Theoretical Foundations of The Executive Branch

Abstract

How can we make sense of executive power, which is now the ubiquitous form of political governing ability? Of course, this may vary depending on the form of the political system (parliamentary system, semi-presidential system, presidential system, etc.). There are many studies carried out in this direction in the doctrine. However, here we will look at what we have with executive power, how it works and whether it works. Indeed, in this context, it can be said that the phenomenon of political executive requires more study effort from a political scientist or lawyer since it is the universal acceptance of the political. Today, when we observe the rise of the executive power, at least in its modern political form, it is important to reveal the structural conditions and functioning of the executive power. So how should we understand the relevance of executive power to mo dern developments? What is executive power, what is it generally expected to do, and what is its connection to modern governments? In this regard, it is emphasized that executive power should be univer sally accepted as a modern necessity. Therefore, a modern doctrine needs to be developed here. Because no modern state can be conside red standing unless it is equipped with a strong executive body; Any state that does not have this government is thought to be inviting di saster, and is viewed with pity and contempt by the more fortunate. The real executive power actually begins with Aristotle. From this it is understood that executive power is a prehistoric reality. However, the creation of the executive power does not represent a definite prog ress in state power and administrative functioning. Because political thought before the invention of executive power did not reveal a pri mitive or thoughtless understanding, and subsequent views do not show clear progress. In this respect, it is said that the executive power covers and conceals the issues it deals with. In our opinion, the impli cit problem here is; It is the resistance that man develops against pure power by discovering modern law. Indeed, the insistence of the executive power, which is a modern compass, in charting one's path, breaks this resistance. In a result, separation of powers is one of the fundamental principles of constitutionalism, although its roots and development date back to ancient times. Accordingly, state power should be divided into three separate powers: legislative, executive and judicial. This form of power sharing reveals the guaranteeing feature of a democratic state. However, at the current stage, we see that the executive power has come to the fore among the said powers and has incorporated the qualities that should be manifested in the legislative power as a requirement of democracy, including managing the policy-making process and law making. Of course, many factors may be involved in this expansion of the executive's authority. However, the main issue we are investigating here is whether the executive is inclined to this expansion of authority in terms of its na ture and meaning. The conclusion we have reached is that the execu tive power is inherently willing to hold power, concentrate it in one hand, and expand its authority.

Keywords

• Power
• Separation of Powers
• State
• Executive Power
• Supremacy of the Executive

YÜRÜTME KUVVETİNİN KURAMSAL TEMELLERİ

Abstract

Kuvvetler ayrılığı, kökleri ve gelişimi çok öncesine dayansa da anayasacılığın temel ilkelerinden birisidir. Buna göre devlet kudreti yasama, yürütme ve yargı olmak üzere üç ayrı erke bölünmelidir. Bu şekildeki iktidar paylaşımı demokratik bir devletin garanti edici özel- liğini ortaya koymaktadır. Ne var ki günümüzde gelinen aşamada yü- rütme kuvvetinin söz konusu kuvvetler arasında ön plana çıktığını, politika yapma sürecini yönetme ve hukuk yapımı da olmak üzere demokrasinin bir gereği olarak yasama kuvvetinde tecelli etmesi ge- reken nitelikleri bünyesine kattığını görmekteyiz. Elbette yürütmenin bu şekildeki yetki genişlemesinde pek çok etken söz konusu edilebilir. Ancak burada bizim araştırdığımız temel husus, yürütmenin doğası ve anlamı bakımından bu yetki genişlemesine eğilim gösterip gösterme- diğidir. Ulaştığımız netice ise yürütme kuvvetinin tabiatı gereği ikti- darı elinde bulundurmaya, tek elde toplanmaya ve yetkisini genişlet- meye olan istekliliğidir.

Keywords

• İktidar
• Kuvvetler Ayrılığı
• Devlet
• Yürütme Kuvveti
• Yürütmenin Üstünlüğü

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