Transition from the Basic Structure Doctrine to Unamendable Articles: Bangladesh Example

Year 2024, Volume: 19 Issue: 2, 1189 - 1222, 28.10.2024

Gizem Güner Yaşar

https://doi.org/10.58820/eruhfd.1574958

Abstract

The 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh clearly regulates the ju
risdiction of the Bangladesh Supreme Court. However, there is no
provision in the Constitution for judicial review of constitutional
amendments. There is also no one or more unamendable provisions
in the first version of the Constitution. In Bangladesh, the issue of
review of constitutional amendments was first raised in the Anwar
Hossain Chowdhury case. In Anwar Hossain Chowdhury, the Bang
ladesh Supreme Court resolved the constitutionality of the Eighth
Amendment by adopting a practice similar to that of the Supreme
Court of India, known as the “basic structure doctrine”. It should be
noted that most of the judges in the Anwar Hossain Chowdhury
case drew heavily from the jurisprudence in the Indian jurisdiction
in shaping their thinking on the basic structure doctrine in the judi
cial review of constitutional amendments. As a result, with this ca
se, it has been accepted that the Constitution has implied limits and
in this context, the so-called “basic structure doctrine” has been
recognized by the judicial organs in the country. Thus, with this
case, the basic structure doctrine has been introduced as a norma
tive tool in determining the conformity of a constitutional amend
ment with the Constitution in terms of substance (content).In recent years, the “basic structure doctrine”, which has been
put forward by the judicial organs of some countries that embrace the
supremacy of the constitution, has found an important place in the
constitutional law agenda. Courts using this doctrine give themselves
extraordinary power to review constitutional amendments based on
their content. In some constitutions, there are clauses that prevent
the amendment of certain provisions and principles of the constitu
tion, “entrenching” them, so to speak. However, the constitutions of
countries where the “basic structure doctrine” is applied do not have
such clauses. Instead, courts have imposed “implied limits” on the
legislature's power to amend the constitution. The Bangladesh Consti
tution did not contain such a protective clause when it came into for
ce. However, in 2011, the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
Bangladesh introduced a comprehensive unamendable article (Article
7B).
Instead of making only the fundamental constitutional principles
and the character of the Republic unamendable, Article 7B renders
unamendable an unusually long series of provisions, totaling 52 artic
les, almost a third of the Constitution. Moreover, it is an extremely
radical innovation to make “the provisions of the articles relating to
the basic structures of the Constitution” unamendable without iden
tifying the basic structures one by one.
In sum, in Anwar Hossain Chowdhury, the judges stated that
amendments to constitutional provisions are permissible as long as
they do not undermine the basic structures of the Constitution; they
did not impose an absolute prohibition on amending any provision of
the Constitution. In contrast, Article 7B identifies certain provisions of
the Constitution as fundamental structures and provides that
amendment of any of these protected provisions is absolutely prohi
bited in any manner whatsoever. In other words, Article 7B transpo
sed the concept of fundamental structures into the text of the Consti
tution. In the doctrine, this practice is referred to as the “the basic
provision doctrine”. The Supreme Court of Bangladesh has to take this
article into account when it comes to reviewing the validity of constitutional amendments in the future. In other words, as long as Article7B exists in the Constitution, it will continue to be important for the Court in determining the validity of constitutional amendments...continued in the article

Keywords

Basic Structure Doctrine, Unamendable Articles, Un constitutional Constitutional Amendments, Bangladesh Constitution

TEMEL YAPI DOKTRİNİNDEN DEĞİŞTİRİLEMEZ MADDELERE GEÇİŞ: BANGLADEŞ ÖRNEĞİ

Abstract

Son yıllarda anayasanın üstünlüğünü benimseyen bazı ülkelerin
yargı organları tarafından ortaya konan “temel yapı doktrini”, anayasa
hukuku gündeminde önemli bir yer bulmuştur. Bu doktrini kullanan
mahkemeler, anayasa değişikliklerinin içeriğine bakarak denetim
yapma konusunda kendilerine olağanüstü bir yetki tanımaktadırlar.
Bangladeş Yüksek Mahkemesi “temel yapı doktrini”ni ilk kez,
1989 yılında karara bağlanan Anwar Hossain Chowdhurdy davasında
benimsemiştir. Bu tarihten sonra uzun bir zaman boyunca temel yapı
doktrini, Bangladeş’te anayasa değişikliklerinin yargısal denetiminde
tek ölçü olarak kullanılmıştır. Bangladeş Anayasasında 2011 yılındayapılan On Beşinci Anayasa Değişikliği ile getirilen geniş kapsamlı 7B
maddesi, Anayasanın önemli sayıda hükmünün değiştirilemeyeceğini
açıkça ortaya koymuştur. Bu çalışmada, 7B hükmünün getirilmesiyle
birlikte temel yapı doktrininin, Bangladeş Anayasasında gelecekte
yapılacak olan anayasa değişikliklerinin yargısal denetiminde en
önemli ölçü olma özelliğini yitireceği ifade edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Yük-
sek Mahkeme yargıçlarının görevden alınmasına ilişkin parlamento
mekanizmasının Anayasanın 7B maddesine dayanılarak anayasaya
aykırı bulunduğu Asaduzzaman Siddiqui davası ise bu iddiayı kanıtlar
niteliktedir.

Keywords

Temel Yapı Doktrini, Değiştirilemez Madde- ler, Anayasaya Aykırı Anayasa Değişiklikleri, Bangladeş Anayasası.

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