Deneysel İktisatta Ödül Mekanizmasının Rolü: Parasal Teşvik ve Ders Notu Karşılaştırması

Year 2018, Issue: 636, 37 - 46, 01.02.2018

Mete Dibo Erdem Seçilmiş , Mehmet Cahit Güran

Abstract

Ödül mekanizmasının türü, bir iktisadi deneyin geçerliliğini belirleyen kritik bir faktördür. Deneysel iktisat literatüründe en çok tercih edilen ödül mekanizmaları; para ve ders notudur. Bu çalışmanın amacı; para ve ders notu kullanımına ilişkin deneysel iktisat literatürünü incelemektir. Yapılan inceleme sonucunda; araştırmacılar tarafından parasal ödüllerin daha sık kullanılmasına rağmen ders notunun ya da paranın daha üstün bir araç olduğuna dair net bir sonuç elde edilememiştir. Ayrıca incelememiz sonunda her deneyi farklı amaç ve bağlamı olan ayrıksı bir araştırma tasarımı olarak analiz etmenin geçerlilik sınaması için daha uygun bir yol olduğu değerlendirilmektedir.

Keywords

Deneysel iktisat, Ödül mekanizması, Geçerlilik

The Role of Reward Mechanism in Experimental Economics: A Comparison of Monetary Incentives and Class Point

Abstract

The type of the reward mechanism is a critical factor that affects the validity of the economics experiments. The two most preferred rewards in the experimental economics literature are money and class points. The aim of this study to review the state of art on the use of money and class points in the experimental economics literature. The result of the literature review shows that, although the monetary reward is the primary motivation used by researchers, there is no clear-cut evidence which shows whether money or class point does better. Our review suggests that a more appropriate way to make a validity examination is to analyze every experiment as a separate research design due to different aims and contexts.

Keywords

Experimental economics, Reward mechanism, Validity

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