Kurumsal Sürüklenme: Yolsuzluk ve Bürokratik Verimliliğin Evrimsel Bir Modeli

Abstract

Bu makale, kurumsal sürüklenme varlığında bürokratik dürüstlük ile yolsuzluk arasındaki evrimsel istikrarı incelemektedir. Çalışmada replikatör dinamikleri içeren bir evrimsel oyun teorisi çerçevesi kullanılarak, bürokratlar arasındaki etkileşim; dürüst, yozlaşmış ve fırsatçı olmak üzere üç stratejili bir simpleks üzerinden modellenmiştir. İkili modellerin aksine bu yaklaşım, yalnızca denetimin yüksek veya yolsuzluğun düşük olduğu durumlarda kurallara uyan koşullu işbirlikçilerin kritik rolünü açığa çıkarmaktadır. Analiz, kurumsal sürüklenmenin yalnızca yolsuzlukta doğrusal bir artışa yol açmadığını, aynı zamanda popülasyonun dürüstlük ve sistematik yolsuzluk arasında salındığı, dürüst ajanların ihbar priminin işbirliği rantını aşması koşuluyla yinelenen bir çevrim oluşturabileceğini göstermektedir. Sabit ceza parametreleri altında dahi, fırsatçı stratejinin dürüst dengeyi bozarak ve katı yolsuzluğun istilasını kolaylaştırarak bir katalizör görevi gördüğü gösterilmiştir. Bulgular, statik yolsuzlukla mücadele politikalarının dinamik strateji evrimine karşı yetersiz olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Keywords

• Evrimsel oyun teorisi
• kurumsal iktisat
• replikatör dinamikleri
• yolsuzluk

Institutional Drift: An Evolutionary Model of Corruption and Bureaucratic Efficiency

Abstract

This paper investigates the evolutionary stability of bureaucratic integrity versus corruption in the presence of institutional drift. Using an Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) framework with replicator dynamics, the interaction among bureaucrats is modeled using a three-strategy simplex: Honest, Corrupt, and Opportunistic. Unlike binary models, this approach captures the critical role of conditional cooperators, that is, agents who comply only when monitoring is high or corruption is low. The analysis demonstrates that institutional drift does not merely lead to a linear increase in corruption but can generate a recurrent cycle in which the population moves from integrity through latent opportunism to systemic graft and back, provided that the whistleblowing premium earned by honest agents exceeds the collusion rent. It is shown that the opportunistic strategy acts as a catalyst, destabilizing the honest equilibrium and facilitating the invasion of hard-core corruption even under constant penalty parameters. These findings suggest that static anti-corruption policies are insufficient against dynamic strategy evolution.

Keywords

• Evolutionary game theory
• institutional economics
• replicator dynamics
• corruptions

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