you can maintain your belief as in the steadfastness view, but if you do not have a high degree prior justification, you need to revise your belief as in the equal weight view. In this article, first I will briefly examine these four views and deal with the points where they fail to satisfy. Later, I will argue that resolution of the disagreement should be case-based. And finally, I will present the evidence-based argument in peer disagreement which is my own response to this problem and explain it with sample cases.

Keywords

Disagreement, Peer Disagreement, Steadfastness, Conciliationism, Evidence

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