CARNAP VE NEURATH'IN FEMİNİST BİLİM FELSEFESİ AÇISINDAN OLASI BİR DEĞERLENDİRMESİ

Year 2023, , 573 - 605, 20.06.2023

Dinçer Çevik

https://doi.org/10.33171/dtcfjournal.2023.63.1.23

Cited By: 1

Abstract

Güncel feminist bilim felsefesinin güncel bilim pratiğinin günümüzdeki hali ile ilgili kuşkuları vardır. Feminist bilim felsefesinin temel iddiası kabaca şu şekilde ortaya konulabilir: Güncel bilim pratiği ve onun ürünleri erkek egemen değerler tarafından tahakküm edilmekte ve bu tahakküm ilişkisi de bilimin rasyonel ve evrensel olması iddialarına gölge düşürmektedir. Bilim felsefesi tarihinde önemli bir yer tutan Viyana Çevresi, özellikle bazı üyelerinin yaklaşımları ve kavram setleriyle feminist bilim felsefesi tarafından eleştirilen noktaların analizinde ve daha iyi hale getirilmesinde rol oynayabilir. Viyana Çevresi tarafından benimsenen dünyanın bilimsel kavranışı günlük hayatın, bilimin ve aydınlanmacı değerlerin eşliğinde reforme edilmesi için modernist politikaların belirlenmesinde rehber görevi görür. Bu bağlamda Viyana Çevresi’nin aydınlanmacı amaçlarına erişmek için kurguladıkları ve kullandıkları felsefi kavramlar ve çerçeveler güncel feminist bilim felsefesi tarafından dile getirilen iddialar ile ilgili önemli olanaklar ve ilişkiler barındırmaktadır. Örneğin Rudolf Carnap’ın kavram mühendisliği ile ilgili çalışmaları Sally Haslanger’in iyileştirilebilir kavramlar yaklaşımı için tamamlayıcıdır. Benzer şekilde, Otto Neurath’ın bütünselciliği, anti-temelciliği ve yardımcı güdüler yaklaşımı ampirik açıdan benzer yeterlilikte olan teorilerin tercihi üzerine düşünmemiz için yardımcı olmaktadır. Bu anlamda Viyana Çevresi’nin en azından bazı üyeleri güncel feminist bilim felsefesinin bilim pratiği ile ilgili dile getirdiği problemlerin tartışılmasında potansiyel faydalar barındırmaktadır. Öte yandan Viyana Çevresi’nin Carnap ve Neurath ile birlikte feminist bilim felsefesi tartışmalarında dile getirilen bütün problemleri çözebileceğini iddia etmeyeceğim. Daha ziyade, onların bilim pratiğine yaklaşımlarının ve bazı kavramsal araçlarının feminist bilim felsefesi programı ile yakın benzerlikler taşıdığını göstermeyi amaçlıyorum.

Keywords

Feminist Bilim Felsefesi, Viyana Çevresi, Rudolf Carnap, Kavram Mühendisliği, Otto Neurath, Yardımcı Güdüler

Supporting Institution

Yok

Project Number

Yok

A POSSIBLE EXAMINATION OF CARNAP AND NEURATH IN TERMS OF FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Abstract

Contemporary feminist philosophy of science criticizes the scientific practice as it is conducted today. The main claim of the feminist philosophers of science argue for could be put as in the follows: contemporary scientific practice and its products is dominated by value judgments determined by male values, and this calls in question as to the rationality and universality of the very nature of the science. Vienna Circle, which has an important place in the history of philosophy of science, especially with some of its members conceptual tools and attitudes could take a role in analyzing and providing a remedy concerning the criticisms levelled against contemporary science and philosophy of science by feminist philosophers of science. The scientific worldview endorsed by Vienna Circle functions as a guide in reforming ordinary life and science and in figuring out modernist policies with respect to Enlightenment values. In this context, some philosophical concepts and frames developed by some members of the Vienna Circle to attend these goals have important possibilities and relations with respect to claims raised in contemporary feminist philosophy of science. For instance, Rudolf Carnap’s work on conceptual engineering is complementary to some contemporary work on conceptual engineering, such as Sally Haslanger’s work on ameliorative concepts. Similarly, Otto Neurath’s holism, anti-foundationalism, and discussion of the work what he calls auxiliary motives can help us think on situations in which there exists competing empirically adequate theories. Accordingly, it is possible to claim that at least some members of Vienna Circle could offer us potential benefits in discussing problems levelled against contemporary scientific practice by feminist philosophers of science. However, I will not claim that the Vienna Circle with Carnap and Neurath can solve all the issues for us, but rather I aim to demonstrate that their approach to scientific practice and some of their conceptual tools have close affinities with feminist philosophy of science program.

Keywords

Feminist Philosophy of Science, Vienna Circle, Rudolf Carnap, Conceptual Engineering, Otto Neurath, Auxiliary Motives

Project Number

Yok

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