BISQUE (DEBT HOLIDAY) CLAUSES: POTENTIAL AND BENEFITS FOR TURKEY

Abstract

Government debt defaults and crises have been among the main problems of many countries since the past. Debt defaults, which have been observed in developing countries as well as developed countries in recent years, imposed some fiscal and economic costs on countries. Because of these costs, countries avoid defaulting on their debts. For this reason, some mechanisms and innovations that prevent default or shorten the default period have come to the fore. One of these innovations is the provisions for deferment of debt, known as “bisque clauses”. From this point of view, this purpose of the study is to investigate the potentials and benefits of bisque clauses for Turkey. In the study, Turkey’s default risk and loan rates were analyzed by using descriptive method. According to the results of the study, since the external debt and loan rates are quite low in Turkey, the influence of bisque clauses is narrow. For this reason, Turkey should benefit from innovative methods applied in the world in external borrowing such as collective action clauses and since domestic borrowing is predominantly included, also should benefit from new domestic borrowing instruments such as index-based sukuk and environmental bonds.

Keywords

• Public Debt Management
• Bisque Clauses
• Innovations in Debt Management
• Turkey

BİSQUE (BORÇ TATİLİ) MADDELERİ: TÜRKİYE İÇİN POTANSİYELİ VE FAYDALARI

Abstract

Kamu borç temerrütleri ve krizleri, geçmişten beri birçok ülkenin temel problemleri arasında yer almaktadır. Son yıllarda gelişmekte olan ülkeler yanında gelişmiş ülkelerde de görülen borç temerrütleri, ülkelere mali ve ekonomik bazı maliyetler yüklemiştir. Söz konusu bu maliyetler nedeniyle ülkeler borç kaynaklı temerrüde düşmekten kaçınmaktadırlar. Bu nedenle temerrüde girmeyi engelleyen ya da temerrüt süresini kısaltan bazı mekanizmalar ve yenilikler gündeme gelmiştir. Bu yeniliklerden bir tanesi de “bisque maddeleri” olarak anılan borç erteleme hükümleridir. Buradan hareketle bu çalışmanın amacı, bisque maddelerinin Türkiye için potansiyeli ve faydalarını araştırmaktır. Çalışmada Türkiye’nin temerrüt riski ve kredi kullanım oranları betimleyici yöntemle analiz edilmiştir. Çalışmanın sonucuna göre Türkiye’de dış borçlanma ve kredi oranları oldukça düşük olduğundan bisque maddelerinin etki alanı dardır. Bu nedenle Türkiye kolektif eylem maddeleri gibi dış borçlanmada dünyada uygulanan inovatif yöntemlerden yararlanmalı ve ağırlıklı olan iç borçlanmaya yer verildiğinden iç borçlanmaya yönelik olarak endekse dayalı sukuk ve çevresel tahviller gibi yeni iç borçlanma enstrümanlarından yararlanmalıdır.

Keywords

• Kamu Borç Yönetimi
• Bisque Maddeleri
• Borç Yönetiminde Yenilikler
• Türkiye

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