Analysis of Syndicated Loans from the Perspective of Competition Economics – Information Economics, Risk Management and Cooperation

Year 2021, Volume: 10 Issue: 1, 41 - 68, 15.01.2021

Emin Köksal , Şahin Ardıyok

Abstract

Syndicated loans are multilateral loans that a single bank cannot finance because of the magnitude and the intensity of the risks. This study analyzes how cooperation between banks based on information exchange affects the uncertainty and risk associated costs in a multilateral lending process. The main question to be answered during the study is “How the antitrust rules related to information exchange may be treated for the economic activities that may only be performed jointly?” The study tries to answer this question based on the relevant economics and finance literature. It concludes that information exchange in the multilateral lending process should be treated differently than bilateral lending.

Keywords

Syndicated loans, antitrust, information economics, risk management

Sendikasyon Kredilerinin Rekabet İktisadı Açısından İncelenmesi – Bilgi Ekonomisi, Risk Yönetimi ve İş Birliği

Abstract

Sendikasyon kredileri, verilecek kredi miktarının büyüklüğü ve alınacak risklerin yoğunluğu sebebiyle tek bir banka tarafından finanse edilemeyen çok taraflı kurumsal kredilerdir. Bu çalışma bilgi paylaşımına dayalı bir iş birliğinin bu tür kredi süreçlerindeki belirsizlik ve riske bağlı maliyetleri nasıl etkilendiğini ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma boyunca özellikle cevaplanmaya çalışılan soru şudur: “Teşebbüslerin ancak ve ancak birlikte gerçekleştirebildikleri, aksi halde gerçekleşmesi mümkün olmayan, ekonomik aktiviteler için bilgi paylaşımı ve iş birliğine dair rekabet kuralları nasıl yorumlanmalıdır?” Bu çalışmanın ilgili iktisat ve finans literatürüne dayalı olarak çok taraflı kurumsal krediler özelinde bu soruya sunduğu cevap, bilgi paylaşımını da içeren iş birliği süreçlerinin iki taraflı kredi süreçlerindeki bilgi paylaşımından farklı bir şekilde değerlendirilmesi gerektiğine işaret etmektedir.

Keywords

Sendikasyonu kredileri, rekabet, bilgi ekonomisi, risk yönetimi

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