Economic Coordination under Incomplete Information

Abstract

A well-functioning economy is essential for financial markets. The leaders and bureaucrats of the critical institutions in an economy may not be able to avoid financial risks due to coordination problems under incomplete information, even when they are competent and know what to do. This study considers the coordination problem under incomplete information of economic agents with partitional information structures. In a simple theoretical model, we show that a financial risk that everybody knows may not be prevented without common knowledge, even in an ideal scenario where the leaders and bureaucrats who run the critical institutions of an economy know what to do to avoid this risk. We discuss whether the authorities should publicly disclose financial risks that are known to everyone. We conclude that an institution that coordinates the information among the key institutions of an economy may help mitigate the financial risks by turning mutual knowledge into common knowledge. Our study highlights once again the stark difference between mutual knowledge and common knowledge, pointing out that higher order knowledge is important in coordination problems.

Keywords

• Incomplete Information
• Common Knowledge
• Mutual Knowledge
• Financial Crises.

Eksik Bilgi Altında Ekonomik Koordinasyon Problemi

Abstract

Finansal piyasaların sağlıklı bir şekilde işlemesi için iyi yönetilen bir ekonomi oldukça önemlidir. Ekonomiyi yöneten liderler ve bürokratlar bir kriz riski durumunda ne yapılması gerektiğini bilseler bile eksik bilgi altında koordinasyon problemi yüzünden ekonomik krizlerden kaçınmak mümkün olmayabilir. Bu çalışmada bölümsel bilgi yapısına sahip ekonomik aktörlerin eksik bilgi altında koordinasyon problemi ele alınmaktadır. Basit bir kuramsal model ile aslında herkesin bildiği bir finansal riskin, ekonomiyi yöneten lider ve bürokratların kriz durumunda ne yapılması gerektiğini bildikleri ideal bir durumda bile ortak bilgi olmadan engellenemeyebileceği gösterilmektedir. Herkesin bildiği finansal risklerin ilgili otoriteler tarafından açıkça kamuya ilanının gerekli olup olmadığı tartışılmaktadır. Sonuçlarımız, herkesin bildiği bir bilgiyi paylaşsa bile bir ekonomik koordinasyon merkezinin karşılıklı bilgiyi ortak bilgiye çevirerek ekonomik aktörlerin bir finansal kriz riski durumunda yapılması gerekeni yapmasını sağlayabileceğini göstermektedir. Çalışmamız ortak bilgi ile karşılıklı bilgi arasındaki keskin farkı vurgulayarak eksik bilgi altındaki koordinasyon problemlerinde yüksek dereceli bilgilerin önemli olduğunu bir kez daha ortaya koymaktadır.

Keywords

• Eksik Bilgi
• Koordinasyon
• Ortak Bilgi
• Karşılıklı Bilgi
• Finansal Krizler.

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