İşletme Grubu İlişkisinin Firmaların Kazanç Yönetimi Uygulamalarına Etkisi

Year 2022, Volume: 7 Issue: 2, 426 - 441, 30.06.2022

Emin Hüseyin Çetenak

https://doi.org/10.30784/epfad.1119396

Abstract

Yasal olarak bağımsız işletmelerin çeşitli resmi ve gayri resmi bağlar aracılığıyla bir araya gelmesi şeklinde tanımlanabilecek işletme grupları, karmaşık yapısı, kendi içerisinde çeşitli işlemler yapmaya elverişli doğası ve yatırımcıların bu işlemleri izlemesinde yaşayacağı zorluk nedeniyle beraberinde vekalet sorunlarını da getirmektedir. Yapı itibariyle finansal raporlama sürecine müdahale etme konusunda daha fazla özgürlük sunan grup yapısı şirket yöneticilerine, azınlık hissedar hakları konusunda daha fazla inisiyatif sağlamaktadır. Temel olarak kazançların kalitesi ve mali tabloların güvenilirliği konusunda ipuçları sunan kazanç yönetimi uygulamalarının önemi grup şirketlerinde görülen karmaşık piramit yapıların varlığı durumunda daha çok artmaktadır. Bu çalışmada Türkiye’de bir gruba bağlı veya bağımsız olarak faaliyet gösteren firmaların kazanç yönetimi uygulamaları 2014-2019 yılları arasında BİST’de faaliyet gösteren firma verileri kullanılarak kantitatif olarak tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Kazanç yönetimi uygulamaları tespitinde düzeltilmiş Jones modelinden yararlanılmıştır. Analiz sonuçları söz konusu dönemde hakim ortağın büyük işletme grubu veya yabancı olduğu firmalarda kazanç yönetimi uygulamalarına daha az gidildiği, diğer taraftan bağımsız firmalarda bu durumun tam tersi olduğunu göstermektedir. Elde edilen sonuçlar Türkiye örneğinde kazançların kalitesinin belirlenmesinde şirketlerin kurumsallaşma düzeyi ve prestijlerinin ortaklık yapısından daha önemli olduğunu işaret etmektedir.

Keywords

İşletme Grupları, Kazanç Yönetimi, Düzeltilmiş Jones Modeli

Impact Of Business Group Relationship On Firm’s Earning Management Practices

Abstract

Business groups, which can be defined as legally independent firms’ bonds with various official and informal ties, also bring agency problem concerns due to their complex structure. Group structure, which provides more freedom to intervene in the financial reporting process, gives company managers more initiative over minority shareholder rights. The importance of earnings management practices, which provide clues about the quality of earnings and the reliability of financial statements, increases more in the presence of complex pyramid structures seen in group companies. In this study, the earnings management practices of a group of affiliated and independent companies were determined quantitatively by using the data of companies operating in the BIST between the years 2014-2019. The modified Jones Model was used to determine earnings management practices. The results of the analysis show that earnings management practices are less likely in companies where the controlling shareholder is a big business group or companies with foreign ownership, while the opposite is true for independent companies. The results indicate that the institutionalization level and prestige of the companies are more important than the ownership structure in determining the quality of earnings in the case of Turkey.

Keywords

Business Groups, Earnings Management, Modified Jones Model

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